AMERICAN EXPLORATION--MASSON (_continued_)
On Masson's return to Kabul he observed the first symptoms of active
interest in Afghan politics on the part of the Indian Government, in
the person of an accredited native agent (Saiad Karamat Ali) who had
travelled with Lieut. Conolly to Herat. Colonel Stoddart was at that
time detained in Bokhara, and was apparently under the impression that
he was befriended by a "profligate adventurer," one Samad Khan, who
had succeeded in establishing himself there as a pillar of the State
after imposing on so astute a politician as the Amir Dost Mahomed Khan
and on many of the leading Afghan Sirdars. Masson seems to have been
better aware of the character of this Khan than the Indian Government,
for he notes that "to be befriended by such a man is in itself
calamitous."
It is quite comprehensible that the Indian Government should not duly
appreciate the position of an adventurer like Masson and his intimate
acquaintance with Afghanistan and its riotous rulers; but it was
unfortunate; for it is not too much to say that Indian Government
officials at that time were but amateurs in their knowledge of Afghan
politics compared to Masson; and much of the horrors of subsequent
events might have been avoided could Masson have been admitted freely
and fully to their counsels. However, for a time he employed himself
in collecting historical and scientific notes on Afghanistan, which we
still regard as standard works for reference. No one has succeeded
better in giving us an impression of the leading characteristics of
the Afghan chiefs of his time, and probably there is not much
improvement effected by a century of moral development. Steeped up to
the eyes in treachery towards each other, debauchees, drunkards,
liars, and murderers, one cannot but admire their extraordinary
virility. It was truly a case of the survival of the fittest, and the
fittest were certainly remarkable men.
The Amir Dost Mahomed Khan was one of the worst, and one of the best.
One of the twenty-two sons of Sirafraz Khan, he worked his way upwards
by truly Afghan methods; methods which in the early days of his career
were utterly detestable, but which attained some sort of reflected
dignity later, when there were not wanting signs that in a different
environment he might have been truly great. He was illiterate and
uneducated, but appreciated the advantages of elementary schooling in
others. Into the strange welter of political intrigue which forms
Afghan history during the period of his rise to power we need not
enter; but it is necessary to note the extraordinary difference with
which the stranger in the land, a Feringhi, was regarded throughout
Afghanistan, then, as compared with his reception at present. It is
even possible that the life of a Feringhi was then safer (_i.e._
deemed of more importance) than that of any ordinary Afghan chief. It
is certain that there was a strong feeling that it was well to be on
good terms with the representatives of a powerful neighbouring state.
This feeling was greatly weakened by the results of the first Afghan
war, and has never again been completely restored.
Although we are only dealing with Masson as an explorer, it is
impossible not to express sympathy with his whole-hearted admiration
for the country of the Afghan. His description of the beauties of the
land, especially in early spring with the awakening of the season of
flowers, the irresistible charm of the mountain scenery of the
Kohistan as the gradual burst of summer bloom crept upwards over the
hills--all this finds an echo in the heart of every one who has ever
seen this "God granted" land; where, after all, the seething scum of
Afghan politics is very much confined to a class, although it
undoubtedly sinks deeper and reaches the mass of the people with more
of the force of self-interest than is the case in India, where the
historical pageant of kings and dynasties has passed over the great
mass of India's self-absorbed people and left them profoundly
unconscious of its progress.
In the year 1833 Masson resumed his researches in the neighbourhood of
Kabul, commencing in the plains about 25 miles north-east from Kabul,
and 8 or 10 from Charikar. These researches were continued for some
years, until the failure of the mission to Kabul in 1838 obliged him
to leave the country; and in his proposal to resume them again in 1840
he was opposed by "a miserable fraction of the Calcutta clique," who
had recourse to "acts as unprecedented, base, and illegal as perhaps
were ever perpetrated under the sanction of authority against a
subject of the British Crown." So that apparently he claimed British
nationality before he left Afghanistan. However that may be, it is
certain that no subsequent explorer has added much that is of value to
the extraordinary evidences of ancient occupation collected by Masson.
Here, he maintains, once existed the city of Alexandria founded by
Alexander on the Kabul plain; and a recent announcement from Kabul
that the site of an ancient city has been discovered obviously refers
to the same position at Begram near Charikar, and is a useful
commentary on the rapidity with which the fame and name of an original
explorer can disappear.
The Masson collection of coins, which totalled between 15,000 and
20,000 in 1837, and which was presented to the East India Company,
proved a veritable revelation of unknown kings and dynasties, and
contributed enormously to our positive knowledge of Central Asian
history. The vast number of Cufic coins found at Begram show that the
city must have existed for some centuries after the Mahomedan
invasion. Chinese travellers tell of a city called Hupian in this
neighbourhood, but Masson is inclined to place the site of Hupian near
Charikar, where there was, in his time, a village called Malek Hupian.
He thinks that Begram had certainly ceased to exist at the time of
Timur's expedition to India; or that conqueror would not have found it
necessary to construct a canal from the Ghorband stream in order to
colonize this favoured corner of the Kabul plain. The canal still
exists as the Mahighir, and the people of the neighbourhood talked
Turki in Masson's time. Three miles east of Kabul there is another
ancient site known as Begram. This was probably the precursor of Kabul
itself, and other "Begrams" are known in India. The term appears to be
generic and to denote a famous site. Buddhist relics lie thickly round
about the Afghan Begrams, groups of them being very abundant
throughout the Kabul valley.
It was after his first visit to Begram that Masson became acquainted
with M. Honigberger, whom he describes as a gentleman from Lahore bent
on archaeological research; and at the close of the autumn Dr.
Gerard, the companion of Lieut. Burnes, appeared at Kabul.
Honigberger's researches, like those of Gerard, appear to have been
confined to archæology, and the results of them form an interesting
story which was given to the world by Eugene Jacquet; but as neither
of these gentlemen can be said to have contributed to the early
geographical knowledge of the country, no further reference need be
made to them, beyond remarking that Honigberger very narrowly escaped
being murdered on his subsequent journey to Bokhara.
Masson's extraordinary capability of dealing with every class of
people with whom he came in contact, and his consequent apparent
immunity from the dangers which beset the ordinary unaccredited
traveller, should not lead to the assumption that Afghanistan was a
safe country to travel in at the time of our first political
negotiations, in spite of there being less fanaticism at that time;
whilst the trans-Oxus states were then almost unapproachable. There,
at least, the gradual encroachment of Russian civilization has
absolutely altered the conditions of European existence, and Bokhara
has become quite a favourite resort for tourists.
Masson's story of Afghan intrigue, which is the substance of Afghan
history at this period, is as interesting as are his archæological
investigations, for it affords us a view of events which occurred
behind the scenes, shut off from India by the curtain of the frontier
hills; but whilst he thus occupied his busy mind with the past and
the present policy of Afghanistan, he did not lose sight of the
opportunity for making fresh excursions into Afghan territory. His
visits to the Kabul valley and Peshawar can hardly claim to be
original explorations, though he undoubtedly acquired by them a local
geographical knowledge far in advance of anything then existing on the
Indian side of the border, and some of it ranks as authoritative even
now. It must not be supposed that these visits and investigations were
carried on without grave risk and constant difficulty, but by this
time Masson had so wide and so varied a personal acquaintance with the
leading chiefs and tribespeople of the country that he usually
succeeded in distinguishing friend from foe, and extricated himself
from positions which would have been fatal to any one less
knowledgeable than himself.
During the year 1835 we learn that Masson was in Northern Afghanistan,
chiefly at Kabul, gathering information; but there appears to be
hardly a place which now figures in our maps with any prominence in
the Kabul province which he did not succeed in visiting; and as
regards some of them (Kunar, for instance) there was nothing added to
his record for at least sixty years. He penetrated the Alishang valley
to within 12 miles of Najil, a point which no European has succeeded
in reaching since; but his sphere of observation was always too
restricted to enable him to make much of his geographical
opportunities. Najil is now somewhat doubtfully placed on our maps
from native information gathered during the surveys executed with the
Afghan campaign of 1878-80.
It was at this period in Masson's career (in 1835) that English
political interest in Kabul began to take an active shape. About this
time Masson accepted a proposal from the Indian Government (which
reached him through Captain Wade, the political officer on the Punjab
frontier) to act as British agent and keep the Government informed as
to the progress of affairs in Kabul. It is rather surprising that
Masson, who never misses an opportunity of asserting that he was not
an Englishman, and was by no means in sympathy with the policy of the
Indian Government towards Afghanistan, should have accepted this
responsibility. However, he did so, for a time at least, though he
subsequently requested that he might be relieved from the duties
entailed by such an equivocal position. He negotiated the foundation
of a commercial treaty between India and Kabul, but with scant
success. This period of seething intrigue at Kabul (as also between
Dost Mahomed Khan and the Sikhs) was hardly favourable to its
inception. His efforts were duly acknowledged by the Government, but
his position as agent became untenable when he found that it led to
interference with the great object of his residence in Afghanistan,
_i.e._ antiquarian research. We can only touch upon the political
events of 1836-37 cursorily, in spite of their absorbing interest, in
order to follow the sequence of Masson's career.
At the beginning of 1836 the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh were
consolidating their position on the Western Punjab frontier, whilst
Dost Mahomed Khan was working all he knew to secure men and money for
military purposes. This led to a half-hearted renewal of
correspondence between Masson and Wade. The commencement of the year
1837 was marked by active preparations on the part of Dost Mahomed for
a campaign against the Sikhs, resulting in an equivocal victory for
the Afghans near Jamrud under Akbar Khan, but no essential change in
the relative position as regards the Peshawar frontier. Various were
the projects set on foot at this time for the assassination of the
Amir, and in the general network of bloody intrigue Masson was not
overlooked; but he was discreetly absent from Kabul during the winter
of 1836-37, having previously found it necessary to keep his house
full of armed men. He returned to Kabul in the spring.
Towards the end of September 1837 Captain Burnes arrived in Kabul on
that historical commercial mission which was to result in a disastrous
misunderstanding between the Indian Government and the Amir. If we are
to believe Masson, it would be difficult to conceive a more
mismanaged and hopelessly bungled political function than this mission
proved to be; but we must remember that in experience of the Afghan
character and knowledge of intrigue the Indian Government and Council
were by no means experts. It is difficult to believe that the mere
fact of inadequate recognition of his services and consequent
disappointment could have so affected a man of Masson's independence
of character, natural ability, and clear sense of justice, as to lead
him to misrepresent the position absolutely. As a commercial mission
he regarded it as unnecessary.
Burnes was instructed to proceed first to Haidarabad (in Sind) for the
purpose of opening up the Indus to commercial navigation, and thence
to journey _via_ Attok to Peshawar (held by the Sikhs), Kabul, and
Kandahar, back again to Haidarabad, all in the interest of a trade
which was already flourishing between Afghanistan and ports on the
Indus already established. "The Governments of India and of England,"
says Masson, "as well as the public at large were never amused and
deceived by a greater fallacy than that of opening the Indus as
regards commercial objects."
The keynote of Masson's policy was non-interference, so long as
interference either in trade or politics was not forced on the British
Government. At that time such views were undoubtedly sound; but even
then there was a stir in the political atmosphere which betokened much
nervousness in high quarters on the subject of Persian and Russian
intrigues with Afghanistan. So far, however, as Masson observes,
"there was little notion entertained at this time of convulsing
Central Asia, of deposing and setting up Kings, of carrying on wars,
of lavishing treasure, and of the commission of a long train of crimes
and follies." But with the arrival of Burnes at Kabul trade interests
seem to have faded and those of a more active policy to have taken
their place. The weak point in this change of policy appears to have
been the want of definite instructions from the Government of India to
their agent.
The appearance of a Russian officer (Lieut. Vektavitch) at Kabul from
the Russian camp at Herat in December (he had, according to Masson, no
real authority to support him, and could only have been acting as a
spy on Burnes) was a source of much agitation; but nothing whatever
appears to have eventuated from his residence in Kabul, except grave
risk to himself. Masson never believed in the dangers arising from
either Persian or Russian intrigue (and he was certainly in a position
to judge), and he remarks about Vektavitch "that such a man could have
been expected to defeat a British mission is too ridiculous a notion
to be entertained; nor would his mere appearance have produced such a
result had not the mission itself been set forth without instructions
for its guidance, and had it not been conducted recklessly, and in
defiance of all common sense and decorum." This, indeed, is the
attitude assumed by Masson throughout towards the mission, although he
was still in the service of the Indian Government and acting under
Burnes.
Burnes certainly seems to have behaved with great want of dignity in
the presence of the Amir and his Sirdars; making obeisance, and
addressing the Amir as if he were a dependant. Nor can his private
arrangements and his method of living in Kabul be commended as those
of a dignified agent. European manners and customs were looser in
those days in India than they are now, but with all latitude for the
_autres temps autres m[oe]urs_ excuse for his conduct, his ideas of
Eastern life seem to have been almost too oriental even for the
approval of the dissolute Afghan. Certain it is that no proposal made
by him on his own responsibility to the Amir (especially as regards
the cession of Peshawar on the death of Ranjit Singh) was supported by
his Government, and time after time he enjoyed the humiliation of
being obliged to eat his own words. On these occasions it would appear
that Masson seldom omitted the opportunity of saying "I told you so."
In the interests of geographical explorations, this mission of Burnes
was important. Whatever else he was, there is no question that he was
as keen a geographical observer as Masson himself, and even if the
wisdom of the despatch of his assistants (Lieut. Leech to Kandahar,
and Dr. Lord with Lieut. Wood to Badakshan) may be questioned on
political grounds, it led to a series of remarkable explorations, some
of which even now furnish authority for Afghan map-making.
In May 1837, Lieut. Eldred Pottinger arrived on leave from India (with
the interest of his father Sir Henry Pottinger to back him), and
immediately made secret preparations for his adventurous journey
through the Hazarajat from Kabul to Herat, which terminated in his
participation in the defence of Herat against the Persians. Thus was
the first authentic account received of the nature of that difficult
mountain region which has subsequently been so thoroughly exploited.
Afghanistan was just beginning to be known.
Masson naturally disapproved of Pottinger's exploit, for he found
himself in hot water owing to the suspicion that he connived at it. He
says: "I have always thought that however fortunate for Lieut.
Pottinger himself, his trip to Herat was an unlucky one for his
country; the place would have been fought as well without him; and his
presence, which would scarcely be thought accidental, although truly
it was so, must not only have irritated the Persian King, but have
served as a pretext for the more prominent exertions of the Russian
staff. It is certain that when he started from Kabul he had no idea
that the city would be invested by a Persian army." Colonel Stoddart
was then the British agent in the Persian Camp.
Incidentally it may be useful to note the results of the occupation of
Seistan about this time by an Afghan army under Shah Kamran, Governor
of Herat and brother to Dost Mahomed; the one brother, in fact, whom
he feared the most. Kamran's army had threatened Kandahar in the early
spring and had spread into Seistan. Here the cavalry horses perished
from disease, and the finest force which had marched from Herat for
years was placed absolutely _hors de combat_. Unable to obtain the
assistance of the army in the field, the frontier fortress of Ghorian
surrendered, and thus reduced Kamran to the necessity of retirement on
Herat and sustaining a siege. The destructive climate of Seistan has
evidently not greatly changed during the last century.
Masson's view of the policy best adapted to the tangled situation was
the surrender of Peshawur to Sultan Mahomed Khan (the Amir's brother),
who already enjoyed half its revenues, which would have been an
acceptable proposition to the Sikh chief, Ranjit Singh (who found the
occupation of Peshawar a most profitless undertaking), and would at
the same time have reconciled the chiefs at Kandahar. The Amir Dost
Mahomed would have reconciled himself to a situation which he could
not avoid and the Indian Government would have enjoyed the credit of
establishing order on their frontiers on a tolerably sure basis
without committing themselves to any alliance, for (he writes) "my
experience has brought me to the decided opinion that any strict
alliance with powers so constituted would prove only productive of
mischief and embarrassment, while I still thought that British
influence might be usefully exerted in preserving the integrity of the
several states and putting their rulers on their good behaviour."
Subsequent events proved the soundness of these views, but we must
remember that Masson wrote "after the event." That he did, however,
strongly counsel Burnes to make no promise in the name of his
Government of the cession of Peshawar to the Amir on the death of
Ranjit Singh, is clear, and it is impossible to say how far the
disappointment felt by the Amir at the refusal of the Indian
Government to ratify this promise may have affected his subsequent
actions. Masson thinks that Burnes should have been recalled, but he
admits the difficulty that beset him owing to want of instructions.
"The folly of sending such a man as Captain Burnes without the fullest
and clearest instructions was now shown," etc. etc. It is surprising
that with his confidence in the ability of his immediate Chief so
absolutely destroyed, he should have continued to serve under him.
Finally, on April 26, Burnes and Masson left Kabul together in a hurry
and were subsequently joined by Lord and Wood, and "thus closed a
mission, one of the most extraordinary ever sent forth by a
Government, whether as to the singular manner in which it was
conducted, or as to the results." Shortly after Masson resigned an
appointment under the Government of India which he stigmatises as
"disagreeable and dishonourable." It was a pity that he held it so
long.
When Masson reached India he found that the Government had already
decided to restore the refugee Shah Sujah to the throne of Kabul, and
that a military expedition to Kandahar had been arranged. What he has
to say about the manner of this arrangement and the nature of the
influence brought to bear on Lord Auckland to bring it about is not
more pleasant reading than is his story of the Kabul Mission. This
tale, indeed, does not belong to the history of exploration any
further than to indicate under what conditions the first military
geographical knowledge of Farther Afghanistan was gained by such true
explorers as Pottinger, Lord, and Wood; and what amount of actually
new information was attained by Burnes' mission. This was very
considerable, as we shall see when we follow Burnes' assistants into
the field. Meanwhile we have not quite done with Masson.
The closing incidents of the career of this remarkable man, as an
explorer, call for little more comment. Once again, in the year
preceding the disastrous termination to our first occupation of Kabul,
did he make Karachi and Sonmiani his base of departure for a fresh
venture in behalf of archæological research in Afghanistan. It was his
intention to proceed to Kandahar and Kabul, but his plans were
frustrated by as remarkable a series of incidents as could well have
barred the progress of any traveller. The Government of India,
instigated by reports which (according to Masson) were the results of
local intrigue and were palpably false, considered itself justified in
an expedition to Kalat and the deposition of its Brahui chief, Mehrab
Khan. This expedition was successfully carried out by General
Wiltshire, and Mehrab Khan was killed in the defence of his citadel.
Subsequently a British agent, Lieut. Loveday, was appointed to Kalat,
and Masson found him there on his arrival from Sonmiani. Masson's
description of him and of his crude political methods is not
flattering, and his weak surrender of Kalat to the badly armed Brahui
rabble who attacked the place in the interests of the late Khan's son
was certainly disgraceful. That surrender, which was only wiped out by
Nott's advance on Kalat, and the final suppression of the Brahui
revolt, cost Loveday his life, and placed Masson in deadly peril. He,
however, succeeded in reaching Quetta, where Captain Bean was in
political charge; but this officer not only put him into confinement
but treated him with positive barbarity.
It is difficult to understand the political view of Masson's existence
in Baluchistan. If any man was capable of unriddling the network of
intrigue that occupied all the Baluch chiefs at this time, or could
bring anything of personal influence to bear on them, it was
undoubtedly Masson, and something of his history was at any rate
known. But he had resigned service under the Indian Government as
"disagreeable and dishonourable," and his reappearance at a time when
all Baluchistan was in the ferment of seething revolt was perhaps
regarded with suspicion. It is also quite conceivable that the local
political officer regarded him simply as an interloping loafer, and,
until he became better acquainted with Masson's character and ability,
would be no more likely to pay him attention than would any political
officer on the frontier to-day who suddenly found himself confronted
with a European in native dress with no valid explanation of his
appearance under very ambiguous circumstances. The days were not long
past when European loafers of any nationality whatsoever could, and
did, find not only service, but distinction, in the courts and armies
of native chiefs who were hostile to British interests. One can only
gather from Masson's strange story that there was no officer in the
British political service at that time with intuition sufficient to
enable him to appraise the situation correctly, or make use of other
experience than his own.
Here, however, we must leave Masson. As an explorer in Afghanistan he
stands alone. His work has never been equalled; but owing to the very
unsatisfactory methods adopted by all explorers in those days for the
recording of geographical observations it cannot be said that his
contribution to exact geographical knowledge was commensurate with
his extraordinary capacity as an observant traveller, or his
remarkable industry.
It is as a critic on the political methods of the Government of India
that Masson's records are chiefly instructive. Hostile critics of
Indian administrative methods usually belong to one of two classes.
They are either uninformed, notoriety-seeking demagogues playing to a
certain party gallery at home, or they are disappointed servants of
the Government, by whom they consider that their merits have been
overlooked. To this latter class it must be conceded that Masson
belonged, in spite of his expressed contempt for government service.
Thus the virulence of his attacks on the ignorance and fatuity of the
political officials with whom he was brought in contact must be freely
discounted, because of the obvious animus which pervades them. Still
it is to be feared there is too much reason to believe that private
interest was the recommendation which carried most weight in the
appointment of unfledged officers, both civil and military, to
political duty on the Indian frontier. These gentlemen took the field
without experience, and without that which might to a certain extent
take the place of experience, viz. an education in the main principles
both social and economical which govern the conditions of existence of
the people with whom they had to deal. A knowledge of political
economy, law, and languages is not enough to enable the young
administrator to take his place on the frontier, if he knows not
enough of the characteristics of the frontier tribes-people to enable
him to maintain the dignity of his position. Even physically there are
qualifications which are not always regarded as useful, which make for
strong influence and good government. A man may be physically powerful
enough to use his strength in fair contest to the immense enhancement
of his personal prestige, but he must not strike a blow where the blow
cannot be returned; and above all he must not endeavour to conciliate
by a silly display of obsequious attention, unless he is prepared to
sacrifice all his personal influence and destroy the respect due to
his office.
Setting aside Masson's sentiments of disgust and horror (which he
really felt) that the fate of men should have been placed at the mercy
of the political officers in whom, at that time, Lord Auckland was
pleased to repose confidence, and his assertions that "on me developed
the task to obtain satisfaction for the insults some of these shallow
and misguided men thought fit to practise," his own account of the
extraordinary complexity of intrigue, and the unfathomable abyss of
deceit and crime which distinguished the political field of native
Baluchistan, is quite enough to account for much of their failure to
deal with the situation. At the same time, it is a strong indication
of the necessity for a sounder system of political education than any
which now exists. Possibly a time may come when we shall cease to see
systems of administration suitable to the plains applied to frontier
mountaineers, or, for that matter, the foreign methods of India
hammered into the nomadic pastoral peoples of other continents than
Asia, where they are wholly inapplicable.