First, how fares the grand alliance? Free Europe is entering into a new
phase of its long and brilliant history. The era of colonial expansion has
passed; the era of national rivalries is fading; and a new era of
interdependence and unity is taking shape. Defying the old prophecies of
Marx, consenting to what no conqueror could ever compel, the free nations
of Europe are moving toward a unity of purpose and power and policy in
every sphere of activity.
For 17 years this movement has had our consistent support, both political
and economic. Far from resenting the new Europe, we regard her as a welcome
partner, not a rival. For the road to world peace and freedom is still
long, and there are burdens which only full partners can share--in
supporting the common defense, in expanding world trade, in aligning our
balance of payments, in aiding the emergent nations, in concerting
political and economic policies, and in welcoming to our common effort
other industrialized nations, notably Japan, whose remarkable economic and
political development of the 1950's permits it now to play on the world
scene a major constructive role.
No doubt differences of opinion will continue to get more attention than
agreements on action, as Europe moves from independence to more formal
interdependence. But these are honest differences among honorable
associates--more real and frequent, in fact, among our Western European
allies than between them and the United States. For the unity of freedom
has never relied on uniformity of opinion. But the basic agreement of this
alliance on fundamental issues continues.
The first task of the alliance remains the common defense. Last month Prime
Minister Macmillan and I laid plans for a new stage in our long cooperative
effort, one which aims to assist in the wider task of framing a common
nuclear defense for the whole alliance.
The Nassau agreement recognizes that the security of the West is
indivisible, and so must be our defense. But it also recognizes that this
is an alliance of proud and sovereign nations, and works best when we do
not forget it. It recognizes further that the nuclear defense of the West
is not a matter for the present nuclear powers alone--that France will be
such a power in the future--and that ways must be found without increasing
the hazards of nuclear diffusion, to increase the role of our other
partners in planning, manning, and directing a truly multilateral nuclear
force within an increasingly intimate NATO alliance. Finally, the Nassau
agreement recognizes that nuclear defense is not enough, that the agreed
NATO levels of conventional strength must be met, and that the alliance
cannot afford to be in a position of having to answer every threat with
nuclear weapons or nothing.
We remain too near the Nassau decisions, and too far from their full
realization, to know their place in history. But I believe that, for the
first time, the door is open for the nuclear defense of the alliance to
become a source of confidence, instead of a cause of contention.
The next most pressing concern of the alliance is our common economic goals
of trade and growth. This Nation continues to be concerned about its
balance-of-payments deficit, which, despite its decline, remains a stubborn
and troublesome problem. We believe, moreover, that closer economic ties
among all free nations are essential to prosperity and peace. And neither
we nor the members of the European Common Market are so affluent that we
can long afford to shelter high cost farms or factories from the winds of
foreign competition, or to restrict the channels of trade with other
nations of the free world. If the Common Market should move toward
protectionism and restrictionism, it would undermine its own basic
principles. This Government means to use the authority conferred on it last
year by the Congress to encourage trade expansion on both sides of the
Atlantic and around the world.