But she happened to be right. Bovis had never said inwardly that he

would take a large allowance of sugar, and he had the tradition about

himself that he was a man of the most moderate habits; hence, with this

conviction, he was naturally disgusted at the saccharine excesses of

Avis.

I have sometimes thought that this facility of men in believing that

they are still what they once meant to be--this undisturbed

appropriation of a traditional character which is often but a melancholy

relic of early resolutions, like the worn and soiled testimonial to

soberness and honesty carried in the pocket of a tippler whom the need

of a dram has driven into peculation--may sometimes diminish the

turpitude of what seems a flat, barefaced falsehood. It is notorious

that a man may go on uttering false assertions about his own acts till

he at last believes in them: is it not possible that sometimes in the

very first utterance there may be a shade of creed-reciting belief, a

reproduction of a traditional self which is clung to against all

evidence? There is no knowing all the disguises of the lying serpent.

When we come to examine in detail what is the sane mind in the sane

body, the final test of completeness seems to be a security of

distinction between what we have professed and what we have done; what

we have aimed at and what we have achieved; what we have invented and

what we have witnessed or had evidenced to us; what we think and feel in

the present and what we thought and felt in the past.

I know that there is a common prejudice which regards the habitual

confusion of _now_ and _then_, of _it was_ and _it is_, of _it seemed

so_ and _I should like it to be so_, as a mark of high imaginative

endowment, while the power of precise statement and description is rated

lower, as the attitude of an everyday prosaic mind. High imagination is

often assigned or claimed as if it were a ready activity in fabricating

extravagances such as are presented by fevered dreams, or as if its

possessors were in that state of inability to give credible testimony

which would warrant their exclusion from the class of acceptable

witnesses in a court of justice; so that a creative genius might fairly

be subjected to the disability which some laws have stamped on dicers,

slaves, and other classes whose position was held perverting to their

sense of social responsibility.

This endowment of mental confusion is often boasted of by persons whose

imaginativeness would not otherwise be known, unless it were by the slow

process of detecting that their descriptions and narratives were not to

be trusted. Callista is always ready to testify of herself that she is

an imaginative person, and sometimes adds in illustration, that if she

had taken a walk and seen an old heap of stones on her way, the account

she would give on returning would include many pleasing particulars of

her own invention, transforming the simple heap into an interesting

castellated ruin. This creative freedom is all very well in the right

place, but before I can grant it to be a sign of unusual mental power, I

must inquire whether, on being requested to give a precise description

of what she saw, she would be able to cast aside her arbitrary

combinations and recover the objects she really perceived so as to make

them recognisable by another person who passed the same way. Otherwise

her glorifying imagination is not an addition to the fundamental power

of strong, discerning perception, but a cheaper substitute. And, in

fact, I find on listening to Callista's conversation, that she has a

very lax conception even of common objects, and an equally lax memory of

events. It seems of no consequence to her whether she shall say that a

stone is overgrown with moss or with lichen, that a building is of

sandstone or of granite, that Meliboeus once forgot to put on his cravat

or that he always appears without it; that everybody says so, or that

one stock-broker's wife said so yesterday; that Philemon praised

Euphemia up to the skies, or that he denied knowing any particular evil

of her. She is one of those respectable witnesses who would testify to

the exact moment of an apparition, because any desirable moment will be

as exact as another to her remembrance; or who would be the most worthy

to witness the action of spirits on slates and tables because the action

of limbs would not probably arrest her attention. She would describe the

surprising phenomena exhibited by the powerful Medium with the same

freedom that she vaunted in relation to the old heap of stones. Her

supposed imaginativeness is simply a very usual lack of discriminating

perception, accompanied with a less usual activity of misrepresentation,

which, if it had been a little more intense, or had been stimulated by

circumstance, might have made her a profuse writer unchecked by the

troublesome need of veracity.

These characteristics are the very opposite of such as yield a fine

imagination, which is always based on a keen vision, a keen

consciousness of what _is_, and carries the store of definite knowledge

as material for the construction of its inward visions. Witness Dante,

who is at once the most precise and homely in his reproduction of actual

objects, and the most soaringly at large in his imaginative

combinations. On a much lower level we distinguish the hyperbole and

rapid development in descriptions of persons and events which are lit up

by humorous intention in the speaker--we distinguish this charming play

of intelligence which resembles musical improvisation on a given motive,

where the farthest sweep of curve is looped into relevancy by an

instinctive method, from the florid inaccuracy or helpless exaggeration

which is really something commoner than the correct simplicity often

depreciated as prosaic.

Even if high imagination were to be identified with illusion, there

would be the same sort of difference between the imperial wealth of

illusion which is informed by industrious submissive observation and the

trumpery stage-property illusion which depends on the ill-defined

impressions gathered by capricious inclination, as there is between a

good and a bad picture of the Last Judgment. In both these the subject

is a combination never actually witnessed, and in the good picture the

general combination may be of surpassing boldness; but on examination it

is seen that the separate elements have been closely studied from real

objects. And even where we find the charm of ideal elevation with wrong

drawing and fantastic colour, the charm is dependent on the selective

sensibility of the painter to certain real delicacies of form which

confer the expression he longed to render; for apart from this basis of

an effect perceived in common, there could be no conveyance of aesthetic

meaning by the painter to the beholder. In this sense it is as true to

say of Fra Angelico's Coronation of the Virgin, that it has a strain of

reality, as to say so of a portrait by Rembrandt, which also has its

strain of ideal elevation due to Rembrandt's virile selective

sensibility. To correct such self-flatterers as Callista, it is worth

repeating that powerful imagination is not false outward vision, but

intense inward representation, and a creative energy constantly fed by

susceptibility to the veriest minutiae of experience, which it

reproduces and constructs in fresh and fresh wholes; not the habitual

confusion of provable fact with the fictions of fancy and transient

inclination, but a breadth of ideal association which informs every

material object, every incidental fact with far-reaching memories and

stored residues of passion, bringing into new light the less obvious

relations of human existence. The illusion to which it is liable is not

that of habitually taking duck-ponds for lilied pools, but of being more

or less transiently and in varying degrees so absorbed in ideal vision

as to lose the consciousness of surrounding objects or occurrences; and

when that rapt condition is past, the sane genius discriminates clearly

between what has been given in this parenthetic state of excitement, and

what he has known, and may count on, in the ordinary world of

experience. Dante seems to have expressed these conditions perfectly in

that passage of the _Purgatorio_ where, after a triple vision which has

made him forget his surroundings, he says--

"Quando l'anima mia tornò di fuori

Alle cose che son fuor di lei vere,

Io riconobbi i miei non falsi errori."--(c xv.)

He distinguishes the ideal truth of his entranced vision from the series

of external facts to which his consciousness had returned. Isaiah gives

us the date of his vision in the Temple--"the year that King Uzziah

died"--and if afterwards the mighty-winged seraphim were present with

him as he trod the street, he doubtless knew them for images of memory,

and did not cry "Look!" to the passers-by.

Certainly the seer, whether prophet, philosopher, scientific discoverer,

or poet, may happen to be rather mad: his powers may have been used up,

like Don Quixote's, in their visionary or theoretic constructions, so

that the reports of common-sense fail to affect him, or the continuous

strain of excitement may have robbed his mind of its elasticity. It is

hard for our frail mortality to carry the burthen of greatness with

steady gait and full alacrity of perception. But he is the strongest

seer who can support the stress of creative energy and yet keep that

sanity of expectation which consists in distinguishing, as Dante does,

between the _cose che son vere_ outside the individual mind, and the

_non falsi errori_ which are the revelations of true imaginative power.

XIV.

THE TOO READY WRITER

One who talks too much, hindering the rest of the company from taking

their turn, and apparently seeing no reason why they should not rather

desire to know his opinion or experience in relation to all subjects, or

at least to renounce the discussion of any topic where he can make no

figure, has never been praised for this industrious monopoly of work

which others would willingly have shared in. However various and

brilliant his talk may be, we suspect him of impoverishing us by

excluding the contributions of other minds, which attract our curiosity

the more because he has shut them up in silence. Besides, we get tired

of a "manner" in conversation as in painting, when one theme after

another is treated with the same lines and touches. I begin with a

liking for an estimable master, but by the time he has stretched his

interpretation of the world unbrokenly along a palatial gallery, I have

had what the cautious Scotch mind would call "enough" of him. There is

monotony and narrowness already to spare in my own identity; what comes

to me from without should be larger and more impartial than the judgment

of any single interpreter. On this ground even a modest person, without

power or will to shine in the conversation, may easily find the

predominating talker a nuisance, while those who are full of matter on

special topics are continually detecting miserably thin places in the

web of that information which he will not desist from imparting. Nobody

that I know of ever proposed a testimonial to a man for thus

volunteering the whole expense of the conversation.

Why is there a different standard of judgment with regard to a writer

who plays much the same part in literature as the excessive talker plays

in what is traditionally called conversation? The busy Adrastus, whose

professional engagements might seem more than enough for the nervous

energy of one man, and who yet finds time to print essays on the chief

current subjects, from the tri-lingual inscriptions, or the Idea of the

Infinite among the prehistoric Lapps, to the Colorado beetle and the

grape disease in the south of France, is generally praised if not

admired for the breadth of his mental range and his gigantic powers of

work. Poor Theron, who has some original ideas on a subject to which he

has given years of research and meditation, has been waiting anxiously

from month to month to see whether his condensed exposition will find a

place in the next advertised programme, but sees it, on the contrary,

regularly excluded, and twice the space he asked for filled with the

copious brew of Adrastus, whose name carries custom like a celebrated

trade-mark. Why should the eager haste to tell what he thinks on the

shortest notice, as if his opinion were a needed preliminary to

discussion, get a man the reputation of being a conceited bore in

conversation, when nobody blames the same tendency if it shows itself in

print? The excessive talker can only be in one gathering at a time, and

there is the comfort of thinking that everywhere else other

fellow-citizens who have something to say may get a chance of delivering

themselves; but the exorbitant writer can occupy space and spread over

it the more or less agreeable flavour of his mind in four "mediums" at

once, and on subjects taken from the four winds. Such restless and

versatile occupants of literary space and time should have lived earlier

when the world wanted summaries of all extant knowledge, and this

knowledge being small, there was the more room for commentary and

conjecture. They might have played the part of an Isidor of Seville or a

Vincent of Beauvais brilliantly, and the willingness to write everything

themselves would have been strictly in place. In the present day, the

busy retailer of other people's knowledge which he has spoiled in the

handling, the restless guesser and commentator, the importunate hawker

of undesirable superfluities, the everlasting word-compeller who rises

early in the morning to praise what the world has already glorified, or

makes himself haggard at night in writing out his dissent from what

nobody ever believed, is not simply "gratis anhelans, multa agendo nihil

agens"--he is an obstruction. Like an incompetent architect with too

much interest at his back, he obtrudes his ill-considered work where

place ought to have been left to better men.

Is it out of the question that we should entertain some scruple about

mixing our own flavour, as of the too cheap and insistent nutmeg, with

that of every great writer and every great subject?--especially when our

flavour is all we have to give, the matter or knowledge having been

already given by somebody else. What if we were only like the Spanish

wine-skins which impress the innocent stranger with the notion that the

Spanish grape has naturally a taste of leather? One could wish that even

the greatest minds should leave some themes unhandled, or at least leave

us no more than a paragraph or two on them to show how well they did in

not being more lengthy.

Such entertainment of scruple can hardly be expected from the young; but

happily their readiness to mirror the universe anew for the rest of

mankind is not encouraged by easy publicity. In the vivacious Pepin I

have often seen the image of my early youth, when it seemed to me

astonishing that the philosophers had left so many difficulties

unsolved, and that so many great themes had raised no great poet to

treat them. I had an elated sense that I should find my brain full of

theoretic clues when I looked for them, and that wherever a poet had not

done what I expected, it was for want of my insight. Not knowing what

had been said about the play of Romeo and Juliet, I felt myself capable

of writing something original on its blemishes and beauties. In relation

to all subjects I had a joyous consciousness of that ability which is

prior to knowledge, and of only needing to apply myself in order to

master any task--to conciliate philosophers whose systems were at

present but dimly known to me, to estimate foreign poets whom I had not

yet read, to show up mistakes in an historical monograph that roused my

interest in an epoch which I had been hitherto ignorant of, when I

should once have had time to verify my views of probability by looking

into an encyclopaedia. So Pepin; save only that he is industrious while

I was idle. Like the astronomer in Rasselas, I swayed the universe in my

consciousness without making any difference outside me; whereas Pepin,

while feeling himself powerful with the stars in their courses, really

raises some dust here below. He is no longer in his spring-tide, but

having been always busy he has been obliged to use his first impressions

as if they were deliberate opinions, and to range himself on the

corresponding side in ignorance of much that he commits himself to; so

that he retains some characteristics of a comparatively tender age, and

among them a certain surprise that there have not been more persons

equal to himself. Perhaps it is unfortunate for him that he early gained

a hearing, or at least a place in print, and was thus encouraged in

acquiring a fixed habit of writing, to the exclusion of any other

bread-winning pursuit. He is already to be classed as a "general

writer," corresponding to the comprehensive wants of the "general

reader," and with this industry on his hands it is not enough for him to

keep up the ingenuous self-reliance of youth: he finds himself under an

obligation to be skilled in various methods of seeming to know; and

having habitually expressed himself before he was convinced, his

interest in all subjects is chiefly to ascertain that he has not made a

mistake, and to feel his infallibility confirmed. That impulse to

decide, that vague sense of being able to achieve the unattempted, that

dream of aerial unlimited movement at will without feet or wings, which

were once but the joyous mounting of young sap, are already taking shape

as unalterable woody fibre: the impulse has hardened into "style," and

into a pattern of peremptory sentences; the sense of ability in the

presence of other men's failures is turning into the official arrogance

of one who habitually issues directions which he has never himself been

called on to execute; the dreamy buoyancy of the stripling has taken on

a fatal sort of reality in written pretensions which carry consequences.

He is on the way to become like the loud-buzzing, bouncing Bombus who

combines conceited illusions enough to supply several patients in a

lunatic asylum with the freedom to show himself at large in various

forms of print. If one who takes himself for the telegraphic centre of

all American wires is to be confined as unfit to transact affairs, what

shall we say to the man who believes himself in possession of the

unexpressed motives and designs dwelling in the breasts of all

sovereigns and all politicians? And I grieve to think that poor Pepin,

though less political, may by-and-by manifest a persuasion hardly more

sane, for he is beginning to explain people's writing by what he does

not know about them. Yet he was once at the comparatively innocent stage

which I have confessed to be that of my own early astonishment at my

powerful originality; and copying the just humility of the old Puritan,

I may say, "But for the grace of discouragement, this coxcombry might

have been mine."

Pepin made for himself a necessity of writing (and getting printed)

before he had considered whether he had the knowledge or belief that

would furnish eligible matter. At first perhaps the necessity galled him

a little, but it is now as easily borne, nay, is as irrepressible a

habit as the outpouring of inconsiderate talk. He is gradually being

condemned to have no genuine impressions, no direct consciousness of

enjoyment or the reverse from the quality of what is before him: his

perceptions are continually arranging themselves in forms suitable to a

printed judgment, and hence they will often turn out to be as much to

the purpose if they are written without any direct contemplation of the

object, and are guided by a few external conditions which serve to

classify it for him. In this way he is irrevocably losing the faculty of

accurate mental vision: having bound himself to express judgments which

will satisfy some other demands than that of veracity, he has blunted

his perceptions by continual preoccupation. We cannot command veracity

at will: the power of seeing and reporting truly is a form of health

that has to be delicately guarded, and as an ancient Rabbi has solemnly

said, "The penalty of untruth is untruth." But Pepin is only a mild

example of the fact that incessant writing with a view to printing

carries internal consequences which have often the nature of disease.

And however unpractical it may be held to consider whether we have

anything to print which it is good for the world to read, or which has

not been better said before, it will perhaps be allowed to be worth

considering what effect the printing may have on ourselves. Clearly

there is a sort of writing which helps to keep the writer in a

ridiculously contented ignorance; raising in him continually the sense

of having delivered himself effectively, so that the acquirement of more

thorough knowledge seems as superfluous as the purchase of costume for a

past occasion. He has invested his vanity (perhaps his hope of income)

in his own shallownesses and mistakes, and must desire their prosperity.

Like the professional prophet, he learns to be glad of the harm that

keeps up his credit, and to be sorry for the good that contradicts him.

It is hard enough for any of us, amid the changing winds of fortune and

the hurly-burly of events, to keep quite clear of a gladness which is

another's calamity; but one may choose not to enter on a course which

will turn such gladness into a fixed habit of mind, committing ourselves

to be continually pleased that others should appear to be wrong in order

that we may have the air of being right.

In some cases, perhaps, it might be urged that Pepin has remained the

more self-contented because he has _not_ written everything he believed

himself capable of. He once asked me to read a sort of programme of the

species of romance which he should think it worth while to write--a

species which he contrasted in strong terms with the productions of

illustrious but overrated authors in this branch. Pepin's romance was to

present the splendours of the Roman Empire at the culmination of its

grandeur, when decadence was spiritually but not visibly imminent: it

was to show the workings of human passion in the most pregnant and

exalted of human circumstances, the designs of statesmen, the

interfusion of philosophies, the rural relaxation and converse of

immortal poets, the majestic triumphs of warriors, the mingling of the

quaint and sublime in religious ceremony, the gorgeous delirium of

gladiatorial shows, and under all the secretly working leaven of

Christianity. Such a romance would not call the attention of society to

the dialect of stable-boys, the low habits of rustics, the vulgarity of

small schoolmasters, the manners of men in livery, or to any other form

of uneducated talk and sentiments: its characters would have virtues and

vices alike on the grand scale, and would express themselves in an

English representing the discourse of the most powerful minds in the

best Latin, or possibly Greek, when there occurred a scene with a Greek

philosopher on a visit to Rome or resident there as a teacher. In this

way Pepin would do in fiction what had never been done before: something

not at all like 'Rienzi' or 'Notre Dame de Paris,' or any other attempt

of that kind; but something at once more penetrating and more

magnificent, more passionate and more philosophical, more panoramic yet

more select: something that would present a conception of a gigantic

period; in short something truly Roman and world-historical.

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