THE Union, which contained 5,300,000 inhabitants in 1800, numbered
7,240,000 in 1810, and 9,634,000 in 1820. At the close of Madison’s
Administration, in 1817, the population probably numbered not less
than 8,750,000 persons. The average rate of annual increase was about
three and five-tenths per cent, causing the population to double within
twenty-three years.
The rate of increase was not uniform throughout the country, but the
drift of population was well defined. In 1800 the five New England
States contained about 1,240,000 persons. Virginia and North Carolina,
united, then contained nearly 1,360,000, or ten per cent more than
New England. In 1820 the two groups were still nearer equality. New
England numbered about 1,665,000; the two Southern States numbered
1,700,000, or about two per cent more than New England. While these two
groups, containing nearly half the population of the Union, increased
only as one hundred to one hundred and twenty-nine, the middle group,
comprising New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, increased in the
relation of one hundred to one hundred and ninety-two,--from 1,402,000
in 1800, to 2,696,000 in 1820. Their rate was about the average ratio
for the Union; and the three Western States,--Ohio, Kentucky, and
Tennessee,--grew proportionally faster. Their population of 370,000
in 1800 became 1,567,000 in 1820, in the ratio of one hundred to four
hundred and twenty-three.
Careful study revealed a situation alarming to New England and
Virginia. If only Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, without
its district of Maine, were considered, a total population numbering
742,000 in 1800 increased only to 881,000 in 1820, or in the ratio of
one hundred to one hundred and eighteen in twenty years. If only the
white population of Virginia and North Carolina were taken into the
estimate, omitting the negroes, 852,000 persons in 1800 increased to
1,022,000 in 1820, or in the ratio of one hundred to one hundred and
twenty. Maryland showed much the same result, while Delaware, which
rose from 64,270 in 1800 to 72,674 in 1810, remained stationary,
numbering only 72,749 in 1820,--a gain of seventy-five persons in ten
years. The white population showed a positive decrease, from 55,361 in
1810 to 55,282 in 1820.
Probably a census taken in 1817 would have given results still less
favorable to the sea-coast. The war affected population more seriously
than could have been reasonably expected, and stopped the growth
of the large cities. New York in 1800 contained 60,000 persons; in
1810 it contained 96,400, but a corporation census of 1816 reported
a population of only one hundred thousand, although two of the six
years were years of peace and prosperity. From that time New York grew
rapidly, numbering 124,000 in 1820,--a gain of about twenty-five per
cent in four years. Even the interior town of Albany, which should
have been stimulated by the war, and which increased four thousand
in population between 1800 and 1810, increased only three thousand
between 1810 and 1820. Philadelphia fared worse, for its population of
96,000 in 1810 grew only to 108,000 in 1820, and fell rapidly behind
New York. Baltimore grew from 26,000 in 1800 to 46,000 in 1810, and
numbered less than 63,000 in 1820. Boston suffered more than Baltimore;
for its population, which numbered 24,000 in 1800, grew only to 32,000
in 1810, and numbered but 43,000 in 1820. Charleston was still more
unfortunate. In 1800 its population numbered about eighteen thousand;
in 1810, 24,700; in 1817 a local census reported a decrease to 23,950
inhabitants, and the national census of 1820 reported 24,780, or eighty
persons more than in 1810. The town of Charleston and the State of
Delaware increased together by the same numbers.
Although the war lasted less than three years, its effect was so great
in checking the growth of the cities that during the period from 1810
to 1820 the urban population made no relative increase. During every
other decennial period in the national history the city population grew
more rapidly than that of the rural districts; but between 1810 and
1820 it remained stationary, at four and nine-tenths per cent of the
entire population. While Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston advanced
slowly, and New York only doubled its population in twenty years,
Western towns like Pittsburg, Cincinnati, and Louisville grew rapidly
and steadily, and even New Orleans, though exposed to capture, more
than trebled in size; but the Western towns were still too small to
rank as important. Even in 1820 the only cities which contained a white
population of more than twenty thousand were New York, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and Boston.
The severest sufferers from this situation were the three southern
States of New England,--Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts,
excluding the district of Maine, which was about to become a separate
State. Fortunately the northern part of New England, notwithstanding
the war, increased much more rapidly than the southern portion; but
this increase was chiefly at the cost of Massachusetts, and returned
little in comparison with the loss. The situation of Massachusetts
and Connecticut was dark. Had not wealth increased more rapidly than
population, Massachusetts would have stood on the verge of ruin; yet
even from the economical point of view, the outlook was not wholly
cheerful.
Judged by the reports of Massachusetts banks, the increase of wealth
was surprising. The official returns of 1803, the first year when such
returns were made, reported seven banks in the State, with a capital
of $2,225,000 and deposits of $1,500,000. In June, 1816, twenty-five
banks returned capital stock amounting nearly to $11,500,000 and
deposits of $2,133,000. The deposits were then small, owing to the
decline of industry and drain of specie that followed the peace, but
the capital invested in banks had more than quintupled in thirteen
years.
This multiplication was not a correct measure of the general increase
in wealth. Indeed, the banks were in excess of the public wants after
the peace, and their capital quickly shrunk from $11,500,000 in June,
1816, to $9,300,000 in June, 1817, a decline of nearly twenty per cent
in a year. From that time it began to increase again, and held its
improvement even in the disastrous year 1819. Assuming 1803 and 1817 as
the true terms of the equation, the banking capital of Massachusetts
increased in fourteen years from $2,225,000 to $9,300,000, or more than
quadrupled.
Gauged by bank discounts the increase of wealth was not so great. In
1803 the debts due to the banks were returned at $3,850,000; in June,
1817, they were $12,650,000. If the discounts showed the true growth
of industry, the business of the State somewhat more than trebled in
fourteen years. Probably the chief industries that used the increased
banking capital were the new manufactures, for the older sources
of Massachusetts wealth showed no equivalent gain. Tested by the
imports, the improvement was moderate. In 1800 the gross amount of
duties collected in Massachusetts was less than $3,200,000; in 1816
it somewhat exceeded $6,100,000, but had not permanently doubled in
sixteen years. Tested by exports of domestic produce, Massachusetts
showed no gain. In 1803 the value of such produce amounted to
$5,400,000; in 1816, to $5,008,000.[154]
Other methods of calculating the increase of wealth gave equally
contradictory results. The registered tonnage of Massachusetts
engaged in foreign trade exceeded two hundred and ten thousand tons
in 1800; in 1816 it was two hundred and seventy-four thousand tons.
In the coasting-trade Massachusetts employed seventy-five thousand
tons in 1800, and one hundred and twenty-nine thousand in 1816. The
tonnage employed in the fisheries showed no growth. The shipping of
Massachusetts seemed to indicate an increase of about forty per cent in
sixteen years.
The system of direct taxation furnished another standard of comparison.
In 1798 a valuation was made in certain States of houses and lands
for direct taxes; another was made in 1813; a third in 1815. That of
1798 amounted to eighty-four million dollars for Massachusetts; that
of 1813, to one hundred and forty-nine millions; that of 1815, to
one hundred and forty-three millions,--a gain of seventy per cent in
sixteen years; but such a valuation in 1817 would probably have shown a
considerable loss on that of 1815.
Evidently the chief increase in wealth consisted in the growth of
manufactures, but after the prostration of the manufacturing interest
in 1816 no plausible estimate of their true value could be made,
unless the bank discounts measured their progress. The result of the
whole inquiry, though vague, suggested that wealth had increased in
Massachusetts more rapidly than population, and had possibly gained
seventy or eighty per cent in sixteen years;[155] but in spite of this
increase the State was in a pitiable situation. Neither steamboats,
canals, nor roads could help it. Thousands of its citizens migrated
to New York and Ohio, beyond the possibility of future advantage to
the land they left. Manufactures were prostrate. Shipping was driven
from the carrying trade. Taxation weighed far more heavily than ever
before. A load of obloquy rested on the State on account of its war
policy and the Hartford Convention. The national government treated it
with severity, and refused to pay for the Massachusetts militia called
into service by the President during the war, because the governor had
refused to place them under national officers.
The condition of Massachusetts and Maine was a picture of New England.
Democratic Rhode Island suffered equally with Federalist Connecticut.
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont showed growth, but the chief
possibility of replacing lost strength lay in immigration. During
the European wars, no considerable number of immigrants were able to
reach the United States; but immediately after the return of peace,
emigration from Europe to America began on a scale as alarming to
European governments as the movement to western New York and Ohio
was alarming to the seaboard States of the Union. During the year
1817 twenty-two thousand immigrants were reported as entering the
United States.[156] Twelve or fourteen thousand were probably Irish;
four thousand were German. More than two thousand arrived in Boston,
while about seven thousand landed in New York and the same number
in Philadelphia. The greater part probably remained near where they
landed, and in some degree supplied the loss of natives who went west.
The rapid growth of the northern cities of the sea-coast began again
only with the flood of immigration.
Although the three southern States of New England were the severest
sufferers, the Virginia group--comprising Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
and North Carolina--escaped little better. In twenty years their white
population increased nineteen and five tenths per cent, while that of
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island increased eighteen per
cent. The wealth of Southern States consisted largely in slaves; and
the negro population of the Virginia group increased about twenty-five
per cent in numbers during the sixteen years from 1800 to 1816. The
exports of domestic produce increased about forty per cent in value,
comparing the average of 1801–1805 with that of 1815–1816. The net
revenue collected in Virginia increased nearly seventy per cent,
comparing the year 1815 with the average of the five years 1800–1804;
while that collected in North Carolina more than doubled.
Measured by these standards, the growth of wealth in the Virginia
group of States was not less rapid than in Massachusetts, and the same
conclusion was established by other methods. In 1816 Virginia contained
two State banks, with branches, which returned for January 1 a capital
stock of $4,590,000, with a note circulation of $6,000,000, and
deposits approaching $2,500,000. Their discounts amounted to $7,768,000
in January, 1816, and were contracted to $6,128,000 in the following
month of November.[157] Although Virginia used only half the banking
capital and credits required by Massachusetts, the rate of increase was
equally rapid, and the tendency toward banking was decided. In 1817
the legislature created two new banks, one for the valley of Virginia,
the other for western Virginia, with a capital stock of $600,000, and
branches with capital stock of $100,000 for each. Between 1800 and
1817, banking capital exceeding five million dollars was created in
Virginia, where none had existed before.
If the estimates made by Timothy Pitkin, the best statistician of the
time, were correct, the returns for direct taxes showed a greater
increase of wealth in Virginia than in Massachusetts.[158] The
valuation of Virginia for 1799 was $71,000,000; that of 1815 was
$165,000,000. The valuation of North Carolina in 1799 was $30,000,000;
that of 1815 was $51,000,000. Maryland was estimated at $32,000,000
in 1799, at $106,000,000 in 1815. The average increase for the three
States was in the ratio of one hundred to two hundred and forty, while
that for Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut was nearer one
hundred to one hundred and seventy-five. The normal increase for the
Union was in the ratio of one hundred to two hundred and sixty-three.
The result obtained from the estimates for direct taxes was affected
by a doubt in regard to the correctness of the valuation of 1799,
which was believed to have been too low in the Southern States;
but the general conclusion could not be doubted that the Virginia
group of States increased steadily in wealth. The rapidity of
increase was concealed by an equally rapid impoverishment of the old
tobacco-planting aristocracy, whose complaints drowned argument. As the
lands of the ancient families became exhausted, the families themselves
fell into poverty, or emigrated to the richer Ohio valley. Their
decline or departure gave rise to many regrets and alarms. With the
impressions thus created, the people associated the want of economical
machinery as a cause of their backwardness, and became clamorous for
roads, canals, and banks. The revolution in their ideas between 1800
and 1816 was complete.
The North Carolinians were first to denounce their old habits of
indifference, and to declare their State in danger of ruin on that
account. A committee of the State legislature reported Nov. 30,
1815, that vigorous measures for self-protection could no longer be
postponed:[159]--
“With an extent of territory sufficient to maintain more
than ten millions of inhabitants, ... we can only boast of a
population something less than six hundred thousand, and it is
but too obvious that this population under the present state of
things already approaches its maximum. Within twenty-five years
past more than two hundred thousand of our inhabitants have
removed to the waters of the Ohio, Tennessee, and Mobile; and it
is mortifying to witness the fact that thousands of our wealthy
and respectable citizens are annually moving to the West, ...
and that thousands of our poorer citizens follow them, being
literally driven away by the prospect of poverty. In this state
of things our agriculture is at a stand.”
The Virginians showed an equally strong sense of their perils. Twelve
months after the North Carolina legislature took the matter in hand, a
committee of the Virginia legislature in December, 1816, discussed the
same topic and reached the same conclusion.[160] Although something
had been done by corporations to open canals on the Potomac, the James
River, and to the Dismal Swamp, the State of Virginia had in sixteen
years made little advance in material welfare. While New England had
built turnpikes wherever a profit could be expected, in Virginia,
said the committee, “the turnpike-roads of the Commonwealth, except
a few short passes of particular mountains and a road recently begun
from Fredericksburg to the Blue Ridge, are confined principally to
the county of Loudon, the adjacent counties of Fairfax, Fauquier, and
Frederick, and to the vicinity of the seat of government.” In other
respects the situation was worse.
“While many other States,” said the committee,[161] “have been
advancing in wealth and numbers with a rapidity which has
astonished themselves, the ancient Dominion and elder sister of
the Union has remained stationary. A very large proportion of
her western territory is yet unimproved, while a considerable
part of her eastern has receded from its former opulence. How
many sad spectacles do her low-lands present of wasted and
deserted fields, of dwellings abandoned by their proprietors,
of churches in ruins! The genius of her ancient hospitality,
benumbed by the cold touch of penury, spreads his scanty hoard
in naked halls, or seeks a coarser but more plenteous repast in
the lonely cabins of the West. The fathers of the land are gone
where another outlet to the ocean turns their thoughts from the
place of their nativity, and their affections from the haunts of
their youth.”
Another committee reported to the House of Delegates Jan. 5, 1816, in
favor of extending the banking system of the State.[162] The report
used language new as an expression of Virginian opinions.
“Your committee believe that a prejudice has gone abroad,
which they confidently trust experience will prove to be
unfounded even to the satisfaction of those by whom it is
entertained, that the policy of Virginia is essentially hostile
to commerce and to the rights of commercial men. Upon the
removal of this prejudice must depend the future contributions
of this Commonwealth toward the prosperity and glory if not
the happiness and safety of the United States. Without the
confidence of foreigners there can exist no foreign commerce.
Without foreign commerce there can exist neither ships, seamen,
nor a navy; and a tremendous lesson has taught Virginia that
without a navy she can have no security for her repose.”
Notwithstanding the gloom of these recitals, the evidence tended
to show that while the white population of Virginia increased only
about nineteen per cent in sixteen years, its wealth nearly doubled.
Comparison with the quicker growth of the Middle States--New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania--caused much of the uneasiness felt by New
England and Virginia. The banking capital of New York, which probably
did not much exceed three million dollars in 1800, amounted in 1816
to nearly $19,000,000; that of Pennsylvania exceeded $16,000,000. The
valuation of houses and lands for the direct tax rose in New York
from $100,000,000 in 1799 to nearly $270,000,000 in 1815; and in
Pennsylvania, from $102,000,000 in 1799 to $346,000,000 in 1815.[163]
The net revenue collected in New York was $2,700,000 in 1800, and
$14,500,000 in 1815; that collected in Pennsylvania was $1,350,000 in
1800, and $7,140,000 in 1815. This rate of increase did not extend to
exports. The value of the domestic exports from New York in 1803 was
about $7,500,000; in 1816 it exceeded $14,000,000; while the value of
Pennsylvanian exports increased little,--being $4,021,000 in 1803 and
$4,486,000 in 1816. The population of New York doubled while that of
Massachusetts and Virginia hardly increased one third. Pennsylvania
grew less rapidly in numbers, but still about twice as fast as New
England.
Although this rate of progress seemed to leave New England and Virginia
far behind the Middle States, it was less striking than the other
economical changes already accomplished or foreseen. The movement of
population or of wealth was not so important as the methods by which
the movement was effected. The invention of the steamboat gave a
decisive advantage to New York over every rival. Already in 1816 the
system had united New York city so closely with distant places that a
traveller could go from New York to Philadelphia by steamboat and stage
in thirteen hours; or to Albany in twenty-four hours; and taking stage
to Whitehall in twelve hours could reach Montreal in thirty hours, and
go on to Quebec in twenty-four hours,--thus consuming about five and a
half successive days in the long journey from Philadelphia to Quebec,
sleeping comfortably on his way, and all at an expense of fifty
dollars. This economy of time and money was a miracle; but New York
could already foresee that it led to other advantages of immeasurable
value. The steamboat gave impetus to travel, and was a blessing to
travellers; but its solid gain for the prosperity of the United States
lay not in passenger traffic so much as in freight, and New York was
the natural centre of both.
While Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas were building roads
and canals across a hundred miles of mountains, only to reach at last
an interior region which enjoyed an easier outlet for freight, New
York had but to people a level and fertile district, nowhere fifty
miles from navigable water, in order to reach the great Lake system,
which had no natural outlet within the Union except through the city
of New York. So obvious was the idea of a canal from the Lakes to the
Hudson that it was never out of men’s minds, even before the war; and
no sooner did peace return than the scheme took large proportions.
Active leaders of both political parties pressed the plan,--De Witt
Clinton, Gouverneur Morris, and Peter B. Porter were all concerned
in it; but the legislature and people then supposed that so vast an
undertaking as a canal to connect Lake Erie with the ocean, national in
character and military in its probable utility, required national aid.
Supposing the Administration to be pledged to the policy outlined by
Gallatin and approved by Jefferson in the Annual Message of 1806, the
New York commissioners applied to Congress for assistance, and uniting
with other local interests procured the passage of Calhoun’s bill for
internal improvements.
They were met by Madison’s veto. This act, although at first it seemed
to affect most the interests of New York, was in reality injurious
only to the Southern States. Had the government lent its aid to the
Erie Canal, it must have assisted similar schemes elsewhere, and in
the end could hardly have refused to carry out Gallatin’s plan of
constructing canals from the Chesapeake to the Ohio, and from the
Santee to the Tennessee River. The veto disappointed New York only for
the moment, but was fatal to Southern hopes. After the first shock of
discouragement, the New York legislature determined to persevere, and
began the work without assistance. The legislature of Pennsylvania at
the same time appropriated half a million dollars for roads and canals,
and for improvements of river navigation, devoting nearly one hundred
and fifty thousand dollars to aid the turnpike-road to Pittsburg. The
fund established by the State of Ohio, as a condition of its admission
to the Union, had in 1816 produced means to construct the National or
Cumberland Road to the hundred and thirteenth mile. The indifference to
internal improvements which had been so marked a popular trait in 1800,
gave place to universal interest and activity in 1816; but the Middle
States were far in advance of the Eastern and Southern in opening
communications with the West; and New York, owing in no small degree
to the veto, could already foresee the time when it would wrest from
Pennsylvania the supply of the valley of the Ohio, while expanding new
tributary territory to an indefinite extent along the Lakes.
When Madison retired from the Presidency, the limits of civilization,
though rapidly advancing, were still marked by the Indian boundary,
which extended from the western end of Lake Erie across Indiana,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Southwestern territory. Only weak and
helpless tribes remained east of the Mississippi, waiting until the
whites should require the surrender of their lands; but the whites,
already occupying land far in advance of their needs, could not yet
take the whole. Not until 1826 were the Indian titles generally
extinguished throughout Indiana. The military work was done, and
the short space of sixteen years had practically accomplished the
settlement of the whole country as far as the Mississippi; but another
generation was needed in order to take what these sixteen years had won.
As population spread, the postal service struggled after it. Except on
the Hudson River, steamboats were still irregular in their trips; and
for this reason the mails continued to be carried on horseback through
the interior. In 1801 the number of post-offices was 957; in 1817
it was 3,459. In 1801 the length of post-roads was less than 25,000
miles; in 1817 it was 52,689. In 1800 the gross receipts from postage
were $280,000; in 1817 they slightly exceeded $1,000,000. In each
case the increase much surpassed the ratio for population, and offered
another means for forming some estimate of the increase of wealth. The
Fourteenth Congress pressed the extension of post-routes in western
New York, Ohio, and Indiana; they were already established beyond the
Mississippi. Rapidity of motion was also increased on the main routes.
From New York to Buffalo, four hundred and seventy-five miles, the
traveller went at an average rate of five miles an hour, and, sleeping
every night, he arrived in about four days. Between Philadelphia and
Pittsburg, where no watercourse shortened the distance, the stage-coach
consumed five and a half days, allowing for stoppage at night. These
rates of travel were equal to those common on routes of similar length
in Europe; but long after 1817 the mail from Washington to New Orleans,
by a route 1,380 miles in length, required twenty-four days of travel.
Had the steamboat system been at once perfected, the mail could have
been carried with much more rapidity; but the progress of the new
invention was slow. After the trial trip of the “Clermont,” Aug.
17, 1807, five years elapsed before the declaration of war; yet in
1812 New York possessed no other steamline than the Albany packets.
Steam-ferries plied to Hoboken, Amboy, and other places in the
immediate neighborhood; but neither Newport, New London, nor New Haven
enjoyed steam communication with New York until after the war. In the
spring of 1813 eight or nine steamboats belonged to the city of New
York, but only three, which ran to Albany, were more than ferries.
At the same time Philadelphia possessed six such ferry-boats. From
Baltimore a steamer ran to the head of Chesapeake Bay; but the southern
coast and the town of Charleston saw no steamboat until a year after
the war was ended.
The West was more favored. In 1811 a boat of four hundred tons was
built at Pittsburg and sent down the river to New Orleans, where it
plied between New Orleans and Natchez. Two more were built at the same
place in 1813–1814; and one of them, the “Vesuvius,” went down the
river in the spring of 1814, rousing general interest in the midst of
war by making the trip in nine days and a half, or two hundred and
twenty-seven hours. The “Vesuvius” remained on the Mississippi for the
next two years, but was burned with her cargo in the summer of 1816. By
that time the world was thinking much of steamboats, and their use was
rapidly extending, though regular trips were still uncommon except in
the east.
The result of the sixteen years, considered only in the economical
development of the Union, was decisive. Although population increased
more rapidly than was usual in human experience, wealth accumulated
still faster. From such statistics as the times afforded, a strong
probability has been shown that while population doubled within
twenty-three years, wealth doubled within twenty. Statistics covering
the later period of national growth, warrant the belief that a
valuation of $1,742,000,000 in 1800 corresponded to a valuation of
$3,734,000,000 in 1820; and that if a valuation of $328 per capita is
assumed for 1800, a valuation of $386 per capita may be estimated for
1820.[164]
These sixteen years set at rest the natural doubts that had attended
the nation’s birth. The rate of increase both in population and wealth
was established and permanent, unless indeed it should become even more
rapid. Every serious difficulty which seemed alarming to the people of
the Union in 1800 had been removed or had sunk from notice in 1816.
With the disappearance of every immediate peril, foreign or domestic,
society could devote all its energies, intellectual and physical, to
its favorite objects. This result was not the only or even the chief
proof that economical progress was to be at least as rapid in the
future as at the time when the nation had to struggle with political
difficulties. Not only had the people during these sixteen years
escaped from dangers, they had also found the means of supplying their
chief needs. Besides clearing away every obstacle to the occupation
and development of their continent as far as the Mississippi River,
they created the steamboat, the most efficient instrument yet conceived
for developing such a country. The continent lay before them, like
an uncovered ore-bed. They could see, and they could even calculate
with reasonable accuracy, the wealth it could be made to yield. With
almost the certainty of a mathematical formula, knowing the rate of
increase of population and of wealth, they could read in advance their
economical history for at least a hundred years.