the physiological standpoint the authors remark truly that in order
to obliterate the distinctions between male and female, it would be
necessary to have evolution over again on a new basis. Although so
different, however, the two sexes are complementary and mutually
dependent, "not merely because they are males and females, but also
in functions not directly associated with those of sex." Males, as
the more katabolic organisms, are more active and variable than the
anabolic females, who are more passive and stable. The former have
larger brains and more intelligence, but the latter have more of the
altruistic sentiment and greater constancy in affection and sympathy.
"Man thinks more, woman feels more. He discovers more, but remembers
less; she is more receptive, and less forgetful." All this is true
within certain limits, but whether or not it may be explained by other
theories remains an open question.
Ω.
ANIMAL LIFE AND INTELLIGENCE. By _C. Lloyd Morgan_, F. G. S. London:
Edward Arnold.
The chief aim which the author of this important work had originally
in view was the consideration of Animal Intelligence. But the subject
of Intelligence being so closely associated with that of Life, and
the questions of Heredity and Natural Selection with those of Habit
and Instinct, he has devoted the first part of the work to Organic
Evolution, as introductory to Mental Evolution. This was rendered
necessary, however, by the direct bearing of Professor Weismann's
recent contributions to biological science on questions of Instinct.
It would be impossible to treat of the mental constitution of the
lower animals without reference to that of man, and in his preface
Professor Morgan forestals certain results arrived at by a comparison
of them. He states that in man alone, and in no dumb animal, is the
rational faculty, as defined by him, developed; and he adds, "it is
contended that among human folk that process of natural selection,
which is so potent in the lower reaches of organic life, sinks into
comparative insignificance. Man is a creature of ideas and ideals. For
him the moral factor becomes one of the very highest importance. He
conceives an ideal self which he strives to realise; he conceives an
ideal humanity towards which he would raise his fellow-man. He becomes
a conscious participator in the evolution of man, in the progress of
humanity."
So great a variety of topics are dealt with by the present work that
we shall be able to do little more than refer critically to the
author's special views, particularly those which concern the mental
characters of the lower animals. There are, however, various points
in the earlier part of the work well deserving of consideration. Such
is the suggestion that, instead of likening an organism as a whole
to a steam-engine, it would be better to liken each cell, with its
fluid explosive material, to a gas-engine, and the mixed air and gas
to whose explosion its motion is due. The importance of _segregation_
as a factor in the formation of improved varieties is insisted on,
but Professor Morgan doubts whether differential fertility, on which
Mr. Romanes lays great stress[93], would, without the co-operation of
other segregation-factors, give rise to separate varieties capable of
maintaining themselves as distinct species (p. 105).
[93] _The Monist_, No. 1. p. 5.
Dealing with the knotty question whether, if the egg produces the
hen, the hen produces the egg, the author criticises Professor
Weismann's idea of the continuity of germ-plasm, which he regards as
"an unknowable, invisible, hypothetical entity, "that may be made
to account for anything and everything, and prefers the hypothesis
of cellular continuity (138 et seq.). The cells which become ova or
sperms never become differentiated into anything else, and "hereditary
similarity is due to the fact that parents and offspring are derived
eventually from the same germinal cells" (p. 175). Finally, Professor
Morgan criticises Mr. Wallace's views on the subject of sexual
selection, which he is inclined to think is a factor with natural
selection in the guidance of evolution (p. 200 et seq.).
More than half of the book, which contains more than 500 pages, is
taken up with these preliminary disquisitions, the remainder being
concerned with the nature and development of the mental activities.
The first branch of this inquiry is that of the senses of animals.
We cannot follow the author in his very interesting remarks on this
subject, beyond referring to his suggestion that the lower animals may
have senses not known to man. After mentioning the muciparous canals
met with in fishes, he says, "apart from the possibility of unknown
receptive organs as completely hidden from anatomical and microscopic
scrutiny as the end-organs of our temperature-sense, there are in the
lower animals organs which may be fitted to receive modes of influence
to which we human folk are not attuned" (p. 298). For example, insects
may be sensitive to tones of heat; while on the other hand, their
color phenomena may vary greatly from ours consequent on structural
differences in the sense-organs. In dealing with mental processes in
man the author states as a well-known fact that "a person whose leg
has been amputated experiences at times tickling and uneasiness in the
absent member" (p. 307). This is not, however, an accurate description
of the phenomenon. There can be no feeling in a lost limb. The idea
that the sensations are "referred outward to the normal source of
origin of impressions," has arisen from the remark sometimes made by
persons thus affected that they feel as though they still had toes.
This is true to some extent, but as a fact the sensation is as though
the toes were bent and tightly bound at the end of the _stump_, and not
at the end of the missing limb.
It is advisable before proceeding further to see what view Professor
Morgan entertains as to the mental process in animals. This is apparent
from the statement that, although there is no difference in kind
between the mind of man and the mind of a dog, yet that "we have, in
the introduction of the analytic faculty, so definite and marked a new
departure, that we should emphasise it by saying that the faculty of
perception, in its various specific grades, differs generically from
the faculty of conception." The author adds, "believing, as I do, that
conception is beyond the power of my favorite and clever dog, I am
forced to believe that his mind differs generically from my own" (p.
350). Elsewhere he says, "if I deny them self-consciousness and reason,
I grant to the higher animals perceptions of marvellous acuteness and
intelligent inferences of wonderful accuracy and precision—intelligent
inferences in some cases, no doubt, more perfect even than those of
man, who is often distracted by many thoughts" (p. 377). If we would
understand these conclusions aright we must know the sense in which
Professor Morgan uses the terms employed, and to do this we must refer
to the explanation he gives of mental processes in man. He tells us
that in the first place we obtain knowledge of the existence of the
objects around us through perception, which is attended with a process
of construction. An object is in fact a _construct_, at the bidding of
certain sensations, which suggest to the mind the associated qualities.
In what sense such an object is regarded as real we shall see later
on. As to the constructs, their formation is followed by examination,
"by which they are rendered more definite, particular and special,
and supplemented by intelligent inferences." Out of this intelligent
examination arises a new mental process, the _analysis of constructs_.
Attention is paid to certain qualities of objects to the exclusion
of others, a process termed by the author _isolation_, the products
being _isolates_. This process is constantly going on, and all the
qualities, relationships, and feelings thus isolated have applied to
them arbitrary symbols. They are in fact _named_, and "hence arises all
our science, all our higher thought." At this stage we enter the field
of conception, as the isolates are _concepts_, whereas throughout the
process of the formation of constructs and their definition we have
to do with perception and percepts. Here Professor Morgan agrees with
Noiré in holding that "the image, in so far as it is an image, whether
simple or composite, is a percept," while so far as there enter into
the idea of objects elements which have been isolated by analysis, the
words for those objects stand for concepts. There is another important
feature of the mental processes in man. The primary aim of the
reception of the influences of the external world, or environment, is
"to enable the organism to answer to them in activity." Moreover, out
of perceptions through association there arise certain expectations,
and "the activities of organisms are moulded in accordance with
these expectations." Phenomena are perceived as linked or woven, and
expectations are the outcome of that perception, the mental process by
which we pass from one link to another being called _inference_. Again,
we have perceptual inference, or inference from direct experience, and
conceptual inference, or "inference based on experience, but reached
through the exercise of the reasoning faculties" (p. 328 et seq.).
Applying these principles to the mental processes in animals, the
author affirms that, granting the theory of evolution, "the early
stages of the process of construction—discrimination, localisation,
and outward projection—are the same in kind throughout the whole
range of animal life, wherever we are justified in surmising that
psychical processes occur, and the power of registration and revival
in memory has been established" (p. 338). But, though the higher
mammalia form _constructs_ analogous to, if not closely resembling
ours, the resemblance cannot be in any sense close, "seeing to how
large an extent our constructs are literally our _handiwork_." To the
question whether the higher animals have "the power of analysing their
constructs and forming isolates, or abstract ideas of qualities apart
from the constructs of which these qualities are elements," Professor
Morgan answers negatively. He supposes, for example, that a dog may
have a vague representation in memory of things good to eat, "in which
the element of eatability is predominant and comparatively distinct,
while the rest is vague and indistinct"; and to mark the difference
he calls the prominent quality a _predominant_, "as opposed to the
isolate when the quality is floated off from the object." Hence he
agrees with Locke that abstraction, in the sense of isolation, is not
possessed by the lower animals, and he thinks that the line should
be drawn there between brute intelligence and human intelligence and
reason (p. 349). As soon as predominant qualities are named they
become isolates, and thus "body and mind became separable in thought;
the self was differentiated from the not-self; the mind was turned
inwards upon itself through the isolation of its varying phases; and
the consciousness of the brute became the self-consciousness of man."
The agent in this upward progress is language, and hence, granting
the possibility of a transitional stage where word-signs stood for
predominants, and not yet for isolates, the author accepts Prof. Max
Müller's view that language and thought are practically inseparable (p.
371). If any serious objection can be made to this reasoning, it must
be we think to the opinion that language made, not merely conceptual
thought, but analysis and isolation possible. This is preceded, as
we have seen by "intelligent examination," and we are expressly told
that out of this arises the mental process of _analysis of constructs_
which animals do not possess. To this faculty then must be traced the
ultimate distinction between them and man. It may be doubted, moreover,
whether animals have any idea of even a predominant quality apart from
some object. The formation of "constructs," that is the recognition
of objects, as the result of external stimuli, is instinctive, except
so far as it depends upon association through experience in past
generations. If animals can even vaguely represent a single quality
apart from an object, it is the first step in analysis, and there is
no reason why they should not go on to abstraction or isolation, and
thence to reason. That animals do not possess reason, in the sense of
conceptual inference, is we think unquestionable, and Professor Morgan
does well in restricting them to intelligence, by which he intends the
process by which perceptual inferences are reached (p. 330).
We have not space to refer to the views expressed in the chapter
on "Appetence and Emotion," beyond stating that the author, while
admitting that in animals are to be found the perceptual germs of even
the higher emotional states, concludes that "ethics, like conceptual
thought and æsthetics, are beyond the reach of the brute. Morality is
essentially a matter of ideals, and these belong to the conceptual
sphere" (p. 414). In the chapter on "Habit and Interest," after
speaking of Mr. Romanes's treatment of instinct as most admirable and
masterly, he compares Mr. Romanes's views as to the origin of secondary
instincts with those of Professor Weismann as to the non-inheritance of
acquired characters, coming to the conclusion that lapsed intelligence
is not a necessary factor in the formation of instincts, and that
there is a probability of some inheritance of experience (p. 436 et
seq.). We must refer our readers to the work itself for the author's
explanation of the "monistic" theory, according to which the two sets
of phenomena, the physical and the mental, are identical, differing
only in being viewed from without or felt from within (p. 417). This
view is developed in the chapter on Mental Evolution, where we read,
"according to the monistic hypothesis, kinesis and metakinesis are
co-ordinate. The physiologist may explain all the activities of men
and animals in terms of kinesis. The psychologist may explain all
the thoughts and emotions of man in thoughts of metakinesis. They
are studying the different phenomenal aspects of the same noumenal
sequences" (p. 472). For Professor Morgan the idea of the object is
the object, but he is not a pure idealist. Phenomena are something
more than states of consciousness. There is a noumenal reality which
underlies the reality of the phenomena, and the enduring ego, of which
certain states of consciousness are occasional manifestations, is
the metakinetic equivalent of the organic kinesis. Here he sees the
solution of the problem which baffles alike materialists and idealists
(p. 475).
We must now take leave of this work which, notwithstanding its
occasional abstruse and technical character, is not "beyond the ready
comprehension of the general reader of average intelligence." It
deserves to be widely read, not only for its subject-matter, but for
its clearness of explanation and wide grasp of thought. The value of
the book is much added to by its diagrams and illustrations, and by an
excellent index and table of contents.
Ω.
PHYSIOGNOMY AND EXPRESSION. By _Paolo Mantegazza_. New York: Scribner &
Welford, 1890.
This work of the versatile Italian Anthropologist is probably one of
those which best represent his many-sided mind, and which will be the
most extensively read. Although strictly scientific, both in its end
and method, it is popular in style and contains matter which must
recommend it to the ordinary as well as the scientific reader. As the
author informs us, he has taken up the study of expression at the
point where Darwin left it. But he has made a further step. He has set
himself the task "of separating, once for all, positive observations
from the number of bad guesses, ingenious conjectures," which have
hitherto encumbered the path of the study of the human countenance
and human expression. His book is a "page of psychology," and he has
endeavored to supply the psychologist, and also the artist, with new
facts, as well as old facts interpreted by new theories, and to bring
into view "some of the laws to which human expression is subject."
A glance at the table of contents shows that the author has fully
carried out the promise thus made. The first chapter of the work after
giving an historical sketch of the science of Physiognomy and of Human
Expression—which in its infancy was "seasoned with the magic which
is one of the original sins of the human family"—and tracing it from
Dalla Porta to Darwin, through Niquetius, Ghiradelli, and Lavater,
proceeds to treat of the human countenance in general, and of each of
its features in particular. The possible judgments on the human face
are reduced in number to five: the physiological, the ethnological,
the æsthetic, the moral, and the intellectual. Of these verdicts, the
ethnological and æsthetic are based almost exclusively on anatomical
characters, while the physiological, moral, and intellectual verdicts
depend chiefly on expression. The coloration of the human skin is an
important ethnological feature, and M. Mantegazza thinks that it
may be reduced to three tints, white, black, and "dried bean" (_fave
seche_), which last he explains by saying that it results from the
superposition of two colors, "most frequently from a sort of black
or very dark brown dust deposited on a ground of dried bean" (p.
31). Among other interesting ethnological generalisations, is the
remark that the Aryans, Semites, and many negroes have large eyes,
while Mongols and many Malays have small eyes. In determining the
color of the eyes, hair, and skin, the author found the table of
tints prepared by M. Broca for the Anthropological Society of Paris
insufficient, as the colors there used are opaque, while transmitted
as well as reflected rays are combined to give the natural coloration.
In the iris of the Lapps fourteen different and graduated shades are
distinguishable, from dark chestnut brown to green. M. Mantegazza
confirms the observation that a certain hue of the eyes is nearly
always associated with a particular hair-color, and he states that
this union is one of the most unvarying ethnical characters by which
to judge of the purity of race. The nose is nearly as important as
the eye as an ethnical and æsthetic feature. The author reproduces M.
Topinard's curious table of its morphological characteristics observing
that it omits only one, which nevertheless is somewhat important,
that is, the angle made by the root of the nose with the forehead.
In relation to the mouth we have the suggestive remark, "the eye is
the centre of the expression of thought; the mouth is the expressive
centre of feeling and of sensuality." As to the color of the hair, M.
Mantegazza has brought together many important facts. Among the higher
races, the hair may be of almost any of the ordinary tints. The Jews
do not differ from the Europeans in this respect, as they exhibit fair
hair as well as dark hair, and light and dark eyes. Although in Germany
the Jewish population generally is much darker than the rest of the
people, many of them have blonde hair, blue eyes, and fair complexion.
For some reason not yet ascertained, there is a tendency in Europe
and especially in England for the blonde type to disappear. We would
suggest that it is a case of reversion to the type of the primitive
inhabitants. M. Mantegazza remarks that the beard does not correspond
to any intellectual type, as it is strongly developed as well among the
Australian aborigines as among the Aryans and Semites. Nevertheless,
the beard is worthy of further study as an ethnological feature. It may
be noted that the Australian aborigines have been connected with the
primitive inhabitants of Western Europe by other characters.
In treating of the expression of the emotions, we are told that
physical expression has two different functions—to replace a complete
language, and "to defend the nerve-centres and other parts of the body
against dangers of different kinds." Much more might have been said on
the first subject, as gesture language has within the last few years
become an important ethnological study, and, indeed, a supplementary
chapter has been written for the English edition of this work on the
physiognomy of gesture. There is great truth in the remarks, that
"every religion and many philosophical schools have been founded by
word and by expression more than by books"; and that "the more feeling
a nation has, the more rich and eloquent are its methods of physical
expression." M. Mantegazza does full justice to the great wealth of
details and the discoveries on which the Darwinian laws of expression
are based, while supplementing them with original observations and
results. It is in the classification of expressions we have probably
the most important feature of the present work. Full synoptical tables
are given of the expressions of Sense, Passion, and Intellect, and of
the various expressions of Pleasure and Pain, Love and Hatred. These
are illustrated by ingenious remarks, as an example of which we may
quote the somewhat cynical statement that "many ladies laugh little
lest they should have precocious wrinkles, while others laugh too
much and on every pretext that they may show their beautiful teeth."
The author well says that in love and pleasure, hatred and pain,
"we have two binary compounds, two such energetic psycho-expressive
combinations that the formidable and the destructive voltaic pile of
our analytic methods is needed to separate the elements." He has some
curious remarks on the fact that laughter and smiling are very frequent
phenomena in the expression of hatred, for which we refer our readers
to the work itself.
To pleasure and pain, love and hatred, M. Mantegazza adds pride and
humiliation, as "the fundamental psychical movements of human nature,
as ancient as man, and common to all the inhabitants of the globe."
Thus, he is of opinion that aristocracy is one of the most natural
features of humanity, and that democrats "make history recede instead
of advancing when they deny the most elementary laws of heredity and of
human nature." We must pass over the expressions of personal feelings,
and those of thought, to reach the chapter on racial and professional
expression. Here races are classified, according to their expression,
into ferocious, gentle, apathetic, grotesque or simian, stupid, and
intelligent, but the classification, like all others from single
characters, is imperfect. Probably as good a classification could be
made on the basis of modes of salutation, beginning with nose-kissing,
or the still more primitive smelling. Raden-Saleh, an artist of Java
preferred nose-_breathing_, as by it we put our soul into contact with
that of the beloved one! It is undoubtedly true, as M. Mantegazza
remarks, that the expression of different peoples is replete with
their most prominent psychical characters. The beautiful impassioned
expression of the Italians is yet defiant and not always frank, owing
to their having been so long subjected to tyrants. Speaking generally,
the European peoples have an expansive or a concentric expression, of
which "the first is found in the Italians, the French, the Slaves, the
Russian: the second in the Germans, the Scandinavians, the Spanish."
The author adds that there is also "a beautiful expression full of
grace, that of the people of Græco-Latin origin; and another hard,
quite angular, without roundness, that of the Germans, the English, and
the Scandinavians."