WILSON.
James Wilson, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and one of
the early Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, was one of
the first jurists in America during the latter part of the last century.
He was born in Scotland about the year 1742. After studying at Glasgow,
St. Andrews, and Edinburgh, he emigrated to Pennsylvania in 1766. He
became, soon after his arrival, a tutor in the Philadelphia College, in
which place he acquired great distinction as a classical scholar. He
subsequently studied the law, and was admitted to the bar; and, after
practising at different places, took up his residence at Philadelphia,
where he continued to reside during the rest of his life.[447]
For six years out of the twelve that elapsed from 1775 to the summoning
of the Convention of 1787, he was a member of Congress. Concerned in all
the great measures of independence, the establishment of the
Confederation, the peace, and the revenue system of 1783, he had
acquired a fund of political experience, which became of great value to
the country and to himself. Although a foreigner by birth, he was
thoroughly American in all his sentiments and feelings, and, at the time
he entered the Convention, there were few public men in the country who
perceived more clearly the causes of the inherent weakness of the
existing government. During the war, he had always considered the
States, with respect to that war, as forming one community;[448] and he
did not admit the idea, that, when the Colonies became independent of
Great Britain, they became independent of each other.[449] From the
Declaration of Independence he deduced the doctrine that the States by
which that measure was adopted were independent in their confederated
character, and not as individual communities. This rather subtile
distinction may seem now to have been of no great practical moment,
since the Confederation had actually united the States as such, rather
than the inhabitants of the States. But it was one of the positions
assumed by those who desired to combat the idea that the States, when
assembled in Convention, were restrained, by their position as equal and
independent sovereignties, from adopting a plan of government founded on
a representation of the people. To this objection Mr. Wilson repeatedly
addressed himself, and his efforts had great influence in causing the
adoption of the principle by which the people of the States became
directly represented in the government in the ratio of their numbers. He
showed that this principle had been improperly violated in the
Confederation, in consequence of the urgent necessity of forming a
union, and the impossibility at that time of forming any other than a
union of the States. As a new partition of the States was now
impracticable, it became necessary for them to surrender a portion of
their sovereignties, and to permit their inhabitants to enter into
direct relations with a new federal union. He pointed out the twofold
relation in which the people must henceforth stand;--in the one, they
would be citizens of the general government; in the other, they would be
citizens of their particular State. As both governments were derived
from the people, and both were designed for them, both ought to be
regulated on the same principles. In no other way could the larger
States consent to a new union; and if the smaller States could not admit
the justice of a proportionate representation, it was in vain to expect
to form a constitution that would embrace and satisfy the whole country.
This great idea of a representative government was in fact the aim of
all Mr. Wilson's exertions; and when the Constitution was formed, he
enforced this idea in the Convention of Pennsylvania with singular
power. His speech in that body is one of the most comprehensive and
luminous commentaries on the Constitution that have come down to us from
that period. It drew from Washington a high encomium, and it gained the
vote of Pennsylvania for the new government, against the ingenious and
captivating objections of its opponents.
The life of this wise, able, and excellent man was comparatively short.
In 1789, he was appointed by Washington a Judge of the Supreme Court of
the United States. While on a circuit in North Carolina, in the year
1798, he died at Edenton, at about the age of fifty-six. The character
of his mind and the sources of his influence will be best appreciated,
by examining some of the more striking passages of his great speech on
the Constitution.[450]
FOOTNOTES:
[447] Encyclopædia Americana, Art. "Wilson, James."
[448] Madison, Elliot, V. 78.
[449] Ibid. 213.
[450] The following extracts from the speech referred to will well repay
a careful perusal.
"_Tacitus_,--the profound politician Tacitus,--who lived towards the
latter end of those ages which are now denominated _ancient_, who
undoubtedly had studied the constitutions of all the states and kingdoms
known before and in his time, and who certainly was qualified, in an
uncommon degree, for understanding the full force and operation of each
of them, considers, after all he had known and read, a mixed government,
composed of the three simple forms, as a thing rather to be wished than
expected. And he thinks that, if such a government could even be
instituted, its duration could not be long. One thing is very
certain,--that the doctrine of representation in government was
altogether unknown to the ancients. Now, the knowledge and practice of
this doctrine is, in my opinion, essential to every system that can
possess the qualities of freedom, wisdom, and energy.
"It is worthy of remark, and the remark may, perhaps, excite some
surprise, that representation of the people is not, even at this day,
the sole principle of any government in Europe. Great Britain
boasts--and she may well boast--of the improvement she has made in
politics by the admission of representation; for the improvement is
important as far as it goes; but it by no means goes far enough. Is the
executive power of Great Britain founded on representation? This is not
pretended. Before the Revolution, many of the kings claimed to reign by
divine right, and others by hereditary right; and even at the
Revolution, nothing further was effected or attempted than the
recognition of certain parts of an original contract (_Blackstone_,
233), supposed, at some former remote period, to have been made between
the king and the people. A contract seems to exclude, rather than to
imply, delegated power. The judges of Great Britain are appointed by the
crown. The judicial authority, therefore, does not depend upon
representation, even in its most remote degree. Does representation
prevail in the legislative department of the British government? Even
here it does not predominate, though it may serve as a check. The
legislature consists of three branches,--the king, the lords, and the
commons. Of these, only the latter are supposed by the constitution to
represent the authority of the people. This short analysis clearly shows
to what a narrow corner of the British constitution the principle of
representation is confined. I believe it does not extend farther, if so
far, in any other government in Europe. For the American States were
reserved the glory and the happiness of diffusing this vital principle
throughout the constituent parts of government. Representation is the
chain of communication between the people and those to whom they have
committed the exercise of the powers of government. This chain may
consist of one or more links, but in all cases it should be sufficiently
strong and discernible.
"To be left without guide or precedent was not the only difficulty in
which the Convention were involved, by proposing to their constituents a
plan of a confederate republic. They found themselves embarrassed with
another, of peculiar delicacy and importance. I mean that of drawing a
proper line between the national government and the governments of the
several States. It was easy to discover a proper and satisfactory
principle on the subject. Whatever object of government is confined, in
its operation and effects, within the bounds of a particular State,
should be considered as belonging to the government of that State;
whatever object of government extends, in its operation or effects,
beyond the bounds of a particular State, should be considered as
belonging to the government of the United States. But though this
principle be sound and satisfactory, its application to particular cases
would be accompanied with much difficulty, because, in its application,
room must be allowed for great discretionary latitude of construction of
the principle. In order to lessen or remove the difficulty arising from
discretionary construction on this subject, an enumeration of particular
instances, in which the application of the principle ought to take
place, has been attempted with much industry and care. It is only in
mathematical science that a line can be described with mathematical
precision. But I flatter myself that, upon the strictest investigation,
the enumeration will be found to be safe and unexceptionable, and
accurate, too, in as great a degree as accuracy can be expected in a
subject of this nature. Particulars under this head will be more
properly explained, when we descend to the minute view of the
enumeration which is made in the proposed Constitution.
"After all, it will be necessary that, on a subject so peculiarly
delicate as this, much prudence, much candor, much moderation, and much
liberality should be exercised and displayed both by the federal
government and by the governments of the several States. It is to be
hoped that those virtues in government will be exercised and displayed,
when we consider that the powers of the federal government and those of
the State governments are drawn from sources equally pure. If a
difference can be discovered between them, it is in favor of the federal
government, because that government is founded on a representation of
the _whole_ Union; whereas the government of any particular State is
founded only on the representation of a part, inconsiderable when
compared with the whole. Is it not more reasonable to suppose that the
counsels of the whole will embrace the interest of every part, than that
the counsels of any part will embrace the interests of the whole?
"I intend not, Sir, by this description of the difficulties with which
the Convention were surrounded, to magnify their skill or their merit in
surmounting them, or to insinuate that any predicament in which the
Convention stood should prevent the closest and most cautious scrutiny
into the performance which they have exhibited to their constituents and
to the world. My intention is of far other and higher aim,--to evince,
by the conflicts and difficulties which must arise from the many and
powerful causes which I have enumerated, that it is hopeless and
impracticable to form a constitution which, in every part, will be
acceptable to every citizen, or even to every government, in the United
States; and that all which can be expected is, to form such a
constitution as, upon the whole, is the best that can possibly be
obtained. Man and perfection!--a state and perfection!--an assemblage of
states and perfection! Can we reasonably expect, however ardently we may
wish, to behold the glorious union?
"I can well recollect, though I believe I cannot convey to others, the
impression which, on many occasions, was made by the difficulties which
surrounded and pressed the Convention. The great undertaking sometimes
seemed to be at a stand; at other times, its motion seemed to be
retrograde. At the conclusion, however, of our work, many of the members
expressed their astonishment at the success with which it terminated.
"Having enumerated some of the difficulties which the Convention were
obliged to encounter in the course of their proceedings, I shall next
point out the end which they proposed to accomplish. Our wants, our
talents, our affections, our passions, all tell us that we were made for
a state of society. But a state of society could not be supported long
or happily without some civil restraint. It is true, that, in a state of
nature, any one individual may act uncontrolled by others; but it is
equally true, that, in such a state, every other individual may act
uncontrolled by him. Amidst this universal independence, the dissensions
and animosities between interfering members of the society would be
numerous and ungovernable. The consequence would be, that each member,
in such a natural state, would enjoy less liberty, and suffer more
interruption, than he would in a regulated society. Hence the universal
introduction of governments of some kind or other into the social state.
The liberty of every member is increased by this introduction; for each
gains more by the limitation of the freedom of every other member, than
he loses by the limitation of his own. The result is, that civil
government is necessary to the perfection and happiness of man. In
forming this government, and carrying it into execution, it is
_essential_ that the _interest_ and _authority_ of the whole community
should be binding in every part of it.
"The foregoing principles and conclusions are generally admitted to be
just and sound with regard to the nature and formation of single
governments, and the duty of submission to them. In some cases, they
will apply, with much propriety and force, to states already formed. The
advantages and necessity of civil government among individuals in
society are not greater or stronger than, in some situations and
circumstances, are the advantages and necessity of a federal government
among states. A natural and very important question now presents
itself,--Is such the situation, are such the circumstances, of the
United States? A proper answer to this question will unfold some very
interesting truths.
"The United States may adopt any one of four different systems. They may
become consolidated into one government, in which the separate existence
of the States shall be entirely absolved. They may reject any plan of
union or association, and act as separate and unconnected States. They
may form two or more confederacies. They may unite in one federal
republic. Which of these systems ought to have been formed by the
Convention? To support, with vigor, a single government over the whole
extent of the United States, would demand a system of the most
unqualified and the most unremitted despotism. Such a number of separate
States, contiguous in situation, unconnected and disunited in
government, would be, at one time, the prey of foreign force, foreign
influence, and foreign intrigue; at another, the victims of mutual rage,
rancor, and revenge. Neither of these systems found advocates in the
late Convention. I presume they will not find advocates in this. Would
it be proper to divide the United States into two or more confederacies?
It will not be unadvisable to take a more minute survey of this subject.
Some aspects under which it may be viewed are far from being, at first
sight, uninviting. Two or more confederacies would be each more compact
and more manageable than a single one extending over the same territory.
By dividing the United States into two or more confederacies, the great
collision of interests apparently or really different and contrary, in
the _whole extent_ of their dominion, would be broken, and, in a great
measure, disappear, in the several parts. But these advantages, which
are discovered from certain points of view, are greatly overbalanced by
inconveniences that will appear on a more accurate examination.
Animosities, and perhaps wars, would arise from assigning the extent,
the limits, and the rights of the different confederacies. The expenses
of governing would be multiplied by the number of federal governments.
The danger resulting from foreign influence and mutual dissensions would
not, perhaps, be less great and alarming in the instance of different
confederacies, than in the instance of different, though more numerous,
unassociated States.
"These observations, and many others that might be made on the subject,
will be sufficient to evince that a division of the United States into a
number of separate confederacies would probably be an unsatisfactory and
an unsuccessful experiment. The remaining system which the American
States may adopt, is a union of them under one confederate republic. It
will not be necessary to employ much time, or many arguments, to show
that this is the most eligible system that can be proposed. By adopting
this system, the vigor and decision of a wide-spreading monarchy may be
joined to the freedom and beneficence of a contracted republic. The
extent of territory, the diversity of climate and soil, the number and
greatness and connection of lakes and rivers with which the United
States are intersected and almost surrounded,--all indicate an enlarged
government to be fit and advantageous for them. The principles and
dispositions of their citizens indicate that, in this government,
liberty shall reign triumphant. Such, indeed, have been the general
opinions and wishes entertained since the era of independence. If those
opinions and wishes are as well founded as they have been general, the
late Convention were justified in proposing to their constituents one
confederate republic, as the best system of a national government for
the United States.
"In forming this system, it was proper to give minute attention to the
interest of all the parts; but there was a duty of still higher
import,--to feel and to show a predominating regard to the superior
interests of the whole. If this great principle had not prevailed, the
plan before us would never have made its appearance. The same principle
that was so necessary in forming it is equally necessary in our
deliberations, whether we should reject or ratify it.
"I make these observations with a design to prove and illustrate this
great and important truth,--that, in our decisions on the work of the
late Convention, we should not limit our views and regards to the State
of Pennsylvania. The aim of the Convention was to form a system of good
and efficient government, on the more extensive scale of the United
States. In this, and in every other instance, the work should be judged
with the same spirit with which it was performed. A principle of duty,
as well as candor, demands this.
"We have remarked, that civil government is necessary to the perfection
of society; we now remark, that civil liberty is necessary to the
perfection of civil government. Civil liberty is natural liberty itself,
divested of only that part which, placed in the government, produces
more good and happiness to the community than if it had remained in the
individual. Hence it follows that civil liberty, while it resigns a part
of natural liberty, retains the free and generous exercise of all the
human faculties, so far as it is compatible with the public welfare.
"In considering and developing the nature and end of the system before
us, it is necessary to mention another kind of liberty, which has not
yet, as far as I know, received a name. I shall distinguish it by the
appellation of _federal liberty_. When a single government is
instituted, the individuals of which it is composed surrender to it a
part of their natural independence, which they before enjoyed as men.
When a confederate republic is instituted, the communities of which it
is composed surrender to it a part of their political independence,
which they before enjoyed as States. The principles which directed, in
the former case, what part of the natural liberty of the man ought to be
given up, and what part ought to be retained, will give similar
directions in the latter case. The States should resign to the national
government that part, and that part only, of their political liberty,
which, placed in that government, will produce more good to the whole
than if it had remained in the several States. While they resign this
part of their political liberty, they retain the free and generous
exercise of all their other faculties, as States, so far as it is
compatible with the welfare of the general and superintending
confederacy.
"Since _States_, as well as citizens, are represented in the
Constitution before us, and form the objects on which that Constitution
is proposed to operate, it was necessary to notice and define _federal_
as well as _civil_ liberty.
"These general reflections have been made in order to introduce, with
more propriety and advantage, a practical illustration of the end
proposed to be accomplished by the late Convention.
"It has been too well known, it has been too severely felt, that the
present Confederation is inadequate to the government, and to the
exigencies, of the United States. The great struggle for Liberty in this
country, should it be unsuccessful, will probably be the last one which
she will have for her existence and prosperity in any part of the globe.
And it must be confessed that this struggle has, in some of the stages
of its progress, been attended with symptoms that foreboded no fortunate
issue. To the iron hand of Tyranny, which was lifted up against her, she
manifested, indeed, an intrepid superiority. She broke in pieces the
fetters which were forged for her, and showed that she was unassailable
by force. But she was environed with dangers of another kind, and
springing from a very different source. While she kept her eye steadily
fixed on the efforts of oppression, licentiousness was secretly
undermining the rock on which she stood.
"Need I call to your remembrance the _contrasted_ scenes of which we
have been witnesses? On the glorious conclusion of our conflict with
Britain, what high expectations were formed concerning us by others!
What high expectations did we form concerning ourselves! Have those
expectations been realized? No. What has been the cause? Did our
citizens lose their perseverance and magnanimity? No. Did they become
insensible of resentment and indignation at any high-handed attempt that
might have been made to injure or enslave them? No. What, then, has been
the cause? The truth is, we dreaded danger only on one side: this we
manfully repelled. But, on another side, danger, not less formidable,
but more insidious, stole in upon us; and our unsuspicious tempers were
not sufficiently attentive either to its approach or to its operations.
Those whom foreign strength could not overpower have wellnigh become the
victims of internal anarchy.
"If we become a little more particular, we shall find that the foregoing
representation is by no means exaggerated. When we had baffled all the
menaces of foreign power, we neglected to establish among ourselves a
government that would insure domestic vigor and stability. What was the
consequence? The commencement of peace was the commencement of every
disgrace and distress that could befall a people in a peaceful state.
Devoid of _national power_, we could not prohibit the extravagance of
our importations, nor could we derive a revenue from their excess.
Devoid of national _importance_, we could not procure for our exports a
tolerable sale at foreign markets. Devoid of national _credit_, we saw
our public securities melt in the hands of the holders, like snow before
the sun. Devoid of national _dignity_, we could not, in some instances,
perform our treaties on our part; and, in other instances, we could
neither obtain nor compel the performance of them on the part of others.
Devoid of national _energy_, we could not carry into execution our own
resolutions, decisions, or laws.
"Shall I become more particular still? The tedious detail would disgust
me. The years of languor are now over. We have felt the dishonor with
which we have been covered; we have seen the destruction with which we
have been threatened. We have penetrated to the causes of both, and when
we have once discovered them, we have begun to search for the means of
removing them. For the confirmation of these remarks, I need not appeal
to an enumeration of facts. The proceedings of Congress, and of the
several States, are replete with them. They all point out the weakness
and insufficiency as the cause, and an _efficient_ general government as
the only cure, of our political distempers.
"Under these impressions, and with these views, was the late Convention
appointed; and under these impressions, and with these views, the late
Convention met.
"We now see the great end which they proposed to accomplish. It was to
frame, for the consideration of their constituents, one federal and
national constitution,--a constitution that would produce the advantages
of good, and prevent the inconveniences of bad government;--a
constitution whose beneficence and energy would pervade the whole Union,
and bind and embrace the interests of every part;--a constitution that
would insure peace, freedom, and happiness to the States and people of
America.
"We are now naturally led to examine the means by which they proposed to
accomplish this end. This opens more particularly to our view the
discussion before us. But, previously to our entering upon it, it will
not be improper to state some general and leading principles of
government, which will receive particular application in the course of
our investigations.
"There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there
is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may be termed supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable. Where does this power reside? To this
question writers on different governments will give different answers.
Sir William Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain the power is
lodged in the British Parliament; that the Parliament may alter the form
of the government; and that its power is absolute, without control. The
idea of a constitution, limiting and superintending the operations of
legislative authority, seems not to have been accurately understood in
Britain. There are, at least, no traces of practice conformable to such
a principle. The British Constitution is just what the British
Parliament pleases. When the Parliament transferred legislative
authority to Henry VIII., the act transferring could not, in the strict
acceptation of the term, be called unconstitutional.
"To control the power and conduct of the legislature by an overruling
constitution, was an improvement in the science and practice of
government reserved to the American States.
"Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient
accuracy our political systems, would answer that, in our governments,
the supreme power was vested in the constitutions. This opinion
approaches a step nearer to the truth, but does not reach it. The truth
is, that, in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
power _remains_ in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our
legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed,
the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people
possess over our constitutions control in _act_, as well as right.
"The consequence is, that the people may change the constitutions
whenever and however they please. This is a right of which no positive
institution can ever deprive them.
"These important truths, Sir, are far from being merely speculative. We,
at this moment, speak and deliberate under their immediate and benign
influence. To the operation of these truths we are to ascribe the scene,
hitherto unparalleled, which America now exhibits to the world,--a
gentle, a peaceful, a voluntary, and a deliberate transition from one
constitution of government to another. In other parts of the world, the
idea of revolutions in government is, by a mournful and an indissoluble
association, connected with the idea of wars, and all the calamities
attendant on wars. But happy experience teaches us to view such
revolutions in a very different light,--to consider them only as
progressive steps in improving the knowledge of government, and
increasing the happiness of society and mankind.
"Oft have I marked, with silent pleasure and admiration, the force and
prevalence, through the United States, of the principle that the supreme
power resides in the people, and that they never part with it. It may be
called the _panacea_ in politics. There can be no disorder in the
community but may here receive a radical cure. If the error be in the
legislature, it may be corrected by the constitution; if in the
constitution, it may be corrected by the people. There is a remedy,
therefore, for every distemper in government, if the people are not
wanting to themselves; if they are wanting to themselves, there is no
remedy. From their power, as we have seen, there is no appeal; of their
error, there is no superior principle of correction.
"There are three simple species of government;--monarchy, where the
supreme power is in a single person; aristocracy, where the supreme
power is in a select assembly, the members of which either fill up, by
election, the vacancies in their own body, or succeed to their places in
it by inheritance, property, or in respect of some _personal_ right or
qualification; a republic or democracy, where the people at large
_retain_ the supreme power, and act either collectively or by
representation.
"Each of these species of government has its advantages and
disadvantages.
"The advantages of a _monarchy_ are strength, despatch, secrecy, unity
of counsel. Its disadvantages are tyranny, expense, ignorance of the
situation and wants of the people, insecurity, unnecessary wars, evils
attending elections or successions.
"The advantages of _aristocracy_ are wisdom, arising from experience and
education. Its disadvantages are dissensions among themselves,
oppression to the lower orders.
"The advantages of _democracy_ are liberty, equality, cautious and
salutary laws, public spirit, frugality, peace, opportunities of
exciting and producing abilities of the best citizens. Its disadvantages
are dissensions, the delay and disclosure of public counsels, the
imbecility of public measures, retarded by the necessity of a numerous
consent.
"A government may be composed of two or more of the simple forms above
mentioned. Such is the British government. It would be an improper
government for the United States, because it is inadequate to such an
extent of territory, and because it is suited to an establishment of
different orders of men. A more minute comparison between some parts of
the British Constitution, and some parts of the plan before us, may
perhaps find a proper place in a subsequent period of our business.
"What is the nature and kind of that government which has been proposed
for the United States by the late Convention? In its principle, it is
purely democratical. But that principle is applied in different forms,
in order to obtain the advantages, and exclude the inconveniences, of
the simple modes of government.
"If we take an extended and accurate view of it, we shall find the
streams of power running in different directions, in different
dimensions, and at different heights,--watering, adorning, and
fertilizing the fields and meadows through which their courses are led;
but if we trace them, we shall discover that they all originally flow
from one abundant fountain.
"In this Constitution, _all authority is derived from the people_.
"Fit occasions will hereafter offer for particular remarks on the
different parts of the plan."
After an elaborate examination of the Constitution, he thus concludes:--
"A free government has often been compared to a pyramid. This allusion
is made with peculiar propriety in the system before you; it is laid on
the broad basis of the people; its powers gradually rise, while they are
confined in proportion as they ascend, until they end in that most
permanent of all forms. When you examine all its parts, they will
invariably be found to preserve that essential mark of free
governments,--a chain of connection with the people.
"Such, Sir, is the nature of this system of government; and the
important question at length presents itself to our view,--Shall it be
ratified, or shall it be rejected, by this Convention? In order to
enable us still further to form a judgment on this truly momentous and
interesting point, on which all we have, or can have, dear to us on
earth is materially depending, let us for a moment consider the
consequences that will result from one or the other measure. Suppose we
reject this system of government; what will be the consequence? Let the
farmer say,--he whose produce remains unasked for; nor can he find a
single market for its consumption, though his fields are blessed with
luxuriant abundance. Let the manufacturer, and let the mechanic, say;
they can feel, and tell their feelings. Go along the wharves of
Philadelphia, and observe the melancholy silence that reigns. I appeal
not to those who enjoy places and abundance under the present
government; they may well dilate upon the easy and happy situation of
our country. Let the merchants tell you what is our commerce; let them
say what has been their situation since the return of peace,--an era
which they might have expected would furnish additional sources to our
trade, and a continuance, and even an increase, to their fortunes. Have
these ideas been realized? or do they not lose some of their capital in
every adventure, and continue the unprofitable trade from year to year,
subsisting under the hopes of happier times under an efficient general
government? The ungainful trade carried on by our merchants has a
baneful influence on the interests of the manufacturer, the mechanic,
and the farmer; and these, I believe, are the chief interests of the
people of the United States.
"I will go further. Is there now a government among us that can do a
single act that a national government ought to do? Is there any power of
the United States that can _command_ a single shilling? This is a plain
and a home question.
"Congress may recommend; they can do no more: they may require; but they
must not proceed one step further. If things are bad now,--and that they
are not worse is only owing to hopes of improvement or change in the
system,--will they become better when those hopes are disappointed? We
have been told, by honorable gentlemen on this floor, that it is
improper to urge this kind of argument in favor of a new system of
government, or against the old one: unfortunately, Sir, these things are
too severely felt to be omitted; the people feel them; they pervade all
classes of citizens, and every situation from New Hampshire to Georgia:
the argument of necessity is the patriot's defence, as well as the
tyrant's plea.
"Is it likely, Sir, that, if this system of government is rejected, a
better will be framed and adopted? I will not expatiate on this subject;
but I believe many reasons will suggest themselves to prove that such
expectation would be illusory. If a better could be obtained at a future
time, is there any thing wrong in this? I go further. Is there any thing
wrong that cannot be amended more easily by the mode pointed out in the
system itself, than could be done by calling convention after
convention, before the organization of the government? Let us now turn
to the consequences that will result if we assent to and ratify the
instrument before you. I shall trace them as concisely as I can, because
I have trespassed already too long on the patience and indulgence of the
house.
"I stated, on a former occasion, one important advantage; by adopting
this system, we become a _nation_; at present, we are not one. Can we
perform a single national act? Can we do any thing to procure us
dignity, or to preserve peace and tranquillity? Can we relieve the
distress of our citizens? Can we provide for their welfare or happiness?
The powers of our government are mere sound. If we offer to treat with a
nation, we receive this humiliating answer: 'You cannot, in propriety of
language, make a treaty, because you have no power to execute it.' Can
we borrow money? There are too many examples of unfortunate creditors
existing, both on this and the other side of the Atlantic, to expect
success from this expedient. But could we borrow money, we cannot
command a fund, to enable us to pay either the principal or interest;
for, in instances where our friends have advanced the principal, they
have been obliged to advance the interest also, in order to prevent the
principal from being annihilated in their hands by depreciation. Can we
raise an army? The prospect of a war is highly probable. The accounts we
receive, by every vessel from Europe, mention that the highest exertions
are making in the ports and arsenals of the greatest maritime powers.
But whatever the consequence may be, are we to lie supine? We know we
are unable, under the Articles of Confederation, to exert ourselves; and
shall we continue so, until a stroke be made on our commerce, or we see
the debarkation of a hostile army on our unprotected shores? Who will
guarantee that our property will not be laid waste, that our towns will
not be put under contribution, by a small naval force, and subjected to
all the horror and devastation of war? May not this be done without
opposition, at least effectual opposition, in the present situation of
our country? There may be safety over the Appalachian Mountains, but
there can be none on our sea-coast. With what propriety can we hope our
flag will be respected, while we have not a single gun to fire in its
defence?
"Can we expect to make internal improvement, or accomplish any of those
great national objects which I formerly alluded to, when we cannot find
money to remove a single rock out of a river?
"This system, Sir, will at least make us a nation, and put it in the
power of the Union to act as such. We shall be considered as such by
every nation in the world. We shall regain the confidence of our
citizens, and command the respect of others.
"As we shall become a nation, I trust that we shall also form a national
character, and that this character will be adapted to the principles and
genius of our system of government: as yet we possess none; our
language, manners, customs, habits, and dress depend too much upon those
of other countries. Every nation, in these respects, should possess
originality; there are not, on any part of the globe, finer qualities
for forming a national character, than those possessed by the children
of America. Activity, perseverance, industry, laudable emulation,
docility in acquiring information, firmness in adversity, and patience
and magnanimity under the greatest hardships;--from these materials,
what a respectable national character may be raised! In addition to this
character, I think there is strong reason to believe that America may
take the lead in literary improvements and national importance. This is
a subject which, I confess, I have spent much pleasing time in
considering. That language, Sir, which shall become most generally known
in the civilized world will impart great importance over the nation that
shall use it. The language of the United States will, in future times,
be diffused over a greater extent of country than any other that we
know. The French, indeed, have made laudable attempts towards
establishing a universal language; but, beyond the boundaries of France,
even the French language is not spoken by one in a thousand. Besides the
freedom of our country, the great improvements she has made, and will
make, in the science of government, will induce the patriots and
_literati_ of every nation to read and understand our writings on that
subject; and hence it is not improbable that she will take the lead in
political knowledge.
"If we adopt this system of government, I think we may promise security,
stability, and tranquillity to the governments of the different States.
They would not be exposed to the danger of competition on questions of
territory, or any other that have heretofore disturbed them. A tribunal
is here found to decide, justly and quietly, any interfering claim; and
now is accomplished what the great mind of Henry IV. of France had in
contemplation,--a system of government for large and respectable
dominions, united and bound together, in peace, under a superintending
head, by which all their differences may be accommodated, without the
destruction of the human race. We are told by Sully that this was the
favorite pursuit of that good king during the last years of his life;
and he would probably have carried it into execution, had not the dagger
of an assassin deprived the world of his valuable life. I have, with
pleasing emotion, seen the wisdom and beneficence of a less efficient
power under the Articles of Confederation, in the determination of the
controversy between the States of Pennsylvania and Connecticut; but I
have lamented that the authority of Congress did not extend to
extinguish, entirely, the spark which has kindled a dangerous flame in
the district of Wyoming.
"Let gentlemen turn their attention to the amazing consequences which
this principle will have in this extended country. The several States
cannot war with each other; the general government is the great arbiter
in contentions between them; the whole force of the Union can be called
forth to reduce an aggressor to reason. What a happy exchange for the
disjointed, contentious State sovereignties!
"The adoption of this system will also secure us from danger, and
procure us advantages from foreign nations. This, in our situation, is
of great consequence. We are still an inviting object to one European
power at least; and, if we cannot defend ourselves, the temptation may
become too alluring to be resisted. I do not mean that, with an
efficient government, we should mix with the commotions of Europe. No,
Sir; we are happily removed from them, and are not obliged to throw
ourselves into the scale with any. This system will not hurry us into
war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power
of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such
distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the
legislature at large: this declaration must be made with the concurrence
of the House of Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a
certain conclusion, that nothing but our national interest can draw us
into a war. I cannot forbear, on this occasion, the pleasure of
mentioning to you the sentiments of the great and benevolent man, whose
works I have already quoted on another subject. M. Necker has addressed
this country in language important and applicable in the strictest
degree to its situation and to the present subject. Speaking of war, and
the greatest caution that all nations ought to use in order to avoid its
calamities,--'And you, rising nation,' says he, 'whom generous efforts
have freed from the yoke of Europe! let the universe be struck with
still greater reverence at the sight of the privileges you have
acquired, by seeing you continually employed for the public felicity: do
not offer it as a sacrifice at the unsettled shrine of political ideas,
and of the deceitful combinations of warlike ambition; avoid, or at
least delay, participating in the passions of our hemisphere; make your
own advantage of the knowledge which experience alone has given to our
old age, and preserve, for a long time, the simplicity of childhood; in
short, honor human nature, by showing that, when left to its own
feelings, it is still capable of those virtues that maintain public
order, and of that prudence which insures public tranquillity.'
"Permit me to offer one consideration more, that ought to induce our
acceptance of this system. I feel myself lost in the contemplation of
its magnitude. By adopting this system, we shall probably lay a
foundation for erecting temples of liberty in every part of the earth.
It has been thought by many, that on the success of the struggle America
has made for freedom will depend the exertions of the brave and
enlightened of other nations. The advantages resulting from this system
will not be confined to the United States, but will draw from Europe
many worthy characters, who pant for the enjoyment of freedom. It will
induce princes, in order to preserve their subjects, to restore to them
a portion of that liberty of which they have for many ages been
deprived. It will be subservient to the great designs of Providence with
regard to this globe,--the multiplication of mankind, their improvement
in knowledge, and their advancement in happiness." (Elliot's Debates,
II. 423-434, 524-529.)