the states of Europe, and neglected neither evangelical exhortations,
nor seductions, nor promises, nor any of the resources of profane
policy, to induce Christian princes to join the crusade proclaimed by
the pope. The sacred college rejoiced at the success of their mission,
and the pope, to prove his gratitude to Heaven, and to draw down divine
blessings upon his enterprise, ordered that processions should be made
and prayers put up, during three days, in the capital of the Christian
world. He himself celebrated the divine office, distributed alms, and
walked barefooted and with his head uncovered to the church of the Holy
Apostles.
Sadoletus, secretary to the Holy See, one of the most distinguished
favourites of the Muses, and who, in the judgment of Erasmus, possessed
in his writings the copiousness and the manner of Cicero, pronounced,
in the presence of the clergy and the Roman people, a discourse, in
which he celebrated the zeal and the activity of the sovereign pontiff,
the eagerness of the Christian princes to make peace with each other,
and the desire they evinced to unite their powers against the Turks:
the orator reminded his auditory of the emperor of Germany and the king
of France, glorious pillars of Christendom; of the army of Charles,
king of Castile, whose youth exhibited all the virtues of ripened
age; of the king of England, the invincible defender of the faith; of
Emanuel, king of Portugal, always ready to sacrifice his own interests
to those of the Church; of Louis II., king of Hungary; and Sigismund,
king of Poland; the first, a young prince, the hope of Christians; the
second, worthy to be their leader; of the king of Denmark, with whose
devotion to religion Europe was well acquainted; and of James, king
of Scotland, the examples of whose family must keep him in the road
of virtue and glory. Among the Christian states, upon which humanity
and religion must build their hopes, Sadoletus did not forget the
Helvetians, a powerful and warlike nation, which burned with such zeal
for the war against the Turks, that its numerous bands of soldiers
were already prepared to march, and only waited for the signal of the
head of the Church. The holy orator finished by a vehement apostrophe
against the race of the Ottomans, whom he threatened with the united
forces of Europe, and by an invocation to God, whom he conjured to
bless the arms of so many princes, of so many Christian nations, in
order that the empire of the world might be wrested from Mahomet, and
that the praises of Jesus Christ might at length resound from the south
to the north, and from the west to the east.
Leo X. was constantly engaged with the crusade he had preached. He
consulted with able captains, and acquired information concerning
the strength of the Turks, and upon the means of attacking them with
advantage: the most certain means was to raise numerous armies. In his
letters to the princes and the faithful, he exhorted Christians not to
neglect prayers and the austerities of penitence; but he recommended
them above all things to prepare their arms, and to oppose their
redoubtable enemies with strength and valour. In concert with the
principal states of Christendom, he laid down the plan of the holy war.
The emperor of Germany was to furnish an army to which the Hungarian
and Polish cavalry should be united. The king of France, with all his
forces, all those of the Venetians, and several states of Italy, and
sixteen thousand Swiss, was to embark at Brindisi, and make a descent
upon the coast of Greece; whilst the fleets of Spain, Portugal, and
England, should set sail from Carthagena and the neighbouring ports,
to transport Spanish troops to the shores of the Hellespont. The
pope proposed to embark himself at the port of Ancona, to repair to
Constantinople, under the walls of which city all the forces of the
Christian powers were to meet.
This plan was gigantic, and never would the Ottoman empire have been
in greater danger, if such vast designs could have been carried into
execution. But the Christian monarchs were only able to observe the
truce proclaimed by the pope, and which they had accepted for a very
few months; each of them had engaged to furnish for the crusade troops
which every day became more necessary to them in their own states, and
which they wished to aggrandize or defend. The old age of Maximilian,
and the approaching vacancy of the imperial throne, at that time held
all the ambitious in a state of expectation: very shortly the rivalry
of Charles V. and Francis I. rekindled war in Europe, and Christendom,
disturbed by the quarrels of princes, no longer thought it probable
they should be invaded by the Turks.
But these political dissensions were not the only obstacles to the
execution of the projects of Leo X. Another difficulty arose from the
levy of the tenths. The clergy everywhere appeared to have the same
indifference for the wars which ruined them. The people dreaded to
see their alms employed in enterprises which had not for object the
triumph of religion. The legate of the pope in Spain addressed himself
first to the Arragonese, who replied by a formal refusal, expressed in
a national synod. Cardinal Ximenes declared, in the name of the king
of Castile, that the Spaniards did not believe in the threats of the
Turks, and that they would not give their money until the pope had
positively announced how he would employ it. If the dispositions and
the will of the court of Rome found less resistance and occasioned no
troubles in England or France, it was because Cardinal Wolsey, minister
of Henry VIII., was associated in the mission of the apostolic legate,
and that Leo X. abandoned the tenths of his kingdom to Francis I.
We have before us several historical documents which have never been
printed, and which throw a great light upon the circumstances of
which we are speaking. The first is a letter from Francis I., dated
from Amboise, the 16th of December, 1516, by which _Master Josse de
Lagarde, doctor in theology, vicar-general of the cathedral church of
Thoulouse_, is named commissary, _touching the fact of the crusade in
the diocese_. The king of France exposes in another letter the aim of
the jubilate that is about to be opened: _it was to implore means to
make war against the infidels, and conquer the Holy Land and the empire
of Greece, detained and usurped by the said infidels_. To these letters
patent are joined instructions given by the king, in concert with the
legate of the pope, for the execution of the bull which orders the
preaching of the crusade in the kingdom of France during the two years
1517 and 1518. These instructions, in the first place, recommend the
choice of good preachers, charged _to make good and devout sermons to
the people, and to explain the faculties and dispensations which are
contained in the bull_, as well as why _the just and holy causes for
which it is ordered, that during two years all other indulgences, all
other general and particular pardons, are suspended and revoked_.
After having spoken of the choice of preachers, and of the manner in
which they ought to preach, the letters patent of the king give some
instructions upon the choice of confessors. The commissary-general of
the crusade could appoint as many as seemed necessary to him for every
church in which were _troncs et questes_ (poor-boxes and gatherings)
for the jubilee. He was commanded to name six for the cathedral of the
diocese, _gens de bonne conscience, hors de suspicion_ (worthy people,
above suspicion). The ecclesiastics thus chosen by the commissary had
the mission to confess all such as were desirous of indulgences; and to
avoid the disorders that might arise from the spirit of rivalry, they
had, to the exclusion of all others, the power to make compositions and
restitutions, and give absolution, &c. &c.
In short, the royal ordinance omitted none of the circumstances which
accompanied the preaching of a crusade, or of the forms which ought to
be adopted in the distribution of indulgences. It goes so far as to
regulate the shape of the _troncs_ placed in the churches to receive
the offerings of the faithful, and the religious ceremonies that
were to be observed during the jubilee.[84] Among other orders, one
commanded that a great number of confessionals, or bills of absolution
and indulgence, should be made; that these bills, signed by a notary,
should be sent to the commissary-general, who would seal them WITH THE
SEAL sent by the king, and that there should be left upon them a blank
space for the name of him or her who wished to procure them. The royal
instruction added, that the commissary should cause his _tronc_ to be
properly and handsomely set up, and that there should be in the centre
of it a large handsome cross, upon which should be written, in great,
fair letters, IN HOC SIGNO VINCES. In order that nothing might be
wanting to excite the people to devotion, it was besides ordered, that
solemn processions should be made, and that in them a handsome banner
should be carried, upon which should be, on one side, the portraits of
the pope and the king of France, and on the other, _paintings full of
Turks and other infidels_.
In this ordinance, of which it gives us great pleasure to recall the
spirit and the expressions, that which history particularly observes,
is the numerous precautions against infidelity and fraud. The
distributors of the indulgences were obliged to consult an assessment
for their government in all expenses and reinstatements. The _troncs_,
in which the money of the faithful was deposited, had three locks and
three keys, and were only to be opened in the presence of witnesses;
among the documents we have quoted, is one which is the legal order
for the opening of the _troncs_,[85] with an account rendered of the
receipts and expenditure, in which the most minute details are not
neglected, and which shows to what a degree exactitude and watchfulness
were carried. These rigorous precautions were the more necessary, from
the people being led to be suspicious by the examples of past times;
it was pretty well known that many of the collectors of the money
for the crusades were not _people of worth, and above suspicion_.
The more sacred the motive for levying this tribute was said to be,
the more promptly was suspicion awakened; and the more anxious did
charity itself appear as to the manner in which its offerings might
be expended. Upon this point, as upon others, authority had so much
the more necessity for keeping a severe watch, from there always
being among the orators of the crusades some who showed more zeal
than wisdom, and whose preachings were really a subject of scandal.
As most of them received a salary proportionate with the amount
of money dropped into the _troncs_ of the churches, many did not
hesitate to exaggerate the promises of the sovereign pontiff and the
privileges attached to gifts of charity. History gives us the example
of a preacher who put forth from the evangelical pulpit the following
culpable maxim: _When a piece of money shall be placed in the tronc of
the crusade for the deliverance of a soul from purgatory, immediately
that soul will be delivered, and will fly away towards heaven_. The
Faculty of Theology of Paris censured this proposition as contrary to
the dogmas of the Church. The prudence of the heads of the Gallican
Church, and the wise measures adopted by the king of France, thus
prevented great disorders. It was not so in Germany, where the greatest
excitement and dissatisfaction prevailed, and where seeds of heresy and
trouble began to spring up even in the bosom of the clergy.
It may have been observed, how much more easy the court of Rome
had hitherto daily made the opening of the treasury of pontifical
indulgences. In the early expeditions to the East, these indulgences
were only granted to the pilgrims of the Holy Land. They were
afterwards granted to all who contributed to the support of the
Crusaders. Still later, they were granted to the faithful who listened
to the sermons of the preachers of the crusades; sometimes even to
those who were present at the mass of the pope’s legates. As the
distribution or sale of indulgences was an inexhaustible source of
wealth, Leo X. took upon him to grant them not only to those who, by
their alms, were willing to aid in defraying the expenses of the war
against the Turks, but to all the faithful whose pious liberality
should contribute to the amount necessary for the completion of the
building of the church of St. Peter, which had been begun by his
predecessor Julius II. Although this destination might have something
noble and truly useful in it; although it might be worthy, in some
sort, of an age in which the arts burst forth with great splendour,
many Christians, particularly in Germany, saw nothing in it but an
actual profanation, and a new means by which the court of Rome sought
to enrich itself at the expense of the faithful.
Albert, archbishop of Mayence, charged with appointing the preachers
of the jubilee and the distributors of papal indulgences, named for
Saxony, Dominicans, to the exclusion of Cordeliers or Augustines,
who had sometimes filled these kinds of missions. The latter showed
themselves jealous of this preference; and as no precaution had been
taken either to avert the effects of this species of rivalry, or put
a stop to the abuses which might be committed, it happened that the
Augustines censured severely the conduct, manners, and opinions of the
Dominicans, and that the latter but too well justified the complaints
of their adversaries.
Luther, an Augustine monk, put himself forward in these violent
quarrels, and distinguished himself by his fervid eloquence;[86] he
spoke strongly against the preachers that had been selected to receive
the contributions of the faithful; and among the propositions he put
forth from the pulpit, history has preserved the following, which
was censured by Leo X.: “It is a sin to resist the Turks, seeing
that Providence makes use of this faithless nation, to visit the
iniquities of his people.” This strange maxim obtained faith amongst
the partisans of Luther; and when the pope’s legate demanded, at the
diet of Ratisbon, the levy of the tenths destined for the crusade, he
met with a warm opposition. Murmurs and complaints arose in all parts
of Germany. The court of Rome was reproached with putting holy things
up to sale: it was compared to the unfaithful shepherd, who shears the
sheep confided to his care; it was accused of despoiling credulous
people; of ruining nations and kings; and of accumulating upon
Christians more miseries than the domination of the Turks could cause
them.
For more than a century, these kinds of accusations resounded
throughout Germany, every time that money was raised for crusades;
or that any tribute whatever was imposed upon the Christians by the
sovereign pontiff. The reformers took advantage of this disposition of
men’s minds to circulate new ideas, and to attempt a revolution in the
Church. Among a nation led by its genius and character to speculative
ideas, philosophic and religious novelties were sure to find more
warm partisans and ardent apostles than elsewhere. It must likewise
be added, that Germany was one of the countries of Christendom that
Rome had, in its omnipotence, spared the least; and that the spirit
of opposition had _there_ taken rise, amidst long quarrels between
the priesthood and the empire. When once the tie that united the minds
of people was broken, and the yoke of an authority consecrated by
time was shaken off, opposition knew no bounds; there was no longer a
limit to opinions: the Church was attacked on all sides at once, and
by a thousand different sects, all opposed to the court of Rome, and
most of them opposed to each other. From that period burst forth that
revolution which was destined to separate for ever many nations of
Christendom from the Romish communion.
It is not our task to describe the events which accompanied the schism
of Luther; but it is curious to observe, that the origin of the
Reformation should be connected, not directly with the crusades, but
with the abuse of the indulgences promulgated for the crusades.
Like all who begin revolutions, Luther was not at all aware of the
extent to which his opposition to the court of Rome might be carried:
he at first began by attacking some abuses of the pontifical authority,
and soon finished by attacking the authority itself. The opinions he
had kindled by his eloquence, the passions he had given birth to among
his disciples, led him himself much further than he could possibly have
foreseen: those who had the greatest reason to combat the doctrines of
the reformers saw, no more than he did, what those doctrines were to
bring with them. Germany, divided into a thousand different states,
and given up to all kinds of disorders, had no authority sufficiently
strong and sufficiently prescient to anticipate the effects of a
schism. At the court of Rome nobody could have believed that a simple
monk could ever shake the pillars of the Church. Amidst the pomp and
the splendour of the arts which he patronized, and diverted by the
cares of an ambitious policy, Leo X. perhaps was too neglectful of the
progress of Luther. Above all, he was wrong in entirely abandoning the
expedition against the Turks, which he had announced to the Christian
world, and which might, at least at the first, have offered a useful
distraction to minds agitated by ideas of reformation. The undertaking
of a holy war which he had followed up with so much warmth at the
beginning of his pontificate and for which the poets promised him
eternal glory,—this enterprise, at his death, no longer engaged his
thoughts, or those of his contemporaries.
In the mean time Soliman, the successor of Selim, had recently taken
possession of Belgrade, and threatened the isle of Rhodes. This isle
was then the last colony of the Christians in Asia. As long as the
Knights of St. John remained masters of it, the sultan of the Turks had
reason to fear that some great expedition might be formed in the West
for the recovery of Palestine and Syria, or even for the conquest of
Egypt, which had lately been united to the Ottoman empire.
The grand-master of the Hospitallers sent to solicit the assistance of
Christian Europe. Charles V. had just united, in his own person, the
imperial crown with that of the Spains. Entirely occupied with opposing
the power of France, and anxious to draw Pope Adrian VI. into a war
against the most Christian king, the emperor was very little affected
by the danger which threatened the Knights of Rhodes. The sovereign
pontiff did not dare to succour them, or solicit for them the support
of Christendom. Francis I. exhibited more generous sentiments; but in
the situation in which his kingdom was then placed, he was unable to
send them the assistance he had promised.
The Knights of Rhodes were left to their own resources. History has
celebrated the labours and the prodigies of heroism by which the order
of the Hospitallers illustrated its defence. After many months of
combats, Rhodes fell into the hands of Soliman. It was a sad spectacle
to behold the grand-master L’Isle-Adam, the father of his knights
and of his subjects, dragging with him the sad remains of the order,
and all the people of Rhodes, who had determined to follow him. He
landed at first upon the coast of Naples, not far from the spot where
Virgil makes the pious Æneas land, with the glorious wreck of Troy.
If the spirit of the crusades could have revived, what heart could
have remained unmoved, at seeing this venerable old man, followed by
his faithful companions in misfortune, seeking an asylum, imploring
compassion, and soliciting, as a reward of their past services, a
little corner of earth upon which he and his warriors might still
unfurl the standard of religion, and combat the infidels.
When the grand-master set forward on his march towards Rome, Adrian
VI. had declared war against the king of France; a league was formed
by the sovereign pontiff, the emperor, the king of England, and the
duke of Milan. In this state of affairs, the Christians of the East
could not hope for any succour. After the death of Adrian, Pope Clement
VII. showed himself more favourable to the order of the Hospitallers.
He received the grand-master with all the demonstrations of a
paternal tenderness. When the chancellor of the order related, in the
consistory, the exploits and the reverses of the knights, the sovereign
pontiff and the Romish prelates shed tears, and promised to interest
all the powers of the Christian world for such noble sufferers.
Unfortunately for the order of St. John, the powers of Europe were more
than ever divided among themselves. Francis I. was made prisoner at the
battle of Pavia. The pope, who had wished to resume the old papal title
of the conciliator, only drew down upon himself the hatred and the
anger of Charles V. Amidst these divisions, the Knights of Rhodes were
forgotten; and it was not till ten years after the conquest of Soliman,
that these noble warriors were able to obtain from the emperor, the
rock of Malta, where they became again the terror of the Mussulmans.
Whilst Europe was thus troubled, the conqueror of Rhodes and Belgrade
reappeared in a threatening attitude upon the banks of the Danube.
Louis II. endeavoured to reanimate the patriotism of the Hungarians,
and caused the old custom of exposing in public a bloody sabre to
be revived, as a signal of war and of danger for the country. But
neither the exhortations of the monarch, nor those of the clergy, nor
even the approach of the enemy, were able to appease the discords,
born of feudal anarchy and the lengthened misfortunes of Hungary. The
Hungarian monarch was only able to get together an army of twenty-two
thousand men, to oppose to that of Soliman. Louis, a young prince
without experience, who allowed himself to be led, even in war, by
ecclesiastics, named, as general of his army, Paul Temory, lately
issued from a convent of Cordeliers, to become archbishop of Colotza.
We are unable to ascertain whether, in this circumstance, the king of
Hungary was obliged to put himself in the hands of the clergy, because
he was abandoned by the nobility; or, if the nobility abandoned him,
because he had put himself in the hands of the clergy. As the pope
constantly excited the Hungarians to defend their own country, the
ecclesiastics of Hungary, who were his interpreters to the faithful,
and even to the king, must naturally have exercised a great influence
in all that concerned the crusade.
In this war twenty-two thousand Christians had to contend with an
army of a hundred thousand Ottomans; and this was the Hungarian army
which, according to the advice of the bishops, offered battle to the
infidels. What is very remarkable in holy wars is, that the clergy
may almost always be recognised by the rashness of the enterprises.
The persuasion of the ecclesiastics, that they were fighting for the
cause of God, with their ignorance of the art of war, prevented them
from seeing perils, did not allow them to doubt of victory, and made
them often neglect the means of human prudence. It was then, in the
confidence of a miraculous success, that the archbishop of Colotza
did not hesitate to venture upon a decisive battle. The clergy who
accompanied him animated the combatants by their discourses, and set
an example of bravery; but religious and warlike enthusiasm cannot
triumph over numbers, and most of the prelates received the palm of
martyrdom in the _mêlée_. Eighteen thousand Christians were left upon
the field of battle; and what added greatly to the misfortune, Louis
II. disappeared, and perished in the general rout, leaving his kingdom
torn by factions and ravaged by the Turks.
The defeat of the Hungarians brought despair to the mind of Clement
VII. The pontiff wrote to all the sovereigns of Europe; he even formed
the project of visiting them in person, and to engage them by his
prayers and his tears to defend Christendom. Neither the touching
exhortations of the pope, nor his suppliant attitude, were able to move
the princes; and it is here that we can plainly perceive the rapid
decline of the pontifical power, which we have so lately seen armed
with all the terrors of the Church, and whose decisions were considered
as the decrees of Heaven. War was about to be rekindled in Italy, and
the pope was not long in becoming himself the victim of the disorders
he would willingly have prevented. The imperial troops entered Rome as
into an enemy’s city. The emperor, who assumed the title of temporal
head of the Church, did not fear to offer to Europe the scandal of the
captivity of a pontiff.
Although the authority of the head of the Church no longer inspired the
same veneration, or exercised the same ascendancy over men’s minds,
nevertheless the violences of Charles V. excited general indignation.
England and France flew to arms. All Europe was troubled: some wished
to avenge the pope, others to take advantage of the disorder; but none
thought of defending Christendom against the invasion of the Turks.
Clement VII., however, from the depths of the prison in which the
emperor detained him, still watched over the defence of Christian
Europe: his legates went to exhort the Hungarians to fight for their
God and their country. As the pontiff had been ruined by the calamities
of war, he implored the charity of the faithful; he ordered that the
plate should be sold in all the churches of Italy; he solicited the
assistance of several Italian states; and he ordered that indulgences
might be distributed and the tenths collected to support the expenses
of the holy war.
The active solicitude of the pope went so far as to seek enemies
against the Turks even in the East and among the infidels. Acomath, who
had in Egypt shaken off the yoke of the Porte, received encouragement
from the court of Rome. A legate of the pope went to promise him the
support of the Christians of the West. The sovereign pontiff kept up
continual relations on all the frontiers and in all the provinces
of the Turkish empire, in order to be made aware of the designs and
preparations of the sultans of Constantinople. It is not out of place
to say here, that most of the predecessors of Clement had taken, as
he did, the greatest care in watching the projects of the infidels.
Thus the heads of the Church did not confine themselves to exciting
the Christians to defend themselves upon their own territories; but,
like vigilant sentinels, they constantly kept their eyes fixed upon the
enemies of Christendom, to warn Europe of the perils which threatened
it.
When the emperor broke the chains of Clement VII., the holy pontiff
forgot the outrages he had received, to give all his cares to the
danger of the German empire, which was about to be attacked by the
Turks. The capital of Austria was soon besieged, and only owed its
safety to the bravery of its garrison. In the diets of Augsburg and
Spire, the pope’s legate endeavoured, in the name of religion, to
rouse the ardour of the people of Germany for their own defence. A
physician, named Riccius, spoke in the name of the emperor, and added
his exhortations to those of the apostolic legate; he made an appeal
to the ancient virtue of the Germans, and reminded his auditors of the
example of their ancestors, who had never endured a foreign domination.
He pressed princes, magistrates, and people, to fight for their own
independence and safety. Ferdinand, king of Bohemia and Hungary, urged
the princes and states of the empire to adopt prompt and effective
measures against the Turks. These exhortations and counsels met with
but little success, but had to encounter a strong opposition from the
still too active spirit of the new doctrines. All the cities, all the
provinces, were occupied by questions agitated by the Reformation. We
may at this time compare the nations of Germany, menaced by the Turks,
to the Greeks of the lower empire, whom history represents as given up
to vain disputes, when the barbarians were at their gates. As among the
Greeks, there was a crowd of men among the Germans, who entertained
less dread of seeing in their cities the turban of Mahomet than the
tiara of the pontiff of Rome; some, governed by a spirit of fatalism
scarcely to be equalled in the Koran, asserted that God had judged
Hungary, and that the safety of that kingdom was not in the power of
men; others (the Millenarians) announced with a fanatical joy the
approach of the last judgment; and whilst the preachers of the crusades
were exhorting the Germans to defend their country, the jealous pride
of an impious sect called for the days of universal desolation.
The paternal proceedings and counsels of the pope were neither able to
calm men’s minds, nor to rekindle an enthusiasm for the holy war, in
Germany, or even among the Hungarians. Ferdinand, brother of Charles
V., whom the imperial power had caused to be declared king of Hungary;
and the vaiwode of Transylvania, who, with permission of the Turks,
reigned over the ruins of his country, were contending for this
unfortunate kingdom, oppressed at the same time by its enemies and its
allies. When Soliman returned, for the third time, to the banks of
the Danube, called thither by a party of the Hungarian nobility, he
found no army to oppose his march. The Ottomans advanced towards the
capital of Austria, and prepared to invade the richest provinces of
Germany. So pressing a danger determined the head and the princes of
the empire to unite their forces against the common enemy. But when the
Turks retired in disorder, no one thought of either fighting with them,
or pursuing them in their precipitate retreat. The king of Hungary,
abandoned all at once by the Germans, and fearing fresh attacks, had
no resource but to sue to his enemies for peace. It is a circumstance
worthy of remark, that the pope was comprised in the treaty: Soliman
gave the title of father to the Roman pontiff, and that of brother to
the king of Hungary. Clement VII., after so many useless attempts to
interest the princes of Christendom, appeared to entertain no hope but
in Providence; and exclaimed with bitterness, when approving the issue
of the pacific negotiations, “We have nothing left but to supplicate
Heaven to watch itself over the Christian world.”
It might be believed that the holy wars were drawing towards an end,
when the head of the Church had laid down his arms, and made peace with
the infidels. But this treaty of peace, like others that had preceded
it, could only be considered as a truce, and war would most likely
break out again when either the Christians or the Mussulmans saw any
hopes of carrying it on with advantage. Such was the policy of the
times; particularly that which governed the Christian and Mussulman
powers in their mutual relations. Soliman had abandoned his projects
upon Germany and Hungary, less out of respect for treaties, than
because he was employing his forces against the Persians, or that he
required his army to quell some revolts which had broken out in Asia
against his authority. On the other side, Christendom left the Ottomans
in peace, because it was a prey to discord; and because most Christian
princes, occupied by their own interests, listened to nothing but the
counsels of their ambition.
Europe had at that time three great monarchs, whose united strength
would have been quite sufficient to crush the power of the Turks;
but these three princes were as much opposed to each other by their
policy as by their character and their genius. Henry VIII. of England,
who had refuted Luther, and leagued himself with the king of France,
to deliver the captive pope, had just separated himself from the
Romish Church. Sometimes allied with France, sometimes allied with
the emperor, occupied in bringing about the triumph of the schism
of which he was the apostle and the head, he had no time to bestow
upon war with the infidels. Francis I. had, in the first place, made
pretensions to the imperial crown, and afterwards to the duchy of Milan
and the kingdom of Naples. These pretensions, which were a source of
misfortunes to himself and France, disturbed the whole of his reign,
and never allowed him an opportunity for seriously undertaking a
crusade against the Turks, a crusade which he himself had preached
in his states. The feeling of vengeance and jealousy which animated
him against a fortunate and powerful rival, inspired him twice with
the idea of seeking an alliance with Soliman. To the great scandal of
Christendom, an Ottoman fleet was received in the port of Marseilles,
and the standard of the lilies was mingled with the crescent under
the walls of Nice. Charles V., master of all the Spains, head of the
German empire, sovereign of the Low Countries, and possessor of several
empires in the new world, was much more anxious to humble the French
monarchy, and establish his domination in Europe, than to defend
Christendom against the invasion of the Turks. During the greater part
of his reign, this monarch conciliated the Protestants of Germany,
on account of the Ottomans; and avoided collision with the Ottomans,
on account of his enemies in the Christian republic. He satisfied
himself with protecting, by his arms, the capital of Austria, when
threatened by the Turks; but when the pope conjured him to employ
his forces for the deliverance of Hungary, he preferred attempting
an expedition to the coast of Africa. A war against the Moors of
Africa was more popular in Spain than an expedition upon the Danube;
and Charles was more desirous of acquiring popularity among the
Spaniards, than of meriting the gratitude of Christendom. The Barbary
powers were recently formed, under the protection of the Ottoman
Porte, and began to render themselves formidable in the Mediterranean.
Charles carried his arms twice to the coast of Africa: in the first
expedition, he got possession of Tunis, planted his standards upon the
ruins of Carthage, and delivered twenty thousand captives, who went
to publish his victories in every part of the Christian world; in the
second expedition, he would have annihilated the Barbary powers, so
destructive to the navigation of the Franks; but a hurricane, which
destroyed his fleet and his army, dispersed the hopes of commerce and
navigators.
At the time Charles experienced so great a disaster whilst combating
the Mussulmans of Africa, the Ottomans, invited by Francis I., were
ravaging the coasts of Italy, and had recently entered Hungary, from
whence they threatened Germany.
Then fresh cries of alarm resounded all over Europe, and among those
who exhorted the nations to oppose the Turks, the voice of Martin
Luther was heard. In a book entitled _Prayer against the Turk_, the
reformer condemned the indifference of people and kings, and advised
the Christians to resist the Mussulmans, if they did not wish to be
led into captivity, as the children of Israel had formerly been. In a
formula of prayer which he had composed, he expressed himself thus:
“Arise, Lord, great God, and sanctify thy name, which thy enemies
outrage; strengthen thy reign, which they wish to destroy, and suffer
us not to be trampled under-foot by those who are not willing that thou
shouldst be our God.”
Murmurs had several times arisen against Luther, who was accused of
having, by his doctrines, weakened the courage of the Germans. Some
time before the period of which we are speaking, he published an
apology, in which, without disavowing the famous proposition censured
by the pope, he gave to his words a different sense from that which
the court of Rome gave them, and which he himself, no doubt, had given
them in the first instance. All his explanations, which it is not very
easy to analyze, were reduced to this idea:—“That it was allowable
to fight with the Turks, but that it was not allowable to fight with
them under the banners of Christianity.” Although the leader of the
Reformation required all the qualities of a perfect Christian in the
warriors called upon to fight the Mussulmans, and although he drew
all the principles of his preaching from the religion of Christ; the
standard of the cross in a Christian army, caused him, he said, more
horror than the sight of the demon. The true motive for his repugnance
for a crusade may be easily guessed; a crusade appeared necessarily to
require the concurrence of the pope; and the concurrence of the pope,
in a war which interested Christendom, was the thing in the world
most dreaded by Luther. He had so strong an aversion to the court of
Rome, that in his writings he asks himself if war ought not to be made
against the Pope as well as the Turk; and in the excess of his hatred,
does not hesitate to answer, _against the one as against the other_.
We will not repeat here the declamations and the sophisms of Luther.
Through the puerile subtleties and the contrary reasonings which he
employs for his justification, we must, however, remark the distinction
he has made between civil authority and ecclesiastical authority: it is
to the first, says the reformer, that it belongs to combat the Turks;
the duty of the second is to wait, to submit, to pray, and to groan.
He adds, that war was not the business of bishops, but of magistrates;
that the emperor, in this circumstance, ought to be considered as the
head of the German confederation, and not as the protector of the
Church, nor as the support of the Christian faith; a title which can
only properly be given to Jesus Christ. All these arguments, doubtless,
had something reasonable in them; and the opinion of Luther upon
the civil authority, although he might have adopted it only out of
opposition to the papal power, would have obtained the approbation of
enlightened minds, if he had not employed, in supporting it, all the
passion of irritated pride; and if his apology, in particular, had not
been stained by abuse which decency will not allow history to repeat.
Not content with this apology, which had for title, _Of the War against
the Turks_, Luther, two years after the siege of Vienna, published
another work, entitled, _A Military Discourse_, in which he also urges
the Germans to take arms. This second discourse begins, as the first
had done, by theological distinctions and subtleties; by declamations
against the pope and the bishops; by predictions upon the approaching
end of the world; and upon the power of the Turks; which the author
finds clearly announced in Daniel. Although he endeavours to prove, as
in his first writing, that the war against the Mussulmans is not at all
a religious war, but an enterprise entirely political; he promises,
not the less, the palms of martyrdom to those who shall die with arms
in their hands. He represents this war as agreeable to the Divinity,
and as the duty of a true disciple of the Gospel. “Thy arm and thy
lance,” says he to every Christian soldier who shall take arms against
the infidels, “shall be the arm and the lance of God. In immolating
Turks, thou wilt not shed innocent blood, and the world will consider
thee as the executioner of the decrees of divine justice; for thou wilt
but kill those whom God has himself condemned. The Turk,” adds he,
“ravishes terrestrial life from Christians, and procures them eternal
life; he at the same time kills himself, and precipitates himself into
hell.” Luther appears to be so penetrated with this idea, that he is
on the point of deploring the fate of the Mussulmans; and to chastise
indifferent Christians, and pusillanimous Germans, he has no punishment
to wish them, unless it be that they should become Turks, and thus be
the property of the devil.
A short extract is not sufficient to show what whimsical and singular
ideas are contained in Luther’s discourse; it may, however, be easily
perceived how much this kind of preaching differs from that of the
orators who preached the crusade in preceding ages. In the second part
of his discourse, the leader of the Reformation addressed himself to
the various classes of society; to the nobility, who are immersed in
luxury and pleasures, but for whom the hour of fight is at length
come; to the citizens and merchants, for too long a time addicted to
usury and cupidity; to the labourers and peasants, whom he accuses of
deceiving and robbing their neighbours. The tone of the preacher is
full of an excessive severity; he speaks like a man who feels no sorrow
at the misfortunes which are about to happen, because he has foretold
them, and his warnings and prophecies have been despised. He says, with
a sort of satisfaction, that after days of joy and debauchery, after
seasons of festivity and pleasures, comes the time of tears, miseries,
and alarms. He finishes by a vehement apostrophe, addressed to all who
shall remain deaf to his voice, and whom the enemy shall find without
defence: “Listen now, then, to the devil in the Turk, you who are not
willing to listen to God in Jesus Christ; the Turk will burn your
dwellings; he will bear away your cattle and your harvests; he will
outrage and slaughter your wives and your daughters before your eyes;
he will impale your little children upon the very stakes of the hedge
which serves as an inclosure to your heritage; he will immolate you
yourselves, or will carry you away into Turkey, to expose you in the
market, like unclean animals; it is he who will teach you what you will
have lost, and what you ought to have done. It is to the Turk belongs
the task to humble the haughty nobility, to render citizens docile, and
to chastise and tame the gross multitude.”
Luther then gives his advice upon the manner of making war against
the Turks; he is desirous that all should defend themselves even to
death, and that all the countries through which the enemy was about to
pass should be laid waste; he terminates his discourse by addressing
consolations to them who shall fall into the hands of the Turks, and
traces out for them a plan of conduct for the time of their captivity
among the infidels.
This language, of which we are far from exaggerating the singularity,
was not at all calculated to warm and rally men’s minds for a struggle
against the enemies of Germany and Christendom. At this period, the
princes and the states of the empire frequently met to deliberate
on their own dangers. It was more easy to convoke diets than to get
together armies. The Protestants were not willing to take arms against
the Turks, for fear of strengthening their adversaries; and the
Catholics were restrained by their fear of the Protestants: amidst the
violent debates that agitated Germany, the Church, and even the civil
authority which Luther had proclaimed, lost all that unity of action,
without which it is impossible to combat a formidable enemy with
advantage. Among the Germans, the spirit of sect weakened by degrees
the spirit of patriotism; among Christians, the hatred they conceived
for one another caused them to lose that pious ardour which had
animated them against the Mussulmans. In proportion as the Reformation
proceeded, Germany became divided into two parties, which were like two
enemies face to face. Both parties soon had recourse to arms, and, in
the fury of civil wars, the invasions of the Turks were forgotten. It
was thus that the Reformation, which took its birth at the end of the
crusades, completely extinguished the enthusiasm for holy wars, and
no longer permitted the nations of Christendom to unite against the
infidels.
The name of the Turks was still pronounced in the diets of Germany, and
even in the council of Trent; but no measures were adopted for making
war against them. From that time there passed nothing in either Hungary
or the East which was able to fix the attention of the Christian world.
The only event upon which Europe seemed interested was the defence
of Malta against all the forces of Soliman. This defence increased
the reputation of the military order of St. John. The port of Malta
became the only place of shelter for Christian vessels on the route to
Egypt, Syria, or Greece. The corsairs of Tunis and Algiers, and all the
pirates who infested the Mediterranean, trembled at the sight of the
rock, and of the galleys over which floated the standard of the cross.
This military colony, always armed against the infidels, and constantly
recruited from the warlike nobility of Europe, offered, up to the end
of the eighteenth century, a living image of ancient chivalry, and of
the heroic epoch of the crusades. We have described the origin of this
illustrious order,—we have followed it in its days of triumph, and in
its reverses, still more glorious than its victories. We will not say
by what revolution it is fallen, nor how it has lost that isle which
was given to it as the reward of its bravery, and which it defended,
during more than two hundred years, against the Ottoman forces and the
barbarians of Africa.
Whilst the Turks miscarried in their expedition against Malta, Soliman
was pursuing the war in Hungary, and still threatening Germany. He died
on the banks of the Danube, in the midst of victories obtained over
the Christians. Christendom must have rejoiced at his death, as it had
rejoiced at the death of Mahomet II. Under the reign of Soliman, who
was the greatest prince of the Ottoman dynasty, the Turks not only
invaded a part of the German empire, but their marine, seconded by the
genius of Barberossa and Dragut, made a progress that must have alarmed
all the maritime powers of Europe. Selim II., who succeeded him, had
neither his qualities nor the genius of most of his predecessors; but
he followed not the less their projects of aggrandizement, or the views
of their ambitious policy. The Ottomans, masters of the coasts of
Greece, Syria, and Africa, were desirous of adding to their conquests
the kingdom of Cyprus, which was then possessed by the Venetians.
After a siege of several months, the Ottoman army obtained possession
of the cities of Famagousta and Nicosia. The Turks stained their
victory by cruelties without example. The bravest of the defenders of
Cyprus expiated in tortures the glory of an obstinate resistance; and
it may be said, it was the executioners that finished the war. The
barbarity of the Turks disgusted the Christian nations afresh; and the
maritime countries of the West beheld with terror an invasion which
threatened to exclude Europeans from every road to the East.
At the approach of the danger, Pope Pius V. exhorted the Christian
powers to take up arms against the Ottomans. A confederation was
formed, consisting of the republic of Venice, Philip II., king of
Spain, and the pope himself, always ready to add the authority of his
example to his preaching. A numerous fleet, equipped for the defence
of the isle of Cyprus, arrived too late in the eastern seas, and was
only able to repair the disgrace of the Christian arms. This fleet,
commanded by Don John of Austria, met that of the Ottomans in the
Gulf of Lepanto. It was in this sea Antony and Augustus disputed the
mastership of the Roman world. The battle which took place between the
Christians and the Turks reminds us in some degree of the spirit and
enthusiasm of the crusades. Before the commencement of the conflict,
Don John hoisted on board his ship the standard of St. Peter, which he
had received from the pope, and the army saluted with cries of joy this
religious signal of victory. The leaders of the Christians passed along
the line of barques, exhorting the soldiers to fight for the cause of
Christ. All the warriors, falling upon their knees, implored divine
protection, and arose full of confidence in their own bravery and the
miracles of heaven.
No naval battle of antiquity can be compared to this of Lepanto, in
which the Turks fought for the empire of the world, and the Christians
for the defence of Europe. The courage and skill of Don John and the
other leaders, the intrepidity and ardour of the soldiers, and the
superiority of the Franks in manœuvring their vessels, and in their
artillery, procured for the Christian fleet a decisive victory. Two
hundred of the enemy’s ships were taken, burnt, or sunk. The wreck of
the Turkish fleet, whilst announcing the victory of the Christians,
carried consternation to the coasts of Greece and to the capital of the
Ottoman empire.
Terrified by the results of this battle, Selim caused the famous castle
of the Dardanelles to be built, which to the present day defends the
entrance to the canal of Constantinople. At the time of the battle, the
roof of the temple of Mecca fell in, and the Turks believed they saw in
this accident a sign of the anger of Heaven. The roof was of wood; and
that it might become, says Cantemir, a more solid emblem of the empire,
the son of Soliman ordered it to be reconstructed of brick.
Whilst the Turks deplored the first reverse their arms had met with,
the whole of Christendom learnt the news of the victory of Lepanto
with the greatest joy. The Venetians, who had awaited in terror the
issue of the battle, celebrated the triumph of the Christian fleet by
extraordinary festivities. In order that no feeling of sadness should
be mingled with the universal joy, the senate set all prisoners at
liberty, and forbade the subjects of the republic to wear mourning
for their relations or friends who had been killed fighting against
the Turks. The battle of Lepanto was inscribed upon coins, and as the
infidels were defeated on the day of St. Justin, the seigneury ordered
that this happy day should be every year a festival for the whole
population of Venice.
At Toledo, and in all the churches of Spain, the people and the
clergy offered up hymns of gratitude to Heaven for the victory it had
granted to the valour of the Christian soldiers. No nation, no prince
of Europe, was indifferent to the defeat of the Turks; and, if one
historian may be believed, the king of England, James I., celebrated
in a poem the glorious day of Lepanto.
As the pope had effectively contributed to the success of the Christian
arms, it was at Rome that the strongest symptoms of delight were
exhibited. Mark Antony Colonna, who had commanded the vessels of the
sovereign pontiff, was received in triumph, and conducted to the
Capitol, preceded by a great number of prisoners of war. The ensigns
taken from the enemy were suspended in the church of Ara-Cœli. After
a solemn mass, Mark Antony Mureti pronounced the panegyric of the
triumphant general. Thus the ceremonies of ancient Rome were mingled
with those of the modern, to celebrate the valour and exploits of
the defenders of Christendom. The Church itself was desirous of
consecrating a victory gained over its enemies among its festivals;
Pius V. instituted one in honour of the Virgin, by whose intercession
it was believed the Mussulmans had been conquered. This festival was
celebrated on the 7th October, the day of the battle of Lepanto, under
the denomination of “Our Lady of Victories.”
Thus a unanimous concert of prayers and thanksgivings arose towards
heaven, and all Christians at the same time showed their gratitude
to the God of armies for having delivered Europe from the invasion
of the Mussulmans. But it was not long before this happy harmony was
disturbed: ambition, reciprocal mistrusts, diversity of interests, all
that had till that time favoured the progress of the Turks, prevented
the Christians from deriving the proper advantages from their victory.
The Venetians were anxious to pursue the war, in order to recover the
isle of Cyprus; but Philip II., dreading any increase in the power
of Venice, withdrew from the confederation. The Venetian republic,
abandoned by its allies, hastened to make peace. It obtained it by
sacrificing all the possessions it had lost during the war,—a strange
result of victory; by which the vanquished dictated laws to the
conqueror, and which plainly shows us to what extent the pretensions of
the Turks would have been carried if fortune had favoured their arms.
The war which was terminated by the battle of Lepanto, was the last in
which the standard of the cross animated or rallied Christian warriors.
The spirit of the holy wars at first arose from popular opinions.
When these opinions became weakened and great powers were formed,
all that relates to war or peace became concentrated in the councils
of monarchs. No more projects for distant expeditions were formed in
public councils; no more warlike enterprises were recommended from the
pulpits of the churches, or before assemblies of the faithful. States
and princes, placed at the head of human affairs, even when they made
war against the Mussulmans, obeyed much less the influence of religious
ideas than interests purely political. From that period the enthusiasm
of the multitude, and all the passions that had given birth to the
crusades, were reckoned as nothing.
The alliance of Francis I. with Soliman was at first a great scandal
for all Christendom. The king of France justified himself by accusing
the ambition and the perfidy of Charles V. His example was quickly
followed by Charles himself, and by other Christian states. Policy,
disengaging itself more and more from that which was religious in it,
came at last to consider the Ottoman Porte, no longer an enemy against
whom it was a duty always to be fighting, but as a great power, whom
it was sometimes necessary to conciliate, and whose support might be
sought without outraging the Deity, or affecting the interests of the
Church.
As the voice of the sovereign pontiff was always the instrument to
summon Christians to take arms against the infidels, the spirit of
the crusades necessarily grew weaker as the authority of the popes
declined. It may be added, that the political system of Europe was
making its development, and the ties and springs which were to
found the equilibrium of the Christian republic had an increasing
tendency to their establishment. Each state had its plan of defence
and aggrandisement, which it followed with a constant activity; all
were employed in endeavouring to attain the degree of power, force,
and influence to which their position and the fortune of their arms
entitled them. Hence those restless ambitions, those mutual mistrusts,
that ever active spirit of rivalry, which scarcely ever permitted
sovereigns to turn their attention towards distant wars.
Whilst ambition and the desire of increasing and defending their power
detained princes in their own states, the people became attached to
their homes by the blessings and the enjoyments of a rapidly-rising
civilization. In the eleventh century, the Franks, the Normans, and
other barbarians from the north, had not quite lost the character and
habits of nomadic races, which favoured the rise and the progress of
that warlike enthusiasm which had precipitated the Crusaders upon the
East. In the sixteenth century, institutions consecrated by time, the
precepts of Christianity better understood, respect for ancestry, love
of settled property, the constantly increasing wealth of cities, with
the progress of industry and of agriculture, had changed the character
of the Franks, destroyed their partiality for a wandering life, and had
become so many ties to attach them to their country.
In the preceding century the genius of navigation had discovered
America and the passage of the Cape of Good Hope. The results of
this discovery effected a great revolution in commerce, attracted
the attention of all nations, and gave a new direction to the human
mind. All the speculations of industry, for so long a time founded
upon the crusades, were directed towards America or the East Indies.
Great empires, rich climates, offered themselves all at once to the
ambition or the cupidity of all who sought for glory, fortune, or
adventures—the wonders of a new world made men forgetful of those of
the East.
At this so memorable epoch, a general emulation arose in Europe for
the cultivation of arts and of letters. The age of Leo X. produced
masterpieces of all kinds.[87] France, Spain, and still more Italy,
turned the newly-discovered art of printing greatly to the advantage
of knowledge. The splendid geniuses of Greece and Rome were everywhere
revived. In proportion as men’s minds became enlightened, the new
career opened before them expanded. Another enthusiasm succeeded to
that of religious enterprises; and the exploits of the heroic times of
our history excited much more admiration in our romances and poets,
than they created desire in people of the world to imitate them.
Then the Epic Muse, whose voice only celebrates distant events, sang
the heroes of the holy wars; and the crusades, for the same reason
that Tasso became at liberty to adorn the recital of them with all
the wealth of his imagination,—the crusades, we say, were no longer
anything for Europe but a poetical remembrance.
One fortunate circumstance for Christendom is, that at the period when
the crusades, which had for their object the defence of Europe, drew
near to their end, the Turks began to lose some part of that military
power which they had displayed in their contests with the Christian
nations. The Ottomans had at first been, as we have already said, the
only nation that kept on foot a regular standing army, which gave it
a vast superiority over powers that it was desirous of subduing. In
the sixteenth century, most of the great states of Europe had likewise
armies which they could at any time bring against their enemies.
Discipline and military tactics had made great progress in Christendom;
artillery and marine became more perfect in the West every day, whilst
the Turks, in all that concerns the art of war, or that of navigation,
gathered no advantage from either the lessons of experience, or from
the knowledge to which time and circumstances had given birth among
their neighbours. We ought to add, that the spirit of superstition
and intolerance which the Turks associated with their wars, was very
injurious to the preservation and extent of their conquests. When
they took possession of a province, they insisted upon making their
laws, their customs, and their worship paramount. They must change
everything, they must destroy everything, in the country in which
they wished to establish themselves; they must either exterminate the
population, or reduce it to the impossibility of disturbing a foreign
domination. Thus it may be remarked, that, although several times
masters of Hungary, they retired from it after every campaign, and were
never able, amidst all their victories, to found a colony or make any
durable establishment there. The Ottoman population which had sufficed
for occupying and enslaving the Greek empire, could not people and
preserve more distant countries. It was this, above everything, which
saved Germany and Italy from the invasion of the Turks. The Ottomans
might, perhaps, have conquered the world if they had been able to
impose their manners upon it, or furnish it with inhabitants.
After the battle of Lepanto, although they had preserved the isle of
Cyprus, and dictated laws to the republic of Venice, the Turks not the
less lost the idea of their being invincible, or that all the world
must submit to their arms. It was observed that from that time most of
the leaders of Turkish armies or fleets became more timid, and felt
less assured of victory, when in the presence of an enemy. Astrologers,
who had till then beheld in the phenomena of the heavens the increase
and the glory of the Ottoman empire, saw nothing during the reign of
Soliman and following reigns but sinister auguries in the aspects of
the celestial bodies. We mention astrologers, because their predictions
have considerable influence upon the policy of the Turks. It is not
improbable that these pretended conjurers did not confine their
observations to the celestial bodies, but that they watched the manners
and the opinions of the people, and the march of events and affairs. It
is for this reason that their prophecies were found true, and that they
belong, in some sort, to history.
The spirit of conquest, however, which had so long animated the nation,
still subsisted, and sometimes fortune favoured the Ottoman banner with
victory.
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, the Turks carried war to
both the banks of the Danube and to the frontiers of Persia. Among the
Christian warriors who flew to the aid of Germany, the duke of Mercœur,
brother of the duke of Mayenne, must not be forgotten; he was followed
by a crowd of French soldiers, who had fought against Henry IV., and
who went to expiate the crimes of civil war by fighting the infidels.
The duke of Mercœur, to whom the emperor Rodolph II. gave the command
of the imperial army, gained several advantages over the Ottomans.
Whilst the war was being carried on in Hungary, the king of Persia
sent an embassy to the emperor of Germany and the princes of the West,
to persuade them to form an alliance with him against the Turks. The
Persian ambassadors repaired to the court of the sovereign pontiff,
and to those of several Christian powers, conjuring them to declare
war against the Ottomans. This embassy of the king of Persia, and the
exploits of the French on the Danube, created great uneasiness in the
Divan, and an ambassador was sent to the king of France, as the most
to be feared of the Christian princes. The letters of credit of the
Turkish envoy bore this title: “To the most glorious, magnanimous, and
greatest lord of the faith of Jesus, pacificator of the differences
which arise among Christian princes, lord of greatness, majesty, and
riches, and glorious guide of the greatest, Henry IV., emperor of
France.” The sultan of the Turks conjured the French monarch, in his
letter, to bring about a truce between the Porte and the emperor of
Germany, and to recall from Hungary the duke of Mercœur, whose valour
and skill brought victory to the banners of the Germans. Henry IV.
interrogated the Ottoman ambassador, and asked him why the Turks
dreaded the duke of Mercœur so much. The ambassador replied, that a
prophecy, credited by the Turks, declared that the sword of the French
would drive them from Europe, and overthrow their empire. Henry IV. did
not recall the duke of Mercœur: this able captain continued to beat the
Ottomans, and having covered himself with glory in the war against the
infidels, he was seized, whilst on his return to France, by a purple
fever, “which,” says Mezerai, “sent him to triumph in heaven.”
In their wars against the Christians, the Turks often found themselves
on the defensive, which was for them a sign of decline. History remarks
that at no period did their reverses cause them more alarm, or their
victories more surprise and joy. Their defeats were almost always a
signal for sedition and revolt, which the decline of power rendered
bold.
And yet the Ottoman empire still carried on war, and advanced like a
storm ready to burst. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the
isle of Chio, which had belonged to the Genoese, was added to its
maritime possessions, and the Turks directed their victorious arms
towards Candia, an important colony of the Venetians. At the same time
an Ottoman army entered Transylvania, and greatly alarmed Austria.
Pope Alexander VII., pressed by the emperor Leopold I. and by the
Venetian senate, endeavoured to form a league among the princes and
states of Christendom, and addressed the king of Poland, the king of
Spain, and more particularly the king of France, to implore their
succour against the Turks.
Louis XIV. yielded to the prayers of the sovereign pontiff, and sent
to Rome an ambassador charged to announce to his holiness, that he
entered into the confederation of the Christian princes. On the other
side, the states of the Germanic empire, which were the allies of
France, assembled at Frankfort, and engaged to raise money and troops,
promising to unite their efforts with those of the French monarch, for
the defence of Christendom.
This generous forwardness on the part of the king of France and his
allies merited, no doubt, the gratitude of Leopold; but, what is
difficult to be believed, the zeal they showed for the common cause,
and which exceeded what was first hoped for, only awakened the jealous
uneasiness of the emperor. We have even reason to think that this
uneasiness extended to the sovereign pontiff; for his holiness welcomed
the propositions of Louis XIV. very coldly; and when the resolutions of
the Germanic body reached Rome, Alexander received with indifference
news for which any other pope, say the memoirs of the time, would not
have failed to go and return solemn thanks in the church of St. Peter
or of St. John of the Lateran. The king of France could not dissemble
his surprise; and in a letter, which he caused to be written to his
ambassador, are these remarkable words: “For the rest, it is more an
affair of his holiness than ours; it will suffice for his majesty,
for his own satisfaction and his duty towards God, to have made all
the advances with respect to this league, that a king, the eldest son
of the Church, and the principal defender of religion, could do in a
danger imminent for Christendom.”
It was soon known that the Turks were making progress, and had
penetrated into Moravia. The emperor Leopold, at their approach,
quitted his capital. The pope then consented to resume the suspended
negotiations. But they were resumed with a sentiment of jealousy and
reciprocal mistrust, that left no hope of a happy result. Louis XIV.,
nevertheless, omitted nothing to prove the frankness of his intentions,
or to forward the formation of a league. It was then believed that an
enterprise against the Turks was the business of all Christendom, and
that, in this case, one Christian power alone, ought not to decide for
peace or war.
We enter into some details here, because these details have not been
hitherto generally known, and that present circumstances may give them
additional interest. We know, likewise, in the days in which we live,
we must search for examples in old remembrances, and often for our true
titles to glory likewise.
The emperor could not be reassured by the demonstrations of the French
monarch; and the rancour which he retained on account of the treaty
of Westphalia, made him forgetful of his own dangers and of those of
the Germanic body. Louis XIV. engaged to set on foot an army of twenty
thousand men, and the confederates of Germany offered as many. Leopold
feared this army on his own account. In the end, Louis satisfied
himself with furnishing six thousand soldiers, under the command of
the count de Coligny and the marquis de la Feuillade. The pope, not
to remain neuter in a war against the Mussulmans, granted the emperor
a subsidy of 70,000 florins, and the faculty of levying tenths upon
all the ecclesiastical property in the Austrian states. All the united
succours of Germany, the king of France, and the other confederate
states, formed an army of thirty thousand men. This army marched to
Hungary. When united to the troops of the emperor, they gained many
advantages over the Turks, and defeated them completely at the battle
of St. Gothard. The Ottomans solicited a suspension of arms, and the
jealous passions which had at first prevented the war being carried on
with vigour, allowed the Divan to conclude an advantageous peace.
The Ottomans, thus delivered from a formidable war, were able to direct
all their strength against Candia, which Venice, now left alone, was
not strong enough to defend. A great number of French warriors then
flew to the succour of a Christian city besieged by the infidels:
among the knights whom the love of glory led to this perilous and
distant war, history takes pleasure in naming the marquis de Fénelon,
whose care had brought up the archbishop of Cambrai, and whom his age
considered as the model of gallant gentlemen. His young son, whom he
took with him, was wounded in an affair against the Turks, and died
of his wounds. France, in the same expedition, had to lament another
hero, the young duke of Beaufort; Mascaron, who pronounced the funeral
oration of this new Maccabeus, thus describes his death: “After the
flight of all the others, yielding rather to number than to strength,
he fell upon his own trophies, and died the most glorious death that
a Christian hero could wish, sword in hand against the enemies of his
God and his king, in the sight of Europe, Asia, and Africa; and more
than all that, in the sight of God and his angels.” Louis XIV., always
considering it consistent with his glory to protect the Christian
states, sent fresh succours to Candia: four French vessels appeared
before the isle; but they arrived too late; the city of Candia, after a
siege of two years and four months, had just capitulated.
This conquest revived the courage of the Turks, and their power,
sustained by the genius of Kiouprouli, whom the Mussulmans called _the
great destroyer of the bells of impiety_, might have still rendered
themselves formidable to the Christian nations, if their policy had
not been governed by a foolish pride. Intoxicated with some trifling
successes, the Turks resumed their project of invading Germany. Towards
the end of the seventeenth century, they made a last attempt, and the
capital of Austria beheld beneath its walls an army of two hundred
thousand infidels.
Germany was exhausted by the thirty years’ war. The king of Poland,
urged by the pope to come to the succour of the Germanic empire,
hastened with his Polish cavalry to the scene of action, and revived
the courage of the Germans and the garrison of Vienna. The Turks, upon
being attacked with impetuosity, abandoned their camp, their artillery,
and their baggage. The wreck of the Ottoman army did not rally till
they reached the banks of the Raab, where they encamped around the tent
of the grand vizier, the only one that had not fallen into the hands
of the conquerors. John Sobieski entered in triumph into the city he
had saved by his courage. This happy event was celebrated throughout
Germany by public rejoicings; and, as had been done after the victory
gained by Don John of Austria, amidst the ceremonies of the Church,
these words from Scripture were repeated: “There was a man sent from
God, named John.”
The defeat of Vienna was for the Turks a signal for the greatest
reverses. The vengeance of the people and the army pursued the grand
vizier, who had conducted the war; and the sultan, Mahomet IV., fell
from the throne at the report of these sanguinary disasters, the
effects of which were felt to the very heart of the empire. The famous
treaty of Carlowitz testifies the losses that the Ottoman nation had
undergone, and the incontestable superiority of its enemies. The
decline of Turkey, as a maritime power, had commenced at the battle of
Lepanto; its decline as a military or conquering power, dates from the
defeat of Vienna. History has two things to remark in the negotiations
of Carlowitz. Hungary, which had for so long a time resisted the
Turks, weakened at length by civil discords and foreign wars, and
given up at the same time to the emperors of Germany and the sultans
of Constantinople, then lost its national independence, and became
united to the possessions of the house of Austria. Among the states
and princes who signed the treaty, the czars of Muscovy, who were
destined, at a later period, to inflict such terrible blows upon the
Ottoman empire, appeared for the first time as a power interested in
the Christian struggle against the infidels.
We have described the origin and progress of the Turks; it only remains
for us now to speak of the causes of their decline.
The Turks were only constituted to contend with a barbarous people,
like themselves, or with a degenerate people, like the Greeks.
When they met with nations that were not corrupted, and were not
deficient in bravery or patriotism, their career was checked. It is a
circumstance worthy of remark, that they were never able to make an
impression upon any of the nations of the Latin Church; the only nation
that was separated from Christendom by the conquests of the Turks was
one that had separated itself from it. When the Ottomans were no longer
able to prosecute their scheme of general invasion, all the passions
which had stimulated them to conquest only served to disturb their own
empire; which is the ordinary destiny of mere conquering nations.
The wars they prosecuted at the same time against Christian Europe and
Persia, were the principal causes of the decay of the military power
of the Turks. The efforts they made against the Persians, diverted
their forces from their expeditions against the Christians; and their
expeditions against the Christians crippled their means for the wars
in Asia. In these two kinds of war they had a very different manner
of fighting. After having for any length of time contended with the
warriors of the Oxus or Caucasus, they were incapacitated for making
war in Europe. They were never able to triumph completely over either
Persia or the Christian nations; and remained at last pressed between
two enemies, equally interested in their ruin, and equally animated by
religious passions.
The Turks, like all the hordes from the north of Asia, brought
with them the feudal government. The first thing to be done by all
nomadic nations, who established themselves in conquered countries,
was the division of the lands, with certain conditions of protection
and obedience. From this division naturally emanated feudalism. The
difference, however, which existed between the Turks and the other
barbarians who conquered the West, was, that the jealous despotism
of the sultans never allowed fiefs to become hereditary, or that
an aristocracy should grow up round it, as in the monarchies of
Christendom. Thus in the Turkish empire nothing was to be seen on
one side, but the authority of an absolute master; and on the other,
nothing but a military democracy. The Ottoman monarchy was thus built
upon that which is weakest in political societies—the will of a single
man, or that of the multitude.
The Turks have been compared to the Romans. Both nations began in
the same manner; for both were nothing but bands of brigands. What
distinguishes them in history is, that the Turks have remained the same
as they were in their origin; whilst the Romans, in their conquests,
never rejected the knowledge, the customs, or even the gods of the
people they conquered. The Turks, on the contrary, took nothing from
other nations, and made it their pride to continue barbarians.
We have said above, that hereditary aristocracy has never been
established by the side of despotism; and this is, perhaps, the
reason why the Ottoman nation has remained in a state of barbarism.
They who have studied the march of human societies know that it
is by the aristocracy that the manners and morals of a people are
formed, and that it is in the middle classes that knowledge has its
birth, and civilization begins.[88] The absence of an aristocracy in
oriental governments, not only explains to us the fragility of those
governments, but it assists us also in explaining why progress has not
been made in a country where nothing distinguished the men from each
other, where no one had sufficient influence to guide the crowd, or was
sufficiently elevated to serve as an example or model.
In consequence of the indifference of the Turks for the arts and
sciences, the labours of industry, agriculture, and navigation, were
confided to their slaves, who were their enemies. As they held in
horror everything new, or that they had not brought from Asia with
them, they were obliged to have recourse to foreigners for everything
that was invented or perfected in Europe. Thus the sources of
prosperity and power, the strength of their armies and their fleets,
were not at all in their own hands. Every one knows what the Turks have
lost by neglecting to learn or to follow the progress of the military
tactics of the Europeans. At the battle of Lepanto, disorder was
introduced into their fleet entirely from their having promised liberty
to their sailors, who were all Christians.
Some modern writers, seeking everywhere for similitudes, have compared
the janissaries to the pretorian cohorts. This comparison has nothing
exact in it: among the Romans, the empire was elective, and the
pretorians got possession of it for the purpose of putting it up
to sale. Among the Turks, the idea of choosing their prince never
suggested itself to the minds of either the people or the soldiery.
The janissaries contented themselves with disturbing the government,
and keeping it in such a state of disorder, that they could never
be dismissed, and might always remain masters. All their opposition
consisted in preventing any amelioration whatever in discipline or
military usages. The abuses and prejudices the most difficult to be
destroyed in a nation, are those which adhere to a body or a class in
which power happens to be placed. All-powerful despotism was never able
to overcome the opposition of the janissaries and spahis; and those
redoubtable corps, which had so effectively contributed to ancient
conquests, became the greatest obstacle to the making of new ones.
The Turks established in Greece had more respect for old usages and
old prejudices, than they had of love for the country they inhabited.
Masters of Stamboul, they had their eyes constantly fixed upon the
places of their origin, and appeared to be but travellers, or passing
conquerors of Europe. They preserved the manners of Asia, the laws of
Asia, the remembrances of Asia; and the West was, in their estimation,
less a country than a theatre for their exploits.
Amidst their decline, nothing was more fatal to the Turks than the
memory of their past glory; nothing was more injurious to them than
that national pride which was no longer in harmony with their fortune,
or in proportion with their strength. The illusions of a power that no
longer existed prevented them from foreseeing the obstacles they were
likely to meet with in their enterprises, or the dangers with which
they were threatened. When the Ottomans made an unsuccessful war, or
an unfavourable treaty, they never failed to lay the blame on their
leaders, whom popular vengeance devoted to death or exile; and whilst
they thus immolated victims to their vanity, their reverses became the
more irreparable, from their persisting in mistaking the true causes of
them.
Tacitus somewhere expresses the joy he felt in seeing barbarians
making war upon one another; and we experience something of this
joy when we see despotism threatened by its own institutions, and
tormented by the very instruments of its power. Another spectacle,
no less consoling to all who love humanity and justice, is to behold
this family of fierce despots, before whom the entire East trembled,
devouring itself. It is well known what victims each sultan, on
ascending the throne, was compelled to offer to the suspicious genius
of despotism. But Heaven does not permit the most sacred laws of nature
to be constantly violated with impunity; and the Ottoman dynasty, in
expiation of so many crimes against family ties, sunk at last into a
species of degradation. The Ottoman princes, brought up in subjection
and fear, lost the energy and the faculties necessary for conducting
the government of a great empire. Soliman II. only increased the evil
by decreeing a constitutional law, that no son of the sultan’s should
command armies or govern provinces. From that time none but effeminate
princes, timid and senseless men, occupied the Ottoman throne.
If the will of the prince became corrupt, it was quite sufficient to
render the corruption general. In proportion as the character of the
sultans degenerated, everything degenerated around them. A universal
apathy displaced the noisy activity of war and victory. To the passion
for conquests succeeded cupidity, ambition, selfishness, and all the
vices that signalize and complete the decline of empires. When states
rise and march on towards prosperity, there is an emulation to increase
their powers; when they decline, there is also an emulation to urge on
their destruction, and take advantage of their ruin.
The empire had always a numerous army; but that army, in which
discipline every day degenerated, was only formidable in time of peace.
A crowd of _Thimariots_, or possessors of fiefs for life, having
nothing to leave to their families, passed over the lands that were
given to them like locusts, which, in the plains where the winds have
wafted them, destroy even to the germs of the harvests. The pachas
governed the provinces as conquerors. The wealth of the people was for
them like the booty which conquerors distributed among themselves on
the day of victory. Such as could amass treasures were able to purchase
impunity. Such as had armies proclaimed their independence. Subalterns
everywhere followed the example of the leaders. In the government, as
well as in the army, everything was put up to sale, everything was
subject to pillage. Thus this empire, which had displayed such energy,
fell like a prey into the hands of all those whom fortune or the
favour of the prince called to authority; and if we may be permitted
to employ a not very elevated comparison to express the degree of
abasement of a nation, the Ottoman power no longer presented any aspect
but that of those lifeless bodies in which we can perceive no motion
but in the insects that are devouring them.
The sultans of Constantinople, while slumbering in their seraglios,
were often awakened by the thunder of popular revolts. Violences of the
army or the people were the only justice able to reach despotism. But
this justice itself was one calamity the more, and only assisted in
precipitating the general decline.
Although the successors of Othman, after the reign of Selim, were the
pontiffs of the national faith, this important dignity added nothing
to their power. The Mussulman faith, which commanded with severity
the observance of many minute practices, did not at all repress the
passions of the multitude. A religious belief which permitted a prince
to commit fratricide could be no safeguard for either the authority
or the life of the prince. A religion always ready to consecrate the
triumph of force, could find no motives in its moral code for the
condemnation of revolt, particularly when the revolt happened to be
crowned with success.[89]
But what is remarkably singular, the Turks, when they rose against a
prince of the Ottoman dynasty, preserved a profound veneration for that
dynasty. They immolated the tyrant to their vengeance, and were ready
to immolate themselves for the tyranny. Thus license, in its greatest
excesses, always respected despotism; and what carried disorder to its
highest pitch was, that despotism in its turn respected license.
The Turks lived in this state of decline as in their natural condition.
Nothing is more remarkable in history than the carelessness of a nation
in the midst of a revolution that is dragging it down to its ruin; and
this revolution with the Turks was not brought about by new ideas, but
by old ideas, not by love of liberty, but by habits of slavery. They
respected the causes of their ruin, because these causes were connected
with the history of barbarous times; and religion, by constantly
repeating to them that “he who is in the fire ought to be resigned,”
prevented them from seeking a remedy for the ills they suffered.
Among nations which incline towards destruction, in the very bosom
of corruption a certain politeness, a certain polish or elegance of
manners, may be observed. The Turks, on the contrary, had a brutal
and savage corruption, and their empire grew old without the nation’s
losing anything of that fierceness of character, of that proud
roughness, which belong to the infancy of society.
We shall be asked why Christendom did not take advantage of this
decline of the Turks to drive them back again into Asia. We have seen
in this history, that the nations of Christian Europe were never able
to combine and agree for the defence of Constantinople, when it was
attacked by the Turks; and they showed no more inclination to combine
to deliver it after it was taken. We may add that the less redoubtable
the Turks became, the fewer were the efforts made to conquer them.
They inspired, besides, no jealousy in the commercial nations of
Christendom. It was in vain that fortune placed them between the East
and the West; that she rendered them masters of the Archipelago, of the
coasts of Africa, of the ports of the Black Sea and the Red Sea: their
finest provinces were deserts, their cities were abandoned. Everything
perished in the hands of an indolent and unpolished people. The Turks
were spared, because they made no use of their advantages; and because
they were, to employ an expression of Montesquieu’s, the men the most
fit to hold great empires carelessly.
Before we terminate this rapid sketch of the Turkish empire in the
seventeenth century, we beg to be allowed to add some reflections which
circumstances may cause to be appreciated. Nothing was more monstrous
than the presence, upon the same territory, of two nations and two
religions that hated and cursed each other reciprocally. Spain had
presented a similar spectacle; but the energy and the magnanimous
constancy of the Spaniards triumphed over an adverse people and an
adverse religion; and at the very time at which the Turks established
themselves in Greece, the Moors, carrying with them their foreign
worship, abandoned their conquests and returned to Africa, from whence
they came. The Greeks, after the invasion of the Ottomans, neither
showed the same energy nor the same courage; although their patriotism
ought to have been constantly animated by the soil they trod on, and by
their very name, of which the conqueror had not been able to deprive
them.
Nevertheless, amidst their abasement and their misery, they were still
able to place their hope in the ascendancy of religious ideas, and in
the wish for civilization, which acted as a tie between all Christian
societies. Whilst the manners and the worship of Islamism rendered the
Turks foreign and even odious to Christendom, the religion of Christ
and the remembrances of history placed the Greeks in relation with the
other nations of Europe.
In proportion as the knowledge derived from antiquity made progress
among the Franks, Greece became for them a sacred country. The language
of Plato and Demosthenes, in which the charms of liberty had been
celebrated with so much eloquence, became more dear to them than their
own maternal tongue. The poetical sites of Greece, which the love of
letters rendered so familiar to the studious class, were for us like
places in which we had passed our infancy. Europe had not a scholar in
whom the city of Aristotle, that of Lycurgus, or that of Epaminondas,
did not inspire something resembling the sentiments we feel for our
own country. If the Greeks were degenerated; if they viewed with
indifference the ruins of their country, ancient Greece still lived for
every enlightened man, and was ever present, wherever a taste for the
arts or a love of learning existed.
The warmer that the interest for the Greeks became, the more barbarous
the Turks appeared. The Ottoman nation came and established itself in
the richest countries of Europe, and remained in sight of all European
people, without becoming acquainted with their languages, their laws,
or their policy; like those troops of wild animals which sometimes
stop in the neighbourhood of the dwellings of man, ignorant of that
which is going on in these places, and having no means to seize their
prey or defend themselves, but their activity, their natural strength,
and the means which a gross instinct gives them. This state of things
was opposed both to the laws of society and the laws of nature, which
do not permit men or nations to live together and in the same place,
except when they possess similar qualities, and are able to employ
their faculties in common. The Turks may have been protected, at first
by the fortune of their own arms, and afterwards by the policy of
certain cabinets; but what real support could they have in the West,
when they were repulsed by the manners, feelings, and opinions of the
European nations, to whom they became every day more foreign?
On one side, the antipathy entertained for a barbarous people; on the
other, the relations which united nations civilized by Christianity,
were likely, sooner or later, to revive that spirit of fraternity which
produced the crusades; and God has willed that this spirit, from which
the holy wars were born, should manifest itself in the same century
which had for a long time refused to acknowledge the effects or to
admire the prodigies of them.
At the moment in which we are finishing this history, the Greeks have
thrown forth a cry of alarm, and this cry has resounded throughout
the Christian world. Is the moment of their deliverance arrived? When
we examine the present state of Europe, we find a much greater force
than would be necessary to conquer Byzantium; but on the other side,
the diversity of interests and opinions will not permit the Christian
republic to unite for this great enterprise. We have seen that the
Turks really possess nothing but the soil of their vast empire; the
riches that are there produced belong to the nations of Christendom,
and these nations are for the Turkish provinces, which they cultivate
to their profit, that which an active and industrious farmer is for the
fields he ploughs and reaps. Add to this, that most of the Christian
powers appear to fear that the displacing of a great empire may break
the ties of the European confederation; they do not, as formerly,
dread the strength of the Ottomans, but the difficulties and divisions
that the conquest would produce. That which may add to their fears is
that impatience for change, that ardent passion for novelty, which
is spread all at once among the nations like a contagious fever;
whilst the Greeks are imploring Europe for their liberty, restless and
dissatisfied spirits look to the East for I do not know what signal
for a revolution in Europe. Thus Christendom, divided by its various
interests, tormented by a thousand different passions, and fearing for
its own repose, awaits with anxiety the events that are preparing,
and appears to recoil from victories which the superiority of her
intelligence and her armies hold out to her.
What will be the issue of all the warlike demonstrations and all
the pacific negotiations of which fame informs us every day? There
is no doubt the cross will again arise in the East, and the fate of
Christians residing there will receive some amelioration; but are we
arrived at the moment which is to render Europe entirely Christian?
Will the Ottoman empire, whose weakness now appears so great, yield
to the power of its enemies, or will it hasten its own ruin? Will
Greece, so long enslaved, resume that rank among nations from which she
formerly descended so ingloriously, or will she fall into the hands
of her liberators? A thousand other questions present themselves to
the mind; but we will not forestall events; above all, we will avoid
multiplying conjectures and hypotheses, or producing here the brilliant
reveries of philosophers and poets, which the severity of history
rejects. When we set a high value upon truth, and have sought it for a
length of time in all that the remembrances of the past contain that is
most positive, we learn to speak of the future with much circumspection
and reserve.
It may be thought that we have dwelt too long upon the Ottoman empire;
but the origin of that empire, its progress and its decline, are
connected with all the events we have had to describe. The sketch
we have traced of it may have been sometimes serviceable in making
our readers acquainted with the spirit and the character of the wars
against the infidels; and is this view our labour has not been useless.
At the period we have now gained, the passions which had given birth to
the prodigies of the crusades had become speculative opinions, which
occupied the attention of writers rather than that of kings or nations.
Thus the holy wars, with their causes and effects, became the objects
of the discussions of doctors and philosophers. We may remember the
opinion of Luther; and although he had partly disavowed or retracted
his first opinion upon the war against the Turks, most of his partisans
continued to evince a great aversion for the crusades.
The minister Jurieu goes much further than Luther. That ardent apostle
of the Reformation, far from thinking that war ought to be made against
the Mussulmans, did not hesitate to consider the Turks as auxiliaries
of the Protestants, and said that the fierce sectaries of Mahomet were
sent to “labour with the Reformers in the great work of God,” which was
the ruin of the papal empire. After the raising of the last siege of
Vienna, in 1683, and the revocation of the edict of Nantes, the same
Jurieu was afflicted at the disgrace of the Reformers and the defeat of
the Turks; adding, at the same time, “that God had only abased them, in
order to raise them together again, and make them the instruments of
his vengeance against the popes.” Such is the excess of blindness to
which the spirit of party or sect has power to carry us, when misled by
hatred, and irritated by persecution.
Other writers, however, celebrated for their genius, and who also
were connected with the Reformation, maintained that wars against the
infidels ought to be carried on: they deplored the indifference of
Christendom, and the wars that were breaking out daily among Christian
nations, whilst they left in peace a people, a foe to all other
peoples. Chancellor Bacon, in his dialogue _de bello sacro_, employs
all his logic to prove that the Turks are excluded from the law of
nations. He invokes, by turns, natural right, the rights of nations,
and divine right, against the barbarians, to whom he refuses the name
of a people, and maintains that war should be carried on against them
as against pirates, anthropophagi, or wild animals. The illustrious
chancellor quotes, in support of his opinion, maxims from Aristotle,
maxims from the Bible, with examples from history, and even from fable.
His manner of reasoning savours a little of the policy and philosophy
of the sixteenth century, and we do not feel ourselves called upon to
repeat arguments, of which many would not be of a nature to convince
minds of the present century.
We prefer developing some of the ideas of Leibnitz, who, in order
to revive the spirit of distant expeditions, addressed himself to
the ambition of princes, and whose political views have received a
memorable application in modern times. At the moment in which Louis
XIV. was preparing to carry his arms into the Low Countries, the
German philosopher sent him a long memorial, to persuade him to renew
the expedition of St. Louis into Egypt. The conquest of that rich
country, which Leibnitz calls the Holland of the East, would favour the
triumph and the propagation of the faith; it would procure for the Most
Christian king the renown of Alexander, and for the French monarchy
vast means of power and prosperity. After the occupation of Alexandria
and Cairo, fortune would offer the conquerors some happy opportunity
for restoring the empire of the East; the Ottoman power, attacked by
the Poles and the Germans, and troubled by internal divisions, was
ready to sink into ruin; Muscovy and Persia were already preparing to
take advantage of its fall; if France put forth her strength, nothing
would be more easy than to gather together again the immense heritage
of Constantine, to dominate over the Mediterranean, to extend her
empire over the Red Sea, over the Sea of Ethiopia, over the Persian
Gulf, and obtain possession of the commerce of India; everything the
most brilliant in the glory and grandeur of empires then presented
itself to the imagination of Leibnitz; and this exalted genius, dazzled
by his own idea, and allying his policy with the prejudices of his
age, could see nothing greater than the conquest of Egypt, _but the
discovery of the philosopher’s stone_: he beheld already, in a shortly
distant futurity, the Christian religion flourishing again in Asia, the
empire and the commerce of the East and the West divided between the
king of France and the house of Austria and Spain, the world rendered
peaceful, and governed by these two conquering powers!
After having developed the advantages of the vast enterprise he
proposed, Leibnitz neglected none of the means that would be likely
to secure the success or facilitate the execution of it. It was in
this part of his memorial that he showed all the superiority of his
genius; and when we read the account of the last war of the French
in Egypt, we cannot but feel persuaded that Buonaparte was well
acquainted with the plan of campaign addressed by Leibnitz to Louis
XIV. But certainly this gigantic enterprise, whose result was likely to
be more brilliant than either solid or durable, was less suited to a
monarch guided in his policy by the sentiments of real greatness, than
to the modern hero, always enamoured of an adventurous and romantic
glory. Nevertheless, the ideas of Leibnitz, although not favourably
received by the cabinet of Versailles, did not fail to produce a lively
impression upon the statesmen of the seventeenth century. It is known
likewise, that the king of France had already thought seriously of
a war against the Turks; and we have reason to believe that Boileau
alluded to all these projects of distant conquests, when he said in his
epistle to the king:
Je t’attends dans six mois aux bords de l’Hellespont.[90]
The eloquence, or even the flattery of authors, could not induce
princes to take up arms against the infidels; and the Crusaders
finished, as they began, with pilgrimages. Among the celebrated
pilgrims who repaired to the East after the holy wars, one of the most
remarkable was Ignatius Loyola. He visited the holy places twice, and,
like St. Jerome, would have ended his days in Palestine, if the Latin
priests had not advised him to return into Europe, where he established
the order of the Jesuits. As was the case before the crusades, princes
mixed with the crowd of Christians who went to the Holy Land. Frederick
III., before he ascended the imperial throne, went on a pilgrimage to
the holy city. We still possess an account of the voyages which were
made successively into Palestine by a prince of Radziwil, a duke of
Bavaria, a duke of Austria, and three electors of Saxony, among whom
was he who was the protector of Luther.
Pilgrims from the West were no longer received at Jerusalem, as in
the early times, by the Knights of St. John, but by the Latin fathers
of the order of St. Francis of Assisi, who devoted themselves to the
guardianship of the holy sepulchre. Preserving the hospitable manners
of ancient times, the guardian father himself washed the feet of
travellers, and furnished them with the necessary assistance for their
pilgrimage. Pilgrims embarked at Venice, where vessels were always
ready to transport them to the coast of Syria. People could obtain
all the benefits attached to the pilgrimage of the Holy Land, without
quitting their homes; either by commissioning pious men who were sent
beyond the seas, or cenobites who resided on the spot.
The greater part of the sovereigns of Christendom, after the example
of Charlemagne, thought it consistent with their glory, not only to
deliver, but to protect the city of Jesus Christ from the outrages of
the Mussulmans. The capitulations of Francis I., renewed by most of his
successors, contain[91] several conditions which contribute to secure
peace to the Christians, with the free exercise of their religion in
the East. In the reign of Henry IV., Deshayes, the ambassador from
France to Constantinople, went to visit the faithful at Jerusalem, and
conveyed to them the consolations of a charity worthy of royalty. The
count of Nointel, who represented Louis XIV. at the court of the sultan
of Turkey, also went into the Holy Land; and Jerusalem received in
triumph the envoy of the powerful monarch, whose credit and renown were
employed to protect the Christians beyond the seas.
Most of the princes of Christendom every year sent their tributes to
the holy city; and in solemn ceremonies, the church of the Resurrection
displayed the treasures offered by the kings of the West. The guardians
of the holy places, who entertained and took charge of pilgrims,
possessed nothing on earth; but the gifts of the faithful were for them
like the manna of the desert, sent every day from heaven. By a species
of miracle constantly renewed, the holy monuments of the Christian
religion, for a long time defended by the armies of the West, having
no longer any defence but religious remembrances, preserved themselves
amidst the barbarous sectaries of Islamism: the security enjoyed by
the city of Jerusalem made its deliverance less thought of. That which
produced the spirit of the crusades in the eleventh century was, above
all other causes, the persecution directed against pilgrims, and the
state of misery in which the Christians of the East existed. When they
ceased to be persecuted, and had fewer miseries to endure, lamentable
accounts no longer awakened the pity and indignation of the western
nations; and Christendom satisfied itself with addressing prayers to
God for the preservation of peace in the places he had sanctified by
his miracles. There was then a spirit of resignation[92] which took
place of the enthusiasm of the crusades; the city of David and of
Godfrey became confounded in the minds of Christians with the heavenly
Jerusalem, and as sacred orators said, “it was necessary to pass
through Heaven to arrive at the Holy Land,” it was of no use appealing
to the bravery of warriors, but to the devotion and charity of the
faithful.