THE RIVAL POLICIES
In face of this Teutonic control of the world's trade, politics and
news supply, the Great Powers whose outlook, political and economic,
was most nearly affected, exhibited a degree of supineness which can
only be adequately explained by such assumptions as one would gladly
eliminate. Anyhow the lessons conveyed by eloquent facts fell upon
deaf ears. Yet it was manifest, in view of Germany's ingenious
combination of economics and politics, and the irresistible
co-operation of the State and individuals in applying it, that the
slipshod methods of Britain and France could no longer be persisted in
without grave danger to these states. To deal with trade and industry
as though they were matters that concerned only the particular
business firms engaged in them was no longer an economical error, it
was also a political blunder. To Government meddling in trade and
industry the British people have ever been averse. And their dislike
is intelligible although no longer warranted. A glance at Germany's
economic campaign and its results ought to have borne out the thesis
that individual self-reliance and push are unavailing to cope with a
potent organism equipped scientifically, provided with large capital
and backed by the resources of diplomacy. New epochs call for fresh
methods, and the era of commercial and industrial individualism was
closed years ago by the German people. Co-ordination of effort, the
combination of politics with economics, and unity of direction were
among Germany's methods in the contest, and she adopted them in the
grounded belief that commerce and industry lie at the nethermost roots
of the vast political movements of the new era.
This is a century of co-operation, of joint efforts for common
interests, of union in trade, industry, labour, politics and war. To
stand aloof is to be isolated, and isolation means helplessness
against danger. Germany was the first Power to grasp these facts, to
understand the new phase of life and to adapt herself to it. For this
work of readjustment her people were specially endowed by Nature, and
in their equipment for the task they saw a mark of election set upon
them by their "old God." For the correlate of co-operation is talent
for organization, and with this the Teutons are plentifully gifted.
They feel impelled as it were by instinct to push forward much further
on the road already traversed by all nations from isolation to
individualism through gregariousness. They opened the new era of
amalgamation by co-ordinating, on a vast scale, individual
achievements, resources and labour, and directing them to a common
end. The allied peoples were meanwhile content to muddle through in
the old way. This difference explains much that seems puzzling in the
outcome of the struggle.
It has been affirmed somewhat off-handedly that the Latin and British
peoples, incapable of united and organized effort, have halted at the
individualist stage. They are supposed to lack the bump of
organization. According to this theory among the Germans, who had
passed through all the intermediate phases and carried individualism
to sinister extremes in the past, a reaction set in which called forth
the latent powers of organization which they possess. And these have
been wielded with brilliant results ever since the unity of the German
Empire was first established. Applying the new principle to politics,
the statesmen of Berlin grasped the fact that all future conflicts in
Europe would be waged by coalitions. Neither Austria-Hungary alone nor
the German Empire alone could undertake a world war. That was the
genesis of the scheme of welding the two central empires in one
politico-military entity and then attracting as many other States as
possible into their orbit. And the enterprise was conducted so
ingeniously that when war was declared, Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey
were tied to the Triple Alliance. And henceforward, whatever the
outcome of the war may be, the permanent fusion of Germany and Austria
is a foregone conclusion.
By the means described a state of things, actual and potential, was
established which rendered Germany's military attack on Europe much
less hazardous and doubtful a venture than was at first supposed. For
there was not a country on the globe which she or her ally had not
subjected to the process of interpenetration, nor was there one which
had remained wholly irresponsive. Even Brazil, Chili, Peru, China,
Morocco, Persia, Abyssinia, had all experienced its effects. And when
at last the harvest-time was come and its fruits were to be
ingathered Germany felt that she could count to varying extents on the
active sympathy and support of governments, parliaments and nations;
on the Turks, the Swiss, the Swedes, the Bulgarians, the Roumanians;
on the autocratic ruler of the Greeks and on millions of
American-Germans. Every independent religious centre was permeated
with an atmosphere composed in Germany. The Caliph and the
Sheikh-ul-Islam of the Moslems, the evangelical preachers of the
Russian Baltic provinces, Brahmins in India, subjects of the Negus of
Abyssinia, the Jews of western Russia and Poland, as well as those of
the Netherlands, the Catholics of Switzerland, Holland and Italy, nay,
the Vatican itself, raised their voices in the chorus of the millions
who sang hosannah to the Highest.[63]
[63] The Highest of All is the official designation of the
Kaiser: der Allerhoechste.
Dismay was the feeling aroused among the Allies by the quick dramatic
moves which precipitated the war. The trump of doom seemed to have
sounded at a moment when mankind was on the point of discovering the
secret of immortality. The utter unpreparedness of the Allies was the
dominant note of the new situation, and its manifestations were
countless and disastrous. There was no adequate British expeditionary
army to send on foreign service, and there existed no machinery by
which such a force could quickly be got together and trained.
Voluntary enlistment was a slowly moving mechanism, and even if it
could be made to work more rapidly, there was no way of employing the
new soldiers, for whom there were neither barracks nor uniforms nor
rifles in sufficiency. And if all these requirements could have been
improvised, there were no generals accustomed to handle armies of
millions. And even if all those wants had been supplied to hand there
was no Government enterprising enough to put them to the best
advantage of the nation. Moreover, colonial expeditions were the most
extensive military operations which the country had carried on within
the memory of the present generation, and it was beyond the power of
the authorities not only to organize the imperial defences on an
adequate scale but even to realize the necessity of attempting the
feat. In a word, the prospect could hardly have been more dismal.
In France it was a degree less cheerless, but still decidedly bleak.
Mobilization there went forward, it is claimed, more smoothly than had
been anticipated, but not rapidly enough to enable adequate forces to
be dispatched in time against the German military flood. The
organization of the railway system was most inefficient. And had it
not been for heroic Belgium, who, confronted with the alternatives of
ruin with honour and safety with ignominy, unhesitatingly chose the
better part, the inrush of the Teutons would, it is asserted by
military experts, have swept away every obstacle that lay between them
and the French capital, which was their first objective. Belgium's
magnificent resistance thus saved Paris, gave breathing space to the
French, and enabled the Allies to swing their sword before smiting.
Russia, too, did better than had been augured of her, but not nearly
as well as if her resources had been organized by competent experts,
alive to the dangers that threatened the empire. On the eve of the war
a process of fermentation among the working men of her two capitals
was coming to a head, and a revolt, if not a revolution, was being
industriously organized. The movement had certainly been fostered, and
probably originated, by wealthy German employers in Petrograd, Moscow
and other industrial centres. They had hoped to frustrate the
mobilization order, retard Russia's entry into the field, and possibly
bring about civil strife. And they were within an ace of succeeding.
On the very eve of hostilities reports reached Berlin and Vienna that
the revolution was already beginning. But the declaration of war
against Germany purified the air, absorbed the redundant energies of
the people, and fused all classes and parties into a whole-hearted,
single-minded nation, giving Russia a degree of union which she had
not enjoyed since Napoleon's invasion. But, separated from her allies,
she went her own way without much reference to theirs. Her plans had
been drafted by her military leaders, and might be modified by local
conditions or subsequent vicissitudes, but were neither co-ordinated
nor even synchronized with those of France and Britain. Thus the first
and most important lesson had still to be mastered.
Liege and Namur having fallen, the danger to Paris struck terror to
the hearts of the French, and the public mind was being gradually
prepared by the Press to receive the depressing tidings of its capture
with dignified calm. The occupation of the capital, it was argued,
would not essentially weaken the military strength of the Republic.
For the army would still be intact, and that was the essential point.
Here, for the first time, one notes the almost invincible force of the
antiquated opinions to which the Allies still tenaciously clung about
warfare as modified by Germany. No misgivings were harboured that the
enemy might threaten to burn the capital city if the army refused to
capitulate, or that he was capable of carrying out such a threat. War
in its old guise, hedged round with traditions of chivalry, with
humanitarian restrictions, with international laws, was how the French
and their allies conceived it. And it was in that spirit that they
made their forecasts and regulated their own behaviour towards the
enemy.
The rise of Generals Joffre, Castelnau and Foch and the retreat of the
German invaders raised the Allies from the depths of despair to a
degree of confidence bordering on presumption. After the departure of
the Belgian Government to Antwerp,[64] the occupation of Brussels,[65]
the defeat of the Austrian army by the Serbs and the rout of three
German army corps by the Russians,[66] the Western Allies conceived
high hopes of the military prowess of the Slavs, and looked to them
for the decisive action which would speedily bring the Teutons to
their knees. And for a time Russia's continued progress seemed to
justify these hopes. Her troops entered Insterburg[67] and pushed on
to Koenigsberg, which they invested and threatened,[68] and in the
south they scored a series of remarkable successes in Galicia. But in
the west of Europe the Allies could at most but retard without
arresting the advance of the Germans, whose aim was to defeat the
French and then concentrate all their efforts on the invasion of the
Tsardom. Despite assurances of an optimistic tenor there appeared to
be no serious hope of defending Paris, nor were effective local
measures adopted for the purpose; and on September 3 the French
Government, against the insistent advice of three experienced Cabinet
Ministers, suddenly moved to Bordeaux, and earned for itself the
nickname of _tournedos a la bordelaise_. On the same historic day the
Tsar's troops triumphantly entered Lemberg, restored to that city its
ancient name of Lvoff, and proceeded to introduce the Russian system
of administration there with all its traditional characteristics. But
in lieu of conferring full powers on the Governor of the conquered
province, a man of broad views and conciliatory methods, the
Government dispatched a narrow-minded official, devoid of natural
ability, of administrative training, and of the sobering consciousness
of his own defects, and listened to his recommendations. For Russia,
like France and Britain, still contemplated the situation and its
potentialities through the distorting medium of the old order of
things. Their orientation had undergone no change.
[64] August 17, 1914.
[65] August 20, 1914.
[66] August 22, 1914.
[67] August 23, 1914.
[68] August 29, 1914.
One of the immediate consequences of Russian rule in Galicia was to
confirm the Vatican in its belief that Austria offered Catholicism far
more trustworthy guarantees for its unhindered growth than could ever
be expected from the Tsardom.
The famous battle of the Marne[69] infused new energies into the
Allies, whose Press organs forthwith took to discussing the terms on
which peace might be vouchsafed to the Teutons, and in these
stipulations a spirit of magnanimity was displayed towards the enemy
which at any rate served to show how little his temper was understood
and how enormously his resources were underrated. Soon, however, the
mist of ignorance began to lift, and saner notions of the stern
interplay of the tidal forces at work were borne in upon the leaders
of the allied peoples. One of the first discoveries to be made was the
enormous consumption of ammunition required by latter-day warfare and
the ease with which the Germans were able to meet this increased
demand. That this enormous advantage was the result of scientific
organization was patent to all. Nor could it be ignored that an
essential element of that organization was the militarization of all
workmen whose services were needed by the State. But from the lesson
thus inculcated to its application in practice there was an abyss. And
as yet that abyss has not been bridged. The most formidable obstacle
in the way is offered by the shackles of party politics, which still
hamper the leaders of the Entente Powers, and in particular of Great
Britain. Industrial compulsion has not yet been moved into the field
of practical politics.
[69] September 12, 1914.
One of Germany's calculations was that, however superior to her own
resources those of her adversaries might be, they were not likely to
be mobilized, concentrated and brought to bear upon the front.
Consequently they would not tell upon the result. Military discipline
had not impregnated any of the allied nations, whose ideas of
personal liberty and dignity would oppose an insurmountable obstacle
to that severe discipline which was essential to military success.
Great Britain, they believed, would cling to her ingrained notions of
the indefeasible right of the British workman to strike and of the
British citizen to hold back from military service. And the telegrams
announcing that in the United Kingdom the cries of "business as
usual," "sport as usual," "strikes as usual," "voluntary enlistment as
usual," indicated the survival of the antiquated spirit of
individualism into a new order of things which peremptorily called for
co-operation and iron discipline, were received in Berlin and Vienna
with undisguised joy. The persistence of this spirit has been the
curse of the Allies ever since.