I. * * *[331] Cicero, in the third book of his treatise On a
Commonwealth, says that nature has treated man less like a mother than
a step-dame, for she has cast him into mortal life with a body naked,
fragile, and infirm, and with a mind agitated by troubles, depressed by
fears, broken by labors, and exposed to passions. In this mind,
however, there lies hidden, and, as it were, buried, a certain divine
spark of genius and intellect.
Though man is born a frail and powerless being, nevertheless he is safe
from all animals destitute of voice; and at the same time those other
animals of greater strength, although they bravely endure the violence
of weather, cannot be safe from man. And the result is, that reason
does more for man than nature does for brutes; since, in the latter,
neither the greatness of their strength nor the firmness of their
bodies can save them from being oppressed by us, and made subject to
our power. * * *
Plato returned thanks to nature that he had been born a man.
II. * * * aiding our slowness by carriages, and when it had taught men
to utter the elementary and confused sounds of unpolished expression,
articulated and distinguished them into their proper classes, and, as
their appropriate signs, attached certain words to certain things, and
thus associated, by the most delightful bond of speech, the once
divided races of men.
And by a similar intelligence, the inflections of the voice, which
appeared infinite, are, by the discovery of a few alphabetic
characters, all designated and expressed; by which we maintain converse
with our absent friends, by which also indications of our wishes and
monuments of past events are preserved. Then came the use of numbers--a
thing necessary to human life, and at the same time immutable and
eternal; a science which first urged us to raise our views to heaven,
and not gaze without an object on the motions of the stars, and the
distribution of days and nights.
III. * * *[332] [Then appeared the sages of philosophy], whose minds
took a higher flight, and who were able to conceive and to execute
designs worthy of the gifts of the Gods. Wherefore let those men who
have left us sublime essays on the principles of living be regarded as
great men--which indeed they are--as learned men, as masters of truth
and virtue; provided that these principles of civil government, this
system of governing people, whether it be a thing discovered by men who
have lived amidst a variety of political events, or one discussed
amidst their opportunities of literary tranquillity, is remembered to
be, as indeed it is, a thing by no means to be despised, being one
which causes in first-rate minds, as we not unfrequently see, an
incredible and almost divine virtue. And when to these high faculties
of soul, received from nature and expanded by social institutions, a
politician adds learning and extensive information concerning things in
general, like those illustrious personages who conduct the dialogue in
the present treatise, none will refuse to confess the superiority of
such persons to all others; for, in fact, what can be more admirable
than the study and practice of the grand affairs of state, united to a
literary taste and a familiarity with the liberal arts? or what can we
imagine more perfect than a Scipio, a Lælius, or a Philus, who, not to
omit anything which belonged to the most perfect excellence of the
greatest men, joined to the examples of our ancestors and the
traditions of our countrymen the foreign philosophy of Socrates?
Wherefore he who had both the desire and the power to acquaint himself
thoroughly both with the customs and the learning of his ancestors
appears to me to have attained to the very highest glory and honor. But
if we cannot combine both, and are compelled to select one of these two
paths to wisdom--though to some people the tranquil life spent in the
research of literature and arts may appear to be the most happy and
delectable--yet, doubtless, the science of politics is more laudable
and illustrious, for in this political field of exertion our greatest
men have reaped their honors, like the invincible Curius,
Whom neither gold nor iron could subdue.
IV. * * *[333] that wisdom existed still. There existed this general
difference between these two classes, that among the one the
development of the principles of nature is the subject of their study
and eloquence, and among the other national laws and institutions form
the principal topics of investigation.
In honor of our country, we may assert that she has produced within
herself a great number, I will not say of sages (since philosophy is so
jealous of this name), but of men worthy of the highest celebrity,
because by them the precepts and discoveries of the sages have been
carried out into actual practice. And, moreover, though there have
existed, and still do exist, many great and glorious empires, yet since
the noblest masterpiece of genius in the world is the establishment of
a state and commonwealth which shall be a lasting one, even if we
reckon but a single legislator for each empire, the number of these
excellent men will appear very numerous. To be convinced of this, we
have only to turn our eyes on any nation of Italy, Latium, the Sabines,
the Volscians, the Samnites, or the Etrurians, and then direct our
attention to that mighty nation of the Greeks, and then to the
Assyrians, Persians, and Carthaginians, and[334] * * *
V. * * * [Scipio and his friends having again assembled, Scipio spoke
as follows: In our last conversation, I promised to prove that honesty
is the best policy in all states and commonwealths whatsoever. But if I
am to plead in favor of strict honesty and justice in all public
affairs, no less than in private, I must request Philus, or some one
else, to take up the advocacy of the other side; the truth will then
become more manifest, from the collision of opposite arguments, as we
see every day exemplified at the Bar.]
And Philus replied: In good truth, you have allotted me a very
creditable cause when you wish me to undertake the defence of vice.
Perhaps, said Lælius, you are afraid, lest, in reproducing the ordinary
objections made to justice in politics, you should seem to express your
own sentiments; though you are universally respected as an almost
unique example of the ancient probity and good faith; nor is it unknown
how familiar you are with the lawyer-like habit of disputing on both
sides of a question, because you think that this is the best way of
getting at the truth.
And Philus said: Very well; I obey you, and wilfully, with my eyes
open, I will undertake this dirty business; because, since those who
seek for gold do not flinch at the sight of the mud, so we who are
searching for justice, which is far more precious than gold, are bound
to shrink from no annoyance. And I wish, as I am about to make use of
the antagonist arguments of a foreigner, I might also employ a foreign
language. The pleas, therefore, now to be urged by Lucius Furius Philus
are those [once employed by] the Greek Carneades, a man who was
accustomed to express whatever [served his turn].[335] * * *[336]Let it
be understood, therefore, that I by no means express my own sentiments,
but those of Carneades, in order that you may refute this philosopher,
who was wont to turn the best causes into joke, through the mere
wantonness of wit.
VI. He was a philosopher of the Academic School; and if any
one is ignorant of his great power, and eloquence, and
acuteness in arguing, he may learn it from the mention made
of him by Cicero or by Lucilius, when Neptune, discoursing on
a very difficult subject, declares that it cannot be
explained, not even if hell were to restore Carneades himself
for the purpose. This philosopher, having been sent by the
Athenians to Rome as an ambassador, discussed the subject of
justice very amply in the hearing of Galba and Cato the
Censor, who were the greatest orators of the day. And the
next day he overturned all his arguments by others of a
contrary tendency, and disparaged justice, which the day
before he had extolled; speaking not indeed with the gravity
of a philosopher whose wisdom ought to be steady, and whose
opinions unchangeable, but in a kind of rhetorical exercise
of arguing on each side--a practice which he was accustomed
to adopt, in order to be able to refute others who were
asserting anything. The arguments by which he disparaged
justice are mentioned by Lucius Furius in Cicero; I suppose,
since he was discussing the Commonwealth, in order to
introduce a defence and panegyric of that quality without
which he did not think a commonwealth could be administered.
But Carneades, in order to refute Aristotle and Plato, the
advocates of justice, collected in his first argument
everything that was in the habit of being advanced on behalf
of justice, in order afterward to be able to overturn it, as
he did.
VII. Many philosophers indeed, and especially Plato and
Aristotle, have spoken a great deal of justice, inculcating
that virtue, and extolling it with the highest praise, as
giving to every one what belongs to him, as preserving equity
in all things, and urging that while the other virtues are,
as it were, silent and shut up, justice is the only one which
is not absorbed in considerations of self-interest, and which
is not secret, but finds its whole field for exercise
out-of-doors, and is desirous of doing good and serving as
many people as possible; as if, forsooth, justice ought to
exist in judges only, and in men invested with a certain
authority, and not in every one! But there is no one, not
even a man of the lowest class, or a beggar, who is destitute
of opportunities of displaying justice. But because these
philosophers knew not what its essence was, or whence it
proceeded, or what its employment was, they attributed that
first of all virtues, which is the common good of all men, to
a few only, and asserted that it aimed at no advantage of its
own, but was anxious only for that of others. So it was well
that Carneades, a man of the greatest genius and acuteness,
refuted their assertions, and overthrew that justice which
had no firm foundation; not because he thought justice itself
deserving of blame, but in order to show that those its
defenders had brought forward no trustworthy or strong
arguments in its behalf.
Justice looks out-of-doors, and is prominent and conspicuous
in its whole essence.
Which virtue, beyond all others, wholly devotes and dedicates
itself to the advantage of others.
VIII. * * * Both to discover and maintain. While the other, Aristotle,
has filled four large volumes with a discussion on abstract justice.
For I did not expect anything grand or magnificent from Chrysippus,
who, after his usual fashion, examines everything rather by the
signification of words than the reality of things. But it was surely
worthy of those heroes of philosophy to ennoble by their genius a
virtue so eminently beneficent and liberal, which everywhere exalts the
social interests above the selfish, and teaches us to love others
rather than ourselves. It was worthy of their genius, we say, to
elevate this virtue to a divine throne, not far from that of Wisdom.
And certainly they neither wanted the will to accomplish this (for what
else could be the cause of their writing on the subject, or what could
have been their design?) nor the genius, in which they excelled all
men. But the weakness of their cause was too great for either their
intention or their eloquence to make it popular. In fact, this justice
on which we reason is a civil right, but no natural one; for if it were
natural and universal, then justice and injustice would be recognized
similarly by all men, just as the heat and cold, sweetness and
bitterness.
IX. Now, if any one, carried in that chariot of winged serpents of
which the poet Pacuvius makes mention, could take his flight over all
nations and cities, and accurately observe their proceedings, he would
see that the sense of justice and right varies in different regions. In
the first place, he would behold among the unchangeable people of
Egypt, which preserves in its archives the memory of so many ages and
events, a bull adored as a Deity, under the name of Apis, and a
multitude of other monsters, and all kinds of animals admitted by the
same nation into the number of the Gods.
In the next place, he would see in Greece, as among ourselves,
magnificent temples consecrated by images in human form, which the
Persians regarded as impious; and it is affirmed that the sole motive
of Xerxes for commanding the conflagration of the Athenian temples was
the belief that it was a superstitious sacrilege to keep confined
within narrow walls the Gods, whose proper home was the entire
universe. But afterward Philip, in his hostile projects against the
Persians, and Alexander, who carried them into execution, alleged this
plea for war, that they were desirous to avenge the temples of Greece,
which the Greeks had thought proper never to rebuild, that this
monument of the impiety of the Persians might always remain before the
eyes of their posterity.
How many--such as the inhabitants of Taurica along the Euxine Sea; as
the King of Egypt, Busiris; as the Gauls and the Carthaginians--have
thought it exceedingly pious and agreeable to the Gods to sacrifice
men! And, besides, the customs of life are so various that the Cretans
and Ætolians regard robbery as honorable. And the Lacedæmonians say
that their territory extends to all places which they can touch with a
lance. The Athenians had a custom of swearing, by a public
proclamation, that all the lands which produced olives and corn were
their own. The Gauls consider it a base employment to raise corn by
agricultural labor, and go with arms in their hands, and mow down the
harvests of neighboring peoples. But we ourselves, the most equitable
of all nations, who, in order to raise the value of our vines and
olives, do not permit the races beyond the Alps to cultivate either
vineyards or oliveyards, are said in this matter to act with prudence,
but not with justice. You see, then, that wisdom and policy are not
always the same as equity. And Lycurgus, that famous inventor of a most
admirable jurisprudence and most wholesome laws, gave the lands of the
rich to be cultivated by the common people, who were reduced to
slavery.
X. If I were to describe the diverse kinds of laws, institutions,
manners, and customs, not only as they vary in the numerous nations,
but as they vary likewise in single cities--in this one of ours, for
example--I could prove that they have had a thousand revolutions. For
instance, that eminent expositor of our laws who sits in the present
company--I mean Manilius--if you were to consult him relative to the
legacies and inheritances of women, he would tell you that the present
law is quite different from that he was accustomed to plead in his
youth, before the Voconian enactment came into force--an edict which
was passed in favor of the interests of the men, but which is evidently
full of injustice with regard to women. For why should a woman be
disabled from inheriting property? Why can a vestal virgin become an
heir, while her mother cannot? And why, admitting that it is necessary
to set some limit to the wealth of women, should Crassus's daughter, if
she be his only child, inherit thousands without offending the law,
while my daughter can only receive a small share in a bequest.[337]
* * *
XI. * * * [If this justice were natural, innate, and universal, all men
would admit the same] law and right, and the same men would not enact
different laws at different times. If a just man and a virtuous man is
bound to obey the laws, I ask, what laws do you mean? Do you intend all
the laws indifferently? But neither does virtue permit this inconstancy
in moral obligation, nor is such a variation compatible with natural
conscience. The laws are, therefore, based not on our sense of justice,
but on our fear of punishment. There is, therefore, no natural justice;
and hence it follows that men cannot be just by nature.
Are men, then, to say that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but
that men who are virtuous through natural conscience follow that which
is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it
is the distinguishing characteristic of the truly just and virtuous man
to render every one his due rights? Are we, then, to attribute the
first of these characteristics to animals? For not only men of moderate
abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as Pythagoras
and Empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right
to the same justice. They declare that inexpiable penalties impend over
those who have done violence to any animal whatsoever. It is,
therefore, a crime to injure an animal, and the perpetrator of such
crime[338] * * *
XII. For when he[339] inquired of a pirate by what right he
dared to infest the sea with his little brigantine: "By the
same right," he replied, "which is your warrant for
conquering the world." * * *
Wisdom and prudence instruct us by all means to increase our power,
riches, and estates. For by what means could this same Alexander, that
illustrious general, who extended his empire over all Asia, without
violating the property of other men, have acquired such universal
dominion, enjoyed so many pleasures, such great power, and reigned
without bound or limit?
But justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to consult the
interests of the whole human race, to give to every one his due, and
injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching
what does not belong to us. What is the result, then? If you obey the
dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honors, provinces, and
kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at.
However, as we are discussing public matters, those examples are more
illustrious which refer to what is done publicly. And since the
question between justice and policy applies equally to private and
public affairs, I think it well to speak of the wisdom of the people. I
will not, however, mention other nations, but come at once to our own
Roman people, whom Africanus, in his discourse yesterday, traced from
the cradle, and whose empire now embraces the whole world. Justice
is[340] * * *
XIII. How far utility is at variance with justice we may
learn from the Roman people itself, which, declaring war by
means of the fecials, and committing injustice with all legal
formality, always coveting and laying violent hands on the
property of others, acquired the possession of the whole
world.
What is the advantage of one's own country but the
disadvantage of another state or nation, by extending one's
dominions by territories evidently wrested from others,
increasing one's power, improving one's revenues, etc.?
Therefore, whoever has obtained these advantages for his
country--that is to say, whoever has overthrown cities,
subdued nations, and by these means filled the treasury with
money, taken lands, and enriched his fellow-citizens--such a
man is extolled to the skies; is believed to be endowed with
consummate and perfect virtue; and this mistake is fallen
into not only by the populace and the ignorant, but by
philosophers, who even give rules for injustice.
XIV. * * * For all those who have the right of life and death over the
people are in fact tyrants; but they prefer being called by the title
of king, which belongs to the all-good Jupiter. But when certain men,
by favor of wealth, birth, or any other means, get possession of the
entire government, it is a faction; but they choose to denominate
themselves an aristocracy. If the people gets the upper hand, and rules
everything after its capricious will, they call it liberty, but it is
in fact license. And when every man is a guard upon his neighbor, and
every class is a guard upon every other class, then because no one
trusts in his own strength, a kind of compact is formed between the
great and the little, from whence arises that mixed kind of government
which Scipio has been commending. Thus justice, according to these
facts, is not the daughter of nature or conscience, but of human
imbecility. For when it becomes necessary to choose between these three
predicaments, either to do wrong without retribution, or to do wrong
with retribution, or to do no wrong at all, it is best to do wrong with
impunity; next, neither to do wrong nor to suffer for it; but nothing
is more wretched than to struggle incessantly between the wrong we
inflict and that we receive. Therefore, he who attains to that first
end[341] * * *
XV. This was the sum of the argument of Carneades: that men
had established laws among themselves from considerations of
advantage, varying them according to their different customs,
and altering them often so as to adapt them to the times; but
that there was no such thing as natural law; that all men and
all other animals are led to their own advantage by the
guidance of nature; that there is no such thing as justice,
or, if there be, that it is extreme folly, since a man would
injure himself while consulting the interests of others. And
he added these arguments, that all nations who were
flourishing and dominant, and even the Romans themselves, who
were the masters of the whole world, if they wished to be
just--that is to say, if they restored all that belonged to
others--would have to return to their cottages, and to lie
down in want and misery.
Except, perhaps, of the Arcadians and Athenians, who, I presume,
dreading that this great act of retribution might one day arrive,
pretend that they were sprung from the earth, like so many field-mice.
XVI. In reply to these statements, the following arguments are often
adduced by those who are not unskilful in discussions, and who, in this
question, have all the greater weight of authority, because, when we
inquire, Who is a good man?--understanding by that term a frank and
single-minded man--we have little need of captious casuists, quibblers,
and slanderers. For those men assert that the wise man does not seek
virtue because of the personal gratification which the practice of
justice and beneficence procures him, but rather because the life of
the good man is free from fear, care, solicitude, and peril; while, on
the other hand, the wicked always feel in their souls a certain
suspicion, and always behold before their eyes images of judgment and
punishment. Do not you think, therefore, that there is any benefit, or
that there is any advantage which can be procured by injustice,
precious enough to counterbalance the constant pressure of remorse, and
the haunting consciousness that retribution awaits the sinner, and
hangs over his devoted head.[342] * * *
XVII. [Our philosophers, therefore, put a case. Suppose, say they, two
men, one of whom is an excellent and admirable person, of high honor
and remarkable integrity; the latter is distinguished by nothing but
his vice and audacity. And suppose that their city has so mistaken
their characters as to imagine the good man to be a scandalous,
impious, and audacious criminal, and to esteem the wicked man, on the
contrary, as a pattern of probity and fidelity. On account of this
error of their fellow-citizens, the good man is arrested and tormented,
his hands are cut off, his eyes are plucked out, he is condemned,
bound, burned, exterminated, reduced to want, and to the last appears
to all men to be most deservedly the most miserable of men. On the
other hand, the flagitious wretch is exalted, worshipped, loved by all,
and honors, offices, riches, and emoluments are all conferred on him,
and he shall be reckoned by his fellow-citizens the best and worthiest
of mortals, and in the highest degree deserving of all manner of
prosperity. Yet, for all this, who is so mad as to doubt which of these
two men he would rather be?
XVIII. What happens among individuals happens also among nations. There
is no state so absurd and ridiculous as not to prefer unjust dominion
to just subordination. I need not go far for examples. During my own
consulship, when you were my fellow-counsellors, we consulted
respecting the treaty of Numantia. No one was ignorant that Quintus
Pompey had signed a treaty, and that Mancinus had done the same. The
latter, being a virtuous man, supported the proposition which I laid
before the people, after the decree of the senate. The former, on the
other side, opposed it vehemently. If modesty, probity, or faith had
been regarded, Mancinus would have carried his point; but in reason,
counsel, and prudence, Pompey surpassed him. Whether[343] * * *
XIX. If a man should have a faithless slave, or an unwholesome house,
with whose defect he alone was acquainted, and he advertised them for
sale, would he state the fact that his servant was infected with
knavery, and his house with malaria, or would he conceal these
objections from the buyer? If he stated those facts, he would be
honest, no doubt, because he would deceive nobody; but still he would
be thought a fool, because he would either get very little for his
property, or else fail to sell it at all. By concealing these defects,
on the other hand, he will be called a shrewd man--as one who has taken
care of his own interest; but he will be a rogue, notwithstanding,
because he will be deceiving his neighbors. Again, let us suppose that
one man meets another, who sells gold and silver, conceiving them to be
copper or lead; shall he hold his peace that he may make a capital
bargain, or correct the mistake, and purchase at a fair rate? He would
evidently be a fool in the world's opinion if he preferred the latter.
XX. It is justice, beyond all question, neither to commit murder nor
robbery. What, then, would your just man do, if, in a case of
shipwreck, he saw a weaker man than himself get possession of a plank?
Would he not thrust him off, get hold of the timber himself, and escape
by his exertions, especially as no human witness could be present in
the mid-sea? If he acted like a wise man of the world, he would
certainly do so, for to act in any other way would cost him his life.
If, on the other hand, he prefers death to inflicting unjustifiable
injury on his neighbor, he will be an eminently honorable and just man,
but not the less a fool, because he saved another's life at the expense
of his own. Again, if in case of a defeat and rout, when the enemy were
pressing in the rear, this just man should find a wounded comrade
mounted on a horse, shall he respect his right at the risk of being
killed himself, or shall he fling him from the horse in order to
preserve his own life from the pursuers? If he does so, he is a wise
man, but at the same time a wicked one; if he does not, he is admirably
just, but at the same time stupid.
XXI. _Scipio._ I might reply at great length to these sophistical
objections of Philus, if it were not, my Lælius, that all our friends
are no less anxious than myself to hear you take a leading part in the
present debate, especially as you promised yesterday that you would
plead at large on my side of the argument. If you cannot spare time for
this, at any rate do not desert us; we all ask it of you.
_Lælius._ This Carneades ought not to be even listened to by our young
men. I think all the while that I am hearing him that he must be a very
impure person; if he be not, as I would fain believe, his discourse is
not less pernicious.
XXII.[344] True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal,
unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose
prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the
good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with
indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is
not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor
the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal
law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our
own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one
thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this
universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the
sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author,
its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from
himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing
he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils
which are usually accounted punishments.
XXIII. I am aware that in the third book of Cicero's treatise
on the Commonwealth (unless I am mistaken) it is argued that
no war is ever undertaken by a well-regulated commonwealth
unless it be one either for the sake of keeping faith, or for
safety; and what he means by a war for safety, and what
safety he wishes us to understand, he points out in another
passage, where he says, "But private men often escape from
these penalties, which even the most stupid persons
feel--want, exile, imprisonment, and stripes--by embracing
the opportunity of a speedy death; but to states death itself
is a penalty, though it appears to deliver individuals from
punishment. For a state ought to be established so as to be
eternal: therefore, there is no natural decease for a state,
as there is for a man, in whose case death is not only
inevitable, but often even desirable; but when a state is put
an end to, it is destroyed, extinguished. It is in some
degree, to compare small things with great, as if this whole
world were to perish and fall to pieces."
In his treatise on the Commonwealth, Cicero says those wars
are unjust which are undertaken without reason. Again, after
a few sentences, he adds, No war is considered just unless it
be formally announced and declared, and unless it be to
obtain restitution of what has been taken away.
But our nation, by defending its allies, has now become the
master of all the whole world.
XXIV. Also, in that same treatise on the Commonwealth, he
argues most strenuously and vigorously in the cause of
justice against injustice. And since, when a little time
before the part of injustice was upheld against justice, and
the doctrine was urged that a republic could not prosper and
flourish except by injustice, this was put forward as the
strongest argument, that it was unjust for men to serve other
men as their masters; but that unless a dominant state, such
as a great republic, acted on this injustice, it could not
govern its provinces; answer was made on behalf of justice,
that it was just that it should be so, because slavery is
advantageous to such men, and their interests are consulted
by a right course of conduct--that is, by the license of
doing injury being taken from the wicked--and they will fare
better when subjugated, because when not subjugated they
fared worse: and to confirm this reasoning, a noble instance,
taken, as it were, from nature, was added, and it was said,
Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern
the body, and reason govern lust, and the other vicious parts
of the mind?
XXV. Hear what Tully says more plainly still in the third
book of his treatise on the Commonwealth, when discussing the
reasons for government. Do we not, says he, see that nature
herself has given the power of dominion to everything that is
best, to the extreme advantage of what is subjected to it?
Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern
the body, and reason govern lust and passion and the other
vicious parts of the same mind? Listen thus far; for
presently he adds, But still there are dissimilarities to be
recognized in governing and in obeying. For as the mind is
said to govern the body, and also to govern lust, still it
governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a parent
his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his
slaves, because it restrains and breaks it. The authority of
kings, of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of
nations, rules their subjects and allies as the mind rules
bodies; but masters control their slaves, as the best part of
the mind--that is to say, wisdom--controls the vicious and
weak parts of itself, such as lust, passion, and the other
perturbations.
For there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to
some one else who might be their own masters; but when those
are slaves who cannot govern themselves, there is no injury
done.
XXVI. If, says Carneades, you were to know that an asp was
lying hidden anywhere, and that some one who did not know it
was going to sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you,
you would act wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit
down. Still, you would not be liable to punishment; for who
could prove that you had known? But we are bringing forward
too many instances; for it is plain that unless equity, good
faith, and justice proceed from nature, and if all these
things are referred to interest, a good man cannot be found.
And on these topics a great deal is said by Lælius in our
treatise on the Republic.
If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that
treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is
honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful.
* * *
XXVII. I am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the
affection borne to our children is implanted by nature;
indeed, if it be not, there can be no conection between man
and man which has its origin in nature. And if there be not,
then there is an end of all society in life. May it turn out
well, says Carneades, speaking shamelessly, but still more
sensibly than my friend Lucius or Patro: for, as they refer
everything to themselves, do they think that anything is ever
done for the sake of another? And when they say that a man
ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not because
it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are
speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one. But these
arguments are argued, I think, in those books by praising
which you have given me spirits.
In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not
that of a wise man.
XXVIII. And again, in Cicero, that same advocate of justice,
Lælius, says, Virtue is clearly eager for honor, nor has she
any other reward; which, however, she accepts easily, and
exacts without bitterness. And in another place the same
Lælius says:
When a man is inspired by virtue such as this, what bribes can you
offer him, what treasures, what thrones, what empires? He considers
these but mortal goods, and esteems his own divine. And if the
ingratitude of the people, and the envy of his competitors, or the
violence of powerful enemies, despoil his virtue of its earthly
recompense, he still enjoys a thousand consolations in the approbation
of conscience, and sustains himself by contemplating the beauty of
moral rectitude.
XXIX. * * * This virtue, in order to be true, must be universal.
Tiberius Gracchus continued faithful to his fellow-citizens, but he
violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the Latin
peoples. But if this habit of arbitrary violence begins to extend
itself further, and perverts our authority, leading it from right to
violence, so that those who had voluntarily obeyed us are only
restrained by fear, then, although we, during our days, may escape the
peril, yet am I solicitous respecting the safety of our posterity and
the immortality of the Commonwealth itself, which, doubtless, might
become perpetual and invincible if our people would maintain their
ancient institutions and manners.
XXX. When Lælius had ceased to speak, all those that were present
expressed the extreme pleasure they found in his discourse. But Scipio,
more affected than the rest, and ravished with the delight of sympathy,
exclaimed: You have pleaded, my Lælius, many causes with an eloquence
superior to that of Servius Galba, our colleague, whom you used during
his life to prefer to all others, even to the Attic orators [and never
did I hear you speak with more energy than to-day, while pleading the
cause of justice][345] * * *
* * * That two things were wanting to enable him to speak in
public and in the forum, confidence and voice.
XXXI. * * * This justice, continued Scipio, is the very foundation of
lawful government in political constitutions. Can we call the State of
Agrigentum a commonwealth, where all men are oppressed by the cruelty
of a single tyrant--where there is no universal bond of right, nor
social consent and fellowship, which should belong to every people,
properly so named? It is the same in Syracuse--that illustrious city
which Timæus calls the greatest of the Grecian towns. It was indeed a
most beautiful city; and its admirable citadel, its canals distributed
through all its districts, its broad streets, its porticoes, its
temples, and its walls, gave Syracuse the appearance of a most
flourishing state. But while Dionysius its tyrant reigned there,
nothing of all its wealth belonged to the people, and the people were
nothing better than the slaves of one master. Thus, wherever I behold a
tyrant, I know that the social constitution must be not merely vicious
and corrupt, as I stated yesterday, but in strict truth no social
constitution at all.
XXXII. _Lælius._ You have spoken admirably, my Scipio, and I see the
point of your observations.
_Scipio._ You grant, then, that a state which is entirely in the power
of a faction cannot justly be entitled a political community?
_Lælius._ That is evident.
_Scipio._ You judge most correctly. For what was the State of Athens
when, during the great Peloponnesian war, she fell under the unjust
domination of the thirty tyrants? The antique glory of that city, the
imposing aspect of its edifices, its theatre, its gymnasium, its
porticoes, its temples, its citadel, the admirable sculptures of
Phidias, and the magnificent harbor of Piræus--did they constitute it a
commonwealth?
_Lælius._ Certainly not, because these did not constitute the real
welfare of the community.
_Scipio._ And at Rome, when the decemvirs ruled without appeal from
their decisions, in the third year of their power, had not liberty lost
all its securities and all its blessings?
_Lælius._ Yes; the welfare of the community was no longer consulted,
and the people soon roused themselves, and recovered their appropriate
rights.
XXXIII. _Scipio._ I now come to the third, or democratical, form of
government, in which a considerable difficulty presents itself, because
all things are there said to lie at the disposition of the people, and
are carried into execution just as they please. Here the populace
inflict punishments at their pleasure, and act, and seize, and keep
possession, and distribute property, without let or hinderance. Can you
deny, my Lælius, that this is a fair definition of a democracy, where
the people are all in all, and where the people constitute the State?
_Lælius._ There is no political constitution to which I more absolutely
deny the name of a _commonwealth_ than that in which all things lie in
the power of the multitude. If a commonwealth, which implies the
welfare of the entire community, could not exist in Agrigentum,
Syracuse, or Athens when tyrants reigned over them--if it could not
exist in Rome when under the oligarchy of the decemvirs--neither do I
see how this sacred name of commonwealth can be applied to a democracy
and the sway of the mob; because, in the first place, my Scipio, I
build on your own admirable definition, that there can be no community,
properly so called, unless it be regulated by a combination of rights.
And, by this definition, it appears that a multitude of men may be just
as tyrannical as a single despot; and it is so much the worse, since no
monster can be more barbarous than the mob, which assumes the name and
appearance of the people. Nor is it at all reasonable, since the laws
place the property of madmen in the hands of their sane relations, that
we should do the [very reverse in politics, and throw the property of
the sane into the hands of the mad multitude][346] * * *
XXXIV. * * * [It is far more rational] to assert that a wise and
virtuous aristocratical government deserves the title of a
commonwealth, as it approaches to the nature of a kingdom.
And much more so in my opinion, said Mummius. For the unity of power
often exposes a king to become a despot; but when an aristocracy,
consisting of many virtuous men, exercise power, that is the most
fortunate circumstance possible for any state. However this be, I much
prefer royalty to democracy; for that is the third kind of government
which you have remaining, and a most vicious one it is.
XXXV. Scipio replied: I am well acquainted, my Mummius, with your
decided antipathy to the democratical system. And, although, we may
speak of it with rather more indulgence than you are accustomed to
accord it, I must certainly agree with you, that of all the three
particular forms of government, none is less commendable than
democracy.
I do not agree with you, however, when you would imply that aristocracy
is preferable to royalty. If you suppose that wisdom governs the State,
is it not as well that this wisdom should reside in one monarch as in
many nobles?
But we are led away by a certain incorrectness of terms in a discussion
like the present. When we pronounce the word "aristocracy," which, in
Greek, signifies the government of the best men, what can be conceived
more excellent? For what can be thought better than the best? But when,
on the other hand, the title "king" is mentioned, we begin to imagine a
tyrant; as if a king must be necessarily unjust. But we are not
speaking of an unjust king when we are examining the true nature of
royal authority. To this name of king, therefore, do but attach the
idea of a Romulus, a Numa, a Tullus, and perhaps you will be less
severe to the monarchical form of constitution.
_Mummius_. Have you, then, no commendation at all for any kind of
democratical government?
_Scipio._ Why, I think some democratical forms less objectionable than
others; and, by way of illustration, I will ask you what you thought of
the government in the isle of Rhodes, where we were lately together;
did it appear to you a legitimate and rational constitution?
_Mummius_. It did, and not much liable to abuse.
_Scipio._ You say truly. But, if you recollect, it was a very
extraordinary experiment. All the inhabitants were alternately senators
and citizens. Some months they spent in their senatorial functions, and
some months they spent in their civil employments. In both they
exercised judicial powers; and in the theatre and the court, the same
men judged all causes, capital and not capital. And they had as much
influence, and were of as much importance as * * *
FRAGMENTS.
XXXVI. There is therefore some unquiet feeling in
individuals, which either exults in pleasure or is crushed by
annoyance.
[_The next is an incomplete sentence, and, as such,
unintelligible_.]
The Phoenicians were the first who by their commerce, and by
the merchandise which they carried, brought avarice and
magnificence and insatiable degrees of everything into
Greece.
Sardanapalus, the luxurious king of Assyria, of whom Tully,
in the third book of his treatise on the Republic, says, "The
notorious Sardanapalus, far more deformed by his vices than
even by his name."
What is the meaning, then, of this absurd acceptation, unless
some one wishes to make the whole of Athos a monument? For
what is Athos or the vast Olympus? * * *
XXXVII. I will endeavor in the proper place to show it,
according to the definitions of Cicero himself, in which,
putting forth Scipio as the speaker, he has briefly explained
what a commonwealth and what a republic is; adducing also
many assertions of his own, and of those whom he has
represented as taking part in that discussion, to the effect
that the State of Rome was not such a commonwealth, because
there has never been genuine justice in it. However,
according to definitions which are more reasonable, it was a
commonwealth in some degree, and it was better regulated by
the more ancient than by the later Romans.
It is now fitting that I should explain, as briefly and as
clearly as I can, what, in the second book of this work, I
promised to prove, according to the definitions which Cicero,
in his books on the Commonwealth, puts into the mouth of
Scipio, arguing that the Roman State was never a
commonwealth; for he briefly defines a commonwealth as a
state of the people; the people as an assembly of the
multitude, united by a common feeling of right, and a
community of interests. What he calls a common feeling of
right he explains by discussion, showing in this way that a
commonwealth cannot proceed without justice. Where,
therefore, there is no genuine justice, there can be no
right, for that which is done according to right is done
justly; and what is done unjustly cannot be done according to
right, for the unjust regulations of men are not to be called
or thought rights; since they themselves call that right
(_jus_) which flows from the source of justice: and they say
that that assertion which is often made by some persons of
erroneous sentiments, namely, that that is right which is
advantageous to the most powerful, is false. Wherefore, where
there is no true justice there can be no company of men
united by a common feeling of right; therefore there can be
no people (_populus_), according to that definition of Scipio
or Cicero: and if there be no people, there can be no state
of the people, but only of a mob such as it may be, which is
not worthy of the name of a people. And thus, if a
commonwealth is a state of a people, and if that is not a
people which is not united by a common feeling of right, and
if there is no right where there is no justice, then the
undoubted inference is, that where there is no justice there
is no commonwealth. Moreover, justice is that virtue which
gives every one his own.
No war can be undertaken by a just and wise state unless for faith or
self-defence. This self-defence of the State is enough to insure its
perpetuity, and this perpetuity is what all patriots desire. Those
afflictions which even the hardiest spirits smart under--poverty,
exile, prison, and torment--private individuals seek to escape from by
an instantaneous death. But for states, the greatest calamity of all is
that of death, which to individuals appears a refuge. A state should be
so constituted as to live forever. For a commonwealth there is no
natural dissolution as there is for a man, to whom death not only
becomes necessary, but often desirable. And when a state once decays
and falls, it is so utterly revolutionized, that, if we may compare
great things with small, it resembles the final wreck of the universe.
All wars undertaken without a proper motive are unjust. And no war can
be reputed just unless it be duly announced and proclaimed, and if it
be not preceded by a rational demand for restitution.
Our Roman Commonwealth, by defending its allies, has got possession of
the world.
* * * * *
INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTH BOOK,
BY THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATOR.
In this fourth book Cicero treats of morals and education, and
the use and abuse of stage entertainments. We retain nothing
of this important book save a few scattered fragments, the
beauty of which fills us with the greater regret for the
passages we have lost.