BOOK I.

* * * * *

These essays on rhetoric were composed by Cicero when he was about one

and twenty years of age, and he mentions them afterwards in his more

elaborate treatise _De Oratore_, (Lib. i. c. 2,) as unworthy of his

more mature age, and more extended experiences. Quintilian also (III.

c. 63,) mentions them as works which Cicero condemned by subsequent

writings. This treatise originally consisted of four books, of which

only two have come down to us.

I. I HAVE often and deeply resolved this question in my mind, whether

fluency of language has been beneficial or injurious to men and to

cities, with reference to the cultivation of the highest order of

eloquence. For when I consider the disasters of our own republic, and

when I call to mind also the ancient calamities of the most important

states, I see that it is by no means the most insignificant portion

of their distresses which has originated from the conduct of the most

eloquent men. But, at the same time, when I set myself to trace back,

by the aid of written memorials and documents, affairs which, by

reason of their antiquity, are removed back out of the reach of any

personal recollection, I perceive also that many cities have been

established, many wars extinguished, many most enduring alliances and

most holy friendships have been cemented by deliberate wisdom much

assisted and facilitated by eloquence. And as I have been, as I say,

considering all this for some time, reason itself especially induces

me to think that wisdom without eloquence is but of little advantage

to states, but that eloquence without wisdom is often most

mischievous, and is never advantageous to them.

If then any one, neglecting all the most virtuous and honourable

considerations of wisdom and duty, devotes his whole attention to the

practice of speaking, that man is training himself to become useless

to himself, and a citizen mischievous to his country; but a man who

arms himself with eloquence in such a manner as not to oppose the

advantage of his country, but to be able to contend in behalf of them,

he appears to me to be one who both as a man and a citizen will be of

the greatest service to his own and the general interests, and most

devoted to his country.

And if we are inclined to consider the origin of this thing which is

called eloquence, whether it be a study, or an art, or some peculiar

sort of training or some faculty given us by nature, we shall find

that it has arisen from most honourable causes, and that it proceeds

on the most excellent principles.

II. For there was a time when men wandered at random over the fields,

after the fashion of beasts, and supported life on the food of beasts;

nor did they do anything by means of the reasoning powers of the mind;

but almost everything by bodily strength. No attention was as yet paid

to any considerations of the religious reverence due to the gods, or

of the duties which are owed to mankind: no one had ever seen any

legitimate marriages, no one had beheld any children whose parentage

was indubitable; nor had any one any idea what great advantage

there might be in a system of equal law. And so, owing to error and

ignorance, cupidity, that blind and rash sovereign of the mind, abused

its bodily strength, that most pernicious of servants, for the purpose

of gratifying itself. At this time then a man,[56] a great and a wise

man truly was he, perceived what materials there were, and what great

fitness there was in the minds of men for the most important affairs,

if any one could only draw it out, and improve it by education. He,

laying down a regular system, collected men, who were previously

dispersed over the fields and hidden in habitations in the woods into

one place, and united them, and leading them on to every useful and

honourable pursuit, though, at first, from not being used to it they

raised an outcry against it; he gradually, as they became more eager

to listen to him on account of his wisdom and eloquence, made them

gentle and civilized from having been savage and brutal. And it

certainly seems to me that no wisdom which was silent and destitute of

skill in speaking could have had such power as to turn men on a sudden

from their previous customs, and to lead them to the adoption of

a different system of life. And, moreover, after cities had been

established how could men possibly have been induced to learn to

cultivate integrity, and to maintain justice, and to be accustomed

willingly to obey others, and to think it right not only to encounter

toil for the sake of the general advantage, but even to run the risk

of losing their lives, if men had not been able to persuade them by

eloquence of the truth of those principles which they had discovered

by philosophy? Undoubtedly no one, if it had not been that he was

influenced by dignified and sweet eloquence, would ever have chosen

to condescend to appeal to law without violence, when he was the most

powerful party of the two as far as strength went; so as to allow

himself now to be put on a level with those men among whom he might

have been preeminent, and of his own free will to abandon a custom

most pleasant to him, and one which by reason of its antiquity had

almost the force of nature.

And this is how eloquence appears to have originated at first, and to

have advanced to greater perfection; and also, afterwards, to have

become concerned in the most important transactions of peace and war,

to the greatest advantage of mankind? But after that a certain sort of

complaisance, a false copyist of virtue, without any consideration

for real duty, arrived at some fluency of language, then wickedness,

relying on ability, began to overturn cities, and to undermine the

principles of human life.

III. And, since we have mentioned the origin, of the good done by

eloquence, let us explain also the beginning of this evil.

It appears exceedingly probable to me that was a time when men who

were destitute of eloquence and wisdom, were not accustomed to meddle

with affairs of state, and when also great and eloquent men were not

used to concern themselves about private causes; but, while the most

important transactions were managed by the most eminent and able men,

I think that there were others also, and those not very incompetent,

who attended to the trifling disputes of private individuals; and as

in these disputes it often happened that men had recourse to lies, and

tried by such means to oppose the truth, constant practice in speaking

encouraged audacity, so that it became unavoidable that those other

more eminent men should, on account of the injuries sustained by the

citizens, resist the audacious and come to the assistance of their own

individual friends.

Therefore, as that man had often appeared equal in speaking, and

sometimes even superior, who having neglected the study of wisdom, had

laboured to acquire nothing except eloquence, it happened that in the

judgment of the multitude he appeared a man worthy to conduct even the

affairs of the state. And hence it arose, and it is no wonder that

it did, when rash and audacious men had seized on the helm of the

republic, that great and terrible disasters occurred. Owing to which

circumstances, eloquence fell under so much odium and unpopularity

that the ablest men, (like men who seek a harbour to escape from some

violent tempest) devoted themselves to any quiet pursuit, as a refuge

from a life of sedition and tumult. So that other virtuous and

honourable pursuits appear to me to have become popular subsequently,

from having been cultivated in tranquillity by excellent men; but

that this pursuit having been abandoned by most of them, grew out of

fashion and obsolete at the very time when it should have been more

eagerly retained and more anxiously encouraged and strengthened.

For the more scandalously the temerity and audacity of foolish and

worthless men was violating a most honourable and virtuous system,

to the excessive injury of the republic, the more studiously did

it become others to resist them, and to consult the welfare of the

republic.

IV. And this principle which I have just laid down did not escape the

notice of Cato, nor of Laelus, nor of their pupil, as I may fairly

call him, Africanus, nor of the Gracchi the grandson of Africanus; men

in whom there was consummate virtue and authority increased by their

consummate virtue and eloquence, which might serve as an ornament to

these qualities, and as a protection to the republic. Wherefore, in

my opinion at least, men ought not the less to devote themselves to

eloquence, although some men both in private and public affairs misuse

it in a perverse manner; but I think rather that they should apply

themselves to it with the more eagerness, in order to prevent wicked

men from getting the greatest power to the exceeding injury of the

good, and the common calamity of all men; especially as this is the

only thing which is of the greatest influence on all affairs both

public and private; and as it is by this same quality that life is

rendered safe, and honourable, and illustrious, and pleasant. For it

is from this source that the most numerous advantages accrue to the

republic, if only it be accompanied by wisdom, that governor of all

human affairs. From this source it is that praise and honour and

dignity flow towards all those who have acquired it; from this source

it is that the most certain and the safest defence is provided for

their friends. And, indeed, it appears to me, that it is on this

particular that men, who in many points are weaker and lower than the

beasts, are especially superior to them, namely, in being able to

speak.

Wherefore, that man appears to me to have acquired an excellent

endowment, who is superior to other men in that very thing in which

men are superior to beasts. And if this art is acquired not by nature

only, not by mere practice, but also by a sort of regular system of

education, it appears to me not foreign to our purpose to consider

what those men say who have left us some precepts on the subject of

the attainment of it.

But, before we begin to speak of oratorical precepts, I think we must

say something of the nature of the art itself; of its duty, of

its end, of its materials, and of its divisions. For when we have

ascertained those points, then each man's mind will, with the more

ease and readiness, be able to comprehend the system itself, and the

path which leads to excellence in it.

V. There is a certain political science which is made up of many and

important particulars. A very great and extensive portion of it is

artificial eloquence, which men call rhetoric. For we do not agree

with those men who think that the knowledge of political science is

in no need of and has no connexion with eloquence; and we most widely

disagree with those, on the other hand, who think that all political

ability Is comprehended under the skill and power of a rhetorician. On

which account we will place this oratorical ability in such a class as

to assert that it is a part of political science. But the duty of this

faculty appears to be to speak in a manner suitable to persuading men;

the end of it is to persuade by language. And there is difference

between the duty of this faculty and its end; that with respect to the

duty we consider what ought to be done; with respect to the end we

consider what is suitable to the duty. Just as we say, that it is the

duty of a physician to prescribe for a patient in a way calculated to

cure him; and that his end is to cure him by his prescriptions. And

so we shall understand what we are to call the duty of an orator, and

also what we are to call his end; since we shall call that his duty

which he ought to do, and we shall term that his end for the sake of

which he is bound to do his duty.

We shall call that the material of the art, on which the whole art,

and all that ability which is derived from art, turns. Just as if we

were to call diseases and wounds the material of medicine, because

it is about them that all medical science is concerned. And in like

manner, we call those subjects with which oratorical science and

ability is conversant the materials of the art of rhetoric. And these

subjects some have considered more numerous, and others less so. For

Gorgias the Leontine, who is almost the oldest of all rhetoricians,

considered that an orator was able to speak in the most excellent

manner of all men on every subject. And when he says this he seems to

be supplying an infinite and boundless stock of materials to this art.

But Aristotle, who of all men has supplied the greatest number of aids

and ornaments to this art, thought that the duty of the rhetorician

was conversant with three kinds of subjects; with the demonstrative,

and the deliberative, and the judicial.

The demonstrative is that which concerns itself with the praise or

blame of some particular individual; the deliberative is that which,

having its place in discussion and in political debate, comprises a

deliberate statement of one's opinion; the judicial is that which,

having its place in judicial proceedings, comprehends the topics of

accusation and defence; or of demand and refusal. And, as our own

opinion at least inclines, the art and ability of the orator must be

understood to be conversant with these tripartite materials. VI For

Hermagoras, indeed, appears neither to attend to what he is saying,

nor to understand what he is promising, for he divides the materials

of an orator into the cause, and the examination. The cause he defines

to be a thing which has in itself a controversy of language united

with the interposition of certain characters. And that part, we too

say, is assigned to the orator, for we give him those three parts

which we have already mentioned,--the judicial, the deliberative, and

the demonstrative. But the examination he defines to be that

thing which has in itself a controversy of language, without the

interposition of any particular characters, in this way--"Whether

there is anything good besides honesty?"--"Whether the senses may be

trusted?"--"What is the shape of the world?"--"What is the size of

the sun?" But I imagine that all men can easily see that all such

questions are far removed from the business of an orator, for it

appears the excess of insanity to attribute those subjects, in

which we know that the most sublime genius of philosophers has been

exhausted with infinite labour, as if they were inconsiderable

matters, to a rhetorician or an orator.

But if Hermagoras himself had had any great acquaintance with these

subjects, acquired with long study and training, then it would be

supposed that he, from relying on his own knowledge, had laid down

some false principles respecting the duty of an orator, and had

explained not what his art could effect, but what he himself could do.

But as it is, the character of the man is such, that any one would

be much more inclined to deny him any knowledge of rhetoric, than to

grant him any acquaintance with philosophy. Nor do I say this because

the book on the art which he published appears to me to have been

written with any particular incorrectness, (for, indeed, he appears to

me to have shown very tolerable ingenuity and diligence in arranging

topics which he had collected from ancient writings on the subject,

and also to have advanced some new theories himself,) but it is the

least part of the business of an orator to speak concerning his art,

which is what he has done: his business is rather to speak from his

art, which is what we all see that this Hermagoras was very little

able to do. And so that, indeed, appears to us to be the proper

materials of rhetoric, which we have said appeared to be such to

Aristotle. VII. And these are the divisions of it, as numerous writers

have laid them down: Invention; Arrangement; Elocution; Memory;

Delivery. Invention, is the conceiving of topics either true or

probable, which may make one's cause appear probable; Arrangement, is

the distribution of the topics which have been thus conceived with

regular order; Elocution, is the adaptation of suitable words and

sentences to the topics so conceived; Memory, is the lasting sense in

the mind of the matters and words corresponding to the reception of

these topics. Delivery, is a regulating of the voice and body in a

manner suitable to the dignity of the subjects spoken of and of the

language employed.

Now, that these matters have been briefly defined, we may postpone to

another time those considerations by which we may be able to elucidate

the character and the duty and the object of this art; for they would

require a very long argument, and they have no very intimate connexion

with the definition of the art and the delivery of precepts relating

to it. But we consider that the man who writes a treatise on the art

of rhetoric ought to write about two other subjects also; namely,

about the materials of the art, and about its divisions. And it seems,

indeed, that we ought to treat of the materials and divisions of this

art at the same time. Wherefore, let us first consider what sort of

quality invention ought to be, which is the most important of all the

divisions, and which applies to every description of cause in which an

orator can be engaged.

VIII. Every subject which contains in itself any controversy existing

either in language or in disputation, contains a question either

about a fact, or about a name, or about a class, or about an action.

Therefore, that investigation out of which a cause arises we call a

stating of a case. A stating of a case is the first conflict of causes

arising from a repulse of an accusation; in this way. "You did so and

so;"--"I did not do so;"--or, "it was lawful for me to do so." When

there is a dispute as to the fact, since the cause is confirmed by

conjectures, it is called a conjectural statement. But when it is a

dispute as to a name, because the force of a name is to be defined by

words, it is then styled a definitive statement. But when the thing

which is sought to be ascertained is what is the character of the

matter under consideration, because it is a dispute about violence,

and about the character of the affair, it is called a general

statement. But when the cause depends on this circumstance, either

that that man does not seem to plead who ought to plead, or that he

does not plead with that man with whom he ought to plead, or that

he does not plead before the proper people, at the proper time,

in accordance with the proper law, urging the proper charge, and

demanding the infliction of the proper penalty, then it is called a

statement by way of demurrer; because the arguing of the case appears

to stand in need of a demurrer and also of some alteration. And

some one or other of these sorts of statement must of necessity be

incidental to every cause. For if there be any one to which it is not

incidental, in that there can be no dispute at all; on which account

it has no right even to be considered a cause at all.

And a dispute as to fact may be distributed over every sort of time.

For as to what has been done, an inquiry can be instituted in this

way--"whether Ulysses slew Ajax;" and as to what is being done, in

this way--"whether the people of Tregellae are well affected towards

the Roman people;" and as to what is going to happen, in this way--"if

we leave Carthage uninjured, whether any inconvenience will accrue to

the republic."

It is a dispute about a name, when parties are agreed as to the fact,

and when the question is by what name that which has been done is to

be designated. In which class of dispute it is inevitable on that

account that there should be a dispute as to the name; not because the

parties are not agreed about the fact, not because the fact is not

notorious, but because that which has been done appears in a different

light to different people, and on that account one calls it by one

name and another by another. Wherefore, in disputes of this kind

the matter must be defined by words, and described briefly; as, for

instance, if any one has stolen any sacred vessel from a private

place, whether he is to be considered a sacrilegious person, or a

simple thief. For when that is inquired into, it is necessary to

define both points--what is a thief, and what is a sacrilegious

person,--and to show by one's own description that the matter which

is under discussion ought to be called by a different name from that

which the opposite party apply to it. IX. The dispute about kind

is, when it is agreed both what has been done, and when there is

no question as to the name by which it ought to be designated; and

nevertheless there is a question of what importance the matter is, and

of what sort it is, and altogether of what character it is; in this

way,--whether it be just or unjust; whether it be useful or useless;

and as to all other circumstances with reference to which there is any

question what is the character of that which has been done, without

there being any dispute as to its name. Humagoras assigned

four divisions to this sort of dispute: the deliberative, the

demonstrative, the judicial, and the one relating to facts. And, as it

seems to us, this was no ordinary blunder of his, and one which it is

incumbent on us to reprove; though we may do so briefly, lest, if we

were to pass it over in silence, we might be thought to have had no

good reason for abandoning his guidance; or if we were to dwell too

long on this point, we might appear to have interposed a delay and an

obstacle to the other precepts which we wish to lay down.

If deliberation and demonstration are kinds of causes, then the

divisions of any one kind cannot rightly be considered causes; for the

same matter may appear to be a class to one person, and a division to

another; but it cannot appear both a class and a division to the same

person. But deliberation and demonstration are kinds of argument; for

either there is no kind of argument at all, or there is the judicial

kind alone, or there are all three kinds, the judicial and the

demonstrative and the deliberative. Now, to say there is no kind of

argument at the same time that he says that there are many arguments,

and is giving precepts for them, is foolishness. How, too, is it

possible that there should be one kind only, namely the judicial, when

deliberation and demonstration in the first place do not resemble one

another, and are exceedingly different from the judicial kind, and

have each their separate object to which they ought to be referred. It

follows, then, that there are three kinds of arguments. Deliberation

and demonstration cannot properly be considered divisions of any kind

of argument. He was wrong, therefore, when he said that they were

divisions of a general statement of the case.

X. But if they cannot properly be considered divisions of a kind of

argument, much less can they properly be considered divisions of a

division of an argument. But all statement of the case is a division

of an argument. For the argument is not adapted to the statement of

the case, but the statement of the case is adapted to the argument.

But demonstration and deliberation cannot be properly considered

divisions of a kind of argument, because they are separate kinds

of arguments themselves. Much less can they properly be considered

divisions of that division, as he calls them. In the next place,

if the statement of the case, both itself as a whole; and also any

portion of that statement, is a repelling of an accusation, then that

which is not a repelling of an accusation is neither a statement of a

case, nor a portion of a statement of a case; but if that which is not

a repelling of an attack is not a statement of a case, nor a portion

of a statement of a case, then deliberation and demonstration are

neither a statement of a case, nor a portion of a statement of a

case. If, therefore, a statement of a case, whether it be the whole

statement or some portion of it, be a repelling of an accusation, then

deliberation and demonstration are neither a statement of a case, nor

any portion of such statement. But he himself asserts that it is

a repelling of an accusation. He must therefore assert also that

demonstration and deliberation are neither a statement of a case, nor

a portion of such a statement. And he will be pressed by the same

argument whether he calls the statement of a case the original

assertion of his cause by the accuser, or the first speech in answer

to such accusation by the advocate of the defence. For all the same

difficulties will attend him in either case.

In the next place a conjectural argument cannot, as to the same

portion of it, be at the same time both a conjectural one and a

definitive one. Again, a definitive argument cannot, as to the same

portion of it, be at the same time both a definitive argument and one

in the form and character of a demurrer. And altogether, no statement

of a case, and no portion of such a statement, can at one and the same

time both have its own proper force and also contain the force of

another kind of argument. Because each kind of argument is considered

simply by its own merits, and according to its own nature; and if any

other kind be united with it, then it is the number of statements of

a case that is doubled, and not the power of the statement that is

increased.

But a deliberative argument, both as to the same portion of it and

also at the same time, very frequently has a statement of its case

both conjectural, and general, and definitive, and in the nature of a

demurrer; and at times it contains only one statement, and at times

it contains many such. Therefore it is not itself a statement of the

case, nor a division of such statement: and the same thing must be

the case with respect to demonstration. These, then, as I have said

before, must be considered kinds of argument, and not divisions of any

statement of the subject.

XI. This statement of the case then, which we call the general one,

appears to us to have two divisions,--one judicial and one relating to

matters of fact. The judicial one is that in which the nature of right

and wrong, or the principles of reward and punishment, are inquired

into. The one relating to matters of fact is that in which the thing

taken into consideration is what is the law according to civil

precedent, and according to equity; and that is the department in

which lawyers are considered by us to be especially concerned.

And the judicial kind is itself also distributed under two

divisions,--one absolute, and one which takes in something besides as

an addition, and which may be called assumptive. The absolute division

is that which of itself contains in itself an inquiry into right and

wrong. The assumptive one is that which of itself supplies no firm

ground for objection, but which takes to itself some topics for

defence derived from extraneous circumstances. And its divisions are

four,--concession, removal of the accusation from oneself, a retorting

of the accusation, and comparison. Concession when the person on his

trial does not defend the deed that has been done, but entreats to be

pardoned for it: and this again is divided into two parts,--purgation

and deprecation. Purgation is when the fact is admitted, but when the

guilt of the fact is sought to be done away. And this may be on three

grounds,--of ignorance, of accident, or of necessity. Deprecation is

when the person on his trial confesses that he has done wrong, and

that he has done wrong on purpose, and nevertheless entreats to be

pardoned. But this kind of address can be used but very rarely.

Removal of the accusation from oneself is when the person on his trial

endeavours by force of argument and by influence to remove the charge

which is brought against him from himself to another, so that it may

not fix him himself with any guilt at all. And that can be done in

two ways,--if either the cause of the deed, or the deed itself, is

attributed to another. The cause is attributed to another when it is

said that the deed was done in consequence of the power and influence

of another; but the deed itself is attributed to another when it is

said that another either might have done it, or ought to have done it.

The retorting of an accusation takes place when what is done is said

to have been lawfully done because another had previously provoked

the doer wrongfully. Comparison is, when it is argued that some

other action has been a right or an advantageous one, and then it is

contended that this deed which is now impeached was committed in order

to facilitate the accomplishment of that useful action.

In the fourth kind of statement of a case, which we call the one which

assumes the character of a demurrer, that sort of statement contains a

dispute, in which an inquiry is opened who ought to be the accuser or

pleader, or against whom, or in what manner, or before whom, or under

what law, or at what time the accusation ought to be brought forward;

or when something is urged generally tending to alter the nature of,

or to invalidate the whole accusation. Of this kind of statement of

a case Hermagoras is considered the inventor: not that many of the

ancient orators have not frequently employed it, but because former

writers on the subject have not taken any notice of it, and have not

entered it among the number of statements of cases. But since it has

been thus invented by Hermagoras, many people have found fault with

it, whom we considered not so much to be deceived by ignorance (for

indeed the matter is plain enough) as to be hindered from admitting

the truth by some envy or fondness for detraction.

XII. We have now then mentioned the different kinds of statements of

cases, and their several divisions. But we think that we shall be

able more conveniently to give instances of each kind, when we are

furnishing a store of arguments for each kind. For so the system of

arguing will be more clear, when it can be at once applied both to the

general classification and to the particular instance.

When the statement of the case is once ascertained, then it is proper

at once to consider whether the argument be a simple or a complex one,

and if it be a complex one, whether it is made up of many subjects

of inquiry, or of some comparison. That is a simple statement which

contains in itself one plain question, in this way--"Shall we declare

war against the Corinthians, or not?" That is a complex statement

consisting of several questions in which many inquiries are made, in

this way.--"Whether Carthage shall be destroyed, or whether it shall

be restored to the Carthaginians, or whether a colony shall be led

thither." Comparison is a statement in which inquiry is raised in the

way of contest, which course is more preferable, or which is the most

preferable course of all, in this way.--"Whether we had better send an

army into Macedonia against Philip, to serve as an assistance to our

allies, or whether we had better retain it in Italy, in order that we

may have as numerous forces as possible to oppose to Hannibal." In

the next place, we must consider whether the dispute turns on general

reasoning, or on written documents, for a controversy with respect

to written documents, is one which arises out of the nature of the

writing.

XIII And of that there are five kinds which have been separated from

statements of cases. For when the language of the writing appears to

be at variance with the intention of the writer, then two laws or more

seem to differ from one another, and then, too, that which has been

written appears to signify two things or more. Then also, from that

which is written, something else appears to be discovered also,

which is not written, and also the effect of the expressions used is

inquired into, as if it were in the definitive statement of the

case, in which it has been placed. Wherefore, the first kind is that

concerning the written document and the intention of it; the second

arises from the laws which are contrary to one another, the third is

ambiguous, the fourth is argumentative, the fifth we call definitive.

But reason applies when the whole of the inquiry does not turn on the

writing, but on some arguing concerning the writing. But, then, when

the kind of argument has been duly considered, and when the statement

of the case has been fully understood; when you have become aware

whether it is simple or complex, and when you have ascertained

whether the question turns on the letter of the writing or on general

reasoning; then it is necessary to see what is the question, what

is the reasoning, what is the system of examining into the excuses

alleged, what means there are of establishing one's own allegations;

and all these topics must be derived from the original statement of

the case. What I call "the question" is the dispute which arises from

the conflict of the two statements in this way. "You have not done

this lawfully;" "I have done it lawfully." And this is the conflict of

arguments, and on this the statement of the case hinges. It arises,

therefore, from that kind of dispute which we call "the question," in

this way:--"Whether he did so and so lawfully." The reasoning is that

which embraces the whole cause; and if that be taken away, then there

is no dispute remaining behind in the cause. In this way, in order

that for the sake of explaining myself more clearly, I may content

myself with an easy and often quoted instance. If Orestes be accused

of matricide, unless he says this, "I did it rightfully, for she had

murdered my father," he has no defence at all. And if his defence be

taken away, then all dispute is taken away also. The principle of his

argument then is that she murdered Agamemnon. The examination of

this defence is then a dispute which arises out of the attempts to

invalidate or to establish this argument. For the argument itself may

be considered sufficiently explained, since we dwelt upon it a little

while ago. "For she," says he, "had murdered my father." "But," says

the adversary, "for all that it was not right for your mother to be

put to death by you who were her son; for her act might have been

punished without your being guilty of wickedness."

XIV. From this mode of bringing forward evidence, arises that last

kind of dispute which we call the judication, or examination of the

excuses alleged. And that is of this kind: whether it was right that

his mother should be put to death by Orestes, because she had put to

death Orestes's father?

Now proof by testimony is the firmest sort of reasoning that can be

used by an advocate in defence, and it is also the best adapted for

the examination of any excuse which may be alleged. For instance, if

Orestes were inclined to say that the disposition of his mother had

been such towards his father, towards himself and his sisters, towards

the kingdom, and towards the reputation of his race and family, that

her children were of all people in the world the most bound to

inflict punishment upon her. And in all other statements or cases,

examinations of excuses alleged are found to be carried on in this

manner. But in a conjectural statement of a case, because there is no

express evidence, for the fact is not admitted at all, the examination

of the defence put forward cannot arise from the bringing forward of

evidence. Wherefore, it is inevitable that in this case the question

and the judication must be the same thing. As "it was done," "it was

not done." The question is whether it was done.

But it must invariably happen that there will be the same number of

questions, and arguments, and examinations, and evidences employed

in a cause, as there are statements of the case or divisions of such

statements. When all these things are found in a cause, then at length

each separate division of the whole cause must be considered. For it

does not seem that those points are necessarily to be first noticed,

which have been the first stated; because you must often deduce those

arguments which are stated first, at least if you wish them to be

exceedingly coherent with one another and to be consistent with the

cause, from those arguments which are to be stated subsequently.

Wherefore, when the examination of the excuses alleged, and all those

arguments which require to be found out for the purpose of such

examination have been diligently found out by the rules of art, and

handled with due care and deliberation, then at length we may proceed

to arrange the remaining portions of our speech. And these portions

appear to us to be in all six; the exordium, the relation of the fact,

the division of the different circumstances and topics, the bringing

forward of evidence, the finding fault with the action which has been

done, and the peroration.

At present, since the exordium ought to be the main thing of all,

we too will first of all give some precepts to lead to a system of

opening a case properly.

XV. An exordium is an address bringing the mind of the hearer into a

suitable state to receive the rest of the speech, and that will be

effected if it has rendered him well disposed towards the speaker,

attentive, and willing to receive information. Wherefore, a man who

is desirous to open a cause well, must of necessity be beforehand

thoroughly acquainted with the nature and kind of cause which he has

to conduct. Now the kinds of causes are five; one honourable, one

astonishing, one low, one doubtful, one obscure. The kind of cause

which is called honourable, is such an one as the disposition of the

hearer favours at once, without waiting to hear our speech. The kind

that is astonishing, is that from which the mind of those who are

about to hear us has been alienated. The kind which is low, is one

which is disregarded by the hearer, or which does not seem likely to

be carefully attended to. The kind which is doubtful, is that in which

either the examination into the excuses alleged is doubtful, or the

cause itself, being partly honourable and partly discreditable; so as

to produce partly good-will and partly disinclination. The kind which

is obscure, is that in which either the hearers are slow, or in which

the cause itself is entangled in a multitude of circumstances hard

to be thoroughly acquainted with. Wherefore, since there are so

many kinds of causes, it is necessary to open one's case on a very

different system in each separate kind. Therefore, the exordium is

divided into two portions, first of all a beginning, and secondly

language calculated to enable the orator to work his way into the good

graces of his hearers. The beginning is an address, in plain words,

immediately rendering the hearer well disposed towards one, or

inclined to receive information, or attentive. The language calculated

to enable the orator to work his way into the good graces of his

hearers, is an address which employs a certain dissimulation, and

which by a circuitous route as it were obscurely creeps into the

affections of the hearer.

In the kind of cause which we have called astonishing, if the hearers

be not positively hostile, it will be allowable by the beginning of

the speech to endeavour to secure their good-will. But if they be

excessively alienated from one, then it will be necessary to have

recourse to endeavours to insinuate oneself into their good graces.

For if peace and good-will be openly sought for from those who are

enemies to one, they not only are not obtained, but the hatred which

they bear one is even inflamed and increased. But in the kind of cause

which I have called low, for the sake of removing his contempt it will

be indispensable to render the hearer attentive. The kind of cause

which has been styled doubtful, if it embraces an examination into the

excuses alleged, which is also doubtful, must derive its exordium

from that very examination; but if it have some things in it of a

creditable nature, and some of a discreditable character, then it will

be expedient to try and secure the good-will of the hearer, so that

the cause may change its appearance, and seem to be an honourable one.

But when the kind of cause is the honourable kind, then the exordium

may either be passed over altogether, or if it be convenient, we may

begin either with a relation of the business in question, or with a

statement of the law, or with any other argument which must be brought

forward in the course of our speech, and on which we most greatly

rely; or if we choose to employ an exordium, then we must avail

ourselves of the good-will already existing towards us, in order that

that which does exist may be strengthened.

XVI. In the kind of cause which I have called obscure, it will be

advisable to render the hearers inclined to receive instruction by a

carefully prepared exordium. Now, since it has been already explained

what effect is to be sought to be produced by the exordium, it remains

for us to show by what arguments all such effects may be produced.

Good-will is produced by dwelling on four topics:--on one derived from

our own character, from that of our adversaries, from that of the

judges, and from the cause itself. From our own character, if we

manage so as to speak of our own actions and services without

arrogance; if we refute the charges which have been brought against

us, and any other suspicions in the least, discreditable which it may

be endeavoured to attach to us; if we dilate upon the inconveniences

which have already befallen us, or the difficulties which are still

impending over us; if we have recourse to prayers and to humble and

suppliant entreaty. From the character of our adversaries, if we are

able to bring them either into hatred, or into unpopularity, or into

contempt. They will be brought into hatred, if any action of theirs

can be adduced which has been lascivious, or arrogant, or cruel, or

malignant. They will be made unpopular, if we can dilate upon their

violent behaviour, their power, their riches, their numerous kinsmen,

their wealth, and their arrogant and intolerable use of all these

sources of influence; so that they may appear rather to trust to these

circumstances than to the merits of their cause. They will be brought

into contempt, if sloth, or negligence, or idleness, or indolent

pursuits, or luxurious tranquillity can be alleged against them.

Good-will will be procured, derived from the character of the hearers

themselves, if exploits are mentioned which have been performed by

them with bravery, or wisdom, or humanity; so that no excessive

flattery shall appear to be addressed to them; and if it is plainly

shown how high and honourable their reputation is, and how anxious is

the expectation with which men look for their decision and authority.

Or from the circumstances themselves, if we extol our own cause with

praises, and disparage that of the opposite party by contemptuous

allusions.

But we shall make our hearers attentive, if we show that the things

which we are going to say and to speak of are important, and unusual,

and incredible; and that they concern either all men, or those who are

our present hearers, or some illustrious men, or the immortal gods, or

the general interests of the republic. And if we promise that we will

in a very short time prove our own cause; and if we explain the

whole of the examination into the excuses alleged, or the different

examinations, if there be more than one.

We shall render our hearers willing to receive information, if we

explain the sum total of the cause with plainness and brevity, that is

to say, the point on which the dispute hinges. For when you wish to

make a hearer inclined to receive information you must also render him

attentive. For he is above all men willing to receive information who

is prepared to listen with the greatest attention.

XVII. The next thing which it seems requisite to speak of, is, how

topics intended to enable the orator to work his way into the good

graces of his hearers ought to be handled. We must then use such a

sort of address as that when the kind of cause which we are conducting

is that which I have called astonishing; that is to say, as I have

stated before, when the disposition of the hearer is adverse to one.

And that generally arises from one of three causes: either if there

be anything discreditable in the cause itself, or if any such belief

appears to have been already instilled into the hearer by those who

have spoken previously; or if one is appointed to speak at a time when

those who have got to listen to one are wearied with hearing others.

For sometimes when one is speaking, the mind of the hearer is

alienated from one no less by this circumstance than by the two

former.

If the discreditable nature of one's cause excites the ill-will of

one's hearers, or if it be desirable to substitute for the man on whom

they look unfavourably another man to whom they are attached; or, for

the matter they regard with dislike, another matter of which they

approve; or if it be desirable to substitute a person for a thing, or

a thing for a person, in order that the mind of the hearer may be led

away from that which he hates to that which he loves; and if your

object is to conceal from view the fact that you are about to defend

that person or action which you are supposed to be going to defend;

and then, when the hearer has been rendered more propitious, to enter

gradually on the defence, and to say that those things at which the

opposite party is indignant appear scandalous to you also; and then,

when you have propitiated him who is to listen to you, to show that

none of all those things at all concern you, and to deny that you are

going to say anything whatever respecting the opposite party whether

it be good or bad; so as not openly to attack those men who are loved

by your hearers, and yet doing it secretly as far as you can to

alienate from them the favourable disposition of your hearers; and

at the same time to mention the judgment of some other judges in a

similar case, or to quote the authority of some others as worthy of

imitation; and then to show that it is the very same point, or one

very like it, or one of greater or less importance, (as the case may

make it expedient,) which is in question at present.

If the speech of your adversaries appears to have made an impression

on your hearers, which is a thing which will be very easily

ascertained by a man who understands what are the topics by which an

impression is made; then it is requisite to promise that you will

speak first of all on that point which the opposite party consider

their especial stronghold, or else to begin with a reference to what

has been said by the adversary, and especially to what he said

last; or else to appear to doubt, and to feel some perplexity and

astonishment as to what you had best say first, or what argument it is

desirable to reply to first--for when a hearer sees the man whom the

opposite party believe to be thrown into perplexity by their speech

prepared with unshaken firmness to reply to it, he is generally apt to

think that he has assented to what has been said without sufficient

consideration, rather than that the present speaker is confident

without due grounds. But if fatigue has alienated the mind of the

hearer from your cause, then it is advantageous to promise to speak

more briefly than you had been prepared to speak; and that you will

not imitate your adversary.

If the case admit of it, it is not disadvantageous to begin with some

new topic, or with some one which may excite laughter; or with some

argument which has arisen from the present moment; of which kind are

any sudden noise or exclamation; or with something which you have

already prepared, which may embrace some apologue, or fable, or other

laughable circumstance. Or, if the dignity of the subject shall seem

inconsistent with jesting, in that case it is not disadvantageous to

throw in something sad, or novel, or terrible. For as satiety of food

and disgust is either relieved by some rather bitter taste, or is at

times appeased by a sweet taste; so a mind weary with listening

is either reinstated in its strength by astonishment, or else is

refreshed by laughter.

XVIII. And these are pretty nearly the main things which it appeared

desirable to say separately concerning the exordium of a speech, and

the topics which an orator should use for the purpose of insinuating

himself into the good grace of his hearers. And now it seems desirable

to lay down some brief rules which may apply to both in common.

An exordium ought to have a great deal of sententiousness and gravity

in it, and altogether to embrace all things which have a reference

to dignity; because that is the most desirable effect to be produced

which in the greatest degree recommends the speaker to his hearer.

It should contain very little brilliancy, or wit, or elegance of

expression, because from these qualities there always arises a

suspicion of preparation and artificial diligence: and that is an idea

which, above all others takes away credit from a speech, and authority

from a speaker. But the following are the most ordinary faults to be

found in an exordium, and those it is above all things desirable

to avoid. It must not be vulgar, common, easily changed, long,

unconnected, borrowed, nor must it violate received rules. What I mean

by vulgar, is one which may be so adapted to numerous causes as to

appear to suit them all. That is common, which appears to be able to

be adapted no less to one side of the argument than to the other. That

is easily changed, which with a slight alteration may be advanced by

the adversary on the other side of the question. That is long, which

is spun out by a superfluity of words or sentences far beyond what is

necessary. That is unconnected, which is not derived from the cause

itself, and is not joined to the whole speech as a limb is to the

body. That is borrowed, which effects some other end than that which

the kind of cause under discussion requires; as if a man were

to occupy himself in rendering his hearer inclined to receive

information, when the cause requires him only to be well disposed

towards the speaker: or, if a man uses a formal beginning of a speech,

when what the subject requires is an address by which the speaker may

insinuate himself into the good graces of his hearer. That is contrary

to received rules, which effects no one of those objects for the sake

of which the rules concerning exordiums have been handed down. This

is the sort of blunder which renders him who hears it neither well

disposed to one, nor inclined to receive information, nor attentive;

or (and that indeed is the most disastrous effect of all) renders him

of a totally contrary disposition. And now we have said enough about

the exordium.

XIX. Narration is an explanation of acts that have been done, or of

acts as if they have been done. There are three kinds of narration.

One kind is that in which the cause itself and the whole principle of

the dispute is contained. Another is that in which some digression,

unconnected with the immediate argument, is interposed, either for the

sake of criminating another, or of instituting a comparison, or of

provoking some mirth not altogether unsuitable to the business under

discussion, or else for the sake of amplification. The third kind is

altogether foreign to civil causes, and is uttered or written for the

sake of entertainment, combined with its giving practice, which is not

altogether useless. Of this last there are two divisions, the one of

which is chiefly conversant about things, and the other about persons.

That which is concerned in the discussion and explanation of things

has three parts, fable, history, and argument. Fable is that in which

statements are expressed which are neither true nor probable, as is

this--

"Huge winged snakes, join'd by one common yoke."

History is an account of exploits which have been performed, removed

from the recollection of our own age; of which sort is the statement,

"Appius declared war against the Carthaginians." Argument is an

imaginary case, which still might have happened. Such is this in

Terence--

"For after Sosia became a man."

But that sort of narration which is conversant about persons, is of

such a sort that in it not only the facts themselves, but also the

conversations of the persons concerned and their very minds can be

thoroughly seen, in this way--

"And oft he came to me with mournful voice,

What is your aim, your conduct what? Oh why

Do you this youth with these sad arts destroy?

Why does he fall in love? Why seeks he wine,

And why do you from time to time supply

The means for such excess? You study dress

And folly of all kinds; while he, if left

To his own natural bent, is stern and strict,

Almost beyond the claims of virtue."

In this kind of narration there ought to be a great deal of

cheerfulness wrought up out of the variety of circumstances; out of

the dissimilarity of dispositions; out of gravity, lenity, hope, fear,

suspicion, regret, dissimulation, error, pity, the changes of fortune,

unexpected disaster, sudden joy, and happy results. But these

embellishments may be derived from the precepts which will hereafter

be laid down about elocution.

At present it seems best to speak of that kind of narration which

contains an explanation of the cause under discussion.

XX. It is desirable then that it should have three qualities; that

it should be brief, open, and probable. It will be brief, if the

beginning of it is derived from the quarter from which it ought to be;

and if it is not endeavoured to be extracted from what has been last

said, and if the speaker forbears to enumerate all the parts of

a subject of which it is quite sufficient to state the total

result;--for it is often sufficient to say what has been done, and

there is no necessity for his relating how it was done;--and if the

speaker does not in his narration go on at a greater length than there

is any occasion for, as far as the mere imparting of knowledge is

concerned; and if he does not make a digression to any other topic;

and if he states his case in such a way, that sometimes that which has

not been said may be understood from that which has been said; and if

he passes over not only such topics as may be injurious, but those too

which are neither injurious nor profitable; and if he repeats nothing

more than once; and if he does not at once begin with that topic

which was last mentioned;--and the imitation of brevity takes in many

people, so that, when they think that they are being brief, they are

exceedingly prolix, while they are taking pains to say many things

with brevity, not absolutely to say but few things and no more than

are necessary. For to many men a man appears to speak with brevity who

says, "I went to the house; I called out the servant; he answered

me; I asked for his master; he said that he was not at home." Here,

although he could not have enumerated so many particulars more

concisely, yet, because it would have been enough to say, "He said

that he was not at home," he is prolix on account of the multitude of

circumstances which he mentions. Wherefore, in this kind of narration

also it is necessary to avoid the imitation of brevity, and we must

no less carefully avoid a heap of unnecessary circumstances than a

multitude of words.

But a narration will be able to be open, if those actions are

explained first which have been done first, and if the order of

transactions and times is preserved, so that the things are related as

they have been done, or as it shall seem that they may have been done.

And in framing this narration it will be proper to take care that

nothing be said in a confused or distorted manner; that no digression

be made to any other subject; that the affair may not be traced too

far back, nor carried too far forward; that nothing be passed over

which is connected with the business in hand; and altogether the

precepts which have been laid down about brevity, must be attended to

in this particular also. For it often happens that the truth is but

little understood, more by reason of the prolixity of the speaker,

than of the obscurity of the statement. And it is desirable to use

clear language, which is a point to be dwelt upon when we come to

precepts for elocution.

XXI. A narration will be probable, if in it those characteristics are

visible which are usually apparent in truth; if the dignity of the

persons mentioned is preserved; if the causes of the actions performed

are made plain; if it shall appear that there were facilities for

performing them; if the time was suitable; if there was plenty of

room; if the place is shown to have been suitable for the transaction

which is the subject of the narration; if the whole business, in

short, be adapted to the nature of those who plead, and to the reports

bruited about among the common people, and to the preconceived

opinions of those who hear. And if these principles be observed, the

narration will appear like the truth.

But besides all this, it will be necessary to take care that such a

narration be not introduced when it will be a hindrance, or when it

will be of no advantage; and that it be not related in an unseasonable

place, or in a manner which the cause does not require. It is a

hindrance, when the very narration of what has been done comes at a

time that the hearer has conceived great displeasure at something,

which it will be expedient to mitigate by argument, and by pleading

the whole cause carefully. And when this is the case, it will be

desirable rather to scatter the different portions of the transactions

limb by limb as it were over the cause, and, as promptly as may be,

to adapt them to each separate argument, in order that there may be

a remedy at hand for the wound, and that the defence advanced may at

once mitigate the hatred which has arisen.

Again, a narration is of no advantage when, after our case has once

been set forth by the opposite party, it is of no importance to relate

it a second time or in another manner; or when the whole affair is so

clearly comprehended by the hearers, as they believe at least that it

can do us no good to give them information respecting it in another

fashion. And when this is the case, it is best to abstain from any

narration altogether. It is uttered in an unseasonable place, when it

is not arranged in that part of the speech in which the case requires

it, and concerning this kind of blunder we will speak when we come

to mention the arrangement of the speech. For it is the general

arrangement of the whole that this affects. It is not related in the

manner which the cause requires, when either that point which is

advantageous to the opposite party is explained in a clear and elegant

manner, or when that which may be of benefit to the speaker is stated

in an obscure or careless way. Wherefore, in order that this fault may

be avoided, everything ought to be converted by the speaker to the

advantage of his own cause by passing over all things which make

against it which can be passed over, by touching lightly on those

points which are beneficial to the adversary, and by relating those

which are advantageous to himself carefully and clearly. And now

we seem to have said enough about narration. Let us now pass on in

regular order to the arrangement of the different topics.

XXII An arrangement of the subjects to be mentioned in an argument,

when properly made, renders the whole oration clear and intelligible.

There are two parts in such a division, each of which is especially

connected with the opening of the cause, and with the arrangement of

the whole discussion. One part is that which points out what are the

particulars as to which one is in agreement with the opposite party,

and also what remains in dispute; and from this there is a certain

definite thing pointed out to the hearer, as that to which he should

direct his attention. The other part is that in which the explanation

of those matters on which we are about to speak, is briefly arranged

and pointed out. And this causes the hearer to retain certain things

in his mind, so as to understand that when they have been discussed

the speech will be ended. At present it seems desirable to mention

briefly how it is proper to use each kind of arrangement. And this

arrangement points out what is suitable and what is not suitable; its

duty is to turn that which is suitable to the advantage of its own

side, in this way--"I agree with the opposite party as to the fact,

that a mother has been put to death by her son." Again, on the other

side.--"We are both agreed that Agamemnon was slain by Clytaemnestra"

For in saying this each speaker has laid down that proposition which

was suitable, and nevertheless has consulted the advantage of his own

side.

In the next place, what the matter in dispute is must be explained,

when we come to mention the examination into the excuses which are

alleged. And how that is managed has been already stated.

But the arrangement which embraces the properly distributed explanation

of the facts, ought to have brevity, completeness, conciseness.

Brevity is when no word is introduced which is not necessary. This is

useful in this sort of speaking, because it is desirable to arrest the

attention of the hearer by the facts themselves and the real divisions

of the case, and not by words or extraneous embellishments of diction.

Completeness is that quality by which we embrace every sort of

argument which can have any connexion with the case concerning which

we have got to speak, and in this division we must take care not to

omit any useful topic, not to introduce any such too late, out of its

natural place, for that is the most pernicious and discreditable error

of all. Conciseness in arrangement is preserved if the general classes

of facts are clearly laid down, and are not entangled in a promiscuous

manner with the subordinate divisions. For a class is that which

embraces many subordinate divisions as, "an animal." A subordinate

division is that which is contained in the class as "a horse."

But very often the same thing may be a class to one person, and a

subordinate division to another. For "man" is a subordinate division

of "animal," but a class as to "Theban," or "Trojan."

XXIII And I have been more careful in laying down this definition, in

order that after it has been clearly comprehended with reference to

the general arrangement, a conciseness as to classes or genera may be

preserved throughout the arrangement. For he who arranges his oration

in this manner--"I will prove that by means of the covetousness and

audacity and avarice of our adversaries, all sorts of evils have

fallen on the republic," fails to perceive that in this arrangement of

his, when he intended to mention only classes, he has joined also a

mention of a subordinate division. For covetousness is the general

class under which all desires are comprehended, and beyond all

question avarice is a subordinate division of that class.

We must therefore avoid, after having mentioned a universal class,

then, in the same arrangement, to mention along with it any one of

its subordinate divisions, as if it were something different and

dissimilar. And if there are many subordinate divisions to any

particular class, after that has been simply explained in the first

arrangement of the oration, it will be more easily and conveniently

arranged when we come to the subsequent explanation in the general

statement of the case after the division. And this, too, concerns the

subject of conciseness, that we should not undertake to prove more

things than there is any occasion for, in this way--"I will prove that

the opposite party were able to do what we accuse them of, and had the

inclination to do it, and did it." It is quite enough to prove that

they did it. Or when there is no natural division at all in a cause,

and when it is a simple question that is under discussion, though that

is a thing which cannot be of frequent occurrence, still we must use

careful arrangement. And these other precepts also, with respect to

the division of subjects which have no such great connexion with the

practice of orators, precepts which come into use in treatises in

philosophy, from which we have transferred, hither those which

appeared to be suitable to our purpose, of which we found nothing in

the other arts. And in all these precepts about the division of our

subjects, it will throughout our whole speech be found that every

portion of them must be discussed in the same order as that in which

it has been originally stated, and then, when everything has been

properly explained, let the whole be summed up, and summed up so that

nothing be introduced subsequently besides the conclusion. The old

man in the Andria of Terence arranges briefly and conveniently the

subjects with which he wishes his freedman to become acquainted--

"And thus the life and habits of my son

And my designs respecting his career,

And what I wish your course towards both to be,

Will be quite plain to you."

And accordingly, as he has proposed in his original arrangement, he

proceeds to relate, first the life of his son--

"For when, O Sosia, he became a man,

He was allow'd more liberty"

Then comes his own design--

"And now I take great care"

After that, what he wishes Sosia to do; that he put last in his

original arrangement he now mentions last--

"And now the part is yours" ...

As, therefore, in this instance, he came first to the portion which he

had mentioned first, and so, when he had discussed them all, made an

end of speaking, we too ought to advance to each separate portion of

our subject, and when we had finished every part, to sum up. Now

it appears desirable to proceed in regular order to lay down some

precepts concerning the confirmation of our arguments, as the regular

order of the subject requires.

XXIV Confirmation is that by means of which our speech proceeding in

argument adds belief, and authority, and corroboration to our cause.

As to this part there are certain fixed rules which will be divided

among each separate class of causes. But it appeals to be not an

inconvenient course to disentangle what is not unlike a wood, or a

vast promiscuous miss of materials all jumbled together, and after

that to point out how it may be suitable to corroborate each separate

kind of cause, after we have drawn all our principles of argumentation

from this source. All statements are confirmed by some argument or

other, either by that which is derived from persons, or by that which

is deduced from circumstances. Now we consider that these different

things belong to persons, a name, nature, a way of life, fortune,

custom, affection, pursuits, intentions, actions, accidents, orations.

A name is that which is given to each separate person, so that each

is called by his own proper and fixed appellation. To define nature

itself is difficult, but to enumerate those parts of it which we

require for the laying down of these precepts is more easy.

And these refer partly to that portion of things which is divine, and

partly to that which is mortal. Now of things which are mortal one

part is classed among the race of men, and one among the race of

brutes: and the race of men is distinguished by sex, whether they be

male or female and with respect to their nation, and country, and

kindred, and age, with respect to their nation, whether a man be a

Greek or a barbarian; with respect to their country, whether a man be

an Athenian or a Lacedaemonian; with respect to their kindred, from

what ancestors a man is descended, and who are his relations; with

respect to his age, whether he is a boy, or a youth, or a full

grown man, or an old man. Besides these things, those advantages or

disadvantages which come to a man by nature, whether in respect of

his mind or his body, are taken into consideration, in this

manner:--whether he be strong or weak; whether he be tall or short;

whether he be handsome or ugly; whether he be quick in his motions or

slow; whether he be clever or stupid; whether he have a good memory,

or whether he be forgetful; whether he be courteous, fond of doing

kindnesses, modest, patient, or the contrary. And altogether all these

things which are considered to be qualities conferred by nature on

men's minds or bodies, must be taken into consideration when defining

nature. For those qualities which are acquired by industry relate to a

man's condition, concerning which we must speak hereafter.

XXV. With reference to a man's way of life it is proper to consider

among what men, and in what manner, and according to whose direction

he has been brought up; what teachers of the liberal sciences he has

had; what admonitors to encourage him to a proper course of life;

with what friends he is intimate; in what business, or employment, or

gainful pursuit he is occupied; in what manner he manages his estate,

and what are his domestic habits. With reference to his fortune we

inquire whether he is a slave or a free man; whether he is wealthy or

poor; whether he is a private individual or a man in office; if he be

in office, whether he has become so properly or improperly; whether he

is prosperous, illustrious, or the contrary; what sort of children he

has. And if we are inquiring about one who is no longer alive, then we

must consider also by what death he died.

But when we speak of a man's habitual condition, we mean his constant

and absolute completeness of mind or body, in some particular

point--as for instance, his perception of virtue, or of some art,

or else some science or other. And we include also some personal

advantages not given to him by nature, but procured by study and

industry. By affection, we mean a sudden alteration of mind or body,

arising from some particular cause, as joy, desire, fear, annoyance,

illness, weakness and other things which are found under the same

class. But study is the assiduous and earnest application of the

mind, applied to some particular object with great good-will, as to

philosophy, poetry, geometry, or literature. By counsel, we mean a

carefully considered resolution to do or not to do something. But

actions, and accidents, and speeches will be considered with reference

to three different times; what a man has done, what has happened to

him, or what he has said; or what he is doing, or what is happening to

him, or what he is saying; or what he is going to do, what is about to

happen to him, or what speech he is about to deliver. And all these

things appear to be attributable to persons.

XXVI. But of the considerations which belong to things, some are

connected with the thing itself which is the subject of discussion;

some are considered in the performance of the thing; some are united

with the thing itself; some follow in the accomplishment of the thing.

Those things are connected with the thing itself which appear always

to be attached to the thing and which cannot be separated from it.

The first of such things is a brief exposition of the whole business,

which contains the sum of the entire matter, in this way--"The slaying

of a parent;" "the betrayal of a country." Then comes the cause of

this general fact; and we inquire by what means, and in what manner,

and with what view such and such a thing has been done. After that we

inquire what was done before this action under consideration was done,

and all the steps which preceded this action. After that, what was

done in the very execution of this action. And last of all, what has

been done since.

But with reference to the performance of an action, which was the

second topic of those which were attributed to things, the place, and

the time, and the manner, and the opportunity, and the facilities will

be inquired into. The place is taken into consideration in which the

thing was done; with reference to the opportunity which the doer

seems to have had of executing the business; and that opportunity is

measured by the importance of the action, by the interval which has

elapsed, by the distance, by the nearness, by the solitude of the

place, or by the frequented character of it, by the nature of the

spot itself and by the neighbourhood of the whole region. And it is

estimated also with reference to these characteristics, whether the

place be sacred or not, public or private, whether it belongs or

has belonged to some one else, or to the man whose conduct is under

consideration.

But the time is, that, I mean, which we are speaking of at the present

moment, (for it is difficult to define it in a general view of it

with any exactness,) a certain portion of eternity with some fixed

limitation of annual or monthly, or daily or nightly space. In

reference to this we take into consideration the things which are

passed, and those things which, by reason of the time which has

elapsed since, have become so obsolete as to be considered incredible,

and to be already classed among the number of fables, and those things

also which, having been performed a long time ago and at a time remote

from our recollection, still affect us with a belief that they have

been handed down truly, because certain memorials of those facts are

extant in written documents, and those things which have been done

lately, so that most people are able to be acquainted with them. And

also those things which exist at the present moment, and which are

actually taking place now, and which are the consequences of former

actions. And with reference to those things it is open to us to

consider which will happen sooner, and which later. And also generally

in considering questions of time, the distance or proximity of the

time is to be taken into account: for it is often proper to measure

the business done with the time occupied in doing it, and to consider

whether a business of such and such magnitude, or whether such and

such a multitude of things, can be performed in that time. And we

should take into consideration the time of year, and of the month, and

of the day, and of the night, and the watches, and the hours, and each

separate portion of any one of these times.

XXVII. An occasion is a portion of time having in it a suitable

opportunity for doing or avoiding to do some particular thing.

Wherefore there is this difference between it and time. For, as to

genus, indeed, they are both understood to be identical; but in time

some space is expressed in some manner or other, which is regarded

with reference to years, or to a year, or to some portion of a year,

but in an occasion, besides the space of time implied in the word,

there is indicated an especial opportunity of doing something. As

therefore the two are identical in genus it is some portion and

species as it were, in which the one differs, as we have said, from

the other.

Now occasion is distributed into three classes, public, common and

singular. That is a public occasion, which the whole city avails

itself of for some particular cause, as games, a day of festival, or

war. That is a common occasion which happens to all men at nearly the

same time, as the harvest, the vintage, summer, or winter. That is a

singular occasion, which, on account of some special cause, happens

at times to some private individuals, as for instance, a wedding, a

sacrifice, a funeral, a feast, sleep.

But the manner, also, is inquired into, in what manner, how, and with

what design the action was done? Its parts are, the doer knowing what

he was about, and not knowing. But the degree of his knowledge is

measured by these circumstances whether the doer did his action

secretly, openly, under compulsion or through persuasion. The fact

of the absence of knowledge is brought forward as an excuse, and its

parts are actual ignorance, accident, necessity. It is also attributed

to agitation of mind, that is, to annoyance, to passion to love,

and to other feelings of a similar class. Facilities, are those

circumstances owing to which a thing is done more easily, or without

which a thing cannot be done at all.

XXVIII. And it is understood that there is added to the general

consideration of the whole matter, the consideration what is greater

than and what is less than, and what is like the affair which is

under discussion, and what is equally important with it, and what is

contrary to it, and what is negatively opposed to it, and the whole

classification of the affair, and the divisions of it, and the

ultimate result. The cases of greater, and less and equally important,

are considered with reference to the power, and number and form of the

business, as if we were regarding the stature of a human body.

Now what is similar arises out of a species admitting of comparisons.

Now what admits of comparisons is estimated by a nature which may be

compared with it, and likened to it. What is contrary, is what is

placed in a different class and is as distant as possible from that

thing to which it is called contrary, as cold is from heat and

death from life. But that is negatively opposed to a thing which is

separated from the thing by an opposition which is limited to a denial

of the quality; in this way, "to be wise," and "not to be wise." That

is a genus which embraces several species, as "Cupidity." That is a

species which is subordinate to a genus, as "Love," "Avarice." The

Result is the ultimate termination of any business; in which it is a

common inquiry, what has resulted from each separate fact; what is

resulting from it; what is likely to result from it. Wherefore, in

order that that which is likely to happen may be more conveniently

comprehended in the mind with respect to this genus, we ought first

to consider what is accustomed to result from every separate

circumstance; in this manner:--From arrogance, hatred usually results;

and from insolence, arrogance.

The fourth division is a natural consequence from those qualities,

which we said were usually attributed to things in distinction from

persons. And with respect to this, those circumstances are sought for

which ensue from a thing being done. In the first place, by what name

it is proper that that which has been done should be called. In the

next place, who have been the chief agents in, or originators of that

action; and last of all, who have been the approvers and the imitators

of that precedent and of that discovery. In the next place, whether

there is any regular usage established with regard to that case, or

whether there is any regular rule bearing on that case, or any regular

course of proceeding, any formal decision, any science reduced to

rules, any artificial system. In the next place, whether its nature is

in the habit of being ordinarily displayed, or whether it is so very

rarely, and whether it is quite unaccustomed to be so. After that,

whether men are accustomed to approve of such a case with their

authority, or to be offended at such actions; and with what eyes they

look upon the other circumstances which are in the habit of following

any similar conduct, either immediately or after an interval. And

in the very last place, we must take notice whether any of those

circumstances which are rightly classed under honesty or utility

ensue. But as to these matters it will be necessary to speak more

clearly when we come to mention the deliberative kind of argument.

And the circumstances which we have now mentioned are those which are

usually attributed to things as opposed to persons.

XXIX. But all argumentation, which can be derived from those topics

which we have mentioned, ought to be either probable or unavoidable.

Indeed, to define it in a few words, argumentation appears to be an

invention of some sort, which either shows something or other in a

probable manner, or demonstrates it in an irrefutable one. Those

things are demonstrated irrefutably which can neither be done nor

proved in any other manner whatever than that in which they are

stated; in this manner:--"If she has had a child, she has lain with

a man." This sort of arguing, which is conversant with irrefutable

demonstration, is especially used in speaking in the way of dilemma,

or enumeration, or simple inference.

Dilemma is a case in which, whichever admission you make, you are

found fault with. For example:--"If he is a worthless fellow, why are

you intimate with him? If he is an excellent man, why do you accuse

him?" Enumeration is a statement in which, when many matters have been

stated and all other arguments invalidated, the one which remains is

inevitably proved; in this manner:--"It is quite plain that he was

slain by this man, either because of his enmity to him, or some fear,

or hope, which he had conceived, or in order to gratify some friend of

his; or, if none of these alternatives are true, then that he was not

slain by him at all; for a great crime cannot be undertaken without a

motive. But he had no quarrel with him, nor fear of him, nor hope of

any advantage to be gained by his death, nor did his death in the

least concern any friend of his. It remains, therefore, that he was

not slain by him at all." But a simple inference is declared from a

necessary consequence, in this way:--"If you say that I did that at

that time, at that time I was beyond the sea; it follows, that I not

only did not do what you say I did, but that it was not even possible

for me to have done it." And it will be desirable to look to this very

carefully, in order that this sort of inference may not be refuted in

any manner, so that the proof may not only have some sort of argument

in it, and some resemblance to an unavoidable conclusion, but that the

very argument itself may proceed on irrefutable reasons.

But that is probable which is accustomed generally to take place,

or which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains some

resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or true. In that

description of subject the most usual probable argument is something

of this sort:--"If she is his mother, she loves her son." "If he is an

avaricious man, he neglects his oath." But in the case which depends

mainly on opinion, probable arguments are such as this: "That there

are punishments prepared in the shades below for impious men."--"That

those men who give their attention to philosophy do not think that

there are gods."

XXX. But resemblance is chiefly seen in things which are contrary to

one another, or equal to one another, and in those things which fall

under the same principle. In things contrary to one another, in this

manner:--"For if it is right that those men should be pardoned who

have injured me unintentionally, it is also fitting that one should

feel no gratitude towards those who have benefited me because they

could not help it."

In things equal to one another, in this way:--"For as a place without

a harbour cannot be safe for ships, so a mind without integrity cannot

be trustworthy for a man's friends." In those things which fall

under the same principle a probable argument is considered in this

way:--"For if it be not discreditable to the Rhodians to let out their

port dues, then it is not discreditable even to Hermacreon to rent

them." Then these arguments are true, in this manner:--"Since there is

a scar, there has been a wound." Then they are probable, in in this

way:--"If there was a great deal of dust on his shoes, he must have

come off a journey." But (in order that we may arrange this matter in

certain definite divisions) every probable argument which is assumed

for the purpose of discussion, is either a proof, or something

credible, or something already determined; or something which may be

compared with something else.

That is a proof which falls under some particular sense, and which

indicates something which appears to have proceeded from it, which

either existed previously, or was in the thing itself, or has ensued

since, and, nevertheless, requires the evidence of testimony, and a

more authoritative confirmation,--as blood, flight, dust, paleness,

and other tokens like these. That is a credible statement which,

without any witness being heard, is confirmed in the opinion of the

hearer; in this way:--There is no one who does not wish his children

to be free from injury, and happy. A case decided beforehand, is a

matter approved of by the assent, or authority, or judgment of some

person or persons. It is seen in three kinds of decision;--the

religious one, the common one, the one depending on sanction. That is

a religious one, which men on their oaths have decided in accordance

with the laws. That is a common one, which all men have almost in a

body approved of and adopted; in this manner:--"That all men should

rise up on the appearance of their elders; That all men should pity

suppliants." That depends on sanction, which, as it was a doubtful

point what ought to be considered its character, men have established

of their own authority; as, for instance, the conduct of the father

of Gracchus, whom the Roman people made consul after his censorship,

because he had done nothing in his censorship without the knowledge of

his colleague.

But that is a decision admitting of comparisons, which in a multitude

of different circumstances contains some principle which is alike

in all. Its parts are three,--representation, collation, example. A

Representation is a statement demonstrating some resemblance of bodies

or natures; Collation is a statement comparing one thing with another,

because of their likeness to one another; Example is that which

confirms or invalidates a case by some authority, or by what has

happened to some man, or under some especial circumstances. Instances

of these things, and descriptions of them, will be given amid the

precepts for oratory. And the source of all confirmations has been

already explained as occasion offered, and has been demonstrated

no less clearly than the nature of the case required. But how each

separate statement, and each part of a statement, and every dispute

ought to be handled,--whether we refer to verbal discussion or

to writings,--and what arguments are suitable for each kind of

discussion, we will mention, speaking separately of each kind, in the

second book. At present we have only dropped hints about the numbers,

and moods, and parts of arguing in an irregular and promiscuous

manner; hereafter we will digest (making careful distinctions between

and selections from each kind of cause) what is suitable for each kind

of discussion, culling it out of this abundance which we have already

displayed.

And indeed every sort of argument can be discovered from among these

topics; and that, when discovered, it should be embellished, and

separated in certain divisions, is very agreeable, and highly

necessary, and is also a thing which has been greatly neglected by

writers on this art. Wherefore at this present time it is desirable

for us to speak of that sort of instruction, in order that perfection

of arguing may be added to the discovery of proper arguments. And all

this topic requires to be considered with great care and diligence,

because there is not only great usefulness in this matter, but there

is also extreme difficulty in giving precepts.

XXXI. All argumentation, therefore, is to be carried on either by

induction, or by ratiocination. Induction is a manner of speaking

which, by means of facts which are not doubtful, forces the assent of

the person to whom it is addressed. By which assent it causes him even

to approve of some points which are doubtful, on account of their

resemblance to those things to which he has assented; as in the

Aeschines of Socrates, Socrates shows that Aspasia used to argue with

Xenophon's wife, and with Xenophon himself. "Tell me, I beg of you, O

you wife of Xenophon, if your neighbour has better gold than you have,

whether you prefer her gold or your own?" "Hers," says she. "Suppose

she has dresses and other ornaments suited to women, of more value

than those which you have, should you prefer your own or hers?" "Hers,

to be sure," answered she. "Come, then," says Aspasia, "suppose she

has a better husband than you have, should you then prefer your own

husband or hers?" On this the woman blushed.

But Aspasia began a discourse with Xenophon himself. "I ask you, O

Xenophon," says she, "if your neighbour has a better horse than yours

is, whether you would prefer your own horse or his?" "His," says he.

"Suppose he has a better farm than you have, which farm, I should like

to know, would you prefer to possess?" "Beyond all doubt," says he,

"that which is the best." "Suppose he has a better wife than you have,

would you prefer his wife?" And on this Xenophon himself was silent.

Then spake Aspasia,--"Since each of you avoids answering me that

question alone which was the only one which I wished to have answered,

I will tell you what each of you are thinking of; for both you, O

woman, wish to have the best husband, and you, O Xenophon, most

exceedingly desire to have the most excellent wife. Wherefore, unless

you both so contrive matters that there shall not be on the whole

earth a more excellent man or a more admirable woman, then in truth

you will at all times desire above all things that which you think to

be the best thing in the world, namely, that you, O Xenophon, may be

the husband of the best possible wife; and you, O woman, that you may

be married to the most excellent husband possible." After they had

declared their assent to these far from doubtful propositions, it

followed, on account of the resemblance of the cases, that if any one

had separately asked them about some doubtful point, that also would

have been admitted as certain, on account of the method employed in

putting the question.

This was a method of instruction which Socrates used to a great

extent, because he himself preferred bringing forward no arguments for

the purpose of persuasion, but wished rather that the person with whom

he was disputing should form his own conclusions from arguments with

which he had furnished himself, and which he was unavoidably compelled

to approve of from the grounds which he had already assented to.

XXXII. And with reference to this kind of persuasion, it appears to me

desirable to lay down a rule, in the first place, that the argument

which we bring forward by way of simile, should be such that it is

impossible to avoid admitting it. For the premiss on account of

which we intend to demand that that point which is doubtful shall be

conceded to us, ought not to be doubtful itself. In the next place, we

must take care that that point, for the sake of establishing which the

induction is made, shall be really like those things which we have

adduced before as matters admitting of no question. For it will be of

no service to us that something has been already admitted, if that for

the sake of which we were desirous to get that statement admitted be

unlike it; so that the hearer may not understand what is the use of

those original inductions, or to what result they tend.

For the man who sees that, if he is correct in giving his assent to

the thing about which he is first asked, that thing also to which he

does not agree must unavoidably be admitted by him, very often will

not allow the examination to proceed any further, either by not

answering at all, or by answering wrongly. Wherefore it is necessary

that he should, by the method in which the inquiry is conducted, be

led on without perceiving it, from the admissions which he has already

made, to admit that which he is not inclined to admit, and at last

he must either decline to give an answer, or he must admit what is

wanted, or he must deny it. If the proposition be denied, then we must

either show its resemblance to those things which have been already

admitted or we must employ some other induction. If it be granted,

then the argumentation may be brought to a close. If he keeps silence,

then an answer must be extracted, or, since silence is very like a

confession, it may be as well to bring the discussion to a close,

taking the silence to be equivalent to an admission.

And so this kind of argumentation is threefold. The first part

consists of one simile, or of several, the second, of that which we

desire to have admitted, for the sake of which the similes have

been employed, the third proceeds from the conclusion which either

establishes the admissions which have been made or points out what may

be established from it.

XXXIII But because it will not appear to some people to have been

explained with sufficient clearness, unless we submit some instance

taken from the civil class of causes, it seems desirable to employ

some example of this sort, not because the rules to be laid down

differ, or because it is expedient to employ such differently in this

sort of discussion from what we should in ordinary discourse, but in

order to satisfy the desire of those men, who, though they may have

seen something in one place, are unable to recognise it in another

unless it be proved. Therefore in this cause which is very notorious

among the Greeks, that of Epaminondas, the general of the Thebans, who

did not give up his army to the magistrate who succeeded him in due

course of law, and when he himself had retained his army a few days

contrary to law, he utterly defeated the Lacedaemonians, the accuser

might employ an argumentation by means of induction, while defending

the letter of the law in opposition to its spirit, in this way:--

"If, O judges, the framer of the law had added to his law what

Epaminondas says that he intended, and had subjoined the exception

'except where any one has omitted to deliver up his army for the

advantage of the republic,' would you have endured it? I think not.

And if you yourselves, (though, such a proceeding is very far from

your religious habits and from your wisdom,) for the sake of doing

honour to this man, were to order the same exception to be subjoined

to the law, would the Theban people endure that such a thing should be

done? Beyond all question it would not endure it. Can it possibly then

appear to you that that which would be scandalous if it were added to

a law, should be proper to be done just as if it had been added to the

law? I know your acuteness well; it cannot seem so to you, O judges.

But if the intention of the framer of the law cannot be altered as to

its expressions either by him or by you, then beware lest it should be

a much more scandalous thing that that should be altered in fact, and

by your decision, which cannot be altered in one single word."

And we seem now to have said enough for the present respecting

induction. Next, let us consider the power and nature of

ratiocination.

XXXIV. Ratiocination is a sort of speaking, eliciting something

probable from the fact under consideration itself, which being

explained and known of itself, confirms itself by its own power and

principles.

Those who have thought it profitable to pay diligent attention to this

kind of reasoning, have differed a little in the manner in which they

have laid down rules, though they were aiming at the same end as far

as the practice of speaking went. For some of them have said that

there are five divisions of it, and some have thought that it had no

more parts than could be arranged under three divisions. And it would

seem not useless to explain the dispute which exists between these

parties, with the reasons which each allege for it; for it is a short

one, and not such that either party appears to be talking nonsense.

And this topic also appears to us to be one that it is not at all

right to omit in speaking.

Those who think that it ought to be arranged in five divisions,

say that first of all it is desirable to explain the sum of the

discussion, in this way:--Those things are better managed which are

done on some deliberate plan, than those which are conducted without

any steady design. This they call the first division. And then they

think it right that it should be further proved by various arguments,

and by as copious statements as possible; in this way:--"That house

which is governed by reason is better appointed in all things, and

more completely furnished, than that which is conducted at random,

and on no settled plan;--that army which is commanded by a wise and

skilful general, is governed more suitably in all particulars than

that which is managed by the folly and rashness of any one. The same

principle prevails with respect to sailing; for that ship performs its

voyage best which has the most experienced pilot."

When the proposition has been proved in this manner, and when two

parts of the ratiocination have proceeded, they say in the third part,

that it is desirable to assume, from the mere intrinsic force of the

proposition, what you wish to prove; in this way:--"But none of all

those things is managed better than the entire world." In the fourth

division they adduce besides another argument in proof of this

assumption, in this manner:--"For both the rising and setting of the

stars preserve some definite order, and their annual commutations

do not only always take place in the same manner by some express

necessity, but they are also adapted to the service of everything, and

their daily and nightly changes have never injured anything in any

particular from being altered capriciously." And all these things are

a token that the nature of the world has been arranged by no ordinary

wisdom. In the fifth division they bring forward that sort of

statement, which either adduces that sort of fact alone which is

compelled in every possible manner, in this way:--"The world,

therefore, is governed on some settled plan;" or else, when it has

briefly united both the proposition and the assumption, it adds this

which is derived from both of them together, in this way:--"But if

those things are managed better which are conducted on a settled plan,

than those which are conducted without such settled plan; and if

nothing whatever is managed better than the entire world; therefore it

follows that the world is managed on a settled plan." And in this way

they think that such argumentation has five divisions.

XXXV. But those who affirm that it has only three divisions, do not

think that the argumentation ought to be conducted in any other way,

but they find fault with this arrangement of the divisions. For they

say that neither the proposition nor the assumption ought to be

separated from their proofs; and that a proposition does not appear to

be complete, nor an assumption perfect, which is not corroborated by

proof. Therefore, they say that what those other men divide into two

parts, proposition and proof, appears to them one part only, namely

proposition. For if it be not proved, the proposition has no business

to make part of the argumentation. In the same way they say that

that which those other men call the assumption, and the proof of the

assumption, appears to them to be assumption only. And the result is,

that the whole argumentation being treated in the same way, appears to

some susceptible of five divisions, and to others of only three; so

that the difference does not so much affect the practice of speaking,

as the principles on which the rules are to be laid down.

But to us that arrangement appears to be more convenient which divides

it under five heads; and that is the one which all those who come from

the school of Aristotle, or of Theophrastus, have chiefly followed.

For as it is chiefly Socrates and the disciples of Socrates who have

employed that former sort of argumentation which goes on induction,

so this which is wrought up by ratiocination has been exceedingly

practised by Aristotle, and the Peripatetics, and Theophrastus; and

after them by those rhetoricians who are accounted the most elegant

and the most skilful. And it seems desirable to explain why that

arrangement is more approved of by us, that we may not appear to have

adopted it capriciously; at the same time we must be brief in the

explanation, that we may not appear to dwell on such subjects longer

than the general manner of laying down rules requires.

XXXVI. If in any sort of argumentation it is sufficient to use a

proposition by itself, and if it is not requisite to add proof to the

proposition; but if in any sort of argumentation a proposition is of

no power unless proof be added to it; then proof is something distinct

from the proposition. For that which can be joined to a thing or

separated from it, cannot possibly be the same thing with that to

which it is joined or from which it is separated. But there is a

certain kind of argumentation in which the proposition does not

require confirmatory proof, and also another kind in which it is of

no use at all without such proof, as we shall show. Proof, then, is a

thing different from a proposition. And we will demonstrate that point

which we have promised to show in this way:--The proposition which

contains in itself something manifest, because it is unavoidable that

that should be admitted by all men, has no necessity for our desiring

to prove and corroborate it.

It is a sort of statement like this:--"If on the day on which that

murder was committed at Rome, I was at Athens, I could not have been

present at that murder." Because this is manifestly true, there is no

need to adduce proof of it; wherefore, it is proper at once to assume

the fact, in this way:--"But I was at Athens on that day." If this is

not notorious, it requires proof; and when the proof is furnished the

conclusion must follow:--"Therefore I could not have been present at

the murder." There is, therefore, a certain kind of proposition which

does not require proof. For why need one waste time in proving that

there is a kind which does require proof; for that is easily visible

to all men. And if this be the case, from this fact, and from that

statement which we have established, it follows that proof is

something distinct from a proposition. And if it is so, it is

evidently false that argumentation is susceptible of only three

divisions.

In the same manner it is plain that there is another sort of proof

also which is distinct from assumption. For if in some sort of

argumentation it is sufficient to use assumption, and if it is not

requisite to add proof to the assumption; and if, again, in some sort

of argumentation assumption is invalid unless proof be added to it;

then proof is something separate and distinct from assumption. But

there is a kind of argumentation in which assumption does not require

proof; and a certain other kind in which it is of no use without

proof; as we shall show. Proof, then, is a thing distinct from

assumption. And we will demonstrate that which we have promised to in

this manner.

That assumption which contains a truth evident to all men has no need

of proof. That is an assumption of this sort:--"If it be desirable

to be wise, it is proper to pay attention to philosophy." This

proposition requires proof. For it is not self-evident. Nor is it

notorious to all men, because many think that philosophy is of no

service at all, and some think that it is even a disservice. A

self-evident assumption is such as this:--"But it is desirable to be

wise." And because this is of itself evident from the simple fact, and

is at once perceived to be true, there is no need that it be proved.

Wherefore, the argumentation may be at once terminated:--"Therefore

it is proper to pay attention to philosophy." There is, therefore, a

certain kind of assumption which does not stand in need of proof; for

it is evident that is a kind which does. Therefore, it is false that

argumentation is susceptible of only a threefold division.

XXXVII. And from these considerations that also is evident, that there

is a certain kind of argumentation in which neither proposition nor

assumption stands in need of proof, of this sort, that we may adduce

something undoubted and concise, for the sake of example. "If wisdom

is above all things to be desired, then folly is above all things to

be avoided; but wisdom is to be desired above all things, therefore

folly is above all things to be avoided." Here both the assumption and

the proposition are self-evident, on which account neither of them

stands in need of proof. And from all these facts it is manifest that

proof is at times added, and at times is not added. From which it

is palpable that proof is not contained in a proposition, nor in an

assumption, but that each being placed in its proper place, has its

own peculiar force fixed and belonging to itself. And if that is the

case, then those men have made a convenient arrangement who have

divided argumentation into five parts.

Are there five parts of that argumentation which is carried on by

ratiocination? First of all, proposition, by which that topic is

briefly explained from which all the force of the ratiocination ought

to proceed. Then the proof of the proposition, by which that which has

been briefly set forth being corroborated by reasons, is made more

probable and evident. Then assumption, by which that is assumed which,

proceeding from the proposition, has its effect on proving the case.

Then the proof of the assumption, by which that which has been assumed

is confirmed by reasons. Lastly, the summing up, in which that which

results from the entire argumentation is briefly explained. So the

argumentation which has the greatest number of divisions consists of

these five parts.

The second sort of argumentation has four divisions; the third has

three. Then there is one which has two; which, however, is a disputed

point. And about each separate division it is possible that some

people may think that there is room for a discussion.

XXXVIII. Let us then bring forward some examples of those matters

which are agreed upon. And in favour of those which are doubtful, let

us bring forward some reasons. Now the argumentation which is divided

into five divisions is of this sort:--It is desirable, O judges, to

refer all laws to the advantage of the republic, and to interpret them

with reference to the general advantage, and according to the strict

wording according to which they are drawn up. For our ancestors were

men of such virtue and such wisdom, that when they were drawing up

laws, they proposed to themselves no other object than the safety and

advantage of the republic; for they were neither willing themselves to

draw up any law which could be injurious; and if they had drawn up one

of such a character, they were sure that it would be rejected when its

tendency was perceived. For no one wishes to preserve the laws for the

sake of the laws, but for the sake of the republic; because all men

believe that the republic is best managed by means of laws. It is

desirable, therefore, to interpret all written laws with reference to

that cause for the sake of which it is desirable that the laws should

be preserved. That is to say, since we are servants of the republic,

let us interpret the laws with reference to the advantage and benefit

of the republic. For as it is not right to think that anything results

from medicine except what has reference to the advantage of the body,

since it is for the sake of the body that the science of medicine has

been established; so it is desirable to think that nothing proceeds

from the laws except what is for the advantage of the republic, since

it is for the sake of the republic that laws were instituted.

Therefore, while deciding on this point, cease to inquire about the

strict letter of the law, and consider the law (as it is reasonable to

do) with reference to the advantage of the republic. For what was more

advantageous for the Thebans than for the Lacedaemonians to be put

down? What object was Epaminondas, the Theban general, more bound

to aim at than the victory of the Thebans? What had he any right to

consider more precious or more dear to him, than the great glory then

acquired by the Thebans, than such an illustrious and magnificent

trophy? Surely, disregarding the letter of the law, it became him to

consider the intention of the framer of the law. And this now has been

sufficiently insisted on, namely, that no law has ever been drawn

up by any one, that had not for its object the benefit of the

commonwealth. He then thought that it was the very extremity of

madness, not to interpret with reference to the advantage of the

republic, that which had been framed for the sake of the safety of the

republic. And it is right to interpret all laws with reference to the

safety of the republic; and if he was a great instrument of the safety

of the republic, certainly it is quite impossible that he by one and

the same action should have consulted the general welfare, and yet

should have violated the laws.

XXXIX. But argumentation consists of four parts, when we either

advance a proposition, or claim an assumption without proof. That it

is proper to do when either the proposition is understood by its own

merits, or when the assumption is self-evident and is in need of no

proof. If we pass over the proof of the proposition, the argumentation

then consists of four parts, and is conducted in this manner:--"O

judges, you who are deciding on your oaths, in accordance with the

law, ought to obey the laws; but you cannot obey the laws unless

you follow that which is written in the law. For what more certain

evidence of his intention could the framer of a law leave behind him,

than that which he himself wrote with great care and diligence? But if

there were no written documents, then we should be very anxious for

them, in order that the intention of the framer of the law might be

ascertained; nor should we permit Epaminondas, not even if he were

beyond the power of this tribunal, to interpret to us the meaning of

the law; much less will we now permit him, when, the law is at hand,

to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, not from that which is

most clearly written, but from that which is convenient for his own

cause. But if you, O judges, are bound to obey the laws, and if you

are unable to do so unless you follow what is written in the law; what

can hinder your deciding that he has acted contrary to the laws?"

But if we pass over the proof of the assumption, again the

argumentation will be arranged under four heads, in this

manner:--"When men have repeatedly deceived us, having pledged their

faith to us, we ought not to give credit to anything that they say for

if we receive any injury; in consequence of their perfidy, there will

be no one except ourselves whom we shall have any right to accuse. And

in the first place, it is inconvenient to be deceived, in the

next place, it is foolish, thirdly, it is disgraceful. But the

Carthaginians have before this deceived us over and over again. It is

therefore the greatest insanity to rest any hopes on their good faith,

when you have been so often deceived by their treachery."

When the proof both of the proposition and of the assumption is passed

over, the argumentation becomes threefold only, in this way--"We must

either live in fear of the Carthaginians if we leave them with their

power undiminished, or we must destroy their city. And certainly it is

not desirable to live in fear of them. The only remaining alternative

then is to destroy their city."

XL But some people think that it is both possible and advisable at

times to pass over the summing up altogether, when it is quite evident

what is effected by ratiocination. And then if that be done they

consider that the argumentation is limited to two divisions, in this

way--"If she has had a child she is not a virgin. But she has had a

child." In this case they say it is quite sufficient to state the

proposition and assumption, since it is quite plain that the matter

which is here stated is such as does not stand in need of summing up.

But to us it seems that all ratiocination ought to be terminated in

proper form and that that defect which offends them is above all

things to be avoided namely, that of introducing what is self evident

into the summing up.

But this will be possible to be effected if we come to a right

understanding of the different kinds of summing up. For we shall

either sum up in such a way as to unite together the proposition and

the assumption, in this way--"But if it is right for all laws to be

referred to the general advantage of the republic, and if this man

ensured the safety of the republic, undoubtedly he cannot by one

and the same action have consulted the general safety and yet have

violated the laws,"--or thus, in order that the opinion we advocate

may be established by arguments drawn from contraries, in this

manner--"It is then the very greatest madness to build hopes on the

good faith of those men by whose treachery you have been so repeatedly

deceived,"--or so that that inference alone be drawn which is already

announced, in this manner--"Let us then destroy their city,"--or so

that the conclusion which is desired must necessarily follow from the

assertion which has been established, in this way--"If she has had a

child, she has laid with a man. But she has had a child." This then is

established. "Therefore she has lain with a man." If you are unwilling

to draw this inference, and prefer inferring what follows, "Therefore

she has committed incest," you will have terminated your argumentation

but you will have missed an evident and natural summing up.

Wherefore in long argumentations it is often desirable to draw

influences from combinations of circumstances, or from contraries. And

briefly to explain that point alone which is established, and in

those in which the result is evident, to employ arguments drawn from

consequences. But if there are any people who think that argumentation

ever consists of one part alone they will be able to say that it is

often sufficient to carry-on an argumentation in this way.--"Since

she has had a child, she has lain with a man." For they say that

this assertion requires no proof, nor assumption, nor proof of an

assumption, nor summing up. But it seems to us that they are misled

by the ambiguity of the name. For argumentation signifies two things

under one name, because any discussion respecting anything which is

either probable or necessary is called argumentation, and so also is

the systematic polishing of such a discussion.

When then they bring forward any statement of this kind,--"Since she

has had a child, she has lain, with a man," they bring forward a plain

assertion, not a highly worked up argument, but we are speaking of the

parts of a highly worked up argument.

XLI. That principle then has nothing to do with this matter. And with

the help of this distinction we will remove other obstacles which seem

to be in the way of this classification, if any people think that it

is possible that at times the assumption may be omitted, and at other

times the proposition, and if this idea has in it anything probable

or necessary, it is quite inevitable that it must affect the hearer in

some great degree. And if it were the only object in view, and if

it made no difference in what manner that argument which had been

projected was handled, it would be a great mistake to suppose that

there is such a vast difference between the greatest orators and

ordinary ones.

But it will be exceedingly desirable to infuse variety into our

speech, for in all cases sameness is the mother of satiety. That will

be able to be managed if we not always enter upon our argumentation

in a similar manner. For in the first place it is desirable to

distinguish our orations as to their kinds, that is to say, at one

time to employ induction, and at another ratiocination. In the next

place, in the argumentation itself, it is best not always to begin

with the proposition, nor in every case to employ all the five

divisions, nor always to work up the different parts in the same

manner, but it is permissible sometimes to begin with the assumption,

sometimes with one or other of the proofs, sometimes with both,

sometimes to employ one kind of summing up, and sometimes another. And

in order that this variety may be seen, let us either write, or in any

example whatever let us exercise this same principle with respect to

those things which we endeavour to prove, that our task may be as easy

as possible.

And concerning the parts of the argumentation it seems to us that

enough has been said. But we wish to have it understood that we hold

the doctrine that argumentations are handled in philosophy in many

other manners, and those too at times obscure ones, concerning which,

however, there is still some definite system laid down. But still

those methods appear to us to be inconsistent with the practice of an

orator. But as to those things which we think belong to orators, we

do not indeed undertake to say that we have attended to them more

carefully than others have, but we do assert that we have written on

them with more accuracy and diligence. At present let us go on in

regular order to the other points, as we originally proposed.

XLII. Reprehension is that by means of which the proof adduced by the

opposite party is invalidated by arguing, or is disparaged, or is

reduced to nothing. And this sort of argument proceeds from the same

source of invention which confirmation employs, because whatever the

topics may be by means of which any statement can be confirmed, the

very same may be used in order to invalidate it. For nothing is to

be considered in all these inventions, except that which has been

attributed to persons or to things. Wherefore it will be necessary

that the invention and the high polish which ought to be given to

argumentation must be transferred to this part of our oration also

from those rules which have been already laid down. But in order that

we may give some precepts with reference to this part also, we will

explain the different methods of reprehension, and those who observe

them will more easily be able to do away with or invalidate those

statements which are made on the opposite side.