[1] This well-known phrase was originally attributed to the
Pythagoreans.
[2]
It is highly characteristic of Platonism that the issue in this
dialogue, as originally stated, is between virtue and vice, whereas,
without any avowed change of ground, the issue ultimately discussed
is between the philosophic life and the life of vulgar ambition or
sensual enjoyment.
[3] This cardinal term is commonly translated "happiness"; and it
must be allowed that it is the most natural term for what we (in
English) agree to call "our being's end and aim." But happiness so
definitely signifies a state of feeling that it will not admit the
interpretation that Aristotle (as well as Plato and the Stoics)
expressly gives to [Greek: eudaimonia]; the confusion is best avoided
by rendering the word by the less familiar "well-being."
[4] Aristotle follows Plato and Socrates in identifying the notions
of [Greek: kalos] ("fair," "beautiful") and [Greek: agathos] ("good")
in their application to conduct. We may observe, however, that while
the latter term is used to denote the virtuous man, and (in the
neuter) equivalent to End generally, the former is rather chosen to
express the quality of virtuous acts which in any particular case is
the end of the virtuous agent. Aristotle no doubt faithfully
represents the common sense of Greece in considering that, in so far
as virtue is in itself good to the virtuous agent, it belongs to that
species of good which we distinguish as beautiful. In later Greek
philosophy the term [Greek: kalon] ("honestum") became still more
technical in the signification of "morally good."
[5] The above account is considerably expanded in H. Sidgwick's
_Hist. of Ethics_ (5th ed., 1902), pp. 59-70.
[6] There is a certain difficulty in discussing Aristotle's views on
the subject of practical wisdom, and the relation of the intellect to
moral action, since it is most probable that the only accounts that
we have of these views are not part of the genuine writings of
Aristotle. Still books vi. and vii. of the _Nicomachean Ethics_
contain no doubt as pure Aristotelian doctrine as a disciple could
give, and appear to supply a sufficient foundation for the general
criticism expressed in the text.
[7] It has been suggestively said that Cynicism was to Stoicism what
monasticism was to early Christianity. The analogy, however, must not
be pressed too far, since orthodox Stoics do not ever seem to have
regarded Cynicism as the more perfect way.
[8] The Stoics were not quite agreed as to the immutability of
virtue, but they were agreed that, when once possessed, it could only
be lost through the loss of reason itself.
[9] Hence some members of the school, without rejecting the
definition of virtue = knowledge, also defined it as "strength and
force."
[10] It is apparently in view of this union in reason of rational
beings that friends are allowed to be "external goods" to the sage,
and that the possession of good children is also counted a good.
[11] The Stoics seem to have varied in their view of "good repute,"
[Greek: eudoxia]; at first, when the school was more under the
influence of Cynicism, they professed an outward as well as an inward
indifference to it; ultimately they conceded the point to common
sense, and included it among [Greek: proegmena].
[12] It is noted of him that he did not disdain the co-operation
either of women or of slaves in his philosophical labours.
[13] The last charge of Epicurus to his disciples is said to have
been, [Greek: ton dogmaton memnesthai].
[14] Epictetus.
[15] Marcus Aurelius.
[16] E.g. Justin Martyr, Origen, Tertullian, Cyprian.
[17] Citra sanguinis effusionem.
[18] To show the crudity of the notion of redemption in early
Christianity, it is sufficient to mention that many fathers represent
Christ's ransom as having been paid to the devil; sometimes adding
that by the concealment of Christ's divinity under the veil of
humanity a certain deceit was (fairly) practised on the great
deceiver.
[19] It is to be observed that Augustine prefers to use "freedom" not
for the power of willing either good or evil, but the power of
willing good. The highest freedom, in his view, excludes the
possibility of willing evil.
[20] Cicero's works are unimportant in the history of ancient ethics,
as their philosophical matter was entirely borrowed from Greek
treatises now lost; but the influence exercised by them (especially
by the _De officiis_) over medieval and even modern readers was very
considerable.
[21] Abelard afterwards retracted this view, at least in its extreme
form; and in fact does not seem to have been fully conscious of the
difference between (1) unfulfilled intention to do an act objectively
right, and (2) intention to do what is merely believed by the agent
to be right.
[22] He was condemned by two synods, in 1121 and 1140.
[23] _Synderesis_ (Gr. [Greek: sunteresis], from [Greek: sunterein],
to watch closely, observe) is used in this sense in Jerome (_Com. in
Ezek_. i. 4-10).
[24] The refusal of the council of Constance to condemn Jean Petit's
advocacy of assassination is a striking example of this weakness. Cf.
Milman, _Lat. Christ_. book xiii. c. 9.
[25] As the chief English casuists we may mention Perkins, Hall,
Sanderson, as well as the more eminent Jeremy Taylor, whose _Ductor
dubitantium_ appeared in 1660.
[26] This influence was not exercised in the region of ethics.
Bacon's brief outline of moral philosophy (in the _Advancement of
Learning_, ii. 20-22) is highly pregnant and suggestive. But Bacon's
great task of reforming scientific method was one which, as he
conceived it, left morals on one side; he never made any serious
effort to reduce his ethical views to a coherent system, methodically
reasoned on an independent basis. The outline given in the
_Advancement_ was never filled in, and does not seem to have had any
effect on the subsequent course of ethical speculation.
[27] He even identifies the desire with the pleasure, apparently
regarding the stir of appetite and that of fruition as two parts of
the same "motion."
[28] In spite of Hobbes's uncompromising egoism, there is a
noticeable discrepancy between his theory of the ends that men
naturally seek and his standard for determining their natural rights.
This latter is never Pleasure simply, but always Preservation--though
on occasion he enlarges the notion of "preservation" into
"preservation of life so as not to be weary of it." His view seems to
be that in a state of nature _most_ men _will_ fight, rob, &c., "for
delectation merely" or "for glory," and that hence all men must be
allowed an indefinite right to fight, rob, &c., "for preservation."
[29] It should be noticed, however, that it is only in his treatment
of Equity and Benevolence that he really follows out the mathematical
analogy (cf. Sidgwick's _History of Ethics_, 5th ed., pp. 180-181).
[30] It should be observed that, while Clarke is sincerely anxious to
prove that most principles are binding independently of Divine
appointment, he is no less concerned to show that morality requires
the practical support of revealed religion.
[31] Three classes of impulses are thus distinguished by
Shaftesbury:--(1) "Natural Affections," (2) "Self-affections," and
(3) "Un-natural Affections." Their characteristics are further
considered in the _History of Ethics_, p. 186 seq.
[32] In a remarkable passage near the close of his eleventh sermon
Butler seems even to allow that conscience would have to give way to
self-love, if it were possible (which it is not) that the two should
come into ultimate and irreconcilable conflict.
[33] It is worth noticing that Hutcheson's express definition of the
object of self-love includes "perfection" as well as "happiness"; but
in the working out of his system he considers private good
exclusively as happiness or pleasure.
[34] Hume's ethical view was finally stated in his _Inquiry into the
Principles of Morals_ (1751), which is at once more popular and more
purely utilitarian than his earlier work.
[35] Hume remarks that in some cases, by "association of ideas," the
rule by which we praise and blame is extended beyond the principle of
utility from which it arises; but he allows much less scope to this
explanation in his second treatise than in his first.
[36] In earlier editions of the _Inquiry_ Hume expressly included all
approved qualities under the general notion of "virtue." In later
editions he avoided this strain on usage by substituting or adding
"merit" in several passages--allowing that some of the laudable
qualities which he mentions would be more commonly called "talents,"
but still maintaining that "there is little distinction made in our
internal estimation" of "virtues" and "talents."
[37] It is to be observed that whereas Price and Stewart (after
Butler) identify the object of self-love with happiness or pleasure,
Reid conceives this "good" more vaguely as including perfection and
happiness; though he sometimes uses "good" and happiness as
convertible terms, and seems practically to have the latter in view
in all that he says of self-love.
[38] E.g. Reid proposes to apply this principle in favour of
monogamy, arguing from the proportion of males and females born;
without explaining why, if the intention of nature hence inferred
excludes occasional polygamy, it does not also exclude occasional
celibacy.
[39] We may observe that some recent writers, who would generally be
included in this school, avoid in various ways the difficulty of
constructing a code of external conduct. Sometimes they consider
moral intuition as determining the comparative excellence of
conflicting motives (James Martineau), or the comparative quality of
pleasures chosen (Laurie), which seems to be the same view in a
hedonistic garb; others hold that what is intuitively perceived is
the rightness or wrongness of individual acts--a view which obviously
renders ethical reasoning practically superfluous.
[40] The originality--such as it is--of Paley's system (as of
Bentham's) lies in its method of working out details rather than in
its principles of construction. Paley expressly acknowledges his
obligations to the original and suggestive, though diffuse and
whimsical, work of Abraham Tucker (_Light of Nature Pursued_,
1768-1774). In this treatise, as in Paley's, we find "every man's own
satisfaction, the spring that actuates all his motives," connected
with "general good, the root whereout all our rules of conduct and
sentiments of honour are to branch," by means of natural theology
demonstrating the "unniggardly goodness of the author of nature."
Tucker is also careful to explain that satisfaction or pleasure is
"one and the same in kind, however much it may vary in degree, ...
whether a man is pleased with hearing music, seeing prospects,
tasting dainties, performing laudable actions, or making agreeable
reflections," and again that by "general good" he means "quantity of
happiness," to which "every pleasure that we do to our neighbour is
an addition." There is, however, in Tucker's theological link between
private and general happiness a peculiar ingenuity which Paley's
common sense has avoided. He argues that men having no free will have
really no desert; therefore the divine equity must ultimately
distribute happiness in equal shares to all; therefore I must
ultimately increase my own happiness most by conduct that adds most
to the general fund which Providence administers.
But in fact the outline of Paley's utilitarianism is to be found a
generation earlier--in Gay's dissertation prefixed to Law's edition
of King's _Origin of Evil_--as the following extracts will
show:--"The idea of virtue is the conformity to a rule of life,
directing the actions of all rational creatures with respect to each
other's happiness; to which every one is always obliged....
Obligation is the necessity of doing or omitting something in order
to be happy.... Full and complete obligation which will extend to all
cases can only be that arising from the authority of God.... The will
of God [so far as it directs behaviour to others] is the immediate
rule or criterion of virtue ... but it is evident from the nature of
God that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their
happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore that my
behaviour so far as it may be a means to the happiness of mankind
should be such; so this happiness of mankind may be said to be the
criterion of virtue once removed."
The same dissertation also contains the germ of Hartley's system, as
we shall presently notice.
[41] It must be allowed that Paley's application of this argument is
somewhat loosely reasoned, and does not sufficiently distinguish the
consequence of a single act of beneficent manslaughter from the
consequences of a general permission to commit such acts.
[42] This list gives twelve out of the fourteen classes in which
Bentham arranges the springs of action, omitting the religious
sanction (mentioned afterwards), and the pleasures and pains of
self-interest, which include all the other classes except sympathy
and antipathy.
[43] In the _Deontology_ published by Bowring from MSS. left after
Bentham's death, the coincidence is asserted to be complete.
[44] It should be observed that Austin, after Bentham, more
frequently uses the term "moral" to connote what he more distinctly
calls "positive morality," the code of rules supported by common
opinion in any society.
[45] In the before-mentioned dissertation. Cf. note 2 to p. 835.
Hartley refers to this treatise as having supplied the starting-point
for his own system.
[46] It should be noticed that Hartley's sensationalism is far from
leading him to exalt the corporeal pleasures. On the contrary, he
tries to prove elaborately that they (as well as the pleasures of
imagination, ambition, self-interest) cannot be made an object of
primary pursuit without a loss of happiness on the whole--one of his
arguments being that these pleasures occur earlier in time, and "that
which is prior in the order of nature is always less perfect than
that which is posterior."
[47] It may be observed that in the view of Kant and others (2) and
(3) are somewhat confusingly blended.
[48] Singularly enough, the English writer who approaches most nearly
to Kant on this point is the utilitarian Godwin, in his _Political
Justice_. In Godwin's view, reason is the proper motive to acts
conducive to general happiness: reason shows me that the happiness of
a number of other men is of more value than my own; and the
perception of this truth affords me at least _some_ inducement to
prefer the former to the latter. And supposing it to be replied that
the motive is really the moral uneasiness involved in choosing the
selfish alternative, Godwin answers that this uneasiness, though a
"constant step" in the process of volition, is a merely "accidental"
step--"I feel pain in the neglect of an act of benevolence, because
benevolence is judged by me to be conduct which it becomes me to
adopt."
[49] In Kantism, as we have partly seen, the most important
ontological beliefs--in God, freedom and immortality of the soul--are
based on necessities of ethical thought. In Fichte's system the
connexion of ethics and metaphysics is still more intimate; indeed,
we may compare it in this respect to Platonism; as Plato blends the
most fundamental notions of each of these studies in the one idea of
good, so Fichte blends them in the one idea free-will. "Freedom," in
his view, is at once the foundation of all being and the end of all
moral action. In the systems of Schelling and Hegel ethics falls
again into a subordinate place; indeed, the ethical view of the
former is rather suggested than completely developed. Neither Fichte
nor Schelling has exercised more than the faintest and most indirect
influence on ethical philosophy in England; it therefore seems best
to leave the ethical doctrines of each to be explained in connexion
with the rest of his system.
[50] Cf. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, _The Philosophical Radicals.
Martineau's Philosophy_, p. 92.