It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a state, that all, or
at least many of these particulars should be well canvassed and inquired
into; and that virtue and education may most justly claim the right of
being considered as the necessary means of making the citizens happy, as
we have already said. As those who are equal in one particular are not
therefore equal in all, and those who are unequal in one particular
are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that all those governments
which are established upon a principle which supposes they are, are
erroneous.
We have already said, that all the members of the community will dispute
with each other for the offices of the state; and in some particulars
justly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance, because they
have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right to the soil is
vested in the community; and also because their fidelity is in general
most to be depended on. The freemen and men of family will dispute the
point with each other, as nearly on an equality; for these latter have
a right to a higher regard as citizens than obscure persons, for
honourable descent is everywhere of great esteem: nor is it an improper
conclusion, that the descendants of men of worth will be men of worth
themselves; for noble birth is the fountain of virtue to men of family:
for the same reason also we justly say, that virtue has a right to put
in her pretensions. Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary
to society, that all others must yield her the precedence.
Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the few;
and they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are compared
with them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they are. But
should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the [1283b] same
city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as the many, such as
usually make up the community, I ask, will there then be any reason to
dispute concerning who shall govern, or will there not? for in every
community which we have mentioned there is no dispute where the supreme
power should be placed; for as these differ from each other, so do those
in whom that is placed; for in one state the rich enjoy it, in others
the meritorious, and thus each according to their separate manners. Let
us however consider what is to be done when all these happen at the same
time to inhabit the same city. If the virtuous should be very few in
number, how then shall we act? shall we prefer the virtuous on account
of their abilities, if they are capable of governing the city? or should
they be so many as almost entirely to compose the state?
There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who claim
the honours of government: for those who found them either on fortune or
family have nothing which they can justly say in their defence; since
it is evident upon their principle, that if any one person can be found
richer than all the rest, the right of governing all these will be
justly vested in this one person. In the same manner, one man who is
of the best family will claim it from those who dispute the point upon
family merit: and probably in an aristocracy the same dispute might
arise on the score of virtue, if there is one man better than all the
other men of worth who are in the same community; it seems just, by the
same reasoning, that he should enjoy the supreme power. And upon this
principle also, while the many suppose they ought to have the supreme
command, as being more powerful than the few, if one or more than one,
though a small number should be found stronger than themselves, these
ought rather to have it than they.
All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles
are justly founded on which these persons would establish their right to
the supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them:
for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their
fortune, they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing
hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better
or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective
capacity.
As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may
answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would
establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for
the use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the
circumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything
consists in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will be
advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in common.
Now, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government and
also in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition, it is
true, is different in different states: the best is that in which a man
is enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of virtue during his
whole life, both in his public and private state. But should there be
one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon degree of virtue,
though not enough to make up a civil state, so that the virtue of the
many, or their political abilities, should be too inferior to come in
comparison with theirs, if more than one; or if but one, with his only;
such are not to be considered as part of the city; for it would be doing
them injustice to rate them on a level with those who are so far their
inferiors in virtue and political abilities, that they appear to them
like a god amongst men. From whence it is evident, that a system of laws
must be calculated for those who are equal to each other in nature and
power. Such men, therefore, are not the object of law; for they are
themselves a law: and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to
include them in the penalties of a law: for probably they might say what
Antisthenes tells us the lions did to the hares when they demanded to
be admitted to an equal share with them in the government. And it is on
this account that democratic states have established the ostracism; for
an equality seems the principal object of their government. For which
reason they compel all those who are very eminent for their power, their
fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give them too
great weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism, and leave
the city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate the
Argonauts served Hercules, for they refused to take him with them in the
ship Argo on account of his superior valour. For which reason those who
hate a tyranny and find fault with the advice which Periander gave to
Thrasybulus, must not think there was nothing to be said in its defence;
for the story goes, that Periander said nothing to the messenger in
answer to the business he was consulted about, but striking off those
ears of corn which were higher than the rest, reduced the whole crop to
a level; so that the messenger, without knowing the cause of what was
done, related the fact to Thrasybulus, who understood by it that he must
take off all the principal men in the city. Nor is this serviceable to
tyrants only; nor is it tyrants only who do it; for the same thing is
practised both in oligarchies and democracies: for the ostracism has in
a manner nearly the same power, by restraining and banishing those who
are too great; and what is done in one city is done also by those who
have the supreme power in separate states; as the Athenians with respect
to the Samians, the Chians, and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly
acquired the superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states
into subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them.
The King of Persia also very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians
when they assume upon their former power: [1284b] and this is a
principle which all governments whatsoever keep in their eye; even those
which are best administered, as well as those which are not, do it;
these for the sake of private utility, the others for the public good.
The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for
a painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally
large, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the
shipwright make the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than it
ought to be; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings
louder and better than the rest to sing in concert with them. There is
therefore no reason that a monarch should not act in agreement with
free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for the
benefit of their respective communities; upon which account when there
is any acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the reason
upon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just; but it is
better for the legislator so to establish his state at the beginning as
not to want this remedy: but if in course of time such an inconvenience
should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such correction. Not that
this was the use it was put to: for many did not regard the benefit of
their respective communities, but made the ostracism a weapon in the
hand of sedition.
It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and
useful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is not
entirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great doubts
about the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which one may
have in strength, riches, or connection: but when the pre-eminence is
virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not right to turn out and
banish such a one; neither does it seem right to govern him, for that
would be like desiring to share the power with Jupiter and to govern
him: nothing then remains but what indeed seems natural, and that is for
all persons quietly to submit to the government of those who are thus
eminently virtuous, and let them be perpetually kings in the separate
states.