Philosophie_. We do not have the work under discussion at hand, but
judging simply from the quotations made in the present article, we can
confidently say that Volkelt has misunderstood Wundt's position. We
shall here confine ourselves to one point only which is of paramount
importance, and Johannes Volkelt fully appreciates its importance. This
point is the problem, "Can we have any objective knowledge at all?"
This is the way we should formulate the question. Volkelt, however,
asks whether the trans-subjective can successfully be made object of
our cognition. It is maintained that there is a trace of naïve Realism
left in Wundt, because his trans-subjectivism remains unproven, and
subject and object are treated as inseparably connected. Wundt says:
"As soon as we make the erroneous proposition that the object of our
perception is only a perception, we shall in vain try to get somehow
out from our subjective perception and to regain in some way the
lost object." This idea is objected to. Also the following passages
are quoted from Wundt: "Reality once destroyed cannot be restored
merely through pure thought," and "the theory of cognition has not
to create reality from elements that do not as yet contain it." We
agree perfectly with Wundt and have expressed similar ideas in the
article "The Origin of Mind," No. 1 of _The Monist_. Perception is a
relation between object and subject. It is an error of idealism to
consider the subject alone as given. The data of experience are states
of subject-object-ness. The idea of mere subjectivity is as much an
abstraction as the idea of things in themselves. Accordingly the term
"trans-subjective" is a misnomer. All perceptions being impressions
of objects and serving as symbols for their correspondent objects
contain an objective element. As soon as we disregard this truth, we
shut ourselves up in the hollow globe of pure ideality; objectivity
becomes an unwarrantable assumption and there is no way out of our own
subjectivism.
Knud Ipsen sketches the history of the Danish philosophy during the
last ten years. He mentions five philosophers, Höffding, Kroman,
Wilkens, Lehmann, and Starcke, among whom Höffding is by far the most
prominent. All the Danish philosophers have one feature in common.
Kroman made a distinction between philosophy and world-conception;
philosophy should make such propositions only as can be logically
proven, not otherwise than theories have to be proven in the
sciences. Yet a world-conception is the work mainly of our emotion
and imagination. Accordingly philosophy and world-conception are two
distinct things which have nothing in common. This position seems to
be generally accepted by the Danish philosophers, and as a natural
consequence Ipsen says, we can speak no more of "philosophy," but
only of philosophical disciplines. The unity of philosophy, its ideal
of system is lost. Metaphysics is dead in Denmark and the search
for the universal laws of existence is also given up. Philosophy has
ceased to be the science of the sciences and has become an aggregate
of scientific disciplines. On this point there is a tacit agreement
so that there is no "useless struggle about great and insolvable
problems," and since Höffding wrote on the relation between faith
and science, our Danish philosophers also shun all theological
interference. A division of labor has taken place so that psychology
has been treated by Höffding, Kroman, and Lehmann, Ethics by Höffding
and Starcke, Logic by Höffding and Kroman, Sociology by Wilkens and
Starcke, and Æsthetics by Wilkens.
Professor Höffding and Kroman in spite of their consensus in rejecting
the unity of philosophy represent a very strong contrast, which is
best characterised by their method of treating the law of causation.
Kroman rejects all the former evidences employed to prove the law of
cause and effect. Empiricism is wrong because it can at best show the
temporal succession of two phenomena, and apriorism is wrong because
_a priori_ knowledge lies in the subject alone and not in the object.
In causation, however, the objects play an important part, and we can
never know whether the objects will always conform to the subjective
and _a priori_ laws. Kroman's view of the subject is that the causal
law is the sole condition by which we can acquire any knowledge at
all, accordingly for the sake of self-preservation we _hope_ that this
condition will be fulfilled. The causal law accordingly is not only the
condition of all knowledge, it is also the postulate with which we have
to start.
Höffding attacks the problem in a different way. He asks first: "How do
we come at all to a reality supposed to be independent of the subject?"
and "What is the import of this reality?" Reality according to Höffding
is not yet given in sense-perception, we arrive at the idea of reality
not until our sense-perceptions are arranged in a coherent system. If
I see a picture at the wall, this may be an hallucination, but if my
sense of touch corroborates the perception of sight, I consider it as
a reality. Thus the idea of reality originates and this reality is
not distinguishable from a coherent and self-consistent dream. To the
dreamer his dream is reality. Now the question of causality is not
legitimate, whether things conform to the law of causation, for indeed
we know things only by their being causes or effects. The main function
of our consciousness is to recognise similarities and dissimilarities,
it searches for unity and this search is performed through the
application of the causal law. Höffding accordingly considers both
ideas, the causal nexus and reality, as being of the same value. His
causal law is more than a postulate, it is in part a result. Our
organ of cognition would die of atrophy if it were not constantly
nourished, and we should share the fate of Tantalus were we condemned
to investigate and always unable to discover.
Kroman looks upon the law of inertia as a special application of
the causal law. To him the conservation of matter and energy is an
hypothesis. Höffding looks upon the law of inertia as a material
principle. Where Kroman speaks of energy, Höffding speaks of corporeal
energy. (It may be that here the German translation _körperliche Kraft_
is at fault.) As a material principle the law of inertia is something
more than a mere corollary of the causal law, for in its present form
it has made science possible. The conservation of matter and energy is
conceived in an analogous manner, but considered as natural laws both
propositions possess a mere hypothetical value.
It appears to us that the law of cause and effect lies deeper still,
and there can be no doubt that the law of the conservation of matter
and energy is the same thing only formulated for different purposes.
Hume's merit was exceedingly great when he laid his finger on the sore
spot of philosophical thought, pointing out the prevailing confusion
about the law of causation. But when investigating the subject, he led
us on a wrong track. Cause and effect are not two objects following one
another, and not even two phenomena following one another. It is not
a synthesis of two events. It is on the contrary an analysis of one
event. Cause and effect is a change. In this change the same amount of
matter and energy is preserved, yet the form is altered. Hume broke
the process of cause and energy into pieces, he lost sight of their
interconnection and was astonished that one piece was not exactly the
same as the other. Hence his skepticism.
The law of cause and effect can be proved, except to him who would
obstinately refuse to acknowledge the law of identity that _A_=_A_.
There may be some one who thinks that something can come out of
nothing, or that something can suddenly disappear into nothing. If
there is, the weight of the argument rests with him, yet we shall not
listen to him until he presents an unequivocal case in which we can
observe a transition from being into not-being or _vice versa_. Until
then we consider the law of identity and also its practical application
and corollary, the conservation of matter and energy as unrefuted.
The law of cause and effect and its corollary the conservation
of matter and energy rest ultimately upon our recognition of the
_Gesetzmässigkeit_ of formal laws. He who acknowledges the correctness
of the statement "2×2=4" as universal and necessary, implicitly accepts
also the law of causation and of the conservation of matter and energy.
The law of the conservation of matter and energy contains no other
proposition than this that 2×2 will always be 2×2 or its product, i. e.
4; it will never be less, it will never be more.
The ultimate basis of the law of causation lies in the laws of form.
We may call causality and the law of inertia and the conservation of
matter and energy hypotheses, but in that case the meaning of the term
hypothesis would have to be changed, for if these laws are hypotheses,
the statement 2×2=4 would be just as much an hypothesis.
* * * * *
In psychology Kroman and Höffding are more antagonistic than in any
other subject. Both consider the soul as an _x_, but Kroman attributes
to this _x_, unity and the faculty of feeling, willing and thinking;
Höffding however looks upon feeling and motion as two sides of the
same unknown object. Kroman in spite of his formal opposition to
metaphysicism still believes in a subject underlying the acts of
consciousness. After all, the name only of metaphysicism seems to be
dead in Denmark, not metaphysicism itself. Höffding has shown how
Kroman's psychological theory has led him into a highly mythical
conception of the activity of the soul.
We may add that the proposition of non-interference with theological
views may be excellent in preserving peace, but we cannot help
considering this kind of peace as a mistaken policy. If there are
conflicts between theology and philosophy, they should be settled, for
there cannot be two contradictory truths, and it is wrong also to leave
errors alone simply for the sake of peace. Yet it is objected that
religion is a matter of the heart and philosophy a matter of the brain.
Certainly, but the heart should have its emotion regulated by the
brain. If our world-conception is the product mainly of our emotions
and of our imagination, it would be simply foolish to let the heart
build its world-conception just as it pleases without consulting the
head. Wherever philosophy and religion or our world-conception (the
latter considered as the product of our emotion) have nothing to say to
each other, wherever they are kept distinct, it will lead to confusion
in all the departments of our existence, it will put our philosophy,
our scientific thought, and our ethics out of joint. A rent will go
through the world of our life producing disharmony in every spot and
the end will be a dreary pessimism. Our emotions are not a separate
chamber of our being which should be kept private and unaffected by
scientific knowledge, our emotions are springs of action, and it is
of paramount importance to keep them in harmony with our knowledge of
facts. The policy of theological non-interference may do for some time,
but certainly not long. It is a mere armistice but no peace, and honest
war is better than a sham-truce which is an ill-concealed state of
intolerable hostility. (Heidelberg: G. Weiss.)
κρς.
VOPROSUI FILOSOFII I PSICHOLOGII. Vol. II. No. 3. March, 1891.
CONTENTS:
SCHILLER'S DOCTRINE OF BEAUTY AND ÆSTHETICAL ENJOYMENT. By _P.
Kalenov_.
ON THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS. (Conclusion.) By _Prince C.
N. Trubetzkoi_.
IDEALS AND REALITY. By _B. V. A. Golzev_.
LETTERS ON COUNT L. N. TOLSTOI'S BOOK "OF LIFE." (Continuation.)
By _A. A. Kozlov_.
RELIGIOUS METAPHYSICS OF THE MOSLEM ORIENT. A Sketch. By _C.
Umanetz_.
THE MORALITY OF MENTALLY DISEASED PERSONS. Ethics Of Mental
Diseases. By _V. Tchij_.
CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1) Introduction to the history of
the new philosophy. Problems of history and of the history
of philosophy. The significance of ancient and mediæval
philosophy. By _N. Grote_.
2) The ideals of most recent Ethics. A review of W. Wundt's "Eine
Untersuchung der Thatsachen und Gesetze des sittlichen Lebens."
By _A. Bao_.
REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC PERIODICALS.
BOOK REVIEWS. Russian and foreign books on Methodology, Logic,
Psychology, Psycho-pathology and Philosophy of history.
POLEMICS ON N. N. LANGE'S ARTICLE. By _E. Tchelpanov_.
APPENDIX: 1) Materials for the history of philosophy in Russia.
1855-1888. (Continuation.) _Y. Kohibovsky._ 2) Bibligraphical
Index. 3) Proceedings of The Psychological Society.
_Schiller's Doctrine of Beauty and Æsthetical Enjoyment._ The nations
of western Europe have been long familiar with Schiller's doctrine of
beauty and of æsthetical enjoyment; but one must agree with the writer,
that it is still a subject that has not outlived, probably never will
outlive, that unfading freshness and deep interest which it ever must
possess to all cultured and thinking minds. The writer, moreover, calls
attention to the fact, that as regards Russia, Schiller, although
well-known as a poet, is too little known as a philosopher.
_On the Nature of Consciousness._ Concluding his series of articles
on the nature of human consciousness with an internal analysis of
consciousness, the writer remarks, that without having recourse to the
testimony of hypnotic experiments or to the phenomenon of so-called
"mental suggestion," which so conspicuously demonstrates the reciprocal
compenetration of the individual sphere of consciousness, we find a
constant, normal, and substantial bond between that which constitutes
and conditions the whole accord or harmony of the spiritual life of
individual man; because, if from our individual consciousness this
vital bond is removed which unites us to other consciousnesses, to
the preceding as well as the following ones; if there is removed from
our individual consciousness the connection and partnership of all
succession, of all that is suggested and suggestible, it will lose
both form and contents, and be turned into nothing.... We know that
man is the heir of the work of previous races, of their organisation
and feeling. All human feelings,—the results of adaptation,—all the
instincts and appetites are precisely just as our organs, they are
our psycho-physical organisation. Feeling is the original basis of
individual consciousness; and thus, in consciousness itself, in our
feeling itself,—we are able to disclose several radical, universal
elements. We, unaccountably, attribute every reality to particular
feelings, and we cannot imagine that these peculiarities depend
exclusively upon our subjective individual feeling, on our own eyes
and ears. Light, warmth, hardness, sound, colors are naïvely conceived
within our consciousness, irrespective of the objective properties of
the things themselves. Usually we suppose that the sun shines, the sea
roars, flowers are fragrant simply through our personal presumption. We
do not understand that our own feelings experience certain sensations
in the presence of the given phenomena.... If we now conceive that
all sensation presupposes something that is sentient; it is clear
that feeling, as conditioning the perception of the material world,
cannot be merely subjective. Recognising the objective reality of the
material world, we presuppose anthropomorphically a general feeling.
The elements of which the external world consists correspond to
the fundamental aspects of sensation and to the elements of sense.
A sensual universe, in so far as we recognise its objectivity,
presupposes a universal sense, with which our own individual sensation
must be connected. In reference to the analysis of moral consciousness
the writer refers the reader to the works of Kant. If there is a
solidarity of myself with all things, then it is clear that I am bound
to live up to it. As in a general way I am conscious of the existence
and reality of other beings, so I likewise feel an ideal, moral
necessity of a common altruism, of a common and perfect love toward
all. This general love is distinguished from natural inclination,
and is contrary to it; this constitutes my bounden _duty_ in my
relation to all, and is a general ethical law. One cannot maintain
that man knew this law _a priori_, because he was moral before and he
knew it not. Still, it is less possible, that man knew this general
and unconditional verity _a posteriori_—that he knew good without
goodness, morals without morality. But, when man attains to a certain
degree of self-knowledge, when he has detached himself from the
omnipotent tyranny of prejudices, and of all traditional principles of
congenital morals, then he grows conscious of this law, and finds it in
himself. This law is not anything external to us, but it is deposited
within us. In just the same proportion as we recognise the law of
causality, we shall also recognise the moral law. _Reason_ itself
is compelled to arouse in us conscience,—theoretical consciousness
awakens ethical consciousness.
The law of causality is a formal law, that does not impart to us
any real cognition; it is, precisely, the form of our knowledge.
The ethical law, the law of the general solidarity of ethical aims,
does not presuppose this form without contents, but presupposes an
ideal content, the true essence of a common _general_ consciousness,
as something that unconditionally must be. Its sanction is not in
the formal agreement of individual beings, but in their being in a
necessary, ideal union.
Man is conscious of the fact that he cannot attain the ethical ideal
through himself only. He must seek for it in perfect love. Only a
perfect and all-comprehensive love can atone and justify man. But this
love is not a natural instinct of man, but a grace, independent of man,
which is acquired by faith. This faith itself is already a fact of
love, and by those who believe, it is conceived as a manifestation of
grace.
_Letters on Tolstoï's book "Of Life."_ The writer of these letters on
Count Tolstoï's book "Of Life" undertakes an analysis of the peculiar
philosophical truths and errors which it contains. He points out the
_method_ employed by Tolstoï and the causes of his contradictions and
errors. By so doing he hopes in conclusion to formulate the theory of
the philosophical system to which belongs the work itself.
The writer first calls his correspondent's attention to Tolstoï's
positive statement to the effect, that "the world is subordinated to
the law of reason—in the heavenly bodies, in animals and plants. This
law, without our own interference, prevails throughout all creation,
and within ourselves we know this law, and are obliged to fulfil the
same." Yet how does Count Tolstoï know that the whole world is subject
to the law of reason? By virtue of the principle of cognition that was
mooted in the writer's previous letter, we can know it with a degree of
certitude only concerning ourselves. Tolstoï himself maintains, that
"much less are we able to know anything about the external, material
world which is subject to the laws of space and time." In other words,
Tolstoï contradicts his own theory. As regards his other statement, his
estimate of "true and false life," the two can only be reconciled by
admitting certain other hypotheses that are manifestly contradictory to
constant human experience, such as the gratuitous hypothesis that men
who follow "the teaching of this world" and not that of wise men "do
not live," they "exist" only. Tolstoï's theory, expressing a definition
of life, would oblige us to turn our attention only to a few facts of
immediate consciousness, but to ignore many others that are not subject
to doubt. But, setting aside Tolstoï's peculiar theory of consciousness
and cognition, the writer turns to the problem of the Ego, as the
most important for the solution of the points involved in the present
discussion.
In reply to this letter the writer regrets that he himself, having but
little taste for deep philosophical discussion, finds it exceedingly
difficult to defend Count Tolstoï's views against attacks such as those
of Mr. Kozlov. Still, it seems to him that Mr. Kozlov in his whole
analysis of Tolstoï's book seeks to evade the main question; namely,
Can we call a human life a life so long as men tear each other to
pieces like wild beasts?
Tolstoï's critic in conclusion asks, what, precisely, ought to be
understood by life? In his reply, after investigating the nature of
the Ego, Mr. Kozlov concludes: Man, according to Tolstoï, is only a
collective term. It is no more than a name for groups of a few special
objects, in their arbitrary relation to a totality. These collective
objects are purely _entia rationis_, as the names forest, river,
army, crowd, etc. This collective subject is called man. Matter, in
Tolstoï's metaphysics, represents the only element, the reality and
substantiality of which is not subject to the least doubt. Matter
is uncreated and indestructible, it remains identical with itself,
constantly through motion combining itself into different aggregates
called bodies. In the formation of the living body, matter serves
as the basis, on which exist other subjects, that also constitute
man, by Tolstoï called "animal personalities." This subject, in its
functions and manifestations answers to that which is usually called
man, and with Tolstoï it has a doubtful substantiality. Thus, although
man is indefinitely continued, preserved through reproduction, and
constantly renewed in fresh specimens, still this subject might
disappear, be destroyed, for example, by a catastrophe happening to
the terrestrial globe. On the other hand, this subject arose in
time. At all events, all that is individual, existing in the separate
specimens of the human race, disappears, is destroyed at the physical
death of the individual, animal body. Consciousness belongs to this
animal personality; it exists in time, and is subject to the laws of
time. On the soil and foundation of this animal individuality there
arises a third existence that enters into the composition of man,
namely—reason or rational consciousness. This element displays the
character of substance in a much higher degree than animal personality.
Like matter it is uncreated, indestructible, and eternal. But eternity
of reason is distinguished from eternity of matter in this, that reason
is not subject to the laws of time and space, to which matter is
subject notwithstanding its eternity. Yet here we have an unavoidable
combination of two conceptions of eternity,—the one as endless time,
the other as absence of time, which means that the idea of time should
not be attributed to it at all. Reason, according to Tolstoï, is not
particular and individual, but purely universal and common. It does not
possess a detached or transcendental being. (Moscow, March, 1891.)
γλν.
TRANSCRIBER'S CORRECTIONS
page original text correction
12 in correllation with in correlation with
27 one hundred cubic millemetres one hundred cubic millimetres
41 by the maintainance of by the maintenance of
67 by the concept of of the _I_ by the concept of the _I_
82 often used as synomyms, often used as synonyms,
89 annointed with oil and soot, anointed with oil and soot,
133 and such mistatements as and such misstatements as
173 that of Arided (α Cycni), that of Arided (α Cygni),
208 in the seventeeth chapter in the seventeenth chapter
225 employd some decades ago employed some decades ago
265 dispute it acumen dispute its acumen
301 world-conception or are ligion world-conception or a religion
315 seats in both ears. seats in both ears."
425 border on imbecilty, border on imbecility,
467 ANALYSES ET COMTES RENDUS. ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.
477 There trenscendentalists There transcendentalists
559 her life ends in insaniyt. her life ends in insanity.
566 the German poets critiicise the German poets criticise
574 an historial point of view an historical point of view
585 (Sankrit) _mânas_ (Sanskrit) _mânas_
590 Weil et Maurice, Pub. Weill et Maurice, Pub.
624 Nr. Nichols's final conclusion Mr. Nichols's final conclusion
631 affords some difficulty. affords some difficulty."
End of Project Gutenberg's The Monist, Vol. 1, 1890-1891, by Various