ISAEUS
§ 1
Dionysius could find, in the authorities whom he consulted, no definite
information about the life of Isaeus. The dates of his birth and death
are unknown; we cannot, as Dionysius observes, say what were his
political opinions, or even whether he had any at all.[153] We are even
in doubt as to his birthplace; some authorities called him an Athenian,
others a Chalcidian. The suggestion that he may have been the descendant
of an Athenian who settled in Chalcis as a _cleruch_ is plausible, but
without any authority.[154] The inference, from the fact that he took no
part in public life, that he was probably an alien, is not justifiable.
The fact that, whether an Athenian or not, he never spoke at any of the
great national assemblies, where rhetoricians from all Greek countries
gave displays, seems to argue that he had no ambition for personal
distinction as an orator, but was content to be a professional writer of
speeches.
There is a legend that the young Demosthenes, impressed by the
effectiveness of Isaeus’ oratory, induced the latter to live in his house
and train him thoroughly in all the arts of the forensic speech-writer;
it is even said that the earliest speech of Demosthenes, against
Aphobus, was in reality composed by his master. The authority for these
tales is quite insignificant, but the influence of Isaeus on Demosthenes
was nevertheless considerable, whether or not they came much into
personal contact.
Dionysius records, on the authority of Hermippus, that Isaeus ‘was a
pupil of Isocrates and a teacher of Demosthenes, and came into close
contact with the best of the philosophers.’[155]
There is no evidence that he was ever a companion of Socrates, since his
name is not anywhere mentioned by Plato.
His earliest speech (_On the Estate of Dicaeogenes_) is assigned with
some probability to the year 390 B.C., and his latest (_On the Estate of
Apollodorus_) to 353 B.C.
If the date 390 B.C. is correct, the period of his study under Isocrates
may reasonably be placed during the period 393-390 B.C., when that orator
was starting his school, and on this assumption we might place the birth
of Isaeus approximately at 420 B.C. But the chronology rests entirely
on internal evidence which in this case is ambiguous; a later date for
the speech is equally possible, and in that case the earliest speech is
that _On the Estate of Aristarchus_, 377-371 B.C. Isaeus, then, need not
have been born before 400 B.C. There is more certainty in the dating of
the last extant speech about 353 B.C., but we have no means of knowing
whether or not the orator lived long after its composition. He may have
spent many years in retirement. Isocrates was writing up to the moment
of his death, but he had great thoughts to express; Isaeus, with no
interest in politics, may, when he retired from the monotonous task of
writing speeches for others, have been glad to find no further necessity
for composition. However, the approximate dates 420-350 B.C. will give a
reasonable duration for such a life.
Isaeus is perhaps the only one of the orators for whom we cannot feel any
enthusiasm. If we had, from external sources, the slightest clue to his
real feelings, we might be able to collect from his speeches some hints
that would help us to form an image of his personality. He is known to
us only from speeches which he wrote for others, all of them, with the
exception of one fragment, dealing with testamentary cases, which are not
the most interesting province of law. He was not personally interested
in any of these trials, unless we can believe the more than doubtful
assertion of the Greek argument to the fourth oration, that he himself
spoke in support of Hagnon and Hagnotheus, being their kinsman.
We may contrast his case with that of Antiphon, who similarly is
known to us chiefly from speeches in one department of law—trials for
homicide; but in Antiphon’s case we are fortunate in having a short but
illuminating notice of his life by Thucydides, which forms the outline of
the picture; and in addition we have the tetralogies which to some extent
help to fill in the details. Of Isaeus as a man we know less, almost,
than we do of Homer. We gather only an impression of his wonderful
efficiency in dealing with subjects of a particular class—his exhaustive
knowledge of the intricacies of testamentary law, and his dexterity in
applying that knowledge to the best purpose; a kind of efficiency which
is admirable, but dull.
Isaeus is our chief authority for the Attic Laws of inheritance.[156]
These laws were often arbitrary, and though they were to some extent
simplified by the fact that a man who had sons could not legally will his
property away from them, the intricacies of tables of consanguinity were
so complex that only a specialist could be expected to have a complete
mastery of them. There was no class of professional lawyers at Athens;
the Attic Laws were very largely framed by amateurs, of which we have
evidence in the number of recorded cases in which the proposers of laws
were prosecuted for illegality, _i.e._ for enacting laws contrary to
laws already established; and as the framing of them was a matter of
haphazard improvisation, so their interpretation was often a question of
the temper of the jury for the moment. No doubt some record of verdicts
was kept, but the Athenians had no great respect for precedent, or at any
rate could not make full use of it in the lack of professional judges who
should be experts in such matters. Thus there were great opportunities
for a man like Isaeus, who combined a minute knowledge of law and
procedure with skill in applying his knowledge; who could quote at will
either the law or precedent for departing from its letter, and, where
the wording of the law left any room for ambiguous interpretation, could
twist the meaning to one side or the other to suit his case.
The particular branch of law which Isaeus chose as his special
province was important owing to the large number of cases dealing with
inheritances which seem to have come before the Athenian Courts, and
these cases were often in themselves important owing to the religious
significance of the fact of inheritance. An Athenian desired to leave
behind him a male heir not only that his property might remain in the
family, but that the family might have a representative who should carry
on the private worship of the household gods, and in particular should
duly perform the funeral rites of the testator and offer all the proper
sacrifices at his grave. Heirship, therefore, carried with it certain
definite religious duties, and a man who had no child living usually
ensured the continuity of the family worship by adopting a son either in
his lifetime or by will.
The skill of Isaeus in dealing with complicated cases is well shown
by a consideration of the arguments of any of the remaining speeches;
for instance, Oration v. (_On the Estate of Dicaeogenes_) is concerned
with the claims of a certain man’s nephew as against his cousin, who
inherited a third portion under a will subsequently proved to be false,
and eventually succeeded to the whole under a second will which the
claimants proved false. Two wills and the results of two previous trials
have to be kept in mind, as well as the rather complicated relationship
of the parties; but Isaeus makes the case substantially clear. Again,
in Oration xi. (_On the Estate of Hagnias_) twenty-three members of the
family are referred to by name, and it is necessary to trace the family’s
ramifications through a large number of second cousins whose nearness of
consanguinity is in some cases affected by the intermarriage of first
cousins. The facts of the case are not easy to follow even on paper, and
it appears that the judges on this occasion were puzzled into giving a
wrong verdict.
The orator’s methods may, however, be studied more conveniently in a
simpler speech, _On the Estate of Ciron_ (Or. viii.). The essential facts
of the case are as follows:—Ciron by his first marriage had one daughter,
the mother of the two claimants. Ciron married a second wife, the sister
of Diodes. The son of Ciron’s brother, instigated by Diodes, made a
counter-claim on the grounds that (1) Ciron’s daughter was illegitimate
and consequently her sons were illegitimate; (2) a brother’s son in any
case has a better claim than a daughter’s son. The speaker, the elder of
the claimants, first establishes his mother’s legitimacy, proving that
Ciron always treated her as his daughter and twice gave her a dowry, and
regarded her sons as his natural heirs.
‘Our grandfather Ciron died, not without issue, but leaving
as issue my brother and myself, the sons of his legitimate
daughter; but the plaintiffs claim the inheritance on the
assumption that they are the next of kin, and insult us by the
insinuation that we are not sons of Ciron’s daughter, and that
he never had a daughter at all. This is due to the claimants’
covetousness and the great amount of Ciron’s estate, which they
have seized, and now control. They have the impudence to say
that he left nothing, and in the same breath to lay a claim to
the inheritance.
‘Now your judgment ought not, in my opinion, to have reference
to the man who has urged the claim, but to Diocles of Phlya,
known as Orestes, who has incited him to annoy us, endeavouring
to withhold the property which Ciron left at his death, and to
endanger our interests, so that he may not have to part with
any of it, if you are misled by the assertions of the claimant.
Since they are working for these ends it is right that you
should be informed of all the facts, in order that no detail
may escape you, and that you may have a full knowledge of all
that has occurred, before you give your verdict. So I ask you
to consult the interests of justice by giving to this case
as serious consideration as you have given to any other case
before. This is only just. Recall the numerous cases that have
come before you, and you will find that no plaintiffs have ever
made a more shameless or barefaced claim to property that does
not belong to them than these two.
‘Now it is a hard task, Gentlemen, for one entirely
inexperienced in the procedure of the courts to hold his own in
a trial for such an important issue against concerted speeches
and witnesses who give false evidence; but I have a confident
hope that I shall obtain justice from you, and that my own
speech will be satisfactory to the point, at least, of stating
a just cause, unless I am thwarted by some obstacle of the kind
which I apprehend. I therefore urge you, Gentlemen, to give
me a courteous hearing, and if you consider that I have been
wronged, to support the justice of my claim.
‘First, I shall convince you that my mother was the legitimate
daughter of Ciron. For events long past I shall rely on
reported statements and evidence, for those within our memory
I shall adduce witnesses who know the facts, as well as proofs
which are stronger than depositions; and when I have laid this
all before you I shall prove that I have a better right than
the claimant to inherit the estate of Ciron.
‘I shall start from the point at which my opponents began, and
from thence onwards instruct you in the facts.
‘My grandfather Ciron, Gentlemen, married my grandmother, who
was his own first cousin, being the daughter of a sister of his
own mother. After the marriage she in due course gave birth to
my mother, and four years later she died.
‘My grandfather, having only this one daughter, married his
second wife, the sister of Diodes, who bore him two sons. He
brought up my mother in the house with his wife and children,
and during the lifetime of the latter, when his daughter was of
marriageable age, he bestowed her on Nausimenes of Cholarge,
giving her a dowry of clothing and gold ornaments, as well as
twenty-five minae. Three or four years after this, Nausimenes
fell ill and died, before my mother had borne him any children.
My grandfather took her back to his house, but owing to the
disorder of her husband’s affairs he did not recover all the
dowry he had given with her; he then married her a second time
to my father, with a dowry of 1000 drachmae.
‘In face of the charges now brought by the plaintiffs, how can
my statements be proved? I sought and found the way.
‘Ciron’s domestic slaves, male and female, must know whether my
mother was or was not his daughter; whether she lived in his
house; whether he did or did not on two occasions give feasts
in honour of her marriage; what dowry each of her husbands
received. Wishing to examine them under torture by way of
supporting the evidence already in my hands, in order that
you might put more confidence in their evidence when they had
submitted to the examination than you would if they were only
apprehending it, I requested the plaintiffs to surrender their
slaves of both sexes to be examined on the above points and all
others of which they have knowledge. But this man, who will
shortly request you to believe his own witnesses, shrank from
submitting to such an examination. But if I can prove that he
refused, how can we avoid the presumption that his witnesses
are now giving false evidence since he has shrunk from a test
so searching?
‘To prove the truth of my assertion, take first this deposition
and read it.[157]
[_The deposition._]
‘Now you hold the opinion, both personally and officially, that
torture is the surest test; and whenever slaves and freemen
come forward as witnesses and you have to arrive at facts, you
do not rely on the evidence of the freemen, but torture the
slaves and seek thus to discover the truth. You are right in
your preference; for you know that whereas some witnesses have
been suspected of giving false evidence, no slaves have ever
been proved to have made untrue statements in consequence of
the torture to which they were submitted.[158]
‘Who may be expected to know the early facts? Obviously those
who were acquainted with my grandfather, and they have told us
what they heard. Who must know about my mother’s marriage? The
parties to the marriage contracts, and their witnesses. On this
point the relations of Nausimenes and of my father have given
evidence. And who knew that my mother was brought up in Ciron’s
house, and was his legitimate daughter? The present claimants
give clear evidence that this is true, by their action in
refusing the torture. Surely, then, it would not be reasonable
for you to discredit my witnesses, while you can hardly fail to
disbelieve those of the other side.
‘Besides these, we can bring other proofs by which you shall
know that we are sons of Ciron’s daughter. He treated us as he
naturally would treat his daughter’s sons; he never conducted a
sacrifice without our presence, but whether the sacrifice were
small or great, we were always there and joined in it. Not only
were we summoned for such occasions, but he always used to take
us to the rural Dionysia, and we used to see the show with him,
sitting by his side; and we came to his house to keep every
feast-day. And when he sacrificed to Zeus Ktesios, a sacrifice
to which he attached the utmost importance, never allowing
slaves or even freemen, outside the family, to participate, but
doing everything by himself, we used to share in the sacrifice;
we helped him to handle the offerings, we helped him to
place them on the altar, we helped him in everything, and, as
our grandfather, he would pray the God to give us health and
wealth. But if he had not considered us as his daughter’s sons,
and seen in us the only descendants left to him, he would never
have done anything of the kind, but would have kept by his
side this man who now claims to be his nephew. The truth of
this is known best of all by my grandfather’s servants, whom
the plaintiff refused to surrender to torture; but it is known
accurately enough by some of my grandfather’s friends, whose
evidence I shall produce’ (§§ 14-17).
The speaker continues that he and his brother were enrolled by Ciron in
the _phratria_, and were allowed to conduct the funeral by Diocles, who
thus tacitly admitted their claim.
He next proves by legal argument that direct descendants have a better
claim than collateral relations. By way of epilogue he gives an account
of the property and the machinations of Diocles, whose personal character
he attacks, and at the end produces evidence that Diocles has been proved
guilty of adultery.
§ 2. _Literary Characteristics_
Isaeus studied under Isocrates, and it is therefore reasonable to
follow the chronological order and take the master first; but as the
master survived the pupil by several years, and was actively engaged
in literature down to the day of his death, ordinary considerations of
seniority do not apply in this case. It is more satisfactory to study
Isaeus in relation, not to Isocrates, but to the earlier speech-writers,
Antiphon and Lysias. He is more closely connected with them in his
subject-matter, since he is, like them, essentially a practical writer,
and his businesslike style has more affinity to the terse condensation
of Lysias than to the florid ‘epideictic’ diction of the author of the
_Panegyric_.
In language there is not very much difference between Lysias and Isaeus;
both use the current vocabulary, making a literary medium out of the
popular speech of their day. A search through the latter’s speeches
re-discovers a certain number of words which, so far as our knowledge
goes, have a poetical tinge; but practically all these may be found in
other orators and prose-writers.[159]
Again, there are a few noteworthy metaphors, such as ἐκκόπτειν, to
‘knock out’ or ‘knock on the head’—this is used again by Dinarchus—and
καθιπποτροφεῖν, ‘to race away one’s money,’ _i.e._ squander it on a
stable. We know little of the idioms of the language spoken in the
streets of Athens in the fourth century, but we do know that popular
speech has always a tendency to the employment of rough metaphors,
and where we come into contact with the spoken word we expect to find
expressions of this kind.[160] A study of the private letters contained
among the Oxyrhynchus Papyri will give many examples to the point.[161]
Lastly, a few words recall the language of comedy.[162]
We may readily believe that, in admitting these few blemishes to the
purity of his Atticism, the orator was indulging in a realism of which
we find very few traces, as a rule, in literary prose.[163]
His grammar, according to strict Attic rule, is occasionally at
fault,[164] and the MSS. exhibit a certain number of word-forms which are
supposed to be un-Attic.[165]
Whether we should emend these passages to suit the supposed standard,
or make the standard more liberal to admit such passages, is a matter
for controversy. The MSS. of Thucydides exhibit a wealth of ingenious
perversity in the way of grammar, and in that case, though many critics
have spent their ingenuity on reducing the text to order and decency, an
opposite school of criticism maintains that the historian may have chosen
to write as he liked. The greatest artists are above the laws of their
art, and Isaeus may have condescended to a level which he knew not to be
the highest.
With regard, then, to the purity of language, Isaeus, though surpassed
by Lysias and Isocrates, is not far behind them. He is on a level with
Lysias also in clearness and accuracy of thought, and in what Dionysius
calls ἐνάργεια, vividness of presentation. But in the structure of
sentences some differences between these two must be noted. Lysias, as
has already been stated, varied his structure considerably according to
the subjects of his speeches, the succession of periods being broken by
the introduction of a freer style; but at the same time he had a love of
antithesis to which sacrifices had sometimes to be made.
Isaeus is free from this straining after antithesis, and is hardly
bound at all by scholastic rules. We cannot truly say that his style
is non-periodic, for formal periods are to be met with; but a marked
characteristic of his style is his skill in the use of short sentences,
often abrupt, nearly always vigorous. In argumentative passages
especially, he uses the form of imaginary question and answer; in
narrative he sometimes gives us a series of short sentences, connected
in thought, but not formally bound together. He has the appearance of
composing negligently, but from his effectiveness we conclude that the
negligence was studied. The following passages illustrate these styles:
‘Eupolis, Thrasyllus, and Mneson were brothers from the same
two parents. Their father left them a considerable property, so
that they were eligible for the performance of public services.
This the three divided amongst them. Of these brothers, two
died about the same time,’ etc.[166]
The speech about Ciron’s inheritance contains the best example of
argument by question and answer:
‘On what ground should a statement be believed? Should we not
say, on the ground of the evidence? I fancy so. And on what
ground should we believe witnesses? From the fact that they
have been tortured? Naturally. And on what grounds should we
disbelieve the statements of the plaintiffs? Because they
shrink from this test? Most certainly.’[167]
A third quotation gives a good example of the purely ornamental use of
the rhetorical question; it is precious as showing us that Isaeus was on
occasion capable of applying a lighter touch. He is so coldly logical as
a rule that we turn with relief to any exhibition of ordinary feeling:
‘Who was there who omitted to cut his hair short when the two
talents arrived? Who was there who failed to wear black, hoping
that his mourning would give him a claim to the inheritance?
Or how many relatives and sons laid claim, by deed of gift, to
the estate of Nicostratus? Demosthenes said he was his nephew,
but when the present claimants disproved his statement, he
retired. Telephus said that Nicostratus had given him all his
property. He too soon ceased to be a claimant. Ameiniades came
before the archon and produced a son for Nicostratus—a child
less than three years old, though Nicostratus had not been in
Athens for eleven years past. Pyrrhus of Lamptra said that the
money had been dedicated by Nicostratus to Athena, but given
by Nicostratus to himself. Ctesias of Besaea and Cranaus first
said that judgment had been given in their favour against
Nicostratus for a talent, and when they could not prove it,
asserted that he was their freedman. They, like the rest,
failed to establish their statement.
‘These were the parties who in the first instance pounced at
once upon the property of Nicostratus. Chariades made no claim
at the time.’[168]
Dionysius, a very keen critic on the literary side, misses in Isaeus the
grace and charm of Lysias, but allows him more cleverness.[169]
This ‘charm,’ by which Dionysius could distinguish a genuine speech of
Lysias, is incapable of definition and too elusive for our blunter wits
to apprehend; but we can form a general impression that the diction of
Lysias has something in it more pleasing than that of Isaeus. Perhaps
there is something in the illustration which the ancient critic applies,
when he compares the speeches of the former to a clearly drawn picture
of simple colour and design; those of the latter to a more elaborate and
ingenious composition, where there is more play of light and shade and
the depth and brilliance of the colouring in some cases obscures the
lines—with a suggestion that the drawing may be faulty.[170] This simile,
however, applies more truly to the structure of the speeches than to the
diction. Dionysius recurs to the style,[171] and quotes parallel extracts
from the introductions to speeches by the two writers to demonstrate the
simplicity of Lysias and the artificiality of Isaeus. The demonstration
is not overpowering. The first specimen from Lysias is indeed simple and
clear, but the extract from Isaeus, though the language is a little more
elaborate, seems equally suitable for its purpose.
Lysias wrote as follows:
‘I feel, Gentlemen, that I must tell you about my friendship
with Pherenicus, so that none of you may be surprised that I,
who have never before pleaded for any one else, am now pleading
for him. I had a friend in his father Cephisodotus, and when
our party was exiled to Thebes I stayed with him, as did any
other Athenian who wished to.
‘He did us many kind services, both officially and privately,
before we were restored to our homes. So when his family met
with the same misfortune, and came in exile to Athens, I
felt that I owed them the greatest possible gratitude, and
received them in such intimate fashion that nobody who came
to the house, and did not know, could tell which of us was
the owner of it. Now Pherenicus knows that there are many who
are cleverer speakers than I, and have more experience of
such business; but he thinks that he can rely absolutely on
my friendship. So I should think it disgraceful, when he asks
me and urges me to support his claims, to allow him to lose
Androclides’ gift, if I can do anything to prevent it.’[172]
The following is the parallel extract from Isaeus:
‘Before now I have been of service to Eumathes, as indeed he
has deserved; and now, so far as in me lies, I shall try to
help you to save him. Now listen to me for a short time, lest
any of you suppose that I through recklessness or any other
unjust motive have approached the case of Eumathes.
‘When I was a trierarch in the archonship of Cephisodorus,
and a report was carried to my relatives that I had been
killed in the sea-fight, whereas I had some moneys deposited
with Eumathes, Eumathes sent for my relative and friends, and
declared the amount of the money which was in his hands, and
justly and honestly made payment in full.
‘In consequence of this I, when I got home in safety, treated
him as a still closer friend, and when he was starting business
as a banker I provided him with money. After this, when
Dionysius claimed him as a slave, I vindicated his liberty,
knowing that he had been manumitted by Epigenes before the
court. But I shall say no more on this subject.’[173]
Dionysius thus criticizes them:
‘What is the difference between these proëmia? In Lysias the
introduction of the subject is pleasing for this one reason,
that it is stated naturally and simply.
‘“I feel, Gentlemen, that I must begin by telling you about my
friendship with Pherenicus”’—
What follows has no appearance of premeditation, but is put just as an
amateur might express it:
‘“so that none of you may be surprised that I, who have never
before pleaded for any one else, am now pleading for him.” But
in Isaeus what seems so simple is really premeditated, and we
see at once that it is rhetorical: “Before now I have been of
service to Eumathes, as indeed he has deserved; and now, so far
as in me lies, I shall try to help you in saving him.” This is
more exalted and less simple than the other; still more is this
true of the next sentence: “Now listen to me for a short time,
lest any of you suppose that I through recklessness or any
other unjust motive have approached the case of Eumathes.”’
Dionysius finds that the expressions here used, προπέτεια, ἀδικία, πρὸς
τὰ Εὐμαθοῦς πράγματα προσῆλθον, sound to him artificial rather than
spontaneous. In this he may be right; but we feel him to be hypercritical
when he blames the next sentence for lack of simplicity, and tries, by
a few verbal alterations, to show how it might have been improved. He
would re-write the sentence thus:—‘When I was trierarch, and it was
reported at home that I had been killed, Eumathes, having some money of
mine on deposit,’ etc. Here he has certainly succeeded in omitting once
the name Eumathes, which occurs twice in Isaeus; but the other changes
consist purely in the substitution of two temporal clauses introduced
by ὅτε (when) for two participial clauses in the genitive absolute—a
construction which is, surely, common enough in all Greek writers to
escape the censure of being ‘rhetorical.’
§ 3. _Structure of Speeches_
The exceptional power of Isaeus does not, then, depend upon any charm
of language or any oratorical gift; it lies in his exhaustive legal
knowledge and his remarkable skill in argument. He has an almost unique
gift for circumstantial statement and proof of the facts bearing on his
case. This is the cleverness (δεινότης) to which Dionysius so often
refers with grudging admiration.
His speeches are not arranged according to a single plan, but, on the
contrary, exhibit great variety of structure. Lysias keeps practically
to one form—exordium, narrative, proof, epilogue. Isaeus, when the
narrative is too long or complicated to be grasped all at once, does not
set it out as a whole, but breaks it up into sections, each of which is
accompanied by its evidence and argument.[174] ‘The orator is afraid.’
thinks Dionysius, ‘that the argument may be hard to follow, on account of
the number of its sections, and that the proofs of the various points,
if all collected together, being so numerous as they must be, dealing
with matters so numerous, may be detrimental to clearness.’ The critic is
referring particularly to the speech _For Euphiletus_ (Or. xii.), a large
fragment of which his quotations have preserved for us; but an analysis
of any of the extant speeches will show that they are constructed
skilfully on varying plans, unhampered by technical rule, with an art
that adapts its material according to the requirements of the case. This
skill, which aims at success rather than literary finish, shows that
Isaeus was above all a competent tactician—such a master of argument
that, ‘whereas we should be ready to believe Lysias even when he tells a
lie, we can hardly regard Isaeus without suspicion even when he tells the
truth.’[175]
Dionysius is no doubt led rather far away by his desire for a contrast;
he has given Isaeus a bad name and is seeking means to justify his
condemnation of the man who ‘takes a mean advantage of his adversary and
outmanœuvres the judges.’[176]
This Greek of a late Hellenistic age thoroughly grasped the Athenian
spirit, which demanded artistic composition and was yet suspicious of
any man who was too obviously clever, a spirit against which we find
Antiphon, the earliest of the orators, contending, when he makes his
characters protest their own inexperience and insinuate that their
opponents seem strong only because they have that same discreditable
skill to make the worse cause appear the better.[177]
Isaeus sometimes reiterates his arguments; he will even quote the same
document twice. This is inartistic, but it pays. A notable advance on his
predecessors is found in the form of some of his epilogues. The earlier
orators were generally content, after stating the case, to finish with
a general appeal to justice or pity. Isaeus on occasion makes a more
practical use of his closing periods; he recapitulates the case, pointing
out that he has proved what he set out to prove;[178] or gives a short
summary of the narrative which he regards as now established, or of the
claims urged by himself and his opponent. In one speech[179] he has
actually reached the end and summarized his results, when the very last
words surprise us by an unexpected attack on his adversary’s character:
‘I do not know that there is any need for me to say more, for I
think there is no point on which you have not full knowledge;
but I will ask the clerk to take the last remaining deposition,
showing how the claimant was convicted of adultery, and read it
to the court.’
Some of the earlier speech-writers made an attempt at character-drawing,
and tried to suit their speeches to the character (ἦθος) of their
clients. In Isaeus this illusion is not maintained; his style varies
somewhat according to the subject, but every speech bears, as Dionysius
observes, the stamp of the professional writer, which must have betrayed
it to the acute perceptions of an Athenian jury.[180] Probably the
accumulated experience of the orators had proved that such attempts at
deception were on the whole useless; for a certain class of client it
would be necessary either to write a bad speech or let it be evident that
the speaker was only a mouthpiece for an advocate cleverer than himself,
and as success in the case was of more importance than artistic illusion,
the proper choice was obvious. The _ethos_ in Isaeus consists not in
making the characters speak as they naturally would have spoken, but in
putting their arguments for them in the way most likely to appeal to
the reason and the feelings of the judges. Experience had further shown
that though, from the lips of a real orator, appeals to sentiment and
passion may have a great effect, such appeals by themselves, unsupported
by argument, or made at an inauspicious moment, may do more harm than
good. An appeal to the reason is always stronger, provided only that the
speaker must avoid giving offence by a too presumptuous bearing.
When the court is already convinced by an argued demonstration of
the justice of the case, an appeal to pity or indignation may be
overpowering; without such preparation it is nothing but a last resort of
weakness.
Isaeus, though he uses such appeals, as indeed he wields every weapon of
the orator’s armoury, uses them with moderation and discernment, showing
in this, as in all his tactics, a sound knowledge of practical utility.
§ 4. _Speeches_
The ‘Life’ by the Pseudo-Plutarch tells us that sixty-four speeches were
attributed to Isaeus, of which fifty were considered genuine. He also
composed an _Art of Rhetoric_. We now possess eleven and a considerable
fragment of a twelfth, and know the titles of forty-two others. The
eleven speeches which are extant all deal directly or indirectly with
inheritances. Six of these are connected with διαδικάσιαι—trials to
decide who is the righteous claimant—and their titles are as follows:—_On
the Estate of Cleonymus_ (Or. i.), date 360-353 B.C.; _On the Estate
of Nicostratus_ (Or. iv.), the date is uncertain—the author of the
‘argument’ asserts, with no plausibility, that Isaeus delivered the
speech in his own person; _On the Estate of Apollodorus_ (Or. vii.),
about 353 B.C.; _On the Estate of Ciron_ (Or. viii.) (_see above_, pp.
108-10), date uncertain, perhaps circa 375 B.C.; _On the Estate of
Astyphilus_ (Or. ix.), date perhaps about 369 B.C.; _On the Estate of
Aristarchus_, date probably between 377 and 371 B.C.
Three speeches deal with prosecutions for false witness in connection
with testamentary cases, viz. _On the Estate of Menecles_ (Or. ii.), date
about 354 B.C.; _On the Estate of Pyrrhus_ (Or. iii.), of uncertain date;
_On the Estate of Philoctemon_ (Or. vi.),—the date of this speech can be
fixed with certainty at 364-363 B.C., as we learn from § 14 that it is
now fifty-two years since the Athenian expedition sailed to Sicily.
Oration v., _On the Estate of Dicaeogenes_, is in an ἐγγύης δίκη,
an action to compel Leochares, who was surety for Dicaeogenes in an
agreement connected with the will of the latter’s cousin, also named
Dicaeogenes, to carry out the contract, since Dicaeogenes, the principal,
is a defaulter. The date can only be fixed by the references to the
death of the testator, who was killed in battle at Cnidos. There are
two engagements which might be referred to, the first in 412 B.C., the
second in 394 B.C. Twenty-two years have elapsed between that event and
the present trial, so the date is either 390 B.C.—many years earlier than
that of any other speech of Isaeus—or 372 B.C.
_On the Estate of Hagnias_ (Or. xi.) is in a prosecution of a guardian
for ill-treatment of his ward under a will.
_For Euphiletus_ (Or. xii.), a considerable fragment preserved by
Dionysius, is the only specimen that we possess of a speech not connected
with a will-case. It refers to an appeal by Euphiletus to a law-court
against the decision of his fellow demes-men, who have struck him off the
roll.
The remaining fragments are hardly important except in so far as
they provide us with the names of several lost speeches. One of them
(frag. 23) contains several sentences repeated verbally from Or. viii.
(_Ciron_), § 28.
The fragment of the speech _For Eumathes_, preserved by Dionysius, has
been referred to above (p. 118).