THE BATTLE OF ARRAS AND VIMY RIDGE.
(APRIL-JUNE 1917.)
The march of the batteries from the Somme to Arras proved very exacting;
not only were the weather conditions rather more than bad—intense cold
and wet being experienced the whole time—but also the batteries, already
deprived of their commanders, were further depleted on the second day of
the march, when an order was received for one officer and twenty men
from every battery to go forward by motor lorry to work upon the
positions which had been allotted for occupation. A measure of praise is
due to those, in many cases, junior officers who under difficult
conditions, short of personnel and in foul weather led the batteries
over the long road through Talmas and Bealcourt towards Arras, now at
last disclosed as the goal of the 33rd Divisional Artillery.
All along the line of that march the direction of the coming battle was
clearly indicated. Vast columns filled the road, columns of infantry,
guns and transport, columns of motor-lorries and ambulances, all with
their faces set towards the north, all forming part of a great moving
stream inexorable in its progress. Even to the inexperienced the sight
of these masses moving up, with scarcely a single vehicle passing in the
opposite direction, indicated a great concentration in progress, a
mighty gathering of the storm clouds, and only two questions remained
unanswered; exactly where, and how soon?
While the batteries were marching steadily along, pondering over these
questions, the brigade and battery commanders, who had covered the whole
distance on the 24th, were busily engaged in examining the positions
they were to occupy and the zones to be covered. The 15th Divisional
Artillery, who were in the line at the time, had already in part
prepared the positions to be occupied by the 33rd, and the work and
trouble they had expended thereon won for them a very deep feeling of
gratitude amongst the officers and men who were to benefit by their
labours. Until the arrival of the working parties who had been detached
from the batteries on the line of march, however, no material work could
be done, and accordingly the time was spent in studying the zone to be
covered and in reconnoitring the best O.P.'s from which to shoot.
ORDER OF BATTLE.
APRIL—MAY 1917.
H.Q.R.A.
C.R.A. Brigade Major. Staff Captain.
Brig.-Gen. C. G. Stewart, C.M.G., Major T. E. Capt. W. E.
D.S.O. Durie, M.C. Bownass.
156th Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel B. A. B. Butler.
Adjutant: Capt. B. L. Oxley.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Major Lutyens. Major M. A. Major G. Lomer, Major W. A. T.
Studd, M.C. D.S.O. Barstow, M.C.
Major H. McA. Major Barker.
Richards, M.C.
162nd Brigade.
Lieut.-Colonel O. M. Harris.
Adjutant: Capt. R. H. Pavitt.
"A" Battery. "B" Battery. "C" Battery. "D" Battery.
Major G. Major V. Major A. van Major W. P.
Fetherston, M.C. Benett-Stanford, Straubenzee, M.C. Colfox.
M.C. (_wounded_).
(_wounded_).
Major H. C. Cory, Capt. W. G.
M.C. Pringle.
Major L. Hill.
The strategical cat was now well out of the bag. A great attack, it was
learnt, was to be launched upon the whole German system from and
including Vimy Ridge on the left to a point well south of Arras on the
right. The 33rd Divisional Artillery was to be responsible for the zone
immediately south of the river Scarpe, and, after taking part in the
preliminary bombardment, was to advance in support of the assaulting
infantry so as to keep in touch with the foremost troops throughout the
battle. With this knowledge the importance of a thorough acquaintance
with the enemy lines was realised, and many hours were spent in front
line and observation station studying the hostile wire, trenches and all
the back areas. For wire-cutting and bombardment of the German front
line our own fire-trench was the best place, and from it a very clear
view of the objectives could, in certain parts, be obtained. In order to
see the opposing support lines and back areas, however, a higher view
point was necessary, and for this purpose certain ruined houses were
utilised in the Faubourg St. Sauveur—an outskirt of Arras on the Cambrai
road—together with the ruins of Blangy and some tall factory chimneys on
the eastern edge of Arras.
The latter offered the most hair-raising experiences at times. On normal
occasions the top of a tall chimney sways in a most noticeable manner
with every gust of wind; when, as was often the case here, a deliberate
shoot was carried out upon it by the enemy, and 5·9 in. shells were
bursting around its base, it really seemed to the wretched observer,
perched on an iron cross-bar at the top, that the chimney must sooner or
later sway right over and break in two, even if a well-aimed shell did
not by a direct hit effect the same result. Moreover the inhabitants of
these chimneys, being quite near to the enemy trenches, had often the
pleasure of hearing a shell, aimed at some object behind them, whisk
past their ears in the course of its flight so close that it seemed
inevitable that ultimately the chimney must be hit.
With the arrival of the working parties on March 27th real activity set
in. Not only did the pits, platforms and dug-outs begun by the 15th
Division require to be completed, but also accommodation for twelve
thousand rounds of ammunition in every battery position had to be made
ready, while the ammunition which was already there needed sorting.
Moreover, the word was passed round to hurry—time was short, and the day
of attack was not far off. Hurry, indeed, was the watchword, and for
four days the men toiled unceasingly; on the 30th work was redoubled,
for on that day the remainder of the gunners of each battery, which had
arrived at Duisans the previous night, came up into billets at Arras and
continued the work of preparation. In addition to making ready the
battery positions in Arras, advanced positions were ordered to be dug
and ammunition dumped just behind our own front line, whither the
batteries would advance as soon as the first objective in the attack had
been secured. This work was of necessity slow, for detection was easy
and by day hostile aeroplanes caused a maddening series of
interruptions.
On the 30th/31st the first guns of the Divisional Artillery came into
action. "A" and B/156 (Major Lutyens and Major Studd) placed advanced
wire-cutting guns five hundred yards behind Arras Cemetery, while Major
Fetherston (A/162) put a forward section in the garden of a house on the
eastern outskirts of Arras, with the task of cutting wire just south of
the river Scarpe on the enemy second and third lines. Wire-cutting was
immediately begun, and from this date the 33rd Divisional Artillery
started to take its active share in the forthcoming battle.
By April 1st the remaining guns of the brigades which had been left at
the wagon lines were brought into action. From their headquarters in 6,
Rue Jeanne d'Arc and 34, Rue des Capucins, Lieut.-Colonel Butler, who
had just been posted to the 156th Brigade, and Lieut.-Colonel Harris
directed the work of the batteries, which was now exceedingly heavy.
Work on the positions was still in progress, wire-cutting—always a slow
business—was continued day in day out, ammunition needed constant
replenishing, registrations had to be checked and renewed, and gunners
and drivers were being instructed in the route by which the advance to
the forward positions would be made. The brigades lay between the
Baudimont Gate and St. Nicholas, and the advance from there must
inevitably take the batteries over a canal bridge and through narrow
winding streets before they could reach Blangy. Whether that bridge
would be intact when the time came and whether the streets would not be
blocked by shell-torn houses remained to be seen; the route was laid
down for the batteries, and that route had to be known by all ranks.
On Wednesday, April 4th, began the bombardment proper, the five-day
bombardment which was to precede the launching of the Spring offensive.
In secret orders it was known as "V" day, the succeeding days being
designated "W," "X," "Y" and "Z"—"Z" representing zero. From this it
will be seen that originally April 8th was fixed for the attack; on the
6th, however, orders were received that between "X" and "Y" days there
should be a "Q" day, for the attack was postponed for twenty-four hours
and it was necessary that the code system should be continued. Each day
had its own special programme with targets, rates of fire and hours of
bombardment fixed. One day was devoted to the destruction of all woods,
another to trench-junctions, a third to villages and cross-roads, and so
on; the enemy front and support line and his wire were at the same time
kept under continual bombardment by day and night, and every night
prolonged gas-shelling of known and suspected battery positions was
carried out.
The "village" day was a wonderful sight; all around behind the enemy
lines great clouds of smoke and brick-dust hung heavily, in which every
now and then further explosions took place. From Tilloy on the
right—handed over to the mercies of a 15 in. howitzer—from Athies,
Feuchy, Fampoux and numberless others these mighty columns of
destruction could be seen rising, and the casualties amongst the enemy
in the villages, which until now had been left more or less untouched,
must have been tremendous. The enemy retaliation was not heavy; in fact,
its weakness gave rise to the rumour that he, knowing what was coming,
had filled his trenches with wire and had retired to a rear position.
Patrols, however, proved the falsity of this, as did also the harassing
fire which was intermittently directed upon the 33rd Divisional
batteries, and which, although not heavy, was sufficient to cause
casualties and give rise to great worry lest some of the vast piles of
ammunition in the positions should be exploded.
Gradually the day of attack—now definitely fixed for the 9th—drew near.
On the 5th the last armoured telephone cable was laid to the batteries
through the wonderful sewers of Arras, those sewers which, converted
into underground passages and lit with electric light, acted as routes
to the front line and afforded underground shelter for all the reserve
troops when the attack was launched. On the 8th the wagon-lines were
advanced from Duisans to a position just west of Arras; on the 8th also
took place the final reconnaissance of the routes forward which were
carefully marked out with flags—one colour for infantry, another for
guns and a third for cavalry. On the evening of the 8th tanks, lumbering
across country, passed the batteries en route for their position of
assembly, and early on the morning of Easter Monday, April 9th, the
tired detachments, after shelling the enemy battery positions with gas
all night long, set dial sight and range drum for the opening rounds of
the barrage. Huddled under shelter of the gun shields from the cold
drizzle which was falling, they peered out through the gradually
thinning darkness, listening for the blast of the whistle which would
herald the opening burst. All around hung a strange silence; in every
battery position sights were being set and checked, ammunition prepared,
the last necessary arrangements made. In every gun pit along the whole
of that long front Nos. 1 stood waiting for the signal which would turn
the countryside into a roaring volcano.
Sharp to the second at 5.30 A.M. the thin blast of countless whistles
cut the air, long sheets of orange flame stabbed the darkness, and with
a roar and a crash the hundreds of guns burst out, lighting up the
countryside, drowning all other sound and putting down a furious barrage
to protect the infantry who, at the same moment, advanced in long lines
to the assault. Standing in the eastern outskirts of St. Nicholas, the
scene was wonderful. Dark night was of a sudden converted into day by
the flashes of countless guns; with a vast eruption the mine prepared
under the enemy trenches opposite Blangy flung skywards what once had
been solid ground, while to the flashes and tumult were now added
countless rockets and Very lights, fired despairingly by the enemy when
he realised that the expected attack had indeed been launched. At the
same time the ominous rattle and clatter of machine-guns broke out with
increasing intensity as the enemy strove to avoid the hand-to-hand
fighting which, above all others, he dreaded the most.
The front covered by the 33rd Divisional Artillery ran southwards from
the river Scarpe and was assaulted by the 44th and 45th Infantry
Brigades of the 15th Division. To the right of this Division the 12th
and 3rd were advancing to the assault, while the left of the 15th
Division kept in touch with the attacking troops of the 9th to the north
of the Scarpe. The 15th Division formed part of the VI. Corps, with the
VII. Corps on the right and the XVII. on the left. The attacking troops
of the 15th Division were faced by the 10th Grenadier Regiment of the
11th German Division, and it was estimated that six German battalions
were in the actual front line between the river Scarpe and the village
of Tilloy.
The first objective to be taken was the German forward system, and this
was quickly overrun, our troops capturing many prisoners and
establishing themselves along the so-called "Black Line" as arranged,
which ran from the Scarpe, through Fred's Wood and southwards to Tilloy.
Here they halted for a space while our protective barrage roared over
their heads, and then at 7.30 A.M., the scheduled time, they advanced
once more with their ranks reorganised to assault the German Second
Line, known as the "Blue Line," which ran down between the Railway
Triangle and Watery Wood, and was continued along Observatory Ridge to
the Cambrai Road. This line was known to be more strongly held than the
first objective, and here it was feared that our troops would be held
up, for there were many formidable obstacles, such as the Railway
Triangle, to be overcome before the objectives could be secured.
As events turned out, these expectations were in part realised. When the
infantry went over the top at the beginning of the day a subaltern from
each of the artillery brigades accompanied the foremost assaulting line,
while a Captain from the same brigades was attached to each battalion
headquarters. In addition to this, from every battery of the 33rd
Divisional Artillery one subaltern was sent with the attacking troops,
to advance with them and to act as a duplicate source of information
with the other F.O.O.'s; as all these officers were accompanied by
telephonists, signallers and linesmen it was expected that at least some
of them would be able to keep their telephone lines uncut, and would
thereby be able to supply first-hand information of the immediate
tactical situation. It was from this source that information now
arrived.
The Railway Triangle just south of the river had proved, as was
expected, the first serious obstacle to the 15th Division. Here stiff
opposition was met, for the enemy machine gunners in their dug-outs in
the embankment escaped unscathed from the barrage, and succeeded in
bringing heavy fire to bear upon the attacking troops before the latter
were able to get to grips with them. What followed was one of the
inevitable results of a creeping barrage, but also gave occasion for a
very fine feat of arms on the part of the batteries. The barrage
automatically crept on towards the German second line, leaving the
infantry, held up by machine-gun fire, farther and farther behind it.
The forward observing officers, however, seeing the crisis which had
arisen, got news back to the batteries; urgent orders were sent to all
the guns concerned, and the barrage, moving away towards Feuchy,
suddenly halted and returned to the Railway Triangle. Back it came to
drop mightily, inexorably upon the embankment itself, pounding and
blasting away at the hostile machine gunners who had been the cause of
all the trouble, until at a given moment, hastily arranged with the
infantry, it lifted and crept forward again, and the programme from
there onwards was continued once more. As a result of the operation the
capture of this very important strategical position was effected at the
second assault with the loss by our infantry of only three men wounded;
every living soul on the embankment had been wiped out by the second
visit of the barrage, and the advance was resumed unchecked! It was a
very fine example of the tactical handling of guns, and fully deserved
the long accounts given of it in the newspapers two days later.
[Illustration:
Scale 1:40,000.
]
With the fall of the Railway Triangle the German second line was quickly
captured, and here, on the immediate front covered by the 33rd
Divisional Artillery, the weary men of the 44th and 45th Infantry
Brigades halted. The assault upon the third German line, the "Brown
Line," had been entrusted to the 46th Infantry Brigade who, during the
attack on the first two systems of defence, had issued forth from the
cellars and sewers of Arras into a position of assembly in the German
front line, and this brigade now advanced to the attack.
As soon as the German second system had fallen, the batteries began to
advance so as to keep touch with the infantry. The delay occasioned by
the holding up of the latter at the Railway Triangle had until now
rendered any move of the guns impossible, for it was essential that
every piece should be brought to bear upon the obstacle which was
stopping the progress of the infantry. Now, however, the move forward
began; one section at a time, the guns advanced to the positions already
prepared for them in Blangy just behind our original front line, battery
commanders going forward to register the guns immediately the trails
were dropped. As soon as the first sections were registered and in
action, the second sections began to advance; directly they were in
action and firing, the third sections joined them, and thus every
battery maintained four guns in action throughout the move forward, and
was able to keep a barrage in front of the infantry who now, in the
afternoon, were advancing to the assault on the German third line.
Strange to relate, the advance of the batteries, which of necessity was
carried out through the outskirts of Arras, was not greatly hampered by
shell fire. It was generally anticipated that the enemy would bombard
the eastern exits of the town as soon as ever the attack was launched,
for he must have known that troops would be issuing forth from there,
and, as the route of the batteries lay over a bridge and through some
very narrow streets, it was fully expected that casualties would be
suffered in this operation. It was therefore with a feeling of relief
that battery commanders saw the whole of their batteries in action in
the new positions around the eastern edge of Blangy, bombarding
throughout the afternoon the defences between Orange Hill and the river
Scarpe.
Throughout that afternoon it did indeed seem as though British arms were
winning the day. All around troops appeared to be pressing forward; up
the road from Arras there suddenly came squadron after squadron of
cavalry which wheeled into a big field in Blangy, dismounted, halted for
a space while reconnoitring parties pushed on ahead, then mounted and
pressed away on over the captured ground for some advanced objective.
Long columns of infantry, transport, ammunition columns and all the
necessary material of war poured steadily out of Arras and moved on ever
towards the east, until it seemed as though the whole of the front were
pushing forward. The batteries in Blangy, firing though they were upon
the enemy as hard as they could, felt somehow that they were being left
behind, and longed to receive the order to limber up and join more
closely in the pursuit which was now going on.
Orders were not long in coming for the 162nd Brigade at any rate.
Leaving the other brigade still in action around the eastern outskirts
of Arras, it threw forward reconnoitring detachments in the middle
afternoon, and by evening had begun to advance to new positions—the
third occupied that day—around the Railway Triangle which, a few hours
before, had been the scene of such close infantry fighting. All day it
had been raining on and off; now it started to snow, and for the
batteries of the 162nd Brigade there began a night of real
heart-breaking work.
Ground which has been barraged, captured and counter-barraged a few
hours previously, rained upon all day, trampled by cavalry and countless
advancing reserves; ground which consists of shell-torn earth hastily
shovelled down by a pioneer battalion to make a rough track, and carried
over trenches by arched wooden bridges or not at all; ground of this
nature churned up into deep sticky mud is, for tired horses and men, a
difficult obstacle over which to drag guns and ammunition on a rapidly
darkening night. Yet it had to be done; the infantry were thought to be
still advancing, and unless they were covered by the guns they must,
sooner or later, meet with disaster. All that evening the four batteries
of the brigade struggled and fought their way through the rapidly
increasing throng on the track; pushed their way past the inevitable
broken-down wagons they met; manhandled each gun in turn through and
over trenches which were not bridged, and ultimately, soaked with mud
and perspiration, utterly worn out but victoriously aware of the fact
that they were still the most advanced batteries and that there were
none ahead of them, they arrived at the Railway Triangle and dropped
into action, A/162 on the eastern side of the embankment, "B," "C" and
"D" on the western. Here they remained throughout the night of the
9th/10th waiting for daylight to come for the advance to be resumed.
Thus ended the first day of the great Spring offensive. The infantry,
pushing on all the evening towards the German third line, had
established posts on the northern slopes of Orange Hill (N.W. of
Monchy); the guns were still keeping touch with them despite the
rapidity of the advance and the appalling weather conditions; many
prisoners and guns had been taken, a considerable number of the enemy
lay dead on the captured ground, and nothing, so far, seemed to be
holding up the advance of our troops.
On the morning of Tuesday, the 10th, the infantry occupied the remainder
of Orange Hill. They had, in the first day of battle, engaged in very
heavy fighting; they had made a rapid advance and now, tired out, were
unwilling to continue until all the batteries were not only in a
position to give them close support, but were in better communication
with them. For this purpose the 156th Brigade advanced up to the Railway
Triangle, while the 162nd pushed forward once again, this time bound for
positions on the western slopes of Orange Hill.
Fortunately there was very little fighting during the 10th; the infantry
were busy consolidating, reorganising themselves and carrying out
reliefs, and therefore it was possible to spend the day in getting all
the guns well forward, replenishing ammunition and making arrangements
for thorough support of the infantry in their next advance.
It was well that the whole of the day was available for this, or rather
it was inevitable that it should be. So fearful was the mud east of the
Railway Triangle, where the Scarpe had helped the rain and snow to form
a bog, that the batteries had to make their way across country to the
outskirts of Arras once again, and, crossing the railway, worked up
towards Monchy along the Cambrai road. The congestion was terrible
everywhere, and movement along the road, which was double-banked by
traffic in both directions, proved maddeningly slow. Not till the early
morning of the 11th did the batteries arrive in their new positions
after a night of bogging and digging-out guns, of marching along chaotic
roads, of urging tired men and tired horses to further work; but now,
grouped on both sides of the road which ran from Feuchy to Feuchy Chapel
cross-roads on the Arras-Cambrai road, they were right up close behind
the advancing infantry on the western slopes of Orange Hill itself, and
were in the best of positions for observation and close artillery
support.
On Wednesday, the 11th, the battle broke out again. The 37th Division,
who had been in reserve hitherto, took up the attack and assaulted
Monchy-le-Preux from the north; at the same time the cavalry advanced on
the village from Orange Hill, and after severe fighting Monchy was
captured. This cavalry action was much criticized at a later date; it
was an attempt to get through a supposed gap in the enemy line, and
consisted of a mounted advance across some seven hundred yards of
perfectly smooth and open ground dipping slightly and then rising again.
In this advance fairly heavy casualties were suffered both from machine
gun and shell fire—the latter being mainly time high-explosive burst the
height of a man's head in the saddle—and the operation ended in a
dismounted action around Monchy; it certainly proved a valuable
distraction from the 37th Division attacking on foot, and, had not the
cavalry put their horses in the village itself when they adopted
dismounted action, it is probable that their losses would not have been
so severe. While this operation, which advanced our line four hundred
yards east of Monchy and up to the river Scarpe, was in progress, the
flanks also tried to advance, but were held up and were forced to return
to the trenches they had left.
During the 11th the 156th Brigade came on from the Railway Triangle and
dropped into action slightly to the north of the 162nd Brigade, and
between it and Feuchy. At the same time the wagon-lines of the brigades
were brought forward and were kept right up close (in the case of the
162nd Brigade, 500 yards) behind the battery positions, for it was
expected that the advance would soon be resumed. Although the Army on
the right, which had captured Bullecourt and Riencourt, had been driven
out again to its original positions, the Army on the left had taken and
held the Vimy Ridge, and it seemed that, with the fall of this important
feature, further progress must very soon be made.
Now, however, the advance, which for three days had been so brilliant,
began to be checked. On April 12th the 29th Division on the right and
the 9th on the left tried to advance their line, but were beaten back.
Hostile artillery, so comparatively silent since the 9th, began to show
increasing activity in barraging our troops and in carrying out
counter-battery work. It was manifest that the enemy, after two days of
disaster, was pulling himself together, and after losing the majority of
his artillery on April 9th and 10th, had now rushed up fresh guns to
stiffen the support of the front.
This opinion was strengthened on the 13th, when every battery and
wagon-line was heavily shelled, the enemy fire being directed not upon
any particular unit, but in a great shell storm over different areas in
which the guns and horses were congregated. It was clear that a
determined resistance was going to be offered to any further attack, and
accordingly the order was circulated that on this part of the front the
line should be held until the flanks had made further progress. Since
this course removed the possibility of any sudden need of teams for a
quick advance, the wagon-lines were ordered to return immediately to the
eastern outskirts of Arras, only a small number of animals for pack-work
being maintained by each battery in forward wagon-lines at the Railway
Triangle. With a sigh of relief battery commanders saw their teams wind
their way down Battery Valley to Arras again; the neighbourhood of
Orange Hill was no place for horses.
The wisdom of thus removing the horses was very soon put beyond all
manner of doubt. All through the early morning and day of the 14th the
batteries were heavily bombarded with gas shell and high explosive,
especially heavy punishment descending upon the area where the horses
had been. Serious casualties would inevitably have been suffered if they
had remained there, but as matters stood the only casualties sustained
were those in the gun positions themselves, and even these did not
prevent the batteries from opening a smashing fire upon the enemy when
in the evening he delivered a violent counter-attack upon Monchy, a
counter-attack which was broken up under our fire, melted away and
failed completely.
The batteries now settled down to what was to be temporarily a "holding"
job, and from the 12th until the 23rd nothing more than the usual
harassing fire and registration was carried out. The brigades were
placed under the administration of the 17th Divisional Artillery and
were ordered to dig themselves in, for heavy casualties had of late been
suffered amongst the detachments, and it was vital that no more wastage
should occur. Digging in was, in the present surroundings, extremely
difficult; two feet below the surface thick solid chalk was met with,
and every shovelful thrown up offered an unmistakable mark to the keen
eyes of the enemy aeroplanes which were now actively patrolling the
front. Not to dig in meant casualties from the usual shell-fire to which
the batteries were inevitably subjected; digging in meant increased
safety for the men but also, despite the fullest use of camouflage, the
attracting of further bombardment by the enemy. Surely a choice between
the devil and the deep sea!
In front of the batteries, on the forward slopes of Orange Hill and in
Monchy, excellent O.P.'s were obtainable and were made full use of. The
weather—hitherto bitterly cold with snow and icy blizzards—began to
improve, and visibility got consequently better. Greenland Hill, Roeux,
the Chemical Works and the Scarpe were clear targets on the left, while
on the right Pelves Mill on the cross-roads, with the ruins of the
little cottage beneath it, showed up clearly as a datum line for the
enemy trench system south of the river. Jigsaw Wood, Hatchet Wood and
Bois du Sars, all on the sky-line, blocked further view, but sufficient
was visible west of them to enable accurate registration to be carried
out on all the enemy forward zone; his actual fire trench could always
be observed from our own front line or even, in the case of the trenches
near the river, from the commanding slopes of Orange Hill.
On Monday, April 23rd, a fresh attack was made by the 17th Division,
with the 29th and 15th on the right and the 51st on the left, the
objectives on the batteries' zone being Bayonet Trench north-east of
Monchy, together with a small enemy salient which had been formed on
this part of the front. Three attacks in all were made, and all failed;
enfilade machine-gun fire from Roeux and from both sides of the river
cut down our men, and eventually the operation had to be called off. On
the 24th the attack was renewed and this time slight progress was made,
but no advance of any account was effected and the losses amongst our
troops were enormous. The battle was indeed becoming costly, and the
gunners, as well as the infantry, were showing the effects of it. Every
day the usual harassing fire took its toll of the detachments, and on
the days when heavy bombardments were carried out on the battery
positions (as on the 22nd when B/162 lost Major Benett-Stanford and
Captain Body wounded, with two out of the three subalterns, Bostock and
Neate, killed) numbers were cut down to an alarming minimum.
On April 28th the battle was again resumed on a grand scale. The 12th
Division assaulted on the front of the batteries, this time with the 3rd
Division on the right and the 34th on the left; at 4.25 A.M. the
infantry attack was launched under cover of a very heavy artillery
barrage, the objectives being those portions of Bayonet and Rifle
trenches which still lay in the hands of the enemy. Three minutes after
the attack began the enemy put down a light barrage of 10·5 cm. and 77
mm. shells, which became heavier on Bayonet Trench itself at about 7.30
A.M., but generally speaking the hostile artillery fire was slight. In
the main the enemy appeared to depend upon his machine guns to ward off
attacks, and in this he was fairly successful. Mist and smoke shell
rendered observation very difficult, but by six o'clock the objective
was reported to have been gained; from here, however, machine-gun fire
began to tell and, although the right battalion of the brigade covered
by the 33rd Divisional Artillery advanced according to plan, and was
reported to have reached the second objective, the left battalion was
held up by machine guns and could not advance.
At half-past six in the morning a smoke barrage was put down along the
south bank of the Scarpe to try and help the left battalion, while at
the same time the field howitzers turned on to the troublesome machine
guns. All day long the batteries kept up a protective barrage in front
of the infantry, increasing at times to intense rate when an enemy
counter-attack showed signs of being launched. At 11.30 A.M. the
infantry endeavoured to consolidate their positions under a now heavy
enemy barrage which had been increasing in intensity upon Bayonet Trench
since ten o'clock, but it was of no avail. Heavy machine-gun fire from
across the river Scarpe prevented them from achieving anything, and not
until nightfall was the position clear.
It was then found that Bayonet Trench had been captured in its entirety,
but that only a portion of Rifle Trench had been wrested from the enemy;
all along the infantry had been greatly impeded by machine-gun fire from
which they suffered heavy casualties. From observation and reports
received it would appear that the enemy had concentrated in considerable
force upon this front, and it was probably due to the work of Forward
Observing Officers from the batteries that the many hostile
counter-attacks attempted had been smashed before they came to fruition.
On the early morning of the 29th the infantry established a line of
posts and generally consolidated the ground captured on the previous
day, but no further gains were possible. A final effort at 3.0 A.M. on
the 30th to capture the remainder of Rifle Trench from the enemy proved
a failure, and the infantry, suffering heavy losses, were forced to
return once more to their trenches.
Thus ended April, which had opened so brilliantly, and with the arrival
of May a less cheering period was destined to begin. Thursday, May 3rd,
in fact, marked the last great effort which was made to continue the
advance along the whole of the front; on the 1st an unsuccessful attempt
to capture the remainder of Rifle Trench had been tried, but this was
purely a local operation, and on the 3rd all three Armies pulled
themselves together and launched a combined assault stretching from
Arleux-en-Gohelle on the left to east of Bullecourt on the right. On the
immediate front of the batteries of the 33rd Divisional Artillery, with
whom were also the 12th Divisional batteries and the VIth Corps Heavy
Artillery, an intense barrage was put down on the enemy front line for
three minutes before zero. At 3.45 A.M. the infantry assaulted, while
the barrage crept on at the rate of thirty-three yards per minute;
intense machine-gun fire was immediately encountered, together with a
heavy barrage which fell upon infantry and gunners alike, but the front
wave of assaulting infantry by keeping close up to our curtain-fire
succeeded in reaching the line Pelves Mill-Gun Trench. Here the
situation became very obscure; owing to the fact that zero hour had been
fixed for an hour of darkness, all communication between the front and
succeeding waves was lost, while a heavy machine-gun barrage put down by
the enemy prevented our second wave from getting beyond Scabbard Trench.
At ten o'clock a party of Germans entered Scabbard Trench and bombed our
men out as far as the junction with New Trench, with the result that the
infantry forming the first wave were left entirely cut off.
All this time the 18-pdrs. had been keeping up a protective barrage
beyond the first objective, in the hopes of saving such of the leading
troops as had got there. At 12.10 P.M. a new bombardment was organised
and two hours later a fresh attack was launched, this time under a very
novel barrage. The enemy, strongly dug in in Scabbard Trench, could not
be reached by the flat trajectory of the 18-pdrs., and accordingly it
was decided to organise a creeping barrage of 4·5 in. howitzers. For a
quarter of an hour four batteries of field howitzers poured high
explosive into Scabbard Trench, our own men lying not only close up to
the trench but also all round it, and at 2.10 P.M. the howitzers lifted
off and ceased firing, whereupon the infantry, keeping close to the
barrage, rushed the trench. It was a desperate measure, this howitzer
barrage, for it was like firing into the centre of a circle with our own
men all round, and, with the infantry lying right up to and following so
closely on the heels of the barrage, it seemed inevitable that a few
rounds should fall short—and only a few short rounds of 4·5 in. H.E. are
sufficient to do inestimable havoc and wreck the confidence of attacking
troops. Like many desperate measures, however, it succeeded; some fifty
Germans, unable to stand the appalling weight of fire (about 80 rounds
of H.E. per minute in a confined space), fled from Scabbard Trench and
rushed down the bank running east towards Pelves Mill, while
simultaneously a party of about one hundred of the enemy left the same
bank and made for the cross-roads just west of the mill. Immediately
they broke cover the 18-pdrs. switched on to the parties with excellent
results, and two companies of the 17th Royal Sussex Regiment, profiting
by the distraction, rushed Scabbard Trench in its entirety; this they
captured almost without casualties, and found seventy dead Germans, the
victims of the howitzer bombardment.
The enemy now opened a furious bombardment upon Scabbard Trench,
realising that it had at last fallen, and at 2.20 P.M. launched a heavy
counter-attack which was beaten off after hand-to-hand fighting, in
which we captured one officer, twenty-five men and two machine guns. All
the afternoon the batteries were busy on various targets, especially
upon enemy infantry who kept massing behind Keeling Copse and running in
small batches to Cartridge Trench. At the same time a good view of the
hostile counter-attacks on Greenland Hill, north of the Scarpe, was
obtained, and on several occasions the guns were switched round to the
left and dealt smashing blows to the enemy every time he attempted to
leave his trenches.
The total result of the battle was that on the extreme right the 5th
Army advanced beyond Bullecourt, but was forced back again by the enemy
who reoccupied the village; around Cherisy all objectives were gained,
but here again the enemy counter-attacked and drove out our troops; on
the immediate front of the batteries a partial success with enormous
loss of life was obtained; on the north of the river the attack on Roeux
failed also, and only on the extreme left was any real success achieved.
Here the 1st Army took Fresnoy and all the objectives north of Oppy.
Oppy itself, however, proved too difficult for the attacking troops, nor
were any of the objectives between it and the river captured. In short,
the attack began well, almost brilliantly, but finished badly; it was
not a defeat—the operations north of Oppy saved it from being called
that—but it was at least a partial failure which had cost many thousands
of lives.
May, then, did not begin very well, and, after spending the whole of the
4th in consolidating the ground of the previous day's battle, a lull set
in—a lull which was not broken until the 11th. At 7.30 P.M. on that day
the 4th Division just north of the river carried out an attack upon
Roeux Chemical Works and Cemetery, the 33rd Divisional Artillery
supporting the operation on the flank. Covered by a barrage, the density
of which was one 18-pdr. for every seven yards of front, the infantry
rushed all the objectives and held them, together with 300 prisoners; to
this gain was added a further advance along the river's edge at 6.0 A.M.
next morning, which was covered by a barrage put down on the
north-western end of Roeux, and by midday on the 12th the infantry were
secure in their newly-won positions. The ominous Chemical Works, from
which such deadly machine-gun fire had been directed on our attacks
south of the river, was now in our hands, and there seemed every chance
of an advance being possible on the front of the batteries.
Orders for this advance were not long in coming. At 6.45 P.M. on that
same evening (12th) the 12th Division, which was covered by the 33rd
Divisional batteries, advanced to the assault on Devil's Trench, while
the 3rd Division prolonged the attack to the right. After a three-minute
bombardment with a density of one 18-pdr. to every ten yards of front,
the 36th and 37th infantry brigades advanced upon the portion of Devil's
Trench which ran northwards from Bit Lane to Harness Lane.
Simultaneously with the attack, however, very heavy rifle and
machine-gun fire was opened by the enemy from both flanks—Gun and Devil
Trenches—which were held in force, and fifty yards short of the trench
our infantry were stopped, unable to advance any farther. Lieut.
Wingfield, the forward observing officer of the 156th Brigade who was
with the attacking company commander, got through to the guns and
reported that the infantry intended to assault again at 10.45 P.M.
Accordingly, for fifteen minutes prior to that time the batteries put
down a heavy barrage and then lifted on to the enemy support trenches.
Close on the heels of the barrage the infantry rose to the attack, but
circumstances were against them; darkness supervened everywhere, the
infantry were scattered all over the place owing to the non-success of
the first attempt, and Devil's Trench was only assaulted here and there.
By midnight it was reported that the remnants of the attacking company
were back in their own original front line again. The operation had
failed completely.
The operations of May 3rd, costly enough by themselves, had now been
followed by the two attacks on the 11th and 12th, and so heavy were the
casualties amongst the infantry that, for a time at any rate, the
infantry battle was broken off, and to the guns was given the task of
wearing down the enemy and of destroying his morale. This new period was
ushered in on the 14th by a Chinese bombardment of the enemy trenches; a
bombardment, that is to say, which bore all the signs of a barrage
covering assaulting troops but which, in reality, crept forward
unfollowed by any infantry, and then dropped back suddenly on to the
hostile fire-trench to catch such of the enemy as had manned the parapet
to meet the expected assault. In this case our guns pounded Devil's
Trench for a short time, and then crept on by lifts of one hundred yards
every minute. After three lifts the barrage suddenly dropped without
warning on to the fire-trench again and blasted it with high explosives
and shrapnel, while the Division on the left swept the area with
enfilade machine-gun fire. No movement was seen, but the enemy doubtless
expected that another attack on Devil's Trench was being launched and
would therefore have manned the parapet; if he did so, his losses must
have been severe.
Having thus attacked his forward infantry, the guns now turned their
attention to enemy ration parties and back areas. Every night, for the
past week or so, a part of the night firing programme (which was carried
out every night by each battery mainly on back areas) had been to keep
up intermittent shell fire upon the road running east from Pelves
towards Hamblain. Aeroplane photographs now received, however, showed
tracks running parallel to this road and about 150 yards south of it,
tracks which became clearer every day. It was manifest that the enemy
had given up using the road and was cutting across country; on the night
of the 15th, therefore, the guns directed their fire in intermittent
bursts on to the original road up till 9.0 P.M., and then at that hour,
by which time all traffic would have been diverted on to the
cross-country tracks, swept up and down those tracks with H.E. and
shrapnel for ten minutes at an intense rate of fire. That this fire was
effective in its object was clearly proved next day, when the enemy
retaliated strongly upon our own lines of communication—sure sign that
we had done something seriously to annoy him.
The batteries now began to have a bad time. Free from infantry attacks
and suffering most of his casualties from the guns, the enemy turned the
full fury of his attention upon the gunners. "B" and C/162 were engaged
by a 5·9 in. high velocity gun, their positions being badly damaged;
D/162 was registered by an enemy aeroplane which carried out an all-day
bombardment upon it in co-operation with an 8 in. howitzer battery. Both
brigades suffered severely from bombardment by 5·9 in. howitzers, while
a couple of whizz-bang batteries devoted themselves to putting
intermittent bursts and sniping rounds into all the battery positions,
and especially those of the 156th Brigade, causing many casualties by
the unexpectedness of their attacks. As a rule, in fact, these sudden
bursts did far more damage to personnel than the long all-day
bombardments, and it was just such a burst which killed Captain Heape of
A/162 and so wounded Lieut. Tucker that he died next day—a loss
grievously felt, for both officers were of the very finest type which
the brigade contained. From day to day each battery in turn underwent a
severe shelling, and the casualties in men and guns mounted, ever
mounted.
On May 16th the lull in infantry fighting was broken, this time by the
enemy. After bombarding our front trenches immediately north of the
Scarpe, together with the village of Feuchy and the back areas in
general, during the whole of the 15th, a big hostile attack was launched
at 3.0 A.M. on the 16th and drove our troops out of Roeux Cemetery and
Chemical Works. By 7.30 A.M. we had counter-attacked and recaptured the
lost ground, and at 9.50 A.M. a hostile counter-attack was driven off.
Shortly after ten o'clock our men were seen advancing north-west from
the Chemical Works, but a furious hostile barrage was put down on them
and they were forced to retire. All day long the batteries poured shell
into Roeux and the adjoining trenches, and all day long fighting
continued; by evening the situation had calmed down, and little change
showed itself on the front as a result of the twenty-four hours'
fighting. It was clear, however, that the enemy was not only going to
offer a stubborn resistance but was even assuming an offensive attitude
in places, and a bitter struggle was anticipated when orders were
received for another attack on Devil's Trench.
On the 19th our troops were once again flung upon this deadly little
objective—flung, as they had so often been before, on a narrow limited
front with the knowledge that flank machine-gun fire must inevitably be
met with.
Major Colfox (D/162) had, on the previous night, run a forward gun right
up to Chinstrap Lane, twelve hundred yards west of Roeux, and had
registered it over open sights in the early morning, in the hope that
enfilade fire from here might assist the infantry in their oft-tried
task. Under a heavy barrage the infantry rushed to grips with the enemy,
but no sooner had our guns started than the enemy opened a heavy
concentrated machine-gun fire all along the front, while his guns put
down a dense barrage within thirty seconds of the beginning of the
attack. A footing was gained in the part of Tool Trench still held by
the enemy, but strong bombing attacks were delivered from both flanks,
and our troops under the pressure of these attacks were forced to
withdraw. Devil's Trench once more had proved a death-trap.
This venture was followed up at 11.30 P.M. on May 30th by an assault on
Hook and Tool Trenches, but the attack only added one more item to the
now growing list of local failures. Our troops were evidently seen
leaving their trenches, and this enabled the enemy to open heavy
machine-gun and artillery fire on them. In spite of this, and of the mud
and water caused by a thunderstorm during the afternoon, the attacking
troops reached their objectives, but so heavy had been the casualties
suffered whilst crossing No Man's Land that the remnants were not strong
enough to deal with the garrison of the trench. Most of the attackers
were driven out by a counter-attack following immediately on the
assault, but a party of the Manchester Regiment established itself in
Hook Trench and managed to hold on till noon next day. The guns poured
shell over their heads and put down barrage after barrage for their
protection, but it was of no avail. Shortly after midday a superior
force of the enemy counter-attacked with fury, and this gallant little
party was overcome.
The advent of June brought with it a further succession of local
attacks—efforts to straighten our line, to remove important points held
by the enemy and generally to improve our tactical position. It was
evident, from the non-success of the French offensive in the south, that
no more operations on a large scale would be carried out here, but it
was also clear that Higher Command had decided in its mind that our line
must embrace certain tactical features now in the hands of the enemy,
and to this end further local undertakings had to be effected. Following
on two Chinese bombardments on June 3rd and 4th, in which the 33rd
Divisional Artillery took part to the south of the river, the 9th
Division carried out a short and successful attack around Greenland Hill
on the night of the 5th, and consolidated all its gains. Soon
afterwards, on the 13th, a very successful attack upon Hook and Long
Trenches was made by the 76th Infantry Brigade. During the previous week
a systematic bombardment had been carried out night and day upon the
enemy defences to obliterate his trenches and to weaken his morale. Each
day, however, there had been no firing between 5.0 A.M. and 9.0 A.M.,
and the enemy had grown accustomed to a period of quiet at this time.
When, therefore, the infantry rushed across at 7.20 A.M., our barrage
not starting till 7.21 by which time they were in the hostile trenches,
they caught the enemy quite unprepared and showing little resistance.
All gains were held and, under cover of a protective barrage, the ground
was consolidated.
At 7.15 A.M. next day (14th) a further attack under cover of a barrage
resulted in the capture of Infantry Hill by our troops, and the morale
of the latter, somewhat shaken by the continued reverses at Roeux and
Devil's Trench during the previous weeks, began now to rise again to the
pitch of confidence and assuredness so badly needed. So greatly did it
improve, in fact, that when the enemy counter-attacked at 2.15 A.M. on
the 16th, in an endeavour to regain Infantry Hill, he was severely
punished and beaten off—except for the loss of two southern posts in
front of Long Trench—despite the fact that the attack had been delivered
with a strength of some seven hundred bayonets under cover of an intense
artillery bombardment. A second hostile attempt at 2.30 A.M. on the
17th, although preceded by a two-hour bombardment, only resulted in our
losing a small portion of Long Trench, and it now seemed as though
Infantry Hill were securely in our hands.
Just prior to these attacks the 33rd Divisional Artillery had received
orders to move out to the wagon-lines and to take over part of the line
further south. The enemy's attitude, however, appeared threatening, and
accordingly the departure of the batteries was postponed until the
activity had died down. By June 20th all appeared to be quiet, and at
6.0 P.M., after twelve weeks of continuous battle on this front, the
march to the wagon-lines was effected. Taking their guns with them, the
batteries topped the ridge west of Battery Valley and marched back to
the peace and rest of Arras once more.
The three months' fighting in this offensive had marked a brilliant
chapter in the doings of the 33rd Divisional batteries. Under all
conditions, in blizzards, in snow and mud, under intense shell-fire from
the enemy they had maintained their reputation for straight shooting and
complete reliability; moreover, and this was above all the most valued,
they had won the entire confidence of the infantry. When the 3rd
Division, which had carried out the operations of June 14th-19th under
cover of the guns of 33rd Divisional Artillery, was withdrawn from the
line, its G.O.C. Major-General Deverell wrote to General Stewart and
asked that the personal thanks of the infantry might be conveyed to the
batteries. "We wish them" he concluded in his letter, "all good fortune
in the future and hope that we may again fight together with that close
co-operation which has been so conspicuously marked whilst we have been
together." High praise, that, and praise dearly won, for there were many
gaps in the ranks as the brigades turned westwards. On each and every
battery the offensive had left a heavy mark, and the faces of new
arrivals bore witness to the many blanks which had had to be filled, but
the greatest loss which the Divisional Artillery as a whole had suffered
was borne especially by the 162nd Brigade. On May 23rd Lieut.-Colonel O.
M. Harris was carried away on a stretcher in the advanced stages of
para-typhoid. To the officers and men of his brigade his name seemed
inextricably interwoven with the brigade itself, for he had "made" it,
working it up from its early raw stage at La Bassée to the fine fighting
instrument it now was. With his going a certain gloom fell upon the
brigade, for all ranks realised that they had lost not only a very
gallant leader but a very true friend.
Before he left, however, Colonel Harris had one great satisfaction.
Throughout the battle of Arras the 162nd Brigade had made it its object
always to be the furthest forward, always to be the nearest to the
infantry. Its batteries were the first across No Man's Land on April
9th, the first to advance as each enemy line fell, the closest up behind
the infantry throughout the operations, and early in May this
achievement was officially recognised. There came one day from
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig a message saying that a captured German
5·9 in. howitzer would be presented to the 162nd Brigade in recognition
of the work it had carried out during the advance, and of the very fine
manner in which it had on all occasions pushed up so close behind the
infantry. Such a distinction has rarely, if ever before, been conferred
upon a brigade of artillery, and to its commanding officer was due a
full measure of praise in that he had worked it up to a pitch of
efficiency which made such deeds possible.
* * * * *
One night the brigades spent in their wagon-lines at Arras, and early on
the morning of the 21st they hooked in and moved off through Beaurains
down the long road which led to Bapaume, to pit their strength this time
against the fortifications of the Hindenburg Line.