CHAPTER II

THE GERMAN SYSTEM OF PREPARATION

On the historic third of August when war was formally declared, its

nature was as little understood by the Allies as had been its

imminence. The statesmen who had to full-front its manifestations were

those who had persistently refused to believe in its possibility, and

who had no inkling of its nature and momentousness. Most of them,

judging other peoples by their own, had formed a high opinion of the

character of the German nation and of the pacific intentions of its

Government, and continued to ground their policy in war time on this

generous estimate, which even when upset by subsequent experience

still seems to linger on in a subconscious but not inoperative state.

At first their preparations to meet the emergency hardly went beyond

the expedients to which they would have resorted for any ordinary

campaign. In this they resembled a sea-captain who should make ready

to encounter a gale when his ship was threatened by a typhoon. Hence

their unco-ordinated efforts, their chivalrous treatment of a

dastardly foe, their high-minded refusal to credit the circumstantial

stories of sickening savagery emanating first from Belgium and then

from France, their gentle remonstrances with the enemy, their

carefully worded arguments, their generous understatement of their

country's case, and their suppression of any emotion among their own

folk akin to hatred or passion. In an insular people for whom peace

was an ideal, neighbourliness a sacred duty, and the psychology of

foreign nations a sealed book, this way of reading the bearings of the

new situation and adjusting them to the nation's requirements was

natural and fateful.

To the few private individuals who had the advantage of experience and

were gifted with political vision the crisis presented itself under a

different aspect. Some of them had foreseen and foretold the war,

basing their forecast on the obvious policy of the German Government

and on the overt strivings of the German nation. They had depicted

that nation as intellectual and enterprising, abundantly equipped with

all the requisites for an exhausting contest, fired with enthusiasm

for a single idea--the subjugation of the world--and devoid of ethical

scruple. And in the clarion's blast which suddenly resounded on the

pacific air they recognized the trump of doom for Teuton Kultur or

European civilization, and proclaimed the utter inadequacy of ordinary

methods to put down this titanic rebellion against the human race.

That has been the gist of every opinion and suggestion on the subject

put forward by the writer of these lines since the outbreak of the

war.

But even without these repeated warnings it should have been clear

that a carefully calculating people like the Germans, in whom the gift

of organizing is inborn and solicitude for detail is a passion, would

not embark on a preventive war without having first established a just

proportion between their own equipment for the struggle and the

magnitude of the issues dependent on its outcome. It was, further,

reasonable to assume that this was no mere onset of army against army

and navy against navy according to the old rules of the game, but a

mobilization by the two military empires of all their resources--military,

naval, financial, economic, industrial, scientific and journalistic--to

be utilized to the fullest for the destruction of the Entente group.

It was also easy to discern that, whichever side was worsted, the

Europe which had witnessed the beginning of the conflict would be

transfigured at its close, and that Germany would, therefore, not

allow her freedom of action in conducting the war to be cramped by

sentimental respect for the checks and restraints of a political

system that was already dead. Lastly, it might readily be inferred

that the huge resources hoarded up by the enemy during forty years of

preparation would be centupled in value by the favourable conditions

which rendered them capable of being co-ordinated and directed by a

single will to the attainment of a single end. All these previsions,

warranted then by unmistakable tokens, have since been justified by

historic events, and it is to be hoped that the practical conclusions

to which they point may sink into the minds of the allied nations as

well as of their Governments, now that nearly two years have gone by

since they were first expressed.

The earliest impression which German mobilization left upon the Allies

was that of the preventive character of this war. For it could have

had no other mainspring than a resolve to paralyse the arm of the

Entente, which, if allowed to wax stronger, might smite in lieu of

being smitten. For the moment, however, Germany was neither attacked

nor menaced. Far from that, her rivals were vying with each other in

their strivings to maintain peace. Her condition was prosperous, her

industries thriving, her colonial possessions had recently been

greatly increased, her influence on the affairs of the world was

unquestioned, her citizens were materially well-to-do, her workmen

were highly paid, her capitalists, seconding her statesmen and

diplomatists, had, with gold extracted from France, Britain and

Belgium, woven a vast net in the fine meshes of which most of the

nations of Europe, Asia and America were being insensibly trammelled.

Already her bankers handled the finances, regulated the industries and

influenced the politics of those tributary peoples. And by these

tactics a relationship was established between Germany and most states

of the globe which cut deep into the destinies of these and is become

an abiding factor of the present contest. For that reason, and also

because of the paramount influence of the economic factor on the

results of the struggle, they are well worth studying.

To her superior breadth of outlook, marvellous organizing powers, the

hearty co-operation between rulers and people, and the ease with

which, unhampered by parliamentary opposition, her Government was

enabled to place a single aim at the head and front of its national

policy, Germany is perhaps more deeply indebted for her successes

during the first phases of the campaign than to the strategy of

Hindenburg or the furious onslaughts of Mackensen. German diplomacy

has been ridiculed for its glaring blunders, and German statesmanship

discredited for its cynical contempt of others' rights and its own

moral obligations. And gauged by our ethical standards the blame

incurred was richly deserved. But we are apt to forget that German

diplomacy has two distinct aspects--the professional and the

economic--and that where the one failed the other triumphed. And if

success be nine-tenths of justification, as the Prussian doctrine

teaches, the statesmen who preside over the destinies of the Teutonic

peoples have little to fear in the way of strictures from their

domestic critics. For they left nothing to chance that could be

ensured by effort. Trade, commerce, finances, journalism, science,

religion, the advantages to be had by royal marriages, by the

elevation of German princes to the thrones of the lesser states, had

all been calculated with as much care and precision as the choice of

sites in foreign countries for the erection of concrete emplacements

for their monster guns. No detail seemed too trivial for the bestowal

of conscientious labour, if it promised a possible return. When in

doubt whether it was worth while to make an effort for some object of

no immediate interest to the Fatherland the German invariably decided

that the thing should be done. "You never can tell," he argued, "when

or how it may prove useful." For years one firm of motor-car makers

turned out vehicles with holes, the object of which no one could guess

until the needs of the war revealed them as receptacles for light

machine-guns.

Nearly two years of an unparalleled struggle between certain isolated

forces of the Allies and all the combined resources of the Teutons

ought to banish the notion that the results achieved are the fruits

only of Germany's military and naval efficiency. In truth, the

adequacy of her military and naval forces constitutes but an integral

part of a much vaster system. It has hitherto been the fashion among

British and French writers to dwell exclusively on the comprehensiveness

of the measures adopted by the Germans to fashion their land and sea

defences into destructive implements of enormous striking power and

scientific precision. But the German conception of the enterprise was

immeasurably more grandiose. It included every means of offence and

defence actually available or yet to be devised, and testifies to a

grasp of the nature of the problem which, so far as one can judge, has

not even yet been attained outside the Fatherland. As the present

situation and its coming developments present themselves as practical

corollaries of causes which the leaders of Germany rendered operative,

it may not be amiss to describe these briefly.

The objective being the subjugation of Europe to Teutonic sway, the

execution of the plan was attempted by two different sets of measures,

each of which supplemented the other: military and naval efficiency on

the one hand and pacific interpenetration on the other. The former has

been often and adequately described; the latter has not yet attracted

the degree of attention it merits. For one thing, it was

unostentatious and invariably tinged with the colour of legitimate

trade and industry. Practically every country in Europe, and many

lands beyond the seas, were covered with networks of economic

relations which, without being always emanations of the governmental

brain, were never devoid of a definite political purpose. While Great

Britain, and in a lesser degree France, distracted by parliamentary

strife or intent on domestic reforms, left trade and commerce to

private initiative and the law of supply and demand, the German

Government watched over all big commercial transactions, interwove

them with political interests, and regarded every mark invested in a

foreign country not merely as capital bringing in interest in the

ordinary way, but also as political seed bearing fruit to be

ingathered when _Der Tag_ should dawn. Thus France and Britain

advanced loans to various countries--to Greece, for instance--at lower

rates of interest than the credit of those states warranted, but they

bargained for no political gain in return. Germany, on the contrary,

insisted on every such transaction being paid in political or economic

advantages as well as pecuniary returns. And by these means she tied

the hands of most European nations with bonds twisted of strands which

they themselves were foolish enough to supply. Italy, Russia, Turkey,

Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Belgium and the Scandinavian States are

all instructive instances of this plan. Bankers and their staffs,

directors of works and factories, agents of shipping companies,

commercial travellers, German colonies in various foreign cities,

military instructors to foreign armies, schools and schoolmasters

abroad, heads of commercial houses in the different capitals, were all

so many agencies toiling ceaselessly for the same purpose. The effect

of their manoeuvres was to extract from all those countries the

wealth needed for their subjugation. One of the most astounding

instances of the success of these hardy manipulations is afforded by

the Banca Commerciale of Italy, which was a thoroughly German concern,

holding in its hands most of the financial establishments, trades and

industries of Italy. This all-powerful institution possessed in 1914 a

capital of L6,240,000 of which 63 per cent. was subscribed by Italian

shareholders, 20 per cent. by Swiss, 14 per cent. by French, and only

2-1/2 per cent. by Germans and Austrians combined! And the astounding

exertions put forward by the Germans during the first twelvemonth of

the war are largely the product of the economic energies which this

line of action enabled them to store up during the years of peace and

preparation.

The execution of those grandiose schemes was facilitated by the easy

access which Germany had to the principal markets of the globe. One of

the main objects of her diplomacy had been to break down the tariff

barriers which would have reserved to the great trading empires the

main fruits of their own labour and enterprise. By the Treaty of

Frankfort the French had been compelled to confer on Germany the

most-favoured-nation clause, thus entitling her to enjoy all the

tariff reductions which the Republic might accord to those countries

with which it was on the most amicable terms. British free trade

opened wide the portals of the world's greatest empire to a deluge of

Teuton wares and to a kind of competition which contrasted with fair

play in a degree similar to that which now obtains between German

methods of warfare and our own. Russia, at first insensible to suasion

and rebellious to threats, endeavoured to bar the way to the economic

flood on her western frontiers, but during the stress of the Japanese

war she chose the lesser of two evils and yielded. The concessions

then made by my friend, the late Count Witte, to the German

Chancellor, drained the Tsardom of enormous sums of money and rendered

it a tributary to the Teuton. But it did much more. It supplied

Germany with a satisfactory type of commercial treaty which she easily

imposed upon other nations. Germany's road through Italy was traced by

the mistaken policy of the French Government which, by a systematic

endeavour to depreciate Italian consols and other securities, drove

Crispi to Berlin, where his suit for help was heard, the Banca

Commerciale conceived, and commercial arrangements concluded which

opened the door to the influx of German wares, men and political

ideals.

A few years sufficed for the fruits of this generous hospitality to

reveal themselves. The influx of wealth and the increased population

helped to render the German army a match for the combined land forces

of her rivals, a formidable navy was created, which ranked immediately

after that of Great Britain, and a large part of Europe was so closely

associated with, and dependent on, Germany that an extension of the

Zollverein was talked of in the Fatherland, and a league of European

brotherhood advocated by the day-dreamers of France and Britain. The

French, however, never ceased to chafe at the commercial chain forged

by the Treaty of Frankfort, but were powerless to break it, while the

British lavished tributes of praise and admiration on Germany's

enterprise, and construed it as a pledge of peace. Russia, alive to

the danger, at last summoned up courage to remove it, and had already

decided to refuse to extend the term of the ruinous commercial treaty,

even though the alternative were war. That was the danger which

stimulated the final efforts of the Kaiser's Government.

Thus the entire political history of Entente diplomacy during this war

may be summarized as a series of attempts on the part of the Allies to

undo some of the effects of the masterstrokes executed by Germany

during the years of abundance which she owed to the favoured-nation

clause, British free trade and kindred economic concessions.

Interpenetration is the term by which the process has been known ever

since Count Witte essayed it in Manchuria and China.

The German procedure was simple, yet effective withal. Funds were

borrowed mainly in France, Britain, Belgium, where investors are often

timid and bankers are unenterprising. And then operations were begun.

The first aim pursued and attained was to acquire control of the

foreign trade of the country experimented on. With this object in view

banks of credit were established which lavished on German traders

every help, information and encouragement. Men of Teuton nationality

settled in the land as heads of firms, as clerks without salary,

private secretaries, foremen, correspondents, and rapidly contrived to

get command of the main arteries of the economic organism. German

manufactures soon flooded the country, because those who undertook to

import them could count on extensive credit from the institutions

founded with the money of the very nations whose trade they were

engaged in killing. In this way the competition, not only of all

Entente peoples but also of the natives of the country experimented

on, was systematically choked. And the customers of these banks,

natives as well as Teutons, became apostles of German influence.

Insensibly the great industrial concerns of the place passed into the

possession of German banks, behind which stood the German empire. A

nucleus of influential business people, having been thus equipped for

action, incessantly propagated the German political faith. German

schools were established and subsidized by the _Deutscher

Schulverein_, clubs opened, musical societies formed, and newspapers

supported or founded, to consolidate the achievements of the

financiers. On political circles, especially in constitutional lands,

the influence of this Teutonic phalanx was profound and lasting.

In all these commercial and industrial enterprises undertaken abroad

for economic gain and political influence, the German State, its

organs and the individual firms, went hand in hand, supplementing each

other's endeavours. The maxim they adopted was that of their military

commanders: to advance separately but to attack in combination. Not

only the Consul, but the Ambassador, the Minister, the Scholar, the

Statesman, nay the Kaiser[1] himself, were the inspirers, the

partners, the backers of the German merchant. Marschall von

Bieberstein once told me in Constantinople that his functions were

those of a super-commercial traveller rather than ambassadorial. And

he discharged them with efficiency. Laws and railway tariffs at home,

diplomatic facilities and valuable information abroad smoothed the way

of the Teuton trader. Berlin rightly gauged the worth of this pacific

interpenetration at a time when Britons were laughing it to scorn as a

ludicrous freak of grandmotherly government. To-day its results stand

out in relief as barriers to the progress of the Allies in the conduct

of the war.

[1] The Kaiser is one of the largest shareholders in the

great mercury mines of Italy.

Of this ingenious way of enslaving foreign nations unknown to

themselves, Italy's experience offers us an instructive illustration.

The headquarters of the German commercial army in that realm were the

offices of the Banca Commerciale in Milan. This institution was

founded under the auspices of the Berlin Foreign Office, with the

co-operation of Herr Schwabach, head of the bank of Bleichroeder.

Employing the absurdly small capital of two hundred thousand pounds,

not all of which was German, it worked its way at the cost of the

Italian people into the vitals of the nation, and finally succeeded in

obtaining the supreme direction of their foreign trade, national

industries and finances, and in usurping a degree of political

influence so durable that even the war is supposed to have only numbed

it for a time.

Between the years 1895 and 1915 the capital of this institution had

augmented to the sum of L6,240,000, of which Germany and Austria

together held but 2-1/2 per cent., while controlling all the

operations of the Bank itself and of the trades and industries linked

with it.

The Germans, as a Frenchman wittily remarked, are born with the mania

of annexation. It runs in their blood. And it is not merely territory,

or political influence, or the world's markets that they seek to

appropriate. Their appetite extends to everything in the present and

future, nay, even in the past which they deem worth having. It is thus

that they claim as their own most of Italy's great men, such as Dante,

Giotto, Leonardo da Vinci, Botticelli, Galileo, and it is now asserted

by a number of Teuton writers that Christ Himself came of a Teutonic

stock.

German organisms, as well as German statesmen, display the same mania

of annexation, and the Banks in especial give it free scope. German

banks differ from French, British and Italian in the nature, extent

and audacity of their operations. It was not always thus. Down to the

war of 1870 their methods were old-fashioned, cautious and slow. From

the year 1872 onward, however, they struck out a new and bold course

of their own from which British and French experts boded speedy

disaster. Private enterprises were turned into joint stock companies,

the capital of prosperous undertakings was increased and gigantic

operations were inaugurated. Between the years 1885 and 1889 the

industrial values issued each year reached an average of 1,770 million

francs; between 1890 and 1895 the average rose to 1,880 millions, and

from 1896 to 1900 it was computed at 2,384 millions.[2]

[2] Cf. _L'Invasione tedesca in Italia_. Ezio M. Gray.

Firenze.

Of all German financial institutions the most influential and

prosperous is the Deutsche Bank. It has been aptly termed an empire

within the empire. Its capital, 250 million francs, exceeds that of

the Reichsbank by thirty millions. It is the first of the six great

German banks, of which four are known as the "D" group, because the

first letter of their respective names is D: Deutsche Bank, Dresdner

Bank, Disconto-Gesellschaft and Darmstaedter Bank. The other two are

the Schaffhausenscher Bankverein and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft.

The total capital of these six concerns amounts to 1,100 million

francs.[3]

[3] _Op. cit._, p. 113.

None of these houses is hampered by those rules, traditions or

scruples which limit the activity of British joint stock banks. They

are free to launch into speculations which, to the sober judgment of

our own financiers, must seem wild and precarious, but to which

success has affixed the hall-mark of approval. Each of the six banks

is a centre of German home industries and also of the foreign

transformations of these. To mention an industry is almost always to

connote some one of the six. Before the war broke out one had but to

gaze steadily at the beautiful facade of this or that Russian bank to

discern the Lamia-like monster from the banks of the Spree. The famous

firm of Krupps, for instance, had its affairs closely interwoven with

those of the Berliner Disconto Gesellschaft, and was more than once

rescued from bankruptcy by its timely assistance. Similar help was

afforded to the celebrated firm of Bauer which is known throughout the

world for its synthetical medicines. There were critical moments in

its existence when it was confronted with ruin. The Bank extricated

the firm from its difficulties, and the present dividend of 33 per

cent. has justified its enterprise.

In this way the latter-day German banks upset all financial

traditions, opened large credits to industries, smoothed the way for

the spread of German commerce, killed foreign competition and

seconded the national policy of their Government. As an instance of

the push and audacity of these modernized institutions, a master

stroke of the Bank of Behrens and Sons of Hamburg may be mentioned: it

bought up the entire coffee crop of Guatemala one year to the

amazement of its rivals and netted a very large profit by the

transaction.

Now as commerce is international and industry depends for its greatest

successes upon exportation, it was inevitable that the up-to-date

German banks should seek fields of activity abroad and aim at playing

a commanding part in the world's commerce. And they tried and

succeeded. For they alone instinctively divined the new spirit of the

age, which may be termed co-operative and agglutinative. It was in

virtue of this new idea that groups of States were leagued together by

Germany in view of her projected war, and it is the same principle

that impels her, before the conflict has yet been decided, to weld to

herself as many tributary peoples as she may to assist her in the

economic struggle which will be ushered in by peace. Germans first

semiconsciously felt and now deliberately hold that in all departments

of modern life, social, economic and political, our conception of

quantities must undergo a radical change. The scale must be greatly

enlarged. The unit of former times must give place to a group of

units, to syndicates and trusts in commerce and industry, to trade

unions in the labour world, to Customs-federations in international

life. That this shifting of quantities is a correlate of the progress

achieved in technical science and in means of communication, and also

of the vastness of armies and navies and of the aims of the world's

foremost peoples, is since then become a truism, realized not only by

the Germans but by all their allies.

For individual enterprise, as well as for national isolation, there is

no room in the modern world. Isolation spells weakness and

helplessness there. The lesser neutral States must of necessity become

the clients of the Great Powers and pay a high price for the

protection afforded them. Hence the maintenance of small nations on

their present basis, with enormous colonies to exploit but without

efficient means of defending them, forms no part of Germany's future

programme. And the altruistic professions of the Entente which claims

to be fighting for the rights of little States, whose idyllic

existence it would fain perpetuate, is scoffed at by the Teutons as

chimerical or hypocritical. When this war is over, whatever its

upshot, Central Europe with or without the non-German elements will

have become a single unit, against whose combined industrial,

commercial and military strivings no one European Power can

successfully compete. And the difficulties which geographical

situation has raised against effective co-operation among the Allies

in war time will make themselves felt with increased force during the

economic struggle which will then begin.

No mere tariff arrangement, but only a genuine league between all the

west European Powers and the British Empire, supplemented by a customs

union between them and the other Allies of the Entente, will then

avail to ward off the new danger and establish some rough approach to

the equilibrium which the present conflict has overthrown. The future

destinies of Europe, as far as one may conjecture from the data

available to-day, will depend largely on the insight of the Entente

nations and their readiness to subordinate national aims and interests

to those of the larger unit which will be the inevitable product of

the new order of things.

The ideal type of the industrial bank having been thus wrought out,

the Germans, whom a thoroughly commercial education had qualified for

the work, carried on vast operations with a degree of boldness which

was matched only by the thoroughness of their precautions. They

advanced money with a readiness and an open-handedness which the West

European financier set down as sheer folly, but which was the outcome

of close study and careful deliberation. They began by acquainting

themselves with the solvency of their clients, with the nature of the

transactions which these were carrying on, with their business methods

and individual abilities, and to the results of this preliminary

examination they adjusted the extent of their financial assistance.

They had secret inquiry offices to keep them constantly informed of

the condition of the various firms and individuals, and when in doubt

they demanded an insight into the books of the company which was

seldom denied them. The Spanish Inquisition was but a clumsy agency in

comparison with the perfect system evolved by these German banks,

which could at any given moment sum up the prospects as well as the

actual situation of each of their customers. It was this comprehensive

survey which warranted some of the large advances they made to

seemingly insolvent firms which afterwards grew to be the most

prosperous in the Fatherland.

The methods thus practised at home were adhered to in all those

foreign countries which the German financier, manufacturer or trader

selected for his field of operations. A bank would be opened in the

foreign capital with money advanced mainly by one of the six great

financial institutions. It would be called by some high-sounding name,

suggestive of the country experimented upon, and little by little the

German capital would be diminished to a minimum and local capital

substituted, but the supreme control kept zealously in the hands of

the Teuton directors. Industries would then be financed and finally

bought up. Others would also be financed but deliberately ruined.

Competition would in this way be effectively killed, and little by

little the life-juices of the country would be canalized to suit the

requirements of German trade, industry and politics.

If an industry in the invaded country was judged capable of becoming

subsidiary to some German industry, the Bank would maintain it for the

purpose of amalgamating the two later on, or else having the foreign

concern absorbed by the Teutonic. This was a labour of patriotism and

profit. But if the business was recognized as a formidable rival to

some German enterprise, it was doomed. The procedure in this case was

simple. The Bank advanced money readily, tied the firm financially,

rendering it wholly tributary; and then when the hour of destiny

struck, the credit was suddenly withdrawn and the curtain rung up in

the Bankruptcy Court. When this consummation became public, the

unsuspecting foreigner would ask with naive astonishment: "How can it

be bankrupt? I understood that Germans were financing it." They were,

and it was precisely for that reason, and because it was on the way to

prosperity as a rival to some German firm, that it was suffocated.[4]

[4] Cf. _L'Invasione tedesca in Italia_, pp. 118, 119.

This ingenious system proved exceptionally effective in Brazil. It has

been said that that republic is become a dependency of Germany. What

cannot be gainsaid is that about one-third of Brazil's national

debt[5] is owing to German bankers, and the whole financial and

industrial movement of the country is swayed by the Society of

Colonization which is German, by the German Society for Mutual

Protection, by the German-Brazilian Society and by the three

Navigation Companies whose steamers ply between Brazil and the

Fatherland.[6] It is because of the far-reaching power and influence

which has accrued to Germany from this successful invasion that

Professor Schmoller of the Berlin University could write: "It behoves

us to desire at any and every cost that, by the next century, a German

land of twenty or thirty million inhabitants shall arise in Southern

Brazil. It is immaterial whether it remains part of Brazil or

constitutes an independent State or enters into close relations with

the German Empire. But without a connection guaranteed by battleships,

without the possibility of Germany's armed intervention in Brazil, its

future would be jeopardized."

[5] 1050 million francs.

[6] _Op. cit._, p. 120.

It is the Monroe doctrine that is commonly credited with thwarting

these designs on South America. But as a matter of plain fact, it is

to the British Navy and to nothing else that the credit is due. Were

it not for the known resolve of the British nation to co-operate in

case of need with the American people in their exertions to uphold

that doctrine against Germany, the Berlin Cabinet would long ago have

formally established a firm footing in Southern Brazil and the United

States Government would have been powerless to prevent it.[7]

[7] An instructive article on the subject by Mr. Moreton

Frewen appeared in the _Nineteenth Century_ of February,

1916.

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