STATE OF CANADA AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE WAR; CONCLUSION 469
THE
LOYALISTS OF AMERICA
AND
THEIR TIMES,
FROM 1620 TO 1816.
CHAPTER XXVII.
THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AFTER THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE--THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND KING OF FRANCE--THE
ALLIANCE NOT PRODUCTIVE OF THE EFFECTS ANTICIPATED--EFFORTS OF THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR RECONCILIATION WITH THE COLONIES NOT SUCCESSFUL.
It was supposed, both in America and France, that when the alliance
between the King of France and Congress, referred to in the last chapter
of the previous volume, became known in England, though it was not
publicly avowed until February, 1778, England would be weakened and
discouraged from further warlike effort, and immediately offer terms of
peace, upon the ground of American independence; but the reverse was the
case.
The alliance between Congress and the King of France was kept in
abeyance by the latter during more than a twelvemonth after it was
applied for by the agents of Congress, until after the defeat and
capture of General Burgoyne and the refusal of Congress to confer with
Lord and General Howe, as British Commissioners, without the previous
acknowledgment by the Commissioners of the independence of the United
States.[1]
Lord Admiral Howe, having spent some months with his fleet at Halifax,
did not arrive at Sandy Hook until the 12th of July, eight days after
the Declaration of Independence. "Besides the troops, Lord Howe had
brought with him a document which it was hoped might render them
unnecessary--the Royal warrant appointing himself and General Howe
Commissioners under the Act of Parliament for the pacification of
America. No doubt the selection of such men was most wisely made. The
memory of their elder brother, who had fallen gloriously in the wars
against the French in Canada, was endeared to the colonists, who had
fought by his side. Both Lord Howe and the General, but Lord Howe
especially, had ever since cultivated a friendly intercourse with
Americans, and now entertained a most earnest wish to conclude the
strife against them. But judicious as was the choice of the
Commissioners, the restricted terms of the Commission were certainly in
the highest degree impolitic. Lord Howe had laboured, but vainly, to
obtain its enlargement; it amounted, in fact, to little more than the
power, first, of receiving submissions, and then, but not till then, of
granting pardons and inquiring into grievances.[2] Yet, still, since
these terms had not been divulged, and were much magnified by common
rumour, the name of the Commission was not ill adapted for popular
effect. Had Lord Howe arrived with it a few weeks before, as he might
and should have done, we are assured by American writers that an
impression might have been produced by it, in some at least of the
thirteen colonies, to an extent which they 'cannot calculate,' or
rather, perhaps, which they do not like to own. But these few months had
been decisive in another direction. During these months both the feeling
and the position of the insurgents had most materially changed."[3]
"The two Royal Commissioners," says Dr. Ramsay, "Admiral and General
Howe, thought proper, before they commenced their military operations,
to try what might be done in their civil capacity towards effecting a
reunion between Great Britain and the colonies. It was one of the first
acts of Lord Howe to send on shore a circular letter to several of the
Royal Governors in America, informing them of the late Act of Parliament
'for restoring peace to the colonies, and granting pardon to such as
should deserve mercy,' and desiring them to publish a declaration which
accompanied the same. In this, he informed the colonists of the power
with which his brother and he were entrusted 'of granting general or
particular pardons to all those who, though they had deviated from their
allegiance, were willing to return to their duty:' and of declaring 'any
colony, province, county or town, port, district or place, to be in the
peace of his Majesty.' Congress, impressed with the belief that the
proposals of the Commissioners, instead of disuniting the people, would
have a contrary effect, ordered them to be speedily published in the
several American newspapers. Had a _redress of grievances_ been at this
late hour offered, though the honour of the States was involved in
supporting their late Declaration of Independence, yet the love of
peace, and the bias of great numbers to their parent State, would, in
all probability, have made a powerful party for rescinding the Act of
Separation, and for re-uniting with Great Britain; but when it appeared
that the power of the Royal Commissioners was little more than to grant
pardons, Congress appealed to the good sense of the people for the
necessity of adhering to the Act of Independence."[4]
It was a diplomatic blunder and an unwise policy for the English
Commissioners to make known to the public the restricted authority of
their commission, instead of simply stating in general terms their
commission under the authority of the Act of Parliament "for restoring
peace to the colonies." On such grounds and for such an object the
Congress could have offered no justifiable excuse for refusing a
conference with the Royal Commissioners; and when, in the course of the
discussion, it should have been found that the Commissioners could not
agree with, and did not feel themselves authorized to accede to, all
the demands of the agents of Congress, the Royal Commissioners (both of
whom were known to be friends of the colonies, and opposed to the
high-handed measures of the Parliament) could have noted the points of
difference, and agreed to recommend the demands made upon them to the
most favourable consideration of the King's Government: at all events,
friendly intercourse and negotiations would have been opened which would
have been probably followed by a suspension of hostilities, if not
complete reconciliation. But this was what Congress, led by John Adams
and Dr. Franklin--bitter enemies to reconciliation--dreaded; and they
very shrewdly saw and improved the imprudent exposure of the Royal
Commissioners, by directing the publication of their circular letter and
declaration in all the provincial newspapers, "that the good people of
the United States may be informed of what nature are the Commissioners,
and what the terms, with expectation of which the insidious Court of
Great Britain had endeavoured to amuse and disarm them; and that the few
who still remain suspended by a hope, founded either on the justice or
moderation of their late King, might now at length be convinced that the
valour alone of their country is to save its liberties."
Thus all conference with the Royal Commissioners was refused on the part
of the leaders in Congress; war and bloodshed followed, and a year of
disastrous defeats to the Revolutionists; but the position of the
Loyalists may be inferred from the resolution of the New York
Revolutionary Convention, adopted a few days after the Declaration of
Independence, and before the actual commencement of hostilities, and
which was as follows: "That all persons residing within the State of New
York, and claiming protection from its laws, owed it allegiance; and
that any person owing it allegiance, and levying war against the State,
_or being an adherent to the King of Great Britain, should be deemed
guilty of treason and suffer death_." The Convention also resolved:
"That as the inhabitants of King's County had determined not to oppose
the enemy, a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the
authenticity of these reports, and to _disarm and secure the
disaffected, to remove or destroy the stock of grain, and, if necessary,
to lay the whole county waste_." Such treatment of adherents to the
unity of the empire, and of even neutrals, at the very commencement of
the war, goes far to account for the warfare of extermination in many
places between the two parties in subsequent years. This mode of warfare
was first instituted against the Loyalists, who acted on the defensive,
and who have been loudly complained of by American historians for having
afterwards, and on some occasions cruelly retaliated upon those who had
driven them to desperation.
A little more than eighteen months after the Declaration of
Independence, 17th of February, 1778, three Bills were introduced into
and passed by the British Parliament, which entirely removed all the
grounds of complaint made by the colonists in previous years, and
provided for the appointment of Commissioners to settle all differences
between the colonies and the mother country. The first of these Bills
was entitled, "For removing Doubts and Apprehensions concerning Taxation
by the Parliament of Great Britain in any of the Colonies." It expressly
repealed by name the tea duty in America, and declared: "That from and
after the passing of this Act the King and Parliament of Great Britain
will not impose any duty, tax, or assessment whatever in any of his
Majesty's (American) colonies, except only such duties as it may be
expedient to impose for the regulation of commerce; the net produce of
such duties to be always paid and applied to and for the use of the
colony in which the same shall be levied." "Thus," says Lord Mahon, "was
the claim of parliamentary taxation fully, at last, renounced."
The second Bill was "To enable his Majesty to appoint Commissioners with
sufficient power to treat, consult, and agree upon the means of quieting
the disorders now subsisting in certain of the colonies, plantations,
and provinces of North America." The Commissioners were to be five in
number, and were invested with extensive powers; they were to raise no
difficulties as to the rank or title of the leaders on either side, but
were left at liberty to treat, consult, and agree with any body or
bodies politic, or any person or persons whatsoever; they might proclaim
a cessation of hostilities on the part of the King's forces by sea or
land, for any time, or under any conditions or restrictions; they might
suspend any Act of Parliament relating to America passed since the 10th
of February, 1763. In short, it was intimated that the Commissioners
might accept almost any terms of reconciliation short of independence,
and subject to be confirmed by a vote of Parliament.
Lord North introduced his Bills in an able and eloquent speech of two
hours, in which he reviewed his own career and the several questions of
dispute with the colonies.[5]
But though taunted from all sides, his Bills passed speedily through
both Houses of Parliament. Lord Mahon remarks: "In spite of such taunts
and far from friendly feelings on all sides, the Conciliatory Bills, as
they have been termed, were not in reality opposed from any quarter.
There was only one division on a clause moved by Mr. Powys, to repeal
expressly by name the Massachusetts Charter Act. Lord North induced a
large majority to vote against that clause, but agreed that the object
in view should be attained by a separate measure. A Bill for that
purpose was therefore introduced by Mr. Powys, and passed through
Parliament concurrently with the other two. In the House of Lords the
same arguments were, with little change, renewed. Lord Shelburne took
occasion to declare his full concurrence in the sentiments of Lord
Chatham, expressing 'the strongest disapprobation of every idea tending
to admit the independence of America,' although acknowledging that
future circumstances might create a necessity for such a submission.
Lord Chatham himself was ill with gout at Hayes, and did not appear.
There was no division; and on the 11th of March (1778), the King, seated
on his throne, gave to all three measures the royal assent."[6]
Lord North and other members of his Administration were convinced that
the American problem could not be solved by their own party; that such a
work could be accomplished by the Earl of Chatham alone, as he had a few
years before, by his skill and energy, when the affairs of America were
in a desperate state after five years' unsuccessful war with France,
dispossessed France, in the short space of two years, of every inch of
American territory. The Duke of Richmond advocated immediate surrender
of independence to the Americans, and peace with them, in order to avoid
a war with France; he doubted the possibility of even Lord Chatham being
able to effect a reconciliation between the American colonies and Great
Britain. Three-fourths of a century afterwards, Lord Macaulay expressed
the same opinion; but Lord Mahon, in his History, has expressed a
contrary opinion, and given his reasons in the following words, well
worthy of being carefully read and pondered:
"In the first place, let it be remembered with what great and what
singular advantages Lord Chatham would have set his hand to the work. He
had from the outset most ably and most warmly supported the claims of
the colonists. Some of his eloquent sentences had become watchwords in
their mouths. His statue had been erected in their streets; his
portrait was hanging in their Council Chambers. For his great name they
felt a love and reverence higher as yet than for any one of their own
chiefs and leaders, not even at that early period excepting Washington
himself. Thus, if even it could be said that overtures of reconciliation
had failed in every other British hand, it would afford no proof that in
Chatham's they might not have thriven and borne fruit.
"But what at the same period was the position of Congress? Had that
assembly shown of late an enlightened zeal for the public interests, and
did it then stand high in the confidence and affection of its
countrymen? Far otherwise. The factions and divisions prevailing at
their town of York (in Virginia, where they removed from Baltimore), the
vindictive rigour to political opponents, the neglect of Washington's
army, and the cabals against Washington's powers, combined to create
disgust, with other less avoidable causes, as the growing depreciation
of the paper-money, the ruinous loss of trade, and the augmented burdens
of the war. Is the truth of this picture denied? Hear then, as
witnesses, the members of Congress themselves. We find in this very
month of March (1778), one of them write to another on the necessity of
joint exertions to "revive the expiring reputation of Congress." (Letter
from William Duer, of New York, to Robert Morris, dated March 6th, 1778,
and printed in the Life of Reed, Vol. I., p. 365.) We find another
lamenting that 'even good Whigs begin to think peace, at some expense,
desirable.' (General Reed to President Wharton, February 1, 1778.)
"When such was the feeling in America, both as regarded Lord Chatham and
as regarded the Congress, it would not certainly follow that any
overture from the former would be rejected on account of the
disapprobation of the latter. The provinces might, perhaps, have not
been inclined to the deliberations, or even cast off the sway of the
central body, and make terms of peace for themselves. At any rate, all
such hope was not precluded; at least some such trial might be made.
"Nor does it appear to me, as to Mr. Macaulay, that there was any, even
the slightest, inconsistency in Lord Chatham having first pronounced
against the conquest of America, and yet refusing to allow her
independence. After the declaration in her behalf of France, Lord
Chatham had said, no doubt, that America could not be conquered. Had he
ever said she could not be reconciled? It was on conciliation, and not
on conquest, that he built his later hopes. He thought the declaration
of France no obstacle to his views, but rather an instrument for their
support. He conceived that the treaty of alliance concluded by the
envoys of the Congress with the Court of Versailles might tend beyond
any other cause to rekindle British feelings in the hearts of the
Americans. Were the glories of Wolfe and Amherst, in which they had
partaken, altogether blotted from their minds? Would the soldier-yeomen
of the colonies be willing to fight side by side with those French whom,
till within fifteen years, they had found in Canada their bitter
hereditary foes? That consequences like to these--that some such
revulsion of popular feeling in America might, perhaps, ensue from an
open French alliance, is an apprehension which, during the first years
of the contest, we find several times expressed in the secret letters of
the Revolution chiefs; it was a possibility which we see called forth
their fears; why then might it not be allowed to animate the hopes of
Chatham?"[7]
But Lord Chatham was not destined even to try the experiment of giving
America a second time to England; in a few days he fell in the House of
Lords, to rise no more, with the protest on his lips against the
separation of the American colonies from England. The Americans had no
confidence in the professions of a Parliament and Ministry which had
oppressed and sought to deceive them for twelve years. As low as the
Congress had fallen in the estimation of a large part of the colonists,
the English Ministry was regarded with universal distrust and aversion.
The Congress refused even to confer with the Royal Commissioners, and
had sufficient influence to prevent any province from entering into
negotiations with them. All the former grounds of complaint had been
removed by the three Acts of Parliament above referred to, and all the
concessions demanded had been granted. The Royal Commissioners requested
General Washington, on the 9th of June (1778), to furnish a passport for
their Secretary, Dr. Ferguson with a letter from them to Congress; but
this was refused, and the refusal was approved by Congress. They then
forwarded, in the usual channel of communication, a letter addressed "To
his Excellency Henry Laurens, the President, and other Members of
Congress," in which they enclosed a copy of their commission and the
Acts of Parliament on which it was founded; and they offered to concur
in every satisfactory and just arrangement towards the following among
other purposes:
"To consent to a cessation of hostilities both by sea and land;
"To restore free intercourse, to revive mutual affection, and renew the
common benefits of naturalization through the several parts of this
empire;
"To extend every freedom to trade that our respective interests can
require;
"To agree that no military forces shall be kept up in the different
States of North America without the consent of the General Congress, or
particular Assemblies;
"To concur in measures calculated to discharge the debts of America, and
to raise the credit and value of the paper circulation;
"To perpetuate our union by a reciprocal deputation of an agent or
agents from the different States, who shall have the privilege of a seat
and voice in the Parliament of Great Britain; or if sent from Great
Britain, in that case to have a seat or voice in the Assemblies of the
different States to which they may be deputed respectively, in order to
attend to the several interests of those by whom they are deputed;
"In short, to establish the power of the respective Legislatures in each
particular State; to settle its revenue, its civil and military
establishment, and to exercise a perfect freedom of legislation and
internal government; so that the British States throughout North
America, acting with us in peace and war under one common sovereign, may
have the irrevocable enjoyment of every privilege that is short of total
separation of interests, or consistent with that union of force on which
the safety of our common religion and liberty depends."[8]
The three Acts of Parliament and the proposals of the five English
Commissioners were far in advance of any wishes which the colonists had
expressed before the Declaration of Independence, and placed the
colonists on the footing of Englishmen--all that the Earl of Chatham and
Mr. Burke had ever advocated--all that the free, loyal, and happy
Dominion of Canada enjoys at this day--all and nothing more than was
required for the unity of the empire and of the Anglo-Saxon race; but
the leaders of Congress had determined upon the dismemberment of the
empire--had determined to sever all connection with the elder European
branch of the Anglo-Saxon family--had determined, and that without even
consulting the constituents whom they professed to represent, to
transfer their allegiance from England to France, to bind themselves
hand and foot to France--that they would make no peace with England,
upon any terms, without the consent of the French Court.
It may be easily conceived what an effect would be produced upon the
truly national mind of both England and America by such a transition on
the part of the leaders of Congress and their representatives abroad--a
transition which might be called a revolution, involving new issues and
new relations of parties; for the question was no longer one of mere
separation from England, much less the question of Stamp Acts, or
taxation without representation, or suspension of charters--all acts and
pretensions of this kind having been repealed and renounced; but the
question was now one of union with the hereditary foe of England and her
colonies; and the unnatural alliance contemplated the invasion of
England by the French, the destruction of British commerce, the wresting
from England of the West Indies as well as Canada,[9] and the
possession by France of whatever islands or territory her navy and army
should conquer.
All this was a different thing from mere independence of the mother
country. The United Empire Loyalists and advocates of colonial rights
were now subject to a new allegiance, and punished as rebels and their
property confiscated if they would not unite with the French against
their English forefathers and brethren. So enamoured were the leaders of
Congress with their new allies, that they interrupted the reading of the
official letter from the British Commissioners on account of a passage
which reflected upon France, and debated three days whether they should
allow the remaining part of the letter to be read.[10]
But the feelings of all classes in England, and of a large part, if not
the great majority, of the colonists, were different from those of the
leaders of Congress, now depleted of many distinguished men who attended
its previous year's sittings.[11]
By this alliance with France the allied colonies became, as it were, a
part of France, bound up in oneness with it--refusing all overtures or
negotiations with the representatives of England without the approval of
the French Court. The coasts, cities, towns, etc., of the American
allies of France therefore became liable to the same treatment on the
part of the British army and navy as the coasts, cities, and towns of
France. Of this the British Commissioners informed the Congress, after
the latter had declared its identity with France, and refused any
further intercourse with them.[12]
The war for a short time after this period became more acrimonious and
destructive on both sides than before, as between the French and
English. But this policy of devastation and retaliation was disapproved
of by the British Government--was confined mostly to some certain coast
towns in New England, while in the South the conduct of Col. Campbell,
on the subjugation of Georgia, was marked by lenity and generosity.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: "While the American Commissioners were urging the Ministers
of the King of France to accept the treaty proposed by Congress, they
received assurances of the good wishes of the Court of France; but were
from time to time informed that the important transactions required
further consideration, and were enjoined to observe the most profound
secrecy. Matters remained in this fluctuating state from December, 1776,
till December, 1777. Private encouragement and public discountenance
were alternated; but both varied according to the complexion of news
from America. The defeat on Long Island, the reduction of New York, and
the train of disastrous events in 1776, which have already been
mentioned, sunk the credit of the Americans very low, and abated much of
the national ardour for their support. Their subsequent successes at
Trenton and Princeton effaced these impressions, and rekindled active
zeal in their behalf. The capture of Burgoyne (October, 1777) fixed
these wavering polities. The successes of the American campaign of 1777
placed them on high ground. Their enmity proved itself formidable to
Britain, and their friendship became desirable to France. It was
therefore determined to take them by the hand and publicly espouse their
cause. The Commissioners of Congress, on the 16th of December, 1777,
were informed by M. Gerard, one of the Secretaries of the King's Council
of State, 'that it was decided to acknowledge the independence of the
United States, and to make a treaty with them; that in the treaty no
advantage would be taken of their situation to obtain terms which
otherwise it would not be convenient for them to agree to; that his Most
Christian Majesty desired the treaty, once made, should be durable, and
their amity to subsist for ever, which could not be expected if each
nation did not find an interest in its continuance as well as in its
commencement.'" (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II.,
Chap, xv., pp. 246, 247.)]
[Footnote 2: "MS. Instructions, May, 6th, 1776, State Paper Office.--It
is therein required as a preliminary condition, before any province
shall be declared in the King's peace, that its Convention, or
Committee, or Association 'which have usurped powers,' shall be
dissolved."]
[Footnote 3: Lord Mahon's History of England, Vol. VI., Chap. liii., pp.
137, 138.
Lord Mahon adds: "At the beginning of the troubles, as I have already
shown, and for a long time afterwards, the vast majority of the
Americans had no wish nor thought of separation from the mother country.
Their object was substantially, and with some new safeguards for their
rights, to revert to the same state in which they had been before the
Administration of George Grenville. But the further the conflict
proceeded, the less and less easy of attainment did that object seem.
How hard, after what had passed, to restore harmonious action between
the powers now at strife, for the people to trust the Governors
appointed by the King, and for the King to trust the Assembly elected by
the people. Even where the actual wrong might have departed, it would
still leave its fatal legacy, rancour and suspicion, behind. Under the
influence of these feelings a great number of persons in all the
colonies were gradually turning their minds to the idea of final
separation from the parent State. Still, in all these colonies, except
only in New England, there were many lingering regrets, many deep-rooted
doubts and misgivings. John Adams writes as follows: 'My dear friend
Gates, all our misfortunes arise from a single source--the reluctance of
the Southern colonies to republican government' (March, 1776, American
Archives, Vol. V., p. 472). Here are the words of another popular
leader: 'Notwithstanding the Act of Parliament for seizing our property,
there is a strange reluctance in the minds of many to cut the knot which
ties us to Great Britain'" (Letter of Reed to Washington, March 3rd,
1776).--_Ib._, pp. 139, 140.]
[Footnote 4: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap.
xi., pp. 121, 122.]
[Footnote 5: "The impression on the House that night, while Lord North
was speaking, and after he sat down, is well described by the pen of a
contemporary--no other, in all probability, than Burke: 'A dull,
melancholy silence for some time succeeded to this speech. It had been
heard with profound attention, but without a single mark of approbation
to any part, from any description of men, or any particular man in the
House. Astonishment, dejection, and fear overclouded the whole assembly.
Although the Minister had declared that the sentiments he expressed that
day had been those which he always entertained, it is certain that few
or none had understood him in that manner; and he had been represented
to the nation at large as the person in it the most tenacious of those
parliamentary rights which he now proposed to resign, and the most
remote from the submissions which he now proposed to make.'
"It may be said, indeed, that there was not a single class or section
within the walls of Parliament to which the plan of Lord North gave
pleasure. The Ministerial party were confounded and abashed at finding
themselves thus requested to acknowledge their past errors and retrace
their former steps. Some among them called out that they had been
deceived and betrayed. In general, however, the majority acquiesced in
sullen silence. On the other part, the Opposition were by no means
gratified to see the wind, according to the common phrase, taken from
their sails. They could not, indeed, offer any resistance to proposals
so consonant to their own expressed opinions, but they took care to make
their support as disagreeable and damaging as possible." (Lord Mahon's
History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lvii., pp. 327-329.)]
[Footnote 6: History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lvii, pp. 329,
330.
Lord Mahon adds: "Only two days previously, Lord North, who had opened
his Budget on the 6th, had carried through his financial resolutions in
the House of Commons, involving a new loan of £6,000,000, which was
contracted on advantageous terms. Thus were funds provided to pursue the
war, should that be requisite. Thus was an opening made for negotiations
should they be practicable. In either case the path was cleared for a
new Administration. Here then was the moment which Lord North had for
some time past desired--the moment when, with most honour to himself and
with most advantage to his country, he could fulfil his intentions of
resigning." (Lord Mahon's History of England, Vol. VI., Chap. lvii, pp.
330, 331.)]
[Footnote 7: Lord Mahon's History of England, Vol. VI., Chap. lvii., pp.
344-347.]
[Footnote 8: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap.
xv., pp. 254, 255.]
[Footnote 9: While Count D'Estaing was at Boston repairing his shattered
fleet, he was not unmindful of an essential part of his commission--to
detach Canada from England. "In pursuance of this design, a Declaration
was published (dated the 28th of October, 1778), addressed in the name
of the King of France to the French inhabitants of Canada, and of every
other part of America formerly subject to that Crown. This Declaration
contained the highest praises of the valour of the Americans; it laid
before the inhabitants of Canada the mortification they must endure in
bearing arms against the allies of their parent State; it represented to
them, in the strongest terms, the ties formed by origin, language,
manners, government, and religion, between the Canadians and the French,
and lamented the misfortune which had occasioned a disjunction of that
colony from France; it recalled to their remembrance the brave
resistance they had made during the many wars they had been engaged in
against England, especially the last; it reminded them of their
favourite warriors and generals, particularly the valiant Montcalm, who
fell at their head, in defence of their country; it earnestly entreated
them to reflect seriously on their disagreeable subjection to strangers
living in another hemisphere, differing from them in every possible
respect, who could consider them no otherwise than as a conquered
people, and would always, of course, treat them accordingly. It
concluded by formally notifying, that the Count D'Estaing was authorized
and commanded by the King of France to declare, in his name, that all
his former subjects in North America who should renounce their
allegiance to Great Britain might depend on his protection and support."
(Dr. Andrews' History of the American War, Vol. III., Chap. xxxviii., p.
171.)]
[Footnote 10: The conciliatory acts of the British Parliament and the
letter of the Commissioners were referred by the Congress to a Committee
of three--all known to be opposed to any reconciliation with England.
This Committee made, the next day after its appointment, a report which
was adopted by Congress, that the British acts were merely intended to
operate upon the hopes and fears of the American people, and to produce
divisions among them; "that those who made any partial convention or
agreement with the Commissioners of Great Britain would be regarded as
enemies; and that the United States could hold no conference with such
Commissioners until the British Government _first withdrew its fleets
and armies, or acknowledged the independence of the United States_."
"This _rejection_ of terms which they not long before would have
cordially welcomed, _was, no doubt, caused by the confident expectation
they then had of the support and alliance of France_; and accordingly
the news of that alliance soon after reached them, and diffused a
general joy throughout the land." (Tucker's History of the United
States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., pp. 221, 222.)]
[Footnote 11: "The Declaration of Independence effected an alteration of
sentiments in England. It was esteemed by many of the most judicious
persons in this country, a measure wholly unnecessary, and without
recurring to which America might have compassed every point proposed by
continuing its resistance to Britain on the same footing it had begun.
This measure occasioned an alienation from its interests in the minds of
many of its former adherents. It was looked upon as a wanton abuse of
the success with which it had opposed the efforts of the British
Ministry to bring them to submission, and as an ungrateful return for
the warmth with which their cause had been espoused in Parliament, and
by such multitudes as in the idea of many amounted to a plurality."
"The Declaration of France completed the revolution that had been
gradually taking place in the opinions of men on their being repeatedly
apprised of the determination of Congress to break asunder all the bonds
of former amity, and to unite themselves in the closest manner with that
kingdom." (Dr. Andrews' History of the American War, Vol. III., Chap.
xxxiv., pp. 82-84.)
The Declaration of France in favour of the independence of the American
colonies, and of alliance with them, was officially communicated to the
British Government the 13th of March, 1778, a few days after which the
French fleet under the command of Count D'Estaing sailed from Toulon,
and arrived off the coast of America in July--after a long voyage of
eighty-seven days. On learning the departure of the French fleet for
America, the British Government sent out, in the same ships with the
Peace Commissioners, orders to Sir Henry Clinton to concentrate his
forces on Long Island and at New York. "The successor of Howe, Sir Henry
Clinton, was," says Lord Mahon, "in character, as upright and amiable;
in skill and enterprise, much superior. Had the earlier stages of the
war been under his direction, his ability might not have been without
influence upon them. But it was his misfortune to be appointed only at a
time when other foes had leagued against us, when the path was beset
with thorns and briars, when scarce any laurels rose in view. In
consequence of the impending war with France, and in conformity with the
advice of Lord Amherst to the King, instructions had been addressed to
Sir Henry, on the 23rd of March, to retire from the hard-won city of
Philadelphia, and concentrate his forces at New York. This order reached
him at Philadelphia, in the month of May, only a few days after he had
assumed the chief command; only a few days before, there came on shore
the British Commissioners of Peace. These Commissioners might well
complain with some warmth, in a secret letter to Lord George Germaine,
that an order so important, so directly bearing on the success of their
mission, should have been studiously concealed from them until they
landed in America, and beheld it in progress of execution. Thus to a
private friend wrote Lord Carlisle (one of the Commissioners): 'We
arrived at this place, after a voyage of six weeks, on Saturday last,
and found everything here in great confusion--- the army upon the point
of leaving the town, and about three thousand of the miserable
inhabitants embarked on board of our ships, to convey them from a place
where _they think they would receive no mercy from those who will take
possession after us_.'"
"Thus from the first," says Lord Mahon, "the Commissioners had against
them the news of a retreat from Philadelphia, and the news of the treaty
of Paris; further, they had against them, as the Opposition in England
had long foreseen and foretold, the fact of their connection with Lord
North. Even at the outset, before their affairs could be known (June 14,
1778), one of the leaders in America, General Joseph Reed, answered a
private note from one of them as follows: 'I shall only say that after
the unparalleled injuries and insults this country has received from the
men who now direct the affairs of Great Britain, a negotiation under
their auspices has much to Struggle with.'" "How different," remarks
Lord Mahon, "might have been his feelings, had they brought their
Commission from Lord Chatham." (History of England, Vol. VI., Chap.
lviii., pp. 372-374.)
Lord Mahon adds: "Not any, even the smallest opening, was afforded to
these messengers of peace. They desired to despatch to the seat of
Congress their Secretary, Dr. Adam Ferguson, the well-known Professor of
Edinburgh, and they applied to Washington for a passport, but Washington
refused it until the pleasure of Congress should be known. The Congress,
on their part, had put forth a resolution declining even to hold any
conference with the Commissioners unless, as a preliminary, they should
either withdraw the fleets and armies, or else, in express terms,
acknowledge the independence of the United States. In vain did the
Commissioners address the President of the Congress, and entreat some
consideration of their terms. (For the terms, see page 11.) To none of
these terms, so tempting heretofore, would the Congress hearken; and
after their first letter, they decided in a summary manner that no
further reply should be returned."--_Ib._, pp. 374, 375.]
[Footnote 12: "Finding it impossible to proceed with their negotiations,
the Commissioners prepared to re-embark for England. First, however,
they issued a manifesto, or proclamation, to the American people,
appealing to them against the decisions of the Congress, and offering to
the colonies at large, or singly, a general or separate peace. This
proclamation was in most parts both ably and temperately argued. But
there was one passage liable to just exceptions. The Commissioners
observed, that hitherto the hopes of a reunion had checked the extremes
of war. Henceforth the contest would be changed. If the British colonies
were to become an accession to France, the law of self-preservation must
direct Great Britain to render the accession of as little avail as
possible to her enemy. Mr. Fox and others in the House of Commons
inveighed with great plausibility against this passage, us threatening a
war of savage desolation. Others again, as friends of Lord Carlisle and
Mr. Eden (afterwards Lord Auckland), asserted that no such meaning was
implied. The error, whatever it might be, lay with the Commissioners,
and in no degree with the Government at home; for Lord North denied, in
the most express terms, that his Ministers had intended to give the
least encouragement to the introduction of any new kind of war in North
America." (Debate in the House of Commons, Dec. 4, 1778.)
Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., pp. 376,
377.]
CHAPTER XXVIII.
COMPLETE FAILURE OF THE FRENCH FLEET AND ARMY, UNDER COUNT D'ESTAING, TO
ASSIST THE CONGRESS.
The leaders of Congress were disappointed in the high expectations which
they had entertained from their unnatural alliance with France. Count
D'Estaing left France with a much more powerful fleet than Lord Howe
commanded in America, besides bringing an army of several thousand
soldiers. He had expected to surprise and capture the British ships in
the River Delaware; but Lord Howe had sailed for New York several days
before his arrival. Count D'Estaing pursued, and lay eleven days at
anchor off Sandy Hook, not being able to get his large ships over the
bar into New York harbour. He at length directed his course, by
Washington's advice, to Long Island, and sailed up the Newport river,
whither he was followed by Lord Howe. "An attack against the British in
that quarter had been projected between the new allies. The French
promised to land from their ships four thousand troops, and the
Americans actually sent a detachment of ten thousand under General
Sullivan. The British troops, only five thousand strong, retired within
their lines at Newport.
"At these tidings, Lord Howe, whose intended successor, Admiral Byron,
had not yet arrived, issued forth from the Hudson and sailed in pursuit
of D'Estaing. The two fleets were on the point of engaging when
separated by a violent storm; there were conflicts between individual
ships only, in which the honour of the British flag was worthily
maintained. D'Estaing now declared his fleet so far damaged by the
storm as to compel him to put into Boston harbour and refit. In this
resolution he persisted, though Sullivan, Greene, and other American
officers altogether denied the necessity, and even transmitted to him a
written protest against it, couched in the most acrimonious terms."[13]
Certain it is, that the course which D'Estaing pursued on this occasion
not only forced the Americans to relinquish their enterprise upon Long
Island, but roused up among them a bitter feeling against the French. To
such an extent was this animosity carried that riots ensued in the
streets of Boston[14] between the American seamen and their new
allies.[15]
Even in regard to the mode of attacking the British on Long Island,
differences arose between Count D'Estaing and his new American friends
on questions of etiquette. Mr. Tucker says: "D'Estaing's fastidiousness
on points of etiquette, and his refusal to aid in what would have given
so serious a blow to the British power in America, is calculated to
raise a doubt whether he was really anxious to bring the war to an
immediate conclusion."[16] Early in November, Count D'Estaing, with the
French squadron, quitted the port of Boston and sailed for the West
Indies, there to pursue exclusively French objects. "Deep was the
disappointment and loud the animadversion of the Americans in the
Northern provinces. They had formed the most sanguine hopes from the
French alliance. They had found that alliance as yet little better than
a name."[17]
The results of Count D'Estaing's expedition, and of the French alliance
thus far, are well summed up by Dr. Ramsay in the following words: "With
the abortive expedition to Rhode Island there was an end to the plans
which were in this first campaign projected by the allies of Congress
for co-operation. The Americans had been intoxicated with hopes of the
most decisive advantages; but in every instance they were disappointed.
Lord Howe, with an inferiority of force, not only preserved his own
fleet, but counteracted and defeated all the views and attempts of Count
D'Estaing. The French fleet gained no direct advantages for the
Americans; yet their arrival was of great service to their cause.
Besides deranging the plans of the British, it carried conviction to
their minds that his Most Christian Majesty was seriously disposed to
support them. The good-will of their new allies was manifested to the
Americans; and though it had failed in producing the effects expected
from it, the failure was charged to winds, weather, and unavoidable
incidents. Some censured Count D'Estaing; but while they attempted to
console themselves by throwing blame on him, they felt and acknowledged
their obligation to the French nation, and were encouraged to persevere
in the war, from the hope that better fortune would attend their future
co-operation."[18] Count D'Estaing proceeded with his fleet to the West
Indies, where he did nothing worthy of the large fleet, reinforced by
that of Count de Grasse with several thousand troops, against the
English fleet under the command of Admiral Byron--much inferior in both
men and metal; but the French admiral declined and evaded any general
engagement, though repeatedly provoked to it. "The British fleet
endeavoured in vain to compel the enemy to come to close fight; they
avoided it with the utmost circumspection and dexterity."[19]
It became indispensably necessary for Admiral Byron to provide a
powerful convoy to the merchant shipping now on the eve of their
departure for England, and whose cargoes were of immense value. Under
all the circumstances, Admiral Byron determined to convoy the homeward
trade with his whole fleet, till it was out of danger of being followed
by Count D'Estaing or of falling in with M. de la Motte, who was on his
way from France to the French islands with a strong squadron. During
Admiral Byron's absence, Count D'Estaing directed an attack to be made
on the island of St. Vincent, the garrison of which was very
inconsiderable, and soon surrendered to the superior strength of the
French, assisted by a great multitude of the Caribbee Indians, and who
seized this opportunity of revenging themselves for injuries inflicted
upon them by the English during the last French war.
In the meantime Count D'Estaing was still further reinforced by the
arrival of the squadron commanded by M. de la Motte. His fleet now
consisted of twenty-six ships of the line and twelve frigates, and his
land force amounted to ten thousand men. With this powerful armament he
sailed for the island of Grenada, the strength of which consisted of
about one hundred and fifty regulars and three or four hundred armed
inhabitants. The garrison was compelled to yield to the prodigious
superiority of force against them, after a most heroic defence, in
which no less than three hundred of the French were killed and
wounded.[20]
The complaints of the Americans of the failure of Count D'Estaing's
expedition to America, of his abandoning the expedition against Long
Island, of his leaving the coasts of the Southern colonies unprotected
and exposed, and proceeding to the West Indies, reached the French
Court, which sent instructions to Count D'Estaing enjoining him to
return with all speed to the assistance of the colonies. For this
purpose he left the West Indies on the 1st of September. Mr. Tucker
remarks: "General Lincoln (commander of the colonial forces in Carolina)
having informed Count D'Estaing that the British ships had gone into
port to repair the damages sustained in the late engagement with his
fleet in the West Indies, and that a fair opportunity was presented of
destroying the British army in Georgia, with the co-operation of the
French fleet, the Count immediately left the West Indies, with
twenty-two sail of the line and eleven frigates. He had on board six
thousand land forces, and arrived so unexpectedly on the coast that a
British fifty-gun ship and three frigates fell into his hands. He then,
in conjunction with General Lincoln, planned an attack on the town of
Savannah."[21]
The arrangements for the attack having been made, the whole French fleet
came to anchor at the mouth of the Savannah river on the 1st day of
September. He was occupied ten days in landing his troops and
artillery; on the 15th of September a junction was formed between the
French and General Lincoln,[22] and with the utmost confidence of
success.[23]
They determined to take the town by siege rather than by storm in the
first instance.[24]
On the 16th of September they demanded, in a very confident and haughty
tone, the surrender of the town to the arms of the King of France; but
General Prevost declined surrendering on a general summons, and
requested a specific statement of the terms of it. The Count replied
that it was for the besieged to propose the terms. General Prevost
requested and obtained twenty-four hours' suspension of hostilities to
prepare his answer. Before the twenty-four hours had elapsed,
Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, with several hundred men who had been
stationed at Beaufort, made their way through inland channels and
swamps, and joined the royal standard at Savannah; and General Prevost
gave his answer of no surrender. The French and Americans, who formed a
junction the evening after, resolved to besiege the town, and consumed
several days in preparing for it, while the works of the garrison were
hourly strengthened by great labour and skill. From the 24th of
September to the 4th of October a heavy cannonade on both sides was kept
up; but the allied army, finding that they could make little or no
impression on the works of the besieged, resolved on a bombardment, with
a stronger cannonading than ever. On the 4th of October the besiegers
opened on the town three batteries, with nine mortars, thirty-seven
pieces of cannon from the land side, and fifteen from the water. The
firing from these batteries lasted, with little intermission, during
five days; but the damage they did was confined mostly to the town,
where some houses were destroyed and some women and children killed.
Soon after the commencement of the cannonade, General Prevost requested
permission to remove the women and children out of the town to a place
of safety; but this request was refused in offensive terms on the part
of Count D'Estaing, by the advice of General Lincoln, on the pretext
that a desire of secreting the plunder lately taken from the South
Carolinas was covered under the veil of humanity, but the real reason
was that the surrender of the town would be expedited by keeping the
women and children in it.[25]
Count D'Estaing, finding that his five days' cannonading made no
impression on the defensive works of the city, and his officers
remonstrating against his continuing to risk so valuable a fleet on a
dangerous coast, in the hurricane season, and at so great a distance
from shore that it might be surprised by a British fleet, now completely
repaired in the West Indies and fully manned, he decided to assault the
town. The attack was commenced in three columns on the 9th, an hour
before sunrise.
"Though the besieged were prepared for the assault, and their fire was
very destructive, the assailants pressed on and planted (for a few
minutes) the standard of both nations on the walls; but the contest
being still obstinately continued, the assailants were brought to a
pause by the fall of Count Pulaski (commanding an American corps), who
received a mortal wound; and Major Glaziers, who commanded the garrison,
rushing at the head of a body of grenadiers and marines, drove back the
allied troops, who were ordered to retreat. The French lost seven
hundred men; the Americans, two hundred and thirty-four. The British
garrison lost only fifty-five in killed and wounded. On the 16th of
October the siege was raised by the Count, who thus for the third time
failed in his co-operation with the Americans, after the fairest
prospects of success."[26]
Mr. Bancroft states the final struggle of this eventful contest, and the
results and effects of it on the Southern colonies, in the following
words:--"After an obstinate struggle of fifty-five minutes to carry the
redoubt, the assailants retreated before a charge of grenadiers and
marines, led gallantly by Maitland. The injury sustained by the British
was trifling; the loss of the Americans was about two hundred; of the
French, thrice as many. The French withdrew their ships, and sailed for
France; the patriots of Georgia who had joined them fled to the
backwoods or across the river.
"Lincoln repaired to Charleston, and was followed by what remained of
his army; the militia of South Carolina returned to their homes; its
continental regiments were melting away; and its paper money became so
nearly worthless, that a bounty of twenty-five hundred dollars for
twenty-one months' service had no attraction. The dwellers near the sea
between Charleston and Savannah were shaken in their allegiance, not
knowing where to find protection. Throughout the State the people were
disheartened, and foreboded desolation."[27]
I have given a more minute account of Count D'Estaing and his abortive
expeditions to America, and of his final attack upon Savannah and its
results; how completely disappointed were the American revolutionists
thus far in their unnatural alliance with France against England; how
little mutual respect or good-will, and what quarrels occurred, whenever
they came or attempted to act together, whether at Boston, or Long
Island, or Charleston, or Savannah; and how much feebler the army and
more gloomy the prospects of the Congress party were at the end of 1779
than they were two years before, when the alliance with France was
formed. Dr. Ramsay well sums up these events as follows:
"The campaign of 1779 is remarkable for the feeble exertions of the
Americans. Accidental causes, which had previously excited their
activity, had in a great measure ceased to have influence. An enthusiasm
for liberty made them comparatively disregard property and brave all
dangers in the first years of the war. The successes of their arms near
the beginning of 1777, and the hope of capturing Burgoyne's army in the
close of it, together with the brisk circulation of a large quantity of
paper-money, in good credit, made that year both active and decisive.
The flattering prospects inspired by the alliance with France in 1778
banished all fears of the success of the revolution, but the failure of
every scheme of co-operation produced a despondency of mind unfavourable
to great exertions. Instead of driving the British out of the country,
as the Americans vainly presumed, the campaigns of 1778 and 1779
terminated without any direct advantage from the French fleet sent to
their aid. Expecting too much from their allies, and then failing in
these expectations, they were less prepared to prosecute the war with
their own resources than they would have been if D'Estaing had not
touched on their coast. Their army was reduced in its numbers and badly
clothed.
"In the first years of the war, the mercantile character was lost in the
military spirit of the times; but in the progress of it the inhabitants,
cooling in their enthusiasm, gradually returned to their former habits
of lucrative business. This made distinctions between the army and
citizens, and was unfriendly to military exertions. While several
foreign events tended to the embarrassment of Great Britain,[28] and
indirectly to the establishment of independence, a variety of internal
causes relaxed the exertions of the Americans, and for a time made it
doubtful whether they would ultimately be independent citizens or
conquered subjects."[29]
Even a year later--"The military force," says Mr. Tucker, "embarked in
the beginning of 1781, to maintain the cause of independence, is thus
stated in (Chief Justice) Marshall's Life of Washington: The Southern
troops, from Pennsylvania to Georgia, did not exceed three thousand men.
Of the Northern troops, twelve hundred had been detached to Virginia,
under La Fayette; with these they amounted only to three thousand
effective men in April. The cavalry and artillery was less than one
thousand. With some small additions, the whole reached four thousand men
in May. They were ill supplied with clothing, and were seriously
threatened with a want of provisions. The quartermaster's department was
without means of transport," (Marshall, Vol. IV., p. 446).[30]
Such was the character and such the fruits of the alliance with France
during the first two years of its existence; and such was the state of
the revolutionary army in 1780, and which seems to have been largely
owing to the incapacity and ill conduct of the Congress itself, which
had become degenerate and corrupt--equal to that of any British
Parliament, or of any Provincial Legislature, under any Royal
Governor.[31]
Abundant evidence can be adduced in proof and illustration of this
statement from the warmest partizans of Congress; but the testimony of
Washington himself is ample and indisputable. In the winter of 1778-9 he
had to concert his measures with Congress at Philadelphia, and he writes
from thence as follows to his friend Benjamin Harrison:
"If I were to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and of men
from what I have seen, heard, and in part known, I should in one word
say that idleness, dissipation, and extravagance seem to have laid fast
hold of them; that speculation, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for
riches seem to have got the better of every other consideration and of
every order of men; that party disputes and personal quarrels are the
great business of the day; whilst the momentous concerns of an empire, a
great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and
want of credit, which in its consequence is the want of everything, are
but secondary considerations, and postponed from day to day, and from
week to week, as if our affairs wore the most promising aspect. * * Our
money is now sinking fifty per cent. a day in this city, and I shall not
be surprised if in the course of a few months a total stop is put to the
currency of it; and yet an assembly, a concert, a dinner, a supper, that
will cost three or four hundred pounds, will not only take men from
acting in this business, but from thinking of it; while a great part of
the officers of our army, from absolute necessity, are quitting the
service. * * I have no resentments, nor do I mean to point at particular
characters. This I can declare upon my honour, for I have every
attention paid me by Congress that I could possibly expect. * * But
such is the picture which from my inmost soul I believe to be true; and
I confess to you that I feel more real distress on account of the
present appearances of things, than I have done at any time since the
commencement of the dispute."[32]
Such is General Washington's own account of the character and occupation
of the Congress of the United States in the third year of the
revolutionary war, and in the second year of their alliance with
France--idleness, dissipation, extravagance, speculation, peculation,
avarice, party and personal quarrels, dancing, feasting; while the
credit was reduced almost to nothing, and the army neglected and
suffering.[33]
Such was the progress of the war; such the failure of the expeditions of
the French alliance; such the state of the revolutionary army, and of
the public credit; and such the degenerate character and proceedings of
Congress and its surroundings in the beginning of 1780--the fifth year
of the civil war.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 13: "They urged D'Estaing to return with his fleet into the
harbour; but his principal officers were opposed to the measure, and
protested against it. He had been instructed to go into Boston if his
fleet met with any misfortune. His officers insisted on his ceasing to
prosecute the expedition against Rhode Island, that he might conform to
the orders of their common superiors. A protest was drawn up and sent to
him, which was signed by John Sullivan, Nathaniel Greene, John Hancock,
I. Glover, Ezekiel Cornel, William Whipple, John Tyler, Solomon Lovell,
John Fitconnel. They protested against the Count's taking the fleet to
Boston, as derogatory to the honour of France, contrary to the intention
of his Christian Majesty and the interests of his nation, destructive in
the highest degree to the welfare of the United States, and highly
injurious to the alliance formed between the two nations. Had D'Estaing
prosecuted his original plan within the harbour, either before or
immediately after the pursuit of Lord Howe, the reduction of the British
post on Rhode Island (which had been in the possession of the British
since 1776) would have been probable; but his departure in the first
instance to engage the English fleet, and in the second from Rhode
Island to Boston, frustrated the whole." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the
United States, Vol. II., Chap. xvi., p. 272.)
"Whatever were the reasons which induced Count D'Estaing to adopt that
measure (of sailing with his fleet direct for Boston), the Americans
were greatly dissatisfied. They complained that they had incurred great
expense and danger, under the prospect of the most effective
co-operation; that depending thereon, they had risked their lives on an
island, where, without naval protection, they were exposed to particular
dangers; that in this situation they were first deserted, and afterwards
totally abandoned, at a time when, by persevering in the original plan,
they had well-grounded hopes of speedy success. Under these
apprehensions the discontented militia went home in such crowds that the
regular army, which remained was in danger of being cut off from a
retreat. In these embarrassing circumstances, General Sullivan
extricated himself with judgment and ability. He began to send off his
heavy artillery and baggage on the 26th, and retreated from the lines on
the night of the 28th." (Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol.
VI., Chap. lviii., p. 173.)]
[Footnote 14: "The inveteracy to the French, traditionally inherent in
the lower classes of the New England people, could not be restrained
from breaking out in Boston, in manner that might have been attended
with the most serious consequences to the interests of both France and
America, had not the prudence of the magistracy interposed on the one
hand, and the sagacity of Count D'Estaing co-operated on the other. A
desperate fray happened in that city between the populace and the French
sailors, in which these were roughly handled, and had much the worse. A
number of them were hurt and wounded, and some, it was reported, were
killed."
"Precisely at the same time, a disturbance of a like nature happened at
Charleston, in South Carolina, between the French and American seamen,
but it was carried to much greater extremities; they engaged on both
sides with small arms, and even with cannon. A number of people were
killed and wounded" (Dr. Andrews' History of the American War, Vol.
III., Chap. xxxviii., pp. 172, 173)]
[Footnote 15: Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap.
lviii, pp. 380, 381.
"During this time Sir Henry Clinton sent out several expeditions in
various quarters. Near Tappan, a body of American horsemen under Colonel
Baylor were surprised and routed, or put to the sword. In Egg-Harbour,
great part of Count Pulaski's foreign legion was cut to pieces. At
Buzzard's Bay, and on the island called Martha's Vineyard, many American
ships were taken or destroyed, store-houses burned, and contributions of
sheep and oxen levied. In these expeditions the principal commander was
General Charles Grey, an officer of great zeal and ardour, whom the
Americans sometimes surnamed the 'No-flint General,' from his common
practice of ordering the men to take the flints out of their muskets,
and trust to their bayonets alone. After some twenty years of further
service, the veteran was raised, by the favour of his Sovereign, to the
peerage as Lord Grey of Howick, and afterwards Earl Grey. His son became
Prime Minister (father of the present Earl Grey), and the greatest
orator who, since the death of Chatham, had appeared in the House of
Lords."--_Ib._, pp. 382, 383.]
[Footnote 16: Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap.
iii., p. 231.]
[Footnote 17: Lord Mahon's History of England, Vol. VI., Chap. lviii.,
p. 384.
Mr. Tucker remarks on this subject: "On the 3rd of November D'Estaing
sailed for the West Indies, and thus ended the costly and fruitless
expedition which bade fair to be decisive of the contest; and which
failed first by disasters from the elements, and then from
misunderstandings in which the interests of the common cause seem to
have been sacrificed to paltry personal feelings on both sides."
(History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap, iii., p. 234.)]
[Footnote 18: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap,
xvi., p. 275.]
[Footnote 19: "Early in January, 1779, reinforcements under Admiral
Byron transferred maritime superiority to the British; and D'Estaing for
six months sheltered his fleet in the bay of Port Royal. At the end of
June, Byron having left St. Lucia to convoy a company of British
merchant ships through the passage, D'Estaing detached a force against
St. Vincent, which, with the aid of the oppressed and enslaved Caribs,
was easily taken. At the same time the French admiral made an attack on
the island of Grenada, whose garrison surrendered on the 4th of July, at
discretion." (Bancroft, Vol. X., Chap, xiii., p. 295.)]
[Footnote 20: "Two days after the taking of Grenada," says Mr. Bancroft,
"the fleet of Byron arrived within sight of the French, and, though
reduced in number, sought a general close action, which his adversary
knew how to avoid." (History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap, xiii.,
p. 295.)]
[Footnote 21: History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap, iii., p. 249.
"Count D'Estaing's intentions and his hopes were, as before, directed to
objects of the first magnitude. The first measure of the plan and
contemplation was to expel the British forces out of Georgia, and to
place that province and the contiguous province of South Carolina, and
in short all the Southern colonies, on a footing of perfect security
from any future invasions by the British troops. After the
accomplishment of this object, he next proposed no less than a total
deliverance of America from the terror of the British arms. This was to
be effected by the destruction of the British fleet at New York. The
latter part of the plan he doubted not to accomplish through the
co-operation of the American army under Washington." (Dr. Andrews'
History of the Late War, Vol. III., Chap. xlv., pp. 308, 309.)]
[Footnote 22: "A junction being formed by the French and American
forces, they amounted together to between nine and ten thousand men.
Count D'Estaing had five thousand regulars, and near one thousand stout
mulattos and free negroes, well armed. The body of Americans that joined
him under the command of General Lincoln consisted of about two thousand
at first, but were soon augmented to twice that number.
"To oppose this formidable strength, General Prevost (the commander of
Savannah) had no more, altogether, than three thousand men; but they
were such as continual experience had shown he could place the utmost
dependence on. Numbers were refugees (loyalists), _whom resentment for
the usage they had received_ exasperated to a degree that rendered them
desperate."--_Ib._, p. 312.]
[Footnote 23: "As soon as the arrival of Count D'Estaing on the coast
was known, General Lincoln, with the army under his command, marched for
the vicinity of Savannah; and orders were given for the militia of
Georgia and South Carolina to rendezvous near the same place. The
British were equally diligent in preparing for their defence. The
American militia, flushed with the hope of speedily expelling the
British from their southern possessions, turned out with an alacrity
which far surpassed their exertions in the previous campaign." (Dr.
Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xvii., p. 302.)]
[Footnote 24: "The French and the Americans encamped separately. Count
D'Estaing thought it most prudent to keep them apart. He knew by
experience how apt they were to disagree; and he hoped that, by acting
asunder from each other, a reciprocal emulation would be excited. It was
agreed, accordingly, that each of them should carry on their respective
approaches without interference from the other side. This method was
particularly agreeable to the French, who, looking upon themselves as
incomparably superior to the Americans, did not choose to divide any
honour with these, to which they imagined that they alone were
entitled." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. III., Chap, xlv.,
pp. 312, 313.)]
[Footnote 25: Count D'Estaing was afterwards so ashamed of this inhuman
refusal, that after the repulse of his assault upon the garrison he
apologized for it, and offered the permission requested, but which was
no longer needed, and therefore refused.
General Stedman, referring to this circumstance, says: "On the morning
of the 4th of October, the batteries of the besiegers having opened with
a discharge from fifty-three pieces of heavy cannon and fourteen
mortars, a request was made by General Prevost that the women and
children might be permitted to leave the town and embark on board
vessels in the river, which should be placed under the protection of
Count D'Estaing, and wait the issue of the siege. But this proposal,
dictated by humanity, was rejected with insult. Fortunately, however,
for the inhabitants as well as the garrison, although an incessant
cannonade from so many pieces of artillery was continued from the 4th to
the 9th of October, less injury was done to the houses in the town than
might have been expected; few lives were lost, and the defences were in
no respect materially damaged." (Stedman's History of the American War,
Vol. II., Chap, xxx., p. 127.)]
[Footnote 26: Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap,
iii., p. 250.
This disastrous attack upon Savannah was followed by mutual
recriminations between the French and American officers and soldiers.
"No good agreement, it has been said, subsisted between the French and
Americans from the commencement of the siege, and their mutual dislike
was now increased by disappointment. After the assault, the French could
no longer conceal their contempt for their new allies; they styled them
'insurgents' in common conversation and even in written memorials."
(General Stedman's History of the American War, Vol. II., Chap, xxx., p.
132.)
"While the British troops were enjoying the satisfaction resulting from
the success that was due to their conduct and valour, the enemy was in a
condition of discontent and sullenness which had like to have terminated
fatally. The Americans could not conceal their disapprobation of the
whole proceedings of Count D'Estaing, nor he the contemptuous light in
which he held them. Reciprocal taunts and reproaches came to such a
height between both the officers and soldiers of either party, that it
was once thought they would have proceeded to actual violence.
"A motive which strongly influenced the Americans was the jealousy they
had conceived against the French commander, on account of his having
summoned General Prevost to _surrender to the arms of France_, without
including those of the United States of America. They inferred from
thence, that either he considered them as unworthy of the honour of
being mentioned conjointly with the King of France, or that he meant to
retain the province of Georgia for that Crown in case of reduction.
Whichever of the two was the meaning of the French commander, it exposed
him equally to the indignation of the Americans.
"To this it may be added, that the inhuman refusal of the request of
General Prevost for a permission to the women and children to depart
from the town of Savannah during the siege, was now by the French
attributed to the Americans, whom they accused of brutality, and whose
general, a French officer of rank, was loaded with the coarsest and most
injurious appellations, in common with his other countrymen.
"From the day of their repulse, both the French and Americans abandoned
all further prosecution of the siege.
"In this manner was the province of Georgia cleared a third time of the
enemy, after the most sanguine expectations had been entertained by all
America that the reduction of this province would have been a
preparatory step to the expulsion of the British fleets and armies from
every part of the continent." (Dr. Andrews' History of the War, etc.,
Vol. III., Chap. xlv., pp. 316-318.)]
[Footnote 27: Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap.
xiii., pp. 297, 298.]
[Footnote 28: "In the latter part of this year (1779), Spain decided on
joining France in the war, anxious as she was to take the chance of
recovering Gibraltar, Jamaica, and the Floridas." (Tucker's History of
the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., p. 251.)
Thus England had arrayed against her two of the most powerful
Governments, with the two most powerful fleets in Europe, besides the
war in America.]
[Footnote 29: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap.
xvii., pp. 305, 306.]
[Footnote 30: Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap.
iii., p. 282.]
[Footnote 31: "There were never more than forty members present--often
no more than twenty. These small numbers, however, by no means insured
harmony, nor precluded violent and unseemly quarrels, rumours of which
were not slow in passing the Atlantic. 'For God's sake,' thus writes La
Fayette from France, 'For God's sake prevent the Congress from disputing
loudly together. Nothing so much hurts the interest and reputation of
America.' (Letter of La Fayette to Washington, June 12th, 1779.) Thus
the object of concealment, unless, perhaps, for private purposes, was
most imperfectly attained, although, in name at least, the deliberations
of Congress at this time were secret. Historically, even the Journal
which they kept gives little light as to their true proceedings. An
American gentleman, who has studied that document with care, laments
that it is painfully meagre, the object being apparently to record as
little as possible." (Life of President Reed, by Mr. William Reed, Vol.
II., p. 18.)
Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., pp. 420,
421.]
[Footnote 32: Letter to Benjamin Harrison, December 30th, 1778.
Washington's Writings, Vol. VI., p. 151, quoted in Lord Mahon's History,
Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., pp. 419, 420.]
[Footnote 33: Dr. Ramsay, referring to this depreciation of the
currency, says: "The confiscation and sale of the property of Tories,
for the most part, brought but very little into the public treasury. The
sales were generally made on credit, and by the progressive
depreciation, what was dear at the time of the purchase, was very cheap
at the time of payment. When this measure was first adopted, little or
no injustice resulted from it, for at that time the paper bills were
equal, or nearly equal, to gold or silver of the same nominal sum. In
the progress of the war, when depreciation took place, the case was
materially altered.
"The aged, who had retired from the scenes of active business to enjoy
the fruits of their industry, found their substance melting away to a
mere pittance, insufficient for their support. The widow who lived
comfortably on the bequests of a deceased husband, experienced a
frustration of all his well-meant tenderness. The laws of the country
interposed and compelled her to receive a shilling, where a pound was
her due. The hapless orphan, instead of receiving from the hands of an
executor a competency to set out in business, was obliged to give a
final discharge on the payment of sixpence in the pound." (Dr. Ramsay's
History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xviii., pp. 315, 316.)
"The paper-money," says Lord Mahon, "had gradually fallen to
one-twentieth, to one-thirtieth, nay, in some cases to not less than
one-hundredth of its nominal value! But perhaps one practical instance
may make this case clearer. In December of this year (1779), and in the
State of Maryland, an English officer received an innkeeper's bill,
which in his Travels he has printed at full length, amounting in
paper-money to £732 and some shillings; and this bill he paid in gold
with four guineas and a half." (Aubury's Travels, Vol. II., p. 492.)
(Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., p. 416.)
General Washington thus describes this state of things in regard to
every man in the public service: "What officers can bear the weight of
prices that every necessary article is now got to? A rat, in the shape
of a horse, is not to be bought at this time for less than two hundred
pounds, nor a saddle under thirty or forty pounds; boots twenty, and
shoes and other articles in like proportion. How is it possible,
therefore, for officers to stand this without an increase of pay? And
how is it possible to advance their pay when flour is selling at
different places from five to fifteen pounds per hundredweight, hay from
ten to thirty pounds, and beef and other essentials in like proportion?"
The depreciation still proceeding, Washington a few months afterwards
says that "a waggon load of money will now scarcely purchase a waggon
load of provisions." (Letters to Governor Morris, October 4th, 1778; and
to the President of the Congress, April 23rd, 1779.)]
CHAPTER XXIX.
1780--A YEAR OF WEAKNESS AND DISASTER TO THE AMERICAN CAUSE, AND OF
SUCCESS TO THE BRITISH ARMS.
The year 1780 was inauspicious for the revolutionary cause, but
auspicious for the English. The financial embarrassments arising from
the depreciation of the paper-money engaged the anxious deliberations of
Congress,[34] and Washington's army was by no means able to cope with
the northern division of the English army.[35]
But La Fayette, now returned from a recent visit to France, during which
he had obtained from the French Court a loan of money and reinforcements
of naval and land forces, Washington contemplated the recovery of New
York, which had long been a favourite object with him. The French
squadron of seven sail of the line, and five frigates and transports,
under the command of Chevalier de Ternay, arrived at Newport harbour,
Long Island, on the 10th July, having on board six thousand troops,
under the command of Count de Rochambeau, who, in order to prevent the
repetition of previous disputes, was directed to put himself under
Washington's orders; and on all points of precedence and etiquette--this
was the first division of the promised reinforcements from France--the
French officers were to give place to the Americans. Washington and
Count de Rochambeau agreed upon an attack on New York. The British had
in New York only four ships of the line and a few frigates; but three
days after the arrival of the French squadron, Admiral Graves reached
New York with six ships of the line. Having now the naval superiority,
the British, instead of waiting to be attacked, proposed to attack the
French at Newport, and for which purpose Sir Henry Clinton embarked with
six thousand men; but as Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot could
not agree on a plan of operations, the British troops were disembarked.
The fleet proceeded to blockade the French ships, and the revolutionary
army was obliged to remain at Newport for their protection. "News
presently arrived that the French second division was detained at Brest,
blockaded there by another British squadron. Instead of being an
assistance, the French auxiliaries threatened to be a burden; three
thousand troops and five hundred militia were kept under arms at Newport
to assist in guarding the French ships. Thus a third time--as it seemed,
almost a sort of fatality--the attempt at French co-operation proved a
failure."[36]
Sir Henry Clinton, on leaving the Count D'Estaing after his defeat at
Savannah, had left the coast of Georgia with his fleet for France,
determined to extend his military operations south, with a view of
completing the submission of the Southern States. Leaving the garrison
of New York under the command of General Knyphausen, he proceeded in
person on an expedition against South Carolina, and besieged Charleston,
the capital. Information had been obtained at Charleston of Sir Henry
Clinton's intention two months before the arrival of his fleet and
troops, and the city was fortified on all sides, and on its redoubts,
lines, and batteries were mounted eighty pieces of cannon and mortars.
The commander, General Lincoln, had a force of 7,000 men of all
denominations under arms, and was expecting large reinforcements. The
army of Sir Henry Clinton was increased by a reinforcement of 3,000
men--making in the whole about 9,000 men under his command.
At the commencement of the siege, the Governor of the State, by the
extraordinary powers conferred upon him by the Legislature, issued a
proclamation requiring such of the militia as were regularly drafted,
and all the inhabitants and _owners of property in the town, to repair
to the American standard and join the garrison immediately, under pain
of confiscation_.
The siege commenced the 3rd of April, and was protracted to the 11th of
May. The terms of capitulation proposed by each party in the earlier
part of the siege were mutually declined. Cannonading continued on each
side until the British opened batteries on the third parallel, played
upon the American garrison with cannon and mortars at a distance of less
than a hundred yards, advanced within twenty-five yards of the American
works, and were ready for making a general assault by land and water
when, on the 11th of May, "a great number of citizens addressed General
Lincoln in a petition, expressing their acquiescence in the terms which
Sir Henry Clinton had offered, and requested his acceptance of them. On
the reception of this petition, General Lincoln wrote to Sir Henry, and
offered to accept the terms before proposed. The royal commanders,
wishing to avoid the extremity of storming the city, and unwilling to
press to unconditional submission an enemy whose friendship they wished
to conciliate, returned a favourable answer. A capitulation was signed
on the 12th of May, and Major General Leslie took possession of the town
the next day. Upwards of 400 pieces of artillery were surrendered.[37]
By the articles of capitulation, the garrison was to march out of town
and deposit their arms in front of the works, but the drums were not to
beat a British march, nor the colours to be uncased. The continental
troops and seamen were to keep their baggage and remain prisoners of war
till exchanged. The militia were to be permitted to return to their
respective homes, as prisoners on parole; and while they adhered to
their parole, were not to be molested by the British troops in person or
property. The inhabitants, of all conditions, were to be considered as
prisoners on parole, and to hold their property on the same terms with
the militia. The officers of the army and navy were to retain their
servants, swords, pistols, and baggage unsearched. They were permitted
to sell their horses, but not to remove them. A vessel was allowed to
proceed to Philadelphia with General Lincoln's despatches unopened."[38]
Shortly after the capture of Charleston, Sir Henry Clinton embarked for
New York with the principal part of his army;[39] but before his
departure he performed several important acts both as Royal Commissioner
and as Commander-in-Chief of the army.
After the surrender of the capital, it was proposed to awe the
disaffected and secure the universal submission of the people by sending
out three expeditions.
"One expedition was sent by Clinton up the Savannah, to encourage the
loyal and reduce the disaffected in the neighbourhood of Augusta:
another proceeded for like purpose to the district of Ninety-Six, where
Williamson surrendered his post and accepted British protection. A third
and larger party, under Cornwallis, moved across the Santee towards
Camden."[40]
These expeditions rather weakened than strengthened the influence of the
British cause, as compulsion rather than conciliation was employed to
re-establish British supremacy; and the proclamations and orders issued
by Sir Henry Clinton before his departure for New York, defeated rather
than promoted the objects intended by them.[41]
After issuing his proclamation (for the purport of which see previous
note), Sir Henry Clinton took his departure, with the major part of his
army, for New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command with four
thousand troops.[42]
"Lord Cornwallis, considering South Carolina as entirely reannexed to
Great Britain, would admit of no neutrality among the inhabitants; but
insisted on their taking the oath of allegiance, which, however, was
generally taken with reluctance by the people of the lower country. This
part of the State was still further alienated by the licentious and
plundering habits of the British soldiers over a conquered country, and
by the seduction of many of the slaves from their masters."[43]
There can be no justification of Lord Cornwallis's policy; but there
were some mitigating circumstances that palliate the severities which he
inflicted. Among those who had been taken prisoners at the capture of
Charleston, and professed loyalty, was, as Lord Mahon says, "One Lisle,
who had not only taken the oath of allegiance, but accepted military
rank as a King's officer; waited just long enough to supply his
battalion with clothes, arms, and ammunition from the royal stores, and
then quietly led them back to his old friends. Highly incensed at such
signal acts of treachery as Lisle's, Lord Cornwallis had recourse to
some severe orders in return. The penalty of death was denounced against
all militiamen who, after serving with the English, went off to the
insurgents. Several of the prisoners in the battle of Camden, men taken
with arms in their hands and British protections in their pockets, were
hanged. Other such examples were made at Augusta and elsewhere. Some who
had been living on their parole at Charleston, and who, in spite of that
parole, carried on a secret correspondence with their insurgent
countrymen, were shipped off to St. Augustine. A proclamation was
issued, sequestering the estates of those who had been the most forward
to oppose the establishment of the royal authority within the province.
Perhaps these measures exceeded the bounds of justice; certainly they
did the bounds of policy. This was shown by the fatal event, when, on
the overthrow of the royalist cause in South Carolina, the measures of
Lord Cornwallis became the plea for other executions and for every act
of oppression that resentment could devise."
"Within the more limited sphere of his own command, Lord Rawdon had
recourse to, or at the very least announced, some measures still more
severe, and far less to be justified. In a letter to one of his
officers, which was intercepted, we find, for example, what follows: 'I
will give the inhabitants ten guineas for the head of every deserter
belonging to the volunteers of Ireland; and five guineas only if they
bring him in alive.' No amount of provocation or of precedent in his
enemies, no degree of youthful ardour in himself, are at all adequate to
excuse these most blamable words. When, however, he was called upon to
vindicate them, Lord Rawdon declared that many of his threats were meant
only 'to act on the fears and prejudices of the vulgar,' and by no means
to be carried into practical effect."[44]
During the latter part of the year there were various skirmishes and
battles between volunteer parties of Independents, under such leaders as
Sumpter and Clarke, and detachments of the British army, with various
success, but nothing which affected the supremacy of the royal cause,
though the moral influence of it was widely weakened by the arbitrary
policy of the British commanders and the conduct of the British troops.
The prospects of the revolution were very gloomy,[45] and its leaders
were much disheartened. In these circumstances of depression and
despondency, an earnest appeal was made to France for men and money,[46]
and the transactions following show that the appeal was not made in
vain, and that French ships and troops were the main instruments in
deciding the battle which was followed by the acknowledgment of American
Independence.[47]
Mr. Hildreth, referring to the close of this year, says: "So far,
indeed, as related to America, Great Britain had good reason to be
satisfied with the late campaign. Georgia was entirely subdued, and the
royal government re-established. The possession of Charleston, Augusta,
Ninety-Six, and Camden, supported by an army in the field, secured
entire control over all the wealthy parts of South Carolina. North
Carolina was full of Tories, anxiously awaiting the approach of
Cornwallis. The three Southern States were incapable of helping
themselves, and those further north, exhausted and penniless, were
little able to send assistance. It seemed as if the promises so often
made by Lord George Germaine's American correspondents were now about to
be fulfilled, and the rebel colonies to sink beneath the accumulated
pressure of this long-protracted struggle."[48]
Thus, at the close of 1780, the military conflicts were almost
invariably successful on the side of the British; the resources of the
revolutionists in both money and men were exhausted, and their hopes of
success utterly extinguished without foreign aid. But though the British
were successful on the fields of battle, they everywhere lost in the
confidence, esteem, and affections of the people, even of the Loyalists.
Yet the prospects of the war party of independence were gloomy indeed.
General Washington felt that some great achievement was necessary to
revive the hopes of his fellow-countrymen, and save from dissolution his
daily decreasing army. His only hope was in aid from France. His words
were:
"Without an immediate, ample, and efficacious succour in money, we may
make a feeble and expiring effort in our next campaign, _in all
probability the period of our opposition_. Next to a loan in money, _a
constant naval superiority on these coasts_ is the object the most
interesting."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 34: "The commissaries, greatly in debt, had neither money nor
credit, and starvation began to stare the soldiers in the face. To
support his army, Washington was again obliged to resort to the harsh
expedient of levying contributions on the surrounding country. Each
county was called upon for a certain quantity of flour and meat; but as
the civil authorities took the matter of supply in hand, for which
certificates were given by the commissaries on the appraisement of two
magistrates, the use of force did not become necessary." (Hildreth's
History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 301.)]
[Footnote 35: "Washington's entire force scarcely exceeded ten thousand
men, a number not equal to the (British) garrison of New York; and even
of these a considerable number were militia drafts, whose terms of
service were fast expiring."--_Ib._, p. 303.
But though New York was in possession of the British, and strongly
garrisoned, apprehensions were entertained of attacks upon the several
English garrison posts in the State from invasions of marauding parties
of the revolutionary army, from facilities of approach on account of the
freezing over of all the rivers from the extreme severity of this
winter. It is singular that while Benjamin Franklin was leader of the
Revolutionists, and now United States Minister to France, his son was
one of the leaders of the Loyalists. "It was now," says Mr. Hildreth,
"that the 'Board of Associated Loyalists' was formed, of which Franklin,
late Royal Governor of New Jersey, released by exchange from his tedious
confinement in Connecticut, was made president. Washington, however, was
in no condition to undertake an attack, and the winter passed off with
few skirmishes." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III.,
Chap. xi., p. 303.)]
[Footnote 36: _Ib._, pp. 311, 312.]
[Footnote 37: "In the siege, the British lost seventy-six killed and one
hundred and eighty-nine wounded; the Americans about an equal number.
The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to five thousand six
hundred and eighteen, counting all the adult males of the town."
(Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. lii., p. 253.)]
[Footnote 38: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap.
xx., pp. 337, 338.
Yet in the face of the facts above stated by Dr. Ramsay, who was an
officer on General Washington's staff, and afterwards member of
Congress, where he had access to the official documents and letters from
which he compiled his history, Mr. Bancroft makes the following
statements and remarks: "The value of the spoil, which was distributed
by English and Hessian commissaries of captures, amounted to about
£300,000 sterling, so that the dividend of a major-general exceeded
4,000 guineas. There was no restraint on private rapine; the silver
plate of the planters was carried off; all negroes that had belonged to
the rebels were seized, even though they had themselves sought an asylum
within the British lines; and at one embarkation 2,000 were shipped to a
market in the West Indies. British officers thought more of amassing
fortunes than of re-uniting the empire. The patriots were not allowed to
appoint attorneys to manage or sell their estates, a sentence of
confiscation hung over the whole land, and British protection was
granted only in return for the unconditional promise of loyalty."
(Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 305,
306.)]
[Footnote 39: "Sir Henry Clinton, having left about 4,000 men for
Southern service, embarked early in June with the main army for New
York. On his departure the command devolved on Lieutenant-General
Cornwallis." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap.
xx., p. 341.)
"They saw South Carolina apparently won back to the royal cause, and
with some probability that North Carolina would follow the example. But
at this crisis intelligence reached Sir Henry Clinton that the Americans
upon the Hudson (under the command of General Washington) were on the
point of receiving considerable succours; that a French fleet sent to
their aid, with several French regiments on board, might soon be
expected off the New England coasts. Sir Henry deemed it his duty to
provide in person for the safety of his principal charge. In the first
days of June he accordingly re-embarked for New York, with a portion of
his army; leaving, however, about 4,000 men under Lord Cornwallis's
command. The instructions given to Lord Cornwallis were to consider the
maintenance of Charleston, and in general of South Carolina, as his main
and indispensable objects; but consistently with these, he was left at
liberty to make 'a solid move,' as it was termed, into North Carolina,
if he judged it proper or found it possible." (Lord Mahon's History,
etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., p. 70.)
On the eve of leaving Charleston for New York, Sir Henry reported to the
British Colonial Minister, Lord Germaine: "The inhabitants from every
quarter declare their allegiance to the King, and offer their services
in arms. There are few men in South Carolina who are not either our
prisoners or in arms with us."]
[Footnote 40: Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap.
xiv., p. 306.
"The universal panic consequent on the capture of Charleston had
suspended all resistance to the British army. The men of Beaufort, of
Ninety-Six, and of Camden, had capitulated under the promise of
security. They believed that they were to be treated as neutrals or as
prisoners on parole. There remained to them no possibility of flight
with their families; and if they were inclined to take up arms, there
was no American army around which they could rally." (Bancroft's History
of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., p. 307.)
"No organized American force was now left in either of the Carolinas.
The three most Southern States had not a battalion in the field, nor
were the next three much better provided. The Virginia line had been
mostly captured at Charleston, or dispersed in subsequent engagements.
The same was the case with the North Carolina regiments. The recent
battle of Camden had reduced the Maryland line to a single regiment--the
Delaware line to a single company." (Hildreth's History of the United
States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 316.)]
[Footnote 41: "On the 22nd of May, confiscation of property and other
punishments were denounced against all who should thereafter oppose the
King in arms, or hinder any one from joining his forces. On the 1st of
June, a proclamation by the Commissioners Clinton and Arbuthnot, offered
pardon to the penitent on their immediate return to allegiance; to the
loyal, the promise of their former political immunities, including
freedom from taxation, except by their own Legislature. This policy of
moderation might have familiarized the Carolinians once more to the
British Government; but the proclamation was not communicated to
Cornwallis--so that when, three weeks later, two leading men, one of
whom had been in a high station, and both principally concerned in the
rebellion, went to that officer to surrender themselves under its
provisions, he could only answer that he had no knowledge of its
existence.
"On the 3rd of June (the day of his departure from Charleston), Clinton,
by a proclamation which he alone signed, cut up British authority in
Carolina by the roots. He required all the inhabitants of the province,
even those outside of Charleston, 'who were now prisoners on parole,' to
take an active part in securing the royal government. 'Should they
neglect to return to their allegiance,' so ran the proclamation, 'they
will be treated as rebels to the government of the King.' He never
reflected that many who accepted protection from fear or convenience,
did so in the expectation of living in a state of neutrality, and that
they might say, 'If we _must fight_, let us fight on the side of our
friends, of our countrymen of America.'" (Bancroft's History of the
United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 307, 308.)]
[Footnote 42: "Earl (afterwards Marquis) Cornwallis was born in 1738.
Early in life he had embraced the military profession, which he pursued
with undeviating honour, though variable success. In him the want of any
shining talents was in a great measure supplied by probity, by
punctuality, by steady courage, by vigilant attention to his duties. In
1776, on the Declaratory Bill, he had shown his conciliatory temper to
the colonies; denying, with Lord Camden and only three Peers besides,
any right we had to tax them while they remained unrepresented in the
House of Commons. When, however, the war broke forth, he acted solely as
became a soldier. Under Lord Cornwallis was now serving a young officer
of no common spirit and daring, destined, like himself, to attain, at
another period, the highest office that an Englishman out of England can
fill--the office of Governor-General of India. This was Francis Lord
Rawdon, subsequently better known, first as Earl of Moira, and then as
Marquis of Hastings. In the ensuing battle of Camden, where he held a
second rank, he played a distinguished part; he was not yet twenty-six
years of age, and he had already gained renown five years before, in the
battle of Bunker's Hill." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap.
lxii., p. 71.)]
[Footnote 43: Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap.
iii., p. 254.
"There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina; and
Lord Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection.
All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British
protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several
of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their
intended effect, produced a strong reaction."--_Ib._, p. 256.]
[Footnote 44: Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., pp.
75, 76.]
[Footnote 45: "While the war raged in South Carolina, the campaign of
1780, in the Northern States, was barren of important events. The
campaign of 1780 passed away in the Northern States, as has been
related, in successive disappointments and reiterated distresses. The
country was exhausted; the continental currency expiring. The army, for
want of subsistence, was kept inactive and brooding over its calamities.
While these disasters were openly menacing the ruin of the American
cause, treachery was silently undermining it. A distinguished officer
(General Arnold) engaged, for a stipulated sum of money, to betray into
the hands of the British an important post committed to his care," etc.
(Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxiv., pp.
364-377.)]
[Footnote 46: "Congress could do nothing, and confessed that it could do
nothing. 'We have required,' thus they wrote to the States on the 15th
of January, 1781, 'aids of men, provisions and money; the States alone
have authority to execute.' Since Congress itself made a public
confession of its powerlessness, nothing remained but _to appeal to
France_ for rescue, not from a foreign enemy, but from the evils
consequent on its own want of government. 'If France lends not a speedy
aid,' wrote General Greene from the South to her Minister in
Philadelphia, 'I fear the country will be for ever lost.' It was
therefore resolved for the moment to despatch to Versailles, as a
special minister, one who had lived in the midst of the ever-increasing
distresses of the army, to set them before the Government of France in
the most striking light. The choice fell on the younger Laurens, of
South Carolina. To this agent Washington confided a statement of the
condition of the country; and with dignity and candour avowed that it
had reached a crisis out of which it could not rise by its own
unassisted strength. To Franklin he wrote in the same strain; and La
Fayette addressed a like memorial of ripe wisdom to Vergennes" (the
French Minister for Foreign Affairs). (Bancroft's History of the United
States, Vol. X., Chap., xix., pp. 417, 418.)
"Scarce any one of the States had as yet sent an eighth part of its
quota into the field; and there was no prospect of a glorious offensive
campaign, unless their generous allies should help them with money, and
with a fleet strong enough to secure the superiority at sea."--_Ib._, p.
425.]
[Footnote 47: It was in the latter part of this year, 1780, that the
treachery of General Arnold and the melancholy tragedy of Major André's
execution took place.]
[Footnote 48: Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap.
xli., p. 331.
"Though British conquests had rapidly succeeded each other, yet no
advantages accrued to the victors. The minds of the people were
unsubdued, or rather were alienated from every idea of returning to
their former allegiance. Such was their temper, that the expense of
retaining them in subjection would have exceeded all the profits of the
conquest. British garrisons kept down open resistance, in the vicinity
of the places where they were established; but as soon as they were
withdrawn and the people left to themselves, a spirit of revolt hostile
to Great Britain always displayed itself; and the standard of
independence, whenever it was prudently raised, never wanted followers
among the active and spirited part of the community." (Dr. Ramsay's
History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., p. 363.)]
CHAPTER XXX.
THE FRENCH AND CONGRESS ALLIES IN 1781 RECOVER VIRGINIA--SURRENDER OF
LORD CORNWALLIS--RESULTS.
Under the adverse circumstances and gloom which attended and closed the
year 1780, as stated in the preceding chapter, Washington felt the
necessity of doing something bold and great to revive the confidence of
his countrymen and arrest the decline of his army.
Under these circumstances, a campaign of operations was devised and
agreed upon by Washington and the commander of the French troops. The
centres of British power in America were the army of about ten thousand
men in New York, under the immediate command of Sir Henry Clinton, who
was, indeed, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in North America;
and secondly, the army of Virginia, about seven thousand men, under the
command of Earl Cornwallis; and thirdly, the garrison of Charleston,
South Carolina, under the command of Lord Rawdon; Savannah, the capital
of Georgia, was also occupied by a British garrison. Washington's plan
was to pretend an attack upon New York, but to make a real attack upon
the army of Virginia, with the view of extinguishing British power in
the Southern States. So well was the appearance of an intended attack
upon New York kept up, that Sir Henry Clinton made all needful
preparations for its defence, and actually ordered Lord Cornwallis to
send a detachment of his men to New York to strengthen its defence; but
after their embarkation for that purpose the order was countermanded,
and Lord Cornwallis was allowed to retain them. Nothing could be more
complete than the deception practised upon Sir Henry Clinton; nor did
he suspect the real intention of the allied armies until they had
crossed the Hudson and were on their way, through the Jerseys,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland, to Virginia.[49]
"In the latter end of August," says Dr. Ramsay, "the American army began
their march to Virginia from the neighbourhood of New York. Washington
had advanced as far as Chester before he received information of the
arrival of De Grasse. The French troops marched at the same time, for
the same place. In the course of this summer they passed through all the
extensive settlements which lie between Newport and Yorktown. It seldom
if ever happened before, that an army led through a foreign country at
so great a distance from their own, among a people of different
principles, customs, language, and religion, behaved with so much
regularity. In their march to Yorktown they had to pass through five
hundred miles of a country abounding in fruit, and at a time when the
most delicious productions of nature, growing on and near the public
highways, presented both opportunity and temptation to gratify their
appetites, yet so complete was their discipline, that in this long march
scarce an instance could be produced of a peach or an apple being taken
without the consent of the inhabitants."[50]
On the 14th of September, Washington and De Rochambeau, in advance of
their armies and with their respective staffs of officers, arrived at
Williamsburg; and with Generals Chastellux, Du Portail, and Knox,
visited Count de Grasse on board his famous ship, the _Ville de Paris_,
and agreed on the plan of operations against Earl Cornwallis at
Yorktown, on York river, to which the allied armies at once proceeded,
for the purpose of besieging it. On the 1st day of October, General
Washington was able to report to the President of Congress that the
investment of the place was completed. "Gloucester (on the opposite side
of the river, not a mile wide there), which was held by Colonel Dundas,
was beleaguered by some Virginian troops, and by the French legion of
the Duke de Lauzun. Yorktown, where Cornwallis in person, and with his
main force, commanded, saw to his left the division of La Fayette, and
to his right the division of St. Simon. Other bodies of troops filled
the space between them, while Washington and Rochambeau fixed their
posts near together, towards the centre. They brought up fifty pieces of
cannon, for the most part heavy, by aid from the French ships, as also
sixteen mortars, and they lost no time in commencing their first
parallel against the town.[51] By the 9th the first parallel was
completed, when the town and its defences were cannonaded and shelled.
Within another week a second parallel was completed within three
hundred yards of the defences, two redoubts stormed and taken--one by
the French and the other by the Americans--and the further defence of
the town rendered impossible."
"Down to this time, the 15th of October, Lord Cornwallis had expected
reinforcements of ships and troops from New York;[52] but he now
despaired of aid from that quarter, and attempted to escape with his
army in the night across the river, which was prevented by a storm, when
the only alternative left him was to surrender on the best terms he
could obtain. On the morning of the 17th he sent a flag of truce to
Washington, proposing a cessation of arms, and a treaty for the
capitulation of his post. Hostilities ceased; the terms of surrender
were discussed and agreed upon on the 18th by four commissioners, two
field officers being named on each side. The army, and all that belonged
to it, was surrendered to Washington; and the ships and seamen to Count
de Grasse" (Tucker).
"All the artillery and public stores in the two forts, together with the
shipping and boats in the two harbours, were to be surrendered by the
English. On the other hand, private property of every kind was to be
respected by the Americans and French. The garrisons of York and
Gloucester were to march out with the same honours of war as had been
granted by Sir Henry Clinton at Charleston; the land forces to remain
prisoners of the United States, and the naval forces prisoners of
France. The soldiers were to be kept in Virginia, Maryland, or
Pennsylvania, and as much by regiments as possible. The general staff
and other officers not left with the troops to be permitted to go to New
York, or to Europe, on parole."[53]
The battle of Yorktown, and the surrender of Lord Cornwallis to the arms
of the French and the Americans, may be regarded as the last battle of
importance of the civil war in America. American writers and orators are
fond of saying that here was brought face to face on the battle-field
the strength of Old England and Young America, and the latter prevailed.
No statement can be more unfounded, and no boast more groundless than
this. England, without an ally, was at war with three kingdoms--France,
Spain, and Holland--the most potent naval and military powers of Europe;
while were also arrayed against her, by an "armed neutrality," Russia,
Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden. England was armed to the teeth for the
defence of her own shores against threatened invasion, while her navies
were maintaining in sundry battles the honour of the British flag on
three seas.
A small part only of the British land and naval forces was on the coast
of America; yet there were garrisons at Savannah and Charleston, and a
much larger military force at New York, under the command of Sir Henry
Clinton, than that of Yorktown, under Lord Cornwallis. In the following
campaign the English fleet was victorious over the French fleet in the
West Indies, capturing the great ship _Ville de Paris_, and taking Count
de Grasse himself prisoner. In the siege of Yorktown there were about
18,000 of the allied army of French and Americans, besides ships of the
line and sailors, while the effective men under command of Lord
Cornwallis amounted to less than 4,000. It was a marvel of skill and
courage that with an army so small, and in a town so exposed and so
incapable of being strongly fortified, and against an allied force so
overwhelming, Lord Cornwallis was able to sustain a siege for a
fortnight, until he despaired of reinforcements from New York.
Be it also observed, that the greater part of the forces besieging
Yorktown were not Americans, but French, who supplied the shipping and
artillery; in short, all the attacking forces by water, and a duplicate
land enemy--the one part under the command of Count de Rochambeau, and
the other part under the command of the Marquis de La Fayette. Had it
not been for the French fleet and the French land forces, Washington
would not have attempted an attack upon Yorktown. The success of the
siege was, therefore, more French than American, though Washington had
the nominal command of the allied army.
No one can doubt the undaunted courage and matchless skill of
Washington, and his great superiority over any English general ever sent
against him; nor can the bravery and endurance of his army be justly
questioned; nor the dash and boldness and gallantry of the French army.
But it is idle to speak of the siege of Yorktown as a trial of strength
between Young America and Old England. And it is equally incorrect to
say that the resources of England, in men or money, in ships or land
forces, were exhausted, or that England was compelled to make peace in
consequence of the disaster of Lord Cornwallis. There had been a peace
party, both in and out of Parliament, opposed to the American war from
the beginning. That party included some of the ablest statesmen in
England, and increased in strength and influence from year to year, by
exposing the incompetence, extravagance, and corruption of the
Administration, the failure of all their plans, and the non-fulfilment
of any of their promises in regard to America; that although they could
defeat the Americans in the field of battle, they had not conquered and
they could not conquer the hearts of the people, who became more and
more alienated from England by the very example and depredations of the
British officers and soldiers. The surrender of Lord Cornwallis, the
importance of which was greatly magnified, increased the intensity of
English feeling against the continuance of the American war, until the
peace party actually gained a majority in the House of Commons,
compelled the retirement of the old and corrupt Ministry, which had been
the cause of all the oppressions in the American colonies and all the
miseries of the war. Session after session, the leaders of the
Opposition in both the Lords and Commons moved resolutions condemning
the American war and the manner of conducting it; the Duke of Richmond,
the Marquis of Rockingham, the Earl of Shelburne in the Lords; and
General Conway, Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, Lord John Cavendish, Mr. Hartley,
Mr. Dunning (afterwards Lord Ashburton), and Sir James Lowther in the
Commons. Several resolutions were introduced into the Commons
condemnatory of the war in America, with a view of reducing the colonies
to submission, and were defeated by small majorities--in one a majority
of ten, and in another a majority of only _one_. At length they were
censured and rejected by the Commons without a division.
On the 22nd of February, General Conway moved "That an address should be
presented to his Majesty, to implore his Majesty to listen to the advice
of his Commons, that the war in America might no longer be pursued for
the impracticable purpose of reducing the inhabitants of that country to
obedience by force, and to express their hopes that his Majesty's desire
to restore the public tranquillity might be forwarded and made effectual
by a happy reconciliation with the revolted colonies."
After a lengthened debate, this resolution was negatived--one hundred
and ninety-three for the resolution, against it one hundred and
ninety-four--a majority of one for the continuance of the war.
The motion having been objected to as vague in its terms, General
Conway, on the 27th of February, introduced another motion, the same in
substance with the previous one, but varied in phraseology, so as to
meet the rules of the House, and more explicit in its terms. This
resolution was strongly opposed by the Ministry; and after a long debate
the Attorney-General moved the adjournment of the House: For the
adjournment voted two hundred and fifteen; against it, two hundred and
thirty-four--majority of nineteen against the Ministry--so that the
original question, and an address to the King, framed upon the
resolution, were then earned without a division.[54] The King returned a
gracious but vague answer.
General Conway, after moving a vote of thanks to the King for his
gracious answer, followed by moving a resolution: "That this House would
consider as enemies to his Majesty and the country all those who should
advise or by any means attempt the further prosecution of offensive war,
on the continent of North America, for the purpose of reducing the
revolted colonies to obedience by force." This motion, after a feeble
opposition from the Ministry, was allowed to pass without a division.
It might be supposed, under these circumstances, that the Ministry would
forthwith resign; but they continued to hold on to office, which they
had held for twelve years, to the great injury of England and her
colonies.
To bring the matter to an issue, the following resolution was moved on
the 8th of March by Lord John Cavendish, seconded by Mr. Powys:
"That it appears to this House, that since the year 1775 upwards of one
hundred millions of money have been expended on the army and navy in a
fruitless war.
"That it appears to this House, that during the above period we have
lost the thirteen colonies of America, which anciently belonged to the
Crown of Great Britain (except the ports of New York, Charleston, and
Savannah), the newly acquired colony of Florida, many of our valuable
West India and other islands, and those that remain are in the utmost
danger.
"That it appears to this House, that Great Britain is at present engaged
in an expensive war with America, France, Spain, and Holland, without a
single ally.
"That it appears to this House, that the chief cause of all these
misfortunes has been the want of foresight and ability in his Majesty's
Ministers.[55]"
The facts stated in the first three of these resolutions were admitted
on all sides; the discussion, therefore, turned upon the conclusion
drawn in the last resolution, the justice of which was patent to all
from the uniform failure and disgrace of the policy and all the separate
measures of Ministers during the whole of their administration. It was
attempted to be argued, in defence of Ministers, that misfortune did not
always prove misconduct; that the failure of execution of measures might
depend, not on those who planned them, but on the fault of those who
were to execute them. But "this ground," says the Parliamentary
Register, "appeared so weak, even to the friends of the Administration,
that it was almost entirely deserted, except by the Ministers
themselves; and the question was taken up with great art and ingenuity
on other topics, as to who would succeed the Administration they were
endeavouring to remove, and the diversity of opinions among them. But
the efforts on the part of Ministers and their friends to create
jealousies and discords among the members of the Opposition proved
fruitless; and when the final vote was proposed, the Secretary of War
evaded it by moving the order of the day, which was carried by a
majority of ten."