Section 1. _Common Sense and common Form_.

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF

OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY, ETC.

by

Frances Reynolds

1785

With an Introduction by James L. Clifford

The Augustan Reprint Society

Frances Reynolds

_An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste,

and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, etc._

(1785)

With an Introduction by James L. Clifford

Publication 27

Los Angeles

William Andrews Clark Memorial Library

University of California

1951

_GENERAL EDITORS_

H. RICHARD ARCHER, _Clark Memorial Library_

RICHARD C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_

EDWARD NILES HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_

JOHN LOFTIS, _University of California, Los Angeles_

_ASSISTANT EDITORS_

W. EARL BRITTON, _University of Michigan_

_ADVISORY EDITORS_

EMMETT L. AVERY, _State College of Washington_

BENJAMIN BOYCE, _Duke University_

LOUIS I. BREDVOLD, _University of Michigan_

CLEANTH BROOKS, _Yale University_

JAMES L. CLIFFORD, _Columbia University_

ARTHUR FRIEDMAN, _University of Chicago_

SAMUEL H. MONK, _University of Minnesota_

ERNEST MOSSNER, _University of Texas_

JAMES SUTHERLAND, _Queen Mary College, London_

H.T. SWEDENBERG, JR., _University of California, Los Angeles_

INTRODUCTION

Since the early nineteenth century it has been known that Frances

Reynolds, the sister of Sir Joshua, was the author of an essay on

taste, which she had printed but did not publish. Yet persistent

search failed to turn up a single copy. It remained one of those lost

pieces which every research scholar hoped someday to discover.

In 1935 it appeared that the search was over. Among some manuscripts

of Mrs. Thrale-Piozzi, long hidden in Wales, was found a printed copy

of an anonymous _Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of

the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty_, which seemed to be the lost essay.

The date was correct; the _Enquiry_ was dedicated to Mrs. Montagu; it

contained a quotation from Dr. Johnson; and, best of all, there was

attached to the pamphlet a copy (in an unidentified handwriting) of

Johnson's well-known letter to Miss Reynolds concerning her essay.

Only one thing stood squarely in the way of the identification. James

Northcote in his _Life of Sir Joshua Reynolds_, published in 1818 (II,

116-19), after describing Johnson's connection with the manuscript,

gives two pages of short excerpts. Most of the quotations are general

statements such as "Dress is the strong indication of the moral

character" or "The fine arts comprehend all that is excellent in the

moral system, and, at the same time, open every path that tends to the

corruption of moral excellence." Unfortunately none of these excerpts

appears directly in the _Enquiry_. Although some of the ideas are

similar, the wording and specific details are different. By no stretch

of the imagination could they be considered to come from the same

piece. Thus Northcote blocked the solution of the mystery for nearly

fifteen years.

Recently, however, evidence has turned up which makes the attribution

a certainty. It is now obvious that Northcote must have been mistaken

in the source of his quotations. Writing as he did many years after

the events he was describing, Northcote either had found a copy of

the first draft of Miss Reynolds' essay, or erroneously quoted from

another anonymous piece which he assumed was by Miss Reynolds. In any

event he was not quoting from the final version which she wished the

world to see.

The story of Miss Reynolds' attempts to publish her essay can at

last be pieced together from various bits of evidence, some hitherto

unpublished. Just when the essay was written is uncertain. All that

we know is that a preliminary version was submitted to the rigorous

criticism of Dr. Johnson in 1781. Johnson, who had corrected some of

her verses in red ink the year before, commented on 21 July 1781:

There is in these such force of comprehension, and such nicety

of observation as Locke or Pascal might be proud of. This I

say with intention to have you think that I speak my opinion.

They cannot however be printed in their present state. Many

of your notions seem not very clear in your own mind, many are

not sufficiently developed and expanded for the common reader;

the expression almost every where wants to be made clearer and

smoother. You may by revisal and improvement make it a very

elegant and curious work.[1]

But Miss Reynolds was not easily discouraged, and Johnson wrote again

on 8 April 1782:

Your work is full of very penetrating meditation, and very

forcible sentiment. I read it with a full perception of the

sublime, with wonder and terrour, but I cannot think of any

profit from it; it seems not born to be popular.

Your system of the mental fabric is exceedingly obscure, and

without more attention than will be willingly bestowed,

is unintelligible. The Ideas of Beauty will be more easily

understood, and are often charming. I was delighted with the

different beauty of different ages.

I would make it produce something if I could but I have indeed

no hope. If a Bookseller would buy it at all, as it must be

published without a name, he would give nothing for it worth

your acceptance.[2]

In passing it might be pointed out that this letter has previously not

been associated with Miss Reynolds' essay on taste, largely because

the available text of the letter has been so faulty. Where Johnson

wrote "The Ideas of Beauty," obviously referring to the second section

of the _Enquiry_, Croker, followed by G.B. Hill, printed "The plans

of Burnaby." To this Hill added a note; "Burnaby, I conjecture, was a

character in the book," with the result that scholars have fruitlessly

been searching ever since for the fictitious Mr. Burnaby, One more

example of the dangers of using nineteenth-century transcripts!

Evidently Johnson's stringent objections temporarily halted her plans,

for we hear nothing more about the essay for two years. Meanwhile, as

appears from a later letter, she showed it to Bennett Langton, hoping

in vain for his help. Nevertheless, she was determined to go ahead and

print the work, even at her own expense. Johnson, still counted upon

for aid, wrote to her on 12 April 1784:

I am not yet able to wait on you, but I can do your business

commodiously enough. You must send me the copy to show the

printer. If you will come to tea this afternoon we will talk

together about it.[3]

On 30 April he commented further: "Mr. Allen has looked over the

papers and thinks one hundred copies will come to five pounds."

Something, however, made her suspicious of his advice, and on 28 May

there came an end to Johnson's connection with the matter. He wrote:

"I have returned your papers, and am glad that you laid aside the

thought of printing them."

But Miss Reynolds had no intention of permanently giving up her

project. Instead she rewrote parts of the essay which had displeased

her critics, and shortly after Johnson's death proceeded to have 250

copies privately printed, with a dedication to Mrs. Montagu. With

Johnson gone, "The Queen of the Bluestockings" must have appeared the

next best patron. That Mrs. Montagu, while no doubt flattered by the

dedication, was herself not overly enthusiastic about the essay may

be gathered from a letter written to her by Miss Reynolds on 12 July

1785. Miss Reynolds began by insisting that "the slightest hint" of

disapprobation on the part of Mrs. Montagu would "consign the work to

oblivion"; then continued:

I never did entertain any desire to publish it, tho I might

to sell it. And my desire of printing it, originated from a

motive which tho' vain I allow, is an natural vanity I wishd

to leave behind me a respectable memorial of my existence,

which I then flatterd myself this would be. Ten impressions or

twenty at the most, were all I wishd to have taken off. Why I

had so many as 250 was because Dr. Johnson advised me to print

that number, and to sell them, to stand the sale of them was

his expression, but I must do Dr. Johnson the justice to say,

that, that advice was given me with a proviso that no person

was in the secret but himself, for on my informing him to

the contrary, he declined or seemd to decline the affair of

getting them printed for me, which I perceiving sent to him

for the manuscript, foolishly entertaining a slight suspicion

which I much reproach myself for, that some other motives

besides the want of merit in the work had influenced this

change of behaviour. Unluckily from the beginning I made too

great allowance in its favour, from an opinion I had con

too of Dr. Johnsons being strongly prejudiced against womens

literary productions. But I deceived myself. He was sincere,

he judged justly of the work, and his opinion exactly

corresponded with yours![4]

Not that she regretted the cost of printing the 250 copies. That was a

minor consideration. She concluded:

If I ever should shew it to any person it will be to Mr.

Langton, from a motive of wishing him to see the alteration I

have made in it for the better, since he saw it, and as it is

also since Dr. Johnson saw it, and particularly that part

he most objected to, my belief that I had obviated that

objection, is another apology for my printing it.

To this Mrs. Montagu returned a wordy and diffuse reply, commenting

that "having for many years past left off all metaphysical studies,"

she was "not a competent judge of any work on subjects of that

nature," yet insisting that she doubted if contemporary readers would

like it. It was obvious that Mrs. Montagu refused to be a party to

further dissemination of the printed copies. And there the matter

rested for almost three more years.

The wish to have some of the copies read by the general public proved

too strong, and on 15 April 1788 Miss Reynolds wrote again to Mrs.

Montagu, asking her aid in recovering a letter, or transcription of a

letter, of Johnson's:

It is of great importance to me the recovery of this letter

particularly so as I perceive I must not presume to hope for

the only patronage that could countervail the loss of Dr.

Johnsons, should I ever be induced to publish the work. I

do not mean that I would publish the letter, but that the

testimony it conveys of Dr. Johnsons approbation, would be

highly advantageous to me in the disposal of the copy to

a Bookseller, indeed _approbation_ is an improper Word,

inadequate to the

praises he bestows on the work, I durst not repeat his

expressions tho I well remember them. Some friendly strictures

also the letter contained, all these I remember I transcribed

verbatim in a letter I sent to you in the beginning of the

year 82. they begin

Many of your notions seem not to be very clear in your own

imagination....[5]

It was not until the next year that with the help of James Northcote

she finally made active preparations to have the work published. As

Miss Reynolds wrote to Mrs. Montagu on 5 February,

I forgot to say that Mr. Nurse recommended Mr. Northcote to a

Mr. Bladen in Paternoster Row for a Publisher, but I sent

in the utmost haste to him to prevent his taking any steps

towards so disgraceful a place as I imagine that to be so

incongruous.[6]

In preparation for the new printing, Miss Reynolds had further revised

her essay, and in order to enhance the value of the piece for general

readers she decided to add three letters from Johnson of which she

chanced to have copies. Totally unconnected with the essay, one was

to Sir Joseph Banks concerning the motto for his goat's collar; the

others concerned the unfortunate Dr. Dodd. But before going ahead she

again asked the advice of her patroness. Mrs. Montagu replied:

I do not see that there is any objection to publishing the 3

letters, but I own I think Dr Johnson judges too lightly of

the crime of forgery ... I believe the tenderness of sentiment

Dr Johnson expresses for Dr Dodd in his afflictions will do

him honour in the eyes of the Publick, & therefore as his

friend you may with propriety publish the letters.[7]

Mrs. Montagu concluded, "I wish some name that would do more honour to

your work was to appear in the dedication, but to be presented to

the publick with such a mark of Mrs Reynolds' friendly regard, will

certainly be esteemed an honour...."

Sometime between February and July 1789 the _Enquiry_ was reprinted,

this time by J. Smeeton (copies of this version may be found in the

Bodleian Library and the Library of Congress). The terminal date for

the reprinting is established by the fact that the three letters

of Johnson which were appended to the essay were reprinted without

comment in the July issue of the _European Magazine_.

Just where Miss Reynolds secured copies of the Johnson letters is

not certain. It is suggestive, however, that the letter to Banks had

originally been sent under cover to Sir Joshua Reynolds and that Sir

Joshua's copy is now among the Boswell papers at Yale University.

There would have been ample opportunity for Frances Reynolds also to

have secured a copy. And the letter to Charles Jenkinson of 20 June

1777 and to Dr. Dodd of 26 June were of the sort that an enterprising

lady might well have wheedled copies from the Doctor. The important

point is that the inclusion of the letters in the 1789 printing of the

_Enquiry_ provides incontrovertible proof of Miss Reynolds' connection

with the piece.

For this second printing the entire pamphlet was reset, with

numerous minor changes of wording and punctuation, but with no major

alterations in meaning. In general the textual improvements are such

as a bluestocking lady might well wish to make. It will be noted that

on pages 25 and 49 of the copy here reproduced someone has made minor

changes in wording in ink. These corrections are made in the later

printing. Moreover, at the end of the 1789 version there is an errata

list, indicating three alterations from the 1785 text which were

mistakes. The Dedication remained unchanged, but the geometrical

illustration was now placed facing the beginning of Chapter I.

The _Enquiry_ was written in what is now recognized as one of the most

exciting periods in the history of aesthetics, the late eighteenth

century being a crucial point in the gradual shift from absolute

classical standards to the relative approaches of the next age. Most

of the important thinkers of the day--Hume, Burke, Lord Kames, Adam

Smith, among others--were thinking deeply about the problem of taste.

And if Miss Reynolds' essay is not one of the most perceptive of the

discussions, it is at least one of the liveliest.

In brief, the _Enquiry_ is what one might expect from an intelligent

amateur, from one not a professional writer, yet one who has given

much thought to the problems of aesthetics. Of course, many of the

ideas are derivative, with echoes of the "moral sense" of Hutcheson,

the "line of grace" of Hogarth, and the terrible sublime of Burke. The

three divisions of the essay--the development of a mental system, the

origin of our ideas of Beauty, and the analysis of taste--follow the

customary pattern of eighteenth-century discussions. Yet the piece

is no slavish refurbishing of old phrases. It is packed with fresh

arguments and novel suggestions. If these are not always completely

coherent or logical, they do represent original thinking.

Twentieth-century readers may be astonished by some of the ideas:

witness the claim that Negroes could never arrive at true taste,

because their eyes were so accustomed to objects diametrically

opposite to taste. As a further example of Miss Reynolds' occasionally

muddled thinking there is the development of her initial assumption.

While the groundwork of man is perfection, this perfection has been

blemished and man is impelled to recapture it in the sublime. Yet

instead of analyzing this impulse, Miss Reynolds appears to take it

for granted. Nor does she consider how perfection is to be achieved

in taste, preferring to conclude with a diatribe in the manner of

Rousseau on the depravity of the times and the corrupting effect of

the arts. (For this and many of the following comments I am indebted

to Mr. Ralph Cohen of the College of the City of New York.)

The cause of some of the ambiguities in her discussion may perhaps be

traced to a rather careless use of terms. At one time "instinct"

or "impulsion," the moral force driving man toward perfection, is a

potentiality developed by cultivation, and at another a force that

is created by cultivation. Although the sublime is the apex of her

mathematically-definite program and is a moral quality attained by

the few, every human being has his point of sublimity in the idea of

a Supreme Being. On the one hand, beauty is a preconceived idea in

the human species; on the other it is not preconceived, but developed.

Finally, the rules of art are perceptions of moral virtue, yet art

which exhibits these rules can corrupt.

It is easy to pick flaws in Miss Reynolds' thinking, for the lack of

sustained logic which Johnson early recognized is apparent at every

turn. Yet for students of the history of ideas the _Enquiry_ contains

much of interest. As a painter, Miss Reynolds throughout stresses the

visual, a concentration which leads her to several valuable insights.

She divides form into two categories, masculine and feminine, but

makes a novel use of these Ciceronian divisions. All non-human

objects--flowers, animals, etc.--are seen as exhibiting male or female

attributes. It might almost be said that with this anthropomorphic

approach she is attempting to develop a "philosophical" basis for the

pathetic fallacy. Furthermore, if the human is used to measure beauty

in the non-human, the implication is that man, not God, is the measure

of beauty. By setting up man as the mediator between the material and

the divine, she points to the concentration in the next century on

human values.

When discussing the _Enquiry_ in his book on the _Sublime_, Samuel

Monk pointed out certain other tendencies which fore-shadow the

coming Romantic revolt. This shift may also be noted in Miss Reynolds'

extension of countenance, the reflection of internal virtue, to mean

"form," and the extension of internal virtue to mean "disposition,"

"object," or content. In developing this form-content division, she

stumbles on a key criticism of associationism: "From association of

ideas, any object may be pleasing, though absolutely devoid of beauty,

and displeasing with it. The form is _then_ out of the question; it is

some _real_ good or evil, with which the object, but not its form, is

associated." This notion that associationism leads away from the

work of art as such is a perceptive comment. Her notion that form and

disposition (or content) must correspond in order to give aesthetic

pleasure suggests, though the terms are different, certain of

Coleridge's basic ideas.

One other point might be stressed: Miss Reynolds takes an extreme

moralistic position toward the arts. Again and again it is insisted

that taste and beauty are moral attributes, not purely aesthetic

concepts. Chapter II ends with the ringing statement: "Of this I

am certain, that true refinement is the effect of true virtue; that

virtue is truth, and good; and that beauty dwells in them, and they

in her." And the next chapter begins: "Taste seems to be an inherent

impulsive tendency of the soul towards true good." On the other

hand, she sees that the arts are not to be encouraged because such

encouragement is apt to lead to the destruction of moral virtue--the

desire for fame and wealth. The value of art as education is dismissed

as of importance only to the few; the dangers of encouragement will

imperil the many. "Though the arts are thus beneficial to the growing

principles of taste, respecting a few individuals, it is well known

that their establishment in every nation has had a contrary effect on

the community in general...."

To conclude: despite its many deficiencies Frances Reynolds' _Enquiry_

is worth reading. It serves admirably to mirror the conflicting

eighteenth-century theories out of which our own aesthetic concepts

have been formed.

James L. Clifford

Columbia University

Notes to the Introduction

1. _Letters_, II, 223-24; corrected from original letter in possession

of Professor F.W. Hilles of Yale University, who has given invaluable

aid in the present investigation.

2. _Letters_, II, 249-50, corrected from the original by Dr. R.W.

Chapman.

3. Copy in possession of Mrs. Doreen Ashworth, Windlesham, Surrey.

4. Original in Huntington Library.

5. Original in possession of Mrs. Ashworth.

6. Rough draft in possession of Mrs. Ashworth.

7. Original in possession of Professor F.W. Hilles.

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES of TASTE, AND OF THE ORIGIN OF

OUR IDEAS of BEAUTY, &c.

Sunt certi denique fines,

Quos ultra citraquè nequit consistere rectum.

HOR.

To Mrs. MONTAGU.

MADAM,

Were I not prompted by gratitude, admiration, and affection, to

dedicate to you the best produce of my abilities, which I imagine this

to be, yet, as the subject, of which it particularly treats, is moral

excellence, the universal voice of mankind, with whom your very name

is synonymous with virtue itself, must plead my apology for taking

this liberty. Besides, madam, it was natural for me, as an author, to

with to avail myself of the advantage, which this address affords

me, of prepossessing the minds of my readers with an example of that

perfection to which all my arguments tend, as a preparative, or aid,

to their better comprehending my meaning.

The influence of virtue is every way beneficial! Your character,

not only secures me from all imputation of flattery, but this public

avowal of my admiration of its excellence conveys an honourable

testimony of the consistency of my principles; having endeavoured to

inculcate, that the love and esteem of true virtue is true honour. And

I may add, that the sweet gratification I feel, in the indulging the

strongest and best propension of my nature, in thus expatiating in its

praise, is true pleasure, true happiness.

I am, Madam,

Your obliged,

Most obedient,

And most humble, servant,

The AUTHOR.

CHAPTER I.

A SKETCH of the MENTAL SYSTEM respecting our Perceptions of Taste, &c.

The mind of man, introspecting itself, seems, as it were, (in

conjunction with the inscrutable principles of nature,) placed in the

central point of the creation: from whence, impelled by her energetic

powers and illumined by her light, the intellectual faculties, like

rays, shoot forth in direct tendency to their ultimate point of

perfection; and, as they advance, each individual mind imperceptibly

imbibes the influence and light of each, and is by this imbibition

alone enabled to approach it.

But, though the light of nature and of reason direct the human mind

to perfection, or true good, yet, being in its progress perpetually

impeded by adventitious causes, casual occurrences, &c. &c. which

induce false opinions of good and evil, its progressive powers

generally stop at a middle point between mere uncultivated nature and

perfection, a medium which constitutes what we call common sense, and

which, in degree, seems as distant from the perfection of the mental

faculties as common form is from the perfection of form, _beauty_.

[Illustration:

SUBLIMITY.

|

GRACE

|

BEAUTY | TRUTH

|

COMMON SENSE | COMMON FORM

|

NATURE]

On meditating on this subject, and marking the progressive stages

or degrees of human excellence, the great leading general truths,

or mental rests, as I may call them, _the common, the beautiful, the

graceful, and the sublime_, I have been naturally led to form a kind

of diagrammatic representation of their respective distances, &c. &c.

which I present to my reader on the opposite page, requesting him to

refer to it now and then as he goes on, in order to facilitate his

comprehension of my meaning.

And here it may be necessary to premise, that, however whimsical and

absurd this delineation may appear to my reader, something analogous

to the thought may be found in the works of many eminent philosophers,

particularly in those of Bacon[A] and of Locke:[B] the latter

suggesting that the whole system of morality might be reduced to

mathematical demonstration; and the former, in his treatise on the

Advancement of Learning, gives a description of the stages of science

very much resembling my delineation of the stages of intellectual

perfection, or taste.

[Footnote A: Advancement of Learning, Book 2d.]

[Footnote B: Essay on human Understanding, Chap. 3d, Book the 4th, and

Chap. 12th, same Book, Sect. 8th.]

It could have been no dishonour to me to have been led by such

conductors! Yet, as the truth cannot dishonour me neither, I must

aver, that my little system was projected, and brought to the exact

state it now is in, without my having the least apprehension that any

thing similar had been suggested before by any person whatever; nor

have I, in consequence of the discovery I have lately made of the

opinions of these respectable authors, added or omitted a single

thought in my treatise. But to return from my digression.

In the exact center of my circle of humanity, I have placed nature,

or the springs of the intellectual powers, which tend, in a

straight line, to its boundary; and, on its boundary, I have placed

demonstrable beauty and truth, and the utmost power of rules; and,

midway; I have placed common sense and common form, half deriving

their existence from pure nature, and half from its highest

cultivation, as far as art or rules can teach. A conjunction which

would itself be the perfection of humanity, but that it is mixed with

all that is not nature, and all that is not art, and thereby made

mediocrity, i.e. _common sense_.

The intellectual powers, arriving at the limit of my common circle,

i.e. at the limit of the basis of my pyramidical system, where I

have placed the fixed proportions of beauty and of truth, (if they

progress,) mount up as a flame, with undulating[A] motion, refining

as they advance, and terminate in the pinnacle, or ultimate point,

_sublimity_; forming in the imagination the figure of a pyramid,

or cone, from the limit of whose base, (on which, as I have before

observed, I have placed demonstrable truth and beauty, the utmost

power of rules, &c.) from that limit up to the ultimate point of

sublimity, I call the region of intellectual pleasure, genius, or

taste; and in its center I place grace, whose influence pervades,

cheers, and nourishes, every part of it, an object which, in this

ideal region, is similar in its situation and degree to that of common

sense in the common or fundamental region. Grace seems to partake

of the perception both of beauty and of sublimity, as common sense

partakes of nature and of art. Grace is the characteristic object or

general form of the ideal region, and its perception is the general

limit of the powers of imagination or taste. Few, very few, attain to

the point of sublimity; the _ne plus ultra_ of human conception! the

alpha and omega. The sentiment of sublimity sinks into the source of

nature, and that of the source of nature mounts to the sentiment of

sublimity, each point seeming to each the cause and the effect; the

origin and the end!

[Footnote A: I use that expression, because it is the peculiar motion

of grace as well as of a flame.]

Having thus drawn the outline of my pyramidical mental system, I

propose to expatiate a little on each point or stage throughout the

great characteristic line of intellectual power.

The first point The exact center, _nature_, or the origin of our

intellectual faculties, admits of no investigation, its idea, as I

have observed before, loses itself in the sentiment of sublimity,

and we see nothing; and therefore I pass on to an object which is

perceptible, _the common general character of humanity_, _exterior and

inferior_. I have placed them on a line, because their ideas are so

analogous, that they unite in one.

Section 1. _Common Sense and common Form_.

Perfection seems to be the ground-work both of common sense and

of common form; and, what prevents each from being perfect, is the

adventitious blemishes, the additions to, and the diminutions from,

what is perfect, making the too little and the too large. But, these

defects being distributed in, small portions throughout the general

common form and common mind, they constitute an object, whether

visible or intellectual, between perfection and imperfection, namely,

that of mediocrity, neither exciting admiration nor disgust. And, as

experience gives the general idea of the common and true appearance

of the human form, as well to the rustic as to the most enlightened

philosopher, so consequently does it enable him to see deformity, or

what is an unusual appearance in that form.

But, though unusual defects seem to be evident to every eye, it is

only to the man of taste and nice discernment that the same degree of

unusual beauties are equally perceptible; which corresponds with my

opinion, that the ground-work of humanity is perfection, and that its

blemishes only tinge its pure white, not discolour it so much, but,

when held at a distance, i.e. in abstract idea, it is still a white,

like a sheet of paper, or cloth of the most perfect white, regularly

checkered over with a variety of figures of every colour, and placed

at a distance, appearing to the eye a white, a mezzo common white;

and, as any unusual figure, I mean unusually large and opaque, on this

mezzo ground, would be more conspicuous than any of a greater degree

of transparency or a more perfect white could be by an absence of any

of the figures; so any degree of deformity is, more opposite to the

general common form than beauty, and any degree of insanity is more

opposite to common sense than intellectual excellence.

And, (to continue my allusion,) as those tints, or blemishes, which

obscure the ground, must be discharged to make a perfect white, so

must the artist, in creating beauty, discharge the blemishes that

tinge and obscure the human form, and which give it the character of

mediocrity, till the perfect white, or total absence of defect, or

beauty, result.

Common sense seems to be diffusive truth, and common form diffusive

beauty; and, as this diffusion is always existing with us, externally

and internally, it is no wonder that we should more easily perceive

what is in opposition to it, _evil_, than what is in unison with it,

_good_.

On a line with common form and common sense I place common ease of

body and of mind: unfelt health, unfelt good, or that arising to the

degree of _satisfaction_ and _content_; in fine, whatever we call

_commonly_ good, and requisite for the well-being of humanity.

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Taste, and of the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty, etc. · 第 1 / 4 章