On May 11, the first time for eighteen days and nights, it was found
possible to withdraw the 29th Division from the actual firing line and
to replace it by the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and by the 42nd
Division, which had completed its disembarkation two days previously.
The withdrawal gave no respite from shells, but at least the men were,
most nights, enabled to sleep.
The moment lent itself to reflection, and during this breathing space I
was able to realize we had now nearly reached the limit of what could
be attained by mingling initiative with surprise. The enemy was as much
in possession of my numbers and dispositions as I was in possession of
their first line of defence; the opposing fortified fronts stretched
parallel from sea to straits; there was little scope left now, either
at Achi Baba or at Kaba Tepe, for tactics which would fling flesh
and blood battalions against lines of unbroken barbed wire. Advances
must more and more tend to take the shape of concentrated attacks on
small sections of the enemy's line after full artillery preparation.
Siege warfare was soon bound to supersede manœuvre battles in the
open. Consolidation and fortification of our front, improvement of
approaches, selection of machine-gun emplacements and scientific
grouping of our artillery under a centralized control must ere long
form the tactical basis of our plans.
So soon, then, as the troops had enjoyed a day or two of comparative
rest I divided my front into four sections. On the left was the 29th
Division, to which the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was attached. In
the left centre came the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, on the right
centre stood the Royal Naval Division, and at my right was the Corps
Expéditionnaire. Thus I secured organization in depth as well as front,
enabling each division to arrange for its own reliefs, supports, and
reserves, and giving strength for defence as well as attack. Hitherto
the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements had forced a hand-to-mouth
procedure upon head-quarters; now the control became more decentralized.
Already, before the new system of local efforts had come into working
order, the 29th Indian Brigade had led the way towards it by a
brilliant little affair on the night of May 10-11. The Turkish right
rested upon the steep cliff north-east of Y beach, where the King's Own
Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion, Royal Naval Division,
had made their first landing. Since those days the enemy had converted
the bluff into a powerful bastion, from which the fire of machine-guns
had held up the left of our attacks. Two gallant attempts by the Royal
Munster Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers to establish a footing
on this cliff on May 8 and 9 had both of them failed.