I should very much like to hear, he replied.

Socrates proceeded:--I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation

of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of

my soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing

on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only

looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium.

So in my own case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether

if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the

help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the

world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that

the simile is not perfect--for I am very far from admitting that he who

contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only

'through a glass darkly,' any more than he who considers them in action

and operation. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first

assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I

affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating

to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded

as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, as I do

not think that you as yet understand me.

No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well.

There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but

only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous

discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that

cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those

familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all

assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and

the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of

the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.

Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you

this.

Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me

in the next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything

beautiful other than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can

be beautiful only in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty--and I

should say the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the

cause?

Yes, he said, I agree.

He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of

those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that

the bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty,

I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly,

and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing

makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in

whatever way or manner obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain,

but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become

beautiful. This appears to me to be the safest answer which I can give,

either to myself or to another, and to this I cling, in the persuasion

that this principle will never be overthrown, and that to myself or

to any one who asks the question, I may safely reply, That by beauty

beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree with me?

Phaedo · 第 21 / 22 题