CHAPTER VI.

1783-1787.

DECAY AND FAILURE OF THE CONFEDERATION.--PROGRESS OF OPINION.--STEPS

WHICH LED TO THE CONVENTION OF 1787.--INFLUENCE AND EXERTIONS OF

HAMILTON.--MEETING OF THE CONVENTION.

The prominent defects in the Confederation, which have been described in

the previous chapters, and which were so rapidly developed after the

treaty of 1783, made it manifest, that a mere league between independent

States, with no power of direct legislation, was not a government for a

country like this, in a time of peace. They showed, that this compact

between the States, without any central arbiter to declare or power to

enforce the duties which it involved, could not long continue. It had,

indeed, answered the great purpose of forming the Union, by bringing the

States into relations with each other, the continuance of which was

essential to liberty; since nothing could follow the rupture of those

relations but the reëstablishment of European power, or the native

despotism which too often succeeds to civil commotion. By creating a

corporate body of confederate States, and by enabling them to go into

the money-markets of Europe for the means of carrying on and concluding

the war, the Confederation had made the idea and the necessity of a

Union familiar to the popular mind. But the purposes and objects of the

war were far less complex and intricate than the concerns of peace. It

was comparatively easy to borrow money. It was another thing to pay it.

The federal power, under the Confederation, had little else to do,

before the peace, than to administer the concerns of an army in the

field, and to attend to the foreign relations of the country, as yet not

complicated with questions of commerce. But the vast duties, capable of

being discharged by no other power, which came rapidly into existence

before the creation of the machinery essential to their performance,

exhibited the Confederation in an alarming attitude.

It was found to be destitute of the essence of political

sovereignty,--the power to compel the individual inhabitants of the

country to obey its decrees. It was a system of legislation for States

in their corporate and collective capacities, and not for the

individuals of whom those States were composed. It could not levy a

dollar by way of impost or assessment upon the property of a citizen. It

had no means of annulling the action of a State legislature, which

conflicted with the lawful and constitutional requirements of Congress.

It made treaties, and was forced to stand still and see them violated by

its own members, for whose benefit they had been made. It owed an

enormous debt, and saw itself, year by year, growing more and more

unable to liquidate even the annually increasing interest. It stood in

the relation of a protector to the principles of republican liberty on

which the institutions of the States were founded, and on the first

occurrence of danger, it stretched forward only a palsied arm, to which

no man could look for succor. It undertook to rescue commerce from the

blighting effects of foreign policy, and failed to achieve a single

conspicuous and important advantage. Every day it lost something of

respect abroad and of confidence at home, until all men saw, with

Washington, that it had become a great shadow without the substance of a

government; while few could even conjecture what was to rise up and

supplant it.

Few men could see, amidst the decay of empire and the absolute negation

of all the vital and essential functions of government, what was to

infuse new life into a system so nearly effete. Yet the elements of

strength existed in the character of the people; in the assimilation,

which might be produced, in the lapse of years, by a common language, a

common origin, and a common destiny;--in the almost boundless resources

of the country;--and, above all, in the principles of its ancient local

institutions, that were capable, to an extent not then conceived, of

expansion and application to objects of far greater magnitude than any

which they had yet embraced. Through what progress of opinion the people

of this country were enabled to grasp and combine these elements into a

new system, which could satisfy their wants, we must now inquire.

In this inquiry, the student of political history should never fail to

observe, that the great difficulty of the case, which made it so complex

and embarrassing, arose from the separate, sovereign, and independent

existence of the States. The formation of new constitutions, in

countries not thus divided, involves only the adaptation of new

institutions and forms to the genius, the laws, and the habits of the

people. The monarchy of France has, in our day, been first remodelled,

and afterwards swept from the face of Europe, to be followed by a

republican constitution, which has in its turn been crushed and

superseded. But France is a country that has long been subjected to as

complete and powerful a system of centralization as has existed anywhere

since the most energetic period of the Roman empire; and whether its

institutions of government have or have not needed to be changed, as

they have been from time to time, those changes have been made in a

country in which an entire political unity has greatly facilitated the

operation.

In the United States, on the contrary, a federal government was to be

created; and it was to be created for thirteen distinct communities;--a

government that should not destroy the political sovereignties of the

States, and should yet introduce a new sovereignty, formed by means of

powers, whose surrender by the States, instead of weakening their

present strength, would rather develop and increase it. This peculiar

difficulty may be constantly traced, amidst all the embarrassments of

the period in which the fundamental idea of the Constitution was at

length evolved.

The progress of opinion and feeling in this country, on the subject of

its government, from the peace of 1783 to the year 1787, may properly be

introduced by a brief statement of the political tendencies of two

principal classes of men. All contemporary evidence assures us that this

was a period of great pecuniary distress, arising from the depreciation

of the vast quantities of paper money issued by the Federal and State

governments; from rash speculations; from the uncertain and fluctuating

condition of trade; and from the great amount of foreign goods forced

into the country as soon as its ports were opened. Naturally, in such a

state of things, the debtors were disposed to lean in favor of those

systems of government and legislation which would tend to relieve or

postpone the payment of their debts; and as such relief could come only

from their State governments, they were naturally the friends of State

rights and State authority, and were consequently not friendly to any

enlargement of the powers of the Federal Constitution. The same causes

which led individuals to look to legislation for irregular relief from

the burden of their private contracts, led them also to regard public

obligations with similar impatience. Opposed to this numerous class of

persons were all those who felt the high necessity of preserving

inviolate every public and private obligation; who saw that the

separate power of the States could not accomplish what was absolutely

necessary to sustain both public and private credit; and they were as

naturally disposed to look to the resources of the Union for these

benefits, as the other class were to look in an opposite direction.

These tendencies produced, in nearly every State, a struggle, not as

between two organized parties, but one that was all along a contest for

supremacy between opposite opinions, in which it was at one time

doubtful to which side the scale would turn.[351]

The three most important centres of opinion in the Union, before the

formation of the Constitution, were Massachusetts, Virginia, and New

York.[352] The public proceedings of each of them, in the order of time,

on the subject of enlarging the federal powers, are, therefore,

important to a just understanding of the course of events which ended in

the calling of the Convention.

The legislature of Massachusetts was assembled in the summer of 1785.

The proposal of Congress, made to the States in 1784, to grant the power

of regulating trade, had been responded to by only four of the States,

and the negotiations in Europe were failing from the want of it. Great

uneasiness and distress pervaded all the commercial classes, and

extended to every other class capable of being affected by a state of

things in which a large balance, occasioned by the extravagant

importation and use of foreign manufactures, was thrown against the

country. The money of the State was rapidly drawn off to meet this

balance, which its other exhausted means of remittance could not

satisfy. It was impossible for the State to recover its former

prosperity, while Great Britain and other nations continued the

commercial systems which they had adopted. It had become plain to the

comprehension of all intelligent persons concerned in trade, that

nothing could break up those systems so long as the United States were

destitute of the same power to regulate their foreign trade, by

admitting or excluding foreign vessels and cargoes according to their

interests; and it needed only the popular expression of this palpable

truth, enforced by a clear and decided executive message, to induce the

legislature to act upon it.[353] Governor Bowdoin gave the necessary

impulse, and suggested the appointment of special delegates from the

States to settle and define the powers with which Congress ought to be

invested.[354]

This message caused the adoption of the first resolution, passed by the

legislature of any State, declaring the Articles of Confederation to be

inadequate to the great purposes which they were originally designed to

effect, and recommending a convention of delegates from all the States,

for the purpose of revising them, and reporting to Congress how far it

might be necessary to alter or enlarge the powers of the Federal Union,

in order to secure and perpetuate its primary objects. Congress was

requested by these resolves to recommend such a convention. A letter,

urging the importance of the subject, was addressed by the Governor of

Massachusetts to the President of Congress, and another to the executive

of each of the other States. The resolves were also inclosed to the

delegates of the State in Congress, with instructions to lay them before

that body at the earliest opportunity, and to make every exertion to

carry them into effect.[355]

They were, however, never presented to Congress. That body was wholly

unprepared for such a step, and the delegation of Massachusetts were

entirely opposed to it, as premature. It had been all along the policy

of Congress to obtain only a grant of temporary power over commerce, and

to this policy they were committed by their proposition, now pending

with the legislatures of the States, and by the instructions of the

commissioners whom they had sent to Europe to negotiate commercial

treaties. The prevalent idea in Congress was, that at the expiration of

fifteen years,--the period for which they had asked the States to grant

them power over commerce,--a new commercial epoch would commence, when

the States would have a more clear and comprehensive view of their

interests, and of the best means for promoting them, whether by treaties

abroad, or by the delegation and exercise of greater power at home. It

was argued, also, that the most safe and practicable course was, to

grant temporary power in the first instance, and to leave the question

of its permanent adoption as a part of the Confederation to depend on

its beneficial effects. Another objection, which afterwards caused

serious difficulty, was, that the Articles of Confederation contained no

provision for their amendment by a convention, but that changes should

originate in Congress and be confirmed by the State legislatures, and

that, if the report of a convention should not be adopted by Congress,

great mischiefs would follow.

But a deep-seated jealousy in Congress of the radical changes likely to

be made in the system of government lay at the foundation of these

objections. There was an apprehension that the Convention might be

composed of persons favorable to an aristocratic system; or that, even

if the members were altogether republican in their views, there would be

great danger of a report which would propose an entire remodelling of

the government. The delegation from Massachusetts, influenced by these

fears, retained the resolutions of the State for two months, and then

replied to the Governor's letter, assigning these as their reasons for

not complying with the directions given to them.[356] The legislature of

Massachusetts thereupon annulled their resolutions recommending a

Convention.[357]

It is manifest from this occurrence, that Congress in 1785 were no more

in a condition to take the lead and conduct the country to a revision of

the Federal Constitution, than they were in 1783, when Hamilton wished

to have a declaration made of its defects, and found it impracticable.

There were seldom present more than five-and-twenty members; and, at the

time when Massachusetts proposed to call upon them to act upon this

momentous subject, the whole assembly embraced as little eminent talent

as had ever appeared in it. They were not well placed to observe that

something more than "the declamation of designing men" was at work,

loosening the foundations of the system which they were

administering.[358] They saw some of its present inconveniences; but

they did not see how rapidly it was losing the confidence of the

country, of which the following year was destined to deprive it

altogether.

Before the year 1785 had closed, however, Virginia was preparing to give

the weight of her influence to the advancing cause of reform.

A proposition was introduced into the House of Delegates of Virginia, to

instruct the delegates of the State in Congress to move a recommendation

to all the States to authorize Congress to collect a revenue by means of

duties uniform throughout the United States, for a period of thirteen

years.[359] The absolute necessity for such a system was generally

admitted; but, as in Massachusetts, the opinions of the members were

divided between a permanent grant of power and a grant for a limited

term. The advocates of the limitation, arguing that the utility of the

measure ought to be tested by experiment, contended, that a temporary

grant of commercial powers might be and would be renewed from time to

time, if experience should prove its efficacy. They forgot that the

other powers granted to the Union, on which its whole fabric rested,

were perpetual and irrevocable; and that the first sacrifices of

sovereignty made by the States had been the result of circumstances

which imperatively demanded the surrender, just as the situation of the

country now demanded a similar surrender of an irrevocable power over

commerce. The proposal to make this grant temporary only, was a proposal

to engraft an anomaly upon the other powers of the Confederacy, with

very little prospect of its future renewal; for the caprice, the

jealousy, and the diversity of interests of the different States, were

obstacles which the scheme of a temporary grant could only evade for the

present, leaving them still in existence when the period of the grant

should expire. But the arguments in favor of this scheme prevailed, and

the friends of the more enlarged and liberal system, believing that a

temporary measure would stand afterwards in the way of a permanent one,

and would confirm the policy of other countries founded on the

jealousies of the States, were glad to allow the subject to subside,

until a new event opened the prospect for a more efficient plan.[360]

The citizens of Virginia and Maryland, directly interested in the

navigation of the rivers Potomac and Pocomoke, and of the Bay of

Chesapeake, had long been embarrassed by the conflicting rights and

regulations of their respective States; and, in the spring of 1785, an

effort at accommodation was made, by the appointment of commissioners on

the part of each State to form a compact between them for the regulation

of the trade upon those waters. These commissioners assembled at

Alexandria in March, and while there made a visit at Mount Vernon, where

a further scheme was concerted for the establishment of harmonious

commercial regulations between the two States.[361] This plan

contemplated the appointment of other commissioners, having power to

make arrangements, with the assent of Congress, for maintaining a naval

force in the Chesapeake, and also for establishing a tariff of duties on

imports, to be enacted by the legislatures of both the States. A report,

embracing this recommendation, was accordingly made by the Alexandria

commissioners to their respective governments. In the legislature of

Virginia this report was received while the proposition for granting

temporary commercial powers to Congress was under consideration; and it

was immediately followed by a resolution directing that part of the plan

which respected duties on imports to be communicated to all the States,

with an invitation to send deputies to the meeting. In a few days

afterwards, the celebrated resolution of Virginia, which led the way to

the Convention at Annapolis, was adopted by the legislature, directing

the appointment of commissioners to meet with the deputies of all the

other States who might be appointed for the same purpose, to consider

the whole subject of the commerce of the United States.[362] The

circular letter which transmitted this resolution to the several States

proposed that Annapolis in the State of Maryland should be the place,

and that the following September should be the time of meeting.

The fate of this measure now turned principally upon the action of the

State of New York. The power of levying a national impost, proposed in

the revenue system of 1783, had been steadily withheld from Congress by

the legislature of that State. Ever since the peace, the State had been

divided between two parties, the friends of adequate powers in Congress,

and the adherents of State sovereignty; and the belief that the

commercial advantage of the State depended upon retaining the power to

collect their own revenues, had all along given to the latter an

ascendency in the legislature. In 1784, they established a custom-house

and a revenue system of their own. In 1785, a proposition to grant the

required powers to Congress was lost in the Senate; and in 1786, it

became necessary for Congress to bring this question to a final issue.

Three other States, as we have seen, stood in the same category with New

York, having decided in favor of no part of the plan which Congress had

so long and so repeatedly urged upon their adoption.[363] Declaring,

therefore, that the crisis had arrived when the people of the United

States, by whose will and for whose benefit the federal government was

instituted, must decide whether they would support their work as a

nation, by maintaining the public faith at home and abroad, or whether,

for want of a timely exertion in establishing a general revenue system,

and thereby giving strength to the Confederacy, they would hazard the

existence of the Union and the privileges for which they had

contended,--Congress left the responsibility of the decision with the

legislatures of the States.[364]

It was now that the influence of Hamilton upon the destinies of this

country began to be favored by the events which had brought its

affairs to the present juncture. To his sagacious and watchful

forecast, the proposal of a commercial convention, emanating from

Virginia, presented the opportunity which he had long desired, to

effect an entire change in the system of the federal government;

while, at the same time, the final appeal made by Congress for the

establishment of the revenue system gave him an occasion to bring the

State of New York into the movement which had been originated by

Virginia. He determined that this system should be again presented to

the legislature, for distinct approval or rejection, and that, if it

should be rejected, the State should still send a representation to

the Convention at Annapolis. He therefore caused the revenue system,

as proposed by Congress, to be again brought before the legislature,

where it was again rejected; and he and his friends then threw their

whole influence in favor of the appointment of commissioners to attend

the commercial convention, and succeeded,--Hamilton himself being

appointed one of them.[365]

This great step having been taken, the course of the State of New York

upon the revenue system of 1783, which brought her at length to an open

controversy with Congress, tended strongly to aid the plans of Hamilton,

and finally gave him the ascendency in the State itself. The

legislature, in May, 1786, passed an act for granting imposts and duties

to the United States, and soon afterwards adjourned. It was immediately

pronounced by Congress not to be a compliance with their recommendation,

and the Governor was earnestly requested to reassemble the legislature.

This he declined to do, upon the ground of a want of constitutional

power. Congress again urged the summoning of the legislature, for the

purpose of granting the system of impost in such a manner as to enable

them to carry it into effect, and the Governor again refused.[366]

Arrived at Annapolis, Hamilton found there the representatives of five

States only.[367] He had come with the determination that the Convention

should lay before the country the whole subject of the condition of the

States and the want of an efficient federal government. But the avowed

purpose of the meeting was solely to consider the means of establishing

a uniform system of commercial regulations, and not to reform the

existing government of the Union. New Jersey alone, of the five States

represented, had empowered her commissioners to consider of "other

important matters," in addition to the subject of commercial

regulations. Four other States had appointed commissioners, none of whom

had attended; and the four remaining States had made no appointments at

all.[368]

Under these circumstances, it was certainly a matter of great delicacy

for the commissioners of five States only to pass upon the general

situation of the Union, and to pronounce its existing government

defective and insufficient. Hamilton, however, felt that this

opportunity, once lost, might never occur again; and although willing to

waive his original purpose of a full exposition of the defects of the

Confederation, he did not deem it expedient that the Convention should

adjourn without proposing to the country some measure that would lead to

the necessary reforms. He modified his original plan, therefore, and

laid before his colleagues a report, which formally proposed to the

several States the assembling of a general convention, to take into

consideration the situation of the United States.

In this document, it was declared that the regulation of trade, which

had been made the object of the meeting at Annapolis, could not be

effected alone, for the power of regulating commerce would enter so far

into the general system of the federal government, that it would require

a corresponding adjustment of the other parts of the system. That the

system of the general government was seriously defective; that those

defects were likely to be found greater on a close inspection; that they

were the cause of the embarrassments which marked the state of public

affairs, foreign and domestic; and that some mode by which they could be

peaceably supplied was imperatively demanded by the public

necessities,--were propositions which the country was then prepared to

receive. A convention of deputies from the different States, for the

special and sole purpose of investigating the defects of the national

government, seemed to be the course entitled to preference over all

others.[369]

It was indeed the only method by which the object of the great statesman

who drafted this report could have been reached. The Articles of

Confederation had provided, that they should be inviolably observed by

every State; that the Union should be perpetual; and that no alteration

should be made in any of the Articles, unless agreed to in a Congress of

the United States, and confirmed by the legislature of every State.[370]

To have left the whole subject to the action of Congress would have

insured, at most, only a change in some of the features of the existing

government, instead of the great reform which Hamilton believed to be

essential,--the substitution of a totally different system. At the same

time, the coöperation and assent of Congress were necessary to the

success of the plan of a convention, in order that it might not seem to

be a violent departure from the provisions of the Articles of

Confederation, and also for the sake of their influence with the States.

The proposal of the report was therefore cautious. It did not suggest

the summoning of a convention to frame a new constitution of government,

but "to devise such further provisions as might appear to be necessary

to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the

exigencies of the Union." It proposed also, that whatever reform should

be agreed on by the convention should be reported to Congress, and, when

agreed to by them, should be confirmed by the _legislatures_ of all the

States. In this manner, the proposal avoided any seeming violence to the

Articles of Confederation, and suggested the convention as a body to

prepare for the use of Congress a plan to be adopted by them for

submission to the States.[371]

At the same time, Hamilton undoubtedly contemplated more than any

amendment of the existing constitution. In 1780, he had analyzed the

defects of the general government, sketched the outline of a Federal

Constitution, and suggested the calling of a convention to frame such a

system.[372] The idea of such a convention was undoubtedly entertained,

by many persons, before the meeting at Annapolis. It had been

recommended by the legislature of New York in 1782, and by that of

Massachusetts in 1785. But Hamilton had foreseen its necessity in 1780,

more than seven years before the meeting at Annapolis; and, although he

may not have been the author of the first public proposal of such a

measure, his private correspondence contains the first suggestion of it,

and proves that he had conceived the main features of the Constitution

of the United States, even before the Confederation itself was

established.[373]

The recommendation of the Annapolis commissioners was variously

received. In the legislature of Virginia it met with a cordial approval,

and an act was passed during the autumn to provide for the appointment

of delegates to the proposed convention. In Congress, it was received at

first with little favor. Doubts were entertained there whether any

changes in the federal government could be constitutionally made,

unless they were to originate in Congress and were then to be adopted by

the legislatures of the States, pursuant to the mode provided by the

Articles of Confederation. The legislatures, it was argued, could not

adopt any scheme that might be proposed by a convention; and if it were

submitted to the people, it was not only doubtful what degree of assent

on their part would make it valid, but it was also doubtful whether

they could change the Federal Constitution by their own direct action.

To these difficulties was to be added the further hazard, that, if the

report of the convention should be made to Congress, as proposed, they

might not finally adopt it, and if it should be rejected, that fatal

consequences would ensue.[374]

The report of the Annapolis commissioners was, however, taken into

consideration; and in the course of the following winter a report upon

it was made in Congress, which conceded the fact that the Confederation

required amendments, and that the proposed convention was the most

eligible mode of effecting them.[375] But this report had to encounter

the objection, entertained by many members, that the measure proposed

would tend to weaken the federal authority, by lending the sanction of

Congress to an extra-constitutional proceeding. Others considered that a

more summary mode of proceeding was advisable, in the form of a direct

appeal to the people of every State to institute State conventions,

which should choose delegates to a general convention, to revise and

amend, or change, the federal system, and to publish the new

constitution for general observance, without any reference to the

States, for their acceptance or confirmation.[376] There were still

others, who preferred that Congress should take up the defects of the

existing system, point them out to the legislatures of the States, and

recommend certain distinct alterations to be adopted by them.[377]

It was no doubt true, that a convention originating with the State

legislatures was not a mode pointed out by the Articles of Confederation

for effecting amendments to that instrument. But it was equally true,

that the mere amendment of that instrument was not what the critical

situation of the country required. On the other hand, a convention

originating with the people of the States would undoubtedly rest upon

the authority of the people, in its inception; but, if the system which

it might frame were to go into operation without first being adopted by

the people, it would as certainly want the true basis of their consent.

These difficulties were felt in and out of Congress. But it does not

seem to have occurred to those who raised them, that the source from

which the convention should derive its powers to frame and recommend a

new system of government was of far less consequence, than that the mode

in which the system recommended should be adopted, should be one that

would give it the full sanction and authority of the people themselves.

A constitution might be framed and recommended by any body of

individuals, whether instituted by the legislatures or by the people of

the States; but if adopted and ordained by the States in their corporate

capacities, it would rest on one basis, and if adopted and ordained by

the people of the States, acting upon it directly and primarily, it

would obviously rest upon another, a different, and a higher authority.

The latter mode was not contemplated by Congress when they acted upon

the recommendation of the Annapolis commissioners. Accustomed to no

other idea of a union than that formed by the States in their corporate

capacities as distinct and sovereign communities; belonging to a body

constituted by the States, and therefore officially related rather to

the governments than to the people of the States; and entertaining a

becoming and salutary fear of departing from a constitution which they

had been appointed to administer,--the members of the Congress of

1786-87 were not likely to go beyond the Annapolis recommendation, which

in fact proposed that the new system should be confirmed by the

legislatures of the States.

But the course of events tended to a different result,--to an actual,

although a peaceable revolution, by the quiet substitution of a new

government in place of the old one, and resting upon an entirely

different basis. While Congress were debating the objections to a

convention, the necessity for action became every day more stringent.

The insurrection in Massachusetts, which had followed the meeting of the

commissioners at Annapolis and had reached a dangerous crisis when their

report was before Congress, had alarmed the people of the older States

by the dangers of an anarchy with which the existing national government

would be obviously unable to cope. The peril of losing the navigation of

the Mississippi, and with it the Western settlements, through the

inefficiency of Congress, was also at that moment impending; while, at

the same time, the commerce of the country was nearly annihilated by a

course of policy pursued by England, which Congress was utterly unable

to encounter. Under these dangers and embarrassments, a state of public

opinion was rapidly developed, in the winter of 1787, which drove

Congress to action. The objections to the proposal before them yielded

gradually to the stern requirements of necessity, and a convention was

at last accepted, not merely as the best, but as the only practicable,

mode of reaching the first great object by which an almost despairing

country might be reassured of its future welfare.

The final change in the views of Congress in regard to a convention was

produced by the action of the legislature of New York. In that body, as

we have seen, the impost system had been rejected, in the session of

1786, and the Governor of the State had even refused to reassemble the

legislature for the reconsideration of this subject. A new session

commenced in January, 1787, in the city of New York, where Congress was

also sitting. A crisis now occurred, in which the influence of Hamilton

was exerted in the same manner that it had been in the former session,

and with a similar result. On that occasion he had followed up the

rejection of the impost system with a resolve for the appointment of

commissioners to attend the meeting at Annapolis. It was now his

purpose, in case the impost system should be again rejected, to obtain

the sanction of Congress to the recommendation of a convention, made by

the Annapolis commissioners. This, he was aware, could be effected only

by inducing the legislature of New York to instruct the delegates of

their State in Congress to move and vote for that decisive measure. The

majority of the members of Congress were indisposed to adopt the plan of

a convention; and although they might be brought to recommend it at the

instance of a State, they were not inclined to do so spontaneously.[378]

The crisis required, therefore, all the address of Hamilton and of the

friends of the Union, to bring the influence of one of these bodies to

bear upon the other.

The reiterated recommendation by Congress of the impost system, now

addressed solely to the State of New York, who remained alone in her

refusal, necessarily occupied the earliest attention of the new

legislature.[379] A warm discussion upon a bill introduced for the

purpose of effecting the grant as Congress had asked for it, ended, on

the 15th of February, in its defeat. The subject of a general convention

of the States, according to the plan of the Annapolis commissioners, was

then before Congress, on the report of a grand committee;[380] and

Congress were hesitating upon its expediency. At this critical juncture,

Hamilton carried a resolution in the legislature of New York,

instructing the delegates of that State in Congress to move for an act

recommending the States to send delegates to a convention for the

purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, which, four days

afterwards, was laid before Congress.[381]

Virginia and North Carolina had already chosen delegates to the

Convention, in compliance with the recommendation from Annapolis; and

Massachusetts was about to make such an appointment, under the influence

of her patriotic Bowdoin. In this posture of affairs, although the

proposition of the New York delegation failed to be adopted,[382] the

fact that she had thus solicited the action of Congress was of decisive

influence, when the members from Massachusetts followed it immediately

by a resolve more acceptable to a majority of the assembly.[383]

The recommendation, as it went forth from Congress, was strictly limited

to a revision of the Articles of Confederation, by a convention of

delegates, and the alterations and new provisions were to be reported to

Congress, and were to be agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the

States. Thus the resolution pursued carefully the mode of amendment and

alteration provided by the Articles of Confederation, except that it

interposed a convention for the purpose of originating the changes to be

proposed in the existing form of government; adding, however, the great

general purpose of rendering the Federal Constitution adequate to the

exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.

The point thus gained was of vast and decisive importance. That Congress

should forego the right of originating changes in the system of

government;[384] that it should advise the States to confer that power

upon another assembly; and that it should sanction a general revision

of the Federal Constitution, with the express declaration of its present

inadequacy,--were all preliminaries essential to a successful reform.

Feeble as it had become from the overgrown vitality of State power, and

from the lack of numbers and talent upon its roll, it was still the

government of the Union; the Congress of America; the lineal successors

of that renowned assembly which had defied the power of England, and

brought into existence the thirteen United States. If it stood but the

poor shadow of a great name, it was still a name with which to do more

than conjure; for it bore a constitutional relation to the States, still

reverenced by the wise and thoughtful, and still necessary to be

regarded by all who desired the security of constitutional liberty. The

risk of immediate attempts to establish a monarchical form of government

was not inconsiderable. The risk that civil confusion would follow a

longer delay to provide for the pressing wants of the country was

greater. Dejection and despondency had taken hold of many minds of the

highest order; while the great body of the people were desiring a change

which they could not define, and which they feared, while they invited

its approach. In such a state of things, considerate men were naturally

unwilling to turn entirely away from Congress, or to exclude its agency

altogether from the processes of reform, and to embark upon the

uncertain sea of political experiment, without chart or rule to guide

their course; for no man could tell what projects, what schemes, and

what influences might arise to jeopard those great principles of

republican liberty on which the political fabric had rested from the

Declaration of Independence to the present hour of danger and distress.

For the wise precedent, thus established, of placing the formation of a

new government under the direct sanction of the old one, the people of

this country are indebted chiefly to Hamilton. Nothing can be more

unfortunate, in any country, than the necessity or the rashness which

sweeps away an established constitution, before a substitute has been

devised. Whether the interval be occupied by provisional arrangements or

left to a more open anarchy, it is an unfit season for the creation of

new institutions. At such a time, the crude projects of theorists are

boldly intruded among the deliberations of statesmen; despotism lies in

wait for the hazards by which liberty is surrounded; the multitude are

unrestrained by the curb of authority; and society is exposed to the

necessity of accepting whatever is offered, or of submitting to the

first usurper who may seize the reins of government, because it has

nothing on which to rest as an alternative. True liberty has gained

nothing, in any age or country, from revolutions, which have excluded

the possibility of seeking or obtaining the assent of existing power to

the reforms which the progress of society demands.

In the days when the Confederation was tottering to its fall; when its

revenues had been long exhausted; and when its Congress embraced, in

actual attendance, less than thirty delegates from only eleven of the

States, it would have been the easy part of a demagogue to overthrow it

by a sudden appeal to the passions and interests of the hour, as the

first step to a radical change.[385] But the great man, whose mature and

energetic youth, trained in the school of Washington, had been devoted

to the formation and establishment of the Union, knew too well, that, if

its golden cord were once broken, no human agency could restore it to

life. He knew the value of habit, the respect for an established,

however enfeebled authority; and while he felt and insisted on the

necessity for a new constitution, and did all in his power to make the

country perceive the defects of the old one, he wisely and honestly

admitted that the assent of Congress must be gained to any movement

which proposed to remedy the evil.

But the reason for not moving the revision of the system of government

by Congress itself was one that could not be publicly stated. It was,

that the highest civil talent of the country was not there. The men to

whom the American people had been accustomed to look in great

emergencies,--the men who were called into the Convention, and whose

power and wisdom were signally displayed in its deliberations,--were

then engaged in other spheres of public life, or had retired to the

repose which they had earned in the great struggle with England. Had the

attempt been made by Congress itself to form a constitution for the

acceptance of the States, the controlling influence and wisdom of

Washington, Franklin's wide experience and deep sagacity, the unrivalled

capacities of Hamilton, the brilliant powers of Gouverneur Morris,

Pinckney's fertility, and Randolph's eloquence, with all the power of

their eminent colleagues and all the strength of principle and of

character which they brought to the Convention, would have been withheld

from the effort. One great man, it is true, was still there. Madison was

in Congress; and Madison's part in the framing of the Constitution was

eminently conspicuous and useful. But without the concentration of

talent which the Convention drew together, representing every interest

and every part of the Union, nothing could have been presented to the

States, by the Congress of 1787, which would have commanded their

assent. The Constitution owed as much, for its acceptance, to the weight

of character of its framers, as it did to their wisdom and ability, for

the intrinsic merits which that weight of character enforced.

It was fortunate, also, that Congress did nothing more than to recommend

the Convention, without undertaking to define its powers. The doubts

concerning its legality, which led many persons of great influence to

hesitate in sanctioning it, were thus removed, and the States were left

free to join in the movement, as an expedient to discover and remedy the

defects of the federal government, without fettering their delegates

with explicit instructions.[386] In this way the Convention, although

experimental and anomalous, derived its influence from the sources in

which it originated, and was enabled, though not without difficulty, to

meet the crisis in which the country was placed. That crisis was one of

a singular character; for the continued existence of the Union, and the

fate of republican governments, were both involved. It was felt and

admitted by the wisest men of that day, that if the Convention should

fail in devising and agreeing upon some system of government, at once

capable of pervading the country with an efficient control, and

essentially republican in its form, the Federal Union would be at an

end. But its dissolution, in the state in which the country then was,

must have been followed by an attempt to establish monarchical

government; because the State institutions were destitute of the

strength necessary to encounter the agitation which would have followed

the downfall of the federal power, and yet some substitute for that

power must have been found. But without civil war, and the most

frightful social convulsions, nothing in the nature of monarchy could

ever have been established in this country after the Revolution. "Those

who lean to a monarchical government," said Washington, "have either not

consulted the public mind, or they live in a region which (the levelling

principles in which they were bred being entirely eradicated) is much

more productive of monarchical ideas than is the case in the Southern

States, where, from the habitual distinctions which have always existed

among the people, one would have expected the first generation and the

most rapid growth of them. I am also clear, that, even admitting the

utility, nay, necessity, of the form, the period is not arrived for

adopting the change without shaking the peace of this country to its

foundation. That a thorough reform of the present system is

indispensable, no one, who has a capacity to judge, will deny; and with

hand and heart I hope the business will be essayed in a full convention.

After which, if more powers and more decision are not found in the

existing form, if it still wants energy and that secrecy and despatch

(either from the non-attendance or the local views of its members) which

are characteristic of good government, and if it shall be found (the

contrary of which, however, I have always been more afraid of than the

abuse of them) that Congress will, upon all proper occasions, exert the

powers which are given with a firm and steady hand, instead of

frittering them back to the States, where the members, in place of

viewing themselves in their national character, are too apt to be

looking,--I say, after this essay is made, if the system proves

inefficient, conviction of the necessity of a change will be

disseminated among all classes of the people. Then, and not till then,

in my opinion, can it be attempted without involving all the evils of

civil discord."[387]

There were other difficulties besides those which may be called legal,

or technical, attending this effort to revise the system of the federal

government. The failure of that system, as it had been put in operation

in 1781, had, to a great extent, chilled the hopes of many of the best

statesmen of America. It had been established under auspices which

seemed to promise far different fruits from those it had actually

produced. Its foundations were laid in the patriotism and national

feeling of the States. The concessions which had been made to secure a

union of republics, having various, and, in some respects, conflicting

interests, seemed at first to guarantee the prompt and faithful

performance of its obligations. But this fair promise had melted into

most unsubstantial performance. The Confederation was framed upon a

principle which never has enabled, and probably never will enable, a

government to become effective and permanent,--the principle of a

league.

Another and a very serious cause for discouragement was the sectional

jealousy and State pride which had been constantly growing, from the

Declaration of Independence to the time when the States were called upon

to meet each other upon broader grounds, and to make even larger

sacrifices than at any former period. It is difficult to trace to all

its causes the feeling which has at times arrayed the different

extremities of this Union against each other. It was very early

developed, after the different provinces were obliged to act together

for their great mutual objects of political independence; but, even in

its highest paroxysms, it has always at last found an antidote in the

deeper feelings and more sober calculations of a consistent patriotism.

Perhaps its prevalence and activity may with more truth be ascribed, in

every generation, to the ambition of men who find in it a convenient

instrument of local influence, rather than to any other cause. It is

certain, that, when it has raged most violently, this has been its chief

aggravating element. The differences of neither manners, institutions,

climate, nor pursuits would at any time have been sufficient to create

the perils to which the Union of the States has occasionally been

exposed, without the mischievous agency of men whose personal objects

are, for the time, subserved by the existence of such peculiarities. The

proof of this is to be found in the fact, that the seasonable sagacity

of the people has always detected the motives of those who have sought

to employ their passions, and has compelled them at last to give way to

that better order of men who have appealed to their reason.

The difficulty of getting the assent of all the States to radical

changes in the federal system, and the uncertainty as to the mode in

which such changes could be effectively adopted, were also among the

reasons which led many persons to regard the Convention as an experiment

of doubtful expediency. The States had hitherto acted only in their

corporate capacities, in all that concerned the formation and

modification of the Union. The idea of a Union founded on the direct

action of the people of the States, in a primary sense, and proceeding

to establish a federal government, of limited powers, in the same manner

in which the people of each State had established their local

constitutions, had not been publicly broached, and was not generally

entertained. Indeed, there was no expectation on the part of any State,

when the delegates to the Convention were appointed, that any other

principle would be adopted as the basis of action, than that by which

the Articles of Confederation contemplated that all changes should be

effected by the action of the States assembled in Congress, confirmed by

the unanimous assent of the different State legislatures.

The prevailing feeling, among the higher statesmen of the country, was,

that the Convention was an experiment of doubtful tendency, but one that

must nevertheless be tried. Washington, Madison, Jay, Knox, Edmund

Randolph, have all left upon record the evidence of their doubts and

their fears, as well as of their convictions of the necessity for this

last effort in favor of the preservation of a republican form of

government.[388] Hamilton advanced to meet the crisis, with perhaps

less hesitation than any of the Revolutionary statesmen. His great

genius for political construction; his large knowledge of the means by

which a regulated liberty may be secured; and the long study with which

he had contemplated the condition of the country, led him to enter the

Convention with more of eagerness and hope than most of its members. He

saw, with great clearness, that the difficulty which embarrassed nearly

all his contemporaries--the question of the mode of enacting a new

constitution--was capable of solution. He did not propound that solution

in advance of the assembling of the Convention; for it was eminently

necessary that the States should not be alarmed by the suggestion of a

principle so novel and so unlike the existing theory of the Union. But

he was fully prepared to announce it, so soon as it could be received

and acted upon.

* * * * *

It was under such auspices and with such views that the Convention

assembled at Philadelphia, on the fourteenth day of May in the year

seventeen hundred and eighty-seven.

At that time, the world had witnessed no such spectacle as that of the

deputies of a nation, chosen by the free action of great communities,

and assembled for the purpose of thoroughly reforming its constitution,

by the exercise, and with the authority, of the national will. All that

had been done, both in ancient and in modern times, in forming,

moulding, or modifying constitutions of government, bore little

resemblance to the present undertaking of the States of America. Neither

among the Greeks nor the Romans was there a precedent, and scarcely an

analogy. The ancient leagues of some of the cities or republics of

Greece did not amount to constitutions, in the sense of modern political

science; and the Roman republic was but the domination of a single race

of the inhabitants of a single city.

In modern Europe, we find no trace of political science until after the

nations were divided, and partial limits set to the different orders and

powers of the state. The feudal system, which acknowledged no relations

in society but those of lord and serf, necessarily forbade all

consideration of any forms of government which were not essentially

founded on that relation; and it was not until that relation had been in

some degree broken in upon, that there began to be any thing like

theoretical inquiries into natural rights. When this took place,--at the

end, or towards the end, of the Middle Ages,--the peculiar forms of the

European governments gave rise to inquiries into the relation of

sovereign and subject. From the beginning of the fifteenth down to the

end of the seventeenth century, there were occasional discussions on the

Continent, growing out of particular events, of such questions as the

right of the people to depose bad princes, and how far it was lawful to

resist oppression. But questions of constitutional form, or of the right

of the people to arrange and distribute the different powers of

government, or the best mode of doing it, did not arise at all.

In England, from the time of the Conquest, until Magna Charta had gone

far towards destroying the system, a feudal monarchy had precluded all

questions touching the form or the spirit of government. The chief

traits of the present constitution, which arose in a great measure from

the circumstance that the lower orders of the nobility became gradually

so much amalgamated with the people as to give rise to the distinct

power of the commons, have all along been inconsistent with the

enactment of new forms of civil polity; although from the time of the

Reformation to the Revolution of 1688, the active principles of English

freedom have, at different junctures, made advances of the utmost

importance. The foundations on which the Stuarts sought to establish

their throne were directly at variance with the spirit and principles of

the Reformation, which totally denied the doctrine of passive and

unlimited obedience, and which led to the struggles that gave birth to

the Puritans. Those severe reformers, whose church constitution was

purely republican, naturally sought to carry its principles into the

state. The result was the Parliamentary troubles of James the First, the

execution of Charles the First under the forms of judicial proceeding,

and the despotism of Cromwell under the forms of a commonwealth. Charles

the Second returned, untaught by all that had happened, to attempt the

reëstablishment of the Stuart principles of unlimited obedience; and

James the Second, who naturally united to them the Catholic religion,

being driven from his kingdom, the question arose of a vacant throne,

and how it should be filled. In all these events, however, from the

death of Elizabeth to the great discussions which followed the

abdication of James the Second, the idea of calling upon the people of

England to frame a government of their own choice, and to define the

limits and powers of its various departments, never arose. The

Convention Parliament discussed, and were summoned to discuss, but a

single fundamental question,--that involving the disposal of the crown.

Still, the political troubles of England gave rise to many theoretical

discussions of natural right, and of the origin and structure of

society. As soon as Charles the First was executed, this discussion

arose abroad, from his friends, who wrote, or influenced others to

write, in defence of the divine right of kings. Hobbes and Filmer

followed, in England, on the same side, and Milton, Locke, and Algernon

Sidney vindicated the natural and inalienable rights of the subject and

the citizen. In the works of these great writers, the foundations of

society are examined with an acuteness which has left little to be done

in the merely speculative part of political inquiry. But the practical

effect of their theories never went farther than the promotion, to a

greater or less extent, of the particular views which they desired to

inculcate concerning the existing constitution, or the particular events

out of which the discussions arose.

Nor should we forget what had been done in France, by the wise and

cautious Montesquieu, or by the vehement and passionate Rousseau, and

the writers of his school. The former, drawing all his views from

history and experience, undertook to show, from the antecedents of each

state, the character of its constitution, to explain and develop its

peculiar properties, and thence to determine the principles on which its

legislation should proceed. The latter, starting from an entirely

opposite point, and designing to write a treatise on Politics in the

widest sense of the term, became a mere theorist, and produced only

certain brilliant speculations upon the social compact, of a purely

democratic character, as fragments of a work which he never finished.

The crowd of writers, too, who preceded, and in part created the French

Revolution, which was just commencing its destructive activity as our

Constitution was formed, really contributed nothing of practical value

to the solution of such great questions as the mode of forming, vesting,

and distributing the various branches of sovereign power.

Thus there was little for American statesmen of that day to look to, in

the way of theories which had been practically proved to be sound and

useful. The constitution of England, it is true, presented to them

certain great maxims, the application of which was not unsuited to the

circumstances and habits of a people whose laws and institutions had

been derived from their English ancestors and their English blood. But

the constitution of England, embracing the three estates of King, Lords,

and Commons, had become what it was, only by the extortion from the

crown of the rights and privileges of the two orders of the people. The

American Revolution, on the other hand, had settled, as the fundamental

principle of American society, that all sovereignty resides originally

in the people; that they derive no rights by way of grant from any other

source; and consequently, that no powers or privileges can exist in any

portion of the people as distinct from the whole. The English

constitution could, therefore, furnish only occasional analogies for

particular details in the structure of departments, which might after

all really require to be founded on different fundamental principles.

But the great problem to be solved--for which English experience was of

no value--was, so to parcel out those portions of original sovereignty,

which the people of the States might be willing to withdraw from their

State institutions, as to constitute an efficient federal republic,

which yet would not control and absorb the powers that might be

reserved. But to comprehend the results that were accomplished, and to

understand the true nature of the system bequeathed to us, it is

indispensable to examine in detail the means and processes by which it

was formed. Before we turn, however, to this great subject, the

characters of the principal framers of the Constitution demand our

attention.

FOOTNOTES:

[351] "The war, as you have very justly observed," General Washington

wrote to James Warren of Massachusetts, in October, 1785, "has

terminated most advantageously for America, and a fair field is

presented to our view; but I confess to you, my dear Sir, that I do not

think we possess wisdom or justice enough to cultivate it properly.

Illiberality, jealousy, and local policy mix too much in all our public

counsels for the good government of the Union. In a word, the

Confederation appears to me to be little more than a shadow without the

substance, and Congress a nugatory body, their ordinances being little

attended to. To me it is a solecism in politics; indeed, it is one of

the most extraordinary things in nature, that we should confederate as a

nation, and yet be afraid to give the rulers of that nation (who are the

creatures of our own making, appointed for a limited and short duration,

and who are amenable for every action and may be recalled at any moment,

and are subject to all the evils which they may be instrumental in

producing) sufficient powers to order and direct the affairs of the

same. By such policy as this, the wheels of government are clogged, and

our brightest prospects, and that high expectation which was entertained

of us by the wondering world, are turned into astonishment; and, from

the high ground on which we stood, we are descending into the vale of

confusion and darkness.

"That we have it in our power to become one of the most respectable

nations upon earth, admits, in my humble opinion, of no doubt, if we

would but pursue a wise, just, and liberal policy towards one another,

and keep good faith with the rest of the world. That our resources are

ample and increasing, none can deny; but while they are grudgingly

applied, or not applied at all, we give a vital stab to public faith,

and shall sink, in the eyes of Europe, into contempt.

"It has long been a speculative question among philosophers and wise

men, whether foreign commerce is of real advantage to any country; that

is, whether the luxury, effeminacy, and corruptions which are introduced

along with it are counterbalanced by the convenience and wealth which it

brings. But the decision of this question is of very little importance

to us. We have abundant reason to be convinced that the spirit of trade

which pervades these States is not to be repressed. It behooves us,

then, to establish just principles; and this cannot, any more than other

matters of national concern, be done by thirteen heads differently

constructed and organized. The necessity, therefore, of a controlling

power, is obvious; and why it should be withheld is beyond my

comprehension." Writings, IX. 139-141.

[352] They are named in this order, because it represents the order in

which they respectively acted upon the enlargement of the federal

powers.

[353] One of the necessary and immediate effects of the Revolution of

course was, the loss of the exclusive commercial advantages which this

country had enjoyed with Great Britain and her dependencies; and the

prohibitory acts and impositions, which fell with their full weight on

the American trade, after the peace, were particularly disastrous to the

trade of Massachusetts. The whale fishery, a business of great

importance, had brought into the Province, before the war, 172,000

guineas per annum, giving employment to American seamen, and not

requiring the use of any foreign materials, except a small quantity of

cordage. A duty was now laid on whale oil in England of £18 per tun. In

addition to the loss thus sustained, the exportation of lumber and

provisions in American bottoms to the West Indies was entirely

prohibited. Another great inconvenience, which came in fact to be

intolerable, was the vast influx of British goods, consigned to English

factors for sale, depriving the native merchants, manufacturers, and

artisans of the market. At the same time, the revenue of the State,

derived from impost and excise duties and a tax on auctions of one per

cent., fell short of the annual interest on the private debt of the

State, 30,000 pounds (currency) per annum, and a tax of 20,000 pounds

(currency) was computed to be necessary to cancel the debt, principal

and interest, in fifteen years, and pay the ordinary charges of the

government. Besides this, the State's proportion of the federal debt was

to be provided for. It was in this state of things that two remarkable

popular meetings were held in Boston, in the spring of 1785, to act upon

the subject of trade and navigation, and to call the attention of

Congress to the necessity for a national regulation of commerce. The

first was a meeting of the merchants and tradesmen, convened at Faneuil

Hall on the 18th of April. They appointed a committee to draft a

petition to Congress, representing the embarrassments under which the

trade was laboring, and took measures to cause the legislature to call

the attention of the delegation in Congress to the importance of

immediate action upon the subject. They also established a committee of

correspondence with the merchants in the other seaports of the United

States, to induce a similar action; and they entered into a pledge not

to purchase any goods of the British merchants and factors residing in

Boston, who had made very heavy importations, which tended to drain the

specie of the State. The other meeting was an assembly of the artisans

and mechanics, held at the Green Dragon Tavern, on the 28th of April, at

which similar resolutions were adopted. It is quite apparent, from these

proceedings, that all branches of industry were threatened with ruin;

and in the efforts to counteract the effects of the great influx of

foreign commodities, we trace the first movements of a popular nature

towards a national control over commerce.

[354] Governor Bowdoin's first Message to the Legislature, May 31, 1785.

[355] July 1, 1785.

[356] The delegation at that time consisted of Elbridge Gerry, Samuel

Holten, and Rufus King. Their "Reasons assigned for suspending the

delivery to Congress of the Governor's letter for revising and altering

the Confederation" may be found in the Life of Hamilton, II. 353. See

also Boston Magazine for 1785, p. 475.

[357] November 25, 1785.

[358] Letter of Messrs. Gerry, Holten, and King, delegates in Congress,

to the Governor of Massachusetts, assigning reasons for suspending the

delivery of his letter to Congress, dated September 3, 1785. Life of

Hamilton, II. 353, 357. "We are apprehensive," said they, "and it is our

duty to declare it, that such a measure would produce throughout the

Union an exertion of the friends of an aristocracy to send members who

would promote a change of government; and we can form some judgment of

the plan which such members would report to Congress. But should the

members be altogether republican, _such have been the declamations of

designing men_ against the Confederation generally, against the rotation

of members, which, perhaps, is the best check to corruption, and against

the mode of altering the Confederation by the unanimous consent of the

legislatures, which effectually prevents innovations in the articles by

intrigue or surprise, that we think there is great danger of a report

which would invest Congress with powers that the honorable legislature

have not the most distant intention to delegate."

[359] November 30th, 1785.

[360] The resolution introduced on the 30th of November was agreed to in

the Delegates, but before it was carried up to the Senate, it was

reconsidered and laid upon the table. Elliot's Debates, I. 114, 115.

Letter of Mr. Madison to General Washington, of December 9, 1785,

Washington's Works, IX. 508.

[361] What direct agency General Washington had in suggesting or

promoting this scheme, does not appear; although it seems to have

originated, or to have been agreed upon, at his house. His published

correspondence contains no mention of the visit of the commissioners;

but Chief Justice Marshall states that such a visit was made, and in

this statement he is followed by Mr. Sparks. (Marshall, V. 90; Sparks,

I. 428.) Mr. Madison, writing to General Washington in December, 1785,

refers to "the proposed appointment of commissioners for Virginia and

Maryland, _concerted at Mount Vernon_, for keeping up harmony in the

commercial regulations of the two States," and says that the meeting of

commissioners from all the States, which had then been proposed, "seems

naturally to grow out of it." (Washington's Writings, IX. 509.)

That Washington foresaw that the plan agreed upon at his house in March

would lead to a general assembly of representatives of all the States,

seems altogether probable, from the opinions which he entertained and

expressed to his correspondents, during that summer, upon the subject of

conferring adequate commercial powers upon Congress. (See his Letters to

Mr. McHenry and Mr. Madison of August 22d and November 30th, Writings,

IX. 121, 145.)

[362] This resolution, passed January 21, 1786, was in these words:

"_Resolved_, That Edmund Randolph, James Madison, Jr., Walter Jones, St.

George Tucker, Meriweather Smith, David Ross, William Ronald, and George

Mason, Esquires, be appointed commissioners, who, or any five of whom,

shall meet such commissioners as may be appointed by the other States in

the Union, at a time and place to be agreed on, to take into

consideration the trade of the United States; to examine the relative

situation and trade of the said States; to consider how far a uniform

system in their commercial regulations may be necessary to their common

interest and their permanent harmony; and to report to the several

States such an act relative to this great object, as, when unanimously

ratified by them, will enable the United States in Congress assembled

effectually to provide for the same; that the said commissioners shall

immediately transmit to the several States copies of the preceding

resolution, with a circular letter respecting their concurrence therein,

and proposing a time and place for the meeting aforesaid."

[363] Rhode Island, Maryland, and Georgia.

[364] "The committee," said the Report, "have thought it their duty

candidly to examine the principles of this system, and to discover, if

possible, the reasons which have prevented its adoption; they cannot

learn that any member of the Confederacy has stated or brought forward

any objections against it, and the result of their impartial inquiries

into the nature and operation of the plan has been a clear and decided

opinion, that the system itself is more free from well-founded

exceptions, and is better calculated to receive the approbation of the

several States, than any other that the wisdom of Congress can devise.

In the course of this inquiry, it most clearly appeared that the

requisitions of Congress for eight years past have been so irregular in

their operation, so uncertain in their collection, and so evidently

unproductive, that a reliance on them in future, as a source from whence

moneys are to be drawn to discharge the engagements of the Confederacy,

definite as they are in time and amount, would be not less dishonorable

to the understandings of those who entertain such confidence, than it

would be dangerous to the welfare and peace of the Union. The committee

are therefore seriously impressed with the indispensable obligation that

Congress are under of representing to the immediate and impartial

consideration of the several States, the utter impossibility of

maintaining and preserving the faith of the federal government by

temporary requisitions on the States, and the consequent necessity of an

early and complete accession of all the States to the revenue system of

the 18th of April, 1783." (Journals of Congress, XI. 35, 36. February

15, 1786.)

[365] Life of Hamilton, II. 374, 375

[366] The legislature of New York were willing to grant the duties to

Congress, but insisted upon reserving the power of levying and

collecting them; and, instead of making the collectors amenable to and

removable by Congress, they made them removable by the State, on

conviction for default or neglect of duty in the State courts. This was

a material departure from the plan recommended by Congress, and was

entirely inconsistent with the grants already made by several of the

States. See the Report and proceedings in Congress on the New York Act,

July 27-August 23, 1786. Journals, XI. 153, 184, 197, 200.

[367] New York was represented by Alexander Hamilton and Egbert Benson;

New Jersey by Abraham Clark, William C. Houston, and James Schureman;

Pennsylvania by Tench Coxe; Delaware by George Read, John Dickinson, and

Richard Bassett; Virginia by Edmund Randolph (Governor), James Madison,

Jr., and St. George Tucker.

[368] General Knox, writing to General Washington under date of January

14, 1787, says: "You ask what prevented the Eastern States from

attending the September meeting at Annapolis. It is difficult to give a

precise answer to this question. Perhaps torpidity in New Hampshire;

faction and heats about their paper money in Rhode Island; and jealousy

in Connecticut. Massachusetts had chosen delegates to attend, who did

not decline until very late, and the finding of other persons to supply

their places was attended with delay, so that the convention had broken

up by the time the new-chosen delegates had reached Philadelphia."

Writings of Washington, IX. 513.

[369] Report of the Annapolis Convention, Elliot's Debates, I. 116;

Hamilton's Works, II. 336.

[370] Article XIII.

[371] Report, ut supra.

[372] See his letter to James Duane, written in 1780, Life, I. 284-305.

[373] Ibid. The first public proposal of a continental convention is

assigned by Mr. Madison to one Pelatiah Webster, whom he calls "an able,

though not conspicuous citizen," and who made this suggestion in a

pamphlet published in May, 1781. Recent researches have not added to our

knowledge of this writer. In the summer of 1782, the legislature of New

York, under the suggestion of Hamilton, passed resolutions recommending

such a convention. On the 1st of April, 1783, Hamilton, in a debate in

Congress, expressed his desire to see a general convention take place.

In 1784, the measure was a good deal talked of among the members of

Congress, and in the winter of 1784-85, Noah Webster, an eminent

political writer in Connecticut, suggested "a new system of government,

which should act, not on the States, but directly on individuals, and

vest in Congress full power to carry its laws into effect." In 1786, the

subject was again talked of among members of Congress, before the

meeting at Annapolis. (Madison. Elliot, V. 117, 118.) But Hamilton's

letter to James Duane, in 1780, although not published at the time, was

of course earlier than any of these suggestions. In that letter, after

showing that the fundamental defect of the then existing system was a

want of power in Congress, he thus analyzes in advance the Articles of

Confederation, which had not then taken effect:--"But the Confederation

itself is defective, and requires to be altered. It is neither fit for

war nor peace. The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty, in each State,

over its internal police, will defeat the other powers given to

Congress, and make our Union feeble and precarious. There are instances,

without number, where acts necessary for the general good, and which

rise out of the powers given to Congress, must interfere with the

internal police of the States; and there are as many instances in which

the particular States, by arrangements of internal police, can

effectually, though indirectly, counteract the arrangements of Congress.

You have already had examples of this, for which I refer to your own

memory. The Confederation gives the States, individually, too much

influence in the affairs of the army; they should have nothing to do

with it. The entire foundation and disposal of our military forces ought

to belong to Congress. It is an essential element of the Union; and it

ought to be the policy of Congress to destroy all ideas of State

attachment in the army, and make it look up wholly to them. For this

purpose, all appointments, promotions, and provisions whatsoever ought

to be made by them. It may be apprehended, that this may be dangerous to

liberty. But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run much

greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal government, than one

which will be able to usurp upon the rights of the people. Already some

of the lines of the army would obey their States in opposition to

Congress, notwithstanding the pains we have taken to preserve the unity

of the army. If any thing would hinder this, it would be the personal

influence of the general,--a melancholy and mortifying consideration.

The forms of our State constitutions must always give them great weight

in our affairs, and will make it too difficult to blind them to the

pursuit of a common interest, too easy to oppose what they do not like,

and to form partial combinations, subversive of the general one. There

is a wide difference between our situation and that of an empire under

one simple form of government, distributed into counties, provinces, or

districts, which have no legislatures, but merely magistratical bodies

to execute the laws of a common sovereign. There the danger is that the

sovereign will have too much power, and oppress the parts of which it is

composed. In our case, that of an empire composed of confederate states,

each with a government completely organized within itself, having all

the means to draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself, the

danger is directly the reverse. It is, that the common sovereign will

not have power sufficient to unite the different members together, and

direct the common forces to the interest and happiness of the whole....

The Confederation, too, gives the power of the purse too entirely to the

State legislatures. It should provide perpetual funds in the disposal of

Congress, by a land-tax, poll-tax, or the like. All imposts upon

commerce ought to be laid by Congress, and appropriated to their use;

for without certain revenues, a government can have no power; that power

which holds the purse-strings absolutely, must rule. This seems to be a

medium which, without making Congress altogether independent, will tend

to give reality to its authority. Another defect in our system is, want

of method and energy in the administration. This has partly resulted

from the other defect; but in a great degree from prejudice and the want

of a proper executive. Congress have kept the power too much in their

own hands, and have meddled too much with details of every sort.

Congress is properly a deliberative corps, and it forgets itself when it

attempts to play the executive. It is impossible that a body, numerous

as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision,

or with system. Two thirds of the members, one half the time, cannot

know what has gone before them, or what connection the subject in hand

has to what has been transacted on former occasions. The members who

have been more permanent will only give information that promotes the

side they espouse, in the present case, and will as often mislead as

enlighten. The variety of business must distract, and the proneness of

every assembly to debate must at all times delay. Lastly, Congress,

convinced of these inconveniences, have gone into the measure of

appointing boards. But this is, in my opinion, a bad plan. A single man,

in each department of the administration, would be greatly preferable.

It would give us a chance of more knowledge, more activity, more

responsibility, and, of course, more zeal and attention. Boards partake

of the inconveniences of larger assemblies; their decisions are slower,

their energy less, their responsibility more diffused. They will not

have the same abilities and knowledge as an administration by single

men. Men of the first pretensions will not so readily engage in them,

because they will be less conspicuous, of less importance, have less

opportunity of distinguishing themselves. The members of boards will

take less pains to inform themselves and arrive at eminence, because

they have fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to give a

preference to the plan of vesting the great executive departments of the

state in the hands of individuals. As these men will be, of course, at

all times under the direction of Congress, we shall blend the advantages

of a monarchy in one constitution.... I shall now propose the remedies

which appear to me applicable to our circumstances, and necessary to

extricate our affairs from their present deplorable situation. The first

step must be to give Congress powers competent to the public exigencies.

This may happen in two ways: one, by resuming and exercising the

discretionary powers I suppose to have been originally vested in them

for the safety of the States, and resting their conduct on the candor of

their countrymen and the necessity of the conjuncture; the other, _by

calling immediately a convention of all the States_, with full authority

to conclude finally upon a general confederation, stating to them

beforehand explicitly the evils arising from a want of power in

Congress, and the impossibility of supporting the contest on its present

footing, that the delegates may come possessed of proper sentiments, as

well as proper authority, to give efficacy to the meeting. _Their

commission should include a right of vesting Congress with the whole or

a proportion of the unoccupied lands, to be employed for the purpose of

raising a revenue, reserving the jurisdiction to the States by whom they

are granted._ The Confederation, in my opinion, should give Congress a

complete sovereignty; except as to that part of internal police which

relates to the rights of property and life among individuals, and to

raising money by internal taxes. It is necessary that every thing

belonging to this should be regulated by the State legislatures.

Congress should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war,

peace, trade, finance; and to the management of foreign affairs; the

right of declaring war, of raising armies, officering, paying them,

directing their motions in every respect; of equipping fleets, and doing

the same with them; of building fortifications, arsenals, magazines,

&c.; of making peace on such conditions as they think proper; of

regulating trade, determining with what countries it shall be carried

on; granting indulgences; laying prohibitions on all the articles of

export or import; imposing duties, granting bounties and premiums for

raising, exporting, or importing; and applying to their own use the

product of these duties, only giving credit to the States on whom they

are raised in the general account of revenues and expense; instituting

admiralty courts, &c.; of coining money, establishing banks on such

terms, and with such privileges, as they think proper; appropriating

funds, and doing whatever else relates to the operations of finance;

transacting every thing with foreign nations; making alliances offensive

and defensive, and treaties of commerce, &c.... The second step I would

recommend is, that Congress should instantly appoint the following great

officers of state: a Secretary for Foreign Affairs; a President of War;

a President of Marine; a Financier; a President of Trade.... These

officers should have nearly the same powers and functions as those in

France analogous to them, and each should be chief in his department,

with subordinate boards, composed of assistants, clerks, &c., to execute

his orders." (Life of Hamilton, I. 284-305.)

[374] Abstract of an Address made to the Legislature of Massachusetts,

by the Hon. Rufus King, in October, 1786. Boston Magazine for the year

1786, p. 406.

[375] Mr. Madison's Notes of Debates in the Congress of the

Confederation. Elliot, V. 96.

[376] This was the opinion of Mr. Jay. He thought that no alterations

should be attempted, unless deduced from the only source of just

authority, the people. He seems to have considered that, if the people

of the States, acting through their primary conventions, were to send

delegates to a general convention, with authority to alter the Articles

of Confederation, the new system would rest upon the authority of the

people, without further sanction. See his letter to General Washington,

of date January 7, 1787. Writings of Washington, IX. 510.

[377] Letter of General Knox to General Washington, January 14, 1787.

Writings of Washington, IX. 513.

[378] Madison. Elliot, V. 96.

[379] It was brought before them by the speech of the Governor

(Clinton), informing them of the resolutions of Congress, which had

requested an immediate call of the legislature to consider the revenue

system, "a subject," he observed, "which had been repeatedly submitted

to them, and must be well understood."

[380] Journals, XII. 15. February 21, 1787.

[381] Ibid. The vote rejecting the impost bill was taken on the 15th of

February. The resolution of instructions was passed on the 17th, and was

laid before Congress on the 21st.

[382] Mr. Madison has recorded the suspicions with which this resolution

of the New York legislature was received. Their previous refusal of the

impost act, and their known anti-federal tendencies, gave rise, he says,

to the belief that their object was to obtain a convention without

having it called under the authority of Congress, or else, by dividing

the plans of the States in their appointments of delegates, to frustrate

them all. (Madison. Elliot, V. 96.) But whatever grounds there might

have been for either of these suspicions, the latter certainly was not

well founded. The New York resolution was drafted by Hamilton, and

although it was passed by a body in which a majority had not exhibited a

disposition to enlarge the authority of Congress, it was manifestly not

intended to prevent the adoption of the plan of a convention. It

contemplated the passage by Congress of an act, recommending the States

to institute a convention of representatives of the States to revise the

Articles of Confederation; and the resolution introduced by the New York

delegation into Congress proposed that the alterations and amendments

which the convention might consider necessary to render the Articles of

Confederation "adequate to the preservation and support of the Union,"

should be reported to Congress and to the States respectively, but did

not direct how they should be adopted. This would have left open a great

question, and seemed to be a departure from the mode in which the

Articles of Confederation directed that amendments should be made.

Probably it was Hamilton's intention to leave the form in which the new

system should be adopted for future action, without fettering the

movement by prescribing the mode before the convention had assembled.

But this course was practically impossible. Congress could not be

prevailed upon to recommend a convention, without making the condition

that the new provisions should be reported to Congress and confirmed by

the States. This gave rise to great embarrassment in the convention,

when it came to be admitted that the Confederation must be totally

superseded, and not _amended_; and it was finally disregarded. But it

was the only mode in which the convention could have been recommended by

Congress, and without that recommendation, probably, it could not have

been instituted.

[383] The resolution introduced by the Massachusetts delegation, when

that of New York had been rejected, after being amended, was finally

passed in the following terms: "Whereas, there is provision in the

Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union for making alterations

therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the

legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced

that there are defects in the present Confederation, as a mean to remedy

which several of the States, and particularly the State of New York, by

express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a

convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and

such a convention appearing to be the most probable means of

establishing in these States a firm national government, _Resolved_,

That, in the opinion of Congress, it is expedient that, on the second

Monday day in May next, a convention of delegates, who shall have been

appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole

express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting

to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions

therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the

States, render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of

government and the preservation of the Union." Journals, XII. 17.

February 21, 1787.

[384] The Articles of Confederation did not expressly require that

amendments should be prepared and proposed in Congress. The thirteenth

Article provided, that no alteration should be made, unless it should

"be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards

confirmed by the legislatures of every State." But it was clearly

implied by this, that Congress were to have the power of recommending

alterations, and this power was exercised in 1783, with regard to the

rule of apportionment.

[385] Governor Randolph of Virginia writing to General Washington, on

the 11th of March, 1787, and urging him to attend the Convention, said:

"I must call upon your friendship to excuse me for again mentioning the

Convention at Philadelphia. Your determination having been fixed on a

thorough review of your situation, I feel like an intruder when I again

hint a wish that you would join the delegation. But every day brings

forth some new crisis, and the Confederation is, I fear, the last anchor

of our hope. Congress have taken up the subject, and appointed the

second Monday in May next as the day of meeting. _Indeed, from my

private correspondence, I doubt whether the existence of that body, even

through this year, may not be questionable under our present

circumstances._" Sparks's Washington, IX. 243, note.

[386] The States of Virginia, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina,

and Delaware had appointed their delegates to the Convention before it

was sanctioned by Congress. Virginia led the way; and the following

preamble to her act shows with what motives and objects she did so.

"Whereas, the commissioners who assembled at Annapolis, on the 14th day

of September last, for the purpose of devising and reporting the means

of enabling Congress to provide effectually for the commercial interests

of the United States, have represented the necessity of extending the

revision of the federal system to all its defects, and have recommended

that deputies for that purpose be appointed by the several legislatures,

to meet in convention in the city of Philadelphia, on the 2d day of May

next,--a provision which was preferable to a discussion of the subject

in Congress, where it might be too much interrupted by the ordinary

business before them, and where it would, besides, be deprived of the

valuable counsels of sundry individuals who are disqualified by the

constitution or laws of particular States, or restrained by peculiar

circumstances from a seat in that assembly: And whereas the General

Assembly of this Commonwealth, taking into view the actual situation of

the Confederacy, as well as reflecting on the alarming representations

made from time to time by the United States in Congress, particularly in

their act of the 15th day of February last, can no longer doubt that the

crisis is arrived at which the good people of America are to decide the

solemn question, whether they will, by wise and magnanimous efforts,

reap the just fruits of that independence which they have so gloriously

acquired, and of that Union which they have cemented with so much of

their common blood,--or whether, by giving way to unmanly jealousies and

prejudices, or to partial and transitory interests, they will renounce

the auspicious blessings prepared for them by the Revolution, and

furnish to its enemies an eventful triumph over those by whose virtue

and valor it has been accomplished: And whereas the same noble and

extended policy, and the same fraternal and affectionate sentiments,

which originally determined the citizens of this Commonwealth to unite

with their brethren of the other States in establishing a federal

government, cannot but be felt with equal force now as motives to lay

aside every inferior consideration, and to concur in such further

concessions and provisions as may be necessary to secure the great

objects for which that government was instituted, and to render the

United States as happy in peace as they have been glorious in war: _Be

it therefore enacted_, &c., That seven commissioners be appointed, by

joint ballot of both houses of Assembly, who, or any three of them, are

hereby authorized as deputies from this Commonwealth to meet such

deputies as may be appointed and authorized by other States, to assemble

in convention at Philadelphia, as above recommended, and to join with

them in devising and discussing all such alterations and further

provisions as may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution

adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and in reporting such an act,

for that purpose, to the United States in Congress, as, when agreed to

by them, and duly confirmed by the several States, will effectually

provide for the same." (Elliot, I. 132.) The instructions of New Jersey

to her delegates were, "to take into consideration the state of the

Union as to trade and other important objects, and of devising such

other provisions as shall appear to be necessary to render the

constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies

thereof." (Ibid. 128.) The act of Pennsylvania provided for the

appointment of deputies to join with the deputies of other States "in

devising, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and

further provisions as may be necessary to render the Federal

Constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union, and in

reporting such act or acts, for that purpose, to the United States in

Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by

the several States, will effectually provide for the same." (Ibid. 130.)

The instructions of Delaware were of the same tenor. (Ibid. 131.) The

act of North Carolina directed her deputies "to discuss and decide upon

the most effectual means to remove the defects of our Federal Union, and

to procure the enlarged purposes which it was intended to effect; and

that they report such an act to the General Assembly of this State, as,

when agreed to by them, will effectually provide for the same." (Ibid.

135.) The instructions to the delegates of New Hampshire were of the

same tenor. (Ibid. 126.) The appointment of the delegates of

Massachusetts was made with reference to the terms of the resolve of

Congress recommending the Convention, and for the purposes declared

therein. (Ibid. 126, 127.) The appointment of Connecticut was made with

the same reference, and with the further direction "to discuss upon such

alterations and provisions, agreeably to the general principles of

republican government, as they shall think proper to render the Federal

Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the

preservation of the Union; and they are further directed, pursuant to

the said act of Congress, to report such alterations and provisions as

may be agreed to by a majority of the United States represented in

convention, to the Congress of the United States, and to the General

Assembly of this State." (Ibid. 127.) The resolutions of New York,

Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia pursued nearly the same terms with

the resolve of Congress. (Ibid. 127, 131, 136, 137.)

[387] Sparks's Washington, IX. 223, 225, 230, 236, 508-520.

[388] Sparks's Washington, IX. 223, 225, 230, 236, 508-520.