in the question whether, as imagined by Compulsory Determinists, the
strongest motive has from the first governed the deliberation or
process of choosing, as it subsequently governs the action chosen, or
whether the victorious motive owes its superior strength to the act
or process of deliberation, which terminates in choice, as much as
to its own initial degree of strength. In favor of the latter view,
he states that choice involves deliberation, and such deliberation
involves a consciousness of incompatible or alternative desires, and
a comparison of their relative degrees of desirability. The act of
choice is the same in nature as the act of selective attention in
perception and thought, and is known by the sense of effort or tension
which gives it the character of an _act_, and the consciousness of
a decisive change in the relative desirabilities of the alternative
desires represented in the deliberation, which gives it the character
of an act of _choice_. All true volition is choice, whether the
desire, almost instantaneously adopted, is adopted because the will
is weak, or because it is strong. In the former case, the will is
mastered by a powerful motive; in the latter case, the motive which it
follows receives its strength from the will itself, in the character
of a deliberating agency. To the extent of the deliberation there is
freedom. Freedom in willing is merely the power to will. Volition is
the name for the whole action of which Freedom is the potential state,
and Choice or Resolve the completing act.
Mr. Stout's article is in continuation of that on "Apperception and
the Movement of Attention" in the last number of _Mind_. Intuitional
thinking is independent of language and other expressive signs.
Language is a way of attending indirectly to that which cannot be
attended to directly, and signs which fulfil such a function are
_expressive_ signs. An expressive sign must be carefully distinguished
from a _suggestive_ sign, which merely calls up a certain idea which
may then be attended to independently of it, and a _substitute_
sign, which is a means of _not_ thinking about the meaning which
it symbolises. The development of language is a development of
self-consciousness. A concept is an apperceptive system objectified
by means of an expressive sign. Expressive signs are the form, as
distinguished from the matter, of conceptual thought. The distinction
between formal and formless languages acts as a line of demarcation
between the language of natural signs and that of conventional
signs. Gesture-language may be described as formless. It is an
instrument of conceptual thinking, in which the natural signs are
either demonstrative or imitative. Onomatopœia is a phonetic gesture.
Conventional signs, being free from the necessary limitations of
natural signs, are capable of expressing adequately and accurately the
most specific and the most abstract concepts.
In his article on the "Nature of Consciousness," Mr. Shand seeks to
show that consciousness, when abstracted from the other acts combined
with it, is a unique judgment, and as an act of judging it is simple
and unanalysable. As a union of act and object, however, consciousness
is complex. The whole is a judgment which, besides its object, contains
also the difference between its act and its object. Here is shown
its contrast with the Transcendent Judgment, which merely judges its
object. But there is a fundamental unity between them. Each is a
judgment—an act concerned about an object different from its act, and,
as an act, each is a simple reality. Judgment, universally as an act,
is such a simple reality. Reality in consciousness means no more than
presentation, and the act of being conscious is the subject exercising
one of its functions. This mysterious something, the subject, cannot
be resolved into any association of presentations, nor into any one of
them, nor be derived by abstraction from them, so far at least as the
act of being conscious is concerned, which is a genuine function of the
subject.
Professor Land gives a sketch of the life and work of Arnold Geulincx,
the Flemish thinker of the seventeenth century known to students of
philosophy in connection with the doctrine of Occasionalism. The key
to Geulincx's view of philosophy is to be found in his statement that
the utterances of our own reason are far less regarded than the shows
of senses and fantasy; although they have their source in the bodily
life, which is radically foreign to the soul, and can only darken
the knowledge of our self and of its true interests. The dualism of
mind and body is for Geulincx a determined fact. Professor Land has
undertaken to prepare a complete edition of Geulincx's works, the
expenses of the publication of which will be defrayed from the balance
remaining over from the Spinoza Memorial fund.
In his discussion on "thought-relations," Mr. Eastwood states that
this puzzling expression is interwoven with the whole of Green's
writings, and requires to be thoroughly explained. The proof that the
Real is identical with the Thinkable was Green's great problem, and
to Hegel's inquiry what are the essential features of thought? he
replied: the constitution of relations. Green found, however, that
they are not fully adequate in themselves and he called to their
aid a spiritual principle or eternal subject. But the reference of
relations to the Eternal Mind as their subject is a reference to the
unknown, and therefore is, on grounds of strict reason, illegitimate.
Thought-relations are essentially finite, and are the connecting links
of the phenomenal world. In the evolution of thought the absolute is
nothing short of the whole, and especially, it is the whole _process of
transition_ from Being to the Idea. The more we try to externalise it
or to arrest its movement, by impressing it with the immutability of
thought-relations, the more it recedes from our grasp.
In his Notes on Volition, Professor Bain considers whether pain is to
be regarded as the sole motive in voluntary action, or whether the
motive is a growing pleasure or a diminishing pleasure, in concurrence
with some form of active exertion. Considerations arising from the
great differences among pleasures themselves leads him to reject the
view that the stimulus of the will is uneasiness pure and simple, and
that pleasure, as such, leads to quiescence and contentment. A taste of
pleasure constitutes an impetus to seek for more and may be accepted as
the normal situation of the human will. The graded scale of voluntary
action ranges from the lowest depths of pain, at which the motive power
is at its maximum, to the highest assignable or attainable modes of
pleasure, approaching which the motive power gradually dies away.
Mr. Mackenzie points out, in considering Mr. Alexander's criticisms
of his _Introduction to Social Philosophy_, the importance of
distinguishing, when dealing with the subject of organic development,
between the psychological and the metaphysical points of view, and
that he wrote entirely from the metaphysical point of view. (London:
Williams & Norgate.)
Ω.
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY.
CONTENTS: February, 1891. Vol. III. No. 4.
AUTOMATIC MUSCULAR MOVEMENTS AMONG THE INSANE; THEIR
PHYSIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE. By _C. P. Bancroft_.
ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. By _Herbert Nichols_.
ON THE RECOVERY OF STIMULATED GANGLION CELLS. By _C. F. Hodge_.
PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. The Nervous System—by _H. H.
Donaldson_; Psychiatry—by _William Noyes_—Experimental;
Miscellaneous.
CONTENTS: April, 1891. Vol. IV. No. 1.
ARITHMETICAL PRODIGIES. By _E. W. Scripture_.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. By _Herbert Nichols_.
PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE: Cerebral Localisation. By _Henry H.
Donaldson_; Notes on Models of the Brain. By _H. H. Donaldson_;
A Laboratory Course in Physiological Psychology. By _E. C.
Sanford_; Contemporary Psychologists—Prof. Edward Zeller. By
_The Editor_.
It is pointed out by Dr. Bancroft that the close relationship between
automatic muscular movement and the inhibitory power renders a study
of the latter essential to a complete understanding of the subject of
automaticity in health and disease. The inhibitory power is intimately
associated with all the higher faculties, and as it must, in common
with them, seek expression through functional activity of the cerebral
cortex, functional or organic disturbance of this region should be
attended by disordered inhibition. In many cases of insanity that
portion of the brain that "originates the will impulse" is cut off by
reason of organic or functional disturbance, and consequently the areas
that lie nearer the centrifugal nerves are left to act independently
of will and inhibition. The development of mechanical attitudes among
the chronic insane is illustrated by a plate exhibiting two cases of
melancholia with stupor and two cases of chronic dementia.
The literature of the Psychology of Time is dealt with by Mr.
Nichols from the historical and the experimental standpoints. The
most striking feature of the whole time investigation is, that of
all the philosophers and psychologists who have touched upon the
problem, only two of the whole number, Condillac obscurely, and James
Mill definitely, have solved the mystery by _letting the sequences
themselves be the ultimate mystery_—by letting their process, as
process and of itself, show forth its own explanation. The results
of experimental investigations in time psychology are scarcely more
satisfactory. Most experimenters have confined themselves to the
determination of the Constant Error, Sensibility, and Weber's Law,
yet with difficulty, if at all, can the results of any two of such
determinations be harmonised. The majority of evidence is strongly
against the validity of Weber's Law; also against any fixed or constant
Periodicity. Later investigators look to physiological processes for
explanation of time-judgments, and particularly to rhythmic habits of
nerve centres.
Dr. Hodge's paper is a continuation of chapters which appeared in
the _American Journal of Psychology_ in May 1888 and May 1889. His
experiments on cats show that spinal ganglion cells do recover from
the effects of injuries by electrically stimulating the nerve going to
them, but that the recovery is a slow process.
An account is given by Dr. Scripture of the known Arithmetical
Prodigies. The opinion of Bidder was that "mental calculation depends
on two faculties of the mind in simultaneous operation—computing and
registering the result"! The power to do long calculations in the mind
without making a mistake is the most remarkable fact in regard to ready
reckoners; next the wonderful rapidity which some of them have shown.
All of them possessed a remarkable impressibility, and practised modes
by which arithmetical associations may be enormously shortened. Dr.
Scripture offers for consideration the points that the power of mental
calculation could be greatly developed under cultivation; that numbers
and their values may be learned before figures, just as a child learns
words and their meanings long before he can read; that it is best to
teach "calculation" by the _abacus_ before "ciphering."
Mr. Nichols records in his second article the result of a series
of experiments made by him at Clark University to investigate the
apparently contradictory results obtained by various experimenters
regarding the Constant Error of Time-judgments. The experiments
teach nothing of the cause of the Constant Error, but it is shown
that those individuals who make the largest constant error, make
the error most constantly in one direction, and are apt to make a
constantly increasing error throughout the series of experiments. Mr.
Nichols's final conclusion is that "the processes of our environment,
of our bodily organism, and of the sensations and images which
correspond thereto, are, in themselves a sufficient explanation of
time-psychology, and that time perception cannot be explained by any
single state or disparate sense, but alone be accounted for as a
_process_." (E. C. Sanford, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.)
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. April, 1891. Vol. I. No. 2.
CONTENTS:
SOCIAL EQUALITY. By _Leslie Stephen_.
THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN ETHICAL CODES. By _Prof. C. H. Toy_.
THE RIGHT FINAL AIM OF LIFE. By _Prof. G. von Gizycki_.
THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE. By _Prof. William
James_.
ANOTHER VIEW OF THE ETHICS OF LAND-TENURE. By _Prof. Simon N.
Patten_.
MORAL TALES. By _Clara E. Collet_.
Mr. Leslie Stephen affirms that it is our duty to try to make men equal
by raising the grade of culture in all classes. The distribution of
classes would continue, but it would correspond purely to the telling
off of each man to the duties which he is best fitted to discharge. The
essential condition of all social improvement is that the individual
should be manly, self-respecting, doing his duty as well as getting
his pay. Nothing will do any permanent good which does not imply the
elevation of the individual in his standard of honesty, independence,
and good conduct.
One of the earliest studies of life, says Professor Toy, is that
which is known as the clan-constitution of society, during which two
important facts are exhibited, (1) ethical ideas are determined by
those of the community, and (2) the deity of the community is regarded
as a member of the clan. Both these characteristics have become
modified in the progress of civilisation. Moral rules and principles
have become clearer, broader, and higher, and society has come to be
an efficient moral guide and support. Religion has moved away from the
conception of the tribal god, and the conception has been formed of the
absolute dominion of natural law in the moral world. The end to which
human moral history points is a conscience absolutely independent and
yet absolutely dependent,—independent in that it refuses to recognise
any other authority than its own ideals, dependent in that it receives
its ideals from the life of man, which is the highest revelation of God.
According to Professor von Gizycki, the ultimate basis of all ethical
demonstration is the supreme standard of good and evil, the greatest
possible happiness of all mankind. Various objections urged against
this, as the final aim of life, are examined by Professor von Gizycki
and declared not to constitute a decisive case against it. As to the
desire to obtain peace of conscience he affirms that this can only
follow upon such action as is in conformity with the greatest possible
happiness of mankind. The Professor has modified his former position.
The injunction, "Seek peace of conscience in devoting thyself to the
welfare of mankind," which he had proposed in his "Moral Philosophy,"
implies an impracticable combination of two distinct final aims. Either
the one or the other must abdicate the supremacy to its rival. We must
invoke the aid of _ethical_ self-love in order to insure the victory
to the forces which make for good. But our ruling aim ought to be the
advancement of the universal happiness of mankind.
The main purpose of Professor James's paper is to show that there is
no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made
up in advance. Three questions in ethics must be kept apart—the
_psychological_, the _metaphysical_, and the _casuistic_. The
psychological question asks after the historical _origin_ of our
moral ideas and judgments; the metaphysical question asks the very
_meaning_ of the words good, ill, and obligation; the casuistic
question asks what is the _measure_ of the various goods and ills
which men recognise, so that the philosopher may settle the true order
of human obligation. As to the _psychological_ question,—relations
exist in our thought which do not merely repeat the couplings of
experience. Our ideals have certainly many sources. They are not all
explicable as signifying corporeal pleasures to be gained, and pains
to be escaped. As to the _metaphysical_ question,—goodness, badness,
and obligation must be _realised_ somewhere in order really to exist.
Without a claim actually made by some concrete person there can be no
obligation, but there is some obligation wherever there is a claim.
Claim and obligation are co-extensive terms. The words good, bad,
obligation, are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold
or anchorage in Being apart from the existence of actually living
minds. "The religion of humanity" affords a basis for ethics as well
as theism does. As to the _casuistic_ question—The best of the marks
and measures of goodness is the capacity to bring happiness, but in
seeking for an universal principle we find that the essence of good is
simply to _satisfy demand_. But the actual possible in this world is
vastly narrower than all that is demanded, and the guiding principle
for ethical philosophy must be simply to satisfy at all times _as many
demands as we can_. So far as the casuistic question goes, ethical
science is just like physical science, and must be ready to revise its
conclusions from day to day. Concrete ethics cannot be final because
they have to wait on metaphysics. The final conclusion is that the
stable and systematic moral universe for which the ethical philosopher
asks is fully possible only in a world where there is a divine thinker
with all-enveloping demands. If he now exist, then actualised in his
thought already must be that ethical philosophy which we seek after as
the pattern which our own must ever more approach.
Professor Patten treats of the economical data bearing on the facts
of land-tenure, and concludes that if no surplus land value goes to
the monopolies or to privileged classes, there is no ethical problem
involved. If some of the surplus goes in this way, then the ethical
problem is the same as if all of the produce of industry above a
minimum of wages went to increase the surplus. The growth of society
in wealth and numbers often makes the man without wealth and land
less productive, because he must use poorer land or less productive
instruments. The loss being due to social changes the workman is
entitled to compensation for which he should look to society, which
may choose the concrete form in which it shall be made. The expense
of doing this should be borne by those who have profited from the
prosperity of society.
In her interesting paper on Moral Tales, Mrs. Collet passes in review
certain books which, read in childhood, have left an indelible
impression on her mind. Chief among them are the "Sandford and Merton"
of Thomas Day, who was deeply impressed by the writings of Rousseau;
the stories of Maria Edgeworth, the most truly democratic of our moral
writers; and those of Dr. Aiken and his sister, Mrs. Barbauld, whose
writings although pervaded by a strong religious spirit, are very
striking for their unaggressive and yet open declaration of the right
to think independently in religion. Mrs. Collet gives her verdict, with
regard to the moral education of children, in favor of the voluntary
"consumption of moral tales." (Philadelphia: _International Journal of
Ethics_, 1602 Chestnut St.)
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.
CONTENTS: March, 1891. No. 183.
POURQUOI MOURONS-NOUS? By _J. Delbœuf_.
SUR UN CAS D'ABOULIE ET D'IDEES FIXES. By _Pierre Janet_.
L'ART ET LA LOGIQUE. (Fin.) By _G. Tarde_.
ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.
REVUE DES PERIODIQUES ETRANGERS.
CONTENTS: April, 1891. No. 184.
QU'EST-CE QUE LA PHYSIOLOGIE GENERALE? By _Ch. Richet_.
LA PHILOSOPHIE DE BACON. By _Victor Brochard_.
SUR UN CAS D'ABOULIE ET D'IDEES FIXES (Fin.) By _Pierre Janet_.
POURQUOI MOURONS-NOUS? (Fin.) By _J. Delbœuf_.
NOTES ET DISCUSSIONS.
ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.
SUR UN OLFACTOMETRE. By _Ch. Henry_.
M. Delbœuf's article is the complement to his studies on the origin
of death, and was inspired by the work of M. Maupas, _Recherches
expérimentales sur la multiplication des infusoires ciliés_, some of
the conclusions of which he thinks are not supported by observation
and emanate from the sophism, "that which has not been seen does not
exist." Nevertheless he accepts the opinion of M. Maupas, as against
M. Weismann, that the protozoa as well as the metazoa, are mortal
as individuals, although immortal in and by the species. M. Delbœuf
accounts for the change from fissiparity to sexuality by reference
to mathematical law applicable to the transformation of species,
according to which from the moment that a _constant_ cause begins to
make a type vary, in however small a degree, the variations will end by
victoriously disputing the position with it. The death of the ciliated
infusoria is then not due, as supposed by M. Maupas, to the effect of
a _senile_ alteration of their elements proceeding from an internal
cause,—which would render inexplicable the unaltered maintenance of
the species,—but the effect of a _disequilibration_ of their organism
due to a sort of mathematically fatal external physical constraint.
The two corpuscles in the union of which the conjugation of those
infusoria consists are regarded by M. Delbœuf as truly male and female,
and he affirms that before uniting they make a _choice_ of individuals
apt to rejuvenate. Intelligence is thus the indispensable factor of
the perpetuity of races. The answer to the double question, Why is
individual matter mortal and specific matter immortal, is reserved for
another number.
M. Janet's interesting study is of a subject, a young girl of 22, who,
as the title denotes, exhibits an almost total loss of the faculty
of will, partly through hereditary causes and partly consequent on a
serious attack Of typhoid fever. Marcelle has a singular difficulty of
movement, which extends to all the voluntary movements of the arms,
the legs, and even the tongue and the lips, and is due to a kind of
paralysis. She is, however, extremely suggestible, and very easily
hypnotised. By experiment M. Janet found that the difficulty of a
movement is in proportion to its novelty. The difficulty consisted
in forming the synthesis of ideas and images which constitutes the
commencement of the act, but its repetition is easy when the act has
been once done. Marcelle sometimes went into a demi-cataleptic state
during which she had a crisis of ideas, which she described as a
cloud passing. She complained that during the cloud her head spoke
constantly. This M. Janet explains by reference to the theory of M.
Séglas that there are several kinds of verbal hallucinations as of
language, that is hallucinations of hearing, of visual images, and of
tactile and muscular sensations attendant on speaking or writing, the
last named being the psychic hallucinations or the epigastric voices of
the insane. During the lucid intervals Marcelle performed the commands
given to her by her hallucinations while under the cloud, like a person
who while in a state of somnambulism receives a posthypnotic suggestion.