VI. The Ethics of Human Beings Toward Non-human Beings.∂

But the most mournful instance of provincial ethics afforded by the

inhabitants of the earth is not that furnished by the varieties of

the human species in their conduct toward each other, but that

afforded by the human race as a whole in its treatment of the

non-human races. Human nature is nowhere so hideous, and human

conscience is nowhere so profoundly inoperative, as in their

disregard for the life and happiness of the non-human animal world.

With the development of the representative powers of the mind, the

widening and mutualising of human activities, and the consequent

enlargement of the human horizon, the feeling of amity has spread

and intensified, until to-day, notwithstanding all that is true of

human sectionalism, the ethical systems of civilised peoples

include, theoretically at least, and more or less seriously, all

human beings whatsoever. Ethical consciousness has extended from

individual to family, from family to clan, from clan to tribe, from

tribe to confederacy, from confederacy to kingdom, from kingdom to

race, from race to species, until, in the case of many millions of

men, ethical feeling has reached, with greater or less vividness and

consistency, the anthropocentric stage of evolution. The fact that

an individual is a _man_—that is, that he belongs to the human

species of animals—entitles him in all civilised lands to the

fundamental rights and privileges of existence. The rights to life,

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are believed to-day, by all

exalted minds, to be the inalienable properties of every _human_

being who comes into the world.

But, except by occasional individuals here and there whose emotions

are more civilised than the rest, or whose conceptions are more

ample and clear, ethical relations are not extended by human beings

beyond the bounds of their own species. Non-human millions are

_outsiders_. They are looked upon and treated by human beings as if

they were an entirely different order of existences, with entirely

different purposes and susceptibilities, from human beings. They are

not considered to be living beings at all, as human beings are, who

are here in the world to enjoy life and all that life holds that is

dear to a living being. They belong to the same class of existences

as the waves of the sea and the weeds of the field. They are looked

upon as mere _things_—mere moving, multiplying objects, without

the slightest equity in the world in which they find themselves.

They may be set upon, beaten, maimed, starved, assassinated, eaten,

insulted, deceived, imprisoned, robbed, tormented, skinned alive,

shot down for pastime, cut to pieces out of curiosity, or compelled

to undergo any other enormity or victimisation anybody can think of

or is disposed to visit upon them. It is enough almost to make

knaves shudder, the cold-blooded and business-like manner in which

we cut their throats, dash out their brains, and discuss their

flavour at our cannibalistic feasts. As Plutarch says, ‘Lions,

tigers, and serpents we call savage and ferocious, yet we ourselves

come behind them in no species of barbarity.’ Accustomed from our

cradle up to look upon violence and assassination, we have become so

habituated and hardened to these things that we perpetrate them and

see them perpetrated with the same indifference as that with which

we watch waves die on the beach. Human beings are, in fact

(‘paragons’ though they pretend to be), the most predatory and

brutal of all animals—the great bone-breakers and bone-pickers of

the planet.

It is scarcely possible, astounding as it is, to commit crimes upon

any beings in this world, except men. There are no beings in the

universe, according to human beings, except themselves. All others

are commodities. They are of consequence only because they have

thighs and can fill up the unoccupied places of the human

alimentary. Human beings are ‘persons,’ and have souls and gods

and places to go to when they die. But the hundreds of thousands of

other races of terrestrial inhabitants are mere ‘animals,’ mere

‘brutes,’ and ‘beasts of the field,’ ‘livestock’ and

‘vermin.’ Every crime capable of being perpetrated by one being

upon another is day after day rained upon them, and with an

equanimity that would do honour to the managers of an inferno. Human

beings preach as the cardinal rule of morality—and they seem never

to tire of its reiteration—that they should do unto others as they

would that others would do unto them; but they hypocritically

confine its application to the members of their own crowd,

notwithstanding there are the same reasons identically for extending

it to all creatures. The happiness of the human species is assumed

to be so much more precious than that of others that the most sacred

interests of others are unhesitatingly sacrificed in order that

human desires may all be fastidiously catered to. Even for a tooth

or a feather or a piece of skin to wear on human vanity, forests are

depopulated and the land filled with the dead and dying.

Assassination is the commonest and most fashionable of human

pastimes. Jaded systems are regularly recuperated by massacre. Men

arm themselves—men who roar about ‘rights,’ and even ministers

of mercy—and go out on killing expeditions with as little

compunction as savages put on war-paint. They come back from their

campaigns of crime like the cut-throats of old Rome, trailing their

victims as trophies, and expecting to be hailed as heroes for the

hells they have established. Barbarians preponderate, and morality

is turned inside out. Cruelty is lionised, and broad-mindedness is

rewarded with a sneer. Compassion is a disease, and to be

fashionable is to be a fiend. If non-human peoples had no nerves and

no choice of emotions, and were utterly indifferent to life, they

could scarcely be treated more completely as personal nonentities.

The denial by human animals of ethical relations to the rest of the

animal world is a phenomenon not differing either in character or

cause from the denial of ethical relations by a tribe, people, or

race of human beings to the rest of the human world. The

provincialism of Jews toward non-Jews, of Greeks toward non-Greeks,

of Romans toward non-Romans, of Moslems toward non-Moslems, and of

Caucasians toward non-Caucasians, is not one thing and the

provincialism of human beings toward non-human beings another. They

are all manifestations of the same thing. The fact that these

various acts are performed by different individuals and _upon_

different individuals, and are performed at different times and

places, does not invalidate the essential sameness of their natures.

Crimes are not classified (except by savages or their immediate

derivatives) according to the similarity of those who do them or

those who suffer from them, but by grouping them according to the

similarity of their intrinsic qualities. All acts of provincialism

consist essentially in the disinclination or inability to be

universal, and they belong in reality, all of them, to the same

species of conduct. There is, in fact, but one great crime in the

universe, and most of the instances of terrestrial wrong-doing are

instances of this crime. It is the crime of _exploitation_—the

considering by some beings of themselves as _ends_ and of others as

their _means_—the refusal to recognise the equal, or the

approximately equal, rights of all to life and its legitimate

rewards—the crime of acting toward others as one would that others

would _not_ act toward him. For millions of years, almost ever since

life began, this crime has been committed, in every nook and quarter

of the inhabited globe.

_Every being_ is an _end_. In other words, every being is to be taken

into account in determining the ends of conduct. This is the only

consistent outcome of the ethical process which is in course of

evolution on the earth. This world was not made and presented to any

particular clique for its exclusive use or enjoyment. The earth

belongs, if it belongs to anybody, to the beings who inhabit it—to

_all_ of them. And when one being or set of beings sets itself up as

the sole end for which the universe exists, and looks upon and acts

toward others as mere means to this end, it is usurpation, nothing

else and never can be anything else, it matters not by whom or upon

whom the usurpation is practised. A tyrant who puts his own welfare

and aggrandisement in the place of the welfare of a people, and

compels the whole people to act as a means to his own personal ends,

is not more certainly a usurper than is a species or variety which

puts its welfare in the place of the welfare of all the inhabitants

of a world. The refusal to put one’s self in the place of others

and to act toward them as one would that they would act toward him

does not depend for its wrongfulness upon who makes the refusal or

upon whether the refusal falls upon this or that individual or set.

Deeds are right and wrong in themselves; and whether they are right

or wrong, good or evil, proper or improper, whether they should be

done or should not be done, _depends upon their effects upon the

welfare of the inhabitants of the universe_. The basic mistake that

has ever been made in this egoistic world in the judging and

classifying of acts has been the mistake of judging and classifying

them with reference to their effects upon some particular fraction

of the inhabitants of the universe. In pure egoism conduct is judged

as good or bad solely with reference to the results, immediate or

remote, which that conduct produces, or is calculated to produce, on

the _self_. To the savage, that is right or wrong which affects

favourably or unfavourably _himself_ or his _tribe_. And this

sectional spirit of the savage has, as has been shown, characterised

the moral conceptions of the peoples of all times. The practice

human beings have to-day—the practice of those (relatively) broad

and emancipated minds who are large enough to rise above the petty

prejudices and ‘patriotisms’ of the races and corporations of

men, and are able to view ‘the world as their country’ (the

world of _human_ beings, of course)—the practice such minds have of

estimating conduct solely with reference to its effects upon the

human species of animals is a practice which, while infinitely

broader and more nearly ultimate than that of the savage, belongs

logically in the same category with it. The partially emancipated

human being who extends his moral sentiments to all the members of

his own species, but denies to all other species the justice and

humanity he accords to his own, is making on a larger scale the same

ethical mess of it as the savage. The only consistent attitude,

since Darwin established the unity of life (and the attitude we

shall assume, if we ever become really civilised), is the attitude

of _universal gentleness and humanity_.

‘The world is my country,’ said Thomas Paine, and every man,

woman, and child capable of appreciating the exalted sentiment

applauded. But ‘the world’ of the great freethinker was

inhabited by _men only_.

The following lines were written by Robert Whitaker, and first

printed in a San Francisco newspaper:

‘My Country is the world! I count

No son of man my foe,

Whether the warm life currents mount

And mantle brows like snow,

Or whether yellow, brown, or black,

The face that into mine looks back.

‘My Native Land is Mother Earth,

And all men are my kin,

Whether of rude or gentle birth,

However steeped in sin;

Or rich or poor, or great or small,

I count them brothers one and all.

‘My Flag is the star-spangled sky,

Woven without a seam,

Where dawn and sunset colours lie,

Fair as an angel’s dream,

The Flag that still unstained, untorn,

Floats over all of mortal born

‘My Party is all humankind,

My Platform, brotherhood;

I count all men of honest mind

Who work for human good,

And for the hope that gleams afar.

My comrades in the holy war.

‘My Country is the world! I scorn

No lesser love than mine,

But calmly wait that happy morn

When all shall own this sign,

And love of country, as of clan,

Shall yield to love of Man.’

Robert Whitaker, you are a grand improvement on the ‘jingo.’ But

you are still too small. There are conceptions as much more

prophetic and exalted than yours as your conception is superior to

that of the Figian.

Broad as he is who can look upon all men as his brethren and

countrymen—broad as he is compared with those groundlings called

‘patriots,’ who can see nothing clearly beyond the bounds of the

political unit to which they belong—he is not broad enough. He is

still a _sectionalist_, a _partialist_. He represents but a _stage_

in the process of ethical expansion. He is, in fact, small compared

with the _universalist_, just as the savage is small compared with

the philanthropist. ‘Mankind,’ ‘humanity,’ ‘all men,’

‘the whole human family’—these are big conceptions, too big

for the poor little nubbins of brains with which most millions make

the effort to think. But they are pitifully small compared with that

grand conception of kinship which takes in all the races that live

and move upon the earth. Smaller yet are these conceptions compared

with that sublime and supreme synthesis which embraces not only the

present generation of terrestrial inhabitants, but which extends

longitudinally as well as laterally, extends in time as well as in

space, and embraces the generations which shall grow out of the

existing generation and which are yet unborn—_that conception

which recognises earth-life as a single process, world-wide and

immortal, every part related and akin to every other party and each

generation linked to an unending posterity_.

Every individual, therefore, emancipated enough to judge of acts of

conduct according to their intrinsic natures and consequences rather

than according to some local or traditional bias, cannot help

knowing that the exploitation of birds and quadrupeds for human whim

or convenience is an offence against the laws of morality, not

different in kind from the offences denounced in human laws as

robbery and murder. The creophagist and the hunter exemplify the

same somnambulism, are the authors of the same kind of conduct, and

belong literally in the same category of offenders, as the cannibal

and the slave-driver. To take the life of an ox for his muscles, or

to kill a sheep for his skin is _murder_, and those who do these

things or cause them to be done are _murderers_ just as actually as

highwaymen are who blow off the heads of hapless wayfarers for their

guineas. If these things _seem untrue_ it is not because they _are_

untrue, but because those to whom they seem so _are unable to judge

conduct from the quadrupedal point of view_. If there were in this

world beings as much more clever than Caucasians as Caucasians are

more clever than cows and sheep, and these beings should regard

themselves as the darlings of the gods and should attach a

fictitious dignity and importance to their own lives, but should

look upon Caucasians as simply so much ‘beef’ and ‘mutton,’

these bleached terrorists of the world would in the course of a few

generations of experience probably become sufficiently illumined to

realise that current human conceptions of cows and sheep are not

only preposterous, but fiendish.

The Universal Kinship · 第 45 / 53 题