Forlorn Condition of Flanders--Parma's secret Negotiations with the
Queen--Grafigni and Bodman--Their Dealings with English Counsellors
--Duplicity of Farnese--Secret Offers of the English Peace-Party--
Letters and Intrigues of De Loo--Drake's Victories and their Effect
--Parma's Perplexity and Anxiety--He is relieved by the News from
England--Queen's secret Letters to Parma--His Letters and
Instructions to Bodman--Bodman's secret Transactions at Greenwich--
Walsingham detects and exposes the Plot--The Intriguers baffled--
Queen's Letter to Parma and his to the King--Unlucky Results of the
Peace--Intrigues--Unhandsome Treatment of Leicester--Indignation of
the Earl and Walsingham--Secret Letter of Parma to Philip--Invasion
of England recommended--Details of the Project.
Alexander Farnese and his heroic little army had been left by their
sovereign in as destitute a condition as that in which Lord Leicester and
his unfortunate "paddy persons" had found themselves since their arrival
in the Netherlands. These mortal men were but the weapons to be used and
broken in the hands of the two great sovereigns, already pitted against
each other in mortal combat. That the distant invisible potentate,
the work of whose life was to do his best to destroy all European
nationality, all civil and religious freedom, should be careless of
the instruments by which his purpose was to be effected, was but natural.
It is painful to reflect that the great champion of liberty and of
Protestantism was almost equally indifferent to the welfare of the human
creatures enlisted in her cause. Spaniards and Italians, English and
Irish, went half naked and half starving through the whole inclement
winter, and perished of pestilence in droves, after confronting the
less formidable dangers of battlefield and leaguer. Manfully and
sympathetically did the Earl of Leicester--while whining in absurd
hyperbole over the angry demeanour of his sovereign towards himself-
represent the imperative duty of an English government to succour English
troops.
Alexander Farnese was equally plain-spoken to a sovereign with whom
plain-speaking was a crime. In bold, almost scornful language, the
Prince represented to Philip the sufferings and destitution of the
little band of heroes, by whom that magnificent military enterprise,
the conquest of Antwerp, had just been effected. "God will be weary of
working miracles for us," he cried, "and nothing but miracles can save
the troops from starving." There was no question of paying them their
wages, there was no pretence at keeping them reasonably provided with
lodging and clothing, but he asserted the undeniable proposition that
they "could not pass their lives without eating," and he implored his
sovereign to send at least money enough to buy the soldiers shoes.
To go foodless and barefoot without complaining, on the frozen swamps of
Flanders, in January, was more than was to be expected from Spaniards and
Italians. The country itself was eaten bare. The obedient Provinces had
reaped absolute ruin as the reward of their obedience. Bruges, Ghent,
and the other cities of Brabant and Flanders, once so opulent and
powerful, had become mere dens of thieves and paupers. Agriculture,
commerce, manufactures--all were dead. The condition of Antwerp was most
tragical. The city, which had been so recently the commercial centre of
the earth, was reduced to absolute beggary. Its world-wide traffic was
abruptly terminated, for the mouth of its great river was controlled by
Flushing, and Flushing was in the firm grasp of Sir Philip Sidney, as
governor for the English Queen. Merchants and bankers, who had lately
been possessed of enormous resources, were stripped of all. Such of the
industrial classes as could leave the place had wandered away to Holland
and England. There was no industry possible, for there was no market for
the products of industry. Antwerp was hemmed in by the enemy on every
side, surrounded by royal troops in a condition of open mutiny, cut off
from the ocean, deprived of daily bread, and yet obliged to contribute
out of its poverty to the maintenance of the Spanish soldiers, who were
there for its destruction. Its burghers, compelled to furnish four
hundred thousand florins, as the price of their capitulation, and at
least six hundred thousand more for the repairs of the dykes, the
destruction of which, too long deferred, had only spread desolation over
the country without saving the city, and over and above all forced to
rebuild, at their own expense, that fatal citadel, by which their liberty
and lives were to be perpetually endangered, might now regret at leisure
that they had not been as stedfast during their siege as had been the
heroic inhabitants of Leyden in their time of trial, twelve years before.
Obedient Antwerp was, in truth, most forlorn. But there was one
consolation for her and for Philip, one bright spot in the else universal
gloom. The ecclesiastics assured Parma, that, notwithstanding the
frightful diminution in the population of the city, they had confessed
and absolved more persons that Easter than they had ever done since the
commencement of the revolt. Great was Philip's joy in consequence.
"You cannot imagine my satisfaction," he wrote, "at the news you give me
concerning last Easter."
With a ruined country, starving and mutinous troops, a bankrupt
exchequer, and a desperate and pauper population, Alexander Farnese was
not unwilling to gain time by simulated negotiations for peace. It was
strange, however, that so sagacious a monarch as the Queen of England
should suppose it for her interest to grant at that moment the very delay
which was deemed most desirable by her antagonist.
Yet it was not wounded affection alone, nor insulted pride, nor startled
parsimony, that had carried the fury of the Queen to such a height on the
occasion of Leicester's elevation to absolute government. It was still
more, because the step was thought likely to interfere with the progress
of those negotiations into which the Queen had allowed herself to be
drawn.
A certain Grafigni--a Genoese merchant residing much in London and in
Antwerp, a meddling, intrusive, and irresponsible kind of individual,
whose occupation was gone with the cessation of Flemish trade--had
recently made his appearance as a volunteer diplomatist. The principal
reason for accepting or rather for winking at his services, seemed to be
the possibility of disavowing him, on both sides, whenever it should be
thought advisable. He had a partner or colleague, too, named Bodman,
who seemed a not much more creditable negotiator than himself. The chief
director of the intrigue was, however, Champagny, brother of Cardinal
Granvelle, restored to the King's favour and disposed to atone by his
exuberant loyalty for his heroic patriotism on a former and most
memorable occasion. Andrea de Loo, another subordinate politician, was
likewise employed at various stages of the negotiation.
It will soon be perceived that the part enacted by Burghley, Hatton,
Croft, and other counsellors, and even by the Queen herself, was not a
model of ingenuousness towards the absent Leicester and the States-
General. The gentlemen sent at various times to and from the Earl and
her Majesty's government; Davison, Shirley, Vavasor, Heneage, and the
rest--had all expressed themselves in the strongest language concerning
the good faith and the friendliness of the Lord-Treasurer and the Vice-
Chamberlain, but they were not so well informed as they would have been,
had they seen the private letters of Parma to Philip II.
Walsingham, although kept in the dark as much as it was possible,
discovered from time to time the mysterious practices of his political
antagonists, and warned the Queen of the danger and dishonour she was
bringing upon herself. Elizabeth, when thus boldly charged, equivocated
and stormed alternately. She authorized Walsingham to communicate the
secrets--which he had thus surprised--to the States-General, and then
denied having given any such orders.
In truth, Walsingham was only entrusted with such portions of the
negotiations as he had been able, by his own astuteness, to divine; and
as he was very much a friend to the Provinces and to Leicester, he never
failed to keep them instructed, to the best of his ability. It must be
confessed, however, that the shuffling and paltering among great men and
little men, at that period, forms a somewhat painful subject of
contemplation at the present day.
Grafigni having some merchandise to convey from Antwerp to London, went
early in the year to the Prince of Parma, at Brussels, in order to
procure a passport. They entered into some conversation upon the misery
of the country, and particularly concerning the troubles to which the
unfortunate merchants had been exposed. Alexander expressed much
sympathy with the commercial community, and a strong desire that the
ancient friendship between his master and the Queen of England might be
restored. Grafigni assured the Prince--as the result of his own
observation in England--that the Queen participated in those pacific
sentiments: "You are going to England," replied the Prince, "and you may
say to the ministers of her Majesty, that, after my allegiance to my
King, I am most favourably and affectionately inclined towards her. If
it pleases them that I, as Alexander Farnese, should attempt to bring
about an accord, and if our commissioners could be assured of a hearing
in England, I would take care that everything should be conducted with
due regard to the honour and reputation of her Majesty."
Grafigni then asked for a written letter of credence. "That cannot be,"
replied Alexander; "but if you return to me I shall believe your report,
and then a proper person can be sent, with authority from the King to
treat with her Majesty."
Grafigni proceeded to England, and had an interview with Lord Cobham.
A few days later that nobleman gave the merchant a general assurance
that the Queen had always felt a strong inclination to maintain firm
friendship with the House of Burgundy. Nevertheless, as he proceeded
to state, the bad policy of the King's ministers, and the enterprises
against her Majesty, had compelled her to provide for her own security
and that of her realm by remedies differing in spirit from that good
inclination. Being however a Christian princess, willing to leave
vengeance to the Lord and disposed to avoid bloodshed, she was ready
to lend her ear to a negotiation for peace, if it were likely to be a
sincere and secure one. Especially she was pleased that his Highness
of Parma should act as mediator of such a treaty, as she considered him
a most just and honourable prince in all his promises and actions. Her
Majesty would accordingly hold herself in readiness to receive the
honourable commissioners alluded to, feeling sure that every step taken
by his Highness would comport with her honour and safety.
At about the same time the other partner in this diplomatic enterprise,
William Bodman, communicated to Alexander, the result of his observations
in England. He stated that Lords Burghley, Buckhurst, and Cobham, Sir
Christopher Hatton, and Comptroller Croft, were secretly desirous of
peace with Spain and that they had seized the recent opportunity of her
pique against the Earl of Leicester to urge forward these underhand
negotiations. Some progress had been made; but as no accredited
commissioner arrived from the Prince of Parma, and as Leicester was
continually writing earnest letters against peace, the efforts of these
counsellors had slackened. Bodman found them all, on his arrival,
anxious as he said, "to get their necks out of the matter;" declaring
everything which had been done to be pure matter of accident, entirely
without the concurrence of the Queen, and each seeking to outrival the
other in the good graces of her Majesty. Grafigni informed Bodman,
however, that Lord Cobham was quite to be depended upon in the affair,
and would deal with him privately, while Lord Burghley would correspond
with Andrea de Loo at Antwerp. Moreover, the servant of Comptroller
Croft would direct Bodman as to his course, and would give him daily
instructions.
Now it so happened that this servant of Croft, Norris by name, was a
Papist, a man of bad character, and formerly a spy of the Duke of Anjou.
"If your Lordship or myself should use such instruments as this," wrote
Walsingham to Leicester, "I know we should bear no small reproach; but
it is the good hap of hollow and doubtful men to be best thought of."
Bodman thought the lords of the peace-faction and their adherents not
sufficiently strong to oppose the other party with success. He assured
Farnese that almost all the gentlemen and the common people of England
stood ready to risk their fortunes and to go in person to the field to
maintain the cause of the Queen and religious liberty; and that the
chance of peace was desperate unless something should turn the tide, such
as, for example, the defeat of Drake, or an invasion by Philip of Ireland
or Scotland.
As it so happened that Drake was just then engaged in a magnificent
career of victory, sweeping the Spanish Main and startling the nearest
and the most remote possessions of the King with English prowess, his
defeat was not one of the cards to be relied on by the peace-party in the
somewhat deceptive game which they had commenced. Yet, strange to say,
they used, or attempted to use, those splendid triumphs as if they had
been disasters.
Meantime there was an active but very secret correspondence between Lord
Cobham, Lord Burghley, Sir James Croft, and various subordinate
personages in England, on the one side, and Champagny, President
Richardot, La Motte, governor of Gravelines, Andrea de Loo, Grafigni, and
other men in the obedient Provinces, more or less in Alexander's
confidence, on the other side. Each party was desirous of forcing or
wheedling the antagonist to show his hand. "You were employed to take
soundings off the English coast in the Duke of Norfolk's time," said
Cobham to La Motte: "you remember the Duke's fate. Nevertheless, her
Majesty hates war, and it only depends on the King to have a firm and
lasting peace."
"You must tell Lord Cobham," said Richardot to La Motte, "that you
are not at liberty to go into a correspondence, until assured of the
intentions of Queen Elizabeth. Her Majesty ought to speak first,
in order to make her good-will manifest," and so on.
"The 'friend' can confer with you," said Richardot to Champagny; "but his
Highness is not to appear to know anything at all about it. The Queen
must signify her intentions."
"You answered Champagny correctly," said Burghley to De Loo, "as to what
I said last winter concerning her Majesty's wishes in regard to a
pacification. The Netherlands must be compelled to return to obedience
to the King; but their ancient privileges are to be maintained. You
omitted, however, to say a word about toleration, in the Provinces, of
the reformed religion. But I said then, as I say now, that this is a
condition indispensable to peace."
This was a somewhat important omission on the part of De Loo, and gives
the measure of his conscientiousness or his capacity as a negotiator.
Certainly for the Lord-Treasurer of England to offer, on the part of her
Majesty, to bring about the reduction of her allies under the yoke which
they had thrown off without her assistance, and this without leave asked
of them, and with no provision for the great principle of religious
liberty, which was the cause of the revolt, was a most flagitious
trifling with the honour of Elizabeth and of England. Certainly the more
this mysterious correspondence is examined, the more conclusive is the
justification of the vague and instinctive jealousy felt by Leicester and
the States-General as to English diplomacy during the winter and spring
of 1586.
Burghley summoned De Loo, accordingly, to recall to his memory all that
had been privately said to him on the necessity of protecting the
reformed religion in the Provinces. If a peace were to be perpetual,
toleration was indispensable, he observed, and her Majesty was said to
desire this condition most earnestly.
The Lord-Treasurer also made the not unreasonable suggestion, that, in
case of a pacification, it would be necessary to provide that English
subjects--peaceful traders, mariners, and the like--should no longer be
shut up in the Inquisition prisons of Spain and Portugal, and there
starved to death, as, with great multitudes, had already been the case.
Meantime Alexander, while encouraging and directing all these underhand
measures, was carefully impressing upon his master that he was not, in
the least degree; bound by any such negotiations. "Queen Elizabeth," he
correctly observed to Philip, "is a woman: she is also by no means fond
of expense. The kingdom, accustomed to repose, is already weary of war
therefore, they are all pacifically inclined." "It has been intimated to
me," he said, "that if I would send a properly qualified person, who
should declare that your Majesty had not absolutely forbidden the coming
of Lord Leicester, such an agent would be well received, and perhaps the
Earl would be recalled." Alexander then proceeded, with the coolness
befitting a trusted governor of Philip II., to comment upon the course
which he was pursuing. He could at any time denounce the negotiations
which he was secretly prompting. Meantime immense advantages could be
obtained by the deception practised upon an enemy whose own object was
to deceive.
The deliberate treachery of the scheme was cynically enlarged upon, and
its possible results mathematically calculated:
Philip was to proceed with the invasion while Alexander was going on with
the negotiation. If, meanwhile, they could receive back Holland and
Zeeland from the hands of England, that would be an immense success. The
Prince intimated a doubt, however, as to so fortunate a result, because,
in dealing with heretics and persons of similar quality, nothing but
trickery was to be expected. The chief good to be hoped for was to
"chill the Queen in her plots, leagues, and alliances," and during the
chill, to carry forward their own great design. To slacken not a whit
in their preparations, to "put the Queen to sleep," and, above all, not
to leave the French for a moment unoccupied with internal dissensions and
civil war; such was the game of the King and the governor, as expounded
between themselves.
President Richardot, at the same time, stated to Cardinal Granvelle that
the English desire for peace was considered certain at Brussels.
Grafigni had informed the Prince of Parma and his counsellors that the
Queen was most amicably disposed, and that there would be no trouble on
the point of religion, her Majesty not wishing to obtain more than she
would herself be willing to grant. "In this," said Richardot, "there is
both hard and soft;" for knowing that the Spanish game was deception,
pure and simple, the excellent President could not bring himself to
suspect a possible grain of good faith in the English intentions. Much
anxiety was perpetually felt in the French quarter, her Majesty's
government being supposed to be secretly preparing an invasion of the
obedient Netherlands across the French frontier, in combination, not with
the Bearnese, but with Henry III. So much in the dark were even the most
astute politicians. "I can't feel satisfied in this French matter," said
the President: "we mustn't tickle ourselves to make ourselves laugh."
Moreover, there was no self-deception nor self-tickling possible as to
the unmitigated misery of the obedient Netherlands. Famine was a more
formidable foe than Frenchmen, Hollanders, and Englishmen combined; so
that Richardot avowed that the "negotiation would be indeed holy," if it
would restore Holland and Zeeland to the King without fighting. The
prospect seemed on the whole rather dismal to loyal Netherlanders like
the old leaguing, intriguing, Hispamolized president of the privy
council. "I confess," said he plaintively, "that England needs
chastisement; but I don't see how we are to give it to her. Only let us
secure Holland and Zeeland, and then we shall always find a stick
whenever we like to beat the dog."
Meantime Andrea de Loo had been bustling and buzzing about the ears of
the chief counsellors at the English court during all the early spring.
Most busily he had been endeavouring to efface the prevalent suspicion
that Philip and Alexander were only trifling by these informal
negotiations. We have just seen whether or not there was ground for that
suspicion. De Loo, being importunate, however--"as he usually was,"
according to his own statement--obtained in Burghley's hand a
confirmation, by order of the Queen, of De Loo's--letter of the 26th
December. The matter of religion gave the worthy merchant much
difficulty, and he begged Lord Buckhurst, the Lord Treasurer, and many
other counsellors, not to allow this point of toleration to ruin the
whole affair; "for," said he, "his Majesty will never permit any exercise
of the reformed religion."
At last Buckhurst sent for him, and in presence of Comptroller Croft,
gave him information that he had brought the Queen to this conclusion:
firstly, that she would be satisfied with as great a proportion of
religious toleration for Holland, Zeeland, and the other United
Provinces, as his Majesty could concede with safety to his conscience and
his honour; secondly, that she required an act of amnesty; thirdly, that
she claimed reimbursement by Philip for the money advanced by her to the
States.
Certainly a more wonderful claim was never made than this--a demand upon
an absolute monarch for indemnity for expenses incurred in fomenting a
rebellion of his own subjects. The measure of toleration proposed for
the Provinces--the conscience, namely, of the greatest bigot ever born
into the world--was likely to prove as satisfactory as the claim for
damages propounded by the most parsimonious sovereign in Christendom. It
was, however, stipulated that the nonconformists of Holland and Zeeland,
who should be forced into exile, were to have their property administered
by papist trustees; and further, that the Spanish inquisition was not to
be established in the Netherlands. Philip could hardly demand better
terms than these last, after a career of victory. That they should be
offered now by Elizabeth was hardly compatible with good faith to the
States.
On account of Lord Burghley's gout, it was suggested that the negotiators
had better meet in England, as it would be necessary for him to take the
lead in the matters and as he was but an indifferent traveller. Thus,
according to De Loo, the Queen was willing to hand over the United
Provinces to Philip, and to toss religious toleration to the winds, if
she could only get back the seventy thousand pounds--more or less--which
she had invested in an unpromising speculation. A few weeks later, and
at almost the very moment when Elizabeth had so suddenly overturned her
last vial of wrath upon the discomfited Heneage for having communicated
--according to her express command--the fact of the pending negotiations
to the Netherland States; at that very instant Parma was writing
secretly, and in cipher, to Philip. His communication--could Sir Thomas
have read it--might have partly explained her Majesty's rage.
Parma had heard, he said, through Bodman, from Comptroller Croft, that
the Queen would willingly receive a proper envoy. It was very easy to
see, he observed, that the English counsellors were seeking every means
of entering into communication with Spain, and that they were doing so
with the participation of the Queen! Lord-Treasurer Burghley and
Comptroller Croft had expressed surprise that the Prince had not yet sent
a secret agent to her Majesty, under pretext of demanding explanations
concerning Lord Leicester's presence in the Provinces, but in reality to
treat for peace. Such an agent, it had been intimated, would be well
received. The Lord-Treasurer and the Comptroller would do all in their
power to advance the negotiation, so that, with their aid and with the
pacific inclination of the Queen, the measures proposed in favour of
Leicester would be suspended, and perhaps the Earl himself and all the
English would be recalled.
The Queen was further represented as taking great pains to excuse both
the expedition of Sir Francis Drake to the Indies, and the mission of
Leicester to the Provinces. She was said to throw the whole blame of
these enterprises upon Walsingham and other ill-intentioned personages,
and to avow that she now understood matters better; so that, if Parma
would at once send an envoy, peace would, without question, soon be made.
Parma had expressed his gratification at these hopeful dispositions on
the part of Burghley and Croft, and held out hopes of sending an agent to
treat with them, if not directly with her Majesty. For some time past--
according to the Prince--the English government had not seemed to be
honestly seconding the Earl of Leicester, nor to correspond with his
desires. "This makes me think," he said, "that the counsellors before-
mentioned, being his rivals, are trying to trip him up."
In such a caballing, prevaricating age, it is difficult to know which of
all the plotters and counterplotters engaged in these intrigues could
accomplish the greatest amount of what--for the sake of diluting in nine
syllables that which could be more forcibly expressed in one--was then
called diplomatic dissimulation. It is to be feared, notwithstanding her
frequent and vociferous denials, that the robes of the "imperial
votaress" were not so unsullied as could be wished. We know how loudly
Leicester had complained--we have seen how clearly Walsingham could
convict; but Elizabeth, though convicted, could always confute: for an
absolute sovereign, even without resorting to Philip's syllogisms of axe
and faggot, was apt in the sixteenth century to have the best of an
argument with private individuals.
The secret statements of Parma-made, not for public effect, but for
the purpose of furnishing his master with the most accurate information
he could gather as to English policy--are certainly entitled to
consideration. They were doubtless founded upon the statements
of individuals rejoicing in no very elevated character; but those
individuals had no motive to deceive their patron. If they clashed
with the vehement declarations of very eminent personages, it must be
admitted, on the other hand, that they were singularly in accordance with
the silent eloquence of important and mysterious events.
As to Alexander Farnese--without deciding the question whether Elizabeth
and Burghley were deceiving Walsingham and Leicester, or only trying to
delude Philip and himself--he had no hesitation, of course, on his part,
in recommending to Philip the employment of unlimited dissimulation.
Nothing could be more ingenuous than the intercourse between the King and
his confidential advisers. It was perfectly understood among them that
they were always to deceive every one, upon every occasion. Only let
them be false, and it was impossible to be wholly wrong; but grave
mistakes might occur from occasional deviations into sincerity. It was
no question at all, therefore, that it was Parma's duty to delude
Elizabeth and Burghley. Alexander's course was plain. He informed his
master that he would keep these difficulties alive as much as it was
possible. In order to "put them all to sleep with regard to the great
enterprise of the invasion," he would send back Bodman to Burghley and
Croft, and thus keep this unofficial negotiation upon its legs. The King
was quite uncommitted, and could always disavow what had been done.
Meanwhile he was gaining, and his adversaries losing, much precious time.
"If by this course," said Parma, "we can induce the English to hand over
to us the places which they hold in Holland and Zeeland, that will be a
great triumph." Accordingly he urged the King not to slacken, in the
least, his preparations for invasion, and, above all, to have a care that
the French were kept entangled and embarrassed among themselves, which
was a most substantial point.
Meantime Europe was ringing with the American successes of the bold
corsair Drake. San Domingo, Porto Rico, Santiago, Cartliagena, Florida,
were sacked and destroyed, and the supplies drawn so steadily from the
oppression of the Western World to maintain Spanish tyranny in Europe,
were for a time extinguished. Parma was appalled at these triumphs of
the Sea-King--"a fearful man to the King of Spain"--as Lord Burghley well
observed. The Spanish troops were starving in Flanders, all Flanders
itself was starving, and Philip, as usual, had sent but insignificant
remittances to save his perishing soldiers. Parma had already exhausted
his credit. Money was most difficult to obtain in such a forlorn
country; and now the few rich merchants and bankers of Antwerp that were
left looked very black at these crushing news from America. "They are
drawing their purse-strings very tight," said Alexander, "and will make
no accommodation. The most contemplative of them ponder much over this
success of Drake, and think that your Majesty will forget our matters
here altogether." For this reason he informed the King that it would be
advisable to drop all further negotiation with England for the time, as
it was hardly probable that, with such advantages gained by the Queen,
she would be inclined to proceed in the path which had been just secretly
opened. Moreover, the Prince was in a state of alarm as to the
intentions of France. Mendoza and Tassis had given him to understand
that a very good feeling prevailed between the court of Henry and of
Elizabeth, and that the French were likely to come to a pacification
among themselves. In this the Spanish envoys were hardly anticipating so
great an effect as we have seen that they had the right to do from their
own indefatigable exertions; for, thanks to their zeal, backed by the
moderate subsidies furnished by their master, the civil war in France
already seemed likely to be as enduring as that of the Netherlands. But
Parma--still quite in the dark as to French politics--was haunted by the
vision of seventy thousand foot and six thousand horses ready to be let
slip upon him at any, moment, out of a pacified and harmonious France;
while he had nothing but a few starving and crippled regiments to
withstand such an invasion. When all these events should have taken
place, and France, in alliance with England, should have formally
declared war against Spain, Alexander protested that he should have
learned nothing new.
The Prince was somewhat mistaken as to political affairs; but his doubts
concerning his neighbours, blended with the forlorn condition of himself
and army, about which there was no doubt at all, showed the exigencies of
his situation. In the midst of such embarrassments it is impossible not
to admire his heroism as a military chieftain, and his singular
adroitness as a diplomatist. He had painted for his sovereign a most
faithful and horrible portrait of the obedient Provinces. The soil was
untilled; the manufactories had all stopped; trade had ceased to exist.
It was a pity only to look upon the raggedness of his soldiers. No
language could describe the misery of the reconciled Provinces--Artois,
Hainault, Flanders. The condition of Bruges would melt the hardest
heart; other cities were no better; Antwerp was utterly ruined; its
inhabitants were all starving. The famine throughout the obedient
Netherlands was such as had not been known for a century. The whole
country had been picked bare by the troops, and the plough was not put
into the ground. Deputations were constantly with him from Bruges,
Dendermonde, Bois-le-Duc, Brussels, Antwerp, Nymegen, proving to him
by the most palpable evidence that the whole population of those cities
had almost literally nothing to eat. He had nothing, however, but
exhortations to patience to feed them withal. He was left without a
groat even to save his soldiers from starving, and he wildly and
bitterly, day after day, implored his sovereign for aid. These pictures
are not the sketches of a historian striving for effect, but literal
transcripts from the most secret revelations of the Prince himself to his
sovereign. On the other hand, although Leicester's complaints of the
destitution of the English troops in the republic were almost as bitter,
yet the condition of the United Provinces was comparatively healthy.
Trade, external and internal, was increasing daily. Distant commercial
and military expeditions were fitted out, manufactures were prosperous,
and the war of independence was gradually becoming--strange to say--a
source of prosperity to the new commonwealth.
Philip--being now less alarmed than his nephew concerning French affairs,
and not feeling so keenly the misery of the obedient Provinces, or the
wants of the Spanish army--sent to Alexander six hundred thousand ducats,
by way of Genoa. In the letter submitted by his secretary recording this
remittance, the King made, however, a characteristic marginal note:--
"See if it will not be as well to tell him something concerning the two
hundred thousand ducats to be deducted for Mucio, for fear of more
mischief, if the Prince should expect the whole six hundred thousand."
Accordingly Mucio got the two hundred thousand. One-third of the meagre
supply destined for the relief of the King's starving and valiant little
army in the Netherlands was cut off to go into the pockets of the
intriguing Duke of Guise. "We must keep the French," said Philip, "in a
state of confusion at home, and feed their civil war. We must not allow
them to come to a general peace, which would be destruction for the
Catholics. I know you will put a good face on the matter; and, after
all, 'tis in the interest of the Netherlands. Moreover, the money shall
be immediately refunded."
Alexander was more likely to make a wry face, notwithstanding his views
of the necessity of fomenting the rebellion against the House of Valois.
Certainly if a monarch intended to conquer such countries as France,
England, and Holland, without stirring from his easy chair in the
Escorial, it would have been at least as well--so Alexander thought--to
invest a little more capital in the speculation. No monarch ever dreamed
of arriving at universal empire with less personal fatigue or exposure,
or at a cheaper rate, than did Philip II. His only fatigue was at his
writing-table. But even here his merit was of a subordinate description.
He sat a great while at a time. He had a genius for sitting; but he now
wrote few letters himself. A dozen words or so, scrawled in
hieroglyphics at the top, bottom, or along the margin of the interminable
despatches of his secretaries, contained the suggestions, more or less
luminous, which arose in his mind concerning public affairs. But he held
firmly to his purpose: He had devoted his life to the extermination of
Protestantism, to the conquest of France and England, to the subjugation
of Holland. These were vast schemes. A King who should succeed in such
enterprises, by his personal courage and genius, at the head of his
armies, or by consummate diplomacy, or by a masterly system of finance-
husbanding and concentrating the resources of his almost boundless
realms--might be in truth commended for capacity. Hitherto however
Philip's triumph had seemed problematical; and perhaps something more
would be necessary than letters to Parma, and paltry remittances to
Mucio, notwithstanding Alexander's splendid but local victories in
Flanders.
Parma, although in reality almost at bay, concealed his despair, and
accomplished wonders in the field. The military events during the spring
and summer of 1586 will be sketched in a subsequent chapter. For the
present it is necessary to combine into a complete whole the subterranean
negotiations between Brussels and England.
Much to his surprise and gratification, Parma found that the peace-party
were not inclined to change their views in consequence of the triumphs of
Drake. He soon informed the King that--according to Champagny and
Bodman--the Lord Treasurer, the Comptroller, Lord Cobham, and Sir
Christopher Hatton, were more pacific than they had ever been. These
four were represented by Grafigni as secretly in league against Leicester
and Walsingham, and very anxious to bring about a reconciliation between
the crowns of England and Spain. The merchant-diplomatist, according to
his own statement, was expressly sent by Queen Elizabeth to the prince of
Parma, although without letter of credence or signed instructions, but
with the full knowledge and approbation of the four counsellors just
mentioned. He assured Alexander that the Queen and the majority of her
council felt a strong desire for peace, and had manifested much
repentance for what had been done. They had explained their proceedings
by the necessity of self-defence. They had avowed--in case they should
be made sure of peace--that they should, not with reluctance and against
their will, but, on the contrary, with the utmost alacrity and at once,
surrender to the King of Spain the territory which they possessed in the
Netherlands, and especially the fortified towns in Holland and Zeeland;
for the English object had never been conquest. Parma had also been
informed of the Queen's strong desire that he should be employed as
negotiator, on account of her great confidence in his sincerity. They
had expressed much satisfaction on hearing that he was about to send an
agent to England, and had protested themselves rejoiced at Drake's
triumphs, only because of their hope that a peace with Spain would thus
be rendered the easier of accomplishment. They were much afraid,
according to Grafigni, of Philip's power, and dreaded a Spanish invasion
of their country, in conjunction with the Pope. They were now extremely
anxious that Parma--as he himself informed the King--should send an agent
of good capacity, in great secrecy, to England.
The Comptroller had said that he had pledged himself to such a result,
and if it failed, that they would probably cut off his head. The four
counsellors were excessively solicitous for the negotiation, and each of
them was expecting to gain favour by advancing it to the best of his
ability.
Parma hinted at the possibility that all these professions were false,
and that the English were only intending to keep the King from the
contemplated invasion. At the same time he drew Philip's attention to
the fact that Burghley and his party had most evidently been doing
everything in their power to obstruct Leicester's progress in the
Netherlands and to keep back the reinforcements of troops and money which
he so much required.
No doubt these communications of Parma to the King were made upon the
faith of an agent not over-scrupulous, and of no elevated or recognised
rank in diplomacy. It must be borne in mind, however, that he had been
made use of by both parties; perhaps because it would be easy to throw
off, and discredit, him whenever such a step should be convenient; and
that, on the other hand, coming fresh from Burghley and the rest into the
presence of the keen-eyed Farnese, he would hardly invent for his
employer a budget of falsehoods. That man must have been a subtle
negotiator who could outwit such a statesman as Burghley--and the other
counsellors of Elizabeth, and a bold one who could dare to trifle on a
momentous occasion with Alexander of Parma.
Leicester thought Burghley very much his friend, and so thought Davison
and Heneage; and the Lord-Treasurer had, in truth, stood stoutly by the
Earl in the affair of the absolute governorship;--"a matter more severe
and cumbersome to him and others," said Burghley, "than any whatsoever
since he was a counsellor." But there is no doubt that these
negotiations were going forward all the spring and summer, that they were
most detrimental to Leicester's success, and that they were kept--so far
as it was possible--a profound secret from him, from Walsingham, and from
the States-General. Nothing was told them except what their own
astuteness had discovered beforehand; and the game of the counsellors--so
far as their attitude towards Leicester and Walsingham was concerned--
seems both disingenuous and impolitic.
Parma, it was to be feared, was more than a match for the English
governor-general in the field; and it was certainly hopeless for poor
old Comptroller Croft, even though backed by the sagacious Burghley, to
accomplish so great an amount of dissimulation in a year as the Spanish
cabinet, without effort, could compass in a week. Nor were they
attempting to do so. It is probable that England was acting towards
Philip in much better faith than he deserved, or than Parma believed;
but it is hardly to be wondered at that Leicester should think himself
injured by being kept perpetually in the dark.
Elizabeth was very impatient at not receiving direct letters from Parma,
and her anxiety on the subject explains much of her caprice during the
quarrel about the governor-generalahip. Many persons in the Netherlands
thought those violent scenes a farce, and a farce that had been arranged
with Leicester beforehand. In this they were mistaken; for an
examination of the secret correspondence of the period reveals the
motives--which to contemporaries were hidden--of many strange
transactions. The Queen was, no doubt, extremely anxious, and with
cause, at the tempest slowly gathering over her head; but the more the
dangers thickened, the more was her own official language to those in
high places befitting the sovereign of England.
She expressed her surprise to Farnese that he had not written to her on
the subject of the Grafigni and Bodman affair. The first, she said, was
justified in all which he had narrated, save in his assertion that she
had sent him. The other had not obtained audience, because he had not
come provided with any credentials, direct or indirect. Having now
understood from Andrea de Loo and the Seigneur de Champagny that Parma
had the power to conclude a peace, which he seemed very much to desire,
she observed that it was not necessary for him to be so chary in
explaining the basis of the proposed negotiations. It was better to
enter into a straightforward path, than by ambiguous words to spin out
to great length matters which princes should at once conclude.
"Do not suppose," said the Queen, "that I am seeking what belongs to
others. God forbid. I seek only that which is mine own. But be
sure that I will take good heed of the sword which threatens me with
destruction, nor think that I am so craven-spirited as to endure a
wrong, or to place myself at the mercy of my enemy. Every week I see
advertisements and letters from Spain that this year shall witness the
downfall of England; for the Spaniards--like the hunter who divided, with
great liberality, among his friends the body and limbs of the wolf,
before it had been killed--have partitioned this kingdom and that of
Ireland before the conquest has been effected. But my royal heart is no
whit appalled by such threats. I trust, with the help of the Divine
hand--which has thus far miraculously preserved me--to smite all these
braggart powers into the dust, and to preserve my honour, and the
kingdoms which He has given me for my heritage.
"Nevertheless, if you have authority to enter upon and to conclude this
negotiation, you will find my ears open to hear your propositions; and I
tell you further, if a peace is to be made, that I wish you to be the
mediator thereof. Such is the affection I bear you, notwithstanding that
some letters, written by your own hand, might easily have effaced such
sentiments from my mind."
Soon afterwards, Bodman was again despatched to England, Grafigni being
already there. He was provided with unsigned instructions, according to
which he was to say that the Prince, having heard of the Queen's good
intentions, had despatched him and Grafigni to her court. They were to
listen to any suggestions made by the Queen to her ministers; but they
were to do nothing but listen. If the counsellors should enter into
their grievances against his Majesty, and ask for explanations, the
agents were to say that they had no authority or instructions to speak
for so great and Christian a monarch. Thus they were to cut the thread
of any such discourse, or any other observations not to the purpose.
Silence, in short, was recommended, first and last, as the one great
business of their mission; and it was unlucky that men whose talent for
taciturnity was thus signally relied upon should be somewhat remarkable
for loquacity. Grafigni was also the bearer of a letter from Alexander
to the Queen--of which Bodman received a copy--but it was strictly
enjoined upon them to keep the letter, their instructions, and the
objects of their journey, a secret from all the world.
The letter of the Prince consisted mainly of complimentary flourishes.
He had heard, he said, all that Agostino Grafigni had communicated, and
he now begged her Majesty to let him understand the course which it was
proper to take; assuring her of his gratitude for her good opinion
touching his sincerity, and his desire to save the effusion of blood,
and so on; concluding of course with expressions of most profound
consideration and devotion.
Early in July Bodman arrived in London. He found Grafigni in very low
spirits. He had been with Lord Cobham, and was much disappointed with
his reception, for Cobham--angry that Grafigni had brought no commission
from the King--had refused to receive Parma's letter to the Queen, and
had expressed annoyance that Bodman should be employed on this mission,
having heard that lie was very ill-tempered and passionate. The same
evening, he had been sent for by Lord Burghley--who had accepted the
letter for her Majesty without saying a word--and on the following
morning, he had been taken to task, by several counsellors, on the ground
that the Prince, in that communication, had stated that the Queen had
expressed a desire for peace.
It has just been shown that there was no such intimation at all in the
letter; but as neither Grafigni nor Bodman had read the epistle itself,
but only the copy furnished them, they could merely say that such an
assertion; if made by the Prince, had been founded on no statement of
theirs. Bodman consoled his colleague, as well as he could, by
assurances that when the letter was fairly produced, their vindication
would be complete, and Grafigni, upon that point, was comforted. He was,
however, very doleful in general, and complained bitterly of Burghley and
the other English counsellors. He said that they had forced him, against
his will, to make this journey to Brussels, that they had offered him
presents, that they would leave him no rest in his own house, but had
made him neglect all his private business, and caused him a great loss of
time and money, in order that he might serve them. They had manifested
the strongest desire that Parma should open this communication, and had
led him to expect a very large recompense for his share in the
transaction. "And now," said Grafigni to his colleague, with great
bitterness, "I find no faith nor honour in them at all. They don't keep
their word, and every one of them is trying to slide out of the very
business, in which each was, but the other day, striving to outrival the
other, in order that it might be brought to a satisfactory conclusion."
After exploding in this way to Bodman, he went back to Cobham, and
protested, with angry vehemence, that Parma had never written such a word
to the Queen, and that so it would prove, if the letter were produced.
Next day, Bodman was sent for to Greenwich, where her Majesty was, as
usual, residing. A secret pavilion was indicated to him, where he was to
stay until sunset. When that time arrived, Lord Cobham's secretary came
with great mystery, and begged the emissary to follow him, but at a
considerable distance, towards the apartments of Lord Burghley in the
palace. Arriving there, they found the Lord Treasurer accompanied by
Cobham and Croft. Burghley instantly opened the interview by a defence
of the Queen's policy in sending troops to the Netherlands, and in
espousing their cause, and then the conversation proceeded to the
immediate matter in hand.
Bodman (after listening respectfully to the Lord-Treasurer's
observations).--"His Highness has, however, been extremely surprised that
my Lord Leicester should take an oath, as governor-general of the King's
Provinces. He is shocked likewise by the great demonstrations of
hostility on the part of her Majesty."
Burghley.--"The oath was indispensable. The Queen was obliged to
tolerate the step on account of the great urgency of the States to have a
head. But her Majesty has commanded us to meet you on this occasion, in
order to hear what you have to communicate on the part of the Prince of
Parma."
Bodman (after a profusion of complimentary phrases).--"I have no
commission to say anything. I am only instructed to listen to anything
that may be said to me, and that her Majesty may be pleased to command."
Burghley.--"'Tis very discreet to begin thus. But time is pressing, and
it is necessary to be brief. We beg you therefore to communicate,
without further preface, that which you have been charged to say."
Bodman.--"I can only repeat to your Lordship, that I have been charged to
say nothing."
After this Barmecide feast of diplomacy, to partake of which it seemed
hardly necessary that the guests should have previously attired
themselves in such garments of mystery, the parties separated for the
night.
In spite of their care, it would seem that the Argus-eyed Walsingham had
been able to see after sunset; for, the next evening--after Bodman had
been introduced with the same precautions to the same company, in the
same place--Burghley, before a word had been spoken, sent for Sir
Francis.
Bodman was profoundly astonished, for he had been expressly informed that
Walsingham was to know nothing of the transaction. The Secretary of
State could not so easily be outwitted, however, and he was soon seated
at the table, surveying the scene, with his grave melancholy eyes, which
had looked quite through the whole paltry intrigue.
Burghley.--"Her Majesty has commanded us to assemble together, in order
that, in my presence, it may be made clear that she did not commence this
negotiation. Let Grafigni be summoned."
Grafigni immediately made his appearance.
Burghley.--"You will please to explain how you came to enter into this
business."
Grafigni.--"The first time I went to the States, it was on my private
affairs; I had no order from any one to treat with the Prince of Parma.
His Highness, having accidentally heard, however, that I resided in
England, expressed a wish to see me. I had an interview with the Prince.
I told him, out of my own head, that the Queen had a strong inclination
to hear propositions of peace, and that--as some of her counsellors were
of the same opinion--I believed that if his Highness should send a
negotiator, some good would be effected. The Prince replied that he felt
by no means sure of such a result; but that, if I should come back from
England, sent by the Queen or her council, he would then despatch a
person with a commission to treat of peace. This statement, together
with other matters that had passed between us, was afterwards drawn up in
writing by command of his Highness."
Burghley.--"Who bade you say, after your second return to Brussels, that
you came on the part of the Queen? For you well know that her Majesty
did not send you."
Grafigni.--"I never said so. I stated that my Lord Cobham had set down
in writing what I was to say to the Prince of Parma. It will never
appear that I represented the Queen as desiring peace. I said that her
Majesty would lend her ears to peace. Bodman knows this too; and he has
a copy of the letter of his Highness."