IMMERMANN, KARL LEBERECHT (1796-1840), German dramatist and novelist,
was born on the 24th of April 1796 at Magdeburg, the son of a government
official. In 1813 he went to study law at Halle, where he remained,
after the suppression of the university by Napoleon in the same year,
until King Frederick William's "Summons to my people" on March 17th. He
responded with alacrity, but was prevented by illness from taking part
in the earlier campaign; he fought, however, in 1815 at Ligny and
Waterloo, and marched into Paris with Blücher. At the conclusion of the
war he resumed his studies at Halle, and after being _Referendar_ in
Magdeburg, was appointed in 1819 _Assessor_ at Münster in Westphalia.
Here he made the acquaintance of Elise von Lützow, Countess von
Ahlefeldt, wife of the leader of the famous "free corps" (see Lützow).
This lady first inspired his pen, and their relationship is reflected in
several dramas written about this time. In 1823 Immermann was appointed
judge at Magdeburg, and in 1827 was transferred to Düsseldorf as
_Landgerichtsrat_ or district judge. Thither the countess, whose
marriage had in the meantime been dissolved, followed him, and, though
refusing his hand, shared his home until his marriage in 1839 with a
grand-daughter of August Hermann Niemeyer (1754-1828), chancellor and
_rector perpetuus_ of Halle university. In 1834 Immermann undertook the
management of the Düsseldorf theatre, and, although his resources were
small, succeeded for two years in raising it to a high level of
excellence. The theatre, however, was insufficiently endowed to allow of
him carrying on the work, and in 1836 he returned to his official
duties and literary pursuits. He died at Düsseldorf on the 25th of
August 1840.
Immermann had considerable aptitude for the drama, but it was long
before he found a congenial field for his talents. His early plays are
imitations, partly of Kotzebue's, partly of the Romantic dramas of Tieck
and Müllner, and are now forgotten. In 1826, however, appeared _Cardenio
und Celinde_, a love tragedy of more promise; this, as well as the
earlier productions, awakened the ill-will of Platen, who made Immermann
the subject of his wittiest satire, _Der romantische Oedipus_. Between
1827 and 1832 Immermann redeemed his good name by a series of historical
tragedies, _Das Trauerspiel in Tirol_ (1827), _Kaiser Friedrich II._
(1828) and a trilogy from Russian history, Alexis (1832). His
masterpiece is the poetic mystery, _Merlin_ (1831), a noble poem, which,
like its model, _Faust_, deals with the deeper problems of modern
spiritual life. Immermann's important dramaturgic experiments in
Düsseldorf are described in detail in _Düsseldörfer Anfänge_ (1840).
More significant is his position as a novelist. Here he clearly stands
on the boundary line between Romanticism and modern literature; his
_Epigonen_ (1836) might be described as one of the last Romantic
imitations of Goethe's _Wilhelm Meister_, while the satire and realism
of his second novel, _Münchhausen_ (1838), form a complete break with
the older literature. As a prose-writer Immermann is perhaps best
remembered to-day by the admirable story of village life, _Der Oberhof_,
which is embedded in the formless mass of _Münchhausen_. His last work
was an unfinished epic, _Tristan und Isolde_ (1840).
Immermann's _Gesammelte Schriften_ were published in 14 vols. in
1835-1843; a new edition, with biography and introduction by R.
Boxberger, in 20 vols. (Berlin, 1883); selected works, edited by M.
Koch (4 vols., 1887-1888) and F. Muncker (6 vols., 1897). See G. zu
Putlitz, _Karl Immermann, sein Leben und seine Werke_ (2 vols., 1870);
F. Freiligrath, _Karl Immermann, Blätter der Erinnerung an ihn_
(1842); W. Müller, _K. Immermann und sein Kreis_ (1860); R. Fellner,
_Geschichte einer deutschen Musterbühne_ (1888); _K. Immermann: eine
Gedächtnisschrift_ (1896).
IMMERSION (Lat. _immersio_, dipping), the act of being plunged into a
fluid, or being overwhelmed by anything; in astronomy, the disappearance
of a heavenly body in the shadow of another, especially of a satellite
in the shadow of its primary.
IMMIGRATION (from Lat. _in_, into, and _migrare_, to depart), the
movement of population, other than that of casual visitors or
travellers, _into_ one country _from_ another (see MIGRATION).
IMMORTALITY (Lat. _in_-, not, _mortalis_, mortal, from _mors_, death),
the condition or quality of being exempt from death or annihilation.
This condition has been predicated of man, both body and soul, in many
senses; and the term is used by analogy of those whose deeds or writings
have made a lasting impression on the memory of man. The belief in human
immortality in some form is almost universal; even in early animistic
cults the germ of the idea is present, and in all the higher religions
it is an important feature. This article is confined to summarizing the
philosophical or scientific arguments for, and objections to, the
doctrine of the persistence of the human soul after death. For the
Christian doctrine, see ESCHATOLOGY; and for other religions see the
separate articles.
In the Orphic mysteries "the soul was regarded as a part of the divine,
a _particula aurae divinae_, for which the body in its limited and
perishable condition was no fit organ, but a grave or prison ([Greek: to
sôma sêma]). The existence of the soul in the body was its punishment
for sins in a previous condition; and the doom of its sins in the body
was its descent into other bodies, and the postponement of its
deliverance" (Salmond's _Christian Doctrine of Immortality_, p. 109).
This deliverance was what the mysteries promised. A remarkable passage
in Pindar (_Thren._ 2) is thus rendered by J. W. Donaldson (_Pindar's
Epinician or Triumphal Odes_, p. 372). "By a happy lot, all persons
travel to an end free of toil. And the body, indeed, is subject to the
powerful influence of death; but a shadow of vitality is still left
alive, and this alone is of divine origin; while our limbs are in
activity it sleeps; but, when we sleep, it discloses to the mind in many
dreams the future judgment with regard to happiness and misery."
The belief of Socrates is uncertain. In the _Apology_ he is represented
as sure that "no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after
death," but as not knowing whether "death be a state of nothingness and
utter unconsciousness, or a change or migration of the soul from this
world to the next" (i. 40, 41). In the _Phaedo_ a confident expectation
is ascribed to him. He is not the body to be buried; he will not remain
with his friends after he has drunk the poison, but he will go away to
the happiness of the blessed. The silence of the _Memorabilia_ of
Xenophon must be admitted as an argument to the contrary; but the
probability seems to be that Plato did not in the _Phaedo_ altogether
misrepresent the Master. In Plato's thought the belief held a prominent
position. "It is noteworthy," says Professor D. G. Ritchie, "that, in
the various dialogues in which Plato speaks of immortality, the
arguments seem to be of different kinds, and most of them quite
unconnected with one another." In the _Phaedrus_ (245 c) the argument
is, that the soul is self-moving, and, therefore, immortal; and this
argument is repeated in the _Laws_ (x. 894, 895). It is an argument that
Plato probably inherited from Alcmaeon, the physician of Croton (Arist.
_De An._ i. 2, § 17 405 A 29), whose views were closely connected with
those of the Pythagoreans. In the _Phaedo_ the main argument up to which
all the others lead is that the soul participates in the idea of life.
Recollection (_anamnesis_) alone would prove pre-existence, but not
existence after death. In the tenth book of the _Republic_ we find the
curious argument that the soul does not perish like the body, because
its characteristic evil, sin or wickedness does not kill it as the
diseases of the body wear out the bodily life. In the _Timaeus_ (41 A)
the immortality even of the gods is made dependent on the will of the
Supreme Creator; souls are not in their own nature indestructible, but
persist because of His goodness. In the _Laws_ (xii. 959 A) the notion
of a future life seems to be treated as a salutary doctrine which is to
be believed because the legislator enacts it (Plato, p. 146). The
estimate to be formed of this reasoning has been well stated by Dr A. M.
Fairbairn, "Plato's arguments for immortality, isolated, modernized, may
be feeble, even valueless, but allowed to stand where and as he himself
puts them, they have an altogether different worth. The ratiocinative
parts of the _Phaedo_ thrown into syllogisms may be easily demolished by
a hostile logician; but in the dialogue as a whole there is a subtle
spirit and cumulative force which logic can neither seize nor answer"
(_Studies in the Philosophy of Religion_, p. 226, 1876).
Aristotle held that the [Greek: nous] or active intelligence alone is
immortal. The Stoics were not agreed upon the question. Cleanthes is
said to have held that all survive to the great conflagration which
closes the cycle, Chrysippus that only the wise will. Marcus Aurelius
teaches that even if the spirit survive for a time it is at last
"absorbed in the generative principle of the universe." Epicureanism
thought that "the wise man fears not death, before which most men
tremble; for, if we are, it is not; if it is, we are not." Death is
extinction. Augustine adopts a Platonic thought when he teaches that the
immortality of the soul follows from its participation in the eternal
truths. The Apologists themselves welcomed, and commended to others, the
Christian revelation as affording a certainty of immortality such as
reason could not give. The Aristotelian school in Islam did not speak
with one voice upon the question; Avicenna declared the soul immortal,
but Averroes assumes only the eternity of the universal intellect.
Albertus Magnus argued that the soul is immortal, as _ex se ipsa causa_,
and as independent of the body; Pietro Pomponazzi maintained that the
soul's immortality could be neither proved nor disproved by any natural
reasons. Spinoza, while consistently with his pantheism denying personal
immortality, affirms that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed
with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal"
(_Eth._ v. prop, xxiii.). The reason he gives is that, as this something
"appertains to the essence of the mind," it is "conceived by a certain
eternal necessity through the very essence of God."
Leibnitz, in accord with the distinctive principle of his philosophy,
affirmed the absolute independence of mind and body as distinct monads,
the parallelism of their functions in life being due to the
pre-established harmony. For the soul, by its nature as a single monad
indestructible and, therefore, immortal, death meant only the loss of
the monads constituting the body and its return to the pre-existent
state. The argument of Ernst Platner (_Philos. Aphor._ i. 1174, 1178) is
similar. "If the human soul is a force in the narrower sense, a
substance, and not a combination of substances, then, as in the nature
of things there is no transition from existence to non-existence, we
cannot naturally conceive the end of its existence, any more than we can
anticipate a gradual annihilation of its existence." He adds a reason
that recalls one of Plato's, "As manifestly as the human soul is by
means of the senses linked to the present life, so manifestly it
attaches itself by reason, and the conceptions, conclusions,
anticipations and efforts to which reason leads it, to God and
eternity."
Against the first kind of argument, as formulated by Moses Mendelssohn,
Kant advances the objection that, although we may deny the soul
extensive quantity, division into parts, yet we cannot refuse to it
intensive quantity, degrees of reality; and consequently its existence
may be terminated not by decomposition, but by gradual diminution of its
powers (or to use the term he coined for the purpose, by
_elanguescence_). This denial of any reasonable ground for belief in
immortality in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ (_Transcendental
Dialectic_, bk. ii. ch. i.) is, however, not his last word on the
subject. In the _Critique of the Practical Reason_ (_Dialectic_, ch. i.
sec. iv) the immortality of the soul is shown to be a postulate.
_Holiness_, "the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law,"
demands an _endless progress_; and "this endless progress is only
possible on the supposition of an _endless_ duration of the _existence_
and _personality_ of the same rational being (which is called the
immortality of the soul)." Not demonstrable as a theoretical
proposition, the immortality of the soul "is an inseparable result of an
unconditional a priori practical law." The moral interest, which is so
decisive on this question in the case of Kant, dominates Bishop Butler
also. A future life for him is important, because our happiness in it
may depend on our present conduct; and therefore our action here should
take into account the reward or punishment that it may bring on us
hereafter. As he maintains that probability may and ought to be our
guide in life, he is content with proving in the first chapter of the
_Analogy_ that "a future life is probable from similar changes (as
death) already undergone in ourselves and in others, and from our
present powers, which are likely to _continue_ unless death destroy
them." While we may fear this, "there is no proof that it will, either
from the nature of death," of the effect of which on our powers we are
altogether ignorant, "or from the analogy of nature, which shows only
that the _sensible proof_ of our powers (not the powers themselves) may
be destroyed." The imagination that death will destroy these powers is
unfounded, because (1) "this supposes we are compounded, and so
discerptible, but the contrary is probable" on _metaphysical_ grounds
(the indivisibility of the subject in which consciousness as indivisible
inheres, and its distinction from the body) and also _experimental_ (the
persistence of the living being in spite of changes in the body or even
losses of parts of the body); (2) this also assumes that "our present
living powers of reflection" must be affected in the same way by death
"as those of sensation," but this is disproved by their relative
independence even in this life; (3) "even the suspension of our present
powers of reflection" is not involved in "the idea of death, which is
simply dissolution of the body," and which may even "be like birth, a
continuation and perfecting of our powers." "Even if suspension were
involved, we cannot infer destruction from it" (analysis of chapter i.
in Angus's edition). He recognizes that "reason did, as it well might,
conclude that it should finally, and upon the whole, be well with the
righteous and ill with the wicked," but only "revelation teaches us that
the next state of things after the present is appointed for the
execution of this justice" (ch. ii. note 10). He does not use this
general anticipation of future judgment, as he might have done, as a
positive argument for immortality.
Adam Ferguson (_Institutes of Moral Philosophy_, p. 119, new ed., 1800)
argues that "the desire for immortality is an instinct, and can
reasonably be regarded as an indication of that which the author of this
desire wills to do." From the standpoint of modern science John Fiske
confirms the validity of such an argument; for what he affirms in regard
to belief in the divine is equally applicable to this belief in a future
life. "If the relation thus established in the morning twilight of man's
existence between the human soul and a world invisible and immaterial is
a relation of which only the subjective term is real and the objective
term is non-existent; then I say it is something utterly without
precedent in the whole history of creation" (_Through Nature to God_,
1899, p. 188, 189). Whatever may have been Hegel's own belief in regard
to personal immortality, the logical issue of his absolute idealism has
been well stated by W. Windelband (_History of Philosophy_, p. 633). "It
became clear that in the system of perpetual Becoming and of the
dialectical passing over of all forms into one another, the finite
personality could scarcely raise a plausible claim to the character of a
substance and to immortality in the religious sense." F. D.
Schleiermacher applies the phrase "the immortality of religion" to the
religious emotion of oneness, amid finitude, with the infinite and, amid
time, with the eternal; denies any necessary connexion between the
belief in the continuance of personal existence and the consciousness of
God; and rests his faith on immortality altogether on Christ's promise
of living fellowship with His followers, as presupposing their as well
as His personal immortality. A. Schopenhauer assigns immortality to the
universal will to live; and Feuerbach declares spirit, consciousness
eternal, but not any individual subject. R. H. Lotze for the decision of
the question lays down the broad principle, "All that has once come to
be will eternally continue so soon as for the organic unity of the world
it has an unchangeable value, but it will obviously again cease to be,
when that is not the case" (_Gr. der Psy._ p. 74).
Objections to the belief in immortality have been advanced from the
standpoints of materialism, naturalism, pessimism and pantheism.
_Materialism_ argues that, as life depends on a material organism,
thought is a function of the brain, and the soul is but the sum of
mental states, to which, according to the theory of psychophysical
parallelism, physical changes always correspond; therefore, the
dissolution of the body carries with it necessarily the cessation of
consciousness. That, as now constituted, mind does depend on brain, life
on body, must be conceded, but that this dependence is so absolute that
the function must cease with the organ has not been scientifically
demonstrated; the connexion of the soul with the body is as yet too
obscure to justify any such dogmatism. But against this inference the
following considerations may be advanced: (1) Man does distinguish
himself from his body; (2) he is conscious of his personal identity,
through all the changes of his body; (3) in the exercise of his will he
knows himself not controlled by but controlling his body; (4) his
consciousness warrants his denying the absolute identification of
himself and his body. It may further be added that materialism can be
shown to be an inadequate philosophy in its attempts to account even for
the physical universe, for this is inexplicable without the assumption
of mind distinct from, and directive of, matter. The theory of
psychophysical parallelism has been subjected to a rigorous examination
in James Ward's _Naturalism and Agnosticism_, part iii., in which the
argument that mind cannot be derived from matter is convincingly
presented. Sir Oliver Lodge in his reply to E. Haeckel's _Riddle of the
Universe_ maintains that "life may be something not only
ultra-terrestrial, but even immaterial, something outside our present
categories of matter and energy; as real as they are, but different, and
utilizing them for its own purpose" (_Life and Matter_, 1906, p. 198).
He rejects the attempt to explain human personality as "generated by
the material molecular aggregate of its own unaided latent power," and
affirms that the "universe where the human spirit is more at home than
it is among these temporary collocations of matter" is "a universe
capable of infinite development, of noble contemplation, and of lofty
joy, long after this planet--nay the whole solar system--shall have
fulfilled its present spire of destiny, and retired cold and lifeless
upon its endless way" (pp. 199-200).
In his lecture on _Human Immortality_ (3rd ed., 1906), Professor William
James deals with "two supposed objections to the doctrine." The first is
"the law that thought is a function of the brain." Accepting the law he
distinguishes _productive_ from _permissive_ or _transmissive_ function
(p. 32), and, rejecting the view that brain produces thought, he
recognizes that in our present condition brain transmits thought,
thought needs brain for its organ of expression; but this does not
exclude the possibility of a condition in which thought will be no
longer so dependent on brain. He quotes (p. 57) with approval Kant's
words, "The death of the body may indeed be the end of the sensational
use of our mind, but only the beginning of the intellectual use. The
body would thus be not the cause of our thinking, but merely a condition
restrictive thereof, and, although essential to our sensuous and animal
consciousness, it may be regarded as an impeder of our pure spiritual
life" (_Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, 2nd ed., p. 809).
Further arguments in the same direction are derived from the modern
school of psychical research (see especially F. W. H. Myers' _Human
Personality_, 1903).
Another objection is advanced from the standpoint of _naturalism_,
which, whether it issues in materialism or not, seeks to explain man as
but a product of the process of nature. The universe is so immeasurably
vast in extension and duration, and man is so small, his home but a
speck in space, and his history a span in time that it seems an arrogant
assumption for him to claim exemption from the universal law of
evolution and dissolution. This view ignores that man has ideals of
absolute value, truth, beauty, goodness, that he consciously communes
with the God who is in all, and through all, and over all, that it is
his mind which recognizes the vastness of the universe and thinks its
universal law, and that the mind which perceives and conceives cannot be
less, but must be greater than the object of its knowledge and thought.
_Pessimism_ suggests a third objection. The present life is so little
worth living that its continuance is not to be desired. James Thomson
("B.V.") speaks "of the restful rapture of the inviolate grave," and
sings the praises of _death_ and of _oblivion_. We cannot admit that the
history of mankind justifies his conclusion; for the great majority of
men life is a good, and its continuance an object of hope.
For pantheism personal immortality appears a lesser good than
reabsorption in the universal life; but against this objection we may
confidently maintain that worthier of God and more blessed for man is
the hope of a conscious communion in an eternal life of the Father of
all with His whole family.
Lastly positivism teaches a corporate instead of an individual
immortality; man should desire to live on as a beneficent influence in
the race. This conception is expressed in George Eliot's lines:
"O, may I join the choir invisible
Of those immortal dead who live again
In minds made better by their presence: live
In pulses stirred to generosity,
In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn
For miserable aims that end with self,
In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,
And with their mild persistence urge man's search
To vaster issues."
But these possibilities are not mutually exclusive alternatives. A man
may live on in the world by his teaching and example as a power for
good, a factor of human progress, and he may also be continuing and
completing his course under conditions still more favourable to all most
worthy in him. Consciously to participate as a person in the progress of
the race is surely a worthier hope than unconsciously to contribute to
it as an influence; ultimately to share the triumph as well as the
struggle is a more inspiring anticipation.
In stating constructively the doctrine of immortality we must assign
altogether secondary importance to the metaphysical arguments from the
nature of the soul. It is sufficient to show, as has already been done,
that the soul is not so absolutely dependent on the body, that the
dissolution of the one must necessarily involve the cessation of the
other. Such arguments as the indivisibility of the soul and its
persistence can at most indicate the _possibility_ of immortality.
The _juridical argument_ has some force; the present life does not show
that harmony of condition and character which our sense of justice leads
us to expect; the wicked prosper and the righteous suffer; there is
ground for the expectation that in the future life the anomalies of this
life will be corrected. Although this argument has the support of such
great names as Butler and Kant, yet it will repel many minds as an
appeal to the motive of self-interest.
The _ethical argument_ has greater value. Man's life here is incomplete,
and the more lofty his aims, the more worthy his labours, the more
incomplete will it appear to be. The man who lives for fame, wealth,
power, may be satisfied in this life; but he who lives for the ideals of
truth, beauty, goodness, lives not for time but for eternity, for his
ideals cannot be realized, and so his life fulfilled on this side of the
grave. Unless these ideals are mocking visions, man has a right to
expect the continuance of his life for its completion. This is the line
of argument developed by Professor Hugo Münsterberg in his lecture on
_The Eternal Life_ (1905), although he states it in the terms peculiar
to his psychology, in which personality is conceived as primarily will.
"No endless duration is our goal, but complete repose in the perfect
satisfaction which the will finds when it has reached the significance,
the influence, and the value at which it is aiming" (p. 83).
More general in its appeal still is the argument from the _affections_,
which has been beautifully developed in Tennyson's _In Memoriam_. The
heart protests against the severance of death, and claims the
continuance of love's communion after death; and as man feels that love
is what is most godlike in his nature, love's claim has supreme
authority.
There is a _religious argument_ for immortality. The saints of the
Hebrew nation were sure that as God had entered into fellowship with
them, death could not sever them from his presence. This is the argument
in Psalms xvi. and xvii., if, as is probable, the closing verses do
express the hope of a glorious and blessed immortality. This too is the
proof Jesus himself offers when he declares God to be the God of the
living and not of the dead (Matt. xxii. 32). God's companions cannot
become death's victims.
Josiah Royce in his lecture on _The Conception of Immortality_ (1900)
combines this argument of the soul's union with God with the argument of
the incompleteness of man's life here:--
"Just because God is One, all our lives have various and unique places
in the harmony of the divine life. And just because God attains and
wins and finds this uniqueness, all our lives win in our union with
Him the individuality which is essential to their true meaning. And
just because individuals whose lives have uniqueness of meaning are
here only objects of pursuit, the attainment of this very
individuality, since it is indeed real, occurs not in our present form
of consciousness, but in a life that now we see not, yet in a life
whose genuine meaning is continuous with our own human life, however
far from our present flickering form of disappointed human
consciousness that life of the final individuality may be. Of this our
true individual life, our present life is a glimpse, a fragment, a
hint, and in its best moments a visible beginning. That this
individual life of all of us is not something limited in its temporal
expression to the life that now we experience, follows from the very
fact that here nothing final or individual is found expressed" (pp.
144-146).
R. W. Emerson declares that "the impulse to seek proof of immortality is
itself the strongest proof of all." We expect immortality not merely
because we desire it; but because the desire itself arises from all that
is best and truest and worthiest in ourselves. The desire is reasonable,
moral, social, religious; it has the same worth as the loftiest ideals,
and worthiest aspirations of the soul of man. The loss of the belief
casts a dark shadow over the present life. "No sooner do we try to get
rid of the idea of Immortality--than Pessimism raises its head.... Human
griefs seem little worth assuaging; human happiness too paltry (at the
best) to be worth increasing. The whole moral world is reduced to a
point. Good and evil, right and wrong, become infinitesimal, ephemeral
matters. The affections die away--die of their own conscious feebleness
and uselessness. A moral paralysis creeps over us" (_Natural Religion_,
Postscript). The belief exercises a potent moral influence. "The day,"
says Ernest Renan, "in which the belief in an after-life shall vanish
from the earth will witness a terrific moral and spiritual decadence.
Some of us perhaps might do without it, provided only that others held
it fast. But there is no lever capable of raising an entire people if
once they have lost their faith in the immortality of the soul" (quoted
by A. W. Momerie, _Immortality_, p. 9). To this belief, many and good as
are the arguments which can be advanced for it, a confident certainty is
given by Christian faith in the Risen Lord, and the life and immortality
which he has brought to light in his Gospel.
In addition to the works referred to above, see R. K. Gaye, _The
Platonic Conception of Immortality and its Connexion with the Theory
of Ideas_ (1904); R. H. Charles, _A Critical History of the Doctrine
of a Future Life in Israel, in Judaism and in Christianity_ (1899); E.
Pétavel, _The Problem of Immortality_ (Eng. trans. by F. A. Freer,
1892); J. Fiske, _The Destiny of Man, viewed in the Light of his
Origin_ (1884); G. A. Gordon, _Immortality and the New Theodicy_
(1897); Henry Buckle, _The After Life_ (1907). (A. E. G.*)
IMMUNITY (from Lat. _immunis_, not subject to a _munus_ or public
service), a general term for exemption from liability, principally used
in the legal sense discussed below, but also in recent times in
pathology (for which see BACTERIOLOGY). In international law the term
("not serving," "not subject") implies exemption from the jurisdiction
of the state which otherwise exercises jurisdiction where the immunity
arises. It is thus applied to the exceptional position granted to
sovereigns and chiefs of states generally, and their direct
representatives in the states to which they are accredited.
Under EXTERRITORIALITY is treated the inviolability of embassies and
legations and the application of the material side of the doctrine of
immunity. As a right appertaining to the persons of those who enjoy it,
the doctrine has grown out of the necessity for sovereigns of respecting
each other's persons in their common interest. To be able to negotiate
without danger of arrest or interference of any kind with their persons
was the only condition upon which sovereigns would have been able to
meet and discuss their joint interests. With the development of states
as independent entities and of intercourse between them and their
"nationals," the work of diplomatic missions increased to such an extent
that instead of having merely occasional ambassadors as at the
beginning, states found it expedient to have resident representatives
with a permanent residence. Hence the sovereign's inviolability becomes
vested in the person of the sovereign's delegate, and with it as a
necessary corollary the exterritoriality of his residence. Out of the
further expansion of the work of diplomatic missions came duplication of
the _personnel_ and classes of diplomatic secretaries, who as forming
part of the embassy or legation also had to be covered by the diplomatic
immunity.
In no branch of international intercourse have states shown so laudable
a respect for tradition as in the case of this immunity, and this in
spite of the hardship which frequently arises for private citizens
through unavoidable dealings with members of embassies and legations.
The Institute of International Law (see PEACE) at their Cambridge
session in 1895 drew up the following rules,[1] which may be taken to be
the only precise statement of theory on the subject, for the guidance of
foreign offices in dealing with it:--
ART. 1.--Public ministers are inviolable. They also enjoy
"exterritoriality," in the sense and to the extent hereinafter
mentioned and a certain number of immunities.
ART. 2.--The privilege of inviolability extends: (1) To all classes
of public ministers who regularly represent their sovereign or their
country; (2) To all persons forming part of the official staff of a
diplomatic mission; (3) To all persons forming part of its
non-official staff, under reserve, that if they belong to the country
where the mission resides they only enjoy it within the official
residence.
ART. 3.--The government to which the minister is accredited must
abstain from all offence, insult or violence against the persons
entitled to the privilege, must set an example in the respect which is
due to them and protect them by specially rigorous penalties from all
offence, insult or violence on the part of the inhabitants of the
country, so that they may devote themselves to their duties in perfect
freedom.
ART. 4.--Immunity applies to everything necessary for the fulfilment
by ministers of their duties, especially to personal effects, papers,
archives and correspondence.
ART. 5.--It lasts during the whole time which the minister or
diplomatic official spends, in his official capacity, in the country
to which he has been sent.
It continues even in time of war between the two powers during the
period necessary to enable the minister to leave the country with his
staff and effects.
ART. 6.--Inviolability cannot be claimed: (1) In case of legitimate
defence on the part of private persons against acts committed by the
persons who enjoy the privilege; (2) In case of risks incurred by any
of the persons in question voluntarily or needlessly; (3) In case of
improper acts committed by them, provoking on the part of the state to
which the minister is accredited measures of defence or precaution;
but, except in a case of extreme urgency, this state should confine
itself to reporting the facts to the minister's government, requesting
the punishment or the recall of the guilty agent and, if necessary, to
surrounding the official residence to prevent unlawful communications
or manifestations.
_Immunity with Respect to Taxes._
ART. 11.--A public minister in a foreign country, functionaries
officially attached to his mission and the members of their families
residing with them, are exempt from paying: (1) Personal direct taxes
and sumptuary taxes; (2) General taxes on property, whether on capital
or income; (3) War contributions; (4) Customs duties in respect of
articles for their personal use.
Each government shall indicate the grounds (_justifications_) to which
these exemptions from taxation shall be subordinated.
_Immunity from Jurisdiction._
ART. 12.--A public minister in a foreign country, functionaries
officially attached to his mission and the members of their families
residing with them, are exempt from all jurisdiction, civil or
criminal, of the state to which they are accredited; in principle,
they are only subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of their
own country. A claimant may apply to the courts of the capital of the
country of the minister, subject to the right of the minister to prove
that he has a different domicile in his country.
ART. 13.--With respect to crimes, persons indicated in the preceding
article remain subject to the penal laws of their own country, as if
they had committed the acts in their own country.
ART. 14.--The immunity attaches to the function in respect of acts
connected with the function. As regards acts done not in connexion
with the function, immunity can only be claimed so long as the
function lasts.
ART. 15.--Persons of the nationality of the country to the government
of which they are accredited cannot claim the privilege of immunity.
ART. 16.--Immunity from jurisdiction cannot be invoked: (1) In case of
proceedings taken by reason of engagements entered into by the exempt
person, not in his official or private capacity, but in the exercise
of a profession carried on by him in the country concurrently with his
diplomatic functions; (2) In respect of real actions, including
possessory actions, relating to anything movable or immovable in the
country.
It exists even in case of a breach of the law which may endanger
public order or safety, or of crime against the safety of the state,
without prejudice to such steps as the territorial government may take
for its own protection.
ART. 17.--Persons entitled to immunity from jurisdiction may refuse to
appear as witnesses before a territorial court on condition that, if
required by diplomatic intervention, they shall give their testimony
in the official residence to a magistrate of the country appointed for
the purpose.
Further questions connected with Immunity and Exterritoriality (q.v.)
arise out of the different industrial enterprises undertaken by states,
such as posts, telegraphs, telephones, railways, steamships, &c., which
require regulation to prevent conflicts of interest between the state
owners and the private interests involved in these enterprises.
(T. Ba.)