There was no intention at first, as has been shown, of laying the question
of infallibility before the council. It happened, however, that a great
clamor, in regard to this question, came to prevail both within and
without the Church. The enemies of the doctrine railed so strongly against
it, and they who did not deny it declaimed so loudly against the
opportuneness of pronouncing any decision concerning it, that it was
positively forced upon the attention of the assembled Fathers. When,
therefore, they came to discuss the primacy and the temporalities of the
Sovereign Pontiff in connection with the Church of Christ, they hesitated
not to consider, at the same time, his immunity from error when speaking,
as Head of the Church and successor of Saint Peter, _ex cathedra_ on
matters of faith and morals. The learning of theologians and the ability
of orators were brought into requisition, and the fact came prominently
out that it had been according to the mind of the Church at all times,
that the Pope, the successor of St. Peter, is divinely assisted when
pronouncing solemnly _ex cathedra_ on questions of faith and morals. When
so pronouncing, the decisions of the Supreme Pastor have always been
accepted by the Church, whether dispersed or assembled in council. It is a
received belief among Christians that to every legitimate office is
attached a grace of vocation. Is it not, therefore, in accordance with
reason and Christian faith, that such grace should belong, and specially
to the highest and most important of all offices? Such grace or assistance
was promised to St. Peter, and through him to his successors, who are
appointed to bear witness throughout all time to the truths of Divine
revelation. For our blessed Lord declared, “I am with you all days.” He
could not better have secured the permanence of his religion—the kingdom
of God on earth, for the salvation of men in every age of the world. When
the Supreme Pastor speaks in the exercise of his sublime office, the
Church also speaks. The teaching and testimony of the Head of the Church
and of the great body of the Church are identical. They must always be in
harmony, as was so admirably shown by the decision of the council on
infallibility and the confirmation thereof by the Holy Father—_confirma
fratres tuous_—“confirm thy brethren.” Let not the opponents of the Church
and her salutary doctrines be carried away by the idea that a subservient
council wished only to glorify their spiritual Chief by ascribing to him
imaginary personal gifts. They were incapable of any such thing. They were
an assembly of the most venerable men in Christendom, who felt all the
weight of their responsibility to God and men in the exercise of their
sacred functions. Their decision has not altered the position of the
Supreme Pastor. Any writings or discourses which he may produce in his
merely personal or more private capacity are received by the Christian
world with that degree of consideration to which they are entitled on
account of the estimation in which he is held by men as a theologian and a
man of learning and ability. It is only when pronouncing solemnly _ex __
cathedra_, as the successor of St. Peter and the Head of the Church, on
questions of faith and morals, that he is universally believed to be
divinely assisted so as to be above the danger of erring, or of leading
into error—in other words (and we cannot help who may be offended), that
he is infallible.
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR—WITHDRAWAL OF THE FRENCH GARRISON FROM
ROME—ADJOURNMENT OF THE COUNCIL.
Events were now at hand which made it impossible for the council to hold
another session. The French Emperor had greatly fallen, in the estimation
of the people of France, from the time of his shameful abandonment of the
chivalrous Maximilian and the popular design of establishing a Latin
empire on the continent of America. In order to make amends and regain his
_prestige_, he had revived the idea, so dear to the French, of rectifying
the Rhine frontier of France by resuming possession of Luxembourg and some
other adjacent provinces. He formally intimated his design to Prussia.
That Power, however, aware of its rights and conscious of its military
superiority, declined all negotiation on the subject. From that moment
Prussia held herself in readiness to repel, with the sword, if necessary,
any insolence that, in the future, might proceed from her aggressive
neighbor, for whose tottering throne war was a necessity. The candidature
of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the throne of Spain now afforded a
pretext, which Napoleon III. was only too anxious to find, for provoking
by a fresh insult his powerful rival. It may be that he dreaded the
accession of strength which might eventually accrue to Prussia if the
crown of Spain were placed on the head of a Prince of the house of
Hohenzollern. Napoleon remonstrated, and threatened war. The youthful
German prince generously renounced a candidature which it was not hard to
see would lead to a rupture between the two Powers, and cause a
destructive war. The King of Prussia, head of the Hohenzollerns,
sanctioned, if he did not command, this act of moderation on the part of
the prince, his relative. But moderation was of no avail. Napoleon,
surrounded by a Jacobinical ministry, insisted upon war. The very idea of
proposing a German for the throne of Spain appeared to him to be a
sufficient cause for issuing a declaration of hostilities. The gauntlet
thus thrown down, the Prussian monarch was too chivalrous to decline the
challenge. He relied on his great military strength, and could afford to
despise the comparatively inferior preparations of the French Empire. With
the vast resources of France at his command, the Emperor, one would
suppose, might have managed, in the course of three years, to increase and
discipline his army, garrison his fortresses and seek alliances. He might
have taken more time if necessary. He had no need to precipitate events,
as he so recklessly did, by declaring war when there was positively no
preparation made for it. We shall presently see whether he were not one of
those whom Providence deprives of reason when it has resolved on their
destruction. In the absence of more effective preparations, the small
garrison at Rome of five thousand men was withdrawn in order to augment
the army which all France believed was destined to crush the formidable
Teuton and capture Berlin. If, however, this had been Napoleon’s only
object in recalling the troops, he could have accomplished it as easily by
ordering four thousand five hundred of the Roman garrison to join the
invading army, leaving the remaining five hundred to guard the city of the
Popes. This smaller number would surely have been as able as five thousand
to repel a Piedmontese force of sixty thousand men. But there was question
of more than mere physical power. So long as it was evident that France
protected the Papal city, whether by a greater or smaller number of
soldiers, the legions of Piedmont never would have marched against it.
Napoleon’s minister, M. de Gramont, revealed the pretext: “It is certainly
not from strategetical necessity that we evacuate the Roman States, but
the political urgency is obvious. We must conciliate the good-will of the
Italian Cabinet.” Much, indeed, it availed them.
Viterbo was evacuated on the 4th of August. The last remnant of French
troops embarked at Civita Vecchia, partly on the 4th and partly on the
6th, the very days on which the French army experienced its first reverses
at Weissemberg, Wœrth and Spikeren. Instead of hesitating to perform a
most cowardly act, which, viewing it only politically, proclaimed his
weakness to all Europe, the Emperor Napoleon made all haste to complete
it. He expressed regret. Who will say that he was sincere? Had he not
perfected the master-work of his reign—his grand transalpine scheme? The
Piedmontese minister, Visconti Venosta, gives a very distinct reply.
Writing to the Piedmontese representatives at foreign courts, this
minister says that as several governments had desired to know their views
in regard to the relation of passing events with the Roman question, his
government had no hesitation in making the clearest explanations. The
convention of 15th September, 1864, had not sufficed to avert the causes
arising abroad which hindered the settlement of the Roman difficulty. He
then accuses the Roman Court of having assumed a hostile attitude in the
centre of the peninsula, and that the consequences of such a position
might be serious for Piedmont on occasion of the Franco-Prussian war and
the complications to which it might give rise. Visconti Venosta further
states that the basis of a new and definite solution of the Roman question
had been confidentially recognized in principle, and was subject only to
the condition of opportunity.
It is no pleasure, surely, to convict the late Emperor of a deep-laid
conspiracy to revolutionize the Roman State, and rob the Holy Father of
his time-honored patrimony. But there is no escaping the conclusion that
he had never ceased to plot with the revolutionists. He was not yet
vanquished and fallen himself when he left the Sovereign Pontiff to his
enemies.
One of the chief calumnies of the time was directed by the revolutionists
against Pius IX. They accused the venerable Pontiff of encouraging the
Prussian monarch to wage war against France. The falsehood of this
accusation can only be equalled by its absurdity. The Holy Father, on the
contrary, earnestly endeavored, although in vain, before the commencement
of hostilities, to avert the dire calamity of war. So early as 22nd July,
1870, he interposed between the two rival sovereigns. “Sire,” he wrote to
the King of Prussia, “in the most serious circumstances in which we are
placed, it will appear to you unusual to receive a letter from me. But as
I hold the office of Vicar of the God of peace in this world, I cannot do
less than offer you my mediation. It is my desire that all preparations
for war should disappear, and that the evils which inevitably follow
should be prevented. My mediation is that of a sovereign who, in his
capacity of king, cannot, on account of the smallness of his territory,
excite any jealousy, but who, nevertheless, will inspire confidence by the
moral and religious influence which he personifies. May God hear my
prayers! and may He also accept those which I offer for your Majesty, with
whom I desire to be united in the common bond of charity.
Pius PP. IX.”
“I have written also to the Emperor of the French.”
The King of Prussia replied from Berlin on the 30th July. The kindly
monarch expressed himself beautifully and with the finest feeling: “Most
blessed Pontiff—I was not surprised but deeply moved when I read the
feeling words which you wrote, in order to cause the voice of the God of
peace to be heard. How could I be deaf to such a powerful appeal? God is
my witness that neither I nor my people have desired this war. In
fulfilment of the sacred duties which God lays on sovereigns and on
nations, we have drawn the sword in order to defend the independence and
honor of our country, and we are prepared to lay it down as soon as these
blessings shall no longer be in danger of being torn from us. If your
Holiness could offer me, on the part of him who has so unexpectedly
declared war, the assurance of sincerely pacific dispositions and of
guarantees against a renewal of such violation of the peace and
tranquillity of Europe, I certainly would be far from refusing to accept
them at the venerable hands of your Holiness, united as I am with you by
the bonds of Christian charity and true friendship. WILLIAM.”
The letter of Pius IX. to the French Emperor has not been published, and
it is not known whether Napoleon deigned to reply. One thing is certain.
He did not either accept the mediation or heed the remonstrances of the
Holy Father. He was equally deaf to the warnings of his old allies of
Crimean fame. The British government despatched to Paris a member of the
cabinet, who, in a prolonged interview with the demented Emperor, argued
earnestly on the part of Queen Victoria and her ministry against his
purposed violation of the peace of Europe by undertaking an unprovoked,
unjust and irrational war.
The war broke out. It was waged disastrously to the French. Pius IX. was
deeply grieved. “Poor France!” he exclaimed, as he heard of each new
defeat of the nation that he loved so well. He interposed once more. But
with the like ill success. Neither could the Germans be checked in their
victorious career, nor could the vanquished French be induced to
acknowledge their defeat and seek such terms of peace as might possibly
have been obtained. On 12th November, 1870, the Holy Father wrote to Mgr.
Guibert, Archbishop of Tours, in whose palace was resident a delegation of
the French government.
“Neglect nothing,” wrote the Pontiff, “we conjure you, in order to prevail
on your illustrious guests to put an end to this war. Nevertheless, we are
not unaware that it does not depend on them alone, and that we should
vainly pursue the great object of peace, if our pacific ministry did not
also meet with support on the part of the conqueror. So we have not
hesitated to write to this effect to his Majesty the King of Prussia. We
cannot, indeed, affirm anything as to the favorable result of the step
which we have taken. We have, nevertheless, some ground for hope, as this
monarch has in other circumstances shown us much good-will.”
Unfortunately, the bold men who had assumed supreme authority in France,
and had undertaken the difficult task of saving the country, were
incapable of accepting good advice, especially when it came from a Pope.
The King of Prussia and his minister, on the other hand, were of the
number of those whom victory intoxicates, and whom the power to dare
everything deprives of all sense of moderation. Pius IX. did not know them
as yet. The representations of Mgr. Guibert to Messrs. Cremieux, Glais
Bisoin and Gambetta, were not more successful than those of Mgr.
Ledochowski, Archbishop of Posen, who hastened to the presence of King
William at Versailles. The earnest endeavors of the archbishop met with
less consideration, to all appearance, at least, although it does not
appear that, on this occasion, William made any reply to Pius IX.
Notwithstanding these untoward circumstances, the Holy Pontiff never lost
confidence in the nation of Charlemagne and St. Louis. France, he said,
although sadly exhausted and bathed in blood, would yet show excellent
fruits.
The Piedmontese government, which had been for some time established at
Florence, now resolved to avail itself of the disasters of France to seize
the city of the Popes, and to constitute it the capital of regenerated
Italy. The minister, Visconti Venosta, in a circular letter, renewed his
calumnies, pretending that a hostile power existed in the centre of Italy,
and hypocritically declared that it had become necessary that the
government of his master should assume the protection of the Holy See.
They would not wait, he said, moreover, till the agitation at home should
lead to the effusion of blood between the Romans and foreign forces, but
would proceed, as soon as they could learn that the opportune time had
come, to occupy what remained to the Holy Father of the Roman States. The
information which the minister sought came with remarkable rapidity. The
day after the circular alluded to was written, another minister, Signor
Lanza, declared that the solemn moment had arrived when the government of
his king was called upon, in the interest of the Holy See and of Italy, to
take measures for the national safety. An envoy was despatched to Rome,
with a letter to the Pope, assuring him that the king’s government was
firmly resolved to give the necessary guarantees for the spiritual
independence of the Holy See, and that these guarantees would be hereafter
the subject of negotiations with the Powers that were interested in the
Papacy. In addition to this mockery of diplomacy, Victor Emmanuel himself
wrote to the Pope, expressing his filial devotedness, while at the same
time he was preparing, from an excess of affection, to bombard his city
and slay his defenders, to rob him from an excessive zeal for justice, to
imprison him in order to set him free, and, finally, that he ought to
allow all this to be done without complaint, and even thank the good king
who took so much care of him.
The Florentine Envoy, Signor Ponza di San Martino, when he came to Rome,
made his first visit to Cardinal Antonelli, who received him politely, and
did not refuse to ask for him an interview with the Pope. The cardinal,
however, declined to have any conversation with him on the object of his
mission. “I know already,” said he, “all that you could tell me. You are
also aware of the reply that I would give. Force, not argument, speaks at
present.” Pius IX. was more afflicted than surprised when he read King
Victor Emmanuel’s letter. He was particularly pained by the tone of this
document. “How the revolution has abased a Prince of the House of Savoy!
It is not satisfied with dethroning kings as often as it can, and with
committing their heads to the guillotine. It must also dishonor them.” The
envoy insisted that the king was sincere; that he was more convinced than
any other, that the independence of the Chief of the Church was a
necessity; and that he offered real and substantial guarantees to this
independence. “And who will guarantee these guarantees” asked the Pope.
“Your king cannot promise anything. He is no longer a king. He depends on
his parliament, which, in its turn, depends on the secret societies.” The
ambassador, more disconcerted than ever, remarked on the difficulties of
the time. He claimed, although timidly, that the king ought to be judged
according to his intentions, as at the time he was constrained by the
aspirations of four-and-twenty millions of Italians. “Your statement is
untrue, sir,” replied Pius IX. “You calumniate Italy! Of these
four-and-twenty millions, twenty-three millions are devoted to me, love
and respect me, and only require that the revolution leave them and me in
peace. The remaining million you have poisoned with false doctrines and
inspired with base passions. These unfortunate people are the friends of
your king and the instigators of his ambitious designs. When they have no
longer need of him they will cast him aside. My answer will be
communicated to you to-morrow. I am too much moved with grief and
indignation to be able to write at present.” Next day, accordingly, 11th
September, the following reply to Victor Emmanuel was conveyed to Signor
Ponza:
“SIRE,—Count Ponza di San Martino has handed me a letter which it has
pleased your Majesty to address to me. This letter is not worthy of an
affectionate son who glories in professing the Catholic faith, and who
prides himself on being royally loyal. I dwell not on the details
contained in the letter, in order to avoid renewing the pain which a first
reading of it gave me. I bless God, who has permitted that your Majesty
should overwhelm with bitterness the last years of my life. I cannot admit
the demands made in your letter, nor adopt the principles which it
contains. I call upon God anew, and commend to Him my cause, which is also
wholly His own. I beseech Him to bestow abundant graces on your Majesty,
to deliver you from all danger, and to grant you all the mercy which you
require.” This answer was not waited for. Victor Emmanuel made haste to
become the declared enemy of Pius IX. On 11th September, the Pontifical
territory was invaded by his orders at three different
points—Aquapendente, in the north: Orte and Correse, to the east; and on
the south, Ceprano. The invading army amounted to sixty thousand men.
After the withdrawal of the French garrison, there remained only at Rome
the few soldiers who constituted the army of the Pope. A great portion of
these were, to the lasting honor of a remote British dependency,
Canadians. They all deserved well of the Holy Father, and had imperilled
their lives in his service. On occasion of the great difficulty which had
arisen, accordingly, he was pleased to address to them in person special
words of comfort and encouragement.
It was evident that, in the adverse circumstances of the time, the Council
of the Vatican could not long continue its deliberations. Accordingly, the
Holy Father authorized such of the bishops as desired to retire to return
to their dioceses until the feast of St. Martin, 11th November following,
at which date it was intended to resume the labors of the council. It was
not, however, strictly speaking, suspended. Some general congregations
(committees) were still held, and the various deputations continued their
studies. During this time, the bishops of the minority, one after another,
expressed their adhesion. The bishops, on returning to their dioceses,
were received with magnificent proofs of the people’s fidelity. Some
parties pretending that the Constitution, _Pastor æternus_, was not
obligatory, because the council was not terminated, Cardinal Antonelli
addressed to the Papal Nuncio at Brussels a letter under date of 11th
August, which removed all doubt on the subject. The rapid march of events,
however, rendered it necessary to interrupt the labors of the assembled
Fathers. On 20th October, accordingly, Pius IX. published the Bull,
_Postquam Dei Munere_, which suspended them for an indefinite period.