[1] Tylor, _Prim. Culture_, ii. 178.
IMAGINATION, in general, the power or process of producing mental
pictures or ideas. The term is technically used in psychology for the
process of reviving in the mind percepts of objects formerly given in
sense perception. Since this use of the term conflicts with that of
ordinary language, some psychologists have preferred to describe this
process as "imaging" or "imagery" or to speak of it as "reproductive" as
opposed to "productive" or "constructive" imagination (see IMAGE and
PSYCHOLOGY). The common use of the term is for the process of forming in
the mind new images which have not been previously experienced, or at
least only partially or in different combinations. Thus the image of a
centaur is the result of combining the common percepts of man and horse:
fairy tales and fiction generally are the result of this process of
combination. Imagination in this sense, not being limited to the
acquisition of exact knowledge by the requirements of practical
necessity, is up to a certain point free from objective restraints. In
various spheres, however, even imagination is in practice limited: thus
a man whose imaginations do violence to the elementary laws of thought,
or to the necessary principles of practical possibility, or to the
reasonable probabilities of a given case is regarded as insane. The same
limitations beset imagination in the field of scientific hypothesis.
Progress in scientific research is due largely to provisional
explanations which are constructed by imagination, but such hypotheses
must be framed in relation to previously ascertained facts and in
accordance with the principles of the particular science. In spite,
however, of these broad practical considerations, imagination differs
fundamentally from belief in that the latter involves "objective control
of subjective activity" (Stout). The play of imagination, apart from the
obvious limitations (e.g. of avoiding explicit self-contradiction), is
conditioned only by the general trend of the mind at a given moment.
Belief, on the other hand, is immediately related to practical activity:
it is perfectly possible to _imagine_ myself a millionaire, but unless I
_believe_ it I do not, therefore, act as such. Belief always endeavours
to conform to objective conditions; though it is from one point of view
subjective it is also objectively conditioned, whereas imagination as
such is specifically free. The dividing line between imagination and
belief varies widely in different stages of mental development. Thus a
savage who is ill frames an ideal reconstruction of the causes of his
illness, and attributes it to the hostile magic of an enemy. In
ignorance of pathology he is satisfied with this explanation, and
actually _believes_ in it, whereas such a hypothesis in the mind of
civilized man would be treated as a pure effort of imagination, or even
as a hallucination. It follows that the distinction between imagination
and belief depends in practice on knowledge, social environment,
training and the like.
Although, however, the absence of objective restraint, i.e. a certain
unreality, is characteristic of imagination, none the less it has great
practical importance as a purely ideational activity. Its very freedom
from objective limitation makes it a source of pleasure and pain. A
person of vivid imagination suffers acutely from the imagination of
perils besetting a friend. In fact in some cases the ideal construction
is so "real" that specific physical manifestations occur, as though
imagination had passed into belief or the events imagined were actually
in progress.
IMAM, an Arabic word, meaning "leader" or "guide" in the sense of a
"pattern whose example is followed, whether for good or bad." Thus it is
applied to the Koran, to a builder's level and plumb-line, to a road, to
a school-boy's daily task, to a written record. It is used in several of
these, senses in the Koran, but specifically several times of leaders
and (ii. 118) of Abraham, "Lo, I make thee a pattern for mankind."
_Imam_ thus became the name of the head of the Moslem community, whose
leadership and patternhood, as in the case of Mahomet himself, is to be
regarded as of the widest description. His duty is to be the lieutenant,
the Caliph (q.v.) of the Prophet, to guard the faith and maintain the
government of the state. Round the origin and basis of his office all
controversies as to the Moslem state centre. The Sunnites hold that it
is for men to appoint and that the basis is obedience to the general
usage of the Moslem peoples from the earliest times. The necessity for
leaders has always been recognized, and a leader has always been
appointed. The basis is thus agreement in the technical sense (see
MAHOMMEDAN LAW), not Koran nor tradition from Mahomet nor analogy. The
Shi'ites in general hold that the appointment lies with God, through the
Prophet or otherwise, and that He always has appointed. The Kharijites
theoretically recognize no absolute need of an Imam; he is convenient
and allowable. The Motazilites held that reason, not agreement, dictated
the appointment. Another distinction between the Sunnites and the
Shi'ites is that the Sunnites regard the Imam as liable to err, and to
be obeyed even though he personally sins, provided he maintains the
ordinances of Islam. Effective leadership is the essential point. But
the Shi'ites believe that the divinely appointed Imam is also divinely
illumined and preserved (_ma'sum_) from sin. The above is called the
greater Imamate. The lesser Imamate is the leadership in the Friday
prayers. This was originally performed by the Imam in the first sense,
who not only led in prayers but delivered a sermon (_khutba_); but with
the growth of the Moslem empire and the retirement of the caliph from
public life, it was necessarily given over to a deputy--part of a
gradual process of putting the Imamate or caliphate into commission.
These deputy Imams are, in Turkey, ministers of the state, each in
charge of his own parish; they issue passports, &c., and perform the
rites of circumcision, marriage and burial. In Persia among Shi'ites
their position is more purely spiritual, and they are independent of the
state. A few of their leaders are called _Mujtahids_, i.e. capable of
giving an independent opinion on questions of religion and canon law. A
third use of the term Imam is as an honorary title. It is thus applied
to leading theologians, e.g. to Abu Hanifa, ash-Shafi'i, Malik ibn Anas,
Ahmad ibn Hanbal (these are called "the four Imams"), Ghazali.
See McG. de Slane's transl. of Ibn Khaldun's _Prolégomènes_, i. 384
seq., 402 seq., 426 seq., 445; iii. 35, 58 seq.; Ostrorog's transl. of
Mawardi's _Ahkam_ i. 89 seq.; Haarbrücker's transl. of Shahrastani by
index; Juynboll's _De Mohammedanische Wet_, 316 seq.; Sell's _Faith of
Islam_, 95 seq.; Macdonald's _Development of Muslim Theology_, 56 seq.
(D. B. Ma.)
IMBECILE (through the French from Lat. _imbecillus_ or _imbecillis_,
weak, feeble; of unknown origin), weak or feeble, particularly in mind.
The term "imbecility" is used conventionally of a condition of mental
degeneration less profound than "idiotcy" (see INSANITY).
IMBREX (Latin for "tile"), in architecture the term given to the
covering tile of the ancient roof: the plain tile is turned up on each
side and the imbrex covers the joint. In the simpler type of roof the
imbrex is semicircular, but in some of the Greek temples it has vertical
sides and an angular top. In the temple of Apollo at Bassae, where the
tiles were in Parian marble, the imbrex on one side of the tile and the
tile were worked in one piece out of the solid marble.
IMBROS, a Turkish island in the Aegean, at the southern end of the
Thracian Chersonese peninsula. It forms with Samothrace, about 17 m.
distant, a caza (or canton) in the sanjak of Lemnos and province of the
Archipelago Isles. Herodotus (v. 26) mentions it as an abode of the
historic Pelasgians (q.v.). It was, like Samothrace, a seat of the
worship of the Cabeiri (q.v.). The island is now the seat of a Greek
bishopric. There is communication with the mainland by occasional
vessels. The island is of great fertility--wheat, oats, barley, olives,
sesame and valonia being the principal products, in addition to a
variety of fruits. Pop. about 92,000, nearly all Turks.
IMERETIA, or IMERITIA a district in Russian Transcaucasia, extends from
the left bank of the river Tskheniz-Tskhali to the Suram range, which
separates it from Georgia on the east, and is bounded on the south by
Akhaltsikh, and thus corresponds roughly to the eastern part of the
modern government of Kutais. Anciently a part of Colchis, and included
in Lazia during the Roman empire, Imeretia was nominally under the
dominion of the Greek emperors. In the early part of the 6th century it
became the theatre of wars between the Byzantine emperor Justinian and
Chosroes, or Khosrau, king of Persia. Between 750 and 985 it was ruled
by a dynasty (Apkhaz) of native princes, but was devastated by hostile
incursions, reviving only after it became united to Georgia. It
flourished until the reign of Queen Thamar, but after her death (1212)
the country became impoverished through strife and internal dissensions.
It was reunited with Georgia from 1318 to 1346, and again in 1424. But
the union only lasted forty-five years; from 1469 until 1810 it was
governed by a Bagratid dynasty, closely akin to that which ruled over
Georgia. In 1621 it made the earliest appeal to Russia for aid; in 1650
it acknowledged Russian suzerainty and in 1769 a Russian force expelled
the Turks. In 1803 the monarch declared himself a vassal of Russia, and
in 1810 the little kingdom was definitively annexed to that empire. (See
GEORGIA.)
IMIDAZOLES, or GLYOXALINES, organic chemical compounds containing the
ring system
/ CH = CH
HN / | .
\ CH = N
Imidazole itself was first prepared by H. Debus (_Ann._ 1858, 107, p.
254) by the action of ammonia on glyoxal, 2C2H2O2 + 2NH3 = C3H4N2 +
H2CO2 + 2H2O. The compounds of this series may be prepared by the
condensation of ortho-diketones with ammonia and aldehydes
R·C - N \\
R·CO·CO·R + 2NH3 + R´·CHO = 3H2O + || \\ C·R´;
R·C - NH /
from thioimidazolones by oxidation with dilute nitric acid (W.
Marckwald, _Ber._, 1892, 25, p. 2361); by distillation of hydrobenzamide
and similarly constituted bodies; and by the action of phosphorus
pentachloride on symmetrical dimethyloxamide, a methylchlorglyoxaline
being formed (O. Wallach, _Ann._, 1877, 184, p. 500).
The glyoxalines are basic in character, and the imide hydrogen is
replaceable by metals and alkyl groups. They are stable towards reducing
agents, and acidyl groups are only introduced with difficulty.
_Imidazole_ (glyoxaline), C3H4N2, crystallizes in thick prisms which
melt at 88-89° C. and boil at 253° C., and are readily soluble in
alcohol and in water. It is unaffected by chromic acid, but potassium
permanganate oxidizes it to formic acid. It forms salts with acids.
_Lophine_ (triphenylglyoxaline),
C6H5·C-N \\
|| \\ C·C6H5,
C6H5·C-NH /
is formed by the dry distillation of hydrobenzamide, or by saturating
an alcoholic solution of benzil and benzaldehyde (at a temperature of
40° C.) with ammonia. It crystallizes in needles which melt at 275° C.
It is a weak base. When heated to 300° C. with hydriodic acid and
hydrochloric acid, in the presence of some red phosphorus, it yields
benzoic acid.
The keto-glyoxalines are known as imidazolones and are prepared by the
action of acids on acetalyl thioureas (W. Marckwald, Ber., 1892, 25,
p. 2357). _Benzimidazole_,
/ N \\
C6H4 / \\ CH,
\ NH /
is the simplest representative of the benzoglyoxalines and is prepared
by the condensation of formic acid with ortho-phenylene diamine. It
forms rhombic crystals which melt at 170° C. It is basic in character,
and on oxidation with potassium permanganate yields a small amount of
glyoxaline dicarboxylic acid,
HOOC·C - N \\
|| \\ CH.
HOOC·C - NH /
(E. Bamberger, _Ann._, 1893, 273, p. 338).
IMITATION (Lat. _imitatio_, from _imitari_, to imitate), the
reproduction or repetition of an action or thought as observed in
another person or in oneself, or the construction of one object in the
likeness of another. By some writers (e.g. Preyer and Lloyd Morgan) the
term "imitation" is limited to cases in which one person copies the
action or thought of another; others have preferred a wider use of the
term (i.e. including "self-imitation"), and have attempted to classify
imitative action into various groupings, e.g. as cases of "conscious
imitation," "imitative suggestion," "plastic imitation" (as when the
members of a crowd subconsciously reproduce one another's modes of
thought and action), and the like. The main distinction is that which
takes into account the question of attention (q.v.). In _conscious_
imitation, the attention is fixed on the act and its reproduction: in
_unconscious_ imitation the reproduction is entirely mechanical and the
agent does not "attend" to the action or thought which he is copying: in
_subconscious_ imitation the action is not deliberate, though the
necessary train of thought would immediately follow if the attention
were turned upon it under normal conditions. Imitation plays an
extremely important part in human and animal development, and a clear
understanding of its character is important both for the study of
primitive peoples, and also in the theories of education, art and
sociology. The child's early development is in large measure imitative:
thus the first articulate sounds and the first movements are mainly
reproductions of the words and actions of parents, and even in the later
stages that teacher is likely to achieve the best results who himself
gives examples of how a word should be pronounced or an action done. The
impulse to imitate is, however, not confined to children: there is among
the majority of adults a tendency to assimilate themselves either to
their society or to those whom they especially admire or respect: this
tendency to shun the eccentric is rooted deeply in human psychology.
Moreover, even among highly developed persons the imitative impulse
frequently overrides the reason, as when an audience, a crowd, or even
practically a whole community is carried away by a panic for which no
adequate ground has been given, or when a cough or a yawn is imitated by
a company of people. Such cases may be compared with those of persons
in mesmeric trances who mechanically copy a series of movements made by
the mesmerist. The universality of the imitative impulse has led many
psychologists to regard it as an instinct (so William James, _Principles
of Psychology_, ii. 408; cf. INSTINCT), and in that large class of
imitative actions which have no obvious ulterior purpose the impulse
certainly appears to be instinctive in character. On the other hand
where the imitator recognizes the particular effect of a process and
imitates with the deliberate intention of producing the same effect, his
action can scarcely be classed as instinctive. A considerable number of
psychologists have distinguished imitative from instinctive actions
(e.g. Baldwin, and Sully). According to Darwin the imitative impulse
begins in infants at the age of four months. It is to be noted, however,
that the child imitates, not every action indiscriminately, but
especially those towards which it has a congenital tendency. The same is
true of animals: though different kinds of animals may live in close
proximity, the young of each kind imitate primarily the actions of their
own parents.
Among primitive man imitation plays a very important part. The savage
believes that he can bring about events by imitating them. He makes, for
instance, an image of his enemy and pierces it with darts or burns it,
believing that by so doing he will cause his enemy's death: similarly
sailors would whistle, or farmers would pour water on the ground, in the
hope of producing wind or rain. This form of imitation is known as
sympathetic magic (see MAGIC). The sociological importance of imitation
is elaborately investigated by Gabriel Tarde (_Les Lois de l'imitation_,
2nd ed., 1895), who bases all social evolution on the imitative impulse.
He distinguishes "custom imitations," i.e. imitations of ancient or even
forgotten actions, and "mode imitations," i.e. imitations of current
fashions. New discoveries are, in his scheme, the product of the
conflict of imitations. This theory, though of great value, seems to
neglect original natural similarities which, by the law of causation,
produce similar consequences, where imitation is geographically or
chronologically impossible.