[a] This is the treatise, or history of the most eminent orators (DE
CLARIS ORATORIBUS), which has been so often cited in the course of
these notes. It is also entitled BRUTUS; a work replete with the
soundest criticism, and by its variety and elegance always charming.
[b] Quintus Mucius Scævola was the great lawyer of his time. Cicero
draws a comparison between him and Crassus. They were both engaged, on
opposite sides, in a cause before the CENTUMVIRI. Crassus proved
himself the best lawyer among the orators of that day, and Scævola the
most eloquent of the lawyers. _Ut eloquentium juris peritissimus
Crassus; jurisperitorum eloquentissimus Scævola putaretur._ _De Claris
Orat._ s. 145. During the consulship of Sylla, A.U.C. 666, Cicero
being then in the nineteenth year of his age, and wishing to acquire a
competent knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence, attached
himself to Mucius Scævola, who did not undertake the task of
instructing pupils, but, by conversing freely with all who consulted
him, gave a fair opportunity to those who thirsted after knowledge.
_Ego autem juris civilis studio, multum operæ dabam Q. Scævolæ, qui
quamquam nemini se ad docendum dabat, tamen, consulentibus
respondendo, studiosos audiendi docebat._ _De Claris Orat._ s. 306.
[c] Philo was a leading philosopher of the academic school. To avoid
the fury of Mithridates, who waged a long war with the Romans, he fled
from Athens, and, with some of the most eminent of his
fellow-citizens, repaired to Rome. Cicero was struck with his
philosophy, and became his pupil. _Cùm princeps academiæ Philo, cum
Atheniensium optimatibus, Mithridatico bello, domo profugisset,
Romamque venisset, totum ei me tradidi, admirabili quodam ad
philosophiam studio concitatus._ _De Claris Orat._ s. 306.
Cicero adds, that he gave board and lodging, at his own house, to
Diodotus the stoic, and, under that master, employed himself in
various branches of literature, but particularly in the study of
logic, which may be considered as a mode of eloquence, contracted,
close, and nervous. _Eram cum stoico Diodoto: qui cum habitavisset
apud me, mecumque vixisset, nuper est domi meæ mortuus. A quo, cum in
aliis rebus, tum studiosissime in dialecticâ exercebar, quæ quasi
contracta et adstricta eloquentia putanda est._ _De Claris Orat._ s.
309.
[d] Cicero gives an account of his travels, which he undertook, after
having employed two years in the business of the forum, where he
gained an early reputation. At Athens, he passed six months with
Antiochus, the principal philosopher of the old academy, and, under
the direction of that able master, resumed those abstract
speculations which he had cultivated from his earliest youth. Nor did
he neglect his rhetorical exercises. In that pursuit, he was assisted
by Demetrius, the Syrian, who was allowed to be a skilful preceptor.
He passed from Greece into Asia; and, in the course of his travels
through that country, he lived in constant habits with Menippus of
Stratonica; a man eminent for his learning; who, if to be neither
frivolous, nor unintelligible, is the character of Attic eloquence,
might fairly be called a disciple of that school. He met with many
other professors of rhetoric, such as Dionysius of Magnesia, Æschylus
of Cnidos, and Zenocles of Adramytus; but not content with their
assistance, he went to Rhodes, and renewed his friendship with MOLO,
whom he had heard at Rome, and knew to be an able pleader in real
causes; a fine writer, and a judicious critic, who could, with a just
discernment of the beauties as well as the faults of a composition,
point out the road to excellence, and improve the taste of his
scholars. In his attention to the Roman orator, the point he aimed at
(Cicero will not say that he succeeded) was, to lop away superfluous
branches, and confine within its proper channel a stream of
eloquence, too apt to swell above all bounds, and overflow its banks.
After two years thus spent in the pursuit of knowledge, and
improvement in his oratorical profession, Cicero returned to Rome
almost a new man. _Is (MOLO) dedit operam (si modo id consequi potuit)
ut nimis redundantes nos, et superfluentes juvenili quadam dicendi
impunitate, et licentiâ, reprimeret, et quasi extra ripas diffluentes
cœrceret. Ita recepi me biennio post, non modo exercitatior, sed propè
mutatus._ See _De Claris Oratoribus_, s. 315 and 316.
[e] Cicero is here said to have been a complete master of philosophy,
which, according to Quintilian, was divided into three branches,
namely, physics, ethics, and logic. It has been mentioned in this
section, note [c], that Cicero called logic a contracted and close
mode of eloquence. That observation is fully explained by Quintilian.
Speaking of logic, the use, he says, of that contentious art, consists
in just definition, which presents to the mind the precise idea; and
in nice discrimination, which marks the essential difference of
things. It is this faculty that throws a sudden light on every
difficult question, removes all ambiguity, clears up what was
doubtful, divides, develops, and separates, and then collects the
argument to a point. But the orator must not be too fond of this close
combat. The minute attention, which logic requires, will exclude what
is of higher value; while it aims at precision, the vigour of the mind
is lost in subtlety. We often see men, who argue with wonderful craft;
but, when petty controversy will no longer serve their purpose, we see
the same men without warmth or energy, cold, languid, and unequal to
the conflict; like those little animals, which are brisk in narrow
places, and by their agility baffle their pursuers, but in the open
field are soon overpowered. _Hæc pars dialectica, sive illam dicere
malimus disputatricem, ut est utilis sæpe et finitionibus, et
comprehensionibus, et separandis quæ sunt differentia, et resolvendâ
ambiguitate, et distinguendo, dividendo, illiciendo, implicando; ita
si totum sibi vindicaverit in foro certamen, obstabit melioribus, et
sectas ad tenuitatem vires ipsâ subtilitate consumet. Itaque reperias
quosdam in disputando mirè callidos; cum ab illâ verò cavillatione
discesserint, non magis sufficere in aliquo graviori actu, quam parva
quædam animalia, quæ in angustiis mobilia, campo deprehenduntur._
Quint. lib. xii. cap. 2.
Ethics, or moral philosophy, the same great critic holds to be
indispensably requisite. _Jam quidem pars illa moralis, quæ dicitur
ethice, certè tota oratori est accommodata. Nam in tantâ causarum
varietate, nulla ferè dici potest, cujus non parte aliquâ tractatus
æqui et boni reperiantur._ Lib. xii. Unless the mind be enriched with
a store of knowledge, there may he loquacity, but nothing that
deserves the name of oratory. Eloquence, says Lord Bolingbroke, must
flow like a stream that is fed by an abundant spring, and not spout
forth a little frothy stream, on some gaudy day, and remain dry for
the rest of the year. See _Spirit of Patriotism_.
With regard to natural philosophy, Quintilian has a sentiment so truly
sublime, that to omit it in this place would look like insensibility.
If, says he, the universe is conducted by a superintending Providence,
it follows that good men should govern the nations of the earth. And
if the soul of man is of celestial origin, it is evident that we
should tread in the paths of virtue, all aspiring to our native
source, not slaves to passion, and the pleasures of the world. These
are important topics; they often occur to the public orator, and
demand all his eloquence. _Nam si regitur providentiâ mundus,
administranda certè bonis viris erit respublica. Si divina nostris
animis origo, tendendum ad virtutem, nec voluptatibus terreni corporis
serviendum. An hoc non frequenter tractabit orator?_ Quint. lib. xii.
cap. 2.