In the latter days of September, 1864, the Confederate Army of Tennessee
lay in the vicinity of Macon, Georgia. It was a dispirited body of men,
homesick and discouraged. For four long months, first under one leader and
then under another, it had opposed, step by step, Sherman's advance toward
Atlanta, and now that important strategic point was in the hands of the
Federal forces. About the middle of July the President of the Confederacy
had seen fit to remove Joseph E. Johnston from the command and replace him
with John B. Hood. The latter's habit of mind and methods of action led
the Richmond authorities to believe that he would proceed very differently
from Johnston, and in this he did not disappoint them. The results showed
that Johnston's Fabian policy was by far the better one under the
circumstances. Sherman had the stronger army, but he was compelled
constantly to detach portions of it in order to guard his lengthening line
of supplies. The one thing he desired most was that his opponent should
assume an aggressive attitude. Hood's idea was precipitation rather than
patience, and in consequence on the 2d of September General Slocum entered
the coveted city.
On the 22d of that month President Davis visited the Southern Army, and
made a memorable address to the troops. He promised them--and they were
delighted at the news--that they would soon be back in Tennessee, for a
fresh invasion of that State had been planned. This would, declared the
speaker, place Sherman in a worse predicament than that in which Napoleon
found himself at Moscow. But the Federal general had at least the
advantage of learning what was going to happen to him, for the President's
words were reported verbatim in the Southern papers, and he prepared to
meet his antagonists. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, was sent to
Nashville while Schofield, with his smaller force known as the Army of the
Ohio, returned to Knoxville where he had spent the previous winter, to
await Hood's advance. By the 1st of October the latter was across the
Chattahoochee in the hope of drawing Sherman from Atlanta. There was a
brave fight at Allatoona where General Corse "held the fort," but Sherman,
although he followed the Confederate army, was unable to bring on a
general engagement.
His great plan of a march through Georgia to the sea was now fully formed
in his mind. He had not yet obtained Grant's sanction to the scheme, but
he ordered Schofield to cooperate with Thomas and sent the Fourth Corps as
further assistance. He himself ceased the pursuit of Hood at Gaylesville
and turned back to Atlanta, confident that the fate of Tennessee was safe
in the hands of his ablest lieutenant, George H. Thomas. Hood appeared on
the 26th of October at Decatur on the south bank of the Tennessee River.
Lack of supplies had delayed his advance, but even so his performances had
greatly alarmed the North. Twice had he interposed between Sherman and the
Federal base and had destroyed many miles of railway, but what in other
circumstances would have placed the Union leader in a dangerous
predicament was now of little moment, since the latter was rapidly making
preparations to cut himself off from all communication with the source of
his supplies. It was necessary that Hood should have the assistance of
Forrest, whose dauntless cavalry had been playing great havoc with the
Federal stores in western Tennessee, so he moved to Florence before
crossing the river, and here Forrest joined him on November 14th. In the
meantime, Schofield, with about twenty-eight thousand men, had reached
Pulaski on the way to encounter the Southern advance.
Now began a series of brilliant strategic moves, kept up for a fortnight
before the two small armies--they were of almost equal strength met in
one awful clash. Hood's efforts were bent toward cutting Schofield off
from Thomas at Nashville. There was a mad race for the Duck River, and the
Federals got over at Columbia in the very nick of time. The Southern
leader, by a skilful piece of strategy and a forced march, pushed on to
Spring Hill ahead of his opponent. He was in an excellent position to
annihilate General Stanley who was in advance, and then crush the
remainder of the Federals who were moving with the slow wagon-trains. But
owing to a number of strange mishaps, which brought forth much
recrimination but no satisfactory explanation, the Union army slipped by
with little damage and entrenched itself at Franklin on the Harpeth River.
Of all the dark days of Confederate history--and they were many--the 29th
of November, 1864, has been mourned as that of "lost opportunities."
Schofield did not expect, or desire, a battle at Franklin, but he was
treated to one the following afternoon when the Confederates came up, and
it was of the most severe nature. The first attack was made as the light
began to wane, and the Federal troops stood their ground although the
orders had been to withdraw, because through some blunder two brigades in
blue had been stationed, unsupported, directly in front of Hood's
approach. The stubborn resistance of Schofield's army only increased the
ardor of the opponents. It is said that thirteen separate assaults were
made upon the Union entrenchments, and the fearful carnage was finally
carried into the streets and among the dooryards of the little town. At
nine o'clock the fury of the iron storm was quelled. Five Confederate
generals, including the gallant Cleburne, lay dead upon the field. In two
of the Southern brigades all the general officers were either killed or
wounded. Hood's loss was about sixty-three hundred, nearly three times
that of Schofield. By midnight the latter was on his way, uninterrupted,
to Nashville. Meanwhile Thomas was performing a herculean task within the
fortifications of that capital city. He had received a large number of
raw recruits and a motley collection of troops from garrisons in the West.
These had to be drilled into an efficient army, and not one move to fight
would Thomas make until this had been done. Grant, in Virginia, grew
impatient and the Northern papers clamored for an attack on Hood, who had
now arrived with thirty-eight thousand men before the city. Finally Grant
took action, and General Logan was hurrying to assume the Federal command.
But by the time he reached Louisville there was no need for his services.
Thomas had for some days been ready with his force of forty-five thousand,
but to increase the difficulties of his position, a severe storm of
freezing rain made action impossible until the morning of December 15th.
The Union lines of defense were in a semi-circle and Hood was on the
southeast, lightly entrenched. The first assault on his right wing
followed by one on his left, forced the Confederates back to a second
position two miles to the south, and that was the first day's work. Hood
had detached a part of his forces and he did all he could to gain time
until he might recover his full strength. But he had respite only until
Thomas was ready on the morrow, which was about noon. The Union army
deployed in front of the Southerners and overlapped their left wing. An
attack on the front was bravely met and repulsed by the Confederates, and
the Federal leader, extending his right, compelled his opponent to stretch
his own lines more and more. Finally they broke just to the left of the
center, and a general forward movement on the Union side ended in the
utter rout of the splendid and courageous Army of Tennessee.
It melted away in disorder; the pursuit was vigorous, and only a small
portion reassembled at Columbia and fell back with a poor show of order
behind the Tennessee.
Many military historians have seen in the battle of Nashville the most
crushing defeat of the war. Certainly no other brought such complete ruin
upon a large and well-organized body of troops.
[Illustration: RUSHING A FEDERAL BATTERY OUT OF JOHNSONVILLE