Burghley.--"The fellow seems to have travelled a good way out of his
commission. His master sends him to buy horses, and he commences a
peace-negotiation between two kingdoms. It would be well he were
chastised. As regards the Antwerp matter, too, we have had many letters,
and I have, seen one from the Seigneur de Champagny, the same effect as
that of all the rest."
Walsingham.--"I see not to what end his Highness of Parma has sent Mr.
Bodman hither. The Prince avows that he hath no commission from Spain."
Bodman.--"His Highness was anxious to know what was her Majesty's
pleasure. So soon as that should be known, the Prince could obtain ample
authority. He would never have proceeded so far without meaning a good
end."
Walsingham.--"Very like. I dare say that his Highness will obtain the
commission. Meantime, as Prince of Parma, he writes these letters, and
assists his sovereign perhaps more than he doth ourselves."
Here the interview terminated. A few days later, Bodman had another
conversation with Burghley and Cobham. Reluctantly, at their urgent
request, he set down in writing all that he had said concerning his
mission.
The Lord Treasurer said that the Queen and her counsellors were "ready to
embrace peace when it was treated of sincerely." Meantime the Queen had
learned that the Prince had been sending letters to the cautionary towns
in Holland and Zeeland, stating that her Majesty was about to surrender
them to the King of Spain. These were tricks to make mischief, and were
very detrimental to the Queen.
Bodman replied that these were merely the idle stories of quidnuncs; and
that the Prince and all his counsellors were dealing with the utmost
sincerity.
Burghley answered that he had intercepted the very letters, and had them
in his possession.
A week afterwards, Bodman saw Walsingham alone, and was informed by
him that the Queen had written an answer to Parma's letter, and that
negotiations for the future were to be carried on in the usual form,
or not at all. Walsingham, having thus got the better of his rivals,
and delved below their mines, dismissed the agent with brief courtesy.
Afterwards the discomfited Mr. Comptroller wished a private interview
with Bodman. Bodman refused to speak with him except in presence of Lord
Cobham. This Croft refused. In the same way Bodman contrived to get
rid, as he said, of Lord Burghley and Lord Cobham, declining to speak
with either of them alone. Soon afterwards he returned to the Provinces!
The Queen's letter to Parma was somewhat caustic. It was obviously
composed through the inspiration of Walsingham rather than that of
Burghley. The letter, brought by a certain Grafigni and a certain
Bodman, she said, was a very strange one, and written under a delusion.
It was a very grave error, that, in her name, without her knowledge,
contrary to her disposition, and to the prejudice of her honour, such a
person as this Grafigni, or any one like him, should have the audacity to
commence such a business, as if she had, by messages to the Prince,
sought a treaty with his King, who had so often returned evil for her
good. Grafigni, after representing the contrary to his Highness, had now
denied in presence of her counsellors having received any commission from
the Queen. She also briefly gave the result of Bodman's interviews with
Burghley and the others, just narrated. That agent had intimated that
Parma would procure authority to treat for peace, if assured that the
Queen would lend her ear to any propositions.
She replied by referring to her published declarations, as showing her
powerful motives for interfering in these affairs. It was her purpose to
save her own realm and to rescue her ancient neighbours from misery and
from slavery. To this end she should still direct her actions,
notwithstanding the sinister rumours which had been spread that she was
inclined to peace before providing for the security and liberty of her
allies. She was determined never to separate their cause from her own.
Propositions tending to the security of herself and of her neighbours
would always be favourably received.
Parma, on his part, informed his master that there could be no doubt that
the Queen and the majority of her council abhorred the war, and that
already much had been gained by the fictitious negotiation. Lord-
Treasurer Burghley had been interposing endless delays and difficulties
in the way of every measure proposed for the relief of Lord Leicester,
and the assistance rendered him had been most lukewarm. Meantime the
Prince had been able, he said, to achieve much success in the field, and
the English had done nothing to prevent it. Since the return of Grafigni
and Bodman, however, it was obvious that the English government had
disowned these non-commissioned diplomatists. The whole negotiation and
all the negotiators were now discredited, but there was no doubt that
there had been a strong desire to treat, and great disappointment at the
result. Grafigni and Andrea de Loo had been publishing everywhere in
Antwerp that England would consider the peace as made, so soon as his
Majesty should be willing to accept any propositions.
His Majesty, meanwhile, sat in his cabinet, without the slightest
intention of making or accepting any propositions save those that were
impossible. He smiled benignantly at his nephew's dissimulation and at
the good results which it had already produced. He approved of gaining
time, he said, by fictitious negotiations and by the use of a mercantile
agent; for, no doubt, such a course would prevent the proper succours
from being sent to the Earl of Leicester. If the English would hand over
to him the cautionary towns held by them in Holland and Zeeland, promise
no longer to infest the seas, the Indies, and the Isles, with their
corsairs, and guarantee the complete obedience to their King and
submission to the holy Catholic Church of the rebellious Provinces,
perhaps something might be done with them; but, on the whole, he was
inclined to think that they had been influenced by knavish and deceitful
motives from the beginning. He enjoined it upon Parma, therefore, to
proceed with equal knavery--taking care, however, not to injure his
reputation--and to enter into negotiations wherever occasion might serve,
in order to put the English off their guard and to keep back the
reinforcements so imperatively required by Leicester.
And the reinforcements were indeed kept back. Had Burghley and Croft
been in the pay of Philip II. they could hardly have served him better
than they had been doing by the course pursued. Here then is the
explanation of the shortcomings of the English government towards
Leicester and the States during the memorable spring and summer of 1586.
No money, no soldiers, when most important operations in the field were
required. The first general of the age was to be opposed by a man who
had certainly never gained many laurels as a military chieftain, but who
was brave and confident, and who, had he been faithfully supported by the
government which sent him to the Netherlands, would have had his
antagonist at a great disadvantage. Alexander had scarcely eight
thousand effective men. Famine, pestilence, poverty, mutiny, beset
and almost paralyzed him. Language could not exaggerate the absolute
destitution of the country. Only miracles could save the King's cause,
as Farnese repeatedly observed. A sharp vigorous campaign, heartily
carried on against him by Leicester and Hohenlo, with plenty of troops
and money at command, would have brought the heroic champion of
Catholicism to the ground. He was hemmed in upon all sides; he was cut
off from the sea; he stood as it were in a narrowing circle, surrounded
by increasing dangers. His own veterans, maddened by misery, stung by
their King's ingratitude, naked, starving, ferocious, were turning
against him. Mucio, like his evil genius, was spiriting away his
supplies just as they were reaching his hands; a threatening tempest
seemed rolling up from France; the whole population of the Provinces
which he had "reconciled"--a million of paupers--were crying to him for
bread; great commercial cities, suddenly blasted and converted into dens
of thieves and beggars, were cursing the royal author of their ruin, and
uttering wild threats against his vicegerent; there seemed, in truth,
nothing left for Alexander but to plunge headlong into destruction, when,
lo! Mr. Comptroller Croft, advancing out of the clouds, like a propitious
divinity, disguised in the garb of a foe--and the scene was changed.
The feeble old man, with his shufing, horse-trucking servant, ex-spy of
Monsieur, had accomplished more work for Philip and Alexander than many
regiments of Spaniards and Walloons could have done. The arm of
Leicester was paralyzed upon the very threshold of success. The picture
of these palace-intrigues has been presented with minute elaboration,
because, however petty and barren in appearance, they were in reality
prolific of grave results. A series of victories by Parma was
substituted for the possible triumphs of Elizabeth and the States.
The dissimulation of the Spanish court was fathomless. The secret
correspondence of the times reveals to us that its only purpose was to
deceive the Queen and her counsellors, and to gain time to prepare the
grand invasion of England and subjugation of Holland--that double purpose
which Philip could only abandon with life. There was never a thought,
on his part, of honest negotiation. On the other hand, the Queen was
sincere; Burghley and Hatton and Cobham were sincere; Croft was sincere,
so far as Spain was concerned. At least they had been sincere. In the
private and doleful dialogues between Bodman and Grafigni which we have
just been overhearing, these intriguers spoke the truth, for they could
have no wish to deceive each other, and no fear of eaves-droppers not to
be born till centuries afterwards. These conversations have revealed to
us that the Lord Treasurer and three of his colleagues had been secretly
doing their best to cripple Leicester, to stop the supplies for the
Netherlands, and to patch up a hurried and unsatisfactory, if not a
disgraceful peace; and this, with the concurrence of her Majesty. After
their plots had been discovered by the vigilant Secretary of State, there
was a disposition to discredit the humbler instruments in the cabal.
Elizabeth was not desirous of peace. Far from it. She was qualmish at
the very suggestion. Dire was her wrath against Bodman, De Loo,
Graafigni, and the rest, at their misrepresentations on the subject. But
she would "lend her ear." And that royal ear was lent, and almost fatal
was the distilment poured into its porches. The pith and marrow of the
great Netherland enterprise was sapped by the slow poison of the ill-
timed negotiation. The fruit of Drake's splendid triumphs in America
was blighted by it. The stout heart of the vainglorious but courageous
Leicester was sickened by it, while, meantime, the maturing of the
great armada-scheme, by which the destruction of England was to be
accomplished, was furthered, through the unlimited procrastination
so precious to the heart of Philip.
Fortunately the subtle Walsingham was there upon the watch to administer
the remedy before it was quite too late; and to him England and the
Netherlands were under lasting obligations. While Alexander and Philip
suspected a purpose on the part of the English government to deceive
them, they could not help observing that the Earl of Leicester was both
deserted and deceived. Yet it had been impossible for the peace-party in
the government wholly to conceal their designs, when such prating fellows
as Grafigni and De Loo were employed in what was intended to be a secret
negotiation. In vain did the friends of Leicester in the Netherlands
endeavour to account for the neglect with which he was treated, and for
the destitution of his army. Hopelessly did they attempt to counteract
those "advertisements of most fearful instance," as Richard Cavendish
expressed himself, which were circulating everywhere.
Thanks to the babbling of the very men, whose chief instructions had been
to hold their tongues, and to listen with all their ears, the secret
negotiations between Parma and the English counsellors became the town-
talk at Antwerp, the Hague, Amsterdam, Brussels, London. It is true that
it was impossible to know what was actually said and done; but that there
was something doing concerning which Leicester was not to be informed was
certain. Grafigni, during one of his visits to the obedient provinces,
brought a brace of greyhounds and a couple of horses from England, as a
present to Alexander, and he perpetually went about, bragging to every
one of important negotiations which he was conducting, and of his
intimacy with great personages in both countries. Leicester,
on the other hand, was kept in the dark. To him Grafigni made no
communications, but he once sent him a dish of plums, "which," said the
Earl, with superfluous energy, "I will boldly say to you, by the living
God, is all that I have ever had since I came into these countries."
When it is remembered that Leicester had spent many thousand pounds in
the Netherland cause, that he had deeply mortgaged his property in order
to provide more funds, that he had never received a penny of salary from
the Queen, that his soldiers were "ragged and torn like rogues-pity to
see them," and were left without the means of supporting life; that he
had been neglected, deceived, humiliated, until he was forced to describe
himself as a "forlorn man set upon a forlorn hope," it must be conceded
that Grafigni's present of a dish of plums could hardly be sufficient to
make him very happy.
From time to time he was enlightened by Sir Francis, who occasionally
forced his adversaries' hands, and who always faithfully informed the
Earl of everything he could discover. "We are so greedy of a peace, in
respect of the charges of the wars," he wrote in April, "as in the
procuring thereof we weigh neither honour nor safety. Somewhat here is
adealing underhand, wherein there is great care taken that I should not
be made acquainted withal." But with all their great care, the
conspirators, as it has been seen, were sometimes outwitted by the
Secretary, and, when put to the blush, were forced to take him into half-
confidence. "Your Lordship may see," he wrote, after getting possession
of Parma's letter to the Queen, and unravelling Croft's intrigues, "what
effects are wrought by such weak ministers. They that have been the
employers of them are ashamed of the matter."
Unutterable was the amazement, as we have seen, of Bodman and Grafigni
when they had suddenly found themselves confronted in Burghley's private
apartments in Greenwich Palace, whither they had been conducted so
mysteriously after dark from the secret pavilion--by the grave Secretary
of State, whom they had been so anxious to deceive; and great was the
embarrassment of Croft and Cobham, and even of the imperturbable
Burghley.
And thus patiently did Walsingham pick his course, plummet in hand,
through the mists and along the quicksands, and faithfully did he hold
out signals to his comrade embarked on the same dangerous voyage. As for
the Earl himself, he was shocked at the short-sighted policy of his
mistress, mortified by the neglect to which he was exposed, disappointed
in his ambitious schemes. Vehemently and judiciously he insisted upon
the necessity of vigorous field operations throughout the spring and
summer thus frittered away in frivolous negotiations. He was for peace,
if a lasting and honourable peace could be procured; but he insisted that
the only road tosuch a result was through a "good sharp war." His troops
were mutinous for want of pay, so that he had been obligedto have a few
of them executed, although he protested that he would rather have "gone a
thousand miles a-foot" than have done so; and he was crippled by his
government at exactly the time when his great adversary's condition was
most forlorn. Was it strange that the proud Earl should be fretting his
heart away when such golden chances were eluding his grasp? He would
"creep upon the ground," he said, as far as his hands and knees would
carry him, to have a good peace for her Majesty, but his care was to have
a peace indeed, and not a show of it. It was the cue of Holland and
England to fight before they could expect to deal upon favourable terms
with their enemy. He was quick enough to see that his false colleagues
at home were playing into the enemy's hands. Victory was what was
wanted; victory the Earl pledged himself, if properly seconded, to
obtain; and, braggart though he was, it is by no means impossible that
he might have redeemed his pledge. "If her Majesty will use her
advantage," he said, "she shall bring the King, and especially this
Prince of Parma, to seek peace in other sort than by way of merchants."
Of courage and confidence the governor had no lack. Whether he was
capable of outgeneralling Alexander Farnese or no, will be better seen,
perhaps, in subsequent chapters; but there is no doubt that he was
reasonable enough in thinking, at that juncture, that a hard campaign
rather than a "merchant's brokerage" was required to obtain an honourable
peace. Lofty, indeed, was the scorn of the aristocratic Leicester that
"merchants and pedlars should be paltering in so weighty a cause," and
daring to send him a dish of plums when he was hoping half a dozen
regiments from the Queen; and a sorry business, in truth, the pedlars
had made of it.
Never had there been a more delusive diplomacy, and it was natural that
the lieutenant-general abroad and the statesman at home should be sad and
indignant, seeing England drifting to utter shipwreck while pursuing that
phantom of a pacific haven. Had Walsingham and himself tampered with the
enemy, as some counsellors he could name had done, Leicester asserted
that the gallows would be thought too good for them; and yet he hoped he
might be hanged if the whole Spanish faction in England could procure for
the Queen a peace fit for her to accept.
Certainly it was quite impossible for the Spanish-faction to bring about
a peace. No human power could bring it about. Even if England had been
willing and able to surrender Holland, bound hand and foot, to Philip,
even then she could only have obtained a hollow armistice. Philip had
sworn in his inmost soul the conquest of England and the dethronement of
Elizabeth. His heart was fixed. It was only by the subjugation of
England that he hoped to recover the Netherlands. England was to be
his stepping-stone to Holland. The invasion was slowly but steadily
maturing, and nothing could have diverted the King from his great
purpose. In the very midst of all these plots and counterplots, Bodmans
and Grafignis, English geldings and Irish greyhounds, dishes of plums and
autograph letters of her Majesty and his Highness, the Prince was
deliberately discussing all the details of the invasion, which, as it was
then hoped, would be ready by the autumn of the year 1586. Although he
had sent a special agent to Philip, who was to state by word of mouth
that which it was deemed unsafe to write, yet Alexander, perpetually
urged by his master, went at last more fully into particulars than he
had ever ventured to do before; and this too at the very moment when
Elizabeth was most seriously "lending her ear" to negotiation, and most
vehemently expressing her wrath at Sir Thomas Heneage for dealing
candidly with the States-General.
The Prince observed that when, two or three years before, he had sent his
master an account of the coasts, anchoring-places, and harbours of
England, he had then expressed the opinion that the conquest of England
was an enterprise worthy of the grandeur and Christianity of his Majesty,
and not so difficult as to be considered altogether impossible. To make
himself absolutely master of the business, however, he had then thought
that the King should have no associates in the scheme, and should make no
account of the inhabitants of England. Since that time the project had
become more difficult of accomplishment, because it was now a stale and
common topic of conversation everywhere--in Italy, Germany, and France--
so that there could be little doubt that rumours on the subject were
daily reaching the ears of Queen Elizabeth and of every one in her
kingdom. Hence she had made a strict alliance with Sweden, Denmark, the
Protestant princes of Germany, and even with the Turks and the French.
Nevertheless, in spite of these obstacles, the King, placing his royal
hand to the work, might well accomplish the task; for the favour of the
Lord, whose cause it was, would be sure to give him success.
Being so Christian and Catholic a king, Philip naturally desired to
extend the area of the holy church, and to come to the relief of so many
poor innocent martyrs in England, crying aloud before the Lord for help.
Moreover Elizabeth had fomented rebellion in the King's Provinces for a
long time secretly, and now, since the fall of Antwerp, and just as
Holland and Zeeland were falling into his grasp, openly.
Thus, in secret and in public, she had done the very worst she could do;
and it was very clear that the Lord, for her sins; had deprived her of
understanding, in order that his Majesty might be the instrument of that
chastisement which she so fully deserved. A monarch of such great
prudence, valour, and talent as Philip, could now give all the world to
understand that those who dared to lose a just and decorous respect for
him, as this good lady had done, would receive such chastisement as royal
power guided by prudent counsel could inflict. Parma assured his
sovereign, that, if the conquest of England were effected, that of the
Netherlands would be finished with much facility and brevity; but that
otherwise, on account of the situation, strength and obstinacy of those
people, it would be a very long, perilous, and at best doubtful business.
"Three points," he said, "were most vital to the invasion of England--
secrecy, maintenance of the civil war in France, and judicious
arrangement of matters in the Provinces."
The French, if unoccupied at home, would be sure to make the enterprise
so dangerous as to become almost impossible; for it might be laid down as
a general maxim that that nation, jealous of Philip's power, had always
done and would always do what it could to counteract his purposes.
With regard to the Netherlands, it would be desirable to leave a good
number of troops in those countries--at least as many as were then
stationed there--besides the garrisons, and also to hold many German and
Swiss mercenaries in "wartgeld." It would be further desirable that
Alexander should take most of the personages of quality and sufficiency
in the Provinces over with him to England, in order that they should not
make mischief in his absence.
With regard to the point of secrecy, that was, in Parma's opinion, the
most important of all. All leagues must become more or less public,
particularly those contrived at or with Rome. Such being the case, the
Queen of England would be well aware of the Spanish projects, and,
besides her militia at home, would levy German infantry and cavalry, and
provide plenty of vessels, relying therein upon Holland and Zeeland,
where ships and sailors were in such abundance. Moreover, the English
and the Netherlanders knew the coasts, currents, tides, shallows,
quicksands, ports, better than did the pilots of any fleets that the King
could send thither. Thus, having his back assured, the enemy would meet
them in front at a disadvantage. Although, notwithstanding this
inequality, the enemy would be beaten, yet if the engagement should be
warm, the Spaniards would receive an amount of damage which could not
fail to be inconvenient, particularly as they would be obliged to land
their troops, and to give battle to those who would be watching their
landing. Moreover the English would be provided with cavalry, of which
his Majesty's forces would have very little, on account of the difficulty
of its embarkation.
The obedient Netherlands would be the proper place in which to organize
the whole expedition. There the regiments could be filled up, provisions
collected, the best way of effecting the passage ascertained, and the
force largely increased without exciting suspicion; but with regard to
the fleet, there were no ports there capacious enough for large vessels.
Antwerp had ceased to be a seaport; but a large number of flat-bottomed
barges, hoys, and other barks, more suitable for transporting soldiers,
could be assembled in Dunkirk, Gravelines, and Newport, which, with some
five-and-twenty larger vessels, would be sufficient to accompany the
fleet.
The Queen, knowing that there were no large ships, nor ports to hold them
in the obedient Provinces, would be unauspicious, if no greater levies
seemed to be making than the exigencies of the Netherlands might
apparently require.
The flat-bottomed boats, drawing two or three feet of water, would be
more appropriate than ships of war drawing twenty feet. The passage
across, in favourable weather, might occupy from eight to twelve hours.
The number of troops for the invading force should be thirty thousand
infantry, besides five hundred light troopers, with saddles, bridles, and
lances, but without horses, because, in Alexander's opinion, it would be
easier to mount them in England. Of these thirty thousand there should
be six thousand Spaniards, six thousand Italians, six thousand Walloons,
nine thousand Germans, and three thousand Burgundians.
Much money would be required; at least three hundred thousand dollars
the month for the new force, besides the regular one hundred and fifty
thousand for the ordinary provision in the Netherlands; and this ordinary
provision would be more necessary than ever, because a mutiny breaking
forth in the time of the invasion would be destruction to the Spaniards
both in England and in the Provinces.
The most appropriate part of the coast for a landing would,
in Alexander's opinion, be between Dover and Margate, because the
Spaniards, having no footing in Holland and Zeeland, were obliged to make
their starting-point in Flanders. The country about Dover was described
by Parma as populous, well-wooded, and much divided by hedges;
advantageous for infantry, and not requiring a larger amount of cavalry
than the small force at his disposal, while the people there were
domestic in their habits, rich, and therefore less warlike, less trained
to arms, and more engrossed by their occupations and their comfortable
ways of life. Therefore, although some encounters would take place, yet
after the commanders of the invading troops had given distinct and clear
orders, it would be necessary to leave the rest in the, "hands of God who
governs all things, and from whose bounty and mercy it was to be hoped
that He would favour a cause so eminently holy, just, and His own."
It would be necessary to make immediately for London, which city, not
being fortified, would be very easily taken. This point gained, the
whole framework of the business might be considered as well put together.
If the Queen should fly--as, being a woman, she probably would do--
everything would be left in such confusion, as, with the blessing of God,
it might soon be considered that the holy and heroic work had been
accomplished: Her Majesty, it was suggested, would probably make her
escape in a boat before she could be captured; but the conquest would be
nevertheless effected. Although, doubtless, some English troops might be
got together to return and try their fortune, yet it would be quite
useless; for the invaders would have already planted themselves upon the
soil, and then, by means of frequent excursions and forays hither and
thither about the island, all other places of importance would be gained,
and the prosperous and fortunate termination of the adventure assured.
As, however, everything was to be provided for, so, in case the secret
could not be preserved, it would be necessary for Philip, under pretext
of defending himself against the English and French corsairs, to send a
large armada to sea, as doubtless the Queen would take the same measure.
If the King should prefer, however, notwithstanding Alexander's advice to
the contrary, to have confederates in the enterprise,--then, the matter
being public, it would be necessary to prepare a larger and stronger
fleet than any which Elizabeth, with the assistance of her French and
Netherland allies, could oppose to him. That fleet should be well
provided with vast stores of provisions, sufficient to enable the
invading force, independently of forage, to occupy three or four places
in England at once, as the enemy would be able to come from various towns
and strong places to attack them.
As for the proper season for the expedition, it would be advisable to
select the month of October of the current year, because the English
barns would then be full of wheat and other forage, and the earth would
have been sown for the next year--points of such extreme importance, that
if the plan could not be executed at that time, it would be as well to
defer it until the following October.
The Prince recommended that the negotiations with the League should be
kept spinning, without allowing them to come to a definite conclusion;
because there would be no lack of difficulties perpetually offering
themselves, and the more intricate and involved the policy of France, the
better it would be for the interests of Spain. Alexander expressed the
utmost confidence that his Majesty, with his powerful arm, would overcome
all obstacles in the path of his great project, and would show the world
that he "could do a little more than what was possible." He also assured
his master, in adding in this most extravagant language, of his personal
devotion, that it was unnecessary for him to offer his services in this
particular enterprise, because, ever since his birth, he had dedicated
and consecrated himself to execute his royal commands.
He further advised that old Peter Ernest Mansfeld should be left
commander-in-chief of the forces in the Netherlands during his own
absence in England. "Mansfeld was an honourable cavalier," he said, "and
a faithful servant of the King;" and although somewhat ill-conditioned at
times, yet he had essential good qualities, and was the only general fit
to be trusted alone.
The reader, having thus been permitted to read the inmost thoughts of
Philip and Alexander, and to study their secret plans for conquering
England in October, while their frivolous yet mischievous negotiations
with the Queen had been going on from April to June, will be better able
than before to judge whether Leicester were right or no in doubting if a
good peace could be obtained by a "merchant's brokerage."
And now, after examining these pictures of inter-aulic politics and back-
stairs diplomacy, which represent so large and characteristic a phasis of
European history during the year 1586, we must throw a glance at the
external, more stirring, but not more significant public events which
were taking place during the same period.