_Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives_:
Having been convened on an extraordinary occasion, as authorized by the
Constitution, your attention is not called to any ordinary subject of
legislation.
At the beginning of the present Presidential term, four months ago, the
functions of the Federal Government were found to be generally suspended
within the several States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida, excepting only those of the
Post-Office Department.
Within these States all the forts, arsenals, dockyards, custom-houses,
and the like, including the movable and stationary property in and
about them, had been seized and were held in open hostility to this
Government, excepting only Forts Pickens, Taylor, and Jefferson, on and
near the Florida coast, and Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, South
Carolina. The forts thus seized had been put in improved condition,
new ones had been built, and armed forces had been organized and were
organizing, all avowedly with the same hostile purpose.
The forts remaining in the possession of the Federal Government in
and near these States were either besieged or menaced by warlike
preparations, and especially Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded by
well-protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in quality to the
best of its own and outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to one. A
disproportionate share of the Federal muskets and rifles had somehow
found their way into these States, and had been seized to be used
against the Government. Accumulations of the public revenue lying within
them had been seized for the same object. The Navy was scattered in
distant seas, leaving but a very small part of it within the immediate
reach of the Government. Officers of the Federal Army and Navy had
resigned in great numbers, and of those resigning a large proportion had
taken up arms against the Government. Simultaneously and in connection
with all this the purpose to sever the Federal Union was openly avowed.
In accordance with this purpose, an ordinance had been adopted in each
of these States declaring the States respectively to be separated from
the National Union. A formula for instituting a combined government of
these States had been promulgated, and this illegal organization, in the
character of Confederate States, was already invoking recognition, aid,
and intervention from foreign powers.
Finding this condition of things and believing it to be an imperative
duty upon the incoming Executive to prevent, if possible, the
consummation of such attempt to destroy the Federal Union, a choice of
means to that end became indispensable. This choice was made, and was
declared in the inaugural address. The policy chosen looked to the
exhaustion of all peaceful measures before a resort to any stronger
ones. It sought only to hold the public places and property not already
wrested from the Government and to collect the revenue, relying for the
rest on time, discussion, and the ballot box. It promised a continuance
of the mails at Government expense to the very people who were resisting
the Government, and it gave repeated pledges against any disturbance to
any of the people or any of their rights. Of all that which a President
might constitutionally and justifiably do in such a case, everything was
forborne without which it was believed possible to keep the Government
on foot.
On the 5th of March, the present incumbent's first full day in office,
a letter of Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the
28th of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of March,
was by that Department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the
professional opinion of the writer that reenforcements could not be
thrown into that fort within the time for his relief rendered necessary
by the limited supply of provisions, and with a view of holding
possession of the same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and
well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the officers
of his command, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures
of Major Anderson's letter. The whole was immediately laid before
Lieutenant-General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in
opinion. On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with
other officers, both of the Army and the Navy, and at the end of four
days came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same conclusion as before.
He also stated at the same time that no such sufficient force was then
at the control of the Government or could be raised and brought to
the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be
exhausted. In a purely military point of view this reduced the duty
of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the
garrison safely out of the fort.
It was believed, however, that to so abandon that position under the
circumstances would be utterly ruinous; that the _necessity_ under which
it was to be done would not be fully understood; that by many it would
be construed as a part of a _voluntary_ policy; that at home it would
discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go
far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it
would be our national destruction consummated. This could not be
allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be
reached _Fort Pickens_ might be reenforced. This last would be a clear
indication of _policy_, and would better enable the country to accept
the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military _necessity_. An order was
at once directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the
steamship _Brooklyn_ into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land,
but must take the longer and slower route by sea. The first return news
from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort
Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding the _Sabine_,
to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the _Brooklyn_,
acting upon some _quasi_ armistice of the late Administration (and of
the existence of which the present Administration, up to the time the
order was dispatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix
attention), had refused to land the troops. To now reenforce Fort
Pickens before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible,
rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in the latter-named
fort. In precaution against such a conjuncture the Government had a
few days before commenced preparing an expedition, as well adapted as
might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to
be ultimately used or not, according to circumstances. The strongest
anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was resolved to
send it forward. As had been intended in this contingency, it was also
resolved to notify the governor of South Carolina that he might expect
an attempt would be made to provision the fort, and that if the attempt
should not be resisted there would be no effort to throw in men, arms,
or ammunition without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the
fort. This notice was accordingly given, whereupon the fort was attacked
and bombarded to its fall, without even awaiting the arrival of the
provisioning expedition.
It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was
in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the assailants. They
well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit
aggression upon them. They knew--they were expressly notified--that the
giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was
all which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by
resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that this Government
desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but merely
to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from
actual and immediate dissolution, trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to
time, discussion, and the ballot box for final adjustment; and they
assailed and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object--to drive
out the visible authority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to
immediate dissolution. That this was their object the Executive well
understood; and having said to them in the inaugural address, "You can
have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors," he took pains
not only to keep this declaration good, but also to keep the case so
free from the power of ingenious sophistry as that the world should not
be able to misunderstand it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its
surrounding circumstances, that point was reached. Then and thereby the
assailants of the Government began the conflict of arms, without a gun
in sight or in expectancy to return their fire, save only the few in the
fort, sent to that harbor years before for their own protection, and
still ready to give that protection in whatever was lawful. In this act,
discarding all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct
issue, "Immediate dissolution or blood."
And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States.
It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a
constitutional republic, or democracy--a government of the people by the
same people--can or can not maintain its territorial integrity against
its own domestic foes. It presents the question whether discontented
individuals, too few in numbers to control administration according to
organic law in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this
case, or on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense,
break up their government, and thus practically put an end to free
government upon the earth. It forces us to ask, Is there in all
republics this inherent and fatal weakness? Must a government of
necessity be too _strong_ for the liberties of its own people, or
too _weak_ to maintain its own existence?
So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power
of the Government and so to resist force employed for its destruction
by force for its preservation.
The call was made, and the response of the country was most gratifying,
surpassing in unanimity and spirit the most sanguine expectation. Yet
none of the States commonly called slave States, except Delaware, gave a
regiment through regular State organization. A few regiments have been
organized within some others of those States by individual enterprise
and received into the Government service. Of course the seceded States,
so called (and to which Texas had been joined about the time of the
inauguration), gave no troops to the cause of the Union. The border
States, so called, were not uniform in their action, some of them being
almost _for_ the Union, while in others, as Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Arkansas, the Union sentiment was nearly repressed and
silenced. The course taken in Virginia was the most remarkable, perhaps
the most important. A convention elected by the people of that State
to consider this very question of disrupting the Federal Union was in
session at the capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter fell. To this body
the people had chosen a large majority of _professed_ Union men. Almost
immediately after the fall of Sumter many members of that majority went
over to the original disunion minority, and with them adopted an
ordinance for withdrawing the State from the Union. Whether this change
was wrought by their great approval of the assault upon Sumter or their
great resentment at the Government's resistance to that assault is not
definitely known. Although they submitted the ordinance for ratification
to a vote of the people, to be taken on a day then somewhat more than
a month distant, the convention and the legislature (which was also in
session at the same time and place), with leading men of the State not
members of either, immediately commenced acting as if the State were
already out of the Union. They pushed military preparations vigorously
forward all over the State. They seized the United States armory
at Harpers Ferry and the navy-yard at Gosport, near Norfolk. They
received--perhaps invited--into their State large bodies of troops,
with their warlike appointments, from the so-called seceded States.
They formally entered into a treaty of temporary alliance and
cooperation with the so-called "Confederate States," and sent members
to their congress at Montgomery; and, finally, they permitted the
insurrectionary government to be transferred to their capital at Richmond.
The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to make
its nest within her borders, and this Government has no choice left but
to deal with it _where_ it finds it; and it has the less regret, as the
loyal citizens have in due form claimed its protection. Those loyal
citizens this Government is bound to recognize and protect, as being
Virginia.
In the border States, so called--in fact, the Middle States--there are
those who favor a policy which they call "armed neutrality;" that is,
an arming of those States to prevent the Union forces passing one way
or the disunion the other over their soil. This would be disunion
completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an
impassable wall along the line of separation, and yet not quite an
impassable one, for, under the guise of neutrality, it would tie the
hands of the Union men and freely pass supplies from among them to the
insurrectionists, which it could not do as an open enemy. At a stroke it
would take all the trouble off the hands of secession, except only what
proceeds from the external blockade. It would do for the disunionists
that which of all things they most desire--feed them well and give them
disunion without a struggle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity to
the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union; and while very
many who have favored it are doubtless loyal citizens, it is,
nevertheless, very injurious in effect.
Recurring to the action of the Government, it may be stated that at
first a call was made for 75,000 militia, and rapidly following this a
proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary
districts by proceedings in the nature of blockade. So far all was
believed to be strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists
announced their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering.
Other calls were made for volunteers to serve three years unless sooner
discharged, and also for large additions to the Regular Army and Navy.
These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under
what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting
then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed
that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of
Congress.
Soon after the first call for militia it was considered a duty to
authorize the Commanding General in proper cases, according to his
discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_,
or, in other words, to arrest and detain without resort to the ordinary
processes and forms of law such individuals as he might deem dangerous
to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but
very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has
been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has
been called to the proposition that one who is sworn to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed" should not himself violate them. Of
course some consideration was given to the questions of power and
propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which
were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing
of execution in nearly one-third of the States. Must they be allowed to
finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the
use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in
such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that practically it
relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very
limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly, Are
all the laws _but one_ to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go
to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the
official oath be broken if the Government should be overthrown when it
was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?
But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not
believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution
that "the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ shall not be
suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it" is equivalent to a provision--is a
provision--that such privilege may be suspended when, in cases of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety _does_ require it. It was
decided that we have a case of rebellion and that the public safety does
require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was
authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the
Executive, is vested with this power; but the Constitution itself is
silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision
was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it can not be believed the
framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should
run its course until Congress could be called together, the very
assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case,
by the rebellion.
No more extended argument is now offered, as an opinion at some length
will probably be presented by the Attorney-General. Whether there shall
be any legislation upon the subject, and, if any, what, is submitted
entirely to the better judgment of Congress.
The forbearance of this Government had been so extraordinary and so long
continued as to lead some foreign nations to shape their action as if
they supposed the early destruction of our National Union was probable.
While this on discovery gave the Executive some concern, he is now happy
to say that the sovereignty and rights of the United States are now
everywhere practically respected by foreign powers, and a general
sympathy with the country is manifested throughout the world.
The reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and the Navy will
give the information in detail deemed necessary and convenient for your
deliberation and action, while the Executive and all the Departments
will stand ready to supply omissions or to communicate new facts
considered important for you to know.
It is now recommended that you give the legal means for making this
contest a short and a decisive one; that you place at the control of the
Government for the work at least 400,000 men and $400,000,000. That
number of men is about one-tenth of those of proper ages within the
regions where apparently _all_ are willing to engage, and the sum is
less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who
seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of $600,000,000 _now_ is a less
sum per head than was the debt of our Revolution when we came out of
that struggle, and the money value in the country now bears even a
greater proportion to what it was _then_ than does the population.
Surely each man has as strong a motive _now_ to _preserve_ our liberties
as each had _then_ to _establish_ them.
A right result at this time will be worth more to the world than ten
times the men and ten times the money. The evidence reaching us from the
country leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abundant, and
that it needs only the hand of legislation to give it legal sanction and
the hand of the Executive to give it practical shape and efficiency. One
of the greatest perplexities of the Government is to avoid receiving
troops faster than it can provide for them. In a word, the people will
save their Government if the Government itself will do its part only
indifferently well.
It might seem at first thought to be of little difference whether the
present movement at the South be called "secession" or "rebellion." The
movers, however, well understand the difference. At the beginning they
knew they could never raise their treason to any respectable magnitude
by any name which implies _violation_ of law. They knew their people
possessed as much of moral sense, as much of devotion to law and order,
and as much pride in and reverence for the history and Government of
their common country as any other civilized and patriotic people. They
knew they could make no advancement directly in the teeth of these
strong and noble sentiments. Accordingly, they commenced by an insidious
debauching of the public mind. They invented an ingenious sophism,
which, if conceded, was followed by perfectly logical steps through all
the incidents to the complete destruction of the Union. The sophism
itself is that any State of the Union may _consistently_ with the
National Constitution, and therefore _lawfully_ and _peacefully_,
withdraw from the Union without the consent of the Union or of any other
State. The little disguise that the supposed right is to be exercised
only for just cause, themselves to be the sole judge of its justice,
is too thin to merit any notice.
With rebellion thus sugar coated they have been drugging the public mind
of their section for more than thirty years, and until at length they
have brought many good men to a willingness to take up arms against the
Government the day _after_ some assemblage of men have enacted the
farcical pretense of taking their State out of the Union who could have
been brought to no such thing the day _before_.
This sophism derives much, perhaps the whole, of its currency from the
assumption that there is some omnipotent and sacred supremacy pertaining
to a _State_--to each State of our Federal Union. Our States have
neither more nor less power than that reserved to them in the Union by
the Constitution, no one of them ever having been a State _out_ of the
Union. The original ones passed into the Union even _before_ they cast
off their British colonial dependence, and the new ones each came into
the Union directly from a condition of dependence, excepting Texas; and
even Texas, in its temporary independence, was never designated a State.
The new ones only took the designation of States on coming into the
Union, while that name was first adopted for the old ones in and by the
Declaration of Independence. Therein the "United Colonies" were declared
to be "free and independent States;" but even then the object plainly
was not to declare their independence of _one another_ or of the
_Union_, but directly the contrary, as their mutual pledge and their
mutual action before, at the time, and afterwards abundantly show. The
express plighting of faith by each and all of the original thirteen in
the Articles of Confederation, two years later, that the Union shall be
perpetual is most conclusive. Having never been States, either in
substance or in name, _outside_ of the Union, whence this magical
omnipotence of "State rights," asserting a claim of power to lawfully
destroy the Union itself? Much is said about the "sovereignty" of the
States, but the word even is not in the National Constitution, nor, as
is believed, in any of the State constitutions. What is a "sovereignty"
in the political sense of the term? Would it be far wrong to define it
"a political community without a political superior"? Tested by this,
no one of our States, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty; and even
Texas gave up the character on coming into the Union, by which act she
acknowledged the Constitution of the United States and the laws and
treaties of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution to
be for her the supreme law of the land. The States have their status in
the Union, and they have no other legal status. If they break from this,
they can only do so against law and by revolution. The Union, and not
themselves separately, procured their independence and their liberty.
By conquest or purchase the Union gave each of them whatever of
independence and liberty it has. The Union is older than any of the
States, and, in fact, it created them as States. Originally some
dependent colonies made the Union, and in turn the Union threw off their
old dependence for them and made them States, such as they are. Not
one of them ever had a State constitution independent of the Union.
Of course it is not forgotten that all the new States framed their
constitutions before they entered the Union, nevertheless dependent
upon and preparatory to coming into the Union.
Unquestionably the States have the powers and rights reserved to them
in and by the National Constitution; but among these surely are not
included all conceivable powers, however mischievous or destructive, but
at most such only as were known in the world at the time as governmental
powers; and certainly a power to destroy the Government itself had never
been known as a governmental--as a merely administrative power. This
relative matter of national power and State rights, as a principle, is
no other than the principle of _generality_ and _locality_. Whatever
concerns the whole should be confided to the whole--to the General
Government--while whatever concerns _only_ the State should be left
exclusively to the State. This is all there is of original principle
about it. Whether the National Constitution in defining boundaries
between the two has applied the principle with exact accuracy is not
to be questioned. We are all bound by that defining without question.
What is now combated is the position that secession is _consistent_ with
the Constitution--is _lawful_ and _peaceful_. It is not contended that
there is any express law for it, and nothing should ever be implied as
law which leads to unjust or absurd consequences. The nation purchased
with money the countries out of which several of these States were
formed. Is it just that they shall go off without leave and without
refunding? The nation paid very large sums (in the aggregate, I believe,
nearly a hundred millions) to relieve Florida of the aboriginal tribes.
Is it just that she shall now be off without consent or without making
any return? The nation is now in debt for money applied to the benefit
of these so-called seceding States in common with the rest. Is it just
either that creditors shall go unpaid or the remaining States pay the
whole? A part of the present national debt was contracted to pay the old
debts of Texas. Is it just that she shall leave and pay no part of this
herself?
Again: If one State may secede, so may another; and when all shall have
seceded none is left to pay the debts. Is this quite just to creditors?
Did we notify them of this sage view of ours when we borrowed their
money? If we now recognize this doctrine by allowing the seceders to go
in peace, it is difficult to see what we can do if others choose to go
or to extort terms upon which they will promise to remain.
The seceders insist that our Constitution admits of secession. They
have assumed to make a national constitution of their own, in which
of necessity they have either _discarded_ or _retained_ the right of
secession, as they insist it exists in ours. If they have discarded it,
they thereby admit that on principle it ought not to be in ours. If they
have retained it, by their own construction of ours they show that to be
consistent they must secede from one another whenever they shall find it
the easiest way of settling their debts or effecting any other selfish
or unjust object. The principle itself is one of disintegration, and
upon which no government can possibly endure.
If all the States save one should assert the power to _drive_ that one
out of the Union, it is presumed the whole class of seceder politicians
would at once deny the power and denounce the act as the greatest
outrage upon State rights. But suppose that precisely the same act,
instead of being called "driving the one out," should be called "the
seceding of the others from that one," it would be exactly what the
seceders claim to do, unless, indeed, they make the point that the one,
because it is a minority, may rightfully do what the others, because
they are a majority, may not rightfully do. These politicians are subtle
and profound on the rights of minorities. They are not partial to that
power which made the Constitution and speaks from the preamble, calling
itself "we, the people."
It may well be questioned whether there is to-day a majority of the
legally qualified voters of any State, except, perhaps, South Carolina,
in favor of disunion. There is much reason to believe that the Union men
are the majority in many, if not in every other one, of the so-called
seceded States. The contrary has not been demonstrated in any one of
them. It is ventured to affirm this even of Virginia and Tennessee; for
the result of an election held in military camps, where the bayonets are
all on one side of the question voted upon, can scarcely be considered
as demonstrating popular sentiment. At such an election all that large
class who are at once, _for_ the Union and _against_ coercion would be
coerced to vote against the Union.
It may be affirmed without extravagance that the free institutions we
enjoy have developed the powers and improved the condition of our whole
people beyond any example in the world. Of this we now have a striking
and an impressive illustration. So large an army as the Government has
now on foot was never before known without a soldier in it but who had
taken his place there of his own free choice. But more than this, there
are many single regiments whose members, one and another, possess full
practical knowledge of all the arts, sciences, professions, and whatever
else, whether useful or elegant, is known in the world; and there is
scarcely one from which there could not be selected a President, a
Cabinet, a Congress, and perhaps a court, abundantly competent to
administer the Government itself. Nor do I say this is not true also in
the army of our late friends, now adversaries in this contest; but if
it is, so much better the reason why the Government which has conferred
such benefits on both them and us should not be broken up. Whoever in
any section proposes to abandon such a government would do well to
consider in deference to what principle it is that he does it; what
better he is likely to get in its stead; whether the substitute will
give, or be intended to give, so much of good to the people. There are
some foreshadowings on this subject. Our adversaries have adopted some
declarations of independence in which, unlike the good old one penned by
Jefferson, they omit the words "all men are created equal." Why? They
have adopted a temporary national constitution, in the preamble of
which, unlike our good old one signed by Washington, they omit "We,
the people," and substitute "We, the deputies of the sovereign and
independent States." Why? Why this deliberate pressing out of view
the rights of men and the authority of the people?
This is essentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union it
is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of
government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men;
to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of
laudable pursuit for all; to afford all an unfettered start and a
fair chance in the race of life. Yielding to partial and temporary
departures, from necessity, this is the leading object of the Government
for whose existence we contend.
I am most happy to believe that the plain people understand and
appreciate this. It is worthy of note that while in this the
Government's hour of trial large numbers of those in the Army and Navy
who have been favored with the offices have resigned and proved false
to the hand which had pampered them, not one common soldier or common
sailor is known to have deserted his flag.
Great honor is due to those officers who remained true despite the
example of their treacherous associates; but the greatest honor and
most important fact of all is the unanimous firmness of the common
soldiers and common sailors. To the last man, so far as known, they
have successfully resisted the traitorous efforts of those whose
commands but an hour before they obeyed as absolute law. This is the
patriotic instinct of plain people. They understand without an argument
that the destroying the Government which was made by Washington means
no good to them.
Our popular Government has often been called an experiment. Two points
in it our people have already settled--the successful _establishing_ and
the successful _administering_ of it. One still remains--its successful
_maintenance_ against a formidable internal attempt to overthrow it. It
is now for them to demonstrate to the world that those who can fairly
carry an election can also suppress a rebellion; that ballots are the
rightful and peaceful successors of bullets, and that when ballots have
fairly and constitutionally decided there can be no successful appeal
back to bullets; that there can be no successful appeal except to
ballots themselves at succeeding elections. Such will be a great lesson
of peace, teaching men that what they can not take by an election
neither can they take it by a war; teaching all the folly of being the
beginners of a war.
Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what is
to be the course of the Government toward the Southern States _after_
the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the Executive deems it proper
to say it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the
Constitution and the laws, and that he probably will have no different
understanding of the powers and duties of the Federal Government
relatively to the rights of the States and the people under the
Constitution than that expressed in the inaugural address.
He desires to preserve the Government, that it may be administered
for all as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizens
everywhere have the right to claim this of their government, and the
government has no right to withhold or neglect it. It is not perceived
that in giving it there is any coercion, any conquest, or any
subjugation in any just sense of those terms.
The Constitution provides, and all the States have accepted the
provision, that "the United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a republican form of government." But if a State may lawfully
go out of the Union, having done so it may also discard the republican
form of government; so that to prevent its going out is an indispensable
_means_ to the _end_ of maintaining the guaranty mentioned; and when an
end is lawful and obligatory the indispensable means to it are also
lawful and obligatory.
It was with the deepest regret that the Executive found the duty of
employing the war power in defense of the Government forced upon him.
He could but perform this duty or surrender the existence of the
Government. No compromise by public servants could in this case be a
cure; not that compromises are not often proper, but that no popular
government can long survive a marked precedent that those who carry an
election can only save the government from immediate destruction by
giving up the main point upon which the people gave the election. The
people themselves, and not their servants, can safely reverse their own
deliberate decisions.
As a private citizen the Executive could not have consented that these
institutions shall perish; much less could he in betrayal of so vast and
so sacred a trust as these free people had confided to him. He felt that
he had no moral right to shrink, nor even to count the chances of his
own life, in what might follow. In full view of his great responsibility
he has so far done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according
to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views
and your action may so accord with his as to assure all faithful
citizens who have been disturbed in their rights of a certain and speedy
restoration to them under the Constitution and the laws.
And having thus chosen our course, without guile and with pure purpose,
let us renew our trust in God and go forward without fear and with manly
hearts.