As some apology may be thought necessary for having introduced certain
unusual words of Greek origin, I shall only observe, that, as all arts and
sciences have certain appropriate terms peculiar to themselves, philosophy,
which is the art of arts, and science of sciences, as being the mistress of
both, has certainly a prior and a far superior claim to this privilege. I
have not, however, introduced, I believe, any of these terms without at the
same time sufficiently explaining them; but, lest the contrary should have
taken place, the following explanation of all such terms as I have been
able to recollect, and also of common words used by Platonists in a
peculiar sense, is subjoined for the information of the reader.
Anagogic, [Greek: anagogikos]. Leading on high.
Demiurgus, [Greek: demiourgos]. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe.
Dianoetia. This word is derived from [Greek: dianoia], or that power of
the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its
reasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction,
that this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary
sense.
The Divine, [Greek: to Theion], is being subsisting in conjunction with
the one. For all things, except the one, viz. essence, life, and
intellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the
gods. For the gods do not subsist in, but prior to, these, which they
also produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many
places, however, Plato calls the participants of the gods by the names of
the gods. For not only the Athenian Guest in the Laws, but also Socrates
in the Phaedrus, calls a divine soul a god. "For," says he, "all the
horses and charioteers of the gods are good," &c. And afterwards, still
more clearly, he adds, "And this is the life of the gods." And not only
this, but he also denominates those nature gods that are always united to
the gods, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one
series. He also frequently calls daemons gods, though, according to
essence, they are secondary to and subsist about the gods. For in the
Phaedrus, Timaeus, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of
gods as far as the daemons. And what is still more paradoxical than all
this, he does not refuse to call some men gods; as, for instance, the
Elean Guest in the Sophista. From all this, therefore, we must infer that
with respect to the word god, one thing which is thus denominated is
simply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to
participation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to
similitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a god; but
every intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every
divine soul is a god according to participation; but divine daemons are
gods according to contact with the gods; and the souls of men obtain this
appellation through similitude. Each of these, however, except the first,
is as we have said, rather divine than a god; for the Athenian Guest in
the Laws, calls intellect itself divine. But that which is divine is
secondary to the first deity, in the same manner as the united is to the
one; that which is intellectual to intellect; and that which is animated
to soul. Indeed, things more uniform and simple always precede, and the
series of beings ends in the one itself.
Doxastic. This word is derived from doxa, opinion, and signifies that
which is apprehended by opinion, or that power which is the extremity of
the rational soul. This power knows the universal in particulars, as that
every man is a rational animal; but it knows not the dioti, or why a
thing is, but only the oti, or that it is.
The Eternal, [Greek: To aionion], that which has a never-ending subsistence,
without any connection with time; or, as Plotinus profoundly defines it,
infinite life at once total and full.
That which is generated, [Greek: to geneton]. That which has not the
whole of its essence or energy subsisting at once without temporal
dispersion.
Generation, [Greek: genesis]. An essence composite and multiform, and
conjoined with time. This is the proper signification of the word; but it
is used symbolically by Plato, and also by theologists more ancient than
Plato, for the sake of indication. For as Proclus beautifully observes
(in MS. Comment in Parmenidem), "Fables call the ineffable unfolding into
light through causes, generation." "Hence," he adds in the Orphic
writings, the first cause is denominated time; for where there is
generation, according to its proper signification, there also there
is time."
A Guest, [Greek: Xenos]. This word, in its more ample signification in
the Greek, denotes a stranger, but properly implies one who receives
another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the following
dialogues, therefore, wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a
Xenos, I have translated this word guest, as being more conformable to
the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly called rich mental
banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so
many guests. Hence in the Timaeus, the persons of that dialogue are
expressly spoken of as guests.
Hyparxis, [Greek: uparxis]. The first principle or foundation, as it
were, of the essence of a thing. Hence also, it is the summit of essence.
Idiom, [Greek: Idioma]. The characteristic peculiarity of a thing.
The Immortal, [Greek: To athanaton]. According to Plato, there are many
orders of immortality, pervading from on high to the last of things; and
the ultimate echo, as it were, of immorality is seen in the perpetuity of
the mundane wholes, which according to the doctrine of the Elean Guest in
the Politicus, they participate from the Father of the universe. For both
the being and the life of every body depend on another cause; since body
is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself.
But the immortality of partial souls, such as ours, is more manifest and
more perfect than this of the perpetual bodies in the universe; as is
evident from the many demonstrations which are given of it in the Phaedo,
and in the 10th book of the Republic. For the immortality of partial
souls has a more principal subsistence, as possessing in itself the cause
of eternal permanency. But prior to both these is the immortality of
daemons; for these neither verge to mortality, nor are they filled with
the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. More venerable,
however, than these, and essentially transcending them, is the
immortality of divine souls, which are primarily self-motive, and contain
the fountains and principles of the life which is attributed about
bodies, and through which bodies participate of renewed immortality. And
prior to all these is the immortality of the gods: for Diotima in the
Banquet does not ascribe an immortality of this kind to demons. Hence
such an immortality as this is separate and exempt from wholes. For,
together with the immortality of the gods, eternity subsists, which is
the fountain of all immortality and life, as well that life which is
perpetual, as that which is dissipated into nonentity. In short,
therefore, the divine immortal is that which is generative and connective
of perpetual life. For it is not immortal, as participating of life, but
as supplying divine life, and deifying life itself.
Imparticipable, [Greek: To amethekton]. That which is not consubsistent
with an inferior nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is an intellect
which is not consubsistent with soul.
Intellectual Projection, [Greek: noera epibole]. As the perception of
intellect is immediate, being a darting forth, as it were, directly to
its proper objects, this direct intuition is expressed by the term
projection.
The Intelligible, [Greek: To noeton]. This word in Plato and Platonic
writers has a various signification: for, in the first place, whatever is
exempt from sensibles, and has its essence separate from them, is said to
be intelligible, and in this sense soul is intelligible. In the second
place, intellect, which is prior to soul, is intelligible. In the third
place, that which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes
intelligence and is essentially perfective of it, is called intelligible;
and this is the intelligible which Timaeus in Plato places in the order
of a paradigm, prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy.
But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according
to divine union and hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of
desire to intellect, as giving perfection to and containing it, and as
the completion of being. The highest intelligible, therefore, is that
which is the hyparxis of the gods; the second, that which is true being,
and the first essence; the third, intellect, and all intellectual life;
and the fourth, the order belonging to soul.
Logismos, reasoning. When applied to divinity as by Plato in the Timaeus,
signifies a distributive cause of things.
On account of which; with reference to which; through which; according to
which, from which; or in which; viz. [Greek: di o, uph' ou, di ou, kath'
o, ex ou]. By the first of these terms, Plato is accustomed to denominate
the final cause; by the second the paradigmatic; by the third, the
demiurgic; by the fourth, the instrumental; by the fifth, form; and by
the sixth, matter.
Orectic. This word is derived from [Greek: orexis], appetite.
Paradigm, [Greek: paradeigma]. A pattern, or that with reference to which
a thing is made.
The perpetual, [Greek: to aidion]. That which subsists forever, but through
a connection with time.
A Politician, [Greek: politikos]. This word, as Mr. Sydenham justly
observes in his notes in the Rivals, is of a very large and extensive
import as used by Plato, and the other ancient writers on politics: for
it includes all those statesmen or politicians in aristocracies and
democracies, who were, either for life, or for a certain time, invested
with the whole or a part of kingly authority, and the power thereto
belonging. See the Politicus.
Prudence, [Greek: Phronesis]. This word frequently means in Plato and
Platonic writers, the habit of discerning what is good in all moral
actions, and frequently signifies intelligence, or intellectual
Perception. The following admirable explanation of this word is given by
Jamblichus Prudence having a precedaneous subsistence, receives its
generation from a pure and perfect intellect. Hence it looks to intellect
itself, is perfected by it, and has this as the measure and most
beautiful paradigm of all its energies. If also we have any communion
with the gods, it is especially effected by this virtue; and through this
we are in the highest degree assimilated to them. The knowledge too of
such things as are good, profitable, and beautiful, and of the contraries
to these, is obtained by this virtue; and the judgment and correction of
works proper to be done are by this directed. And in short it is a
certain governing leader of men, and of the whole arrangement of their
nature; and referring cities and houses, and the particular life, of
every one to a divine paradigm, it forms them according to the best
similitude; obliterating some things and purifying others. So that
prudence renders its possessors similar to divinity. Jamblic. apud.
Stob. p. 141.
Psychical, [Greek: psychikos]. Pertaining to soul.
Science. This word is sometimes defined by Plato to be that which assigns
the causes of things; sometimes to be that the subjects of which have a
perfectly stable essence; and together with this, he conjoins the
assignation of cause from reasoning. Sometimes again he defines it to be
that the principles of which are not hypotheses; and, according to this
definition, he asserts that there is one science which ascends as far as
to the principle of things. For this science considers that which is
truly the principle as unhypothetic, has for its subject true being, and
produces its reasonings from cause. According to the second definition,
he calls dianoetic knowledge science; but according to the first alone,
he assigns to physiology the appellation of science.
The telestic art. The art pertaining to mystic ceremonies.
Theurgic. This word is derived from [Greek: Theourgia], or that religious
operation which deifies him by whom it is performed as much as is possible
to man.
Truth, [Greek: aletheia]. Plato, following ancient theologists, considers
truth multifariously. Hence, according to his doctrine, the highest truth
is characterized by unity, and is the light proceeding from the good,
which imparts purity, as he says in the Philebus, and union, as he says
in the Republic, to intelligibles. The truth which is next to this in
dignity is that which proceeds from intelligibles, and illuminates the
intellectual orders, and which an essence unfigured, uncolored, and
without contact, first receives, where also the plain of truth is
situated, as it is written in the Phaedrus. The third kind of truth is,
that which is connascent with souls, and which through intelligence comes
into contact with true being. For the psychical light is the third, from
the intelligible; intellectual deriving its plenitude from intelligible
light, and the psychical from the intellectual. And the last kind of
truth is that which is full of error and inaccuracy through sense, and
the instability of its object. For a material nature is perpetually
flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide even for a moment.
The following beautiful description of the third kind of truth, or that
which subsists in souls, is given by Jamblichus: "Truth, as the name
implies, makest a conversion about the gods and their incorporeal energy;
but, doxastic imitation, which, as Plato says, is fabricative of images,
wanders about that which is deprived of divinity and is dark. And the
former indeed receives its perfection in intelligible and divine forms,
and real beings which have a perpetual sameness of subsistence; but the
latter looks to that which is formless, and non-being, and which has a
various subsistence; and, about this it's visive power is blunted. The
former contemplates that which is, but the latter assumes such a form as
appears to the many. Hence the former associates with intellect, and
increases the intellectual nature which we contain; but the latter, from
looking to that which always seems to be, hunts after folly and
deceives." Jamblic. apud Stob. p. 136.
The unical, [Greek: to niaion]. That which is characterized by unity.