THREE FORMIDABLE FORTRESSES

The three dominating features in this southern section seemed to me to

be:

(1) Sari Bair Mountain, running up in a succession of almost

perpendicular escarpments to 970 feet. The whole mountain seemed to be

a network of ravines and covered with thick jungle.

(2) Kilid Bahr plateau, which rises, a natural fortification

artificially fortified, to a height of 700 feet to cover the forts of

the Narrows from an attack from the Aegean.

(3) Achi Babi, a hill 600 feet in height, dominating at long field-gun

range what I have described as being the toe of the peninsula.

A peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern sector is that

from Achi Babi to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon,

presenting only its outer edges to direct fire from the sea. The inside

of the spoon appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full

of spurs, nullahs, and confused under-features.

Generally speaking the coast is precipitous, and good landing-places

are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu is a small sandy bay (W), and half

a mile north of it is another small break in the cliffs (X). Two

miles farther up the coast the mouth of a stream indents these same

cliffs (Y 2), and yet another mile and a half up a scrub-covered gully

looked as if active infantry might be able to scramble up it on to

heights not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham by Quebec (Y).

Inside Sedd-el-Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about 300 yards across,

facing a semicircle of steeply-rising ground, as the flat bottom of

a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by an old

castle, on the other by a modern fort. By Eski Hissarlik, on the

east of Morto Bay (S), was another small beach, which was, however,

dominated by the big guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there

are two good landing-places on either side of Gaba Tepe. Farther to

the north of that promontory the beach was supposed to be dangerous

and difficult. In most of these landing-places the trenches and lines

of wire entanglements were plainly visible from on board ship. What

seemed to be gun emplacements and infantry redoubts could also be made

out through a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and

of the forces available to man them there was no possibility of judging

except by practical test.

Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to

convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for

flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore

could be expected to meet with success; whereas, on the other hand, a

tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The

landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have described--a

theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for any such

attempt--involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming

in military history except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes.

The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns or else

so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or

three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough

to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration

and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt.

It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as

many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as

well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable if

awkward contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the

force.

The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my landing. Had it

been British weather there would have been no alternative but instantly

to give up the adventure. To land two or three thousand men, and then

to have to break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks

of 34,000 regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back, was not an

eventuality to be lightly envisaged. Whatever happened the weather must

always remain an incalculable factor, but at least by delay till the

end of April we had a fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.

Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatches from the Dardanelles, etc. · 第 16 / 130 题