THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI
"_And you, good Yeomen,
Whose limbs were made in England, show us here
The mettle of your pasture; let us swear
That you are worth your breeding._"
SHAKESPEARE.--KING HENRY THE FIFTH.
[Sidenote: Oct. 1917.]
Our infantry withdrew from the line for a rest on the 12th October.
The artillery, however, merely changed the scene of their labours, and
about ten days later marched straight up from their former positions
into action in the neighbourhood of Wancourt, to cover the 51st
Division; the trench mortar batteries in the meantime were temporarily
distributed between the 3rd and the 16th Divisions.
On the 29th we had the misfortune to lose a valuable officer in Lieut.
H. Sutherland, signalling officer of the 312th Brigade, who was killed
very soon after his brigade had joined the 51st Division.
My own headquarters had meanwhile moved to Haplincourt, and on the
30th October I learned from the G.O.C.R.A. of the 4th Corps that a big
attack was to be made in the direction of Cambrai within about three
weeks, in which the 62nd Division was to play a leading part. It was,
in fact, to attack and capture the village of Havrincourt, a position
of enormous strength protected by an elaborate system of trenches and
barbed wire entanglements, and forming one of the strongest portions of
the formidable Hindenburg line.
[Sidenote: Nov. 1917.]
The method of attack was to be an entirely new departure. There was
to be no artillery preparation; in other words, not one gun beyond
the normal was to be fired until the moment of assault, or what is
technically known as "Zero." Then the barrage was to begin, and the
infantry were to assault preceded by tanks. In addition to my own
brigades, I was to have under my command for the operation the 77th,
93rd, and 16th Brigades, i.e. twenty batteries in all.
A period of intense activity now commenced. A tremendous lot of work
had to be done, and there were at first very few men to do it. A party
of about 100 men, taken from the 3rd and 16th Brigades R.H.A., was
placed at my disposal, and I entrusted the superintendence of the
work to Major C. A. Eeles, who tackled it with the greatest energy.
Positions were selected for the five brigades at ranges of from 2000 to
2500 yards from the enemy's front line, chiefly along the Hubert road
on the northern edge of the Havrincourt Wood, and, as it was absolutely
essential that the work should be done without the Boche suspecting it,
and the whole country was visible from his lines, the task was a very
difficult one. The first thing to do was to screen off the proposed
positions from view. That part of the wood through which the Hubert
road ran had been cut down by the Huns when they retreated through
it in April; a lot of scrub had grown up in the clearing during the
summer, and with this a screen of twigs and branches was erected in one
night, for a distance of two miles along the edge of the road on the
enemy's side. When morning broke on the 4th November the road itself
was invisible from the German trenches, and yet the screen that hid it
mingled so well with the surrounding scrub that the enemy never noticed
any change. For the next fortnight the work of preparation went on
night and day, and so careful were the precautions taken by the working
parties, that the enemy never had the slightest suspicion that anything
unusual was going on. On this occasion the weather helped us, as the
days were usually misty, and yet not a drop of rain fell all the time.
The preliminaries consisted in making positions for 20 batteries,
digging ammunition recesses and telephone pits, construction of
shelters for the detachments, the preparation of gun platforms and
trail beds, and the collection at the gun pits of tremendous dumps of
ammunition (700 rounds per 18-pounder gun and 450 rounds per howitzer).
For the conveyance of the latter about three miles of light railway had
to be laid down. Then O.P.'s and brigade headquarters were selected
and prepared, and camouflage was collected and placed over all work as
it was carried out, and also arranged ready for putting on the guns as
they were required to move into their positions in action.
Lieut. E. W. Davis was wounded on the 9th November.
Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Foot, D.S.O., A.A. and Q.M.G. of the Division,
left us about this time on appointment to a corps. He had always been
most helpful to the gunners, and we were very sorry to lose him. His
place was taken, after an interval of a few weeks, by Lieut.-Colonel
Harold Lea, D.S.O., with whom the Divisional Artillery always preserved
the same happy relations.
The artillery concentration began on the night of the 12th/13th
November, when the 310th and 312th Brigades arrived in the
neighbourhood of Beaulencourt; they concentrated next day at Barastre,
where their wagon lines were to be during the battle. In this advance
to the battle area the most elaborate precautions were taken to keep
the enemy's suspicions from being awakened. All troops marched by
night, and remained hidden during the day time in the various big
woods, which are dotted about in this part of the country. I well
remember walking over to the Corps Headquarters at Villers au Flos on
the evening of the 14th; it was a pitch dark night, and I found it
almost impossible to make my way along the road, which was covered
along its whole length by an unbroken column of heavy guns being drawn
by caterpillars--the heavy artillery concentrating for the battle. And
yet next morning that same road presented its usual empty and tranquil
appearance to such hostile planes as might happen to fly overhead.
On the 18th, Divisional headquarters moved to Neuville. The 312th
Brigade moved into their gun positions on the night of the 17th/18th,
and all the rest of my command on the night of the 18th/19th, i.e. the
310th, 77th, 93rd, and 153rd Brigades.
Lieut.-Colonel Lough, commanding 312th Brigade, left on the 17th,
invalided home, and his successor, Lieut.-Col. A. G. Eden, joined us on
the 19th.
The night of the 19th was a very anxious one, and will long be
remembered by all who took part in the battle. It was impossible to
tell whether the enemy had any suspicions of what was in store for
him; he might even know all about it, and this was the more possible,
as he had made a raid two nights before the battle and had captured
one or two of our men. There was a chance that he might have wormed
some information out of them, for an uneducated man may often give
away valuable information quite innocently, out of pure ignorance or
indiscretion. If he _did_ know, the enemy might have wrecked the attack
before it began, by bombarding the long line of guns, which had the
most definite orders on no account to fire a round till 6.20 a.m. when
the attack was to be launched. As it happened, the Boche showed great
uneasiness, and fired very heavily during the night, though fortunately
not on any vital places. We listened to the firing in great suspense,
and watched the flashes of the shell bursting apparently very near our
line of guns; but we could get no information, for no telephones were
allowed until the moment of attack, lest indiscreet things might be
said, and tapped by the enemy's listening apparatus.
At 5.45 a.m. there was a particularly furious burst of firing, which
died down at a few minutes past six, and was succeeded by a dead
silence, during which one could fancy one heard the anxious beating
of fifty thousand hearts. Did the Boche know; had he some infernal
surprise for us? We stood in a little group outside the hut which
served for our headquarters, and fixed our eyes on the long grey line
of wood along the edge of which the guns lay waiting. The moment
arrived. A tremendous thunder clap broke the silence; the whole sky
grew red, and the air sighed with shell. The battle had begun according
to our plans, and success was certain.
Preceded by the tanks, our infantry swept forward in an irresistible
wave, and pressing close up behind the barrage, overcame all
obstacles, capturing system after system of strongly fortified posts,
and following the tanks through a jungle of barbed wire which the Boche
might well have believed to be absolutely impenetrable. By about noon
they had taken all their objectives. Havrincourt, Graincourt, Anneux,
and the Cambrai road, from the factory north-west of Graincourt to the
canal, were in our hands, together with several hundreds of prisoners,
a 4.2-inch howitzer battery, and many machine guns and mortars. The
Division had made the record advance of the war, 7000 yards in one day.
The following message was received in the evening:
"Army Commander sends special congratulations to all ranks of the 62nd
Division on their very fine achievements to-day."
As this was the greatest battle in which the Division had yet been
engaged, I shall here give in full the official account of the
artillery action, as it was made out at the time by Capt. Lindsell, my
Brigade Major.
_20th November._ From zero (6.20 a.m.) until the capture of the brown
line the artillery action was in the nature of a set piece, the barrage
being fired according to timetable as detailed. No modifications were
found necessary.
_10.30 a.m._ The first artillery advance was ordered, 77th Brigade
being directed to send forward one battery to the area north-east of
Havrincourt Wood in support of the 185th Infantry Brigade.
_10.40 a.m._ Eight prisoners were captured by the advanced
reconnoitring party of C/310.
_10.50 a.m._ The 5th Brigade R.H.A., having passed under the orders of
the C.R.A. 62nd Division, was ordered to advance battery by battery to
the east of Havrincourt, to support the advance of the 186th Infantry
Brigade on Graincourt.
_11.40 a.m._ The 77th Brigade was ordered to advance complete to the
south-west of Havrincourt to cover the line Graincourt--Factory on
Bapaume-Cambrai road.
_12 noon._ The 310th Brigade was ordered to advance battery by battery
to the east of Havrincourt to support, with 5th Brigade R.H.A., the
further advance of the 186th Infantry Brigade.
_2 p.m._ The Divisional Artillery situation was as follows:
5th Brigade R.H.A. East of Havrincourt, moving into action.
310th Brigade R.F.A. In column of route moving forward.
77th " " Two batteries in action south-west of
Havrincourt, and two moving into
action in the same area.
} Still in original positions, 93rd
93rd " " } and 153rd awaiting orders
153rd " " } from 36th Division, to whose
312th " " } command they had now passed.
_2 p.m._ It was ascertained that the 51st Division (on our right) had
not captured Flesquières. As this position exposed the right of the
attack of the 62nd Division, the 310th Brigade were ordered back to
their former positions; this order did not, however, take effect, as on
receipt of later information they were allowed to continue their former
movement.
_2.30 p.m._ The 77th Brigade was in action complete S.W. of
Havrincourt.
_4.10 p.m._ The 5th Brigade R.H.A. and 310th Brigade R.F.A., in action
east of Havrincourt, were grouped under Colonel West, R.H.A., to
cover the line gained by the 186th Infantry Brigade in the vicinity
of Graincourt. The 77th Brigade was ordered to cover the part in the
direction of Flesquières. The 312th Brigade, still in its original
position, was ordered to be prepared to cover the brown line as a
defensive measure in case of necessity.
_6.50 p.m._ Orders were issued for the 62nd Division to continue the
advance on Bourlon on the 21st, and for a further advance of all
artillery brigades in support of this attack. Owing to the state of
the ground it was found impossible to get the guns forward during the
night. Brigades therefore advanced as early as possible on the 21st to
positions S.W. of Graincourt, with the exception of the 5th Brigade
R.H.A., which remained N.E. of Havrincourt. The four brigades, as their
batteries were able to get into action, were placed at the disposal of
the G.O.C. 186th Infantry Brigade for his attack on Bourlon Wood. Owing
to bad going and damaged roads the difficulties of getting guns forward
proved very considerable, but all brigades were in position by the
afternoon of the 21st, with communication established with the Infantry
Brigade headquarters in Graincourt.
_21st November._ Bourlon Wood and village were attacked, under a
barrage fired by the 5th R.H.A. and 310th Brigades. The attack was held
up by machine gun fire from the Marquion trench. During the remainder
of the day the artillery forward moves were continued, and a fresh
attack on the Marquion line was organised for the 22nd.
_22nd November._ The 62nd Division again attacked under a barrage
provided by all four artillery brigades. The attack succeeded in
gaining a hold astride the Marquion line, south of Bourlon Wood.
The 40th Division then relieved the 62nd, the artillery, however,
remaining in action under the former division.
* * * * *
The following Divisional Order was issued on the 24th November:
"SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY.
"The Divisional Commander has the honour to announce that both the
Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander have expressed their high
appreciation of the achievements of the 62nd Division in the battle.
"The Divisional Commander had the most implicit confidence that the
Division would acquit itself with honour. To have advanced 7000 yards
on the first day, taken all objectives, held them against counter
attacks, and handed over all gains intact to the relieving division, is
a feat of arms of which any division may be justly proud.
"The number of prisoners taken by the division is not far short of
2000. Thirty-seven guns have been captured, which include two 8-inch
howitzers, one complete 4.2-inch battery, one complete battery of
5.9-inch, and the remainder guns of various calibres, many of which
were brought into action against the enemy.
"The number of machine guns, granatenwerfer, etc., etc., which have
fallen into our possession is so considerable that it has not been
possible yet to make an accurate tally of them.
"The advance of the artillery to Graincourt, and the accuracy of the
barrage, is worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Regiment.
"To G Battalion, the Tanks, all ranks of the Division expresses their
admiration of the skill, bravery, and the splendid self-sacrifice which
made success possible.
"The discipline, valour, and steadiness of all ranks has been beyond
praise.
"It is with great and legitimate pride that I have the honour to sign
my name as Commander of the 62nd West Riding Division.
"WALTER BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General."
On the 23rd, 24th and 25th November attacks were continued by the 40th
Division against Bourlon Wood, which ended in the gaining of a firm
footing in its southern outskirts. I received a letter from the G.O.C.
40th Division expressing his thanks "for the excellent and untiring
support which the 62nd Divisional Artillery gave to the infantry under
his command" on these days.
On Sunday the 25th the 62nd Division was ordered back into the line,
much to our surprise, in relief of the 40th Division, which had
suffered heavily in its severe three days' fight. Our orders were to
capture Bourlon Wood, and we had the support of the following artillery
in addition to our own: 5th Brigade R.H.A., 77th, 178th, and 181st
Brigade R.F.A., and the 87th Heavy Artillery group.
Divisional headquarters moved forward into the Park of Havrincourt
Chateau.
The attack was made at 6.20 a.m. on the 27th under a rolling barrage,
and resulted in the capture of almost the whole of Bourlon Wood, the
highest piece of ground for miles round. Our losses were very heavy,
but the success was a most important one, and in the battle our tired
Division met and shattered a division of Prussian Guards which had to
be withdrawn from the line after only 24 hours in action.
Lieut. E. E. C. Lintern was wounded on the 25th, and for gallant
services on the 21st and 22nd, Major E. W. F. Jephson won a bar to his
Military Cross, and Lieut. N. Hess was awarded the Military Cross. The
same honour was gained by Lieut. J. B. Boden and Lieut. P. C. Furlong
for the following acts:
"On the 23rd November, Lieut. Boden, finding a disabled enemy field gun
in a forward position, fitted the breech mechanism of another gun to
it, and brought it into action in the open. He fired about 60 rounds
with excellent effect, though under heavy fire, and in full view of the
enemy."
"On the 25th November, when one of his guns blew up while his battery
was in action, Lieut. Furlong collected the detachment who were
suffering from shell shock, got them under cover, and steadied the
detachments at the other guns, under heavy shell fire."
On the night of the 28th our infantry was relieved by the 47th
Division. On this day and on the 29th there was a great increase of
activity on the part of the enemy's artillery, and it became evident
that he had been strongly reinforced.
At 8.45 a.m. on the 30th the enemy launched a very formidable counter
attack, pouring his infantry forward in great masses and with the most
desperate determination, supported by a tremendous artillery fire of
high explosive and gas shell. As the hostile infantry appeared over
the crest of the hill, to the west of Bourlon Wood, they were engaged
with direct fire by our field artillery, which swept through and raked
the advancing masses again and again, inflicting the most appalling
losses upon them. The most desperate fighting went on all day, and at
one time my two most forward batteries, A/312 and D/312, were within
a few hundred yards of the Boche infantry. Batteries have seldom been
given such excellent targets of massed infantry in the open as offered
themselves that day to nearly all my batteries, and full advantage was
taken of the opportunity. At 4 p.m., when darkness came on, the enemy
had made no progress against our corps front, the most determined
attacks of four German divisions, with three others in support, having
been utterly crushed by the unconquerable resistance of the three
British Divisions in the line. To quote from the official account
issued by the General Staff:
"At the end of this day of high courage and glorious achievement,
except for a few advanced positions, some of which were afterwards
regained, our line had been maintained intact. The men who had come
triumphantly through this mighty contest felt, and rightly felt, that
they had won a great victory, in which the enemy had come against them
in his full strength, and had been defeated with losses at which even
the victors stood aghast."
Against the corps on our right the Boche had been more successful, and
the position on its extreme right was at one time full of peril. Here
the enemy penetrated our lines and captured Gonnelieu and Gouzancourt,
though he was driven out of the latter village by the Guards that same
night. The back areas were very heavily bombarded all through the day,
and the D.A.C. in Metz suffered a good many casualties.
Lieut. C. B. Innes was wounded during this day's fighting; Lieut. E. T.
Williams was awarded the Military Cross, while Lieut. J. B. Boden added
a bar to the decoration which he had earned only eight days before:
"During a strong enemy attack the battery was in action during the
whole of the day. For over seven hours the battery was heavily shelled,
and during the whole of this period Lieut. Boden was among the guns,
occasionally working a gun himself, and setting a magnificent example
to the men of his detachment. Finally he was put _hors de combat_
through a shell dropping close by him and stunning him. His cool
determination and devotion to duty were magnificent."
"On the battery being heavily shelled, and fired on by machine guns
from the flank, orders were received to withdraw. Lieut. Williams
remained behind with two guns, the wheels of which had been damaged,
but succeeded in getting both of them clear of the position, thereby
setting a splendid example of gallantry and fearlessness to the men."
Thirty-three Military Medals were also awarded (v. Appendix).
I handed over artillery command on the evening of the 30th, and
rejoined Divisional Headquarters at Haplincourt, to find that all
our three infantry brigades had again been thrown into the line in
support of three different divisions. I heard to my great sorrow that
Brig.-General Bradford, V.C., who had joined the 62nd only about three
weeks before, had been killed. He was a man of extraordinary gallantry
and great personal charm, and a born soldier and leader of men.
I copy here an extract from a captured document, signed by the
Commander of the German army on our front, which was rather flattering
to our pride as gunners:
"It is worthy of remark that our enemy's guns have a much smaller zone
of dispersion than our own. They also appear to have better and more
accurate data for shooting from the map than we have. This seems to be
proved from the fact that in weather that excludes all possibility of
observation, and under conditions very different from those prevailing
during previous shoots, he obtains hits on small targets with great
accuracy."
[Sidenote: Dec. 1917.]
Divisional Headquarters left the area of the Cambrai battle on the
4th December, together with the infantry of the Division, and after
several moves the Artillery Headquarters finally settled down for a
time at Bethoncourt, near Tincques, on the 19th. The guns, as usual,
remained in action, supporting different divisions in the arduous work
of adjusting the new trench line. Bourlon Wood was given up together
with some more of the captured ground, but Havrincourt was retained,
and the net result to us was considerably on the credit side.
Capt. E. F. Johnson was killed on the 9th December only about a week
after joining the Division. On the 13th Lieut. L. Gane was awarded the
Military Cross when in action at Doignies:
"When an enemy shell hit one of the gun pits which contained a large
number of charges, Lieut. Gane ordered all the men away, and himself
went into the pit. Satisfied that immediate action would save the shell
dump and prevent the fire from spreading, he had a party to extinguish
the flames, which was successfully accomplished. By his prompt action
and coolness he saved the shells and guns from being blown up."
I received the following letter dated the 11th December from the G.O.C.
R.A. of the 47th Division:
"To-morrow I shall be parting with your brigades and D.A.C., and I take
the opportunity of thanking you most heartily for all the work they
have done since you handed them over to me.
"Our infantry have been greatly pleased with the support your gallant
fellows have given them, not only on November 30th, but ever since, and
I am only sorry that they have had to put up with so much discomfort,
but the conditions have made it impossible to do much for them. Colonel
Sherlock has been a tower of strength.
"E. N. WHITLEY,
Brig.-General R.A."
At last, after another fortnight of hard fighting and great discomfort,
the artillery was withdrawn, and arrived in the rest area behind Arras
on the 29th December. In spite of the severity of the weather, all
ranks greatly enjoyed the rest which they had so well earned, although
it could only be called a rest in the sense that they were out of
danger and in a condition of comparative comfort. Much work of course
had to be done in cleaning up and generally refitting, and in preparing
to take up the new positions just north of Arras, which were now to be
our special charge.
[Sidenote: Jan. 1918.]
On the 7th January my Brigade-Major, Capt. W. G. Lindsell, D.S.O.,
M.C., left the Division to take up the appointment of Staff Officer
R.A. of the 8th Corps. He was greatly regretted throughout the
Division, by none more sincerely than by myself. To an unlimited
capacity for work, and a meticulously accurate knowledge of staff
duties, he added a tact and charm of manner which made him many friends
in the Divisional Artillery, and helped to ensure that all orders,
however unpleasant, were carried out cheerfully and without question in
full confidence that nothing which bore the Brigade-Major's signature
would ever be unreasonable or unnecessary.
Major F. FitzGibbon, D.S.O., was appointed Brigade-Major in Lindsell's
place, and I may say at once that he proved a most worthy successor.
In the New Year's gazette Capt. Lindsell, M.C., and Major Arnold
Forster both received the D.S.O., and Major R. C. Foot the Military
Cross. All these honours had been thoroughly well earned, but it
was a great disappointment to me that more officers could not
receive decorations. The allotment of honours allowed for regimental
officers was always so small that each gazette left this feeling of
disappointment behind it, and many an officer remained undecorated
at the end of the war who had earned such distinction over and over
again. Major Arnold Forster, I may here mention, was the only battery
commander to hold that position in the Division throughout the war; one
or two others ran him close as far as service in France was concerned,
but he commanded a battery--and commanded it with conspicuous
success--from May, 1916, till the breaking up of the Division in
Germany, and had the satisfaction therefore of fighting the battery
which he had himself trained.