And here we must give the perhaps unexpected answer that, unfortunately,

matters are here actually just reversed; science does not stand before

the accomplishment of our author. Between the essential facts of

heredity and constitution, and the seemingly complete creations of

delusion, there yawns a breach which we find filled up by the writer of

_Gradiva_. Science does not yet recognize the significance of repression

nor the fact that it needs the unconscious for explanation to the world

of psychopathological phenomena; it does not seek the basis of delusion

in psychic conflict, and does not regard its symptoms as a

compromise-formation. Then our author stands alone against all science?

No, not that—if the present writer may reckon his own works as science.

For he, himself, has for some years interceded—and until recently

almost alone[3]—for the views which he finds here in _Gradiva_ by W.

Jensen, and he has presented them in technical terms. He has pointed out

exhaustively, for the conditions known as hysteria and obsession, the

suppression of impulses and the repression of the ideas, through which

the suppressed impulse is represented, as a characteristic condition of

psychic disturbance, and he has repeated the same view soon afterwards

for many kinds of delusion.[4] Whether the impulses which are, for this

reason, considered are always components of the sex-impulse, or might be

of a different nature, is a problem of indifference in the analysis of

_Gradiva_, as, in the case chosen by the author, it is a matter only of

the suppression of the erotic feeling. The views concerning psychic

conflict, and the formation of symptoms by compromises between the two

psychic forces which are struggling with each other, the present writer

has found valid in cases professionally treated and actually observed,

in exactly the same way that he was able to observe it in Norbert

Hanold, the invention of our author.[5] The tracing back of neurotic,

especially of hysterically morbid activities to the influence of

unconscious thoughts, P. Janet, the pupil of the great Charcot, had

undertaken before the present writer, and in conjunction with Josef

Breuer in Vienna.[6]

It had actually occurred to the present writer, when, in the years

following 1893, he devoted himself to investigations of the origin of

psychic disturbances, to seek confirmation of his results from authors,

and therefore it was no slight surprise to him to learn that in

_Gradiva_, published in 1903, an author gave to his creation the very

foundation which the former supposed that he, himself, was finding

authority for, as new, from his experiences as a physician. How did the

author come upon the same knowledge as the physician, at least upon a

procedure which would suggest that he possessed it?

Norbert Hanold’s delusion, we said, acquires further development through

a dream, which he has in the midst of his efforts to authenticate a gait

like Gradiva’s in the streets of his home-city. The content of this

dream we can outline briefly. The dreamer is in Pompeii on that day

which brought destruction to the unfortunate city, experiences the

horrors without himself getting into danger, suddenly sees Gradiva

walking there and immediately understands, as quite natural, that, as

she is, of course, a Pompeiian, she is living in her native city and

“without his having any suspicion of it, was his contemporary.” He is

seized with fear for her, calls to her, whereupon she turns her face

toward him momentarily. Yet she walks on without heeding him at all,

lies down on the steps of the Apollo temple, and is buried by the rain

of ashes, after her face has changed colour as if it were turning to

white marble, until it completely resembles a bas-relief. On awakening,

he interprets the noise of the metropolis, which reaches his ear, as the

cries for help of the desperate inhabitants of Pompeii and the booming

of the turbulent sea. The feeling that what he has dreamed has really

happened to him persists for some time after his awakening, and the

conviction that Gradiva lived in Pompeii and died on that fatal day

remains from this dream as a new, supplementary fact for his delusion.

It is less easy for us to say what the author of _Gradiva_ intended by

this dream, and what caused him to connect the development of this

delusion directly with a dream. Assiduous investigation of dreams has,

to be sure, gathered enough examples of the fact that mental disturbance

is connected with and proceeds from dreams,[7] and even in the

life-history of certain eminent men, impulses for important deeds and

decisions are said to have been engendered by dreams; but our

comprehension does not gain much by these analogies; let us hold,

therefore, to our case, the case of the archæologist, Norbert Hanold, a

fiction of our author. At which end must one lay hold of such a dream to

introduce meaning into it, if it is not to remain an unnecessary

adornment of fiction? I can imagine that the reader exclaims at this

place: “The dream is, of course, easy to explain—a simple

anxiety-dream, caused by the noise of the metropolis, which is given the

new interpretation of the destruction of Pompeii, by the archæologist

busied with his Pompeiian girl!” On account of the commonly prevailing

disregard of the activities of dreams, one usually limits the demands

for dream-explanations so that one seeks for a part of the dream-content

an external excitation which covers itself by means of the content. This

external excitation for the dream would be given by the noise which

wakens the sleeper; the interest in this dream would be thereby

terminated. Would that we had even one reason to suppose that the

metropolis had been noisier than usual on this morning! If, for example,

our author had not omitted to inform us that Hanold had that night,

contrary to his custom, slept by an open window! What a shame that our

author didn’t take the trouble! And if an anxiety-dream were only so

simple a thing! No, this interest is not terminated in so simple a way.

The connection with the external, sensory stimulus is not at all

essential for the dream-formation. The sleeper can neglect this

excitation from the outer world; he may be awakened by it without

forming a dream, he may also weave it into his dream, as happens here,

if it is of no use to him from any other motive; and there is an

abundance of dreams for whose content such a determination by a sensory

excitation of the sleeper cannot be shown. No, let us try another way.

Perhaps we can start from the residue which the dream leaves in Hanold’s

waking life. It had formerly been his fancy that Gradiva was a

Pompeiian. Now this assumption becomes a certainty and the second

certainty is added that she was buried there in the year 79.[8]

Sorrowful feelings accompany this progress of the formation of the

delusion like an echo of the fear which had filled the dream. This new

grief about Gradiva will seem to us not exactly comprehensible; Gradiva

would now have been dead for many centuries even if she had been saved

in the year 79 from destruction. Or ought one to be permitted to

squabble thus with either Norbert Hanold or his creator? Here, too, no

way seems to lead to explanation. We wish, nevertheless, to remark that

a very painful, emotional stress clings to the augmentation which the

delusion derives from this dream.

Otherwise, however, our perplexity is not dispelled. This dream does not

explain itself; we must decide to borrow from _Traumdeutung_ by the

present writer, and to use some of the rules given there for the

solution of dreams.

One of these rules is that a dream is regularly connected with the day

before the dream. Our author seems to wish to intimate that he has

followed this rule by connecting the dream directly with Hanold’s

“pedestrian investigations.” Now the latter means nothing but a search

for Gradiva whom he expects to recognize by her characteristic manner of

walking. The dream ought, therefore, to contain a reference to where

Gradiva is to be found. It really does contain it by showing her in

Pompeii, but that is no news for us.

Another rule says: If, after the dream, the reality of the

dream-pictures continues unusually long so that one cannot free himself

from the dream, this is not a kind of mistake in judgment called forth

by the vividness of the dream-pictures, but is a psychic act in itself,

an assurance which refers to the dream-content, that something in it is

as real as it has been dreamed to be, and one is right to believe this

assurance. If we stop at these two rules, we must decide that the dream

gives real information about the whereabouts of Gradiva, who is being

sought. We now know Hanold’s dream; does the application of these two

rules lead to any sensible meaning?

Strange to say, yes. This meaning is disguised only in a special way so

that one does not recognize it immediately. Hanold learns in the dream

that the girl sought lives in the city and in his own day. That is, of

course, true of Zoë Bertgang, only that in his dream the city is not the

German university-city, but Pompeii, the time not the present, but the

year 79, according to our reckoning. It is a kind of disfigurement by

displacement; not Gradiva is transported to the present, but the dreamer

to the past; but we are also given the essential and new fact _that he

shares locality and time with the girl sought_. Whence, then, this

dissimulation and disguise which must deceive us as well as the dreamer

about the peculiar meaning and content of the dream? Well, we have

already means at hand to give us a satisfactory answer to this question.

Let us recall all that we have heard about the nature and origin of

fancies, these preliminaries of delusion. They are substitution for and

remnants of different repressed memories, which a resistance does not

allow to push into consciousness, which, however, become conscious by

heeding the censor of resistance, by means of transformations and

disfigurements. After this compromise is completed, the former memories

have become fancies, which may easily be misunderstood by the conscious

person, that is, may be understood to be the ruling psychic force. Now

let us suppose that the dream-pictures are the so-called physiological

delusion-products of a man, the compromise-results of that struggle

between what is repressed and what is dominant, which exist probably

even in people absolutely normal in the daytime. Then we understand that

we have to consider the dream something disfigured behind which there is

to be sought something else, not disfigured, but, in a sense, something

offensive, like Hanold’s repressed memories behind his fancies. One

expresses the admitted opposition by distinguishing what the dreamer

remembers on waking, as _manifest dream-content_, from what formed the

basis of the dream before the censor’s disfigurement, _the latent

dream-thoughts_. To interpret a dream, then, means to translate the

manifest dream-content into the latent dream-thoughts, which make

retrogressive the disfigurement that had to be approved by the

resistance censor. When we turn these deliberations to the dream which

is occupying us, we find that the latent dream-thoughts must have been

as follows: “The girl who has that beautiful walk, whom you are seeking,

lives really in this city with you;” but in this form the thought could

not become conscious; in its way there stood the fact that a fancy had

established, as a result of a former compromise, the idea that Gradiva

was a Pompeiian girl, and therefore nothing remained, if the actual fact

of her living in the same locality and at the same time was to be

perceived, but to assume the disfigurement: you are living in Pompeii at

the time of Gradiva; and this then is the idea which the manifest

dream-content realizes and represents as a present time which he is

living in.

A dream is rarely the representation, one might say the staging, of a

single thought, but generally of a number of them, a web of thoughts. In

Hanold’s dream there is conspicuous another component of the content,

whose disfigurement is easily put aside so that one may learn the latent

idea represented by it. This is the end of the dream to which the

assurance of reality can also be extended. In the dream the beautiful

walker, Gradiva, is transformed into a bas-relief. That is, of course,

nothing but an ingenious and poetic representation of the actual

procedure. Hanold had, indeed, transferred his interest from the living

girl to the bas-relief; the beloved had been transformed into a stone

relief. The latent dream-thoughts, which remain unconscious, wish to

transform the relief back into the living girl; in connection with the

foregoing they speak to him somewhat as follows: “You are, of course,

interested in the bas-relief of Gradiva only because it reminds you of

the present, here-living Zoë.” But this insight would mean the end of

the delusion, if it could become conscious.

Is it our duty to substitute unconscious thoughts thus for every single

bit of the manifest dream-content? Strictly speaking, yes; in the

interpretation of a dream which had actually been dreamed, we should not

be allowed to avoid this duty. The dreamer would then have to give us an

exhaustive account. It is easily understood that we cannot enforce such

a demand in connection with the creature of our author; we will not,

however, overlook the fact that we have not yet submitted the chief

content of this dream to the work of interpretation and translation.

Hanold’s dream is, of course, an anxiety-dream. Its content is fearful;

anxiety is felt by the dreamer in sleep, and painful feelings remain

after it. That is not of any great help for our attempt at explanation;

we are again forced to borrow largely from the teachings of

dream-interpretation. This admonishes us not to fall into the error of

deriving the fear that is felt in a dream from the content of a dream,

not to use the dream-content like the content of ideas of waking life.

It calls to our attention how often we dream the most horrible things

without feeling any trace of fear. Rather the true fact is a quite

different one, which cannot be easily guessed, but can certainly be

proved. The fear of the anxiety-dream corresponds to a sex-feeling, a

libidinous emotion, like every neurotic fear, and has, through the

process of repression, proceeded from the libido.[9] In the

interpretation of dreams, therefore, one must substitute for fear sexual

excitement. The fear which has thus come into existence, exercises

now—not regularly, but often—a selective influence on the

dream-content and brings into the dream ideational elements which seem

suitable to this fear for the conscious and erroneous conception of the

dream. This is, as has been said, by no means regularly the case, for

there are anxiety dreams in which the content is not at all frightful,

in which, therefore, one cannot explain consciously the anxiety

experienced.

I know that this explanation of fear in dreams sounds odd, and is not

easily believed; but I can only advise making friends with it. It would,

moreover, be remarkable if Norbert Hanold’s dream allowed itself to be

connected with this conception of fear and to be explained by it. We

should then say that in the dreamer, at night, the erotic desire stirs,

makes a powerful advance to bring his memory of the beloved into

consciousness and thus snatch him from the delusion, experiences

rejection and transformation into fear, which now, on its part, brings

the fearful pictures from the academic memory of the dreamer into the

dream-content. In this way the peculiar unconscious content of the

dream, the amorous longing for the once known Zoë, is transformed into

the manifest-content of the destruction of Pompeii and the loss of

Gradiva.

I think that sounds quite plausible so far. One might justly demand that

if erotic wishes form the undisfigured content of this dream, then one

must be able to point out, in the transformed dream, at least a

recognizable remnant of them hidden somewhere. Well, perhaps even this

will come about with the help of a suggestion which appears later in the

story. At the first meeting with the supposed Gradiva, Hanold remembers

this dream and requests the apparition to lie down again as he has seen

her.[10] Thereupon the young lady rises, indignant, and leaves her

strange companion, in whose delusion-ridden speech she has heard the

suggestion of an improper erotic wish. I think we may adopt Gradiva’s

interpretation; even from a real dream one cannot always demand more

definiteness for the representation of an erotic wish.

Thus the application of some rules of dream-interpretation have been

successful on Hanold’s first dream, in making this dream comprehensible

to us in its chief features, and in fitting it into the sequence of the

story. Then it must probably have been produced by its author with due

consideration for these rules. One could raise only one more question:

why the author should introduce a dream for further development of the

delusion. Well, I think that is very cleverly arranged and again keeps

faith with reality. We have already heard that in actual illness the

formation of a delusion is very often connected with a dream, but after

our explanation of the nature of dreams, we need find no new riddle in

this fact. Dreams and delusion spring from the same source, the

repressed; the dream is, so to speak, the physiological delusion of the

normal human being. Before the repressed has become strong enough to

push itself up into waking life as delusion, it may easily have won its

first success under the more favourable circumstances of sleep, in the

form of a dream having after-effects. During sleep, with the diminution

of psychic activity, there enters a slackening in the strength of the

resistance, which the dominant psychic forces oppose to the repressed.

This slackening is what makes the dream-formation possible and therefore

the dream becomes, for us, the best means of approach to knowledge of

the unconscious psyche. Only the dream usually passes rapidly with the

re-establishment of the psychic revival of waking life, and the ground

won by the unconscious is again vacated.

III

In the further course of the story there is another dream, which can

tempt us, even more perhaps than the first, to try to interpret it and

fit it into the psychic life of the hero; but we save little if we leave

the representation of the author of _Gradiva_ here, to hasten directly

to this second dream, for whoever wishes to interpret the dream of

another, cannot help concerning himself, as extensively as possible,

with every subjective and objective experience of the dreamer. Therefore

it would be best to hold to the thread of the story and provide this

with our commentaries as we progress.

The new delusion of the death of Gradiva at the destruction of Pompeii

in the year 79 is not the only after-effect of the first dream analysed

by us. Directly afterwards Hanold decides upon a trip to Italy, which

finally takes him to Pompeii. Before this, however, something else has

happened to him; leaning from his window, he thinks he sees on the

street a figure with the bearing and walk of his Gradiva, hastens after

her, in spite of his scanty attire, does not overtake her, but is driven

back by the jeers of the people on the street. After he has returned to

his room, the song of a canary whose cage hangs in the window of the

opposite house calls forth in him a mood such as if he wished to get

from prison into freedom, and the spring trip is immediately decided

upon and accomplished.

Our author has put this trip of Hanold’s in an especially strong light,

and has given to the latter partial clearness about his subjective

processes. Hanold has, of course, given himself a scientific purpose for

his journey, but this is not substantial. Yet he knows that the “impulse

to travel has originated in a nameless feeling.” A peculiar restlessness

makes him dissatisfied with everything he encounters and drives him from

Rome to Naples, from there to Pompeii, without his mood’s being set

right, even at the last halting-place. He is annoyed by the foolishness

of honeymoon travellers, and is enraged over the boldness of

house-flies, which populate the hotels of Pompeii; but finally he does

not deceive himself over the fact that “his dissatisfaction was

certainly not caused by his surroundings alone, but, to a degree, found

its origin in him.” He considers himself over-excited, feels “that he

was out of sorts because he lacked something without being able to

explain what, and this ill-humour he took everywhere with him.” In such

a mood he is enraged even at his mistress, science; as he wanders for

the first time in the glow of the midday sun through Pompeii, all his

science had left him without the least desire to rediscover it; “he

remembered it as from a great distance, and he felt that it had been an

old, dried-up, boresome aunt, dullest and most superfluous creature in

the world.” (_G._ p. 48.)

In this uncomfortable and confused state of mind, one of the riddles

which are connected with this journey is solved for him at the moment

when he first sees Gradiva walking through Pompeii; “he became

conscious, for the first time, that he had, without himself knowing the

motive in his heart, come to Italy on that account and had, without

stop, continued from Rome and Naples to Pompeii to see if he could here

find trace of her—and that in a literal sense—for, with her unusual

gait, she must have left behind in the ashes a foot-print different from

all the others.” (_G._ p. 50.)

As our author has put so much care into the delineation of this trip, it

must be worth our while to explain its relation to Hanold’s delusion and

its place in the sequence of events. The journey is undertaken for

motives which the character does not at first recognize and does not

admit until later, motives which our author designates directly as

“unconscious.” This is certainly true to life; one does not need to have

a delusion to act thus; rather it is an everyday occurrence, even for

normal people, that they are deceived about the motives of their actions

and do not become conscious of them until subsequently, when a conflict

of several emotional currents re-establishes for them the condition for

such confusion. Hanold’s trip, therefore, was intended, from the

beginning, to serve the delusion, and was to take him to Pompeii to

continue there the search for Gradiva. Let us remember that before, and

directly after the dream, this search filled his mind and that the dream

itself was only a stifled answer of his consciousness to the question of

the whereabouts of Gradiva. Some force which we do not recognize,

however, next prevents the plan of the delusion from becoming conscious,

so that only insufficient pretexts, which can be but partially revived,

remain as a conscious motivation for the trip. The author gives us

another riddle by having the dream, the discovery of the supposed

Gradiva on the street, and the decision to make the journey because of

the influence of the singing canary follow one another like chance

occurrences without inner coherence.

Delusion and Dream : an Interpretation in the Light of Psychoanalysis of Gradiva · 第 10 / 13 段