And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality,
you conceived and attained that idea?
Very true, he said.
Which might be like, or might be unlike them?
Yes.
But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you
conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been
an act of recollection?
Very true.
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other
material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they
equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they
fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?
Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.
And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object,
observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing,
but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he
who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to
which the other, although similar, was inferior?
Certainly.
And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of
absolute equality?
Precisely.
Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first
saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals
strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?
Very true.
And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known,
and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some
other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?
Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the
same as the other.
From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things
aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?
Yes.
Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have
had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to
that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?--for to that
they all aspire, and of that they fall short.
No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.
And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon
as we were born?
Certainly.
Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous
time?
Yes.
That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?
True.
And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born
having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the
instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all
other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty,
goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of
essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer
questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the
knowledge before birth?
We may.
But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten what in each case
we acquired, then we must always have come into life having knowledge,
and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts--for knowing
is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not
forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?
Quite true, Socrates.
But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at
birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered what
we previously knew, will not the process which we call learning be a
recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be
rightly termed recollection?
Very true.
So much is clear--that when we perceive something, either by the help of
sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we are
able to obtain a notion of some other thing like or unlike which is
associated with it but has been forgotten. Whence, as I was saying, one
of two alternatives follows:--either we had this knowledge at birth, and
continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to
learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.
Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.
And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at
our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to
our birth?