able to resist the temptation, when he was in the middle of” the enemy,
“nor would decline it to obtain a victory: as, in one of those fits, he
had suffered the horse to escape out of Cornwall; and the most signal
misfortunes of his life in war had their rise from that uncontrollable
license”. Goring “in truth, wanted nothing but industry (for he had
wit, and courage, and understanding, and ambition uncontrolled by any
fear of God or man) to have been as eminent and successful in the
highest attempt of wickedness, as any man in the age he lived in, or
before”.
[Footnote 52: _Hist._, vol. II, part II. book viii.]
We come next to a general of a very different character, the general in
command of Newcastle’s artillery. It might be expected that a general
would be chosen to command artillery on account of his knowledge of
guns and their management; but Sir Philip Warwick says that Newcastle
chose Davenant as his General of Artillery because he was a poet.
Aubrey has something to tell us about this warbling warrior. He
says[53] that Shakespeare stayed “once a yeare” at the public-house
kept by Davenant’s father and mother, and the old scandal-monger
adds that, “when he was pleasant over a glasse of wine with his
most intimate friends,—e.g., Sam Butler (author of _Hudibras_)
etc.”—Davenant would say that he considered he wrote with the very
spirit of Shakespeare “and seemed contented enough to be thought his
son”. He was very intimate with Newcastle’s friend, Sir John Suckling;
and, long after the time with which we are dealing in this chapter, he
became Poet Laureate.
[Footnote 53: _Lives of Eminent Men._]
Like Goring, Davenant to some extent obtained his appointment by
the help of the Queen; for when she sent[54] “over a considerable
quantity of military stores, for the use of the Earl of Newcastle’s
army, Mr. Davenant came over with them, offered his services to that
noble Peer, who was his old friend and patron, and was by him made
Lieutenant-General of his Ordnance, to the no small dislike of some,
who thought that a post very unfit for a poet; in which, however, they
made no great compliment to their General” (Newcastle) “who wrote poems
and plays as well as Mr. Davenant”.
[Footnote 54: _Biog. Brit._, p. 1605.]
To make his staff complete, Newcastle appointed, “The Revᵉʳᵉⁿᵈ Mr.
Hudson,” a “very able Divine,” “Scout Master General of the army,” as
we learn from the same authority.
We find the army of the North, therefore, under a Commander-in-Chief
who was utterly inexperienced, a General of infantry who had[55] “the
unavoidable prejudice, in this conjuncture, of being a Scots-man,” a
drunkard for General of cavalry, a poet for General of Artillery, and
a very able divine for “Scout Master-General”. What could be expected
of a campaign in which, at any critical moment, the Commander-in-Chief
might have “retired to his softer pleasures” and refused to see
anybody, while one of his Generals might be getting drunk, another,
not exactly drunk, but “pleasant with a glass of wine,” reciting his
poems or boasting of his illegitimate birth, and a third writing a
sermon?
[Footnote 55: Clarendon.]
During the winter Newcastle was not idle. The Duchess says: “And
though the season of the year might well have invited my Lord to take
up his Winter-quarters, it being about _Christmas_; yet after he had
put a good Garison into the City of _York_, and fortified it, upon
intelligence that the Enemy was still at _Tadcaster_,” a town about
eight miles south-west of York, “and had fortified that place, he
resolved to march thither”.
The enemy had broken down part of the stone bridge which gave entrance
to the town, had planted guns on the remaining part, and had also
placed guns on a newly-made fort on a hill, near the town, commanding
the road from York. This affair is worthy of notice because, as will
presently be seen, it reflects upon the character of Goring, the
Lieutenant-General of the Horse.
“My Lord ... ordered a march before the said Town in this manner: That
the greatest part of his Horse and Dragoons should in the night march
to a Pass at _Weatherby_, five miles distant from _Tadcaster_, towards
North-west, from thence under the Command of his then Lieutenant
General of the Army, to appear on the West side of _Tadcaster_ early
the next morning, by which time my Lord with the rest of his Army
resolved to appear at the East-side of the said Town; which intention
was well design’d, but ill executed; for though my Lord with that part
of the Army which he commanded in person, that is to say, his Foot and
Cannon, attended by some Troops of Horse, did march that night, and
early in the morning appear’d before the Town on the East side thereof,
and there drew up his Army, planted his Cannon, and closely and orderly
besieged that side of the Town, and from ten in the morning till four
a Clock in the afternoon, battered the Enemies Forts and Works, as
being in continual expectation of the appearance of the Troops on the
other side, according to his order; yet (whether it was out of Neglect
or Treachery that my Lords Orders were not obeyed) that days Work was
rendered ineffectual as to the whole Design.”
“Ineffectual” because Goring and his horse did _not_ “appear on the
West side of Tadcaster early the next morning”. Consequently the
enemy escaped during the night and went “to another strong hold not
far distant from _Tadcaster_, called _Cawood_-Castle, to which, by
reason of its low and boggy Scituation, and foul and narrow Lanes
and passages, it was not possible for my Lord to pursue them without
too great an hazard to his Army; whereas had the Lieutenant General
performed his Duty, in all probability the greatest part of the
principal Rebels in _Yorkshire_ would that day have been taken in their
own trap, and their further mischief prevented”.
Although Goring is not mentioned by name, in the above account, there
can be little doubt that he was the delinquent. We know the name of the
Lieutenant-General who commanded “the greatest part of the horse and
dragoons”. Whether his conduct was due to drunkenness, or to treachery,
or to jealousy of Newcastle, does not appear. The poet, whose guns
“battered the enemy’s forts and works,” may have done better than might
have been expected on this occasion.
At about this period a very courteous correspondence took place
between Newcastle and the younger Hotham. The relations of the Hothams
to Newcastle are a matter of history concerning which the Welbeck
manuscripts contain many interesting and important details. Only
fragments from those manuscripts can be given here.
In December, 1642, Captain John Hotham, Sir John’s son, wrote to
Newcastle[56] about an exchange of prisoners, offering to release
“as many as the Earl has released, without an exchange”. On the 27th
he wrote: “Your free and noble expressions of doing me so many great
and real favours shall make me endeavour either to requite them or be
extremely thankful for them”.
[Footnote 56: Portland MSS., vol. I, 80, 84, 87.]
A few days later he wrote: “With faith and honour to serve the King and
the Commonwealth is all our ambition, and to leave that to posterity
which our ancestors left us, an untainted name”. And he goes on to
“bewail the unhappiness of these distractions, that hinder me from
attending upon your Lordship”.
A week afterwards he wrote again to Newcastle: “I honour the King as
much as any and love the Parliament, but do not desire to see either
absolute conquerors.... If the honourable endeavours of such powerful
men as yourself do not take place for a happy peace, the necessitous
people of the whole Kingdom will presently rise in mighty numbers and
whosoever they pretend for at first, within a while they will set up
for themselves, to the utter ruin of all the nobility and gentry of the
kingdom.”
We shall presently have occasion to look at some letters from Hotham to
Newcastle written three months later. In the meantime several events
took place of considerable importance both to Newcastle and to the
Hothams.
In some “propositions for peace,” which the Parliament sent to the
King in January, 1643, complaints were made at “the raising, drawing
together, and arming of great numbers of Papists, under the command of
the Earl of Newcastle ... whereby ... the Papists have attained means
of attempting, with hopes of effecting, their mischievous designs
of rooting out the Reformed Religion, and destroying the professors
therefore”. Newcastle had no love for Papists. He simply took into his
army any loyal men whom he met with. But the Commons were bent upon his
destruction, and one of their “propositions for peace” was that, in
any amnesty there should be a special “exception of William, Earl of
Newcastle”.
Although both Clarendon and the Duchess tell us that Newcastle won
nearly all his skirmishes in midwinter, 1642-3, there are what profess
to be “True Relations” to the contrary among the _Thomason Tracts_.
“1643. Jan. 2. A True Relation of a Great Victory obtained by Lord
Willoughby of Parham against divers forces of the Earl of Newcastle.”
“1643. Jan. 23. A True and Plenary Relation of the defeat given by Lord
Fairfax forces unto my Lord of Newcastles forces in Yorkshire.”
In February, 1643, Newcastle was informed that the Queen, having
sailed from Holland, would shortly land somewhere on the east coast of
Yorkshire, and he was ordered to meet her and to escort her to a place
of safety. One would imagine that, at this time, Newcastle must have
had more than sufficient worries and anxieties on his mind, without
having the care of the Queen’s precious person laid upon his shoulders.
Her Majesty had sailed from Scheveling in a fine English ship,
accompanied by eleven transports laden with stores and ammunition for
the King; and, as a convoy, she had the protection of the famous Dutch
Admiral, van Tromp. After tossing in a storm for a fortnight, she was
driven back to Scheveling; but in a few days she sailed again and
anchored in Burlington (now Bridlington) Bay, on 20 February.
Two days passed without any symptoms of troops for her protection; so
she remained on board; but, on the 22nd, a large body of cavaliers
appeared on the hills. Newcastle, who had not known where to expect
her to land, had been rambling along the east coast; and, as soon as
his scouts brought him news of the arrival of the Queen’s ships, he
hastened to Burlington.
Under the protection of Newcastle by land and van Tromp by sea, the
Queen landed and got lodgings in the town. On reaching the shores of
her husband’s kingdom, she might fairly have expected some peaceful
repose after her voyage; but her rest was disturbed at five o’clock the
next morning, by the sound of heavy firing.
Five small ships of war, belonging to the Parliament, had entered the
bay during the night, unobserved by van Tromp, whose large ship drew
too much water to follow them into the bay. It seems absurd that they
should have been out of shot of the Dutch guns; but the cannon of that
time did not carry far. As the Parliament had voted the Queen guilty
of high treason for sending supplies from abroad to the King’s army,
Batten, the Parliamentary Admiral, thought this a good opportunity of
taking either her person or her life. She wrote to King Charles:[57]
“One of these ships had done me the honour to flank my house, which
fronted the pier, and before I could get out of bed, the balls were
whistling upon me in such style that you may easily believe I loved not
such music. Everybody came to force me to go out, the balls beating so
on all the houses, that, dressed just as it happened, I went on foot to
some distance from the village to the shelter of a ditch like that at
Newmarket;[58] but, before we could reach it, the balls were singing
round us in fine style and a serjeant was killed within twenty paces of
me.” This must have been trying work for a lady, at between five and
six o’clock on a February morning, more than an hour before sunrise, on
the bleak coast of Yorkshire.
[Footnote 57: _Letters of Henrietta Maria_, ed. Mrs. Everett Green, p.
166.]
[Footnote 58: As all racing men know, the Ditch at Newmarket is a long
mound.]
When the Parliamentary ships sailed out of the bay into deep water, on
the ebbing of the tide, van Tromp had a word or two with them; but,
strange to say, he failed to capture them.
The captain of one of the Parliamentary ships, however, had imprudently
ventured on shore, where he was taken prisoner by some of Newcastle’s
soldiers. Having been tried by court-martial and condemned to be
hanged, he happened to be met by the Queen on his way to execution. She
asked what the procession meant and, on being informed, she ordered him
to be liberated, when he went over at once to the King’s service. This
incident is mentioned in Bossuet’s famous funeral oration after the
death of Henrietta Maria.
CHAPTER VIII.
According to a Yorkshire tradition, recorded by Miss Strickland in her
_Queens of England_ (viii. 98), while the Queen’s stores were being
laden and put in order of march, she stayed at Boynton Hall, a place
some two miles to the west of Burlington or Bridlington, belonging
to Sir William Strickland who, although he had received a baronetcy
from Charles I was now on the side of the Parliament. Sir William
happened to be away from home, but—probably owing to the presence of
Newcastle’s troops—the Queen was received as a guest, if only as an
enforced guest, by either Lady Strickland, or by whatever person may
have been in charge of the house. Among other efforts of hospitality
for the benefit of Her Majesty, a great display was made of gold and
silver plate.
When the Queen went away, she expressed her excessive gratitude for
the excellent entertainment which had been provided for herself and
her train, adding that, as the Parliament was granting no subsidies to
the King, she regretted to be under the painful necessity of carrying
away with her the plate of which there had been such a magnificent
display. She said that she should look upon it only as a loan—in fact
its temporary removal would be a mere matter of form—and she left
a portrait of herself as a pledge for its repayment. There never was
any return or repayment; but the portrait is stated to have become,
in course of time, at least as valuable as the plate for which it was
pledged. So says Miss Strickland who, as one of the family, should have
been able to judge; but, in making this calculation, we doubt whether
she sufficiently considered the increase in the value of the plate
during the same course of time. Silver plate of the reign of Charles I
has been sold for as much as £40 an ounce. The writer of these pages
has a silver box, given to an ancestress of his own by Charles II, and
it was lately valued for insurance, by a professional expert, at £30 an
ounce.
The Queen then retired to York, under the protection of Newcastle. The
Duchess says:—
“My Lord finding Her Majesty in this condition, drew his Army near
the place where she was, ready to attend and protect Her Majesties
Person, who was pleased to take a view of the Army as it was drawn up
in order; and immediately after, which was in _March, 1643_, took Her
journey towards _York_, whither the whole Army conducted Her Majesty
and brought her safe into the City. About this time, Her Majesty having
some present occasion for Money, My Lord presented Her with 3,000£
_Sterling_, which she graciously accepted”—Charles and Henrietta
seldom “graciously refused”—“and having spent some time there in
Consultation about the present affairs, she was pleased to send some
Armes and Ammunition to the King, who was then in _Oxford_; to which
end, my Lord ordered a Party, consisting of 1500, well commanded, to
conduct the same, with whom the _Lord Percy_, who then had waited
upon Her Majesty from the King, returned to _Oxford_; Which Party His
Majesty was pleased to keep with him for his own Service,” much to the
loss and inconvenience of Newcastle.
The Queen’s presence did much for the King’s cause in Yorkshire. Some
time earlier, Sir Hugh Cholmley had been induced by his friend, Sir
John Hotham, to take the side of the Parliament; and, as a reward, he
had been made Governor of the Castle of Scarborough, a fortress of
considerable importance. But, when the Queen came, says Clarendon, he
“very frankly revolted to his allegiance; and waited on Her Majesty
for her assurance of her pardon”. He then delivered up the Castle of
Scarborough to Newcastle, who reinstated him as Governor of it, on
behalf of the King. It may be worth mentioning that Clarendon says
Cholmley had[59] “oftener defeated the Earl of Newcastle’s troops ...
than any other officer of those parts”.
[Footnote 59: Vol. II, part I. book vi.]
The Queen wrote, in a letter to Charles I, on 20 March, 1643: “Sir Hugh
Cholmley is come in with a troop of horse to kiss my hand; the rest of
his people he left at Scarborough, with a ship laden with arms, which
the ships of the Parliament had brought thither. So she is ours.”
To some extent, the propinquity of the Queen was also influencing the
Hothams; although they hesitated to follow the example of Cholmley by
delivering up Hull to Newcastle. Sir Philip Warwick says[60]:—
“The Queen presently after landed at Burlington Bay with good provision
of arms, ordnance, and ammunition, and was by the Earl of Newcastle
conveyed to York; and she so influenced Sir Hugh Cholmley, who
commanded the port of Scarborough for the Parliament, and old Sir John
Hotham and his son, who commanded Hull, that important garrison; that
had she been as successful in the last as she was in the first, the
whole North had been cleared, and that undoubtedly would have turned
the scale upon the South, and restored his Majesty unto his just
rights, the people unto their true liberties, and the nation unto its
former profound peace. But Hotham’s timorous temper betrayed himself
and the design.”
[Footnote 60: _Memoires_, p. 237.]
Cholmley immediately became very active in the King’s service; and, to
some extent by his assistance, Newcastle obtained command of almost the
whole of Yorkshire. The younger Hotham at about this time explained
the position of himself and his father to Newcastle, in the following
letters:—
“CAPTAIN JOHN HOTHAM TO THE EARL OF NEWCASTLE.[61]
“1643. MAR. 22. I have sent this other letter to excuse me for not
granting Sir Marmaduke Langdale a safe conduct, and, to deal freely
with your Lordship, he shall never have one from me, I know him too
well. For a letter to the Queen, that I will certainly come in and
at such a time, I cannot do it. This enclosed you may show her, if
you please, or burn, for your Lordship knows that I ever said to you
that I would do anything which might further his Majesty’s service in
the peace of the kingdom, and that if the Parliament did stand upon
unreasonable terms with him, I would then declare myself against them
and for him, but otherwise to leave my party that I had set up with,
and no real cause given that an honest man may justify himself for so
doing before God and the world, I would never do it, although I endured
all the extremities in the world, for I well knew no man of honour or
worth will ever think such a man worthy of friendship or trust. For
the prejudice you undergo for not spoiling the East Riding truly you
have put an obligation upon me by sparing it thus long, but rather than
your Lordship shall suffer anything of prejudice either in your honour
or affairs, I shall not desire the thing any longer, but you may take
what course you please, and we shall do so for our defense. For Sir
Hugh Cholmley and his manner of coming in, every man must satisfy his
own conscience and then all is well! All are not of one mind.” Captain
Hotham was intensely jealous of Cholmley but dared not follow his
example.
[Footnote 61: Welbeck MSS., vol. I, 105.]
To this letter Newcastle would seem to have sent a civil reply; for
within a fortnight, Hotham wrote again:—[62]
“1643. MAR. 30. I thank you for your two letters in which you are
pleased so favourably to interpret the actions of your servant, and, if
your Lordship knew my real intentions, you would be far from blaming
me.... You have got by Sir Hugh Cholmley’s turning, when he could give
no reason for it, but an old castle,” [Scarborough] “which will cost
you more keeping than it is worth: his captains and soldiers are all
here and have left him naked enough.”
[Footnote 62: Welbeck MSS., vol. I, 109.]
One would infer from the next letter that Newcastle had written too
hopefully to the Hothams about the probability of a renewal of their
allegiance to the King, and that, in retaliation, Captain Hotham was
trying to shake the allegiance of Newcastle himself, by telling him
that he was distrusted by the Royalists.
“CAPTAIN JOHN HOTHAM TO THE EARL OF NEWCASTLE.[63]
“1643. APRIL. BEVERLEY.—I am very sorry you should ever harbour
such an opinion of me as to think that any motive whatsoever could
ever move me to betray the public trust I have ever undertaken.... My
particular affection to your person was a motive to me to be glad to
serve you if a way might be found to do it as befitted a gentleman,
otherwise I will not serve the greatest Emperor.... But now to give
you a taste that all is not as you think at Court, I shall freely tell
you this, that within this four days some very near her Majesty spoke
such words of contempt and disgrace of you as truly for my part I
could not hear them repeated with patience, and you will plainly see,
if they dare it, you will have a successor.”
[Footnote 63: _Ibid._, 701.]
Newcastle was evidently disturbed in his mind by this very disagreeable
news, as well he might be; for he must have sent immediately to Hotham
asking for fuller particulars. A couple of days after the preceding
letter, Captain Hotham sent him these details:—
“The words were these: ‘that you were a sweet General, lay in bed until
eleven o’clock and combed till twelve, then came to the Queen, and so
the work was done, and that General King did all the business’. They
were spoken by my Lady Cornwallis in the hearing of Mr. Portington,
a fellow cunning enough; and this to my father and another gentleman
with many other words of undervaluing, which he said were spoken by
others.... You can expect nothing at Court: truly the women rule
all.... You have now done great service; that will be forgotten when
they think they can shift without you.”
How far Hotham may have been perfectly honest and sincere in his
correspondence with Newcastle it is difficult to determine. That
there was a good deal of truth in what he said as to Newcastle
having enemies among the Royalists and the rumours of his living a
too easy and luxurious life in a campaign, and leaving the work of
the Commander-in-Chief to General King, is made probable by certain
statements which we have already seen in the words of Clarendon. But
both the Hothams were anxious to be on the winning side; they were
doubtful as to which side that would be, and it seems likely that,
in spite of all the high-sounding professions in the letters of the
younger Hotham, the motives of both the father and the son were
personal rather than patriotic.
Later in the same month, Hotham appears to have been trying to bring
about peace, by interesting some of the leading supporters of the
Parliament, with whom he came in contact, in favour of the King. On
14 April he wrote to Newcastle from Lincoln: “I have not been idle
since I writ last to do his Majesty and your Lordship the best service
I could, although to bring that about I was glad to go seemingly by
the contrary. I have since I came into this town dealt with some of
my friends that they would not be so violent against his Majesty’s
service, and was bold (enough) to promise them a pardon if they would
retire and give way, that this country might be wholly at his devotion.
The gentlemen are so considerable that of my knowledge, if they desist,
there shall not be a man here to hold up his hand against his Majesty.”
This was very cheering news for Newcastle and was almost enough to make
him fancy that the end of the campaign was in sight.
On 4 May Captain Hotham wrote to Newcastle: “I think you are mistaken
in my father, for the reason of his standing a little aloof is, that
he so infinitely wishes the peace of the kingdom, which he thinks the
King’s last answer tends not to, that I know staggered him much....
It was said from a good hand that the Queen thought much you did not
enough communicate with her and take her directions.... I confess I am
in a very great strait in these businesses, your Lordship’s wisdom can
best give directions in it.”
Yet the very next day Captain Hotham wrote with others to Lenthall
about joining his forces to those of Cromwell. This, however, may have
been with the object of throwing dust in the eyes of the Parliament;
and it is the more likely because the Parliament itself seems to
have thought that something of this sort was his object. Whitelock
says:—[64]
“Captain Hotham, being suspected by the Parliament, was imprisoned at
Nottingham, from whence escaping, he under-hand treated with the Earl
of Newcastle.”
[Footnote 64: _Memorials_, p. 67.]
We may as well dispose of the Hothams once for all; albeit to do so
will make it necessary to anticipate considerably beyond the period
of Newcastle’s campaign with which we are now dealing. Although long,
the following statement of the whole affair of the Hothams by Sir
Hugh Cholmley is worth reading, especially as the writer had been on
intimate terms both with the Hothams and with Newcastle. Yet it may
be that the statement should be taken _cum grano salis_; as Cholmley
probably felt considerable resentment towards the Hothams for regarding
him as a base renegade from the Parliamentary cause in which he had at
one time shown so much zeal.
“AN ORIGINAL, ENDORSED BY CLARENDON ‘SIR HUGH CHOLMLEY’S MEMORIALS’.[65]
“If Sir John Hotham could have been assured of what he had done or said
in Parliament, and received into grace and favour,”—Cholmley seems to
mean: If he could have been assured that what he had said in Parliament
in the past would have been forgiven him and that he would be received
into grace and favour by the King—“he might have been made a faithful
and serviceable person; the denying of which (or at least answering
it coldly) was a great motive to his undertaking that employment at
Hull....
[Footnote 65: Clarendon State Papers, 181.]
“Sir John Hotham, when he departed from London, gave assurance to
some of his nearest friends, that he would not deny the King entrance
into Hull, and surely had not done it, but that he was informed by
some person near the King, in case he permitted his Majesty entrance,
he would lose his head; and it is conceived the same person did most
prompt the King to go to Hull....
“The Earl of Newcastle had not been long with his forces in Yorkshire,
when there began a treaty between him and young Hotham; whom together
with his father they sought to draw to the King’s party.
Sir Marmaduke Langdale, a great friend of young Hotham’s,[66] was the
mover between him and the Earl; and this was sooner laid hold on, in
that the Lord Fairfax was now made a General for the Parliament of the
forces of Yorkshire, and some adjacent counties; which discontented old
Hotham, and though the son had as much as in reason he could expect
(and more than fell to his share), being made Lieutenant General to
Fairfax, yet he was not well pleased.
[Footnote 66: But see Hotham’s letter of 22 March, to Newcastle, p. 89.]
“The Queen’s army coming to Bridlington had brought such a magazine
of arms and ammunition, my Lord of Newcastle’s army began to be very
formidable and young Hotham having retired himself (and those forces
which belonged to him and his father) from the Lord Fairfax, and
being then at Beverley, began to have fresh notions of treating; and
thereupon makes a journey for one night to the Earl at Bridlington,
upon colour and pretences of a change of prisoners; there he demanded
his father to be made a Viscount, and himself a Baron, that they might
have £20,000 in money, and a Patent to the father to be Governor of
Hull during his life”;—this was, indeed, the very converse of the
system of purchasing peerages mentioned in an early chapter—“all
which, as it would have been granted, so probably accepted, but that in
this nick of time, Sir John received some assurance of the Scots coming
into England, and that young Hotham (by his alliance and friendship
with the Wrays) was chosen General of Lincolnshire; yet both parties
made this advantage by the treaty, that as the Lord Newcastle forebore
to come near Hull and Beverley, so young Hotham, though he had above
1,000 horse and dragoons, did not interrupt the Lord Newcastle’s march
from Bridlington; which might easily have been done, his army being
over-charged with baggage, and the season so tempestuous that his
forces were very much dispersed.
“Immediately after this young Hotham goes to be General for the
Parliament in Lincolnshire, so that the treaty was off the hinge,
till such time as he was laid hold of at Nottingham by Cromwell,
which the father did so much resent as he did not only write to the
close committee in a menacing style for his son’s enlargement, but
was otherwise so passionate in words and deportment that it gave the
Parliament a great suspicion of him.... In the interim young Hotham
breaks loose from Cromwell, and comes to Hull where the father and son
think it very opportune to renew the treaty with my Lord of Newcastle;
and thereupon Sir John writes that letter, which was after (at the
battle of York) taken in my Lord’s cabinet,” i.e. Newcastle’s, “and
cost both the Hothams their heads.”...
It is a matter of English history that Sir John Hotham and his son were
arrested, imprisoned for many months in London, tried, and beheaded.
And it is a somewhat remarkable fact—journalists would call it “the
irony of fate”—that Sir John Hotham, who had been one of the first to
express a wish in Parliament for proceedings against Archbishop Laud,
should have been executed a few days before that Archbishop. Possibly a
knowledge of this fact may have helped to mitigate the sadness of the
last days of Laud.
During the months dealt with in a portion of the present chapter;—to
be exact, on the 17th of April, 1643,—Newcastle lost his first wife.
It is scarcely possible that he can have been with her when she died;
but of her illness and death, the collector of these historical odds
and ends has been unable to discover any details.
CHAPTER IX.
In April Newcastle learned that the enemy’s General of cavalry
was going to leave Cawood Castle for the west of Yorkshire; so he
dispatched Goring, with a strong body of horse, to attack him on
his march. Goring, a really able General when sober, overtook the
Parliamentary cavalry and surprised their rear by a sudden charge,
at Bramham Moor, or, as it was sometimes called, Seacroft Moor, and
completely routed them, although their numbers were greater than his
and in spite of their being under the command of Fairfax himself. If
the Duchess’s story is true, Goring’s Horse killed many of the enemy,
and took about 800 prisoners whom, with ten or twelve colours, they
carried to York.
Lord Fairfax wrote[67] of this engagement: “Here our men, thinking
themselves secure, were more careless in keeping order; and, whilst
their officers were getting them out of houses where they sought for
drink (it being an extream hot day)”—apparently it was one of the
enemy’s drunken days and one of Goring’s sober days—“the enemy got,
by another way into the Moore, as soon as we,” and then he candidly
acknowledges the complete rout. Indeed he says: “Some officers, with
me, made our retreat with much difficulty”.
[Footnote 67: Masère’s _Select Tracts_, p. 422.]
This was an important victory to the credit of Goring; but the glory
of his surprising Fairfax in April was sadly tarnished in May by his
being surprised in his turn by Fairfax. Newcastle had taken Wakefield
in April and had left it under the protection of Goring and his Horse.
The enemy quietly approached and entered that town at night. Night is
usually a bad time, and a town a bad place, for a drunkard: be this as
it may, Goring was taken prisoner with most of his men and horses, and
the enemy “possessed themselves of the whole Magazine, which was a very
great loss and hindrance to my Lords designs, it being the Moity of his
Army, and most of his Ammunition”.[68]
[Footnote 68: The Duchess’s account.]
Fairfax wrote:[69] “This appeared the greater mercy, when we saw our
mistake; for we found three thousand men in the town, and expected but
half the number.... This was more a miracle than a victory.”
[Footnote 69: Masère’s _Select Tracts_, p. 424.]
Pious Royalists, on the contrary, would probably attribute their own
defeat to the machinations of the devil; and the impious modern reader
may possibly consider the victory, on Fairfax’s own showing, rather a
fluke.
Some time afterwards Newcastle recovered Goring by an exchange of
prisoners; but the defeat at Wakefield very seriously hampered him.
Shortly before the disaster at Wakefield, Newcastle had taken Rotherham
by storm, and Sheffield without opposition. Early in June he stormed
and took Howly House, a place which the Duchess describes as “a strong
stone house, well fortified ... wherein was a garrison of soldiers,
which My Lord summoned, but the Governor disobeying the summons, he
battered it with his cannon, and so took it by force”. She gives
Newcastle great credit for his extraordinary humanity in not killing
the Governor in cold blood, after the place had been captured.
The King was now becoming very nervous and he wished for Newcastle’s
help. On 18 June, 1643, the Queen wrote to Newcastle from Newark: “The
King is still expecting to be besieged in Oxford.... He had sent me a
letter to command you absolutely to march to him, But I do not send
it to you, since I have taken a resolution with you that you remain.
There is a gentleman, Lieutenant Markham, who has received from you a
letter, so angry, that I thought it could not be from you, so that I
have commanded him to remain, and I hope that he will not be punished
for it, moreover ... since I am yet good-natured enough not to send
you your order from the King to march to him, you, on your part, must
not punish one who stays by order of the Queen.... Your constant and
faithful friend, HENRIETTA MARIA.” [70]
[Footnote 70: _Letters of Henrietta Maria_, edited by Mrs. Everett
Green, p. 219.]
This letter shows the conveniences likely to follow from allowing a
lady to meddle in the conduct of a campaign.
Newcastle let his army rest at Howly House for five or six days. He
then marched towards Bradford, “a little, but a strong town”.
Very unexpectedly, Newcastle “met with a strong interruption” on
his march to the “little” town of Bradford; for the enemy had “very
privately gotten out of Lancashire” “a vast number of Musquetiers,”
and, as all the country about Bradford sympathized with the Parliament,
Newcastle was unable to obtain intelligence of the movements of his
foes. Newcastle’s greatest victory was to be won in the battle which
followed and the Duchess shall act as our War Correspondent—by no
means an inefficient one on this occasion.
Although written of as Alderton and Atherton and Adderton, the name of
the scene of this battle is now spelt Adwalton Moor. It is immediately
to the right of Drighlinton Station, on the branch line from Ardsley
Junction to Bradford.
The Duchess begins by saying that in Fairfax’s “Army there were near
5000 Musquetiers, and 18 Troops of Horse, drawn up in a place full of
hedges, called _Atherton-moor_, near to their Garison at _Bradford_,
ready to encounter my Lord’s Forces, which then contained not above
half so many Musquetiers as the Enemy had; their chiefest strength
consisting in Horse, and these made useless for a long time together
by the Enemies Horse possessing all the plain ground upon that Field;
so that no place was left to draw up my Lords Horse, but amongst old
Coalpits; Neither could they charge the Enemy, by reason of a great
ditch and high bank betwixt my Lord’s and the Enemies Troops, but by
two on a breast, and that within Musquet shot; the Enemy being drawn
up in hedges, and continually playing upon them, which rendered the
service exceeding difficult and hazardous.
“In the mean while the Foot of both sides on the right and left Wings
encounter’d each other, who fought from Hedg to Hedg, and for a long
time together overpower’d and got ground of my Lords Foot, almost to
the invironing of his Cannon; my Lords Horse (wherein consisted his
greatest strength) all this while being made, by reason of the ground,
incapable of charging; at last the Pikes of my Lords Army having had no
employment all the day, were drawn against the Enemies left wing, and
particularly those of my Lords own Regiment, which were all stout and
valiant men, who fell so furiously upon the Enemy, that they forsook
their hedges, and fell to their heels: At which very instant my Lord
caused a shot or two to be made by his Cannon against the Body of the
Enemies Horse, drawn up within Cannon shot, which took so good effect,
that it disordered the Enemies Troops.
“Hereupon my Lord’s Horse got over the Hedg, not in a body (for
that they could not), but dispersedly two on a breast; and as soon
as some considerable number was gotten over, and drawn up, they
charged the Enemy, and routed them; so that in an instant there was
a strange change of Fortune, and the Field totally won by my Lord,
notwithstanding he had quitted 7000 Men, to conduct Her Majesty,
besides a good Train of Artillery, which in such a Conjuncture would
have weakned _Caesars_ Army. In this Victory the Enemy lost most of
their Foot, about 3000 were taken Prisoners, and 700 Horse and Foot
slain, and those that escaped fled into their Garison at _Bradford_,
amongst whom was also their General of the Horse, Sir Thos. Fairfax.”
Fairfax, after stating that the Royalist troops had been on the very
point of retreating, goes on to say:[71] “Whilst they were in this
wavering condition, one Colonel Skirton”—a Colonel in Newcastle’s
army—“desired his General to let him charge with a stand of Pikes,
with which he broke in upon our men; and, they not being relieved by
our reserves (which were commanded by some ill-affected officers,
chiefly Major General Gifford, who did not his part as he ought to do),
our men lost ground which the enemy seeing, pursued this advantage, by
bringing up fresh troops; ours being discouraged, began to fly and were
soon routed.”
[Footnote 71: Masère’s _Select Tracts_, p. 426.]
Heath says:[72] “The Marquess of Newcastle ... routed the
Parliamentarians, gained their five pieces of cannon, and so amazed
them, that they fled to Leeds, which way was precluded and obstructed;
then to Bradford, in their flight whither, he took and killed two
thousand, while Fairfax hardly escaped to Leeds with the convoy of one
troop of horse. The next day the said Earl came before Bradford, which
after the battering of forty great shot, he took, with two thousand
more of the same party the next morning, with all their arms and
ammunition.”
[Footnote 72: _A Chronicle of the Late Intestine War in the Three
Kingdoms_, etc. By James Heath, London: Thomas Basset, 1676.]
After the battle of Adderton Heath, Newcastle had an opportunity of
showing courtesy to Fairfax,[73] “whose Lady being behind a Servant on
Horse-back, was taken by some of My Lord’s Soldiers, and brought to
his Quarters, where she was treated and attended with all civility and
respect and within few days sent to _York_ in my Lords own Coach, and
from thence very shortly after to _Kingstone_ upon _Hull_, where she
desired to be, attended by my Lords Coach and Servants”.
[Footnote 73: The Duchess’s account.]
Of this incident Fairfax himself wrote:[74] “Not many days after the
Earl of Newcastle sent my wife back again in his coach, with some horse
to guard her; which generous act of his gained him more reputation than
he would have got by detaining a lady prisoner, upon such terms”.
[Footnote 74: Masère’s _Tracts_, p. 431.]
Although he had captured his enemy’s wife, Newcastle unfortunately
failed to capture his enemy’s far more important staff, owing to some
dilatoriness on the part of a galloper,[75] “the chief Officers
retiring to _Hull_, a strong Garison of the Enemy ... My Lord, knowing
they would make their escape thither, as having no other place of
refuge to resort to, sent a Letter to _York_ to the Governour of that
City, to stop them in their passage; yet by neglect of the Post, it
coming not timely enough to his hands, his Design was frustrated.”
[Footnote 75: So says the Duchess.]
Newcastle had taken Lincoln and retaken Gainsborough, which had been
captured shortly before by Cromwell; so altogether, at this part of the
campaign, he was a victorious General.
It might seem pretty safe to infer that the Duchess’s account of the
war was written from what she heard from her husband’s lips, and it
is difficult to believe that he did not insist upon seeing it, either
in manuscript or in proof, before it was published. If this surmise
be correct, he intended, at the point in the campaign which we have
now reached, to have gone to the South, so as to attack the enemy from
the North, while the King fought them from the South. Ever afterwards
he appears to have believed that, had he done so, he “would doubtless
have made an end of the war”. But urgent requests reached him from the
General in command at York, as well as from “the nobility and gentry”
of the county, to return at once to their assistance, as they declared
that the enemy was increasing in number and power every day. His
General at York stated that, unless Newcastle came quickly, all would
be lost in the North. Hints also reached him, that if he took his army
to the South and left Yorkshire to its fate, he would be considered to
have betrayed his trust.
Newcastle then hurried back to York, only to find the enemy so weak,
that it retreated before him wherever he went, and his presence as well
as that of his troops unnecessary.
The question presents itself whether Newcastle would have been wise
to march to the South, leaving such a fortress as Hull behind him, a
fortress very strongly garrisoned and containing many of Fairfax’s
best officers. It is true that the younger Hotham had professed some
sympathy with the Royalists, but neither he nor his father had shown
any definite symptoms of deserting the Parliament. On the other
hand, it might be argued that it would have been worth while to lose
Yorkshire and the northern counties, if by co-operation Newcastle’s
army and the King’s could have completely conquered the southern
counties, subdued London, and broken the power of the Parliament.
In the early autumn of 1643, King Charles made Newcastle a Marquess.
This advance in the peerage was of course an acknowledgment of his
military services, and had nothing whatever to do with any purchase of
the title by such a gross thing as filthy lucre: at the same time it is
difficult to forget that the new Marquess had probably spent more in
hard cash out of his own pocket for the King in raising his army than
would have been necessary to buy the title in the ordinary heraldic
market.
The gentlemen of Yorkshire were very uneasy at the presence of the
recently-mentioned strong garrison in the south-east corner of their
county, at Hull, and they besought Newcastle to lay siege to it and
crush it, once for all, promising to raise 10,000 men to help him if he
would make the attempt, a promise which was never fulfilled. Newcastle
consented to their request, marched to Hull and besieged it.
The defence of Hull under Lord Fairfax was a very different thing
from what it would have been if the wavering, half-Royalist Sir John
Hotham had still been in command. But Hotham had lately been arrested
and taken to the Tower. Newcastle threw up a good many batteries and
fired red-hot shot into the town. Fairfax replied to Newcastle’s fire
with water, by cutting dykes on the Hull and Humber, thus flooding the
invaders, their batteries, their guns, their red-hot shot, and their
camps.
And now, again, the question of marching to the assistance of the royal
army in the South of England was urged upon Newcastle. According to
Clarendon, while he was besieging Hull—and he besieged it for six
weeks—the King ordered him,[76] if he thought he could not take it
quickly, to leave sufficient troops to invest it, and to march with
the remainder of his army through Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire
and Essex towards London, which Charles would then approach from the
opposite side.
[Footnote 76: Clarendon, _Hist._, vol. II, part I. book vii.]
Charles also told the Queen to press Newcastle on this point—evidently
he had not much confidence in the power of his own commands! She wrote
to Newcastle: “He” (the King) “had written me to send you word to go
into Suffolk, Norfolk or Huntingdonshire. I answered him that you were
a better judge than he of that, and that I should not do it. The truth
is that they envy your army.” [77]
[Footnote 77: _Letters of Henrietta Maria_, Mrs. Everett Green, p. 225.]
Newcastle sent a reply back to the King, telling him that “he had
not strength enough to march and to leave Hull securely blocked up,”
and that the gentlemen of Yorkshire, “who had the best regiments and
were among the best officers, utterly refused to march till Hull were
taken”. This shows the state of discipline among the King’s faithful
officers at this period.
Besides Clarendon’s account of the King’s attempt to draw Newcastle to
the South, we have that of Sir Philip Warwick, who acted as Charles’s
envoy in this business:—[78]
“The King, finding by these experiences in the South, how tough the
business was likely to prove, sent me some time before into the North
to the Earl of Newcastle. My commission was, (for I had but three or
four words under the King’s hand, written on a piece of white sarsanet
to give me credit with him) to try what he meant to do with his army;
and whether he would (when the season was) march up Southerly and in
a distinct body keep at some distance from the King, to give a check
unto the Southern army. But I found him very averse to this, and
perceived that he apprehended nothing more than to be joined to the
King’s army, or to serve under Prince Rupert; for he designed himself
to be the man that should turn the scale, and to be a self-subsisting
and distinct army, wherever he was, which, when I perceived fixed in
him, being left to discretion, I thought it more reasonable to wave it,
than press him to the contrary.... He told me that, when he could quit
Yorkshire, and leave it in a condition to defend itself against the
aforementioned enemies in it, he would march through Lincolnshire and
recruit himself there, and so over the Washes into Norfolk and Suffolk
and the associated counties; which had been a noble design.” After
mentioning a disaster which later on befell Newcastle and the prospects
of King Charles, Warwick adds: “which if he had pursued that design of
marching into their associated counties, it had prevented; so as he had
a natural foresight, from whence his danger should arise; but not a
good angel or genius to divert it”.
[Footnote 78: _Memoires of the Reigne of King Charles_, by Sir Philip
Warwick. London: Ri. Chiswell, 1701.]
It was all very well for Newcastle to talk about his projects when he
should be able to quit Yorkshire and leave it in a condition to defend
itself; but very soon he was not in a position to do either.
On 10 October, Manchester, Fairfax, and Cromwell defeated a force which
Newcastle had collected in Lincolnshire. According to Whitelock,[79]
“The Earl of Manchester took in Lincoln upon surrender, and therein
2500 armes, 30 colours, 3 pieces of cannon”. The same authority states
that: “The Lord Fairfax beat from about Hull part of the King’s,” i.e.
Newcastle’s, “forces, took from them 9 pieces of cannon, of which one
was a demy-culverin, one of those which they called ‘the Queen’s Gods,’
and 100 arms.... Colonel Cromwell routed 7 troops of the King’s horse
in Lincolnshire under Colonel Hastings.” Newcastle was then obliged to
raise the siege of Hull, much to the disappointment and alarm of the
“nobility and gentlemen of Yorkshire”; and he marched back to York.
[Footnote 79: _Memorials_, p. 72.]
Of the state of the war after this event Clarendon says:[80] “Albeit
the Marquis of Newcastle had been forced to rise as unfortunately from
Hull, as the King had been from Gloucester, yet he had still a full
power over Yorkshire, and a greater in Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire
than the Parliament had”. The latter part of this statement is rather
surprising when we consider the recent defeat of Newcastle’s forces in
Lincolnshire.
[Footnote 80: _Hist._, vol. II, part I. book vii.]
In ending this chapter we will notice a letter from the Queen to
Newcastle, written on 7 October, just before he raised the siege of
Hull, in which the old matter of the Governorship of the Prince crops
up again.[81]
[Footnote 81: _Letters of Henrietta Maria_, Mrs. Everett Green, p. 230.]
“There is one thing about which I want to be informed by you before
doing it. The Marquis of Hertford desires to be made groom of the
stole to the King. If that be, he must cease to be governor to Prince
Charles, so that we must place some one else about Prince Charles,
which I do not wish to do, without first knowing whether you wish to
have it again.” Presently she says (if he does not wish for it again):
“there are two other places and I desire to know which would be most
agreeable to you, for I have nothing in my thoughts so much as to show
you and all the world the esteem in which I hold you, therefore write
frankly to me, as to a friend, as I am now doing to you, which you
desire;—_chamberlain, or gentleman of the bedchamber_. If I had chosen
to act ceremoniously, I should have had this written to you by another,
that is all very well where there is no esteem, such I have for you;
and as this is written with frankness, I request a reply of the same,
and that you believe me, as I am, truly and constantly,
“Your faithful and very good friend,
“HENRIETTA MARIA R.”
[Illustration: William Cavindish Marquis of Newcastle.
_From an Original by_ Van Dyck.
_His Seals & Autographs from the original Letters in the Possession of_
John Thane]
CHAPTER X.
Newcastle had not been many days in York, when he heard a rumour that
the enemy was advancing from the South into Derbyshire, and he marched
thither at once, that is to say early in November, 1643. He posted
some troops in different parts of the county, and fortunately he met
with no serious opposition. On the contrary, he was able to raise a
considerable force both of cavalry and of infantry. The rumour of
the advance of an army from the South proved groundless, and he went
peacefully to his own houses of Bolsover and Welbeck, where he stayed
for a little time, making them his winter quarters.
Unfortunately, the pleasures of his hearth and home were marred by the
arrival of some very unwelcome information,[82] namely, that the Scots
were about to invade England with a large army, which was to fight
on the side of the Parliament. This was serious news, indeed, to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Royalist army in the North of England, which
would necessarily be called upon to check the invasion.
[Footnote 82: Kippis states that he was at Welbeck when he received
this news.]
“At this time,” [83] we read in Clarendon, “nothing troubled the
King so much as the intelligence he received from Scotland, that they
had already formed their army, and resolved to enter England in the
winter season.... The circumstance of the time made the danger of the
invasion the more formidable; for the Earl of Newcastle, lately created
a Marquis, had been compelled with his army, as much by the murmours
and indisposition of his officers, as by the season of the year, to
quit his design upon Hull, and to retire to York.” Clarendon adds that
the garrison at Hull had “made many strong infalls into the country and
defeated some of his” (Newcastle’s) “troops”.
[Footnote 83: _Hist._, vol. II, part I. bk. vii.]
The report of the expected advance of an army from Scotland greatly
alarmed the nervous “nobility and gentry of Yorkshire,” who sent to
implore Newcastle to return to their assistance, once more promising
to raise 10,000 men to strengthen his army. Newcastle marched back to
York,—not to please the nobility and gentry of that county, who had
promised, and yet failed to provide, a force of 10,000 men for him, on
a former occasion—but because it was necessary to proceed to York on
his way North against the Scots. When he reached York, he found that
the nobility and gentry had not raised so much as a single man to add
to his army. Therefore he had himself to raise what men he could for
the defence of the county, when he was actually on his march towards
the North against the enemy.
The military situation was now greatly changed. Hitherto the
Parliamentary army had lain between the King in the South and
Newcastle in the North. If Hull could have been taken and its garrison
captured, Newcastle would have marched to the South and the army of
the Parliament would soon have been attacked on both sides at once.
Now, on the contrary, it was Newcastle who was likely to be attacked on
both sides at once, by the Scots from the North and by Fairfax from the
South.
On 19 January, 1644, the Scottish army of 21,000 men crossed the
border and Newcastle marched to the city from which he took his title.
He came there in February, and on the 13th he wrote[84] to the King,
announcing his arrival there, and stating that he had had to march his
army through thawing snow and floods. He added that, the day after his
arrival, the Scots attacked the town; but that the town’s soldiers were
very faithful and drove the enemy a mile from its walls. He lamented
that he would not be able to take more than 5000 foot and 3000 horse
into the field, or 8000 in all, against the enemy’s 20,000 or more; and
he complained of want both of arms and of ammunition.
[Footnote 84: Rupert Correspondence, Warburton’s _Rupert_, vol. I, p.
504.]
According to the Duchess, the Scottish General was ignorant of
Newcastle’s arrival, expected no opposition, consequently approached
the town incautiously and was repulsed with considerable loss. She
writes as to what immediately followed:—
“The Enemy being thus stopt before the Town, thought fit to quarter
near it, in that part of the Country; and so soon as my Lords Army
was come up, he” (i.e., Newcastle) “designed one night to have fallen
into their Quarter; but by reason of some neglect of his Orders in
not giving timely notice to the party designed for it, it took not
an effect answerable to his expectation. In a word, there were three
Designs taken against the Enemy, whereof if one had but hit, they would
doubtless have been lost; but there was so much Treachery, Jugling
and Falshood in my Lord’s own Army” (were the poets and the divines
quarrelling?) “that it was impossible for him to be successful in his
Designs and Undertakings. However, though it failed in the Enemies
Foot-Quarters, which lay nearest the Town; yet it took good effect in
their Horse Quarters, which were more remote; for my Lord’s Horse,
Commanded by a very gallant and worthy Gentleman”—can this have been
the reinstated Goring?—“falling upon them, gave them such an Alarm,
that all they could do, was to draw into the Field, where my Lord’s
Forces charged them, and in a little time routed them totally, and
kill’d and took many Prisoners, to the number of 1500.”
Whitelock gives a slightly different account of this affair. “The
Scots besieged Newcastle, and took a main outwork, and beat back the
enemy sallying out upon them. The Marquess of Newcastle being in the
town, burnt a hundred houses in the suburbs; the inhabitants clamour
against him. Seven of the Parliamentary frigates lay in the mouth of
the haven to stop their passage by seas. The Marquess ordered the
firing of the coal-mines, but that was prevented by General Leslie’s
surprising of all the boats and vessels.”
The Scots withdrew; but they went Southwards and got into Newcastle’s
rear. Both armies manœuvred against each other in various parts
of the county of Durham, for some time, without coming into actual
collision, the Scots seeming anxious to avoid an engagement; indeed
their failure to take an immediate initiative with their large
preponderance in numbers was the cause of much discontent and grumbling
among the supporters of the Parliament in London.
On more than one occasion, we have seen the King desiring that
Newcastle should march his army to the support of that in the South.
The tables were now turned. On 16 February, Newcastle wrote to Charles,
urging him to send troops to the North against the powerful Scottish
army, and expressing a strong opinion that, unless reinforcements were
sent thither, and sent very speedily, the King would be in danger of
losing his crown.
Some desultory fighting took place in the beginning of March, of which
Newcastle gave an account to the King; and, as a specimen of his
military dispatches, parts of it shall be given here. They can be read,
or skipped at the reader’s pleasure.[85]
[Footnote 85: Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, Charles Ist, vol. LX,
pp. 42-43. March 9th, 1644. No. 13.]
(Dispatch communicating the doings of the army under the Marquis of
Newcastle to the King.) It is headed “A True relation of all the
observable passages that have happened in these (northern) parts since
my last to your Majesty; with the reason of the impossibility of making
good the Tyne against the Scots.... Sir Thos. Riddell sent about 50
musketeers from Tynemouth Castle to destroy some corn in the enemies’
quarters, from whence they were drawn out, as he was informed: But it
seems his intelligence betrayed them to the enemy and about 45 of them
were taken prisoners, who being carried to Leslie (Earl of Leven) he
sent them to me as a token, and I returned him thanks for his civility,
with this answer, that I hoped very shortly to repay that debt with
interest, which I did in a few days.”
“Colonel Dudley from his quarters about Prudhoe marched over the
river with some horse and dragoons and fell into a quarter of the
enemy’s in Northumberland, and slew and took all that was in it, 55
prisoners, and gave such an alarum to four of their quarters that they
quitted them in disorder and with some loss; in which (skirmish) we
should have suffered no loss at all, had not Colonel Brandling been
taken prisoner through the unfortunate fall of his horse; and Colonel
Dudley perceiving a greater force preparing to assult him, retreated,
and in his retreat took 8 of the Scots prisoners, both horses and men,
but they took 4 of his dragoons, whose horses were so weak they could
not pass the river.... Upon Wednesday the 6th inst. at one o’clock
afternoon our first troops passed Newbridge, and a while after the
enemy appeared with some horse; when they advanced toward us with more
than they first discovered, after some bullets had been exchanged, and
they appeared again in greater force, we backed our party with Lord
Henry (Percy’s) regiment,—Lieutenant Colonel Schrimsher (Scrimegour)
commanding them—being part of Colonel Dudley’s brigade, with which
he drew up after them, with whom also we sent some musketeers; which
caused the enemy that day to look upon us at a farther distance.”
It would appear much to Newcastle’s credit that he was able to
manœuvre for some time against an army nearly three times the size
of his own, were it not doubtful whether the credit was not due to King
(Lord Ethyn), to whom he is known to have left much of the work which
should properly have been done by himself. As to his other generals
they seem to have been Newcastle’s chief source of weakness. Here is a
story of disaster told by the Duchess:—
“A great misfortune befel My Lords Forces in _Yorkshire_; for the
Governour whom he had left behind with sufficient Forces for the
defence of that Country, although he had orders not to encounter the
Enemy, but to keep himself in a defensive posture; yet he being a
man of great valour and courage, it transported him so much that he
resolved to face the Enemy, and offering to keep a Town that was not
tenable, was utterly routed, and himself taken prisoner, although he
fought most gallantly.”
Of this affair, Whitelock gives a fuller account:—[86]
“The Lord Fairfax, and Sir Thomas Fairfax his son, joining together,
drew up their forces at Selby,[87] where a garrison of the King’s was,
and in it Colonel Bellasis the Governor of York; that night they beat
in a party of the enemy’s horse and took divers prisoners.
[Footnote 86: _Memorials_, p. 82.]
[Footnote 87: About a dozen miles south of York.]
“Early the next morning they beset the Town in three divisions, and
after a hot fight, wherein both parties performed brave service,
Fairfax routed them, and entered the town, where they took 4 Colonels,
4 Majors, 20 Captains, 130 inferior officers, 1,600 common soldiers,
4 brass pieces of ordnance, powder, match, 2,000 arms, 500 horse,
besides colours, and a pinnace, and ships in the river, and 500 more
prisoners at Hemcough near Selby.”
“The Earl of Newcastle, troubled at the news of Selby, and his army
waiting upon the approach of the Scots towards them, they left Durham
to the Scots and General Leslie pursued them.”
The forces of Newcastle were hard pressed throughout their return to
York. The Duchess’s account says that Newcastle’s rear had to fight
the enemy every day of the journey; but that the retreat was made in
excellent order.
News of Newcastle’s retreat to York caused great disappointment among
the Royalists at Court, and his enemies took the opportunity of blaming
his whole conduct of the war. These complaints were conveyed to him in
letters by his friends. Their effect upon him was so great that he
lost heart and, as is pretty evident from the following letter, he had
written to the King expressing a wish to resign his command.
(MS. Harl., 6988, art. 104. Orig. Entirely in the King’s hand.)
“NEW CASTELL
By your last dispach I perceave that the Scots are not the only, or
(it may be said) the least ennemies you contest withall at this tyme;
wherefore I must tell you in a word (for I have not tyme to make
longe discourses) you must as much contem the impertinent or malitius
tonges and pennes of those that ar or professe to be your frends, as
well as you dispyse the sword of an equall ennemie. The trewth is, if
eather you, or my L. Ethen leave my service, I am sure (at least) all
the Northe (I speake not all I thinke) is lost. Remember all courage
is not in fyghting; constancy in a good cause being the cheefe, and
the dispysing of slanderus tonges and pennes being not the least
ingredient. I’l say no more, but, let nothing disharten you from doing
that which is most for your owen honnor, and good of (the thought of
leaving your charge being against booke)
“Your most asseured reall
“constant frend
“CHARLES R.
“OXFORD 5. AP: 1644.”
The question presents itself whether the tongues and pens of those who
were dissatisfied with Newcastle’s conduct of the campaign in the
North, spoke and wrote with no foundation for dissatisfaction. Perhaps
both the blame and the praise which were his due are pretty fairly
allotted on one of the pages of Hume:—[88]
“Newcastle,” he says, “the ornament of the Court and of his order,
had been engaged, contrary to the natural bent of his disposition,
into these military operations, merely by a high sense of honour,
and a personal regard to his master. The dangers of the war were
disregarded by his valour; but its fatigues were oppressive to his
natural indolence. Munificent and generous in his expense, polite
and elegant in his taste, courteous and humane in his behaviour, he
brought a great accession of friends and of credit to the party which
he embraced.”
[Footnote 88: _History of England_, VII, 13.]
Undoubtedly this is true. His own expenditure upon the war was
enormous, as the Duchess assures us and as contemporary writers
testify; and his personal influence brought many great men, followed
by large numbers of their servants, dependants and tenants, into the
Royalist army. Again, his “humane behaviour” made him and his army
popular in the counties which they occupied, a condition as important
as difficult of attainment in a civil war.
Hume continues: “But amidst all the hurry of action, his inclinations
were secretly drawn to the soft arts of peace, in which he took
delight; and the charms of poetry, music, conversation, often stole
him from his rougher occupations. He chose Sir William Davenant, an
ingenious poet, for his lieutenant general”—“as one of his lieutenants
generals” would have been more accurate—“The other persons, in whom he
placed confidence, were more the instruments of his refined pleasures,
than qualified for the business which they undertook. And the severity
and application, requisite to the support of discipline, were qualities
in which he was entirely wanting.”
Very probably these defects were more accountable for Newcastle’s
failures than “the juggling, falsehood and treachery in his army
and amongst some of his officers” of which his Duchess was fond of
complaining. And it is more than likely that Granger was right in
saying that Newcastle “was much better qualified for a court than a
camp”.[89]
[Footnote 89: _Biog. Hist. of Eng._, 4th edition, 1804, vol. II, p.
125.]
Not the less should it be remembered that Newcastle was vastly
outnumbered by his enemy from Scotland and that his troops which he had
left in his rear had been defeated by his enemy in the South. Under
such conditions even Napoleon would have been in difficulties.
CHAPTER XI.
Early in the year 1644 five Irish regiments were landed at Mostyn, on
the north coast of Wales, to join the Royalist army, and probably that
part of it under the command of Newcastle. They were unopposed as they
marched through Wales, Chester, and a great portion of the county of
Cheshire. But when they reached Nantwich, some seventeen miles to the
south-east of Chester, they found it strongly garrisoned. They had
not long laid siege to it, when Sir Thomas Fairfax, the son of Lord
Fairfax, arrived with a superior force, and, after a stubborn battle of
two hours, routed them. Thereupon nearly half of the Irish regiments
“turned their coats” and joined the Parliamentary army under Sir Thomas
Fairfax, who then, considerably strengthened in numbers, was free to
join his forces with those of his father in Yorkshire. This made the
position of Newcastle much more precarious. He must have written to the
King asking for reinforcements, for Charles replied:—
(MS. Harl., 6988, art. 106. Orig. Entirely in the King’s hand.)
“NEW CASTELL
“You need not doute of the care I have of the North and in particular
of your assistance against the Scots invasion, but you must consider
that wee, lyke you, cannot doe alwais what we would; besydes our taske
is not litle that we strugle with, in which if we faile, all you can
doe will be to little purpose; wherfor You may be asseured of all
assistance from hence that may be, without laing our selfes open to
eminent danger, the particulars of which I refer you to my L. Digby
and rest.
“Your most asseured reall
“constant frend
“CHARLES R.
“OXFORD 11. AP:
“1644.”
Meanwhile, general interest was concentrated on the war in the South.
Essex and Waller, each with a large force, were endeavouring either
to enclose the army of the King, or to besiege him in Oxford. Knowing
his inferiority in numbers, Charles avoided a battle, and partly by
manœuvring, and partly owing to the mutual jealousy of Essex and
Waller which prevented them from acting in concert, the King managed
to escape them, after fighting one or two unimportant and indecisive
actions. His position was now one of great jeopardy, and it was just
then that he received the disheartening news of the defeat at Selby and
Newcastle’s enforced retreat to York, with his request to be relieved
of his command.
At York Newcastle soon found himself closely invested. Our female War
Correspondent shall tell us what she knew about it.
“My Lord being now at _York_, and finding three Armies against him,
_viz._ the Army of the _Scots_, the Army of the _English_ that gave the
defeat to the Governour of _York_, and an Army that was raised out of
associate Counties,”—this is a little premature; as the army of the
Associated Counties did not arrive for several weeks—“and but little
Ammunition and Provision in the Town; was forced to send his Horse away
to quarter in several Counties, _viz._ _Derbyshire_, _Nottinghamshire_,
_Leicestershire_, for their subsistence, under the Conduct of his
Lieutenant-General of the Horse, My dear Brother, Sir _Charles Lucas_,
himself remaining at _York_, with his Foot and Train for the defence
of that City.” Clarendon, however, says that Newcastle’s object in
sending his Lieutenant-General of the Horse (Goring, of course), with
a large body of cavalry, was “to remain in those places he should find
most convenient, and from whence he might best infest the enemy.” In
carrying out these instructions, Goring, at first, not only met with
some success, but at the same time raised additional forces on his
marches, and money also, as we learn from the following State Paper.[90]
[Footnote 90: S. P. Charles I, Dom., May 25, 1644, vol. DI. 141 A.]
“Proceedings at the Committee of both kingdoms.... To advertise the
Earl of Manchester of the great damage done to cos. Leicester, Stafford
and those parts, by the Earl of Newcastle’s horse, which, coming from
York, have raised 1,000 horse, and £10,000.”
Lord Newcastle has “now about 3,000 horse and dragoons near Uttoxeter
in Staffordshire, which we hear with 1,000 horse might have been wholly
prevented. They still increase their force, raise much money, and ruin
those that depend on protection from the Parliament.” Evidently Goring,
to use an expression of the Duchess, “carved for himself” in the
districts in which he was campaigning.
It was as much as Newcastle could do to withstand the siege of York.
His biographer says:—
“The Enemy having closely besiedged the City on all sides, came to
the very Gates thereof, and pull’d out the Earth at one end, as those
in the City put it in at the other end; they planted their great
Cannons against it, and threw in Granadoes at pleasure: But those
in the City made several sallies upon them with good success. At
last, the General of the associate Army of the Enemy, having closely
beleaguer’d the North side of the Town, sprung a Mine under the wall
of the Mannor-yard, and blew part of it up; and having beaten back the
Town-Forces (although they behaved themselves very gallantly) enter’d
the Mannor-house with a great number of their men, which as soon as my
Lord perceived, he went away in all haste, even to the amazement of all
that were by, not knowing what he intended to do; and drew 80 of his
own Regiment of Foot, called the White-Coats, all stout and valiant
Men, to that Post, who fought the Enemy with that courage, that within
a little time they killed and took 1500 of them; and My Lord gave
present order to make up the breach which they had made in the wall;
Whereupon the Enemy remain’d without any other attempt in that kind,
so long, till almost all provision for the support of the soldiery in
the City was spent, which nevertheless was so well ordered by my Lords
Prudence, that no Famine or great extremity of want ensued.”
No famine or great extremity, perhaps, for the moment. Nevertheless,
Newcastle was becoming very anxious, and, at the least, foresaw both
famine and great extremity facing him in the near future. Clarendon
tells us that “he sent an express to the King to inform him of the
condition he was in”; and to let him know “that he doubted not to
defend himself in that post, for the term of six weeks or two months;
in which time he hoped his Majesty would find some way to relieve him”.
Newcastle was well aware that the King would know of his objection
to having his army joined to that of Rupert, an objection proceeding
from something near akin to jealousy; so, now that he was in a strait,
and practically begging for Rupert’s help, since it was the only help
available, he thought it wise to write to Charles “that he hoped his
Majesty did believe that he would never make the least scruple to obey
the grandchild of King James”.
Charles, in fact, had already sent Prince Rupert northwards with the
relief of Newcastle as his ultimate object. Having marched for his
quarters at Shrewsbury, Rupert had taken by surprise the strong
Parliamentary forces that were investing Newcastle’s garrison at
Newark-upon-Trent, in Nottinghamshire, and had compelled them to raise
the siege. He had then marched westward and taken Stockport, Bolton,
and Liverpool. The message from the King, ordering him to proceed at
once to the relief of York, reached him when he had raised the siege of
Latham House, which had been gallantly defended by the brave Lady Derby
for more than four months.
Like Newcastle, Rupert had enemies at Court: like Newcastle again, he
was anxious to be relieved of his command, and this just at the time
when Newcastle was asking for his assistance. Once more, as in the case
of Newcastle, Rupert’s rivals were urging the King to recall him.
Things were going badly with Newcastle. Whitelock says: “A battery was
made at the Windmill-Hill at York, five pieces of ordnance planted,
which shot into the town, and did much hurt. The Lord Eglinton, with
four thousand Scots, entered some of the gates. A strong party sallying
out of the city was beaten back with loss. General Leven with his
regiment took a fort from the enemy, and in it 120 prisoners. The
garrison burnt up much of the suburbs.”
According to Whitelock,[91] Newcastle made an attempt to leave York.
“The Earl of Newcastle, Sir Thomas Widderington, and other chief
commanders with a strong party sallied out of the town, endeavouring
to escape, but were driven back into the city.” It is most unlikely
that Newcastle was “endeavouring to escape” and to desert York in its
extremity. The probability is that he was only making a sally upon the
enemy’s forces.
[Footnote 91: P. 86.]
Whitelock makes another statement. He says:[92] “The Earl of Newcastle
desired a treaty, which was admitted, and he demanded to march away
with bag and baggage, and arms, and drums beating, and colours flying,
and that all within the town should have liberty of conscience, the
Prebends to enjoy their places, to have Common Prayer, organs, surplice
hoods, crosses, etc.”
[Footnote 92: P. 87.]
It is almost incredible that in return he would have promised to
take no farther part in the war. But even if he and his army were
to continue to fight for the King, he would have been offering to
surrender the highly important fortress of York. It is far more likely
that he was endeavouring to delay the siege operations of the enemy by
parleys and negotiations, while awaiting the arrival of Rupert.
His conditions, however, were “denied by the Parliament’s Generals;
but they offered the Earl of Newcastle that he and all his commanders
should go forth on horseback with their swords and the common soldiers
with staves in their hands, and a month’s pay, and all else to be left
behind them”.
This obviously meant the disarmament of the troops, which one would
have expected Newcastle to have instantly refused; but, says
Whitelock, “the enemy desired four or five days to consider thereof
which was granted,” and this, if true, has an ugly sound. But every day
of armistice was of value to Newcastle, when a force was known to be
coming to his relief, and he may have seized the opportunity for delay.
Besides the large Scottish army, and the troops under Lord Fairfax,
Newcastle was to be besieged before long by the army that had been
raised against the King in what were known as the Associated Counties,
namely Essex, Cambridgeshire, Suffolk, Norfolk, Bedford and Huntingdon.
This army had been placed under the command of the Earl of Manchester
who, when Lord Kimbolton, had been impeached by Charles at the same
time as the Five Members. His General of the Horse—or it might almost
be said his second in command—was Oliver Cromwell.
Manchester was a rigid Presbyterian. Warwick says of him:—[93]
“The Earl of Manchester, formerly known by the name of Lord Kimbolton,
was a gentleman of very good parts, and of very good education, both
at home and abroad, and of a debonnaire nature, but very facile or
changeable.... With all his good nature, or the facility of it, he did
as much harm as the worst-natured man could have done. And therefore it
was supposed, though he seemed the head, he was but the instrument of
Mr. Cromwell, who made great ravage in all those associated counties on
the King’s party.”
[Footnote 93: P. 246.]
Cromwell’s character is too well known to need description here; but,
as Warwick was with Newcastle, let us hear what he has to say about the
most formidable enemy against whom Newcastle ever fought a battle.[94]
[Footnote 94: P. 247.]
“I have no mind to give an ill character of Cromwell; for, in his
conversation with me, he was ever friendly; though at the latter
end ... he was sufficiently frigid. The first time that ever I took
notice of him was in the beginning of the Parliament held in November,
1640, when I vainly thought myself a courtly young gentleman, (for we
courtiers valued ourselves much upon our good clothes). I came one
morning into the House well clad, and perceived a gentleman speaking
(whom I knew not) very ordinarily apparelled; for it was a plain cloth
suit, which seemed to have been made by a country tailor; his linen
was very plain and not very clean ... his hat was without a band,
his stature was a good size, his sword stuck close to his side, his
countenance swollen and reddish, his voice sharp and untuneable....
Yet I lived to see this very gentleman, whom out of no ill-will I thus
describe, by multiplied good successes, and by real (but usurped) power
(having had a better tailor and more converse among good company) ...
appear of a great and majestic deportment.”
“... Whilst I was about Huntingdon, visiting old Sir Oliver Cromwell,
his uncle and godfather, at his house at Ramsey, he told me this
story of his successful nephew and godson; that he visited him with a
good strong party of horse, and that he asked him his blessing, and
that, the few hours he was there, he would not keep on his hat in his
presence; but, at the same time, he not only disarmed but plundered
him; for he took away all his plate.” As we are aware, there was a
royal precedent for robbing a host of his plate.
Among the State Papers, there are a good many dispatches from the
Parliamentary army in the North at this (to Newcastle) very critical
time. The first to be quoted tells us the strength of the force which
Rupert was said to be taking to the relief of Newcastle.[95]
[Footnote 95: S. P. Charles I, Dom., 1644, May 31, Manchester vol. DI,
No. 148.]
“SIR JOHN MELDRUM TO THE EARL OF DENBIGH.... Sir Thomas Fairfax and
Major-General (David) Leslie are in full pursuit of Prince Rupert’s
Army, deeply engaged in a country full of difficult passages for
ordnance and carriages. Rupert’s forces are divided into two bodies,
the Marquis of Newcastle’s horse, not exceeding 3,000 as I am credibly
informed, and 100 foot, without ordnance, lying upon the frontiers
of Yorkshire, betwixt Woodhead and Stopford; and the Prince himself
with 4,000 horse and 7,000 foot, and 14 pieces of ordnance lying about
Bolton and Bury, at a great distance from each other.”
From the following it would appear that Goring must have manœuvred
very skilfully to avoid being heavily outnumbered in a battle.[96]
[Footnote 96: S. P. Charles I, Dom., June 1, 1644, vol. DII, No. 1.]
“SELBY. THE EARL OF MANCHESTER TO THE COMMITTEE OF BOTH KINGDOMS ... I
can assure you that I took all care to bring on an engagement with the
Duke of Newcastle’s horse which came from York, but they would not stay
within 20 or 30 miles of where my horse were. The time they employed
in plundering about Leicester, most part of my horse were on this side
Trent, unable to move by reason of the heavy rains. As soon as they
had notice that Major-General Leslie and my horse were moving towards
Nottingham, thinking to intercept them in their march northward, they
marched in such hot haste toward Uttoxeter that they left great numbers
of their horse dead on the highways, passing the Trent at Burton, and
so got into Derbyshire. Sir Thos. Fairfax was sent with directions to
engage Newcastle’s horse, we having intelligence that they were coming
toward Sheffield and Rotherham, but as soon as our horse were within
7 or 8 miles of them, they presently marched into those parts of the
country in which it would be very difficult to pursue them.”
Although Goring was not strong enough to engage his enemy at this time,
he was doing good service by delaying the juncture of the army of the
Associated Counties with the Scottish army before York. But a time
came when he could delay that juncture no longer.[97]
[Footnote 97: S. P. Charles I, Dom., June 11, 1644, vol. DII, No. 10.]
“SIR HARRY VANE, JUNR., TO THE COMMITTEE OF BOTH KINGDOMS LEAGUER
BEFORE YORK.... It appears to me very evident that if Manchester had
not brought up his foot to the siege the business would have been very
dilatory, whereas the siege is now made very straight about the city,
the Earl’s forces lying on the North side, where they have advanced
very near the walls, and are busy in a mine of which we expect a speedy
account, if by a treaty we be not prevented. The Scotch forces under
Sir James Lumsdale’s (Lumsden’s) command united with those of Lord
Fairfax, possess the suburbs at the East side, and are within pistol
shot and less of Walmgate.”
In the later part of the same dispatch, Sir Harry Vane notices the
“parley” mentioned by Whitelock. He only dwells upon a matter of
etiquette, which turned upon the question whether Newcastle did not
put Manchester’s name on the direction of a letter, through literal
ignorance of his presence, or from a desire to ignore it.
“On the 9th inst., the Earl of Newcastle sent letters to the Earl of
Leven and Lord Fairfax for a parley, not taking notice of the Earl of
Manchester being there, but in that respect the treaty was refused and
notice sent to Newcastle that unless he directed his letters to all
three generals he could have no answer, whereupon letters were sent to
all three Generals, and a civil excuse by the omission in regard, as he
pretended, he did not know the Earl of Manchester in person had been
there.” It is possible the mistake may have been intentional, with the
object of again causing a delay.
In June, Newcastle was reported to have had a success of some sort, in
which he was said to have lost his life.[98]
[Footnote 98: S. P. Charles I, Dom., June 27, 1644, vol. DII, No. 30.]
“SIR E. NICHOLAS TO SIR GERVASE LUCAS. OXFORD.... It is not believed
at London that the Marquis of Newcastle is slain, but they confess the
Marquis of Newcastle has given the Scots a good blow.” Possibly this
may refer to the occasion on which the Duchess says that her husband
“killed and took 1500” of the enemy.
CHAPTER XII.
Although Newcastle had been anxious to avoid a junction with Rupert as
long as possible, lest he should lose some of the credit of defeating
the enemy in the North, he had no personal dislike of that General.
The two men were on good terms, and they were correspondents. Among
the Rupert letters are four from Newcastle, congratulating him on
different victories. In one of them he says of those victories that,
“as they are too big for anybody else, so they appear too small for his
Royal Highness,” and in another that, although Rupert will not allow
them to be talked about in his presence, they will be talked about “to
posterity, to His Royal Highness’s everlasting fame”.
Early on 1 July, Newcastle heard that Rupert with his army would arrive
that very day, and he immediately wrote, and sent to Rupert, the
following letter of welcome:—[99]
“May it please your Highness, you are welcome, sir, so many several
ways, as it is beyond my arithmetic to number, but this I know, you are
the Redeemer of the North, and the Saviour of the Crown. Your name,
sir, hath terrified three great Generals, and they fly before it. It
seems their design is not to meet your Highness, for I believe they
have got a river between you and them; but they are so nearly gone as
there is (no) certainty at all of them or their intentions, neither can
I resolve anything, since I am made of nothing but thankfulness and
obedience to your Highness’s commands.”
[Footnote 99: _The Pythouse Papers_, p. 19.]
Rupert arrived, as Warwick tells us, “with a very good army, Goring
being joined to him with the Northern horse”. It was not without some
skilful manœuvring that he was able to effect an entrance into York.
Here is his enemy’s account of it:—[100]
“LEAGUER BEFORE YORK.
“THE EARLS OF LEVEN, LINDSAY, AND MANCHESTER, FERDINANDO LORD FAIRFAX,
AND THOS. HATCHER. Since our last the conditions of affairs is not
a little changed for on Monday last, upon notice of Prince Rupert’s
march from Knaisburgh (Knaresborough) towards us, we resolved and
accordingly drew out the armies to have met him.” They do not say that
Newcastle came after them, but Heath (_Chronicle_, p. 58) says, “those
in York pursued their rear, and seized some provisions,” which must
have been most welcome to a half-famished garrison expecting a good
many thousand more hungry men who would also want food. The Generals
go on to say that they “for that end did march the same night to
Long Marston, about four miles west of York, but the Prince having
notice thereof passed with his army at Boroughbridge,” a place about
eighteen miles to the north-west of York, and quite out of his direct
route, “and so put the river Ouse betwixt him and us, whereby we were
disabled to oppose his passage into York, the bridge we built on the
west side of the town, being so weak that we durst not adventure to
transport our armies over upon it. This made us resolve the next
morning to march to Tadcaster for stopping his passage southward.”
[Footnote 100: S. P., Dom., Charles I, vol. LX.]
According to this account, therefore, it was Rupert who put the river
between himself and the enemy, and not the enemy who put the river
between themselves and Rupert, as Newcastle had written.
Rupert having effected his juncture with Newcastle, the Parliamentary
generals had to consider what should be their next step. It used to
be held that a besieging army should be larger than that of the place
invested; but the Royalist and the Parliamentary armies were pretty
equal in numbers. The most probable decision of the Parliamentary
Generals, therefore, would be to retire.
On the other hand, it was a question whether it would be the policy
of the Royalist army to force an engagement. With a fortified town
at their backs, it might have been under other circumstances; but
Newcastle’s men had been much underfed of late, and Rupert’s were
wearied by long marches, whereas the Parliamentary forces, although
very short of provisions, were better fed than Newcastle’s, nor were
they travel-worn like Rupert’s.
When Rupert went into York, on Monday, 1 July, he took about 2000 horse
with him; but he left his foot, his ordnance, and the remainder of his
cavalry in camp about five miles to the north of the town.
Newcastle, a dignified man of middle-age, accustomed to respect and
deference, had now to receive as his superior officer that impetuous
sprig of royalty, Prince Rupert, a youth of 22; and, glad as he was
that Rupert had come to his relief, he can scarcely have got rid of
all his previous feelings of jealousy. He told Rupert that the enemy
had already raised the siege, that the Parliamentary Generals were
quarrelling, that there was intense jealousy between the Scotch and the
English troops, and that, in all probability, the army from Scotland
would separate itself from its English allies, when, if left to
themselves, the enemy would disperse in various directions, and would
make no further attempts upon York.
Rupert, on the contrary, wanted to attack, stating that he had a
letter in his pocket from the King commanding him to give battle to
the Parliamentary army and crush it, once for all.[101] Newcastle
urged that it would at least be wiser to await the arrival of Colonel
Clavering, whom he was momentarily expecting with more than 3000
men, as well as that of 2000 men from the Northern garrisons. With
this addition of 5000 men, the Royalist army would have considerably
outnumbered that of the Parliament. Besides the reinforcements
definitely expected, Newcastle had great hopes of the arrival of
Montrose with some troops from Scotland. Rupert replied to Newcastle’s
arguments by saying: “Nothing venture, nothing win,” and then he
returned to his camp and spent the night there.
[Footnote 101: Sir Philip Warwick (p. 278), who was present at the
battle which followed, wrote: “Had not the Lord Digby, this year, given
a fatal direction to that excellent Prince Rupert to fight the Scottish
Army, surely that great Prince and soldier had never so precipitately
fought them”.
Digby was supposed to have inspired the King to write the letter to
Rupert here mentioned. The letter said: “If York be lost, I shall
esteem my crown little less.... But if York be relieved, and you
beat the rebels of both Kingdoms which are before it, then, but not
otherwise, I may possibly make a shift.” Lord Culpepper, when the King
told him that this letter had been sent, exclaimed: “Why, then, before
God you are undone; for upon this peremptory order he will fight,
whatever comes of it” (Warburton’s _Prince Rupert_, vol. II, p. 438).]
Early on the Tuesday morning Rupert was again in York and with
Newcastle. Meanwhile there had been as much diversity of opinion
between the Parliamentary Generals on the question of fighting or
not fighting, as between the Royalist. The English Generals were all
for action, the Scotch for a withdrawal to seek some more favourable
battle-field, and finally the latter over-persuaded the former.
In the Royalist council of war, Rupert was able to reply to Newcastle’s
continued desire for delay until the arrival of the shortly expected
reinforcements, by stating that his scouts reported the enemy to be
already on the move and that, unless they were attacked that day, they
would probably altogether escape a battle.
Newcastle persisted in his objections to an immediate engagement,
while Rupert’s persistence in favour of it never wavered. Heated, if
courteous, words are said to have passed between the two Generals—the
story that they even came to blows may be safely dismissed as
fiction—but finally Newcastle yielded although under strong protest,
to the royal authority, saying: “I am ready and willing, on my part,
to obey Your Highness, no otherwise than if His Majesty were here in
person. Happen what may, I will not shun to fight: for I have no other
ambition than to live and die a loyal subject of His Majesty.”
Rupert replied: “My Lord, I hope we shall have a glorious day”.[102]
Orders were then given to marshal all the forces into order of battle.
[Footnote 102: Such is the substance of the story as told by several
contemporary writers. Clarendon, however, in his very brief account of
the Battle of Marston Moor, says: “The Prince, without consulting with
the Marquis of Newcastle, or any of the officers within the town, sent
for all the soldiers to draw out, and put the whole army in battalia”.
But Cholmley’s Memorials touching the Battle of York, which were drawn
up for Clarendon’s information, and on which Clarendon most likely
based his own account, were written in 1649, five years after the
event, when Cholmondley may have forgotten some of the details.]
The rear-guard of the Parliamentary army was just preparing to
start—the advance-guard was already three miles on its road towards
Tadcaster, when a body of Royalist horse appeared, pulled up, and then
galloped away. Almost immediately afterwards, between ten and eleven
o’clock, 5000 of Rupert’s horse entered upon the moor, near Marston
village, where the rebel army had been encamped during the night
and a small part of it was still remaining. On hearing of this the
Parliamentary Generals thought that Rupert was manœuvring to attack
them on their march. If he fell upon their rear it might be fatal,
therefore Fairfax sent gallopers on the fastest horses he could find to
urge the immediate return of all the Parliamentary troops then on the
march.
Marston Moor lies seven miles to the west of York, about half-way
between that city and Knaresborough. Although enclosed in 1767, at the
time with which we are dealing much of it consisted of a large tract of
open moorland, covered with whinbushes and gorse; but there were fields
of rye on the southern side. The soil was marshy in some places and
sandy in others. A road called Marston Lane crossed it, for about two
miles from east to west, and 300 or 400 yards to the north of this lane
ran “a great ditch,” almost parallel with it. This ditch separated the
moor from some cultivated land.
On the south side, for the most part in some fields of rye, between the
road and the ditch, the Parliamentary Generals placed the main body of
their troops as they arrived. To the north of the ditch, the part of
the moor on which the Royalist troops were gradually assembling, the
ground was very flat; but from the road, running from east to west,
the ground rises towards the south; and, upon this rising ground,
the General of the Scotch ordnance placed twenty-five guns. Behind
these guns, and still higher on the incline, the Generals of the
Parliamentary army made their head-quarters, near which they posted
their wagons and stores.
The arrival and the posting of the troops seems to have been slow on
both sides. To distinguish between the two armies, the Cavaliers wore
no scarves, and the Puritans wore white paper or white handkerchiefs
in their hats; their watchword was “God with us,” while that of the
Cavaliers was “God and the King”. “How goodly a sight,” wrote Ash,
Lord Manchester’s chaplain, “was this to behold, when two mighty
armies, each of which consisted of above 20,000 horse and foot, did,
with flying colours prepared for the battle, look each other in the
face.”
But afternoon had come on and many of Newcastle’s troops had not yet
arrived. More extraordinary still, Newcastle himself had not put in
an appearance. Rupert galloped back to York to find out the reason of
the delay. There he found that a considerable number of Newcastle’s
cavalry were in a state of mutiny, clamouring for their long over-due
pay, and openly declaring that they would not leave the city to face
the enemy until they got it. Both Rupert and Newcastle “played the
orator” to them; but it was only after oft-repeated promises of prompt
payment that they yielded and marched out of York so late as nearly
five o’clock in the afternoon, with Rupert riding in the rear, and
Newcastle, in his state-coach drawn by six horses, following them at a
short distance.
Having once started, the hitherto reluctant cavalry rode rapidly to the
front. Rupert had arranged everything for his order of battle before
going into York. The accounts of that order are rather conflicting;
but, roughly speaking, it was something of this sort. The centre was
composed mainly of infantry under Newcastle and King, or Lord Ethyn
as he was now entitled. The right wing was formed of Rupert’s own
cavalry, including his regiment of “old soldiers all, gentlemen who
had seen much service in France and Spain,” Lord Byron’s Irish horse,
Lord Grandison’s horse, and some other cavalry, in all 7200 horse,
drawn up in twelve divisions. The left wing contained about 4000 of
Newcastle’s cavalry under Goring and Sir Charles Lucas, with a line of
musketeers in front of them. The whole of the ditch was also lined with
musketeers. A few guns were also posted in the ditch, and the rest of
the artillery was placed on the flanks.
Confronting the Royalist centre was the Parliamentary infantry under
Manchester and Leven. Opposite the Royalist right, the enemy’s left
contained Cromwell’s “Ironsides,” other cavalry of Manchester’s and
some Scottish horse; in all about 4200 horse, supported by 3000 foot
soldiers. In front of the Royalist left the enemy’s right was made up
of 4800 horse, consisting of Lord Fairfax’s famous cavalry and some
Scottish cavalry regiments, including the Ayrshire Lancers—rather an
uncommon armament at that period. In both armies reserves of cavalry
and infantry were drawn up in the rear. The numbers in the opposing
armies is doubtful; but probably they were pretty equal, and something
over 20,000 on either side.
Rupert showed Ethyn a sketch of his position and asked him how he liked
it. Ethyn replied that it was very fine on paper, but that it would
not be so on the field. Rupert had placed his front rank close to the
ditch, which was impassable in many places, and to this Ethyn strongly
objected. Rupert replied, “They may be drawn to a farther distance”.
Ethyn, probably thinking that any retreat along the whole line would
draw on an immediate attack from the enemy, replied, “No, sir. It is
too late.”
Rupert was very angry with Ethyn for saying this. They had not been
on the best of terms beforehand, for Rupert thought that Ethyn, when
General King, had not sufficiently supported him in a certain battle
on the Continent. Rupert revenged himself upon Ethyn for finding fault
with his order of battle on Marston Moor by twitting him when the
engagement was over, for having been of very little use during the
action.
In the course of the afternoon, a few shots were fired from the cannon
of both armies; but without important results, although a captain was
killed on each side; on one a nephew of Cromwell, on the other a son
of Sir Gilbert Haughton. Some of the Puritan soldiers sang psalms,
deriving considerable consolation from the psalmist’s denunciations
of his enemies, which they mentally applied to what they called “the
King’s cursed and cursing cormorants”. Rupert, not tolerating defeat
even in devotion, ordered his chaplain to preach to his men; on hearing
of which the Puritans declared Rupert to be a “jingling Machiavelian,”
guilty of a blasphemous mockery.
Several showers had fallen during the day, and towards evening black
clouds gathered overhead, a heavy thunderstorm set in, and rain fell in
torrents. On arriving at Marston Moor, Newcastle asked Rupert whether
he meant to fight that evening—it was then between five and six
o’clock. Rupert said that he had no intention of doing so and that he
would make his grand attack early in the morning: at the same time he
recommended Newcastle to seize the opportunity of taking a rest.
A rest was only too welcome! Newcastle had had a long, anxious,
perplexing day, and he was glad to return to his coach, which had been
left at some little distance behind the troops. The first thing he did
on getting into it was to light his pipe[103] and enjoy a soothing
smoke, after which, utterly worn out by worry, he fell asleep upon the
cushions of his chariot.
[Footnote 103: Leadman’s _Battles Fought in Yorkshire_, p. 135.
Clarendon also mentions the pipe incident (_Clarendon State Papers_,
No. 1805), but he gives a rather different account of it. This
opportunity may be taken of saying that the accounts of the Battle
of Marston Moor are so conflicting, that, for once, the scribe has
departed from his usual custom of making his witnesses speak for
themselves, and has attempted to give the substance of the story
as best as he can, after studying the various, and very varying,
authorities on the subject.]
CHAPTER XIII.
Many people may have experienced the sensation of being suddenly
disturbed soon after going to sleep, when very tired. Sleep at that
time is supposed to be at its deepest. On being awakened, although only
ten or twenty minutes may have actually passed since sleep came on, it
would seem as if it had lasted for hours; not that there is the sense
of refreshment usual after long sleep, on the contrary, the feeling
left is one of bewilderment combined with extreme languor.
It is probable that with some such sensations Newcastle suddenly awoke,
about seven o’clock, on the evening of Tuesday, 2 July, 1644; and there
was noise in abundance to disturb his slumbers. The heavy roll of the
thunder was drowned by the booming of cannon, the firing of muskets,
pistols and arquebuses, and the war cries of the excited soldiers; for
in those primitive times soldiers fought near enough to bandy curses
with each other. One naturally wonders whether, when it came to “push
of pike,” the Roundhead warriors remembered how strictly they had been
forbidden by Cromwell to use bad language, if indeed any language could
be worse than that of the Puritan divines themselves.
Most likely the Generals on either side had had no intention of
fighting that evening; certainly there is no reason for doubting
the sincerity of Rupert in telling Newcastle that he did not intend
to attack until the morning; but, as we have seen, the rival armies
had been drawn up perilously close to each other. They were within
musket-shot—a very short distance with the fire-arms of the period,
and it may be that the battle was begun by some of the men without
orders from their officers. Anyhow, the match had been applied to the
powder; probably the Generals on either side thought that the battle
had been begun by those on the other, and soon orders were given in all
directions for a general engagement.
Would’st hear the tale? On Marston Heath
Met, front to front, the ranks of Death;
Florished the trumpets fierce, and now
Fired was each eye, and flushed each brow,
On either side loud clamours ring
“God and the Cause!”—“God and the King!”
_Rokeby_, Canto I. xix.
Newcastle armed himself as quickly as possible, mounted his horse
and galloped to the front, accompanied by his brother, Sir Charles
Cavendish, two other officers, and his page. The first men he came upon
were some gentleman volunteers, who had formerly chosen him for their
captain, and he called out to them:—
“Gentlemen, You have done me the Honour to choose me your Captain, and
now is the fittest time that I may do you service; wherefore if you’ll
follow me I shall lead you on the best I can, and show you the way to
your own Honour”.
They were soon under fire and Newcastle led them against a regiment
of Scottish infantry. By some ill-luck, or clumsiness, he lost his
sword; but, although several officers immediately offered him theirs,
he refused them and took his page’s little sword, which the Duchess
tells us was “half leaden”. With this little weapon, however, he killed
three Scots and led his company of volunteers right through the enemy’s
regiment. Then he was brought to a standstill by a single brave Puritan
pikeman, whom he charged three times without effect, but the courageous
fellow was hacked down by the followers of Newcastle.
Meanwhile, Newcastle’s cavalry were doing splendidly on his left under
Goring and Sir Charles Lucas, whose sister Newcastle subsequently
married. She describes her brother as one who by nature “had a practick
genius to the warlike arts, or Arts in War, as Natural Poets have to
Poetry”. With regard to the Royalist cavalry, Mr. Fortescue, in his
standard work, _A History of the British Army_,[104] writes of “the
superiority of the Royalist cavalry. The long neglect of the mounted
service left the supremacy to the ablest amateurs, and the majority of
these, though there were hundreds of gentlemen on the Parliamentary
side, were undoubtedly for the King. Nor was it only the courage,
honour, and resolution of which Cromwell had spoken that favoured
them; they had from the nature of the case better horses, a higher
standard of horsemanship and equipment, a quicker natural intelligence
and a higher natural training. The thousand lessons which the county
gentlemen learned when riding with hawk and hound were of infinite
advantage in the casual and irregular warfare of the first two or three
years ... One fatal defect however marred what should have been a most
efficient cavalry, the blot had been hit by Cromwell, indiscipline.”
[Footnote 104: Vol. I, pp. 201-2.]
It was with such cavalry as this that Goring and Sir Charles Cavendish
charged on Marston Moor, on a day which, Mr. Fortescue says, “may
indeed be termed the first great day of English cavalry”.
On the whole, Ethyn may have been right in blaming Rupert for drawing
up his army close to the “great ditch,” but his having done so did him
good service on his left flank; for, when Fairfax wished to charge
Newcastle’s cavalry, he found the ditch impassable, and his only means
of reaching his enemy to be an almost straight lane which ran at right
angles to, and across, the ditch. Fairfax’s cavalry were only able
to cross the bridge over the ditch “three or four” abreast, and it
is surprising that they should have got over it at all, exposed as
they were to the fire of musketeers lining the lane. The muskets of
the period, however, could be reloaded but very slowly, and the heavy
rain which was falling may have interfered with the priming and caused
missfires. Nor did the Royalist artillery, likewise directed upon the
bridge, but also probably hampered by the rain, very seriously cripple
the invaders. Fairfax’s horse drove the Royalist gunners “from their
cannon, being two drakes” (six-pounders) and a “demiculverine” (a
nine-pounder).
What appears to have obstructed the progress of Fairfax’s cavalry
even more than the musketeers, the drakes and the demiculverine, was
a quantity of furze bushes and small ditches which they found lying
between themselves and Newcastle’s horse, when they had got over the
“great ditch”. The Royalist cavalry was also inconvenienced by these
impediments, for both sides charged simultaneously. “We were a long
time engaged with one another,” wrote Fairfax, who was unhorsed and
received a deep cut across the cheek which marked him for the rest of
his life. Sir Charles Fairfax and Major Fairfax were killed. “There
was scarce an officer but received a hurt,” wrote Lord Fairfax. Sir
William Fairfax led the Yorkshire foot across the ditch over Moor Lane
Bridge; but the fire of Newcastle’s famous regiment of Whitecoats did
this infantry more mischief than it had done to the cavalry; and the
Yorkshire foot were driven back, thinned in numbers and completely
demoralized by the gallant Royalists.
“On Marston, with Rupert, ’gainst traitors contending.”[105]
[Footnote 105: “On Leaving Newstead Abbey,” Byron.]
A small portion of Newcastle’s horse ran away and Fairfax, with about
400 men, made the mistake of following them for some distance towards
York. Then it occurred to him that he had better return to see how the
rest of his cavalry was faring; so he galloped back.
He says:[106] “Having charged through the enemy, my men going after in
pursuit, and myself returning back to my other troops, I was got-in
among the enemy who stood, up and down the field, in several bodies of
horse. So, taking the signal out of my hat, I passed through them for
one of their own commanders, and got to my Lord of Manchester’s horse.”
[Footnote 106: _Short Memorial._ Masères’s _Tracts_.]
During the temporary absence of Fairfax, the main body of his cavalry
had fallen into some confusion, and Goring seized the opportunity of
making a vigorous charge upon it. The King’s old horse, “veterans of
hard service and fame,” were more than the newly hired cavalry of
the Roundheads could withstand and a rout set in. Goring had a cry
raised of “See they run in the rear,” on hearing which those in the
van turned tail and began to run themselves. The Ayrshire Lancers and
the regiments of Lord Eglinton, whose son was mortally wounded in this
battle, held their ground for some time; but the stampede of the routed
van at last bore them with it to the rear. Then there was a general
rush for the bridge over the ditch, which some of the defeated foot
had not yet crossed, and the Parliamentary cavalry and infantry became
hopelessly mixed up, many men on foot being trampled upon by the horses
of their own comrades.
When the Roundhead troops had returned to their own side of the ditch,
the Royalist cavalry pursued them headlong. Heath says, “the Scots some
of them ran ten miles on end, and a wee bit, crying quarter, with other
lamentable expressions of fear”. Arthur Trevor in a letter to Ormonde,
says that the Scottish cavalry kept galloping away, crying “Wae’s us!
Wae’s us! We’re a’ undone.”
And many a bonny Scot, aghast,
Spurring his palfrey northward, passed,
Cursing the day when zeal or meed
First lured their Lesley o’er the Tweed.
_Rokeby._
All, however, did not spur northward: some spurred to Lincoln, some
to Hull, some to Halifax, some to Wakefield, all reporting the utter
rout of the Parliamentary army. The news reached Newark, whence the
Royalists sent an express messenger to convey the glorious tidings to
Oxford. Both at Oxford and at Banbury, Church bells were rung, bonfires
were lighted, and fireworks were let off in honour of the great victory
of Rupert and Newcastle over the combined armies of the Parliament and
the Scotch. The splendid news made happy the heart of King Charles and
set his anxious mind at rest.
Reports of the victory spread to London. Vicars, the Puritan author,
wrote: “Yea, our sottish and bewitched mole-eyed malignants of London
also, were so led along with a spirit of lying, like their father
the devil, that they mightily boasted of this robber’s vain victory
over us, the vanquishing of our whole three armies, the death and
imprisonment of all our three most renowned and precious Generals”.[107]
[Footnote 107: _Jehovah Jireh._]
The defeated Roundhead Generals fled for their lives. Manchester ran
away, but repented and returned: Lord Leven never drew rein till he
reached Leeds, twenty miles from the battle-field; and Lord Fairfax
fled for refuge to Cawood Castle, where, finding neither food, fire nor
candle, he philosophically got into bed. Indeed Principal Baillee wrote
in a letter to a friend, dated 12 July, 1644: “All six generals took to
their heels—this to you alone”.
But let us return to the battle-field and observe a few further details
of the fight: for thus far we have only been concerned with the
Royalist left wing and the Parliamentary right.
At the beginning of the battle, soon after seven in the evening, the
left wing of the Roundheads charged the ditch, which was passable in
their front. While Manchester’s infantry attacked that of Newcastle,
Cromwell’s cavalry charged Rupert’s, Byron’s and the Irish horse. “And
now,” wrote Manchester’s chaplain, “you might have seen the bravest
sight in the world, for they moved down the hill like so many thick
clouds, in brigades of 800, 1,000, 1,200 and 1,500 each.” “We came down
the hill,” says Watson, who was with Cromwell’s cavalry, “in bravest
order and with the greatest resolution that ever was seen.... In a
moment we were passed the ditch and on to the moor upon equal terms
with the enemy.” The Royalists abandoned four drakes in the ditch.
Watson continues: “Our front division charged their front, Cromwell’s
division of 300 horse, in which he himself was in person, charging the
first division of Prince Rupert’s, of which himself was in person,[108]
in which all were gallant men”.
[Footnote 108: Some accounts, however, state that, instead of leading
his own men, Rupert led Newcastle’s horse on the Royalist left.]
Yet it was not all plain sailing for Cromwell and his cavalry. A
sword-wound[109] on the neck obliged Cromwell to leave the field and
receive surgical treatment in a house hard by, and the Royalist cavalry
made a splendid resistance, repelling the Roundheads several times.
As was the custom in those days, both sides galloped towards each
other until they were within shot, when they pulled up and fired their
carbines or pistols, and then charged with their swords. It is said
that at the last charge on this occasion, the rival cavalry, after
firing, threw their pistols at each others heads.
[Footnote 109: Mark Trevor, who is said to have given the wound, was
created Lord Dungannon, for his services in this war. But Whitelock
says that the wound was made by a graze from a pistol bullet, “which
some imagined to be by accident and want of care by some of his
own men”. General Crawford supports this account of the wound. See
Masères’s _Tracts_. The story of the sword-wound is in Leadman’s
_Battles Fought in Yorkshire_, p. 138; a book giving a very elaborate
account of the battle.]
Carlyle describes the scene as “the most enormous hurly-burly of fire
and smoke and steel flashings and death tumult, ever seen in those
regions. We just get a glimpse of them joining battle in complete array
and the next shows them scattered, broken, straggling across moor and
field on both sides in utter bewilderment.” A spirited account, but
somewhat misleading, for they fought long and hard before either side
was scattered.