ALL THE TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JURY--JUDGE M'CONNELL'S LUCID CHARGE--THE
JURY RETIRES--A PERIOD OF ANXIETY--POPULAR EXCITEMENT AT ITS
HEIGHT--DEMEANOR OF THE PRISONERS--SUSPENSE AT LAST ENDED--THE VERDICT.
Breathless silence prevailed as the State's Attorney concluded his
argument. Attention was now directed to Judge McConnell. Every eye in
the court-room, including that of the prisoners, was directed toward the
bench. Spreading before him a bulky roll of foolscap, his Honor, after
requesting the close attention of the jurors, commenced to read the
final instructions. These were couched as follows:
"The jury are judges of the law as well as of the facts in this
case, and if they can say upon their oaths that they know the law
better than the Court itself, they have the right to do so; but,
before assuming so solemn a responsibility, they should be sure
that they are not acting from caprice or prejudice, that they are
not controlled by their will or wishes, but from a deep and
confident conviction that the Court is wrong and they are right.
Before saying this upon their oaths, it is their duty to reflect
whether, from their study and experience, they are better qualified
to judge of the law than the Court. If under all circumstances they
are prepared to say that the Court is wrong in its exposition of
the law, the statute has given them that right.
"In the language of the statute, murder is the unlawful killing of
a human being, in the peace of the people, with malice
aforethought, either expressed or implied. The unlawful killing may
be perpetrated by poisoning, striking, starving, drowning,
stabbing, shooting, or by any other of the various forms or means
by which human nature may be overcome and death thereby occasioned.
Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away
the life of a fellow-creature, which is manifested by external
circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied when no
considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of
the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
"Whoever is guilty of murder, shall suffer the punishment of death
or imprisonment in the penitentiary for his natural life, or for a
term of not less than fourteen years. If the accused, or any of
them, are found guilty by the jury, the jury shall fix the
punishment by their verdict.
"An accessory is he who stands by and aids, abets, or assists, or
who, not being present, aiding, abetting, or assisting, hath
advised, encouraged, aided, or abetted the perpetration of the
crime. He who thus aids, abets, assists, advises, or encourages,
shall be considered as principal and punished accordingly. Every
such accessory, when a crime is committed within or without this
State by his aid or procurement in this State, may be indicted and
convicted at the same time as the principal, or before or after his
conviction, and whether the principal is convicted or amenable to
justice or not, and punished as principal.
"The manner or cause of death, which is alleged in the indictment,
is an essential element of the charge against the defendants, and
the law requires the prosecution to establish that averment to your
satisfaction, beyond reasonable doubt, as it is laid in the
indictment, before a conviction of the defendants, or either of
them, can lawfully be had. But whether or not the manner or cause
of death was as laid in the indictment may be established by
circumstantial evidence, just as any other fact essential to
conviction may be.
"The indictment against the defendants is no evidence of their
guilt, but is merely a formal charge for the purpose of putting
them upon trial. You ought to commence the investigation of this
case with a presumption that the defendants, and each of them are
innocent of the crime of which they are accused, and you should act
upon this presumption throughout your consideration of the
evidence. Unless this presumption of innocence shall have been
overcome by proof of guilt so strong, credible, and conclusive as
to convince your minds, beyond every reasonable doubt, that the
defendants are guilty, and unless the evidence is of such a nature
as to exclude every reasonable doubt of guilt, then you ought to
acquit the defendants.
"But this rule of law, which clothes every person accused of crime
with the presumption of innocence, and imposes on the State the
burden of establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is not
intended to aid any one who is in fact guilty of the crime to
escape, but is a humane provision of law, intended, so far as human
agencies can, to guard against the danger of any innocent person
being unjustly punished.
"Circumstantial evidence in criminal cases is the proof of such
facts and circumstances connected with or surrounding the
commission of the crime charged as tends to show the guilt or
innocence of the party charged, and if these facts and
circumstances are sufficient to satisfy the jury of the guilt of
the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt, then such evidence is
sufficient to authorize the jury in finding the defendants guilty.
"The law exacts a conviction, wherever there is sufficient legal
evidence to show the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and circumstantial evidence is legal evidence.
"The following rules should guide you in your use and application
of the circumstances introduced in evidence: It is the duty of the
jury to enter upon the consideration of each circumstance proven,
having in their minds the presumption that the defendants, and each
of them, are innocent, and in considering such fact or
circumstance, they should apply to it the presumption of innocence,
and if such fact or circumstance, when considered in connection
with all the evidence in the case, can be explained consistently
with the innocence of the accused, it is their duty so to explain
it. No circumstance introduced in evidence on this trial can be
used by you as a basis for any inference of guilt against the
defendants, or either of them, unless such circumstance is first
proven to your entire satisfaction, and every circumstance in the
case which is not proven to your entire satisfaction should be
wholly dismissed from consideration, and must not be permitted to
influence you to any extent against the defendants, or either of
them. Any circumstance which is essential to a conclusion of guilt
against the defendants, or either of them, should be established
beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty before it can
be used by the jury against the defendants.
"In order to justify the inference of legal guilt from
circumstantial evidence, the existence of the inculpatory facts
must be absolutely incompatible with the innocence of the accused,
and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis
than that of their guilt. If you can reconcile the facts in this
case upon any reasonable theory consistent with the innocence of
the defendant, John Kunze, it is your duty so to do, and to find
said defendant, John Kunze, not guilty. If you can reconcile the
facts in this case upon any reasonable theory consistent with the
innocence of the defendant, Patrick O'Sullivan, it is your duty so
to do, and to find said defendant, Patrick O'Sullivan, not guilty.
If you can reconcile the facts in this case upon any reasonable
theory consistent with the innocence of the defendant, Martin
Burke, it is your duty so to do, and to find said defendant, Martin
Burke, not guilty. If you can reconcile the facts in this case upon
any reasonable theory consistent with the innocence of the
defendant, Daniel Coughlin, it is your duty so to do, and to find
said defendant, Daniel Coughlin, not guilty.
"It is not sufficient for the jury to find that a resolution was
adopted for the appointment of a secret committee in Camp 20 on
February 8, 1889, but it must further appear to your satisfaction,
beyond all reasonable doubt that such committee was in fact
appointed by the defendant Beggs, and that such appointment was in
pursuance or in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crime set
out in the indictment, and you must further be satisfied, beyond
all reasonable doubt, that the defendant Beggs had knowledge of the
purpose for which said committee was asked, or, if appointed,
assented to its purpose subsequently, or you will not be justified
in finding a participation in such conspiracy on the part of the
defendant Beggs by reason of the facts just recited. That the
defendant Beggs was a member of the United Brotherhood and was the
presiding officer of Camp 20 are not circumstances standing alone
tending to establish his guilt of the crime charged in the
indictment in this case. And as there is no evidence in this case
that any overt act was committed by the defendant Beggs in the
commission of the alleged murder charged in the indictment in this
case, therefore, unless it is established that a conspiracy was
entered into to commit the murder charged in said indictment, to
which conspiracy the said Beggs was a party, he should be
acquitted.
"When the testimony of witnesses appears to be fair, is not
unreasonable or unnatural, and is consistent with itself, and where
the witnesses have not, in any manner, been impeached, then you
have no right under the law, to disregard the testimony of such
witnesses from mere whim, caprice, or without just cause. It is the
duty of the jury to consider the whole of the evidence, and to
render a verdict in accordance with the weight of all the evidence
in the case, and not act upon a consideration of the evidence for
the prosecution or the defense alone. All the evidence must be
considered.
"While it is your duty to carefully scrutinize and dispassionately
weigh the evidence of all the witnesses in the case, still it is
your sworn duty to give proper credit to the evidence of each and
all of the witnesses, and, if possible, to reconcile all of the
evidence in the case with the presumption that each witness has
intended to speak the truth, unless by their manner of testifying
on the witness-stand, or by inconsistent statements sworn to, or by
the testimony inconsistent with other credible evidence in the
cause you are impelled to believe that the testimony of some one or
more of the witnesses is untruthful or unreliable, or unless you
are led to believe, from an exhibition of interest, bias or
prejudice, that such witness or witnesses have been inclined to
exaggerate, color or suppress the truth, or unless they have been
impeached in some of the ways known to the law.
"One of the modes of impeaching a witness is by showing that he or
she has made statements out of court at variance with his or her
statements on the witness-stand; and if the jury believe from the
evidence that a witness has made statements at another time and
place at variance with his or her evidence in this case, regarding
any material matter testified to by him or her, then it is the
province of the jury to determine to what extent this fact tends to
impeach either his or her memory or his or her credibility, or
detract from the weight which ought to be given to his or her
testimony. If the jury believe from the evidence that any witness
has willfully sworn falsely as to any matter or thing material to
the issues in this case, then the jury are at liberty to disregard
his or her entire testimony, except in so far as it has been
corroborated by other credible evidence, or by the facts and
circumstances proven on the trial. Testimony of verbal admissions,
statements and conversations, ought to be taken by you with
caution, because that sort of testimony is subject to much
imperfection and mistake. And when the verbal admission of a person
charged with crime is offered in evidence, the whole of the
admission must be taken together, as well that part which makes for
the accused as that which makes against him; and if part of the
statement which is in favor of the defendant is not disproved, and
is not apparently improbable or untrue, when consistent with all
the other evidence in the case, then such part of the statement is
entitled to as much consideration from the jury as any other part
of the statement.
"Before you can be warranted in using against any one of the
defendants any evidence respecting the conduct or conversation of
any other defendant, you must believe to a moral certainty, from
reliable and credible evidence, not only that the particular
defendant whose conduct and conversation the prosecution seek to
use against the defendant was a member of an unlawful conspiracy,
as charged in the indictment, but that the defendant himself was
also an associate and member of such conspiracy. If, after an
examination of all the evidence, which examination should be made
by you in a spirit free from passion and prejudice, there should
exist in your mind any reasonable doubt as to whether or not any
defendant was a member of an unlawful conspiracy as charged in the
indictment, then and in such case it would be illegal and wrong for
you to use against such defendant any evidence respecting the
conduct or conversation of any other defendant, even if you should
believe that such other defendant was a member of such alleged
conspiracy.
"In no view which can be taken of this case will you be warranted
in using against one defendant any evidence of the act, conduct or
conversation of any other defendant occurring subsequent to the day
of the alleged homicide of Dr. Cronin.
"Although you may believe that the defendant Beggs, at a meeting of
Camp 20 on May 10th, remarked in substance that that committee was
to report to him, and even if you should further believe that such
remark possessed some criminal import, yet, in no view that can be
taken of this case, will you be justified in using such remark as
evidence against any other defendant.
"Although you may fully and confidently believe that one J. B.
Simonds, the person who drove Dr. Cronin away from his home on the
night of May 4th, and other unknown persons were members of a
conspiracy to murder Dr. Cronin as charged in the indictment, and,
indeed, that they did murder him, yet you can not and ought not use
any evidence respecting the conduct and conversations of such
persons, or any of them, against any defendant unless you are first
convinced beyond every reasonable doubt, from the evidence, that
such defendant was also a member of such conspiracy to murder Dr.
Cronin.
"Although you may believe that a conspiracy existed to murder Dr.
Cronin, and although you may further believe that he was murdered
in pursuance of such conspiracy, yet the fact that a defendant did
some act which contributed in some measure in producing the
Doctor's death will not justify you in concluding that the
defendant doing such act was a member of such conspiracy, unless
you further believe, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that said defendant, at the time of doing such act, actually knew
and intended that the act done by him should be one of a series of
acts to be done by others in producing the Doctor's death.
"A conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence, the
same as any other fact, and such evidence is legal and competent
for that purpose; so whether an act which was committed was done by
a member of a conspiracy, may be established by circumstantial
evidence, whether the identity of the individual who committed the
act be established or not; and also whether the act done was in
pursuance and furtherance of a common design, may be ascertained
from the same class of evidence; and if the jury believe, from the
evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendants or any of them, conspired and agreed together, or with
others, to kill and murder Patrick Henry Cronin, and that in
pursuance and furtherance of that common design and by a member or
members of such conspiracy the said Patrick Henry Cronin was killed
and murdered in manner and form as charged in the indictment in
this case, then such of these defendants, if any, whom the jury
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt were parties
to such conspiracy, are guilty of the murder of the said Cronin,
whether the identity of the individual doing the killing be
established or not, or whether such defendants were present at the
time of the killing or not.
"Under the charge of conspiracy against any of the defendants to
commit murder, it must be proven, beyond every reasonable doubt,
that such defendant combined with one or more persons in the common
purpose and with the common design to murder the deceased before
you will be justified in believing that the conspiracy existed as
charged against him. Although you may believe that the defendant
Burke rented the Carlson cottage and removed the furniture and
other articles mentioned in evidence from 117 South Clark street to
the said cottage, and although you may further believe that Dr.
Cronin was murdered in the Carlson cottage, you are advised that
these acts of the defendant Burke in themselves are insufficient to
justify you in concluding that he was a party to the alleged
conspiracy, unless it further appears, beyond all reasonable doubt,
that such acts of the defendant Burke were deliberately and
willfully intended by him to assist in the perpetration of the
crime of murder.
"Although you may believe than Dinan's horse and buggy was used on
May 4th to take the Doctor to his death, you are advised that the
act of the defendant, Coughlin, in engaging such horse and buggy is
insufficient to justify you in concluding that he was a party to
the alleged conspiracy, unless it further appears beyond all
reasonable doubt that such act of the defendant, Coughlin, was
deliberately and willfully intended by him to assist in the
perpetration of the crime of murder.
"Although you may believe that the contract between O'Sullivan and
Dr. Cronin was used on May 4th to decoy the Doctor to his death,
you are advised that the act of the defendant, O'Sullivan, in
making such contract of itself is insufficient to justify you in
concluding that he was a party to the alleged conspiracy, unless it
further appears, beyond all reasonable doubt, that such act of the
defendant, O'Sullivan, was deliberately and willfully intended by
him to assist in the perpetration of the crime of murder, or that
he knowingly and corruptly consented to the use of said contract in
accomplishing the alleged murder of the deceased.
"In considering the circumstance of the contract made between
Patrick O'Sullivan and Dr. Cronin, you are not permitted by the law
to take into account or draw any inference from the fact that the
witnesses McGarry, Capt. Schaack, Mrs. T. T. Conklin, and others
testified that they expressed the opinion to Patrick O'Sullivan in
conversing with him that the said contract was unbusiness-like,
unusual, strange, and suspicious; such opinions furnish you no
warrant for concluding that the object and purpose of Patrick
O'Sullivan in making the contract was illegal or criminal.
"While it is necessary, in order to establish a conspiracy, to
prove a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to
accomplish the criminal or unlawful purpose alleged in the
indictment, yet it is not necessary to prove that the parties ever
came together and entered into any formal agreement or arrangement
between themselves to effect such a purpose; the combination, or
common design or object may be regarded as proved, if the jury
believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
parties were knowingly willfully, and actually pursuing in concert
the unlawful object stated in the indictment, whether acting
separately or together, by common or different means; providing
they were leading intentionally to the same unlawful result.
"The evidence in proof of a conspiracy will generally, in the
nature of the case, be circumstantial. Though a common design is
the nature of the charge, it is not necessary to prove that the
defendants came together, and actually agreed in terms to have that
design and to pursue it by common means. If it be proved to the
satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendants knowingly and intentionally pursued by their acts the
same object, one pursuing one part, and another another part of the
same, so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the
same object, the jury will be justified in the conclusion that they
are engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.
"If the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
acting in the light of the entire charge of the Court, that the
defendants now on trial, or some of them, conspired together, or
together and with others who were to the Grand Jury unknown, to
kill and murder Patrick Henry Cronin, and that one or more of the
conspirators, in pursuance and furtherance of the conspiracy, did
kill and murder the said Cronin in manner and form as charged in
the indictment, then any or all of the defendants (if any) who so
conspired are in law guilty of such murder, although they may not
have actually killed the said Cronin, or been present at the time
or place of the killing.
"The burden of proving everything essential to the establishment of
the charge against the defendants, and each of them, lies on the
prosecution, and even if it were conceded that somebody murdered
Dr. Cronin, yet the defendants are not required nor expected to
prove who committed the murder.
"The prosecution is required to prove beyond all reasonable doubt
that the defendants, and not somebody else, committed the crime
charged in the indictment. It is insufficient to justify you in
convicting the defendants, that the evidence disclosed that Patrick
H. Cronin was murdered, and that the defendants, or somebody else,
murdered him, or that the probabilities are that the defendants and
not somebody else murdered him.
"You ought not, and can not legally convict the defendants, or
either of them, upon the mere doctrine of chance and probability.
Although you may believe that it is highly probable and very likely
that the defendants are guilty, and even that it is far more likely
and probable that they are guilty than that they are innocent, yet,
no amount of suspicion will warrant you in finding a verdict of
'guilty' against the defendants, or any of them.
"To warrant a conviction upon a charge of murder, the evidence must
be of such kind and quantity as to convince the jury of the truth
of the charge beyond every reasonable doubt, and to a moral
certainty. If, therefore, when you, without passion, prejudice, or
bias, have fairly and honestly considered the entire evidence on
both sides of the case, do not feel morally certain, to the
exclusion of every reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the
defendants, then it is your duty to acquit them.
"It is the duty of the jury to examine the evidence on both sides
of the case without any feeling of resentment or revenge, and if,
after such examination, you entertain any reasonable doubt as to
whether the deceased was murdered by the defendants as charged in
the indictment, or by somebody else, you should acquit the
defendants; in other words, if the evidence, after an impartial
consideration, leaves your mind in a state of reasonable doubt as
to whether any particular defendant is guilty, as charged in the
indictment, then such defendant should be acquitted.
"If the evidence in this case fails to show any motive on the part
of the defendant to commit the crime charged against him, then this
is a circumstance in favor of his innocence, which the jury ought
to consider in connection with all the other evidence in the case
in arriving at a verdict.
"An individual juror ought not to compromise any well-founded doubt
of guilt that he may entertain respecting the defendants or any of
them with his fellow-jurors. The jury can agree only to convict or
acquit, and you can only properly convict when the guilt of the
defendants is so fully and clearly proven to the mind of each
individual juror, as to exclude every reasonable doubt of guilt.
"A reasonable doubt is that state of the case which, after the
entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence in the case
leaves the jurors in that condition that they can not say they have
an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge. It is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a
strong one, that the fact is more likely to be true than the
contrary, but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to
a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and
directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of
the juror who is bound to act upon it conscientiously.
"In considering the case, however, the jury are not to go beyond
the evidence to hunt up doubts, nor must they entertain such doubts
as are merely chimerical or conjectured. A doubt to justify an
acquittal must be reasonable, and it must arise from candid and
impartial investigation of all the evidence in the case, and unless
it is such that were the same kind of doubt interposed in the
graver transactions of life, it would cause a reasonable and
prudent man to hesitate and pause, it is insufficient to authorize
a verdict of not guilty. If, after considering all the evidence,
you can say you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the
charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
"The doubt which the juror is allowed to retain in his own mind,
and under the influence of which he should frame a verdict of not
guilty, must always be a reasonable one. A doubt produced by undue
sensibility in the mind of any juror in view of the consequence of
his verdict is not a reasonable doubt, and a juror is not allowed
to create sources or materials of doubt by resorting to trivial and
fanciful suppositions, and remote conjectures as to possible states
of facts, differing from that established by the evidence. You are
not at liberty to disbelieve as jurors, if, from the evidence, you
believe as men; your oath imposes on you no obligation to doubt
where no doubt would exist if no oath had been administered.
"In this case the jury may, as in their judgment the evidence
warrants, find any or all of the defendants guilty, or any or all
of them not guilty; and if in their judgment the evidence warrants,
they may, in case they find the defendants, or any of them guilty,
fix the same penalty for all the defendants found guilty, or
different penalties for the different defendants found guilty.
"And in case they find the defendants, or any of them, guilty of
murder, they should fix the penalty either at death or at
imprisonment for life in the penitentiary, or at imprisonment in
the penitentiary for a term of any number of years not less than
fourteen."
* * * * *
THE JURY RETIRES.
The instructions of Judge McConnell were listened to with intense
interest by the jurors, the prisoners, and the spectators. After he had
concluded he made a verbal statement to the effect that if the jurors
had taken any notes during the progress of the case, it would be
necessary for them to disregard them in the jury-room. The oath was then
administered to the bailiffs who were to take charge of the jury. Each
one of them was compelled to solemnly swear by the ever-living God that
they would take the jury to some private, convenient place provided by
the sheriff, and keep them together, without eat or drink, water
excepted, unless ordered by the court; and not to speak to them
themselves nor to permit any person or persons to speak to them until
they had agreed upon a verdict.
This formality concluded, a discussion arose as to the exhibits which
had been offered in evidence going into the jury-room. As to the locks
of hair cut from the head of the body found in the catch-basin there was
no objection on the part of the counsel for the defendants. Special
objection was raised however, to the O'Sullivan card, the articles of
clothing found in the sewer, the bloody trunk, the satchel and hat, and
the documentary evidence which had been submitted in the course of the
case. All the objections on the part of counsel for the defendants to
the introduction of these articles to the jury-room were, however,
overruled, and at half-past four on the afternoon of Friday, December
13th, the jury retired. It was the prevalent opinion of those who had
been in attendance on the trial from its inauguration, that the
deliberations of the body would be of short duration. This idea,
however, proved to be erroneous. For over six hours the counsel on both
sides, the friends of the prosecution, and the adherents of the defense
sat around the court-room in momentary expectation that a verdict would
be reached.
About an hour after the jury had retired, a request was sent into the
court-room for the maps, charts and other exhibits which had been
introduced in evidence, and it was complied with. At six o'clock one of
the bailiffs was dispatched to procure supper for the body. Court was
reconvened at nine o'clock, but, no word being received from the jury, a
recess was declared until nine o'clock on the following morning. When
the day broke, however, the jury was far from an agreement, and although
the court remained in continuous session until night, no word was
received from the twelve good men and true who held the fate of the five
prisoners in the balance. Meanwhile, public excitement had reached a
remarkable pitch. Large crowds had assembled outside of the court
building anxiously awaiting a deliverance from the jury, and in the
public resorts throughout the city the probable outcome of the trial and
the fate of the defendants was the one absorbing topic of discussion.
No message from the jury was delivered to the court at any time during
Saturday, and after remaining in session until nearly midnight, a recess
was ordered the following morning. In the meantime a score of ugly
rumors gained currency.
It was claimed that the jury stood eleven to one in favor of convicting
all of the defendants, and that the one man in question had been "fixed"
by the defense. Another rumor had it that the recalcitrant juror had
been subjected to personal violence by some of his colleagues who were
indignant at the course which he had seen fit to pursue. Saturday night
passed, and the dawn of the Sabbath was broken, but still the twelve men
had failed to reach a conclusion upon the evidence presented to them.
The rule of court regarding their comfort had been held in abeyance so
far as to allow of their being provided with blankets and other
necessaries for passing the night, together with bounteous meals from
an adjoining restaurant, whenever they felt inclined to refresh the
inner man.
All through the Sabbath, throngs of people, about equally divided
between the friends of the murdered physician and the adherents of the
faction to which the prisoners belonged, were congregated about the
streets adjacent to the Criminal Court. No word came from the jury-room,
however, and Judge McConnell, who put in an appearance at six o'clock in
the evening, promptly ordered a recess until ten o'clock Monday morning,
as soon as it was definitely ascertained that the jury was not prepared
to make any communication.
The delay afforded an opportunity of compiling some interesting
statistics in connection with the famous trial. Its practical
commencement was on August 30th, when the examination of veniremen for
the selection of a jury was inaugurated. The first panel of four jurors
was accepted on September 18th, after nearly one hundred men had been
examined and had confessed that they were prejudiced against the
accused, or had formed an opinion based upon the published reports of
the case which could not be removed by evidence. The second panel of
four was secured on October 8th, and the third and final panel on
October 22d. The presentation of the case for the State occupied from
October 24th to November 16th, the type-written transcript of the
testimony against the defendants covering nearly 4,000 pages. The
defense opened on November 16th and closed on November 30th, having in
the meantime examined nearly seventy witnesses.
The speeches occupied fourteen and one-half days of which State's
Attorney Longenecker consumed one and a half days in his opening
address, Judge Wing one and one-half, Mr. Ingham one, Mr. Donahoe one
and one-half, Mr. Hynes one and one-half, Mr. Foster one and one-half,
Mr. Forrest three, and Mr. Longenecker, in his closing analysis of the
case, one and one-half. Taken from its inception to the close, the trial
was the most lengthy in the history of American jurisprudence, being
only equalled by that of the celebrated Tichborne case in England, which
occupied in the aggregate nearly five months. The trial of Daniel
Coughlin and his associates commenced on August 26th and ended with the
rendering of the verdict on December 16th. In the effort to secure a
jury 1,115 special veniremen were examined, of which number 928 were
excused for cause, 97 were peremptorily challenged for the defense, 78
by the State and twelve finally chosen.
The expenses of the case were enormous. The fees of the special
veniremen and the jury aggregated $8,000. The salaries of the bailiffs,
special officers, and court officials reached $20,000, not including the
cost of maintaining the courts. The fees of the witnesses summoned in
behalf of the State reached a total of over $5,000, while the
expenditures on account, of legal assistance to the State's Attorney
were fully $20,000. The accounts of the stenographers and type-writers,
ran into another $10,000, and on the sum total, taken in connection with
the fact that the entire business of the courts was delayed during the
progress of the trial, a final estimate of $100,000 as the total cost of
the trial to the tax-payers, is not an exorbitant one. The outlay on the
part of the defense, as far as could be ascertained, did not probably
exceed $20,000.
A VERDICT AT LAST.
It was not until half past two of the afternoon of Monday, Dec. 16th,
that the members of the jury, after being locked up over seventy hours,
were prepared to render a verdict. Court was opened at ten o'clock in
the morning, but there being no sign of any communication from the
jury-room, a recess was taken until two o'clock. Shortly before that
hour it was learned that a verdict had at last been reached.
Extraordinary precautions were at once taken in and about the court
room.
The general public was excluded, and only counsel engaged in the case,
representatives of the press, and about two score of police officers in
plain clothes were admitted. Judge McConnell took his seat on the bench
at 2:25, and a moment later the five prisoners were ushered in over the
iron bridge leading from the jail.
John F. Beggs, a deathly pallor on his face, and his blue eyes glaring
as though protruding from the bleached bones of a skeleton, headed the
line. Next to him came Daniel Coughlin, with a nervous, cynical smile
upon his face. Then followed O'Sullivan, his jaws set firm, and the
fingers of his right hand tugging nervously at his mustache. Close
behind him came Martin Burke, with the same look of stolid indifference
that he had worn throughout the trial. Kunze, who brought up the line,
was apparently the least concerned of the five, smiling and bowing as he
passed in to the reporters and court officials.
Just as soon as the prisoners had taken their seats and the fifteen
deputy sheriffs, three to each man, had filled the space behind their
chairs, the jury was brought in. Breathless silence prevailed. Everyone
present seemed impressed with the solemnity of the moment. Even Judge
McConnell, who had maintained a calm and reserved air throughout the
trial, nervously mopped his brow, from which the perspiration threatened
to pour in torrents. In response to a question of the clerk Foreman
Clarke responded that the jury had agreed upon a verdict, at the same
time handing up a sealed paper to the bench. The painful and oppressive
stillness which prevailed was only broken when the voice of the clerk,
who had in the meantime unfolded the paper, rang out clear and distinct
in tones that penetrated through the iron doors to the corridors beyond.
This is what he read:
We, the jury, find the defendant, John F. Beggs, not guilty.
We, the jury, find the defendant, John Kunze, guilty of
manslaughter as charged in the indictment and fix his punishment at
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of three years.
We, the jury, find the defendants Daniel Coughlin, Patrick
O'Sullivan and Martin Burke, guilty of murder in the manner and
form as charged in the indictment and fix the penalty at
imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of their natural
lives.
One prolonged buzz, as though a thousand bated breaths had been
loosened, filled the court-room as the clerk resumed his seat. Then
there was a wail, a despairing cry. Little Kunze, the comedian of the
prisoners, had broken down at last. The hot, scalding tears chased each
other down his cheeks as, with clasped hands and a look of unutterable
agony upon his face, he ejaculated again and again, "My God! My God! God
knows I am innocent! I never was in Lake View that night! Oh! God knows
I am innocent, gentlemen!"
Very different were the feelings of John F. Beggs, who occupied the
extreme right of the line. No sooner had the last words of the verdict
been read than in a single bound he was before the jurors. Shaking each
by the hand he thanked them cordially, and then, addressing them as a
body, said: "Gentlemen, I thank you. I trust that the future may confirm
your judgment upon me, and that you will never regret that you found me
not guilty of this terrible charge."
O'Sullivan was the only one of the other three prisoners who gave vent
to his feelings in tears. They trickled down his cheeks for a moment,
but he brushed them away and soon recovered his self-possession.
Coughlin looked defiantly around the court-room but did not betray any
emotion, while Martin Burke looked more cool and unconcerned than any
man in the room. The formal motion for a new trial was entered and
recorded, the iron doors revolved on their hinges, the four prisoners
passed to the jail beyond, the great trial was at an end, and with three
men condemned to a living death and the fourth incarcerated for a period
commensurate with his crime, the murder of the Irish patriot was
avenged.
* * * * *
Transcriber's note:
Text in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).
The following misprints have been corrected:
"portait" corrected to "portrait" (page xii)
"Identifed" corrected to "Identified" (page xiii)
"forthought" corrected to "forethought" (page 17)
"confidental" corrected to "confidential" (page 17)
"physican's" corrected to "physician's" (page 22)
"Captains" corrected to "Captain" (page 31)
"the the" corrected to "the" (page 35)
"miscroscope" corrected to "microscope" (page 36)
"pecular" corrected to "peculiar" (page 47)
"PHYSICAN" corrected to "PHYSICIAN" (page 57)
"Presdents" corrected to "Presidents" (page 58)
"exept" corrected to "except" (page 62)
"orginization" corrected to "organization" (page 70)
"Main" corrected to "Maine" (page 70)
"h m" corrected to "him" (page 74)
"generel" corrected to "general" (page 74)
"represenative" corrected to "representative" (page 78)
"purjurer" corrected to "perjurer" (page 81)
"Nationel" corrected to "National" (page 81)
"enlaree" corrected to "enlarge" (page 81)
"reprehensibl" corrected to "reprehensible" (page 87)
"informotion" corrected to "information" (page 90)
"sufficint" corrected to "sufficient" (page 91)
"discusson" corrected to "discussion" (page 95)
"busines" corrected to "business" (page 100)
"Lomansey" corrected to "Lomasney" (page 100)
"physican's" corrected to "physician's" (page 107)
"the the" corrected to "the" (page 133)
"Catharines" corrected to "Catherines" (page 151)
"imprisioned" corrected to "imprisoned" (page 219)
"PHILADELHHIA" corrected to "PHILADELPHIA" (page 234)
"contradition" corrected to "contradiction" (page 246)
"Coronor" corrected to "Coroner" (page 248)
"Sulllivan" corrected to "Sullivan" (page 252)
"villian" corrected to "villain" (page 255)
"mitimus" corrected to "mittimus" (page 270)
"phenominal" corrected to "phenomenal" (page 271)
"stoping" corrected to "stopping" (page 281)
"Clan-na-6ael" corrected to"Clan-na-gael" (page 282)
"witnessess" corrected to "witnesses" (page 287)
"admissable" corrected to "admissible" (page 289)
"Schack" corrected to "Schaak" (page 289)
"arirve" corrected to "arrive" (page 296)
"beheld" corrected to "be held" (page 296)
"homeat" corrected to "home at" (page 296)
"Februray" corrected to "February" (page 300)
"WINNEPEG" corrected to "WINNIPEG" (page 303)
"Winnepeg" corrected to "Winnipeg" (page 304)
"occasionaly" corrected to "occasionally" (page 304)
"Winnepeg" corrected to "Winnipeg" (page 312)
"condiserable" corrected to "considerable" (page 317)
"admissibl eand" corrected to "admissible and" (page 323)
missing "the" added (page 327)
extraneous "while" removed (page 329)
"transfered" corrected to "transferred" (page 331)
"employe's" corrected to "employees" (page 336)
"of of" corrected to "of" (page 336)
"BAGNELL" corrected to "BAGNALL" (page 345)
missing "he" added (page 360)
"fradulently" corrected to "fraudulently" (page 363)
"no" corrected to "not" (page 376)
"nationalty" corrected to "nationality" (page 377)
"Lafllin" corrected to "Laflin" (page 385)
"preceedings" corrected to "proceedings" (page 391)
"elasses" corrected to "classes" (page 394)
"distinetion" corrected to "distinction" (page 394)
"ean" corrected to "can" (page 395)
missing "to" added (page 407)
"the" corrected to "that" (page 408)
"apointment" corrected to "appointment" (page 408)
"giving" corrected to "given" (page 423)
"and and" corrected to "and" (page 423)
"O'Sulivan" corrected to "O'Sullivan" (page 427)
"stanch" corrected to "staunch" (page 435)
"It" corrected to "If" (page 444)
"no" corrected to "on" (page 453)
"Simons" corrected to "Simonds" (page 485)
"iniflct" corrected to "inflict" (page 487)
"mantlepiece" corrected to "mantelpiece" (page 495)
"Gentleman" corrected to "Gentlemen" (page 498)
"if if" corrected to "if" (page 509)
missing "I" added (page 511)
"responsibly" corrected to "responsibility" (page 513)
"lelt" corrected to "left" (page 515)
"patroit" corrected to "patriot" (page 518)
"acount" corrected to "account" (page 520)
"palf" corrected to "half" (page 523)
"abili" corrected to "alibi" (page 524)
"dont" corrected to "don't" (page 525)
"Cughlin" corrected to "Coughlin" (page 526)
"anyth ng" corrected to "anything" (page 526)
"predjudice" corrected to "prejudice" (page 527)
"predjudices" corrected to "prejudices" (page 527)
"a" corrected to "as" (page 533)
"Gods" corrected to "God's" (page 534)
"Inspite" corrected to "In spite" (page 537)
"beeause" corrected to "because" (page 542)
"steets" corrected to "streets" (page 546)
"they" corrected to "that" (page 548)
"whn" corrected to why" (page 552)
"poople" corrected to "people" (page 552)
"aftet" corrected to "after" (page 557)
"certainity" corrected to "certainty" (page 564)
"predjudice" corrected to "prejudice" (page 565)