"15 GRAMERCY PARK, NEW YORK, _March 28, 1886_.
"DEAR GOVERNOR HILL,--I feel that Mr. Husted[38] is
permitting the resolution on coast defences to slumber too long,
and that New York is failing to take the position which is necessary
to the safety of the whole country, and especially to her own safety.
[38] Mr. Husted, then Republican leader in the Assembly at Albany,
had charge of some resolutions urging the New York members in
Congress to push Mr. Tilden's policy of strengthening our coast
defences. The paper that immediately follows this letter, entitled
"Sea-coast Defences," is a contribution which Mr. Tilden made to Mr.
Manning, with a view of its being made a part of the annual report.
"I think it is highly desirable that you should call his attention
to the subject.
"Very truly yours,
"S. J. TILDEN.
"I am here until Monday afternoon."
"SEA-COAST DEFENCES
"In considering the state of the public revenues, the subject
involves the question whether we shall extinguish the surplus by
reducing the revenue; or, whether we shall apply the surplus to
payments on the public debt; or, whether we shall seize the occasion
to provide for our sea-coast defences, which have been too long
neglected. The Secretary is of the opinion that the latter is a
paramount necessity, which ought to precede the reduction of the
revenue; and ought, also, to precede an excessive rapidity in the
payment of the public debt.
"The property exposed to destruction in the nine seaports--Portland,
Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
New Orleans, and San Francisco--cannot be less in value than five
thousand millions of dollars. To this must be added a vast amount
of property dependent for its use on three seaports. Nor does this
statement afford a true measure of the damage which might be carried
to the property and business of the country by a failure to protect
these seaports from hostile naval attacks.
"They are the centres, not only of foreign commerce, but of most of
the internal trade and exchanges of domestic productions. To this
state of things the machinery of transportation of the whole country
has become adapted.
"The interruptions of the currents of traffic by the occupation of
one of our principal seaports by a foreign enemy, or the destruction
of them by bombardment, or by the holding over them the menace of
destruction for the purpose of exacting contribution or ransom,
would inflict upon the property and business of the country an
injury which can neither be foreseen nor measured.
"The elaborate and costly fortifications, which were constructed
with the greatest engineering skill, are now practically useless.
They are not capable of resisting the attacks of modern artillery.
"A still greater defect exists in our coast defences. The range of
the best modern artillery has become so extended that our present
fortifications, designed to protect the harbor of New York, where
two-thirds of the import trade and more than one-half of the export
trade of the whole United States is carried on, are too near to the
great populations of New York city, Jersey City, and Brooklyn to be
of any value as a protection.
"To provide effectual defences would be the work of years. It
would take much time to construct permanent fortifications. A
small provision of the best modern guns would take several years.
Neither of these works can be extemporized in presence of emergent
danger. A million of soldiers with the best equipments on the
heights surrounding the harbor of New York, in our present state of
preparation, or, rather, in our total want of preparation, would be
powerless to resist a small squadron of war-steamers.
"This state of things is discreditable to our foresight and to our
prudence.
"The best guarantee against aggression--the best assurance that our
diplomacy will be successful and pacific, and that our rights and
honor will be respected by other nations, is in their knowledge that
we are in a situation to vindicate our reputation and interests.
While we may afford to be deficient in the means of defence, we
cannot afford to be defenceless. The notoriety of the fact that we
have neglected the ordinary precautions of defence invites want of
consideration in our diplomacy, injustice, arrogance, and insult at
the hands of foreign nations.
"It is now more than sixty years since we announced to the world
that we should resist any attempts, from whatever quarter they might
come, to make any new colonizations on any part of the American
continent--that while we should respect the _status quo_, we
should protect the people of the different nations inhabiting this
continent from every attempt to subject them to the dominion of any
European power, or to interfere with their undisturbed exercise of
the rights of self-government.
"This announcement was formally made by President Monroe, after
consultation with Mr. Madison and Mr. Jefferson. It was formulated
by John Quincy Adams. Our government has firmly adhered to the
Monroe Doctrine, and even so late as 1865 it warned Napoleon III.
out of Mexico.
"It is impossible to foresee, in the recent scramble of the European
powers for the acquisition of colonies, how soon an occasion may
arise for our putting in practice the Monroe Doctrine. It is clear
that there ought to be some relation between our assertion of this
doctrine, and our preparation to maintain it.
"It is not intended to recommend any attempt to rival the great
European powers in the creation of a powerful navy. The changes
which have rapidly occurred by the diminution of the relative
resisting power of the defensive armor of ironclads, and by the
increased efficiency of modern artillery--which, on the whole, has
gained in the competition--suggest that we should not, at present,
enter largely into the creation of armored vessels.
"In the questions that beset this subject until they shall have
reached a solution, we can content ourselves with adding but
sparingly to our navy. But what we can add should be the very
best that experience and science can indicate. This prudential
view is reinforced by the consideration that the annual charge
of maintaining a war-vessel bears an important proportion to the
original cost of construction.
"In constructing permanent fortifications, and in providing an ample
supply of the best modern artillery, the annual cost of maintenance
is inconsiderable. Nearly the whole expenditure is in the original
outlay for construction.
"If we do not make this expenditure necessary to provide for our
sea-coast defences when we have a surplus, and have no need to levy
taxes, we certainly will not make those expenditures when we have no
longer a surplus in the Treasury.
"To leave our vast interests defenceless, in order to reduce the
cost of whiskey to its consumers, would be a solecism.
"The present time is peculiarly favorable for providing for this
great national necessity too long neglected. Not only does the
surplus in the Treasury supply ample means to enable us to meet this
great public want, without laying new burdens upon the people, but
the work can now be done at a much lower cost than has ever before
been possible. The defensive works would consist almost entirely of
steel and iron. Those materials can now be had at an unprecedentedly
low price. A vast supply of machinery, and of labor, called into
existence by a great vicissitude in the steel and iron industries,
offers itself to our service. We should have the satisfaction of
knowing that while we were availing ourselves of these supplies,
which would ordinarily be unattainable, we were setting in motion
important industries, and giving employment to labor in a period
of depression. With encouragement by the guarantee of work, or,
perhaps, by the government itself furnishing the plant, the
inventive genius of our people would be applied to the creation of
new means and improved machinery, and establishments would spring
into existence capable of supplying all of the national wants,
and rendering us completely independent of all other countries in
respect to the means of national defence."