he should bring his train to a full stop. But as he happens to have
a clear track for a mile ahead of him he keeps on. He, too, forms a
habit which has to be reckoned with some day.
Again, all trainmen understand that an express train has no business
to run past a station while accommodation trains are discharging
passengers. It is by no means an uncommon occurrence, however, to see
an express train disregard these positive instructions, on the strength
of hand motions given by trainmen on the accommodation train to the
effect that they are about to start, and that the way is safe and clear
for the flyer. Yet in this manner accidents happen, and passengers from
the accommodation are always likely to be caught in a trap between the
trains.
But the dangerous and widespread effects of the permissive principle
applied to important rules will be appreciated to the full when we
study the interpretation which railroad men in general are in the habit
of applying to the word _caution_.
On all railroads there are certain fixed signals for the guidance and
information of employees. When caution is called for, the light is
usually green and the semaphore horizontal. Now, as the writer looks at
it, when any signal indicates _caution_, it is not to be looked upon
as a permissive or conditional signal to be interpreted at will by
different enginemen. According to the rules and to common sense when a
train, at the time a cautionary signal is sighted, is running thirty
or forty miles an hour, it calls for a positive and not a theoretical
reduction in speed. The cautionary signal is not merely a piece of
information to be stowed away in the brain of the enginemen, to be
utilized when a rear end or a broken rail is sighted.
Although for a number of years the inflexible enforcement of the rules
relating to these cautionary signals has been advocated, yet to-day
train after train will run past these semaphores and green lights
without any reduction in speed, provided the track ahead of them is
seen to be clear.
Here we tackle the very heart of the matter, for in so far as the
rules and common sense are concerned, it should not make a particle of
difference to the engineman whether the track ahead is or is not known
to be clear of trains; his instructions call for cautious running,
and by no possible interpretation or juggling with words can cautious
running, or running under control, be taken to mean running at full
speed. Yet in the way I have indicated the cancer of a very dangerous
habit has been allowed to grow into the American system of managing
trains. This wrong interpretation of the word _caution_ by enginemen
and others has without a shadow of doubt during the past few years cost
the corporations thousands upon thousands of dollars and multitudes of
human lives. For if railroad managers labor under the delusion that
enginemen can run _cautiously at full speed_ when the track is clear,
and avoid disaster when from unforeseen reasons another train happens
to be on the same section, they are very much mistaken.
Practically speaking, then, the permissive principle covers the whole
field of railroad life, and is a constant menace alike to the interests
of the corporations and to those of the traveling public. As a matter
of fact, we, the employees, are bigger than the rules. According to our
way of thinking, it is not alone necessary that a rule should be plain
and sound from a general standpoint, but its downright meaning and
necessity must also be evident in each and every particular instance.
If it fails to stand this test, we consider ourselves at liberty to use
our judgment in regard to it.
Illustrations of the danger that lurks in this permissive principle can
be multiplied indefinitely. But, after all, it is only a link in the
chain, for there are other features in the personality of railroad men
that call for serious attention.
The other day, within a few miles of Boston, an express passenger
train approached a railroad crossing at grade. For some reason the
gate-tender was negligent and failed to lower the gates. By reason
of just such negligence, teams are frequently struck and lives are
lost at these crossings. On all railroads, the rules are quite plain
and unmistakable in regard to such matters. It is the duty of the
engineman to report the incident to the management. As a matter of
fact on this particular occasion the engineman failed to do so. He
failed to appreciate the fact that the safety of the public at these
crossings is altogether dependent upon the strict observance of the
rules. He had scruples and emotional objections, perhaps, to reporting
this gate-tender, and rather than do so he took all the chances in
connection therewith, chief among which is the simple fact that on a
railroad unchecked negligence can be depended upon to breed disaster.
That railroad men in general are either indifferent to or ignorant
of the importance of the above fundamental fact will be made still
clearer by another illustration. On September 16, 1907, that is, on
the day following the disaster at West Canaan, N. H., the writer was
a witness of the violation of two most important rules by a number of
enginemen, conductors, and brakemen. A switch leading from the west- to
the east-bound main line was left open while an express passenger train
was passing inward bound. A freight train was on the west-bound track
waiting to back over. Two minutes later, _with his train only halfway
in to clear the main line_, the engineman on the freight whistled in
his flagman in the face of an accommodation passenger train which
had followed the express. From beginning to end, on the permissive
principle, it was a perfectly safe transaction, for there was a mile of
straight track in both directions; but the rules for the running of the
trains and for the safety of the public were violated. The witnesses
were seven or eight veteran railroad men, who looked upon the affair
as perfectly proper and justifiable under the circumstances. It never
entered the heads of these men that the affair should be reported to
the management. That some of the best men in the service should behave
in this way, as it were in the very shadow of the accident at West
Canaan, is almost inconceivable. Of course, if these incidents stood
by themselves their significance might be comparatively trifling; but
as a matter of fact they are illustrations of a condition which is
thoroughly typical of American railroads. This condition or situation
may be briefly yet correctly outlined as follows:--
There is practically _no out-on-the-road supervision_ on American
railroads.
Railroad managers depend upon the reports of employees for information
in regard to violations of rules. But employees do not, and cannot be
compelled to, report their associates; consequently negligence of all
kinds is practically unchecked.
Finally: unchecked negligence can be shown to be the root and direct
cause of nearly all preventable accidents, and loss of life therefrom,
on American railroads.
Here we have a conclusion worth looking into. At a glance we perceive
that negligence is the prime and fundamental fact. It is the direct
cause of the trouble. The fact that the negligence is _unchecked_ is
important, yet secondary. It should be treated as a separate issue, and
it must stand or fall on its own merits.
But our conclusion that accidents result in almost all cases from
unchecked negligence should be supported by evidence and proof. For
examples in support of it, let us take two of the most disastrous
wrecks in the history of New England railroads.
On November 26, 1905, at Baker Bridge in Lincoln, Mass., seventeen
people were killed and thirty injured. An express passenger train was
following an accommodation train, which was somewhat late. Cautionary
signals calling for reduced speed and careful running were passed
at intervals by the express train, but, according to the evidence,
the engineman paid no attention to them; hence the accident. Now the
habitual negligence in regard to these cautionary signals was a matter
of common knowledge. In fact, attention was called to the matter both
before and after the accident by the writer. The unchecked negligence
in this particular case was therefore directly responsible for the
accident and the loss of life.
Again, on September 15, 1907, at West Canaan, N. H., twenty-five people
were killed and forty injured. The unchecked negligence in this case
is by no means so striking as in the previous example, and yet the
evidence pointing in that direction is quite as significant. A mistake
occurred in the transmission of an important train order. This mistake
was the direct cause of the accident. For various reasons it was
impossible to say by whom the mistake was made.
Now let us turn to our book of rules and take note of the following
instructions to train dispatchers and operators: “In transmitting
messages write slowly and firmly,” etc.
With all proper consideration for hard-worked and conscientious train
dispatchers, I am compelled to confess that train orders are seldom
if ever sent “slowly and firmly.” Operators will bear me out in the
statement that orders are transmitted by dispatchers as fast as the men
can handle them. That is to say, between veterans in the business they
are rattled off at the highest limit of speed. The men concerned in the
accident at West Canaan were veterans. Had the man at West Canaan been
a “plug,” that is, a green hand, in all probability the accident would
not have occurred. While, of course, this is merely a supposition,
yet the fact remains that the men would have been transmitting _slowly
and firmly, and the chances for a mistake would have been reduced to a
minimum_.
I thoroughly understand and appreciate the difficulties with which the
train dispatcher has to contend. I am quite aware that he is called
upon to handle trains with the utmost dispatch; nevertheless, I insist
that, in order to reduce chances of accident to a minimum, train orders
should in all cases be transmitted slowly and firmly. I stand by the
rules. The issue is between speed and safety, and in all cases the
latter should be given the right of way.
Thoughtful railroad men, who understand the situation on the railroads
at the present day, are yet very slow in suggesting remedies. They say,
“It is up to the management to enforce the rules.” On the other hand,
if a superintendent can be persuaded to express an opinion he will
retort, “It is up to the men to obey the rules. They are plain enough
and sufficient for the purpose, but we cannot station a spy at every
switch to make sure that the rules are obeyed. We have to depend on the
personality and general intelligence of our employees.”
It will, I think, be evident from the facts and conditions that we
have been considering, that whatever secondary causes there may be
for preventable railroad accidents, the trainmen themselves hold the
key to the situation. They are at liberty to obey the rules, and thus
solve the problem in the only way in which it ever can be solved; or,
they can continue to place upon these rules a wrong interpretation, and
thus evade their manifest meaning and purpose. As matters stand to-day
between labor organizations and railroad managers, it is very doubtful
if by any practical system of supervision or discipline the rules for
the safe and efficient running of trains can in all cases and at all
times be adequately enforced. Thus the whole business resolves itself
into a personal matter with us as conscientious railroad men. Singly
and collectively, it is up to us to do the square thing, if necessary,
in spite of the management.
As the case stands to-day, we railroad men are in a class by ourselves.
We are well-paid, well-treated, well-educated, and well-organized.
In all that pertains to our material well-being we compare more
than favorably with any other class of workers in the country; but
considered as responsible individuals intrusted with the care of
railroad property and the safety of the traveling public, our records
are very unsatisfactory. The truth of this conclusion is not open to
question. We cannot escape from the statistics and the figures; and,
day by day, the evidence against us continues to accumulate.
There are many people who think that the intelligence and education
of the twentieth-century railroad man can be depended upon to guard
against the shortcomings to which I have called attention. On the
contrary, I am inclined to think that the intellectual independence
of the railroad men is in itself a danger to be guarded against.
Standing by itself, the statement that knowledge is power is a fallacy.
Knowledge is only a means. Its benefit to any one is always an open
question. In other words, the secret of power is in the application
of knowledge. Thus when we analyze a modern railroad accident we
are forced to the conclusion that many railroad men take chances by
reason of the supreme confidence which they possess in their own
cleverness and ability to deal with an emergency, however sudden.
This resourceful characteristic of Americans is a splendid thing from
a general standpoint, but in the railroad business it has its stern
limitations. Only too many of our accidents are illustrations, not of
lack of knowledge or resource, but of the downright misapplication of
these intellectual features. In some cases we find an over-supply of
self-confidence, in others a disinclination to knuckle right down to
the observance of plain and positive instruction. In such cases a man
cannot be called the fortunate possessor of intellectual advantages,
but their manifest victim.
Railroad managers, therefore, sooner or later will come to understand
that the one thing needed in the railroad business at the present
day is to educate employees to appreciate the fact that successful
and safe railroading in the future will have to depend, not upon the
multiplication of safety devices or the reconstruction of rules, but
upon the personal effort and conduct of conscientious, alert, and
careful men.
Meanwhile, thought counts; and it is a good idea for practical railroad
men to look into and study these problems, each according to his
ability and the light that is in him.
III
THE MANAGEMENT
The problem of safety in railroad travel has been discussed, from
widely different points of view, by many conscientious investigators.
The methods of these writers in marshaling facts and drawing
conclusions are usually identical. The formula consists of a variety of
accidents, a variety of causes, and a variety of possible or proposed
remedies. For results, up to date, we have a library of information,
but not a suspicion of improvement, in the record of preventable
fatalities. Meanwhile, in the public mind there is confusion of
ideas and considerable doubt as to the practical outcome of all this
discussion. This is a natural state of affairs, for the reason that the
only factor in the situation which is constant, and about which there
is no difference of opinion, is the impotency of railroad people in
coping with the difficulties.
Now, after all that has been spoken and written on the subject of
efficient and safe railroad service, the problem remains, as at the
beginning, essentially personal, social, and ethical in its nature.
Nearly all questions in regard to it must, sooner or later, be thought
out in this direction by railroad employees and managers. We may
continue to work over and reconstruct our rules and to multiply our
safety devices until we compel trains to creep from station to station;
yet the problem will remain unsolved, the needless and disgraceful
sacrifice of life will continue, until trainmen, enginemen, and
managers put their heads together and agree to adopt a new code of
railroad morals. My meaning when I allude to railroad morals should be
clearly understood.
On nearly all railroads a given rule is obeyed at one point and
disregarded at another, on account of different sets of conditions.
This conduct leads to accidents when men who have habitually disobeyed
the regulations at points where such action is harmless undertake to
behave in the same way under conditions when a strict observance of the
rules is vitally important. Generally speaking, managers are cognizant
of this state of affairs, and thus in a measure they are morally to
blame for it; but I do not think that they realize the extent of the
evil, for the reason that any organized out-of-door supervision is
unknown, and thus the report of an accident, that is to say, the result
of these practices, is usually the first and only information on the
subject that reaches the manager’s office. The blame for accidents
that happen in this way cannot be said to rest upon any particular
class of employees or to depend upon their intelligence or length of
service. Among the culprits you will find some of the oldest and most
experienced men as well as some of the greenest. This goes to show that
the trouble is inherent in the system, and a part of the everyday life
and character of armies of railroad men.
But in a straightforward investigation of this nature it is
particularly desirable to get hold of all the facts that can be used
in any way to throw light on the situation, and there is only one
method, as yet untried, for properly securing and emphasizing these
facts. Let us call this the confessional method. In the hands of a
competent witness it can be depended upon to furnish us with all the
information necessary for a thorough comprehension of our subject.
This confessional method has nothing to conceal. It has no axe to
grind, no interests to protect. It is born of a heartfelt appreciation
of the seriousness of the situation on our railroads. Mindful of the
ever-increasing and lamentable loss of life caused by the unstudied
indifference and negligence of employees, as well as by the blindness
of the authorities to the real issues and dangers, it approaches
and takes hold of the problem somewhat in the spirit of the King in
“Hamlet,” when in an agony of remorseful retrospection he exclaimed,
“Try what repentance can: what can it not?”
That there is an urgent call for this confessional method of supplying
the facts in this railroad business is capable of easy demonstration.
When an accident takes place on a railroad, some kind of an explanation
or reason for its occurrence is immediately called for. Consequently
there is a lining up of opposing interests. A certain management has to
be vindicated, certain employees to be defended. In the investigation
that follows, an array of facts defensive and otherwise is brought
forward in the interests of the opposing parties; but evidence and
facts that are likely to reflect on both men and management, and
perhaps on the handling of the case or of other cases by the Board of
Railroad Commissioners, are studiously avoided. The facts that are
suppressed in this way usually contain the heart of the whole business,
and are the very points in which the public is profoundly interested.
An illustration in point will make this doubly clear.
About a year ago, in an accident near Troy, N. Y., five passengers
were killed and many were injured. A special passenger train crashed
into the rear of a regular passenger train. There is a sharp curve in
the track a short distance above the scene of the collision. Had the
special been handled carefully round this curve instead of recklessly,
the accident would not have occurred. Caution, of course, is necessary
in running round sharp curves, and the rules on all railroads are plain
and emphatic on the subject. But the authorities who investigated this
accident treated it as an isolated instance of individual carelessness.
Within a period of six months these gentlemen are called upon to pass
judgment on probably twenty wrecks, every one of them bearing the same
earmarks of disobedience as this disaster near Troy, yet no one ever
dreams of hunting up a common cause for dozens of accidents that are
exactly similar and brought about in the same way. To be precise, this
accident at Troy was the result of a habit. At a glance we perceive
that the public is a hundred times more likely to be interested in
the uprooting of such a bad habit as running recklessly round curves
than it is in placing the responsibility or punishing the offender in
any particular instance. Yet who ever heard of a verdict that placed
the blame for an accident on a habit? The reasons for the oversight
are obvious. A dangerous habit, long continued and unchecked, is a
decided reflection on men and management, and, indeed, on the Railroad
Commissioners, whose vigilance it has escaped; and consequently no
evidence or facts in regard to these bad habits are ever permitted to
find their way into investigations. It will be evident, therefore, that
the confessional method can be profitably employed in supplying a few
missing links in our knowledge of actual conditions and methods of
operation on the railroads.
To begin with, it will be well to take note of an estimate, made after
a careful study of the figures, that fully eighty-five per cent of the
fatalities that occur on our railroads can be directly traced to the
negligence of employees. Regardless of the accuracy of this estimate,
it certainly points to a very serious state of affairs. In studying
the nature of these accidents and the conditions under which they take
place, one cannot help being impressed with the fact that almost every
possible way in which trouble can occur on a railroad is foreseen
and provided for by some rule or safety device. So carefully has the
ground been studied and worked over, that in every case of preventable
accident it can almost be taken for granted that an employee is to
blame. That is to say, the management of a railroad is always found
to be impregnably protected by the rules and regulations from any
direct responsibility. But, after all, this is only one side of the
shield, for clearly the moral responsibility of a railroad manager
cannot be said to cease with the printing of a batch of rules or the
erection of a system of signals. It is not only necessary that rules
should be plain and sufficient in themselves to prevent accidents,
it is also equally essential that reasonable and systematic efforts
should be exerted to enforce them. On a railroad, as elsewhere, the
means employed for the supervision of personal conduct and for the
enforcement of necessary rules are all included in the term discipline.
Without some organized and effective system of discipline no industrial
establishment of any kind can be successfully administered. On
railroads in particular, the department of discipline is intimately
related to the interests of the traveling public. Let us then examine
in a practical manner the nature and methods of the discipline that
is in force at the present day on what may be considered the most
important railroad in New England. A little personal experience will
throw the necessary light on the subject.
[Illustration: A YARD WRECK]