THE INFINITE UNIVERSE--THE MIRROR OF GOD[289]
In the contemplation of the infinite, writes Bruno, man attains his
highest good. All things aspire to the end for which they are ordained,
and the more perfect its nature the more nobly and effectively does
each aspire. Man alone, however, as endowed with a twofold nature,
pursues a twofold good,--"on the boundary line of eternity and time,
between the archetypal world and the copy, the intelligible and the
sensible, participating in either substance."[290] Human effort can
find satisfaction in none but the highest and first truth and goodness.
Neither our intellect nor our will ever rests. It is clear therefore
that their end lies not in particular goods or truths which lead us
on from one to another and to another, but in universal good and
truth, outside of and beyond which no good or truth exists. So long
as we believe that any truth is left to know, or any good to gain, we
seek always further truth, desire always further good. The end of our
inquiry, therefore, and of our effort cannot be in a truth or in a good
that is limited. In each and all is the desire in-born to become all
things. Such infinite desire implies the existence in reality of that
which will satisfy it. If "Universal Nature" or Spirit is _able_ to
satisfy the appetite of each "particular nature" or mode of itself, and
that of itself as a whole, then the understanding and desire which are
innate, inseparable from and co-substantial with each and all shall not
be in vain, nor look hopelessly to a false and impossible end. Again,
were universal nature and the efficient cause content with finite
truth and good, they would not satisfy the infinite aspiration of
particular things. It is true that even the desire for continuance of
our present life is not satisfied; a particular mode of matter cannot
realise all "forms" or ideas at once, but only in succession and one
by one; it knows and therefore desires only that which is present to
it at any given time: by force of nature, therefore, it comes in its
ignorance (which arises from the "contraction" of the form to this or
that particular matter and the limitation of matter by this or that
form) to desire to be _always_ that which it _now_ is. The wise soul,
however, will not fear death, will indeed sometimes wish for it, since
there awaits every substance eternity of duration, immensity of space,
and the realisation of all being. "Whatever the good be for which a
man strives, let him turn his eyes to the heavens and the worlds;
there is spread before him a picture, a book, a mirror, in which he
may behold, read, contemplate the imprint (_vestigium_), the law, and
the reflection of the highest good--and with his sensible ears drink
in the highest harmony, and raise himself as by a ladder, according to
the grades of the forms of things, to the contemplation of another,
the highest world."[291] The contemplation of the extended infinite
and "explicate" or unfolded nature is thus only a means by which we
may rise to the contemplation of the infinite in itself, "implicate"
nature, God. "It is no frivolous or futile contemplation, but one
most weighty and worthy of the perfect man, which we pursue, when we
seek the splendour, the fusion, and the intercommunication of divinity
and of nature not in an Egyptian, Syrian, Greek or Roman individual,
not in food, drink, or any ignoble matter, with the gaping many, but
in the august palace of the all-powerful, in the immeasurable space
of the Ether, in the infinite potency of twofold nature, all-becoming
and all-creating. So from the eternal vast and immeasurable effect in
visible things, we comprehend the eternal and the immeasurable majesty
and goodness. Let us then turn our eyes to the omniform image of the
omniform God, and gaze upon the living and mighty reflection of Him."
The three characteristics of the universe as a mirror of God which
Bruno sought to drive home to the minds of men were its infinite
extent, the infinite number of its parts, and its uniformity, or the
similarity of its constituent elements throughout its whole extent. His
illustrations and his arguments would in many cases cause a smile if
they were put forward seriously at the present day, but no absurdities
can outbalance his enthusiasm, the readiness and thoroughness of his
polemic against Aristotle and the old cosmology, and the fertility of
imagination by which he is able to look, and to make others look, at
things from his new, and therefore, at first, confusing point of view.
[Sidenote: The universe infinite.]
Bruno's arguments rest partly on inferences from sense-knowledge,
partly on the principle of sufficient reason. Thus the infinity of
extent is evidenced, first, by the teaching of sense, in the constant
change which our circle of vision undergoes as we move from one place
to another. There always appears to be an ultimate limit, but no sooner
do we move than the limit is seen to have been only apparent; so, it
may be inferred, could we transfer ourselves with our senses to any
of the distant stars, we should still seem to ourselves to be in the
centre of a closed sphere,--the very same appearance which is presented
to us on this earth.
Aristotle's theory of the limitation of space by the ultimate sphere
of the heavens was open to objections, many of which were raised in
the early schools. The "subtle Averroes" had endeavoured to avoid some
of these by the doctrine that beyond this outer sphere is the divine
being, the eternal self-sufficient Mind.[292] "But how," asks Bruno,
"can body be bounded by that which is not body? The divine nature is no
less nor in any other manner _within_ the whole than _without_; it is
neither place nor in place."[293] Space therefore is always bounded by
space, body by body, that is, each is infinite in extent. Were divinity
that which bounds space, it would itself be space under another
name.[294] Aristotle's theory implied that the universe as a whole was
not in any place or space. The "place" of each body, he had said, is
the containing surface of the sphere above it; the outermost sphere,
therefore, as there is no other beyond it, is itself uncontained and
without place. The theory implied also the identity of body and space,
and was the ground of Aristotle's rejection of the vacuum in nature.
For a truer conception of Space, Bruno turned to an earlier commentator
(or group of commentators--"Philoponus") on Aristotle, who defined it
as "a continuous physical quantity in three dimensions, in which the
magnitude of bodies is contained, in nature before and apart from all
bodies, receiving all indifferently, beyond all conditions of action
and passion, not mixing with things, impenetrable, without form or
place."[295] It is called _physical_, because it can not be separated
from the existence of natural things. It is itself not contained,
because it equals with its dimensions those of body as the transparency
of a crystal has the same dimensions with the crystal itself. Neither
body nor space can be thought of the one apart from the other.[296]
Granted the infinity of space, that of matter necessarily follows by an
inverse of the principle of sufficient reason:--for there is no reason,
according to Bruno, why this small part alone of space, where our earth
is, should be filled; the eternal operation is not distinct from the
eternal power, nor could it be the will of God to cramp nature, which
is the hand of the all-powerful, his force, act, reason, word, voice,
order and will.[297] "There is one matter, one power, one space, one
efficient cause, God and Nature, everywhere equally, and everywhere
powerful.--We insult the infinite cause when we say that it may be the
cause of a finite effect; to a finite effect it can have neither the
name nor the relation of an efficient."[298]
The corresponding argument from the capacity of our human imagination
to think always of a greater than any given magnitude, _i.e._ its
inability to rest short of the infinite, is expanded elsewhere. Our
imaginative faculty is the _umbra_ or shadow of nature; its power,
therefore, of adding quantity to quantity, _ad infinitum_, must have
something in nature to which it corresponds; nature does not give a
faculty for which there is no satisfaction. There is then in truth an
infinite universe, such as our imagination demands. Bruno notices the
objection that on this theory anything whatever might be said about the
universe, _e.g._ that it is infinite man, since one can imagine a human
form filling the universe; and he replies, "it _is_ infinite man, or
infinite ass, or infinite tree, each and all, since in the infinite all
particular things are one and the same."[299]
[Sidenote: Aristotle.]
[Sidenote: 1. The _primum mobile_.]
[Sidenote: 2. The elements.]
[Sidenote: 3. The whole and its parts.]
The arguments we have traced are:--(1) What appears to be a limit
to our senses always proves to be imaginary, when we are able to
test it, therefore we may infer that it is imaginary in other cases;
(2) the very notion of space, implying that it has neither form nor
place, means that it is infinite, limitless; (3) we cannot imagine a
portion of space than which there is not another greater, and so _ad
infinitum:_ but reality cannot fall short of thought, therefore space
is infinite. The arguments of Aristotle against the infinity of the
world are taken up in detail in the second book of the _De Immenso_. As
the controversy, however important at the time, has lost much of its
interest for us, we need only give a brief sketch of its main lines.
The first argument was drawn from the assumption of an ultimate sphere
or _primum mobile_ which moved about the earth as a centre.[300] It
was clear that if the universe were infinite the radii of this sphere
would be infinitely prolonged, and therefore the termini of any two
given radii at an infinite distance one from another. The motion of
the sphere would thus be inconceivable, for it would require infinite
time in which to pass from one point to another. The answer of Bruno
was that the universe as a whole was not moveable at all, nor had it
any centre; only its parts were moved and each of these had its own
relative and finite centre. The apparent motion of the sphere was due
to the real movement of the earth about its axis. A similar answer
was given to the argument from the movements of bodies according to
their elements. As to us on the earth, the earth appears to be the
centre of the universe, so to the inhabitants of the moon, the moon
will appear to be such. Matter rising from the earth to the moon would
appear to the inhabitants of the latter to fall. These distinctions
were relative to the finite worlds, but might not be referred to
the whole universe. As the earth is one world, the moon another, so
each has its own centre, each its own _up_ and _down_: nor can these
differences be assigned absolutely to the whole and its parts together,
but only relatively to the position and condition of the latter.[301]
In his _third_ argument Aristotle sought to prove that infinite body
in general was impossible.[302] If the whole is infinite its simple
elements must be so also. These must be either of an infinite number of
kinds, different from one another, or of a finite number of kinds, or
all of the same kind. But the first of the alternatives is impossible
on the _a priori_ ground that each element must have a special kind of
movement corresponding to it, and the kinds of movement are actually
few in number; the second and third, because the movement of the
elements should then be infinite, whereas in the actual universe motion
is limited both in centre and circumference. The arguments, however, do
not apply to Bruno's theory of the universe. Motion is always from one
definite point to another; we do not set out from Italy in order to go
on _ad infinitum_, but to go to some definite point. He does not, as
Epicurus did, regard all minima as in infinite motion downwards through
the universe; there is no down, no centre, no up, all is simply and
generally in flux. It is not the elements that are innumerable in kind,
but the composite bodies, the stars, which are constituted by them;
and of these the parts move about their natural body, as the parts of
the earth towards the earth, and those of the moon toward the moon in
their own regions; all motion is therefore limited,--each world has, as
it were, _margins_ of its own. The idea that if any of the elements,
as fire or water, were infinite, there would be infinite lightness or
gravity, and hence that the universe would move as a whole upwards or
downwards, is equally at fault. To the universe as a whole the terms
heavy and light do not apply, but only to its parts, the finite and
determinate bodies consisting of finite and determinate elements. These
elements, whether they be taken as of one or more kinds, since they
cannot move outside of the universe, must have finite movements.
[Sidenote: 4. Action between the infinite and the finite.]
The fourth argument[303] was based upon the impossibility of action
between an infinite body and a second body whether finite or infinite.
An infinite cannot act upon a finite because the action would
necessarily be timeless. Were it in time we could then find a finite
body which in the same time would produce the same effect; but there
can be no such equality between the finite and the infinite. Similarly
action between two infinites would occur in infinite time; in other
words, would not take place at all. The conclusion is that neither
fire nor earth nor any of the elements can be infinite in quantity.
Bruno suggests, in the first place,[304] that a change may be produced
timelessly; thus if a body in a large circle cover a certain space in
the _minimum_ of time, a body in a smaller circle will cover a less
space in _no_ time, for nothing can be smaller than the minimum.[305]
In the second place, no action of the whole or effect upon the whole
exists, it is only the finite bodies within it, each with its finite
force, that act upon one another. Even if two infinite bodies, over
against one another, were supposed, their action would not be of one
whole upon another, but of the parts on the contiguous parts.[306]
Force is exerted by bodies not _intensively_ but _extensively_, because
as, where one part of a body is, there another is not, so at the point
where one part of the body acts another does not.[307]
[Sidenote: 5. Proportion of parts to whole in the infinite.]
A difficulty, not unknown to recent philosophy, occurred as to the
relation of infinites to one another. Whatever is an element of
the infinite must be infinite also; hence both earths and suns are
infinite in number. But the infinity of the former, said Bruno, is not
greater than that of the latter; nor, where all are inhabited, are
the inhabitants in greater proportion to the infinite than the stars
themselves.[308] Each sun is surrounded by several earths or planets,
but the one class is not greater in respect of its infinite than the
other. A single sun, earth, constellation, is not really a part of
the infinite nor a part in it, for it can bear no proportion to it.
A thousand infinities are not more than two or three, and even _one_
is not comprehensible by finite numbers. In the innumerable and the
immeasurable there is no place for more or less, few or many, nor for
any distinctions of number or measure.[309] The matter of the stars
is immeasurable, and no less immeasurable is that of the fiery type
or suns than of the aqueous type or earths. Nor does the fact that
these infinities are not given to sense disprove their existence, as
Aristotle had maintained. To imagine there is nothing beyond the sphere
which limits our range of sight, is to be like Bruno as a child, when
he believed there was nothing beyond Mount Vesuvius because there _was_
nothing to strike his senses.[310] Though each class be infinite,
we have seen that the infinite does not act infinitely, that is
_intensively_, but acts finitely, _i.e. extensively_. Each individual
and species is finite, but the number of all individuals is infinite,
and infinite are the matter in which they consist and the space in
which they move. Everywhere, therefore, limit and measure are only in
the particular and the individual, which, compared with the universe,
are nothing.
[Sidenote: 6. Figure and body.]
A further argument was derived from the necessity of figure in body
and from the relation of body to space.[311] Every body is known to
us as of a certain and definite figure, whereas infinite body would
necessarily be unfigured. In this case, said Bruno, Aristotle is
confounding body with space, although he elsewhere separates the two
notions. That space is something other than the bodies which fill it,
that it is more than limit or figure, is evident from the fact that
always between any two corporeal surfaces, between any two atoms, there
is space. Nor is space merely an accident of body, a special quality of
it, as colour is, for example, for we cannot think of colour without
a body in which it exists, and when the body is abstracted the colour
goes also, whereas space may be thought of apart from body, and body,
when removed does not take with it its space. Perhaps we should say
that space is really the continuous ether or light which penetrates
throughout the universe, and seems to fill space more continuously than
wood, stone, or iron, in which there is an admixture of _vacuum_. Must
all bodies be figured, then the figure of the infinite is the sphere.
The dimensions of space coincide with those of body, and the definition
given of body as tri-dimensional quantity applies also to space:--there
cannot be any body which is not in place, nor can its dimensions exist
without equal dimensions of the containing space.
[Sidenote: 7. The centre of the earth, etc.]
A seventh argument, closely related to some of the others, is drawn
from the old belief in the earth as the centre of gravity, the heaviest
body in the universe, and in the empyrean as the outermost limit and
the lightest body.[312] But, as we have seen, there is in the universe
no centre--as the stars and their inhabitants are heavenly beings to
us, so are we and our earth to them. "Just as the earth knows no centre
or downward direction proper which is away from its own body, but only
a centre of its mass, a central cavern of its heart, from which the
precious life is diffused through the whole body, and which we may
believe to be the chief seat of the soul; so there must be in the moon
and other bodies a centre which connects all parts, to which every
member contributes, and which is nourished by all the forces of the
living body." The old belief, therefore, that if there were inhabitants
at the antipodes they would be apt to fall downwards into space, or
that the parts of the moon and its living beings might fall upon our
earth, was absurd, for the face of the earth always looks upward in the
direction of the radii from the centre to the superficies.[313]
[Sidenote: 8. The perfect as the self-limited.]
The last argument was that drawn from the supposed perfection of the
universe.[314] Aristotle defined the perfect as that which was limited
by itself, not by another. Hence the immeasurable would not be perfect,
while the world was perfect because limited by its own terminus. Again
body does not pass over into any other kind of quantity, but it is
the limit into which the line and the point flow. The first argument,
said Bruno, would hold of any fragment of body, while the second
would apply to any animal or member of an animal, for these also are
self-contained and do not pass over into any other kind. Perfection
has no reference to quantity, nor to limitation by self, which is a
geometrical determination.[315] For this mechanical idea of perfection,
Bruno substitutes a teleological; the perfect is that which consists
of a number of parts or members, working together towards the end for
which the whole is ordained: the universe is perfect "as adorned by so
many worlds, which are so many deities, and as that in and to which, as
a unity embracing the perfection of all, innumerable things perfect in
their kind are reduced, referred, united."[316]
[Sidenote: Infinite number of worlds.]
The infinity of space or ether and of matter being proved, it follows
again, by the principle of sufficient reason, that the "worlds" are
"innumerable" or infinite in number.--As it is good that the world
exists, and would be bad did it not exist, so in a similar space,
and where similar causes are, it is good that there be a world, and
bad should there not be one. If the world is single, then there is a
single, finite, particular good, and infinite wide-spread universal
evil. He who is able to produce good, and does not do so, without
cause, is evil; "as not to be able is _privatively_ evil, to be able
and to be unwilling would be so _positively_, and God in regard to the
finite effect would be a finitely good cause, in regard, however, to
the repression of infinite realisation, would be infinitely evil."[317]
Perfection does not belong to our world, our system, taken by itself,
since there are innumerable other possible worlds which cannot be
contained in it. Given a man endowed with all human perfections, the
existence of other men subordinate to him is not excluded, but rather
demanded in order that he may fulfil the harmony of his being. So
the best, the first, of the monads,--which comprises all particular
things in itself,--embraces, in spite of its unity, innumerable worlds,
without limit, under its corporeal aspect. _One_ does not suffice, for
the productive mind diffuses itself throughout the whole universe,
wholly in every part, in equal goodness and power, and fills the
void in order that its great image may be presented throughout the
whole.[318] Nature thus puts forth an infinite mirror of itself and a
fitting reflection; its substance is infinite and its force eternal,
there is an _explicit_ immeasurable, as God is _implicitly_ in the
whole and everywhere wholly.[319] To the infinite nothing finite
bears any proportion, nor can be a fitting product of it. Hence if it
communicate itself at all to corporeal things, or unfold its magnitude
in corporeal existences and in multitude, the reflection of its essence
and imprint of its power must be infinite in magnitude and without
number. "Although, when we consider individuals singly, under that
proximate and immediate respect in which they are particulars, they
must be referred to a finite principle and cause (since a finite effect
demands a finite power), in the consideration of the universe, however,
each and all the innumerable existences in immeasurable space point to
an infinite first cause."[320]
[Sidenote: Argument from God to the world.]
In the simplicity and unity of God's being, all attributes are one,
therefore knowledge, will, and power coincide. The consequences of this
doctrine Bruno unfolds in a series of aphorisms or propositions--which
are interesting as anticipating Spinoza's method of "proof":[321]--1.
The Divine essence is infinite. 2. As the measure of being, so is the
measure of power. 3. As the measure of power, so is the measure of
action. 4. God is absolutely simple essence or being in which there
can be no complexity nor internal diversity. 5. Consequently in him,
being, power, action, volition, and whatever can be truly attributed to
him, are one and the same. 6. Therefore the will of God is above all
things, and can be frustrated neither by himself nor by another. 7.
Consequently the Divine will is not only necessary, but is necessity
itself, and its opposite is not only impossible but impossibility
itself. 8. In simple essence there cannot be contrariety of any kind,
nor inequality: will, therefore, is not contrary to, nor unequal
to, power. 9. Necessity and liberty are one, hence what acts by the
necessity of nature acts freely; it would not act freely at all did
it act otherwise than is demanded by necessity and nature, or by the
necessity of nature.[322] 10. There is not an infinite _power_, unless
there be an infinite _possible_; _i.e._ there is not that which is able
to create an infinite unless there be that which is able to be created.
What is a power which is impossible of realisation or which is relative
to an impossible? 11. As there is a world in _this_ space, so also
there is able to be one in any space similar to that which, were this
world removed, would remain equal to the world. 12. There is no ground
for denying, outside the world, a similar space to that in which the
world is, nor any for regarding it as finite.[323] 14. It is better to
be than not to be; it is more worthy to create what is good than not to
create it. To posit (create) being and truth is incomparably better
than to allow not-being or nothing. 15. The potency of nature ought
not to be frustrated, nor space remain unfilled for infinite duration,
for then potency would be relative to an impossible. 16. That infinite
potency (whether extensive or intensive) should be frustrated of
existence means that infinite evil should be actually posited, as space
is actually infinite. 17. As _this_ space can receive this world and be
adorned thereby, so also any similar space whatever, indiscernible from
it, a similar principle being present, could have received a similar
world.[324] 19. Of God and of nature we should think as highly as
possible. 20. Of the greatest things nothing should be rashly asserted
which is contrary to sense and reason.
[Sidenote: Knowledge of God.]
The infinite number of worlds is thus made to depend for its proof
upon the identity of power and will, of will and knowledge, _i.e._
thought, in God. Whatever is in the mind of God is realised in the
universe. Before God past, present, and future are one, present, and
eternal;[325] he is unable to change his purpose or to deny himself.
What he wills and what he can are one and the same; nor can he do what
he wills not, for fate is the Divine will itself. Hence, as he cannot
be other than he is, so nothing can be done by him otherwise than as it
is done. The nature of God is a simple substance; however many names
be predicated of it, they signify, one and all, the same thing.[326]
Infinite virtue, if limited neither by itself nor by another, acts by
the necessity of its own nature, not by a necessity alien to itself
and to its will; it is itself necessity. The necessity by which it
acts, therefore, can be frustrated neither from within, by itself, nor
from without, by another: not the former, for it cannot be both one
thing and another, nor the latter, because its necessity is the law of
all other things. There can be nothing which may prevent this nature,
necessity, will, power, from proceeding according to its whole power,
which is goodness itself, according to its whole goodness, which is
power itself, and both are infinite, and diffuse themselves infinitely.
Man's liberty of action is expressed imperfectly, and sometimes in
an imperfect object, is continually being disturbed by passion and
ignorance of things; for if we acted without any disturbance of the
will, or course of thought, without ignorance, or passion, then our
action would be determined always towards the better of two opposed
ends. Before we act we stand between the two ways and deliberate, and
at last determine, but in uncertainty and perturbedness of spirit;
while God, as in nature most perfect, acts in the one of two ways
that is the most fitting. Nor is it an imperfection of nature to be
determined in one direction only, away from that which may lead to
error. Thus we may not refer the will and action of God to a liberty of
this kind, of being equally or unequally disposed to two contradictory
volitions or acts--a liberty of indifference--but his liberty is of the
kind which is identical with necessity. Over it is nothing greater, in
the way of it there is nothing equal, all things in all and throughout
all serve it. God's knowledge is not discursive, involves no effort.
To be in the mind of God is to be realised (_species concepta deo est
effectio resque_). Thus as the perfect monad, he is intrinsically and
extrinsically the whole, sustaining all things. There is on the one
side infinite goodness and infinite desire for its realisation, on the
other infinite desire of being realised; the result must be perfect
satisfaction and perfect good.
[Sidenote: Abstract ideas.]
In order to understand how far Bruno has moved at this, the final
stage of his philosophy, from the Neoplatonism of its beginnings, the
ninth chapter of the last book of the _De Immenso_ must be taken into
account.[327] It is interesting in view of the relation of Spinoza to
Bruno, as well as of the consistency of Bruno's own thought. In it the
existence of _abstract ideal types_ is contended against,--"Nowhere is
essence apart from existence;--nature is nothing but the virtue that is
immanent (_insita_) in things, and the law by which all things fulfil
their course. There is no abstract that subsists in logical reason
but not in reality, no justice by which things are just, no goodness
through which they are good, wisdom through which they are wise, nor
are _deitas_ and _feritas_ the ground of existence of gods and beasts:
nor is it light by which shining bodies shine, nor shadow by which
folly, darkness, fictions, nonsense come to exist." The student of
nature must not suppose form and matter, light and colour and motion,
to exist separately by themselves because they may be conceived or
defined by themselves. There is then no archetypal world to which the
Creator looked in fabricating this of ours, but nature produces all
things from within itself, without thought or hesitation. "Study to
know where Nature and God are, for there are the causes of things, the
life of principles, the source of elements, the seeds of the things
that are to be brought forth, the typal forms, active potency producing
all things, ... there is also matter, the underlying passive potency,
abiding, present, ever coming together into one as it were, for it
is not as if a creator came from on high, to give it order and form
from without. Matter pours forth all things from its own lap, Nature
itself is the inward workman, a living art, a wondrous virtue which is
endowed with mind, giving realisation to a matter which is its own, not
foreign to itself; not hesitating, but producing all things easily out
of itself, as fire shines and burns, as light spreads without effort
through space.... Nature is not so miserably endowed as to be excelled
by human art, which is directed by a kind of internal sense, while
several kinds of animals, guided by their inward mind, show an innate
foresight of a wonderful kind,--ants and the industrious bees, which
have no type or model spread before them. For there is a nature which
is _more than present to_, which is _immanent in_ things, remote from
none as none is remote from being, except the false: and while only
the surface of things without changes, deeper in the heart of all than
is each to itself it lives, the principle of existence, source of all
forms, ... Mind, God, Being, One, Truth, Fate, Reason, Order."[328]
_Natura naturata_ is thus not a resultant or outcome of _natura
naturans_ with Bruno; they are one and the same thing under different
aspects, and both are one with God, the living force in things.
[Sidenote: Aristotle on plurality of worlds.]
[Sidenote: Perfection.]
The arguments of Aristotle against the plurality of worlds are in the
seventh book set out one by one, and controverted from Bruno's own
standpoint, at times with great fulness and subtlety. It would be
unprofitable to enter far into this debate, where the advantage lay so
obviously on one side. We have already seen that Bruno was able to lay
his finger upon the weak spot in Aristotle's system, the definitions
of space and time. There is no absolute norm of time, said Bruno,
whether arithmetical, geometrical, or physical; for in this kind we
cannot fix a _minimum_, and least of all on Peripatetic principles;
there is always a less than any given period of time, hence we cannot
lay down any true measure of time, _i.e._ all time is relative to the
individual. In any case the daily movement (of the outermost sphere, as
Aristotle thought, but in fact) of the earth, is not really circular.
There are as many moving agents as there are stars, as there are souls,
or deities.[329] But "if we must assume some one presiding over the
infinite number of agents, we must ascend above all or descend down
to the centre of all, to the absolute being, present above all and
within all ... more intimate to all things than each is to itself, not
more distant from one than from another, for it is equally the nearest
to all."[330] Several of the arguments of Aristotle were drawn from
abstract conceptions of unity and perfection, and evidently raised
interesting problems for the time of Bruno. They are, briefly, that
a plurality of worlds would be irrational, since no reason could be
given for one number rather than another, that it is more in accordance
with the perfection of the monad, that all reality should be massed
together in one world, that the economy of nature does not admit of
the multiplication of goods, that the passive capacity (_matter_) is
not equal to the active power (the _form_), that the perfect is by
its very nature unique. Bruno answers that there is no definite, but
an infinite, number of worlds, and that if the former were the case
no reason could be put forward why there should be only one, which in
Bruno's sense of world is no doubt true. As to the monad, the true
monad is that which embraces all number or plurality in itself. "We
are not compelled to define a number, we who say that there is an
infinite number of worlds; _there_ no distinction exists of odd or
even, since these are differences of number, not of the innumerable.
Nor can I think there have ever been philosophers who, in positing
several worlds, did not posit them also as infinite: for would not
reason, which demands something further beyond this sensible world, so
also outside of and beyond whatever number of worlds is assumed, assume
again another and another?"[331]
[Sidenote: One life in all the worlds.]
That there are more worlds than one is due to the presence everywhere
throughout space of the same principle of life, which everywhere has
the same effect; just as within one of these worlds, the earth, we find
different species of the same animal--of man, for example--which cannot
be descended from the same parentage. There are "men of different
colours, cavemen, mountain-pygmies, the guardians of minerals, the
giants of the South," each of which races must have been produced
independently in its own place. And finally, although it is true
that nothing can be added to the perfect, why may not the perfect
be multiplicable? Though the perfect man is one, nature may produce
several within the same species. "Everywhere is one soul, one spirit
of the world, wholly in the whole and in every part of it, as we find
in our lesser world also. This soul ... (should the kind of place and
of element not conflict) produces all things everywhere; so that for
the generation of some even time is not required.... The infinite
universe, and it only under God, is perfect. Nothing finite is so good
that it could not be better; whatever may be better has some degree
of evil and defect, as what is not absolutely bright is not without
some signs of obscurity.... Therefore the perfect, absolutely and
in itself, is one, infinite, which cannot be greater or better, and
than which nothing can be greater or better. This is one, everywhere,
the only God, universal nature, of which nothing can be a perfect
image or reflection, but the infinite. Everything finite therefore is
imperfect, every sensible world is imperfect, as good and evil, matter
and form, light and darkness, joy and sadness concur in it, and all
things everywhere are in alteration and movement; but all of them, in
the infinite, are as in unity, truth, and goodness, and in this aspect
the infinite is rightly called the universe."[332] In the infinite, as
we have learned from the _Causa_, all contraries are one. The universe
is perfect, not because of its quantity, but because it contains all
other things in it.[333] Within the limits of their kind small causes
can produce small effects with some perfection; much more effective is
that immeasurable and more general cause, of which nothing stands in
the way. It is a harmony of the many in one, the only corporeal image
of the divine mind. The finite, however, is imperfect only when taken
apart from the whole to which it belongs, _i.e._ evil and defect are
appearances only. Although in nature not all things are of their best,
and more species than one produce monstrosities, yet we may not find
fault with the great building of the mighty architect, for even the
small, weak, and diminutive contributes its part to the nobility of the
whole. Is a picture most beautiful when it is blazoned all over with
gold and purple? Does it not shine out best from a dull background?
Can there be any part which, in its order and place within the whole
body, is not good, and the best in the end and in the whole? A harmony
in music is better the greater the variety within it of length, accent,
pause, and the like.[334]
The perfect may be either (1) "the perfect absolutely, or (2) the
perfect in its kind." The former again is twofold, according as it
is (1) "that which is wholly in the whole and in every part, or (2)
that which is wholly in the whole but not in the part." Of these the
one is divinity, the intellect of the universe, absolute goodness and
truth, the other the immeasurable corporeal reflection of the divine.
As within the universe there are many things perfect in their kind,
which it combines in its unity, containing in itself the perfection of
all, it may in a second sense be called the absolutely perfect. For
no one world singly, nor system of worlds, nor any number of systems,
can be brought into comparison with God, except indirectly, through
the immeasurable wisdom, power, and goodness. "Nothing is absolutely
imperfect or evil, for the highest nature exists in a certain sense
in the meanest and lowest, as on the palette of a painter colours are
thought little of which presently, unfolded into the scheme of the
picture, shall seem to be, along with the painter himself, of chief
importance."[335] Moral evil, itself, as we shall find, has no reality
for Bruno's pantheism. Justice and goodness, not existing as abstract
entities, have their only ground in the divine will, _i.e._ in the
course of nature.[336] On the other hand, it is not in the part, the
detail, the trivial or minute existence, that the divine will is most
adequately declared, but in the whole, its plan and its law. "What
is best and most glorious, most beseeming the goodness of His nature,
is to be attributed to His will. It is impious to seek this in the
blood of insects, in the mummied corpse, in the foam of the epileptic,
under the shaking feet of murderers, or in the melancholy mysteries of
vile necromancers;[337] it must be sought rather in the inviolable,
intemerate law of nature, in the religion of a mind directed duly by
that law, in the splendour of the sun, in the beauty of the things
which are brought forth from this our parent, after His true image,
as expressed bodily in the beauty of those innumerable living things,
which, in the immeasurable sweep of the one heaven, shine and live,
have sense and intelligence, and sing praises to the One, the highest
and best."[338]