VIII. Universal Ethics.∂

There are the same reasons for the recognition by human beings of

ethical relations to non-human beings as there are for the

recognition by human beings of ethical relations among themselves

Analyse the reasons for being considerate toward men, any variety of

men, and you will find the same reasons to exist for being

considerate toward all men. And analyse the reasons for being

altruistic toward men—for being kind and sympathetic toward

them—and you will find the same reasons to exist for being

altruistic toward those who are not men. The doctrine that we human

beings may perform upon the other inhabitants of the earth all sorts

of injurious acts, and that these acts when so performed by us are

perfectly right and proper, but that these same things when done by

others to us are crimes, is the logic of pure brutalitarianism. It

is a doctrine utterly without intelligence, at variance with every

sentiment of justice and humanity, and has no legitimate existence

outside the fibrous brains of ruffians.

_Right_ and _wrong_ are qualities belonging to two diverse kinds of

conduct. They are the qualities which render conduct respectively

proper and improper. All terrestrial races (unless the very lowest)

have the power of experiencing two kinds of conscious states—the

desirable (pleasurable) and the undesirable (painful). Now, if

beings were indifferent as to what sort of conscious states entered

into and made up their experiences, there would manifestly be no

such thing as propriety and impropriety in the causing of these

states. But they are not indifferent. The pleasurable experiences

are the experiences all beings are seeking, and the painful ones are

the ones they are all seeking to avoid. Those acts which help or

tend to help beings to those experiences for which they are striving

are, therefore, right and proper, and are, they and their authors,

called _good_. While those acts which compel beings to undergo that

which they are striving to avoid are improper and wrong, and are,

they and their authors, called _bad_. Kindness, courtesy, justice,

mercy, generosity, sympathy, love, and the like, are good, and

selfishness, cruelty, deceit, pillage, injustice, and murder, are

bad, because they are respectively the promoters and destroyers of

wellbeing and happiness in the world.

But these two kinds of conduct produce the same respective effects

upon non-human beings as they do upon human beings. The emotion of a

mangled sensory—is it not the same terrible thing whether the

sensory hang to the brain of a quadruped or a man? Do shelter and

food not affect shivering and empty cattle, horses, and fowls,

precisely as they do human beings? Thunder harsh words at your dog.

Will he not shrink and suffer, just as your child or hired hand will

under like acts of terrorisation? Speak kindly to him, love him, and

accord to him a quarter of the consideration you claim for yourself.

Is he not caused to be one of the happiest and most devoted of

associates? To take squirrels or song-birds, the most active of

animals, and shut them up in narrow cages, and keep them there shut

off from their companions and their own green world their whole

lives long; to take an animal as sensitive and high-minded as the

horse and put a pack on his back and a bit in his mouth, and then

strike him dozens of times a day with a lash whose touch is like

fire; to shoot off the legs and wings of birds and fill their vitals

with lead, and leave them to flounder out a lingering death in the

reeds and grasses—do these things not cause misery and desolation

in the world? To place temptations in the way of fur-bearing animals

and induce them to enter carefully concealed traps, and then allow

them to remain in the villainous clutches of these devices, not

minutes, but hours, perhaps days, until it suits the convenience of

the ensnarer to knock out their brains, or until, crazed by pain,

the poor wretches eat off their own limbs and escape—is not this a

_monstrous_ thing to do?

Oh that men everywhere were moved by the deep tenderness and the

all-embracing sympathy of poor Robert Burns, who could apologise

with real feeling to a frightened field-mouse whom he had

accidentally upturned with his plough.

‘Wee, sleekit, cow’rin’, tim’rous beastie,

O, what a panic’s in thy breastie!

Thou needna start awa’ sae hasty,

Wi’ bick’ring brattle!

I had be laith to rin and chase thee,

Wi’ murd’rous pattle!

‘I’m truly sorry man’s dominion

Has broken nature’s social union,

And justifies that ill opinion

Which makes thee startle

At me, thy poor, earth-born companion,

And fellow-mortal.’

Long ago it was said, and truthfully, that the merciful man is

merciful to his ox. The truly kind man, the truly honest and the

truly humane man, is not kind and honest and humane to men only, but

to _all_ beings—to the humble and lowly as well as to the proud

and powerful—_to all that have the misfortune to feel and mourn_.

Benevolence is the same beautiful thing whether it pour sunshine

into the dark and saddened souls of men or into the dark and

saddened souls of other beings. John Howard never hearkened to a

nobler duty when he lifted the darkness that hung over English gaols

than will some inflamed soul some day who hears the cry of the

lonely captives who to-day languish in menagerial dungeons to

satisfy human curiosity. He who will emancipate horses from the hell

in which they pass their lives—make them the associates of men

instead of their slaves—will deserve to stand in the constellation

of the world’s redeemers beside Garrison and Garibaldi. Is there

he who holds in his heart-cups the love and compassion of Buddha?

Let him go where the dagger drips and the heartless pole-axe

crashes, and the meek-eyed millions of the meadows pour out their

innocent existences in the soulless houses of slaughter. Let him

lift from off the races the hounding incubus of fear, give back to

them their birthright—the right to a free, unhunted life—and

make the great monster (man) to be their high-priest and friend.

‘Among the noblest in the land,

Though he may count himself the least,

That man I honour and revere

Who, without favour, without fear,

In the great city dares to stand

The friend of every friendless beast,

And tames with his unflinching hand

The brutes that wear our form and face,

The were-wolves of the human race.’

If to do good is to generate welfare, then to cause welfare to a

horse, a bird, a butterfly, or a fish, is to do good just as truly

as to cause welfare to men. And if to do evil is to cause

unhappiness and illfare, then to cause these things to one

individual or race is evil just as certainly as to cause them to any

other individual or race. And if to put one’s self in the place of

others, and to act toward them as one would wish them to act toward

him, is the one great rule—the Golden Rule—by which men are to

gauge their conduct when acting toward each other, then this is also

the one great rule—the Golden Rule—by which men are to regulate

their conduct toward all beings. There is no escape from these

conclusions, except for the savage and the fool.[1]

1. The deliberate causing of misery and death to criminals, whether

they be human or non-human beings, individuals or species, is not,

as is sometimes supposed, a violation or reversal of the general

theory of ethics. When they are prompted by a spirit of tenderness

and universal goodness rather than by a spirit of revenge, penalties

are justifiable by the everyday assumption that it is sometimes wise

to inflict or undergo a certain amount of illfare in order to avoid

or forestall a larger amount. The problems of universal penology are

not different from those of human penology, practically the same

cases and perplexities being presented by all delinquents. See

‘Better-World Philosophy,’ by the author, pp. 218-227, for a

discussion of the function of punishment.

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