Sharpsburg, Maryland, September 17, 1862. There were long minutes on that
sunny day in the early fall of 1862 when Robert E. Lee, at his
headquarters west of Sharpsburg, must have been in almost entire ignorance
of how the battle went. Outnumbered he knew his troops were; outfought he
knew they never would be. Longstreet, Hood, D. H. Hill, Evans, and D. R.
Jones had turned back more than one charge in the morning; but, as the day
wore on, Lee perceived that the center must be held. Sharpsburg was the
key. He had deceived McClellan as to his numerical strength and he must
continue to do so. Lee had practically no reserves at all. At one time
General Longstreet reported from the center to General Chilton, Lee's
Chief of Staff, that Cooke's North Carolina regiment--still keeping its
colors at the front--had not a cartridge left. None but veteran troops
could hold a line like this, supported by only two guns of Miller's
battery of the Washington Artillery. Of this crisis in the battle General
Longstreet wrote afterward: "We were already badly whipped and were
holding our ground by sheer force of desperation." Actually in line that
day on the Confederate side were only 37,000 men, and opposed to them were
numbers that could be footed up to 50,000 more. At what time in the day
General Lee must have perceived that the invasion of Maryland must come to
an end cannot be told. He had lost 20,000 of his tired, footsore army by
straggling on the march, according to the report of Longstreet, who adds:
"Nearly one-fourth of the troops who went into the battle were killed or
wounded." At dark Lee's rearward movement had begun.
[Illustration: A REGIMENT THAT FOUGHT AT SOUTH MOUNTAIN--THE THIRTY-FIFTH
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