Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible, and when
you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit so long as
your men have strength to follow.... The other rule is, never fight
against heavy odds, if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl your
own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and
crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus
destroy a large one in detail.--_"Stonewall" Jackson._
The main move of the Union army, for 1862, was to be McClellan's advance
up the Peninsula toward Richmond. Everything had been most carefully
planned by the brilliant strategist. With the assistance of McDowell's
corps, he expected in all confidence to be in the Confederate capital
before the spring had closed. But, comprehensively as he had worked the
scheme out, he had neglected a factor in the problem which was destined in
the end to bring the whole campaign to naught. This was the presence of
"Stonewall" Jackson in the Valley of Virginia.
The strategic value to the Confederacy of this broad, sheltered avenue
into Maryland and Pennsylvania was great. Along the northeasterly roads
the gray legions could march in perfect safety upon the rear of Washington
so long as the eastern gaps could be held. No wonder that the Federal
authorities, however much concerned with other problems of the war, never
removed a vigilant eye from the Valley.
Jackson had taken possession of Winchester, near the foot of the Valley,
in November, 1861. He then had about ten thousand men. The Confederate
army dwindled greatly during the winter. At the beginning of March there
were but forty-five hundred men. With Banks and his forty thousand now on
Virginia soil at the foot of the Valley, and Fremont's army approaching
the head, why should the Federal commander even think about this
insignificant fragment of his foe? But the records of war have shown that
a small force, guided by a master mind, sometimes accomplishes more in
effective results than ten times the number under a less active and able
commander.
The presence of Banks compelled Jackson to withdraw to Woodstock, fifty
miles south of Winchester. If McClellan ever experienced any anxiety as to
affairs in the Valley, it seems to have left him now, for he ordered Banks
to Manassas on March 16th to cover Washington, leaving General Shields and
his division of seven thousand men to hold the Valley. When Jackson heard
of the withdrawal, he resolved that, cut off as he was from taking part in
the defense of Richmond, he would do what he could to prevent any
aggrandizement of McClellan's forces.
Shields hastened to his station at Winchester, and Jackson, on the 23d of
March, massed his troops at Kernstown, about three miles south of the
former place. Deceived as to the strength of his adversary, he led his
weary men to an attack on Shields' right flank about three o'clock in the
afternoon. He carried the ridge where the Federals were posted, but the
energy of his troops was spent, and they had to give way to the reserves
of the Union army after three hours of stubborn contest. The Federal ranks
were diminished by six hundred; the Confederate force by more than seven
hundred. Kernstown was a Union victory; yet never in history did victory
bring such ultimate disaster upon the victors.
At Washington the alarm was intense over Jackson's audacious attack.
Williams' division of Banks' troops was halted on its way to Manassas and
sent back to Winchester. Mr. Lincoln transferred Blenker's division, nine
thousand strong, to Fremont. These things were done at once, but they were
by no means the most momentous consequence of Kernstown. The President
began to fear that Jackson's goal was Washington. After consulting six of
his generals he became convinced that McClellan had not arranged proper
protection for the city. Therefore, McDowell and his corps of thirty-seven
thousand men were ordered to remain at Manassas. The Valley grew to
greater importance in the Federal eyes. Banks was made entirely
independent of McClellan and the defense of this region became his sole
task. McClellan, to his great chagrin, saw his force depleted by forty-six
thousand men. There were now four Union generals in the East operating
independently one of the other.
General Ewell with eight thousand troops on the upper Rappahannock and
General Johnson with two brigades were now ordered to cooperate with
Jackson. These reënforcements were badly needed. Schenck and Milroy, of
Fremont's corps, began to threaten Johnson. Banks, with twenty thousand,
was near Harrisonburg.
The Confederate leader left General Ewell to watch Banks while he made a
dash for Milroy and Schenck. He fought them at McDowell on May 8th and
they fled precipitately to rejoin Fremont. The swift-acting Jackson now
darted at Banks, who had fortified himself at Strasburg. Jackson stopped
long enough to be joined by Ewell. He did not attack Strasburg, but stole
across the Massanutten Mountain unknown to Banks, and made for Front
Royal, where a strong Union detachment was stationed under Colonel Kenly.
Early on the afternoon of May 23d, Ewell rushed from the forest. Kenly and
his men fled before them toward Winchester. A large number were captured
by the cavalry before they had gotten more than four miles away.
Banks at Strasburg realized that Jackson was approaching from the rear,
the thing he had least expected and had made no provision for. His
fortifications protected his front alone. There was nothing to be done but
retreat to Winchester. Even that was prevented by the remarkable speed of
Jackson's men, who could march as much as thirty-five miles a day. On May
24th, the Confederates overtook and struck the receding Union flank near
Newtown, inflicting heavy loss and taking many prisoners. Altogether,
three thousand of Banks' men fell into Jackson's hands.
This exploit was most opportune for the Southern arms. It caused the final
ruin of McClellan's hopes. Banks received one more attack from Ewell's
division the next day as he passed through Winchester on his way to the
shelter of the Potomac. He crossed at Williamsport late the same evening
and wrote the President that his losses, though serious enough, might have
been far worse "considering the very great disparity of forces engaged,
and the long-matured plans of the enemy, which aimed at nothing less than
entire capture of our force." Mr. Lincoln now rescinded his resolution to
send McDowell to McClellan. Instead, he transferred twenty thousand of the
former's men to Fremont and informed McClellan that he was not, after all,
to have the aid of McDowell's forty thousand men.
Fremont was coming from the west; Shields lay in the other direction, but
Jackson was not the man to be trapped. He managed to hold Fremont while he
marched his main force quickly up the Valley. At Port Republic he drove
Carroll's brigade of Shields' division away and took possession of a
bridge which Colonel Carroll had neglected to burn. Fremont in pursuit was
defeated by Ewell at Cross Keys. Jackson immediately put his force of
twelve thousand over the Shenandoah at Port Republic and burned the
bridge. Safe from the immediate attack by Fremont, he fell upon Tyler and
Carroll, who had not more than three thousand men between them. The
Federals made a brave stand, but after many hours' fighting were compelled
to retreat. Jackson emerged through Swift Run Gap on the 17th of June, to
assist in turning the Union right on the Peninsula, and Banks and Shields,
baffled and checkmated at every move, finally withdrew from the Valley.
[Illustration: "STONEWALL" JACKSON AT WINCHESTER 1862