HISTORY
OF THE
ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION
OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES;
WITH
NOTICES OF ITS PRINCIPAL FRAMERS.
BY
GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOLUME I.
NEW YORK:
HARPER AND BROTHERS,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1854.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1854, by
GEORGE T. CURTIS,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of
Massachusetts
TO
GEORGE TICKNOR, ESQ.,
THE HISTORIAN OF SPANISH LITERATURE,
BY WHOSE ACCURATE SCHOLARSHIP AND CAREFUL CRITICISM
THESE PAGES HAVE LARGELY PROFITED,
I DEDICATE THIS WORK,
IN AFFECTIONATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF TIES,
WHICH HAVE BEEN TO ME CONSTANT SOURCES OF HAPPINESS
THROUGH MY WHOLE LIFE.
PREFACE.
A special history of the origin and establishment of the Constitution of
the United States has not yet found a place in our national literature.
Many years ago, I formed the design of writing such a work, for the
purpose of exhibiting the deep causes which at once rendered the
Convention of 1787 inevitable, and controlled or directed its course and
decisions; the mode in which its great work was accomplished; and the
foundations on which our national liberty and prosperity were then
deliberately settled by the statesmen to whom the American Revolution
gave birth, and on which they have rested ever since.
In the prosecution of this purpose I had, until death terminated his
earthly interests, the encouragement and countenance of that illustrious
person, whose relation to the Constitution of the United States, during
the last forty years, has been not inferior in importance to that of
any of its founders during the preceding period.
Mr. Webster had for a long time the intention of writing a work which
should display the remarkable state of affairs under whose influence the
Constitution was first brought into practical application; and this
design he relinquished only when all the remaining plans of his life
were surrendered with the solemn and religious resignation that marked
its close. It was known to him that I had begun to labor upon another
branch of the same subject. In the spring of 1852 I wrote to him to
explain the plan of my work, and to ask him for a copy of some remarks
made by his father in the Convention of New Hampshire when the
Constitution was ratified by that State. I received from him the
following answer.
"WASHINGTON, March 7th, [1852].
"MY DEAR SIR,--
"I will try to find for you my father's speech, as it was collected from
tradition and published some years ago. If I live to see warm weather in
Marshfield, I shall be glad to see you beneath its shades, and to talk
of your book.
"You are probably aware that I have meditated the writing of something
upon the History of the Constitution and the Administration of
Washington. I have the plan of such a work pretty definitely arranged,
but whether I shall ever be able to execute it I cannot say:--'the wills
above be done.'
"Yours most truly,
"DANL. WEBSTER."
Regarding this kind and gracious intimation as a wish not to be
anticipated in any part of the field which he had marked out for
himself, I replied, that if, when I should have the pleasure of seeing
him, my work should seem to involve any material part of the subject
which he had comprehended within his own plan, I should of course
relinquish it at once. When, however, the period of that summer's
leisure arrived, and brought with it, to his watchful observation, so
many tokens that "the night cometh," he seemed anxious to impress upon
me the importance of the task I had undertaken, and to remove any
obstacle to its fulfilment that he might have suggested. Being with him
alone, on an occasion when his physician, after a long consultation, had
just left him, he said to me, with an earnestness and solemnity that can
never be described or forgotten: "_You_ have a future; _I_ have none.
You are writing a History of the Constitution. _You_ will write that
work; _I_ shall not. Go on, by all means, and you shall have every aid
that I can give you."
The event of which these words were ominous was then only four weeks
distant. Many times, during those short remaining weeks, I sought "the
shades of Marshfield"; but now it was for the offices and duties, not
for the advantages, of friendship;--and no part of my work was ever
submitted to him to whose approbation, sympathy, and aid I had so long
looked forward, as to its most important stimulus and its most
appropriate reward.
But the solemn injunction which I had received became to me an
ever-present admonition, and gave me--if I may make such a
profession--the needful fidelity to my great subject. Whatever may be
thought of the manner in which it has been treated, a consciousness that
the impartial spirit of History has guided me will remain, after every
ordeal of criticism shall have been passed.
And here, while memories of the earlier as well as of the later lost
crowd upon me with my theme, I cannot but think of him, jurist and
magistrate, friend of my younger as well as riper years, who was called
from all human sympathies before I had conceived the undertaking which I
have now completed. Fortunate shall I be, if to those in whom his blood
flows united with mine I can transmit a work that may be permitted to
stand near that noble Commentary, which is known and honored wherever
the Constitution of the United States bears sway.
The plan of this work is easily explained. The first volume embraces the
Constitutional History of the United States from the commencement of the
Revolution to the assembling of the Convention of 1787, together with
some notices of the principal members of that body. The second volume is
devoted to the description of the process of forming the Constitution,
in which I have mainly followed, of course, the ample Record of the
Debates preserved by Mr. Madison, and the official Journal of the
proceedings.[1]
The period of our history from the commencement of the Revolution to the
beginning of Washington's administration is the period when our State
and national institutions were formed. With the events of the
Revolution, its causes, its progress, its military history, and its
results, the people of this country have long been familiar. But the
constitutional history of the United States has not been written, and
few persons have made themselves accurately acquainted with its details.
How the Constitution of the United States came to be formed; from what
circumstances it arose; what its relations were to institutions
previously existing in the country; what necessities it satisfied; and
what was its adaptation to the situation of these States,--are all
points of the gravest importance to the American people, and all of them
require to be distinctly stated for their permanent welfare.
For the history of this Constitution is not like the history of a
monarchy, in which some things are obsolete, while some are of present
importance. The Constitution of the United States is a living code, for
the perpetuation of a system of free government, which the people of
each succeeding generation must administer for themselves. Every line of
it is as operative and as binding to-day as it was when the government
was first set in motion by its provisions, and no part of it can fall
into neglect or decay while that government continues to exist.
The Constitution of the United States was the means by which republican
liberty was saved from the consequences of impending anarchy; it secured
that liberty to posterity, and it left it to depend on their fidelity to
the Union. It is morally certain that the formation of some general
government, stronger and more efficient than any which had existed since
the independence of the States had been declared, had become necessary
to the continued existence of the Confederacy. It is equally certain,
that, without the preservation of the Union, a condition of things must
at once have ensued, out of which wars between the various provinces of
America must have grown. The alternatives, therefore, that presented
themselves to the generation by whom the Constitution was established,
were either to devise a system of republican government that would
answer the great purposes of a lasting union, or to resort to something
in the nature of monarchy. With the latter, the institutions of the
States must have been sooner or later crushed;--for they must either
have crumbled away in the new combinations and fearful convulsions that
would have preceded the establishment of such a power, or else they must
have fallen speedily after its triumph had been settled. With the former
alternative, the preservation of the States, and of all the needful
institutions which marked their separate existence, though a difficult,
was yet a possible result.
To this preservation of the separate States we owe that power of minute
local administration, which is so prominent and important a feature of
our American liberty. To this we are indebted for those principles of
self-government which place their own interests in the hands of the
people of every distinct community, and which enable them, by means of
their own laws, to defend their own particular institutions against
encroachments from without.
Finally, the Constitution of the United States made the people of these
several provinces one nation, and gave them a standing among the nations
of the world. Let any man compare the condition of this country at the
peace of 1783, and during the four years which followed that event, with
its present position, and he will see that he must look to some other
cause than its merely natural and material resources to account for the
proud elevation which it has now reached.
He will see a people ascending, in the comparatively short period of
seventy years, from an attitude in which scarcely any nation thought it
worth while to treat with them, to a place among the four principal
powers of the globe. He will see a nation, once of so little account and
so little strength that the corsairs of the Mediterranean could prey
unchecked upon its defenceless merchantmen, now opening to their
commerce, by its overawing diplomacy and influence, an ancient empire,
on the opposite side of the earth we inhabit, which has for countless
ages been firmly closed against the whole world. He will first see a
collection of thirteen feeble republics on the eastern coast of North
America, inflicting upon each other the manifold injuries of rival and
hostile legislation; and then again he will behold them grown to be a
powerful confederacy of more than thirty States, stretching from the
Atlantic to the Pacific, with all their commercial interests blended and
harmonized by one superintending legislature, and protected by one
central and preponderating power. He will see a people who had at first
achieved nothing but independence, and had contributed nothing to the
cause of free government but the example of their determination to
enjoy it, founding institutions to which mankind may look for hope, for
encouragement and light. He will see the arts of peace--commerce,
agriculture, manufactures, jurisprudence, letters--now languishing
beneath a civil polity inadequate and incompetent, and now expanding
through a continent with an energy and force unexampled in the history
of our race,--subduing the farthest recesses of nature, and filling the
wilderness with the beneficent fruits of civilization and Christianity.
Surveying all this,--looking back to the period which is removed from
him only by the span of one mortal life, and looking around and before
him, he will see, that among the causes of this unequalled growth stands
prominent and decisive, far over all other human agencies, the great
code of civil government which the fathers of our republic wrought out
from the very perils by which they were surrounded.
It is for the purpose of tracing the history of the period in which
those perils were encountered and overcome, that I have written this
work. But in doing it, I have sought to write as an American. For it is,
I trust, impossible to study the history of the Constitution which has
made us what we are, by making us one nation, without feeling how
unworthy of the subject--how unworthy of the dignity of History--would
be any attempt to claim more than their just share of merit and renown
for names or places endeared to us by local feeling or traditionary
attachment. Historical writing that is not just, that is not impartial,
that is not fearless,--looking beyond the interests of neighborhood, the
claims of party, or the solicitations of pride,--is worse than useless
to mankind.
BOSTON, July, 1854.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] In citing the "Madison Papers," I have constantly referred to the
edition contained in the fifth (supplementary) volume of Mr. Jonathan
Elliot's "Debates," &c., because it is more accessible to general
readers. The accuracy of that publication, and its full and admirable
Index, make it a very important volume to be consulted in connection
with the subject of this work. In this relation, I may suggest the
desirableness of a new and carefully revised edition of the Journals of
the old Congress;--an enterprise that should be the care of the national
government. A great magazine of materials for our national history, from
the first Continental Congress to the adoption of the Constitution,
exists in those Journals.
CONTENTS
OF
VOLUME FIRST.
BOOK I.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION TO THE ADOPTION OF THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.
CHAPTER I.
1774-1775.
ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.--ORIGIN OF
THE UNION.--SITUATION OF THE COLONIES BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.
Page
Political Organizations of the Colonies 3
Provincial Governments 4
Proprietary Governments 5
Charter Governments 5
Causes of the Revolution 6
Local Legislatures 7
Power of the Colonies to unite, asserted by the Revolution 8
Reasons why they were enabled to effect the Union 8
A General Congress 10
First Step towards it 11
Assembling of the Congress 13
Delegates 14
Method of Voting 15
Rights of the Colonies 16
Separation from Great Britain not contemplated 18
Relations of the Congress to the Country 19
Authority of Parliament 20
Declaration of Rights 22
Cessation of Exports and Imports 23
Another Congress proposed 25
Royal Government terminated in Massachusetts 25
Provincial Congress of Massachusetts 26
Battle of Lexington 27
CHAPTER II.
1775-1776.
THE SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.--FORMATION AND CHARACTER OF
THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.--APPOINTMENT OF A
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.--FIRST ARMY OF THE REVOLUTION.
New Continental Congress 28
Delegates 29
Colonies represented 29
Duration of this Congress 30
War commenced 31
Massachusetts and New York apply to the Congress for Direction
and Assistance 31
The Congress proceeds to put the Country into a State of
Defence 32
American Continental Army created 32
Washington chosen Commander-in-Chief 33
Measures to defray the Expenses of War 34
Treasury Department established 35
General Post-office organized 35
Militia 35
Relations with Indian Tribes 35
Royalists 36
The Congress advise Provisional Governments 37
Separation from England determined upon 38
Suppression of the Royal Authority 39
National Union formed before the State Governments 39
The Revolutionary Government 40
Note on Washington's Appointment as Commander-in-Chief 41
CHAPTER III.
1776-1777.
CONTINUANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.--DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE.--PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT.--FORMATION
OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY.
Independence proposed 49
Committee to prepare the Declaration 50
Instructions to the Delegates 51
Declaration adopted 51
Consequences of its Adoption 51
The Title "United States of America" first used 52
Articles of Confederation proposed 53
The Revolutionary Congress, the Real Government 54
Power of the Congress 55
General Washington's Position 55
Difficulties which he had to encounter 56
Machinery of Government defective 57
Formation of the Army 58
Remodelling of the Army 59
Difficulties attending it 59
Committee appointed to confer with General Washington 60
Error of Short Enlistments 60
Washington does not concur in their Expediency 60
Powers of the National Government 62
Difficulties attending their Exercise 63
Popular Feeling about the Grievances 64
Tories 65
Officers of the Royal Government in New Hampshire seized 66
General Lee's Offer to seize the Tories of New York 66
He prepares to defend New York 67
Orders to disarm the Tories in Queen's County 68
Orders countermanded 68
Washington's Regret 69
His Directions to Lee 70
Tories of Queen's County arrested 71
Inhabitants of New York alarmed 71
Congress compelled to submit the Subject to the Colonial
Authorities 72
Questions of Prize 73
Origin of the American Navy 73
Vessels fitted out to intercept the Enemy's Supplies 73
Falmouth burned 74
Letters of Marque and Reprisal 75
Prizes captured 75
Adjudication of Prizes 76
Delay in obtaining Decisions 77
Means of defraying the Public Expenses 77
Paper Money issued 78
Delay in Signing the Bills 79
Pressing Wants of the Army 79
Washington borrows Money of the Province of Massachusetts
Bay 80
Defects of the Revolutionary Government 80
Jealousy of Standing Armies 80
Note on the Authorship of the Declaration of Independence 81
CHAPTER IV.
JULY, 1776-NOVEMBER, 1777.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE.--REORGANIZATION OF THE CONTINENTAL
ARMY.--FLIGHT OF THE CONGRESS FROM PHILADELPHIA.--PLAN OF THE
CONFEDERATION PROPOSED.
Effect of the Declaration of Independence 89
More vigorous and decisive Measures adopted by the Congress 90
Mischievous Adhesion to State Interests 90
History of the Army 91
General Washington abandons the City of New York 91
Writes to the President of Congress 91
He retreats to the Heights of Haerlem, and again appeals to
Congress 92
The Congress organizes a new Army 92
Number of Battalions raised by each State 93
Inducements to enlist 93
Serious Defects in the Plan 93
Washington suggests a Remedy 94
Promotion of the Officers provided for 95
Another Defect in the Plan 95
Massachusetts and Connecticut offer further Pay to their Men 95
Washington remonstrates 96
Congress augments the Pay of the Army 96
Ill Effects of the System 96
Number of the American Forces near New York 96
Washington's Discouragement 97
His Situation and Trials 97
His Retreat through New Jersey 98
Loss of Philadelphia threatened 99
Washington asks for Extraordinary Powers from the Congress 100
Powers intrusted to him 100
Unsettled Condition of the Political System 101
The Congress apologizes to the Governors of the States 102
Inaccuracy of their Position 103
The States acquiesce in the Powers granted to Washington 104
Articles of Confederation pending in Congress 104
Eminent Men retire from Congress 104
Delegations of the States renewed 105
Striking Instance of State Jealousy 106
Washington requires an Oath of Allegiance to the United
States 107
The Requisition denounced as improper 107
Its Propriety 108
Formation of a new Army 110
Embarrassments in the Formation of the Army 110
Persistence of the States in giving Extra Bounties 110
Bounty offered by Massachusetts 111
Army greatly reduced 111
Washington hindered in his Efforts to plan and carry out a
Campaign 112
Applications for Troops to defend particular Neighborhoods 112
Battle of the Brandywine 113
The Congress leaves Philadelphia 113
Sir William Howe takes Possession of it 113
The Congress removes to Yorktown 113
They resolve to consider the Articles of Confederation 114
The Plan of a Confederacy submitted to the several
Legislatures 114
Necessity for a National Government 114
End of the Revolutionary Government approaching 115
Want of a Civil Executive 115
States engaged in forming Governments 116
Colonies accustomed to the Business of Government 116
Practice of Representation familiar 117
Previous Political Training of the People 118
Distinctions between the Departments of Government 119
Ideas not yet applied to a General Government 120
Union of the People of the United States, as distinguished
from a Union of the States, learned by a bitter Experience 122
First Stage in the Constitutional History of the Country 123
CHAPTER V.
NOVEMBER, 1777-MARCH, 1781.
ADOPTION OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.--CESSIONS OF
WESTERN TERRITORY.--FIRST POLITICAL UNION OF THE STATES.
Adoption of the Articles of Confederation 124
Causes which delayed the Adoption of the Confederation 125
Changes of the Members of Congress 126
The present Congress compared with that of 1776 127
Objections made to the Articles of Confederation 128
Propositions for Amendments rejected 129
Objection made by the State of New Jersey 129
Their Suggestion rejected 130
Claims of the Larger States to Vacant Lands 131
Objection of the Smaller States 131
Assent of Maryland to the Confederation withheld 133
New York authorizes its Delegates in Congress to limit the
Western Boundaries of the State 134
Congress urges other States to surrender a Portion of their
Claims 134
Generous Example of New Jersey 135
Delaware follows it 135
Maryland adopts the Articles of Confederation 136
Virginia yields her Claim to some of her Territory 137
Progress of the People of the United States towards a
National Character 139
Security against a Dissolution of the Confederacy 140
CHAPTER VI.
NATURE AND POWERS OF THE CONFEDERATION.
Nature of the Government established by the Confederation 142
Provisions in the Confederation for the States as separate
Communities 143
Form of Government established by it 143
The Confederation a League for Mutual Defence and Protection 144
Powers of Congress with regard to the External Relations of
the Country 144
Powers of Congress with regard to Internal Affairs 145
Committee of the States to sit in the Recess of Congress 146
Restrictions imposed upon Congress 146
Revenues of the Country 147
No Provision for enforcing Measures adopted by Congress 148
The United States enter upon a New Era of Civil Polity 149
The Confederation demonstrates the Necessity for a more
perfect Union 149
BOOK II.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE
ADOPTION OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, IN 1781, TO THE
PEACE OF 1783.
CHAPTER I.
1781-1783.
REQUISITIONS.--CLAIMS OF THE ARMY.--NEWBURGH
ADDRESSES.--PEACE PROCLAIMED.--THE ARMY DISBANDED.
Congress assembles under the Confederation 155
Treaty of Peace signed 155
Treaty of Alliance with France 156
Delay of the States in complying with the Requisitions of
Congress 156
Washington addresses Letters to the States on the Subject of
Finance, and completing their Quotas of Troops 157
Force of the Army 158
Discontents in the Army 158
The Newburgh Addresses 159
Congress votes an Establishment of Half-Pay for the Officers 160
Impracticable Adherence to the Principles of Civil Liberty 161
Provision for the Officers found to be inadequate 162
Congress recommends to the States to make Provision for the
Officers and Soldiers 162
Pennsylvania places her Officers upon Half-Pay for Life 163
Congress pass a Resolve giving Half-Pay for Life to the
Officers 163
Disappointment of the Officers 164
The Congress of the Confederation refuse to redeem the Pledge
of the Revolutionary Congress 164
Officers offer to commute the Half-Pay for Life 165
Breach of Public Faith 166
Situation of Washington 167
Anonymous Address circulated among the Officers at Newburgh 168
Washington forbids an Assemblage at the Call of an Anonymous
Paper 168
He appoints a Day to hear the Report of their Committee 168
The Officers again refer their Claims to the Consideration of
Congress 169
Half-Pay commuted to Five Years' Full Pay 170
The Army disbanded 170
Value of the Votes which fixed the Compensation of the
Officers 171
CHAPTER II.
1781-1783.
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONFEDERATION.--REVOLUTIONARY
DEBT.--REVENUE SYSTEM OF 1783.
Public Debt of the United States 172
Congress recommend a Duty upon Importations 173
Office of Superintendent of Finance established 174
Rhode Island refuses to grant to Congress the Power of Levying
Duties 174
Virginia repeals the Act by which she had granted this Power
to Congress 175
No Means of paying the Public Debts 175
Another Plan for collecting Revenues recommended to the
States 176
Strong Appeal to the People in Favor of it 177
Claims of the various Classes of the Public Creditors 178
Character of the United States involved 179
The Confederation a Government for Purposes of War 181
Its Great Defects 181
The Moral Feelings an Unsafe Reliance for the Operations of
Government 183
Proofs of this in the History of the Confederation 184
Design of the Framers of the Revenue System 185
Claims of the Army 186
Wisdom of proposing a Scheme of Finance during the Continuance
of the War 186
Influence of the Revenue System of 1783 188
The System of 1783 different from the Present Constitution 188
Note on the Half-Pay for the Officers of the Revolution 190
Note on the Newburgh Addresses 194
CHAPTER III.
1781-1783.
OPINIONS AND EFFORTS OF WASHINGTON, AND OF HAMILTON.--DECLINE
OF THE CONFEDERATION.
Washington's Relations to the People of this Country 200
His Address to them on resigning his Office 201
His Views at the Close of the War 202
Hamilton's Opinions 203
His Advice and Suggestions 204
The Necessity for a Complete Sovereignty in Congress 204
Hamilton's Entry into Congress 206
Nature of a Federal Constitution not understood 206
Hamilton urges the Necessity of vesting the Appointment of
Collectors of Revenue in the General Government 208
Ratio of Contribution by the States to the Treasury uncertain 210
Hamilton desires to change the Principle of the Confederation 211
Advises General Taxes to be collected under Continental
Authority 212
An Attempt to substitute Specific Taxes on Land and Houses 212
It is determined to adopt Population as the Basis of
Contribution 213
Hamilton's Views on a Peace Establishment 214
Committee to arrange the Details of such a System 215
An Army and Navy necessary 216
No Provision in the Articles of Confederation for their
Maintenance during Peace 216
Hamilton advises Federal Provision for Defence 219
Congress driven from Philadelphia 220
Hamilton examines the Confederation 221
Its Defects 222, 223
He proposes to revise it 224
His Plan unsuccessful 224
Improvement in the Revenue System 225
Causes of the Decline of a National Spirit 226
Falling off in the Attendance of Members of Congress 226
Results of the Confederation 228
Its Defects displayed 229
Another Government necessary for the great Duties of Peace 230
BOOK III.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE
PEACE OF 1783 TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787.
CHAPTER I.
JANUARY, 1784-MAY, 1787.
DUTIES AND NECESSITIES OF CONGRESS.--REQUISITIONS ON THE
STATES.--REVENUE SYSTEM OF 1783.
State of the Union from 1783 to 1787 233
Dangers and Evils which existed during the Four Years after
the War 234
A New Congress 235
Washington's Resignation 235
Congress urge the Attendance of absent Members 236
Ratification of the Treaty of Peace 237
Congress perpetually in Session during the War 238
Number of Delegates from each State 238
Low State of the Representation 239
Duties of the Government 240
Supplies for the Year 1784 240
How to be obtained 241
Old Requisitions unpaid 241
Supplies necessary for the Year 1785 242
Supplies necessary for the Year 1786 242
Rhode Island and New Jersey propose to pay their Quotas in
their own Paper Currency 242
Inadequacy of Requisitions 243
States which had assented to the Revenue System in February,
1786 244
Congress make known the Public Embarrassments 245
Impost granted by all the States except New York 246
Argument used in Support of her Refusal 247
Hamilton's Answer to it 247
Congress recommend to New York to reconsider the Revenue
System 247
The Governor refuses to summon the Legislature 247
Failure of the Revenue System 248
CHAPTER II.
1784-1787.
INFRACTIONS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE.
Provisions of the Treaty of Peace 249
Departure of the British Troops from the Atlantic Coast 249
Western Posts retained 249
Interests of British Subjects 250
Confiscated Property 250
Power of Confiscation belonging to the United States 252
Refugees 252
State Laws prohibiting the Recovery of British Debts 253
Articles of the Treaty infringed by New York 254, 255
Powers of the Government inadequate 255
Treaty of Peace 256
Violations of its Articles 257
Congress recommend to the States to repeal all Acts repugnant
to the Treaty 258
The two Countries remain in the same Position 259
CHAPTER III.
1786-1787.
NO SECURITY AFFORDED BY THE CONFEDERATION TO THE STATE
GOVERNMENTS.--SHAYS'S REBELLION IN MASSACHUSETTS, AND ITS
KINDRED DISTURBANCES.
Defence against External Assaults, the Object of the
Confederation 260
Construction of the State Constitutions 261
Fundamental Doctrine of the American Constitutions 262
Commencement of Discontents in Massachusetts 263
The Confederation without Power to act upon the Internal
Condition of a State 264, 265
State Governments exposed to the Dangers of Anarchy 265
Insurrection in Massachusetts 266
Debt of that State at the Close of the War 266
Decrease of Exports and Fisheries 267
General Condition of the State 267, 268
Private Debts 268
The Tender Act 268
Effects of this Law 269
Shays's Rebellion 269
Firmness of Governor Bowdoin 270
Insurrection suppressed 270
Congress unable to interpose 271
Hostile Disposition of the Western Indians 271
Troops to be raised by the New England States 272
Extent of the Disaffection in New England 273
Beneficial Effect of these Disturbances 273
The Union necessary to the Preservation of Order 274
Washington's Anxieties 274
CHAPTER IV.
ORIGIN AND NECESSITY OF THE POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE.
Inability of the Confederation to manage Foreign Commerce 276
Essential that it should be managed by the United States 277
Views of the Revolutionary Statesmen 277, 278
Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign
Countries 279
Negotiation of the Treaty with the Netherlands 280
Duties and Imposts 281
Congress without Power to enforce Treaty Stipulations upon
the States 282
Relations of the United States with Great Britain 282
Measure of Mr. Pitt 282
Change of the English Administration 283
Mr. Pitt's Bill 283
Views of the New English Administration 283, 284
American Trade excluded from the British West Indies 284
The three great Branches of American Commerce 285
Congress apply to the States for further Powers 286
Action of the States thereupon 286
Success of Treaties dependent on the Grant of further Powers 287
Incongruities in the Grants of the several States 288
Failure of the Attempt to negotiate Commercial Treaties 289
Discordant Legislation of the States 290
CHAPTER V.
1783-1787.
THE PUBLIC LANDS.--GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWESTERN
TERRITORY.--THREATENED LOSS OF THE WESTERN SETTLEMENTS.
Relations of Congress to the Public Lands 291
Efforts to procure Cessions from the States 292
Cession by New York 293
Disposal of the Territories 293
Power of Congress to acquire and hold Lands 293
Its Constitutional Authority to deal with acquired Territory 294
Cession of Northwestern Territory by Virginia 295
States to be formed from this Territory 296
Congress pass a Resolve for the Regulation of ceded Territory 296
Principles on which the Government of New States should be
established 297
Provision for admitting New States into the Union 298
Compact between the Old and New States 299
The Public Lands the true Resources for the Payment of the
Public Debt 299
Slavery to be excluded from the New States 299
Cession by Massachusetts and Connecticut of a Portion of their
Territorial Claims 299, 300
Modification by Virginia of her Act of Cession 300
Cession of Lands by South Carolina 301
No other Lands ceded to the United States before 1787 301
Ordinance for the Government of the Northwestern Territory
enacted 302
Its Provisions concerning Property 302
Civil Government of the Territory 303
Laws to be adopted 303
Appointment of Civil Officers 304
Counties and Townships to be formed 304
Representation in the Legislature provided for 304
Articles of Compact between the Original States and the
People and States in the Territory 305, 306
Wisdom of this Scheme of Government 306, 307
Political Difficulties in the Management of this Territory 308
Threatened Loss of the Western Settlements 309, 310
Washington's Plan of uniting the Eastern and Western States 310
He considers the Opening of the Mississippi not important 311
The Southern Boundary of the United States, by the Treaty of
Peace 312
Secret Article in that Treaty 312
Spain refuses to concede the Navigation of the Mississippi 313
Arrival of Guardoqui as Minister from Spain 313
The United States insist on the Right to navigate the
Mississippi 314
The Right refused, but a Commercial Treaty tendered 314
Importance of this Treaty 314
The States divided with Regard to the Mississippi 314, 315
Mr. Jay proposes a Middle Course 315
Treaty to be limited to Twenty-five Years 316
Use of the River to be suspended for the same Period 316
Change in Mr. Jay's Instructions 317
Seizure of American Property at Natchez 318
Inhabitants of the Western Settlements alarmed 318
Richness of their Territory 319
Their Complaints of Congress 320
Their Resolves 321
Retaliatory Seizure of Spanish Property 322
The Executive of Virginia disavows the Act 322
Guardoqui adheres to his Position 323
Committees of Correspondence formed in the West 323
The Inhabitants of Kentucky in Motion 323
Remonstrances of Virginia on the Subject of shutting up the
Mississippi 323
Their Delegates intercede with the Spanish Minister 324
Their Efforts ineffectual 324
The Vote of Seven States attacked in Congress 325
Unconstitutionality of that Vote 325, 326
It is not rescinded 326
Critical Position of the Country 326
The Subject of the Mississippi postponed to await the Action
of the Federal Convention 326, 327
CHAPTER VI.
1783-1787.
DECAY AND FAILURE OF THE CONFEDERATION.--PROGRESS OF
OPINION.--STEPS WHICH LED TO THE CONVENTION OF
1787.--INFLUENCE AND EXERTIONS OF HAMILTON.--MEETING OF THE
CONVENTION.
The Federal Power under the Confederation unequal to the
Discharge of its Duties 328
The Confederation destitute of Political Sovereignty 329
Capacities of the Country 330
Difficulties in the Formation of a Federal Constitution 331
Progress of Opinion upon the Subject of a General
Government 332, 333
Important Centres of Opinion 334
Action of Massachusetts 334
Distress pervading the Commercial Classes 334, 335
Governor Bowdoin's Message 336
The Legislature recommend a General Convention 336, 337
Their Delegates in Congress refuse to present the Resolves 337
Congress desire only a Temporary Power over Commerce 337
Jealousy in Congress of the Changes likely to be made in the
Government 338
The Legislature of Massachusetts rescind their Resolutions 339
Condition of Congress in 1785 339
Action of Virginia 340
Proposed Enlargement of the Powers of Congress over Trade 340
Difficulties between the Citizens of Virginia and Maryland 341
Meeting at Alexandria 341
Report of the Commissioners of Virginia and Maryland to their
Governments 342
Virginia invites a Meeting of Commissioners from all the
States at Annapolis 343
Action of New York 343
Final Appeal by Congress for the Establishment of the Revenue
System of 1783 344
Exertions of Hamilton 345
The Revenue System again rejected by the New York Legislature 346
Commissioners appointed by New York to attend the Commercial
Convention 346
Course of New York upon the Revenue System 346
Five States only represented at Annapolis 347
Hamilton's Original Plan, and its Modification 347, 348
His Report 348
He desires an entirely New System of Government 349
Caution in his Proposal 350
His extensive Views 350
Reception of the Recommendation of the Annapolis Commissioners
in Virginia 351
Objections to it in Congress 352-355
Report of the Commissioners taken into Consideration 355
Opinions of different Members upon the Subject 355
Legal Difficulties in the Way of a Convention 356
Views entertained in Congress 357
Critical State of the Country 357, 358
It impels Congress to Action 358
Influence of the Course of New York upon Congress 358, 359
Their Delegation instructed to move a Convention 360
Failure of this Proposition 360
Adoption of a Resolve proposed by the Massachusetts Members
for the same Purpose 361
Mode of Amendment recommended by Congress 362
Importance of this Action of Congress 362
Dangers of Inaction 363
Importance of the Sanction of the Old Government, in the
Formation of a new one 364
Hamilton's Wisdom 365
Reason for not intrusting the Revision of the System of
Government to Congress 365, 366
Powers of the Convention not defined by Congress 367
Nature of the Crisis 368
Danger of an Attempt to establish Monarchical Government 369
Washington's Opinions 370, 371
Other Difficulties attending the Revision of the Federal
System 371
Sectional Jealousy and its Causes 371, 372
New Idea of a Union 372, 373
Prevailing Feeling among Statesmen concerning the Convention 373
Hamilton fully equal to the Demands of the Crisis 373, 374
Assembling of the Convention 374
Novelty of their Undertaking 374, 375
State of Political Science in Modern Europe 375
The Results of English Liberty 376, 377
French Discussions 377, 378
The English Constitution an imperfect Guide 378
Nature of the Problem 379
CHAPTER VII.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION.--WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT OF
THE CONVENTION.
Embarrassments attending the Assembling of the Convention 380
Discipline to which the American People had been subjected 381, 382
The Constitution the Result of Circumstances 382
Consequences of a Want of Power in the First Government 383
Its Incapacity 384
Sufferings of the People 384
Civil Liberty the Result of Trial and Suffering 385, 386
Qualities of the Framers of the Constitution 386, 387
Hamilton 387
Washington 388
Madison 388
Franklin 388
Gouverneur Morris 388
Their Characters formed during the Revolution 388, 389
Diversities of Opinion in such an Assembly 389
Patriotism of its Members 390
A Republican System their great Object 390
Slight Value of the Examples of other Countries 391
Necessity for a National Head 392
The New Government established without Violence 393
Washington at Mount Vernon 393, 394
His Opinions upon the Powers of the Federal Government 394-396
His Fears as to the Result of a Convention 396, 397
The Legislature of Virginia desire to place him at the Head
of their Delegation 397
Refuses informally 398
Declines a Re-election as President of the Society of the
Cincinnati 398
Receives Official Notice of his Appointment to the Convention 399
Declines the Appointment 399
The Insurrection in Massachusetts changes his
Determination 399, 400
He leaves Mount Vernon for Philadelphia 401
Is elected President of the Convention 401
His great Object, to secure a Republican Government 402
The Idea of a Monarchical Government entertained to some
Extent 402
Coercive Power necessary in the General Government 403
Washington's Character as a Statesman 404
His Fitness for the Chair of the Convention 405
CHAPTER VIII.
HAMILTON.
Causes why Hamilton is less known at the present Day, than
other Statesmen of the Revolution 406
Immediate Effect of his Death upon the Country 407
His Birth and Education 408
Very early Entrance upon Political Life 408
His Essays on the Rights of the Colonies 408
Appointed Aide-de-Camp to Washington 409
Elected to Congress from New York 409
A Member of the Legislature 409
Delegate to the Federal Convention 409
One of the Authors of the Federalist 409
Elected to the State Convention 409
Secretary of the Treasury 409
Retirement 409
Command of the Provisional Army 409
Practice of the Law 409
Death 409, 410
Character 410-419
CHAPTER IX.
MADISON.
His Birth and Education 420
Entrance into Congress 421
His Influence in inducing Virginia to yield the Northwest
Territory 422
Other important Services in the Congress of the
Confederation 422, 423
Retires to Virginia 423
Efforts for the Enlargement of Commercial Powers 423, 424
His Connection with the Events which led to the Convention 424-427
Appointed one of the Commissioners to Annapolis 427
Drafts the Act of Virginia appointing Delegates to the Federal
Convention 427
His Labors in the Convention 427, 428
Records the Debates 428
His Character 428-431
CHAPTER X.
FRANKLIN.
His long Career of Public Service 433, 434
His distinguished Residences abroad 434, 435
Importance and Influence of his Presence in the Convention 435-437
His Objections to the Constitution 437
Sacrifices them to the Public Good 437
His Efforts to produce Unanimity 437, 438
CHAPTER XI.
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS.
Birth and Education 440
Views on the Independence of America 441
Services in Congress 442
Appointed Assistant Financier 443
Elected to the Federal Convention 444
His Character 444-447
CHAPTER XII.
KING.
Birth and Education 448
Elected to Congress 448
His Opinions on the Subject of a Federal Convention 449
His Views of the Insurrection in Massachusetts 450
Disappointment concerning the Powers of the Confederation 450
Change of Opinion 450, 451
View of the true Principle for the new Government 451
Introduces the Prohibition against Laws affecting the
Obligation of Contracts 452
His Character 453
CHAPTER XIII.
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY.
Descent and Education 454
Military Career 454
Appointed to the Federal Convention 455
His Course on the Slave-Trade, and the Regulation of Commerce 456
Vindication of the Framers of the Constitution 456-460
Note on the Abolition of the Slave-Trade 460
CHAPTER XIV.
WILSON.
Birth and Education 462
Emigration to America 462
Services in Congress 462, 463
His Opinions in the Convention 463, 464
Exertions for a Representative Government 464
Appointed Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States 465
His Speech on the Constitution in the Pennsylvania
Convention 465-479
CHAPTER XV.
RANDOLPH.
An Aide-de-camp to Washington 480
Services in Congress 480
Elected Governor of Virginia 481
Procures the Attendance of Washington 481
His Opinions on the Constitution, and the existing Crisis 481-485
Genealogy 485
CHAPTER XVI.
CONCLUSION OF THE PRESENT VOLUME.
The Other Members of the Convention 486, 487
Responsible Position of the American People 487, 488
APPENDIX.
Circular Letter of Congress recommending the Articles of
Confederation 491
Representation of New Jersey on the Articles of Confederation 493
Act of New Jersey accepting the Confederation 497
Resolutions passed by the Council of Delaware respecting the
Articles of Confederation 498
Act to authorize the Delegates of the Delaware State to ratify
the Articles of Confederation 500
Instructions of the General Assembly of Maryland to their
Delegates, respecting the Articles of Confederation 501
Act of the Legislature of New York, to facilitate the
Completion of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual
Union among the United States of America 505
Report of the Committee of Congress as to the Proceedings of
the Legislatures of Maryland, New York, and Virginia in
Relation to the Articles of Confederation 506
Act to empower the Delegates of Maryland to ratify the
Articles of Confederation 508
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the
States 509
Members of the Convention which formed the Constitution 516
BOOK I.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE REVOLUTION TO THE ADOPTION OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.
CHAPTER I.
1774-1775.
ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.--ORIGIN OF THE UNION.
The thirteen British colonies in North America, by whose inhabitants the
American Revolution was achieved, were, at the commencement of that
struggle, so many separate communities, having, to a considerable
extent, different political organizations and different municipal laws:
but their various populations spoke almost universally the English
language. These colonies were Virginia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. From the times
when they were respectively settled, until the union formed under the
necessities of a common cause at the breaking out of the Revolution,
they had no political connection; but each possessed a domestic
government peculiar to itself, derived directly from the crown of
England, and more or less under the direct control of the mother
country.
The political organizations of the colonies have been classed by jurists
and historians under the three heads of Provincial, Proprietary, and
Charter governments.
To the class of Provincial governments belonged the Provinces of New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia. These
had no other written constitutions, or fundamental laws, than the
commissions issued to the Governors appointed by the crown, explained by
the instructions which accompanied them. The Governor, by his
commission, was made the representative or deputy of the King, and was
obliged to act in conformity with the royal instructions. He was
assisted by a Council, the members of which, besides participating with
him, to a certain extent, in the executive functions of the government,
constituted the upper house of the provincial legislature; and he was
also authorized to summon a general assembly of representatives of the
freeholders of the Province. The three branches thus convened,
consisting of the Governor, the Council, and the Representatives,
constituted the provincial Assemblies, having the power of local
legislation, subject to the ratification and disapproval of the crown.
The direct control of the crown over these provincial governments may
also be traced in the features, common to them all, by which the
Governor had power to suspend the members of the Council from office,
and, whenever vacancies occurred, to appoint to those vacancies, until
the pleasure of the crown should be known; to negative all the
proceedings of the assembly; and to prorogue or dissolve it at his
pleasure.
The Proprietary governments, consisting of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Delaware, were those in which the subordinate powers of legislation and
government had been granted to certain individuals called the
proprietaries, who appointed the Governor and authorized him to summon
legislative assemblies. The authority of the proprietaries, or of the
legislative bodies assembled by the Governor, was restrained by the
condition, that the ends for which the grant was made to them by the
crown should be substantially pursued in their legislation, and that
nothing should be done, or attempted, which might derogate from the
sovereignty of the mother country. In Maryland, the laws enacted by the
proprietary government were not subject to the direct control of the
crown; but in Pennsylvania and Delaware they were.[2]
The Charter governments, consisting, at the period of the Revolution, of
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, may be said, in a stricter
sense, to have possessed written constitutions for their general
political government. The charters, granted by the crown, established an
organization of the different departments of government similar to that
in the provincial governments. In Massachusetts, after the charter of
William and Mary granted in 1691, the Governor was appointed by the
crown; the Council were chosen annually by the General Assembly, and the
House of Representatives by the people. In Connecticut and Rhode
Island, the Governor, Council, and Representatives were chosen annually
by the freemen of the colony. In the charter, as well as the provincial
governments, the general power of legislation was restrained by the
condition, that the laws enacted should be, as nearly as possible,
agreeable to the laws and statutes of England.
One of the principal causes which precipitated the war of the Revolution
was the blow struck by Parliament at these charter governments,
commencing with that of Massachusetts, by an act intended to alter the
constitution of that Province as it stood upon the charter of William
and Mary; a precedent which justly alarmed the entire continent, and in
its principle affected all the colonies, since it assumed that none of
them possessed constitutional rights which could not be altered or taken
away by an act of Parliament. The "Act for the better regulating the
government of the Province of Massachusetts Bay," passed in 1774, was
designed to create an executive power of a totally different character
from that created by the charter, and also to remodel the judiciary, in
order that the laws of the imperial government might be more certainly
enforced.
The charter had reserved to the King the appointment of the Governor,
Lieutenant-Governor, and Secretary of the Province. It vested in the
General Assembly the choice of twenty-eight councillors, subject to
rejection by the Governor; it gave to the Governor, with the advice and
consent of the Council, the appointment of all military and judicial
officers, and to the two houses of the legislature the appointment of
all other civil officers, with a right of negative by the Governor. The
new law vested the appointment of councillors, judges, and magistrates
of all kinds, in the crown, and in some cases in the Governor, and made
them all removable at the pleasure of the crown. A change so radical as
this, in the constitution of a people long accustomed to regard their
charter as a compact between themselves and the crown, could not but
lead to the most serious consequences.
* * * * *
The statements which have now been made are sufficient to remind the
reader of the important fact, that, at the commencement of the
Revolution, there existed, and had long existed, in all the colonies,
local legislatures, one branch of which was composed of representatives
chosen directly by the people, accustomed to the transaction of public
business, and being in fact the real organs of the popular will. These
bodies, by virtue of their relation to the people, were, in many
instances, the bodies which took the initiatory steps for the
organization of the first national or Continental Congress, when it
became necessary for the colonies to unite in the common purpose of
resistance to the mother country. But it should be again stated, before
we attend to the steps thus taken, that the colonies had no direct
political connection with each other before the Revolution commenced,
but that each was a distinct community, with its own separate political
organization, and without any power of legislation for any but its own
inhabitants; that, as political communities, and upon the principles of
their organizations, they possessed no power of forming any union among
themselves, for any purpose whatever, without the sanction of the Crown
or Parliament of England.[3] But the free and independent power of
forming a union among themselves, for objects and purposes common to
them all, which was denied to their colonial condition by the principles
of the English Constitution, was one of the chief powers asserted and
developed by the Revolution; and they were enabled to effect this union,
as a revolutionary right and measure, by the fortunate circumstances of
their origin, which made the people of the different colonies, in
several important senses, one people. They were, in the first place,
chiefly the descendants of Englishmen, governed by the laws, inheriting
the blood, and speaking the language of the people of England. As
British subjects, they had enjoyed the right of dwelling in any of the
colonies, without restraint, and of carrying on trade from one colony to
another, under the regulation of the general laws of the empire, without
restriction by colonial legislation. They had, moreover, common
grievances to be redressed, and a common independence to establish, if
redress could not be obtained: for although the precise grounds of
dispute with the Crown or the Parliament of England had not always been
the same in all the colonies, yet when the Revolution actually broke
out, they all stood in the same attitude of resistance to the same
oppressor, making common cause with each other, and resting upon certain
great principles of liberty, which had been violated with regard to many
of them, and with the further violation of which all were threatened.
* * * * *
It was while the controversies between the mother country and the
colonies were drawing towards a crisis, that Dr. Franklin, then in
England as the political agent of Pennsylvania, of Massachusetts, and of
Georgia, in an official letter to the Massachusetts Assembly, dated July
7th, 1773, recommended the assembling of a general congress of all the
colonies. "As the strength of an empire," said he, "depends not only on
the _union_ of its parts, but on their readiness for united exertion of
their common force; and as the discussion of rights may seem
unseasonable in the commencement of actual war, and the delay it might
occasion be prejudicial to the common welfare; as likewise the refusal
of one or a few colonies would not be so much regarded, if the others
granted liberally, which perhaps by various artifices and motives they
might be prevailed on to do; and as this want of concert would defeat
the expectation of general redress, that might otherwise be justly
formed; perhaps it would be best and fairest for the colonies, in a
general congress now in peace to be assembled, or by means of the
correspondence lately proposed, after a full and solemn assertion and
declaration of their rights, to engage firmly with each other, that they
will never grant aids to the crown in any general war, till those rights
are recognized by the King and both houses of Parliament; communicating
at the same time to the crown this their resolution. Such a step I
imagine will bring the dispute to a crisis."[4]
The first actual step towards this measure was taken in Virginia. A new
House of Burgesses had been summoned by the royal Governor to meet in
May, 1774. Soon after the members had assembled at Williamsburg, they
received the news that, by an act of Parliament, the port of Boston was
to be closed on the first day of the succeeding June, and that other
disabilities were to be inflicted on the town. They immediately passed
an order, setting apart the first day of June as a day of fasting,
humiliation, and prayer, "to implore the Divine interposition for
averting the heavy calamity which threatened destruction to their civil
rights, and the evils of civil war, and to give them one heart and one
mind firmly to oppose, by all just and proper means, every injury to
American rights." Thereupon, the Governor dissolved the House. But the
members immediately assembled at another place of meeting, and, having
organized themselves as a committee, drew up and subscribed an
Association, in which they declared that the interests of all the
colonies were equally concerned in the late doings of Parliament, and
advised the local Committee of Correspondence to consult with the
committees of the other colonies on the expediency of holding a general
Continental Congress. Pursuant to these recommendations, a popular
convention was holden at Williamsburg, on the 1st of August, which
appointed seven persons as delegates to represent the people of Virginia
in a general Congress to be held at Philadelphia in the September
following.[5]
The Massachusetts Assembly met on the last of May, and, after negativing
thirteen of the Councillors, Governor Gage adjourned the Assembly to
meet at Salem on the 7th of June. When they came together at that place,
the House of Representatives passed a resolve, declaring a meeting of
committees from the several colonies on the continent to be highly
expedient and necessary, to deliberate and determine upon proper
measures to be recommended to all the colonies for the recovery and
establishment of their just rights and liberties, civil and religious,
and for the restoration of union and harmony with Great Britain. They
then appointed five delegates[6] to meet the representatives of the
other colonies in congress at Philadelphia, in the succeeding September.
These examples were at once followed by the other colonies. In some of
them, the delegates to the Continental Congress were appointed by the
popular branch of the legislature, acting for and in behalf of the
people; in others, they were appointed by conventions of the people
called for the express purpose, or by committees duly authorized to make
the appointment.[7] The Congress, styling themselves "the delegates
appointed by the good people of these colonies," assembled at
Philadelphia on the 5th of September, 1774, and organized themselves as
a deliberative body by the choice of officers and the adoption of rules
of proceeding. Peyton Randolph of Virginia was elected President, and
Charles Thompson of Pennsylvania Secretary of the Congress.
No precedent existed for the mode of action to be adopted by this
assembly. There was, therefore, at the outset, no established principle
which might determine the nature of the union; but that union was to be
shaped by the new circumstances and relations in which the Congress
found itself placed. There had been no general concert among the
different colonies as to the numbers of delegates, or, as they were
called in many of the proceedings, "committees" of the colonies, to be
sent to the meeting at Philadelphia. On the first day of their
assembling, Pennsylvania and Virginia had each six delegates in
attendance; New York had five; Massachusetts, New Jersey, and South
Carolina had four each; Connecticut had three; New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, Delaware, and Maryland had two each. The delegates from North
Carolina did not arrive until the 14th.[8]
As soon as the choice of officers had taken place,[9] the method of
voting presented itself as the first thing to be determined; and the
difficulties arising from the inequalities between the colonies in
respect to actual representation, population, and wealth, had to be
encountered upon the threshold. Insuperable obstacles stood in the way
of the adoption of interests as the basis of votes. The weight of a
colony could not be ascertained by the numbers of its inhabitants, the
amount of their wealth, the extent of their trade, or by any ratio to be
compounded of all these elements, for no authentic evidence existed from
which data could be taken.[10] As it was apparent, however, that some
colonies had a larger proportion of members present than others,
relatively to their size and importance, it was thought to be equally
objectionable to adopt the method of voting by polls. In these
circumstances, the opinion was advanced, that the colonial governments
were at an end; that all America was thrown into one mass, and was in a
state of nature; and consequently, that the people ought to be
considered as represented in the Congress according to their numbers, by
the delegations actually present.[11] Upon this principle, the voting
should have been by polls.
But neither the circumstances under which they were assembled, nor the
dispositions of the members, permitted an adoption of the theory that
all government was at an end, or that the boundaries of the colonies
were effaced. The Congress had not assembled as the representatives of a
people in a state of nature, but as the committees of different
colonies, which had not yet severed themselves from the parent state.
They had been clothed with no legislative or coercive authority, even of
a revolutionary nature; compliance with their resolves would follow only
on conviction of the utility of their measures; and all their resolves
and all their measures were, by the express terms of many of their
credentials, limited to the restoration of union and harmony with Great
Britain, which would of course leave the colonies in their colonial
state. The people of the continent, therefore, as a people in the state
of nature, or even in a national existence as one people standing in a
revolutionary attitude, had not then come into being.
The nature of the questions, too, which they were to discuss, and of the
measures which they were to adopt, were to be considered in determining
by what method of voting those questions and measures should be decided.
The Congress had been called to secure the _rights_ of the colonies.
What were those rights? By what standard were they to be ascertained? By
the law of nature, or by the principles of the English Constitution, or
by the charters and fundamental laws of the colonies, regarded as
compacts between the crown and the people, or by all of these combined?
If the law of nature alone was to determine their rights, then all
allegiance to the British crown was to be regarded as at an end. If the
principles of the English Constitution, or the charters, were to be the
standard, the law of nature must be excluded from consideration. This
exclusion would of necessity narrow the ground, and deprive them of a
resource to which Parliament might at last compel them to look.[12] In
order, therefore, to leave the whole field open for consideration, and
at the same time to avoid committing themselves to principles
irreconcilable with the preservation of allegiance and their colonial
relation to Great Britain, it was necessary to consider themselves as an
assembly of committees from the different colonies, in which each colony
should have one voice, through the delegates whom it had sent to
represent and act for it. But, as if foreseeing the time when population
would become of necessity the basis of congressional power, when the
authority of Parliament should have given place to a system of American
continental legislation, they inserted, in the resolve determining that
each colony should have one vote, a caution that would prevent its being
drawn into precedent. They declared, as the reason for the course which
they adopted, that the Congress were not possessed of, or able to
procure, the proper materials for ascertaining the importance of each
colony.[13]
It appears, therefore, very clear, that an examination of the relations
of the first Congress to the colonies which instituted it will not
enable us to assign to it the character of a government. Its members
were not elected for the express purpose of making a revolution. It was
an assembly convened from separate colonies, each of which had causes of
complaint against the imperial government to which it acknowledged its
allegiance to be due, and each of which regarded it as essential to its
own interests to make common cause with the others, for the purpose of
obtaining redress of its own grievances. The idea of separating
themselves from the mother country had not been generally entertained by
the people of any of the colonies. All their public proceedings, from
the commencement of the disputes down to the election of delegates to
the first Congress, including the instructions given to those delegates,
prove, as we have seen, that they looked for redress and relief to means
which they regarded as entirely consistent with the principles of the
British Constitution.[14]
Still, although this Congress did not take upon themselves the functions
of a government, or propose revolution as a remedy for the wrongs of
their constituents, they regarded and styled themselves as "the
guardians of the rights and liberties of the colonies";[15] and in that
capacity they proceeded to declare the causes of complaint, and to take
the necessary steps to obtain redress, in what they believed to be a
constitutional mode. These steps, however, although not directly
revolutionary, had a revolutionary tendency.
On the 6th of September, 1774, a resolve was passed, that a committee be
appointed to state the rights of the colonies in general, the several
instances in which those rights had been violated or infringed, and the
means most proper to be pursued for obtaining a restoration of them.
Another committee was ordered on the same day, to examine and report the
several statutes affecting the trade and manufactures of the colonies.
On the following day, it was ordered that the first committee should
consist of two members, and the second of one member, from each of the
colonies.[16] Two questions presented themselves to the first of these
committees, and created a good deal of embarrassment. The first was,
whether, in stating the rights of the colonies, they should recur to the
law of nature, as well as to the British Constitution and the American
charters and grants. The second question related to the authority which
they should allow to be in Parliament;--whether they should deny it
wholly, or deny it only as to internal affairs, admitting it as to
external trade; and if the latter, to what extent and with what
restrictions. It was soon felt that this question of the authority of
Parliament was the essence of the whole controversy. Some denied it
altogether. Others denied it as to every species of taxation; while
others admitted it to extend to the regulation of external trade, but
denied it as to all internal affairs. The discussions had not proceeded
far, before it was perceived that this subject of the regulation of
trade might lead directly to the question of the continuance of the
colonial relations with the mother country. For this they were not
prepared. It was apparent that the right of regulating the trade of the
whole country, from the local circumstances of the colonies and their
disconnection with each other, could not be exercised by the colonies
themselves: it was thought that the aid, assistance, and protection of
the mother country were necessary to them; and therefore, as a proper
equivalent, that the colonies must admit the right of regulating the
trade, to some extent and in some mode, to be in Parliament. The
alternatives were, either to set up an American legislature, that could
control and regulate the trade of the whole country, or else to give the
power to Parliament. The Congress determined to do the latter; supposing
that they could limit the admission, by denying that the power extended
to taxation, but ceding at the same time the right to regulate the
external trade of the colonies for the common benefit of the whole
empire.[17] They grounded this concession upon "the necessities of the
case," and "the mutual interests of both countries";[18] meaning by
these expressions to assert that all legislative control over the
external and internal trade of the colonies belonged of right to the
colonies themselves, but, as they were part of an empire for which
Parliament legislated, it was necessary that the common legislature of
the whole empire should retain the regulation of the external trade,
excluding all power of taxation for purposes of revenue, in order to
secure the benefits of the trade of the whole empire to the mother
country.
The Congress, therefore, after having determined to confine their
statement to such rights as had been infringed by acts of Parliament
since the year 1763, unanimously adopted a Declaration of Rights, in
which they summed up the grievances and asserted the rights of the
colonies. This document placed the rights of the colonies upon the laws
of nature, the principles of the English Constitution, and the several
charters or compacts. It declared, that, as the colonies were not, and
from their local situation could not be, represented in the English
Parliament, they were entitled to a free and exclusive power of
legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their right
of representation could alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and
internal polity, subject only to the negative of their sovereign, in
such manner as had been before accustomed. At the same time, from the
necessity of the case and from a regard to the mutual interests of both
countries, they cheerfully consented to the operation of such acts of
Parliament as were in good faith limited to the regulation of their
external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages
of the whole to the mother country, and the commercial benefit of its
respective members; excluding every idea of taxation, internal and
external, for raising a revenue on the subjects in America, without
their consent.[19]
In addition to this, they asserted, as great constitutional rights
inherent in the people of all these colonies, that they were entitled to
all the rights, liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born
subjects within the realm of England; to the common law of England, and
especially to trial by a jury of the vicinage; to the immunities and
privileges granted and confirmed to them by royal charters, or secured
by their several codes of provincial laws; and to the right of peaceably
assembling to consider grievances and to petition the King.[20]
In order to enforce their complaints upon the attention of the
government and people of Great Britain, and as the sole means which were
open to them, short of actual revolution, of coercing the ministry into
a change of measures, they resolved that after the 10th of September,
1775, the exportation of all merchandise, and every commodity
whatsoever, to Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies, ought to
cease, unless the grievances of America should be redressed before that
time; and that after the first day of December, 1774, there should be no
importation into British America, from Great Britain or Ireland, of any
goods, wares, or merchandise whatever, or from any other place, of any
such goods, wares, or merchandise as had been exported from Great
Britain or Ireland, and that no such goods, wares, or merchandise be
used or purchased.[21] They then prepared an association, or agreement,
of non-importation, non-exportation, and non-consumption, in order, as
far as lay in their power, to cause a general compliance with their
resolves. This association was subscribed by every member of the
Congress, and was by them recommended for adoption to the people of the
colonies, and was very generally adopted and acted upon.[22] They
resorted to this as the most speedy, effectual, and peaceable measure to
obtain a redress of the grievances of which the colonies complained; and
they entered into the agreement on behalf of the inhabitants of the
several colonies for which they acted.
* * * * *
This Congress, which sat from the 5th of September to the 26th of
October, 1774, had thus made the restoration of commercial intercourse
between the colonies and the other parts of the British empire to depend
upon the repeal by Parliament of the obnoxious measures of which they
complained, and upon the recognition of the rights which they asserted;
for although their acts had not the foundation of laws, the general
adoption of their recommendations throughout the colonies gave them a
power that laws rarely possess. Before they adjourned, they recommended
that another Congress of all the colonies should be held at Philadelphia
on the 10th of the following May, unless their grievances were redressed
before that time, and that the deputies to such new Congress should be
chosen immediately.[23]
But while the Continental Congress were engaged in the adoption of these
measures of constitutional resistance, and still acknowledged their
colonial relations to the imperial government, the course of events in
Massachusetts had put an end to the forms of law and government in that
colony, as established or upheld by imperial authority. The last
Assembly held in the Province upon the principles of its charter had
been dissolved by the Governor's proclamation, at Salem, on the 17th of
June, 1774. The new law for the alteration of the government had taken
effect; and in August the Governor received from England a list of
thirty-six councillors, who were to be called into office by the King's
writ of _mandamus_, instead of being elected, as under the charter, by
the House of Representatives. Two thirds of the number accepted their
appointment; but popular indignation, treating them as enemies of their
country, compelled the greater part of them to renounce their offices.
The new judges were prevented everywhere from proceeding with the
business of the courts, which were obstructed by assemblies of the
people, who would permit no judge to exercise his functions, save in
accordance with the ancient laws and usages of the Colony.
Writs had been issued for a new General Assembly, which was to meet at
Salem in October; but it was found, that, while the old constitution had
been taken away by act of Parliament, the new one had been rejected by
the people. The compulsory resignation of so many of the councillors
left that body without power, and the Governor deemed it expedient to
countermand the writs by proclamation, and to defer the holding of the
Assembly until the popular temper should have had time to cool. But the
legality of the proclamation was denied; the elections were everywhere
held, and the members elect assembled at Salem, pursuant to the
precepts. There they waited a day for the Governor to attend, administer
the oaths, and open the session; but as he did not appear, they resolved
themselves into a Provincial Congress, to be joined by others who had
been or might be elected for that purpose, and adjourned to the town of
Cambridge, to take into consideration the affairs of the Colony, in
which the regular and established government was now at an end. Their
acts were at first couched in the form of recommendations to the people,
whose ready compliance gave to them the weight and efficacy of laws,
and there was thus formed something like a new and independent
government. Under the form of recommendation and advice, they settled
the militia, regulated the public revenue, provided arms, and prepared
to resist the British troops. In December, 1774, they elected five
persons to represent the Colony in the Continental Congress that was to
assemble at Philadelphia in the ensuing May. They were met by a
proclamation, issued by the Governor, in which their assembly was
declared unlawful, and the people were prohibited, in the King's name,
from complying with their recommendations, requisitions, or resolves.
Through the winter, the Governor held the town of Boston, with a
considerable body of royal troops, but the rest of the Province
generally yielded obedience to the Provincial Congress. In this posture
of affairs, the encounter between a detachment of the King's forces and
a body of militia, commonly called the battle of Lexington, occurred, on
the 19th of April, 1775.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, § 160.
[3] That a union of the colonies into one general government, for any
purpose, could not take place without the sanction of Parliament, was
always assumed in both countries. The sole instance in which a plan of
union was publicly proposed and acted upon, before the Revolution, was
in 1753-4, when the Board of Trade sent instructions to the Governor of
New York to make a treaty with the Six Nations of Indians; and the other
colonies were also instructed to send commissioners to be present at the
meeting, so that all the provinces might be comprised in one general
treaty, to be made in the King's name. It was also recommended by the
home government, that the commissioners at this meeting should form a
plan of union among the colonies for their mutual protection and defence
against the French. Twenty-five commissioners assembled at Albany in
May, 1754, from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. In this body, a plan of union was
digested and adopted, which was chiefly the work of Dr. Franklin. It was
agreed that an act of Parliament was necessary to authorize it to be
carried into effect. It was rejected by all the colonial Assemblies
before which it was brought, and in England it was not thought proper by
the Board of Trade to recommend it to the King. In America it was
considered to have too much of _prerogative_ in it, and in England to be
too _democratic_. It was a comprehensive scheme of government, to
consist of a Governor-General, or President-General, who was to be
appointed and supported by the crown, and a Grand Council, which was to
consist of one member chosen by each of the smaller colonies, and two or
more by each of the larger. Its duties and powers related chiefly to
defence against external attacks. It was to have a general treasury, to
be supplied by an excise on certain articles of consumption. See the
history and details of the scheme, in Sparks's Life and Works of
Franklin, I. 176, III. 22-55; Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts,
III. 23; Trumbull's History of Connecticut, II. 355; Pitkin's History of
the United States, I. 140-146. In 1788, Franklin said of it: "The
different and contradictory reasons of dislike to my plan make me
suspect that it was really the true medium; and I am still of opinion it
would have been happy for both sides, if it had been adopted. The
colonies so united would have been sufficiently strong to have defended
themselves: there would have been no need of troops from England: of
course the subsequent pretext for taxing America, and the bloody contest
it occasioned, would have been avoided. But such mistakes are not new:
history is full of the errors of states and princes." (Life, by Sparks,
I. 178.) We may not join in his regrets now.
[4] It is not certain by whom the first suggestion of a Continental
Congress was made. Thomas Cushing, Speaker of the Massachusetts
Assembly, and a correspondent of Dr. Franklin, appears to have expressed
to him the opinion, previously to the date of Franklin's official letter
quoted in the text, that a congress would grow out of the committees of
correspondence which had been recommended by the Virginia House of
Burgesses. But Mr. Sparks thinks that no other direct and public
recommendation of the measure can be found before the date of Franklin's
letter to the Massachusetts Assembly. Sparks's Life of Franklin, I. 350,
note. In the early part of the year 1774, the necessity of such a
congress began to be popularly felt throughout all the colonies.
Sparks's Washington, II. 326.
[5] These delegates were Peyton Randolph, Richard Henry Lee, George
Washington, Patrick Henry, Richard Bland, Benjamin Harrison, and Edmund
Pendleton.
[6] Thomas Cushing, Samuel Adams, Robert Treat Paine, James Bowdoin, and
John Adams.
[7] The delegates in the Congress of 1774 from New Hampshire were
appointed by a Convention of Deputies chosen by the towns, and received
their credentials from that Convention. In Rhode Island, they were
appointed by the General Assembly, and commissioned by the Governor. In
Connecticut, they were appointed and instructed by the Committee of
Correspondence for the Colony, acting under authority conferred by the
House of Representatives. In New York, the mode of appointment was
various. In the city and county of New York, the delegates were elected
by popular vote taken in seven wards. The same persons were also
appointed to act for the counties of West Chester, Albany, and Duchess,
by the respective committees of those counties; and another person was
appointed in the same manner for the county of Suffolk. The New York
delegates received no other instructions than those implied in the
certificates, "to attend the Congress and to represent" the county
designated. In New Jersey, the delegates were appointed by the
committees of counties, and were simply instructed "to represent" the
Colony. In Pennsylvania, they were appointed and instructed by the House
of Assembly. In the counties of New Castle, Kent, and Sussex on
Delaware, delegates were elected by a convention of the freemen
assembled in pursuance of circular letters from the Speaker of the House
of Assembly. In Maryland, the appointment was by committees of the
counties. In Virginia, it was by a popular convention of the whole
Colony. In South Carolina, it was by the House of Commons. Georgia was
not represented in this Congress.
[8] Journals, I. 1, 12.
[9] The President and Secretary appear to have been chosen _viva voce_
or by a hand vote. John Adam's Works, II. 365.
[10] Adams, II. 366.
[11] This opinion, we are told by Mr. Adams, was advanced by Patrick
Henry. See notes of the debate, in Adams, II. 366, 368.
[12] See the very interesting notes of their debates in Adams's Works,
II. 366, 370-377.
[13] Journals, I. 10.
[14] The instructions embraced in the credentials of the delegates to
the first Congress were as follows:--NEW HAMPSHIRE,--"to devise,
consult, and adopt such measures as may have the most likely tendency to
extricate the colonies from their present difficulties; to secure and
perpetuate their rights, liberties, and privileges; and to restore that
peace, harmony, and mutual confidence which once happily subsisted
between the parent country and her colonies." MASSACHUSETTS,--"to
deliberate and determine upon wise and proper measures, to be by them
recommended to all the colonies, for the recovery and establishment of
their just rights and liberties, civil and religious, and the
restoration of union and harmony between Great Britain and the colonies,
most ardently desired by all good men." RHODE ISLAND,--"to meet and join
with the other commissioners or delegates from the other colonies in
consulting upon proper measures to obtain a repeal of the several acts
of the British Parliament for levying taxes upon his Majesty's subjects
in America without their consent, and particularly the commercial
connection of the colonies with the mother country, for the relief of
Boston and the preservation of American liberty." VIRGINIA,--"to
consider of the most proper and effectual manner of so operating on the
commercial connection of the colonies with the mother country, as to
procure redress for the much injured Province of Massachusetts Bay, to
secure British America from the ravage and ruin of arbitrary taxes, and
speedily to procure the return of that harmony and union so beneficial
to the whole empire, and so ardently desired by all British America."
SOUTH CAROLINA,--"to consider the acts lately passed and bills depending
in Parliament with regard to the port of Boston and Colony of
Massachusetts Bay, which acts and bills, in the precedent and
consequences, affect the whole continent of America;--also the
grievances under which America labors by reason of the several acts of
Parliament that impose taxes or duties for raising a revenue, and lay
unnecessary restraints and burdens on trade;--and of the statutes,
parliamentary acts, and royal instructions, which make an invidious
distinction between his Majesty's subjects in Great Britain and America;
with full power and authority to concert, agree to, and effectually
prosecute such legal measures as, in the opinion of the said deputies
and of the deputies so to be assembled, shall be most likely to obtain a
repeal of the said acts and a redress of these grievances." The
delegates from New York and New Jersey were simply instructed "to
represent" those colonies in the Congress. Journals, I. 2-9.
[15] Letter of the Congress to Governor Gage, October 10, 1774.
Journals, I. 25, 26.
[16] Additions were made to it.
[17] Works of John Adams.
[18] See the origin of these expressions explained, in Adams's Works,
II. 373-375.
[19] Journals, I. 29.
[20] Ibid. They adopted also an Address to the People of Great Britain,
and a Petition to the King, embodying similar principles with those
asserted in the Declaration of Rights. Ibid. 38, 67.
[21] Journals, I. 21.
[22] This association, signed by the delegates, of Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina, as well as of the other colonies,
contained, among other things, the following agreement:--"We will
neither import nor purchase any slaves imported after the first day of
December next; after which time we will wholly discontinue the
slave-trade, and will neither be concerned in it ourselves, nor will we
hire our vessels, nor sell our commodities or manufactures, to those who
are concerned in it." Journals, I. 33.
[23] Journals, I. 56. Oct. 22, 1774.
CHAPTER II
1775-1776.
THE SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.--FORMATION AND CHARACTER OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.--APPOINTMENT OF A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.--FIRST
ARMY OF THE REVOLUTION.
A new Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia on the 10th of May,
1775; and in order to observe the growth of the Union, it is necessary
to trace the organization of this body, and to describe briefly the kind
of sovereignty which it exercised, from the time of its assembling until
the adoption and promulgation of the Declaration of Independence.[24]
The delegates to this Congress were chosen partly by the popular branch
of such of the colonial legislatures as were in session at the time, the
choice being afterwards ratified by conventions of the people; but they
were principally appointed by conventions of the people held in the
various colonies. All these appointments, except those made in New York,
took place before the battle of Lexington, and most of them had been
made in the course of the previous winter.[25] The credentials of the
delegates, therefore, while they conferred authority to adopt measures
to recover and establish American rights, still expressed, in many
instances, a desire for the restoration of harmony between Great Britain
and her colonies. In some cases, however, this desire was not expressed,
but a naked authority was granted, to consent and agree to all such
measures as the Congress should deem necessary and effectual to obtain a
redress of American grievances.
When this Congress assembled, it seems to have been tacitly assumed that
each colony should continue to have one vote through its delegation
actually present. All the thirteen colonies were represented at the
opening of the session, except Georgia and Rhode Island. Three days
after the session commenced, a delegate appeared from the Parish of St.
Johns in Georgia, who was admitted to a seat, but did not claim the
right of voting for the colony. On the 15th of May, a delegation from
Rhode Island appeared and took their seats.
The credentials of the delegates contained no limitation of their powers
with respect to time, with the exception of those from Massachusetts and
South Carolina, whose authority was not to extend beyond the end of the
year. The Congress continued in session until the 1st of August, and
then adjourned for a recess to the 5th of September. When they were
again assembled, the delegations of several of the colonies were
renewed, with different limitations as to their time of service. Georgia
sent a full delegation, who took their seats on the 13th of September.
Still later, the delegations of several other colonies were renewed from
time to time, and this practice was pursued both before and after the
Declaration of Independence, thus rendering the Congress a permanent
body.[26]
Notwithstanding the absence of any express authority in their
instructions to enter upon revolutionary measures, the circumstances
under which the Congress assembled placed it in the position and cast
upon it the powers of a revolutionary government. Civil war had actually
commenced, and blood had been shed. Whether this war was to be carried
on for independence, or was only to be waged until the British ministry
could be compelled to acknowledge the rights which the colonies had
asserted, the Congress necessarily became, at once, the organ of the
common resistance of the colonies against the parent state. The first
thing which evinces its new relation to the country was the application
made to it by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, immediately
after the battle of Lexington, for direction and assistance. While they
informed the Continental Congress that they had proceeded, at once, to
raise a force of thirteen thousand six hundred men, and had made
proposals to the other New England colonies to furnish men in the same
proportions, stating that the sudden exigency of their affairs precluded
the possibility of waiting for direction, they suggested that an
American army ought forthwith to be raised for the common cause.[27] In
the same manner, the city and county of New York applied for the advice
of Congress, how to conduct themselves with regard to the British troops
expected in that quarter. These applications caused the Congress at once
to resolve itself into a committee of the whole, to take into
consideration the state of America.[28]
These proceedings were soon followed by another application on the part
of the Provincial Convention of Massachusetts, setting forth the
difficulties under which they were laboring for want of a regular form
of government; requesting explicit advice respecting the formation of a
new government; and offering to submit to such a general plan as the
Congress might direct for the colonies, or to endeavor to form such a
government for themselves as should not only promote their own
advantage, but the union and interest of the whole country.[29]
Placed in this manner at the head of American affairs, the Continental
Congress proceeded, at once, to put the country into a state of defence,
and virtually assumed a control over the military operations of all the
colonies. They appointed committees to prepare reports on military
measures: first, to recommend what posts should be occupied in the city
of New York; secondly, to devise ways and means for procuring ammunition
and military stores; thirdly, to make an estimate of the moneys
necessary to be raised; and fourthly, to prepare rules and regulations
for the government of the army.
They then proceeded to create a continental, or national army. To the
battle of Lexington had succeeded the investment of Boston, by an army
composed of regiments raised by the New England provinces, under the
command of General Ward of Massachusetts. This army was adopted by the
Congress; and, with other forces raised for the common defence, became
known and designated as the American Continental Army.[30] Six companies
of riflemen were ordered to be immediately raised in Pennsylvania, two
in Maryland, and two in Virginia, and directed to join the army near
Boston, and to be paid by the continent.[31]
On the 15th of June, 1775, Colonel George Washington, one of the
delegates in Congress from Virginia, was unanimously chosen to be
commander-in-chief of the continental forces.[32] Having accepted the
appointment, he received from the Congress a commission, together with a
resolution by which they pledged their lives and fortunes to maintain,
assist, and adhere to him in his great office, and a letter of
instructions, in which they charged him to make it his special care,
"that the liberties of America receive no detriment."[33] In the
commission given to the general, the style of "the United Colonies" was
for the first time adopted, and the defence of American Liberty was
assumed as the great object of their union.[34] On the 21st of June,
Washington left Philadelphia to take command of the army, and arrived at
Cambridge in Massachusetts on the 2d of July. Four major-generals and
eight brigadier-generals were also appointed by the Congress for the
continental army; rules and regulations for its government were adopted
and proclaimed, and the pay of the officers and privates was fixed.[35]
The Congress also proceeded, as the legislative authority of the United
Colonies, to create a continental currency, in order to defray the
expenses of the war. This was done by issuing two millions of dollars,
in bills of credit, for the redemption of which the faith of the
confederated colonies was pledged. A quota of this sum was apportioned
to each colony, and each colony was made liable to discharge its
proportion of the whole, but the United Colonies were obligated to pay
any part which either of the colonies should fail to discharge.[36] The
first of these quotas was made payable in four, the second in five, the
third in six, and the fourth in seven years from the last day of
November, 1775, and the provincial assemblies or conventions were
required, by the resolves of the Congress, to provide taxes in their
respective provinces or colonies, to discharge their several quotas.[37]
The Congress also directed reprisals to be made, both by public and
private armed vessels, against the ships and goods of the inhabitants of
Great Britain found on the high seas, or between high and low
water-mark; this being a measure of retaliation against an act of
Parliament, which had authorized the capture and condemnation of
American vessels, and which was considered equivalent to a declaration
of war. They also threw open the ports of the United Colonies to all
the world, except the dominions and dependencies of Great Britain.
Further, they established a general Treasury Department, by the
appointment of two joint Treasurers of the United Colonies, who were
required to give bonds for the faithful performance of the duties of
their office,[38] and they organized a general Post-Office, by the
appointment of a Postmaster-General for the United Colonies, to hold his
office at Philadelphia, to appoint deputies, and to establish a line of
posts from Falmouth in Massachusetts to Savannah in Georgia, with such
cross posts as he should judge proper.[39]
The proceedings of the Congress on the subject of the Militia were, of
course, in the nature of recommendations only. They advised the arming
and training of the militia of New York, in May, 1775,[40] and in July
they recommended to all the colonies to enroll all the able-bodied,
effective men among their inhabitants, between sixteen and fifty years
of age, and to form them into proper regiments.[41] The powers of the
Congress to call into the field the militia thus embodied were
considered to be subject to the consent of those exercising the
executive powers of government in the colony, for the time being.[42]
The relations of the country with the Indian tribes and nations were
deemed to be properly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress.
Three departments of Indian Affairs, Northern, Southern, and Middle,
with separate commissioners for each, were therefore established in
July, having power to treat with the Indians in the name and on behalf
of the United Colonies.[43] Negotiations and treaties were entered into
by these departments, and all affairs with the Indians were conducted by
them, under the direction and authority of the Congress.[44]
With regard to those inhabitants of the country who adhered to the
royalist side of the controversy, the Congress of 1775-6 did not assume
and exercise directly the powers of arrest or restraint, but left the
exercise of such powers to the provincial assemblies, or conventions,
and committees of safety, in the respective colonies, with
recommendations from time to time as to the mode in which such powers
ought to be exercised.[45]
Besides all this, the different applications made to the Congress by the
people of Massachusetts,[46] of New Hampshire,[47] of Virginia,[48] and
of South Carolina, concerning the proper exercise of the powers of
government in those colonies, and the answers to those applications,
furnish very important illustrations of the position in which the
Congress were placed. To the people of Massachusetts, they declared
that no obedience was due to the act of Parliament for altering their
charter, and that, as the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor would not
observe the directions of that instrument, but had endeavored to subvert
it, their offices ought to be considered vacant; and, as the Council was
actually vacant, in order to conform as near as might be to the spirit
and substance of the charter, they recommended to the Provincial
Convention to write letters to the inhabitants of the several towns
entitled to representation in the Assembly, requesting them to choose
representatives, and requesting the Assembly when chosen to elect
councillors; adding their wish, that these bodies should exercise the
powers of government until a Governor of the King's appointment would
consent to govern the colony according to its charter.[49] The
Provincial Conventions of New Hampshire, Virginia, and South Carolina
were advised to call a full and free representation of the people, in
order to establish such a form of government as, in their judgment,
would best promote the happiness of the people and most effectually
secure peace and good order in their Provinces, during the continuance
of the dispute with Great Britain.[50] This advice manifestly
contemplated the establishment of provisional governments only.
But between the date of these last proceedings and the following spring
a marked change took place, both in the expectations and wishes of the
people of most of the colonies, with regard to an accommodation of the
great controversy. The last petition of the Congress to the King was
refused a hearing in Parliament, as emanating from an unlawful assembly,
in arms against their sovereign. In November, the town of Falmouth in
Massachusetts was bombarded and destroyed by the King's cruisers. In the
latter part of December, an act was passed in Parliament, prohibiting
all trade and commerce with the colonies; warranting the capture and
condemnation of all American vessels, with their cargoes, and
authorizing the commanders of the King's ships to compel the masters,
crews, and other persons found in such vessels, to enter the King's
service. The act also empowered the King to appoint commissioners, with
authority to grant pardon, on submission, to individuals and to
colonies, and after such submission to exempt them from its
operation.[51] Great preparations were made to reduce the colonies to
the submission required by this act, and a part of the troops that were
to be employed were foreign mercenaries.
The necessity of a complete separation from the mother country, and the
establishment of independent governments, had, therefore, in the winter
of 1775-6, become apparent to the people of America. Accordingly, the
Congress, asserting it to be irreconcilable to reason and good
conscience for the people of the colonies any longer to take the oaths
and affirmations necessary for the support of any government under the
crown of Great Britain, and declaring that the exercise of every kind of
authority under that crown ought to be suppressed, and a government of
the people of the colonies substituted in its place, recommended to the
respective assemblies and conventions of the colonies, where no
government sufficient for the exigencies of their affairs had been
already established, to adopt such a government as in the opinion of the
representatives of the people would best conduce to the happiness and
safety of their constituents and of America in general.[52]
* * * * *
It is apparent, therefore, that, previously to the Declaration of
Independence, the people of the several colonies had established a
national government of a revolutionary character, which undertook to
act, and did act, in the name and with the general consent of the
inhabitants of the country. This government was established by the
union, in one body, of delegates representing the people of each colony;
who, after they had thus united for national purposes, proceeded, in
their respective jurisdictions, by means of conventions and other
temporary arrangements, to provide for their domestic concerns by the
establishment of local governments, which should be the successors of
that authority of the British crown which they had "everywhere
suppressed." The fact that these local or state governments were not
formed until a union of the people of the different colonies for
national purposes had already taken place, and until the national power
had authorized and recommended their establishment, is of great
importance in the constitutional history of this country; for it shows
that no colony, acting separately for itself, dissolved its own
allegiance to the British crown, but that this allegiance was dissolved
by the supreme authority of the people of all the colonies, acting
through their general agent, the Congress, and not only declaring that
the authority of Great Britain ought to be suppressed, but recommending
that each colony should supplant that authority by a local government,
to be framed by and for the people of the colony itself.
The powers exercised by the Congress, before the Declaration of
Independence, show, therefore, that its functions were those of a
revolutionary government. It is a maxim of political science, that, when
such a government has been instituted for the accomplishment of great
purposes of public safety, its powers are limited only by the
necessities of the case out of which they have arisen, and of the
objects for which they were to be exercised. When the acts of such a
government are acquiesced in by the people, they are presumed to have
been ratified by the people. To the case of our Revolution, these
principles are strictly applicable, throughout. The Congress assumed, at
once, the exercise of all the powers demanded by the public exigency,
and their exercise of those powers was fully acquiesced in and confirmed
by the people. It does not at all detract from the authoritative
character of their acts, nor diminish the real powers of the
Revolutionary Congress, that it was obliged to rely on local bodies for
the execution of most of its orders, or that it couched many of those
orders in the form of recommendations. They were complied with and
executed, in point of fact, by the provincial congresses, conventions,
and local committees, to such an extent as fully to confirm the
revolutionary powers of the Congress, as the guardians of the rights and
liberties of the country. But we shall see, in the further progress of
the history of the Congress, that while its powers remained entirely
revolutionary, and were consequently coextensive with the great national
objects to be accomplished, the want of the proper machinery of civil
government and of independent agents of its own rendered it wholly
incapable of wielding those powers successfully.
* * * * *
NOTE TO PAGE 33.
ON WASHINGTON'S APPOINTMENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
The circumstances which attended the appointment of
Washington to this great command are now quite well known. He
had been a member of the Congress of 1774, and his military
experience and accomplishments, and the great resources of
his character, had caused his appointment on all the
committees charged with making preparations for the defence
of the colonies. Returned as a delegate from Virginia to the
Congress of 1775, his personal qualifications pointed him out
as the fittest person in the whole country to be invested
with the command of any army which the United Colonies might
see fit to raise; and it is quite certain that there would
have been no hesitation about the appointment, if some
political considerations had not been suggested as obstacles.
At the moment when the choice was to be made, the scene of
actual operations was in Massachusetts, where an army
composed of troops wholly raised by the New England colonies,
and under the command of General Ward, of that Province, was
besieging the enemy in Boston. This army was to be adopted by
the Congress into the service of the continent, and serious
doubts were entertained by some of the members of the
Congress as to the policy of appointing a Southern general to
the command of it, and a good deal of delicacy was felt on
account of General Ward, who, it was thought, might consider
himself injured by such an appointment. On the other hand,
there were strong reasons for selecting a general-in-chief
from Virginia. That colony had taken the lead, among the
Southern provinces, in the cause of the continent, and the
appointment seemed to be due to her, if it was to be made
upon political considerations. The motives for this policy
were deemed sufficient to outweigh the objections arising
from the character and situation of the army which the
general would, in the first instance, have to command. But
after all, it cannot be doubted, that the preëminent
qualifications of Washington had far more weight with the
majority of the Congress, than any dictates of mere policy,
between one part of the Union and another, or any local
jealousies or sectional ambition.
Mr. John Adams, whose recently published autobiography
contains some statements on this subject, speaks of the
existence of a Southern party against a Northern, and a
jealousy against a New England army under the command of a
New England general, which, he says, he discovered after the
Congress had been some time in session, and after the
necessity of having an army and a general had become a topic
of conversation. (Works, II. 415.) In a letter, also, written
by Mr. Adams in 1822 to Timothy Pickering, he states that, on
the journey to Philadelphia, he and a party of his
colleagues, the delegates from Massachusetts to this
Congress, were met at Frankfort by Dr. Rush, Mr. Mifflin, Mr.
Bayard, and others of the Philadelphia patriots, who desired
a conference with them; that, in this conference, the
Philadelphia gentlemen strongly advised the Massachusetts
delegates not to come forward with bold measures, or to
endeavor to take the lead; and represented that Virginia was
the most populous State in the Union, proud of its ancient
dominions, and that "they [the Virginians] think they have a
right to take the lead, and the Southern States, and the
Middle States, too, are too much disposed to yield it to
them."
"I must confess," says Mr. Adams, "that there appeared so
much wisdom and good sense in this, that it made a deep
impression on my mind, and it had an equal effect on all my
colleagues." "This conversation," he continues, "and the
principles, facts, and motives suggested in it, have given a
color, complexion, and character to the whole policy of the
United States from that day to this. _Without it, Mr.
Washington would never have commanded our armies_; nor Mr.
Jefferson have been the author of the Declaration of
Independence; nor Mr. Richard Henry Lee the mover of it; nor
Mr. Chase the mover of foreign connections. _If I have ever
had cause to repent of any part of this policy, that
repentance ever has been and ever will be unavailing._ I had
forgot to say, nor had Mr. Johnson ever have been the
nominator of Washington for general." (Works, II. 512, 513.)
Without impeaching the accuracy of Mr. Adams's recollection,
on the score of his age when this letter was written, and
without considering here how or why Mr. Jefferson came to be
the author of the Declaration of Independence, it is believed
that Mr. Adams states other facts, in his autobiography,
sufficient to show that motives of policy towards Virginia
were _not_ the sole or the principal reasons why Washington
was elected general. Mr. Adams states in his autobiography,
that at the time when he observed the professed jealousy of
the South against a New England army under the command of a
Northern general, it was very visible to him "that Colonel
Washington was their object"; "and," he adds, "so many of our
stanchest men were in the plan, that we could carry nothing
without conceding it." (Works, II. 415.) When Mr. Adams came,
as he afterwards did, to put himself at the head of this
movement, and to propose in Congress that the army at
Cambridge should be adopted, and that a general should be
appointed, he referred directly to Washington as the person
whom he had in his mind, and spoke of him as "a gentleman
from Virginia who was among us and very well known to all of
us, a gentleman whose skill and experience as an officer,
whose independent fortune, great talents, and excellent
universal character, would command the approbation of all
America, and unite the cordial exertions of all the colonies
better than any other person in the Union. Mr. Washington,
who happened to sit near the door, as soon as he heard me
allude to him, from his usual modesty, darted into the
library-room." (Works, II. 417.) It is quite clear,
therefore, that Mr. Adams put the appointment of Washington,
in public, upon his qualifications and character, known all
over the Union. He further states, that the subject came
under debate, and that nobody opposed the appointment of
Washington on account of any personal objection to him; and
the only objection which he mentions as having been raised,
was on the ground that the army near Boston was all from New
England, and that they had a general of their own, with whom
they were entirely satisfied. He mentions one of the Virginia
delegates, Mr. Pendleton, as concurring in this objection;
that Mr. Sherman of Connecticut and Mr. Cushing of
Massachusetts also concurred in it, and that Mr. Paine of
Massachusetts expressed strong personal friendship for
General Ward, but gave no opinion upon the question.
Afterwards, he says, the subject being postponed to a future
day, "pains were taken out of doors to obtain a unanimity,
and the voices were generally so clearly in favor of
Washington, that the dissentient members were persuaded to
withdraw their opposition, and Mr. Washington was nominated,
I believe, by Mr. Thomas Johnson of Maryland, unanimously
elected, and the army adopted." (Ibid.)
It is worth while to inquire, therefore, what were the
controlling reasons, which so easily and so soon produced
this striking unanimity. If it was brought about mainly by
the exertions of a Southern against a Northern party, and by
the yielding of Northern men to the Virginians from motives
of policy, it would not have been accomplished with so much
facility, although even a Washington were the candidate of
Virginia. Sectional jealousies and sectional parties inflame
each other; the struggles which they cause are protracted;
and the real merits of men and things are lost sight of in
the passions which they arouse. If policy, as a leading or a
principal motive, gave to General Washington the great body
of the Northern votes, there would have been more
dissentients from that policy than any of the accounts
authorize us to suppose there were, at any moment, while the
subject was under consideration. Nor does the previous
conduct of Virginia warrant the belief, that her subsequent
exertions in the cause of American liberty were mainly
purchased by the honors bestowed upon her great men, or by so
much of precedence as was yielded in the public councils to
the unquestionable abilities of her statesmen. Some of them
had undoubtedly been in favor of measures of conciliation to
a late period; and some of them, as Washington, Patrick
Henry, and Richard Henry Lee, had been, from an early period,
convinced that the sword must decide the controversy. They
were perhaps as much divided upon this point, until the army
at Boston was adopted, as the leading men of other colonies.
But when the necessity of that measure became apparent, it
was the peculiar happiness of Virginia to be able to present
to the country, as a general, a man whose character and
qualifications threw all local and political objects at once
into the shade. In order to form a correct judgment, at the
present day, of the motives which must have produced a
unanimity so remarkable and so prompt, we have only to
recollect the previous history of Washington, as it was known
to the Congress, at the moment when he shrank from the
mention of his name in that assembly.
He was forty-three years of age. From early youth, he had had
a training that eminently fitted him for the great part which
he was afterwards to play, and which unfolded the singular
capacities of his character to meet the extraordinary
emergencies of the post to which he was subsequently called.
That training had been both in military and in civil life.
His military career had been one of much activity and
responsibility, and had embraced several brilliant
achievements. In 1751, it became necessary to put the militia
of Virginia in a condition to defend the frontiers against
the French and the Indians. The province was divided into
military districts, in each of which an adjutant-general,
with the rank of major, was commissioned to drill and inspect
the militia. Washington, at the age of nineteen, received the
appointment to one of these districts; and in the following
year, the province was again divided into four grand military
divisions, of which the northern was assigned to him as
adjutant-general. In 1753, the French crossed the lakes, to
establish posts on the Ohio, and were joined by the Indians.
Major Washington was sent by the Governor of Virginia to warn
them to retire. This expedition was one of difficulty and of
delicacy. He crossed the Alleghany Mountains, reached the
Ohio, had interviews with the French commander and the
Indians, and returned to Williamsburg to make report to the
Governor. Of this journey, full of perilous adventures and
narrow escapes, he kept a journal, which was published by the
Governor; was copied into most of the newspapers of the other
colonies; and was reprinted in London, as a document of much
importance, exhibiting the views and designs of the French.
In 1754, he was appointed, with the rank of
lieutenant-colonel, second in command of the provincial
troops raised by the Legislature to repel the French
invasion. On the first encounter with a party of the enemy
under Jumonville, on the 28th of May, 1754, the chief command
devolved on Washington, in the absence of his superior. The
French leader was killed, and most of his party were taken
prisoners. Washington commanded also at the battle of the
Great Meadows, and received a vote of thanks for his services
from the House of Burgesses. This was in 1754, when he was at
the age of twenty-two. During the next year, in consequence
of the effect of some new arrangement of the provincial
troops, he was reduced from the rank of colonel to that of
captain, and thereupon retired from the army, with the
consolation that he had received the thanks of his country
for the services he had rendered. In 1755, he consented to
serve as aide-de-camp to General Braddock, who had arrived
from England with two regiments of regular troops. In this
capacity he served in the battle of the Monongahela with much
distinction. The two other aids were wounded and disabled
early in the action, and the duty of distributing the
General's orders devolved wholly upon Washington. It was in
this battle that he acquired with the Indians the reputation
of being under the special protection of the Great Spirit,
because he escaped the aim of many of their rifles, although
two horses were shot under him, and his dress was perforated
by four bullets. His conduct on this occasion became known
and celebrated throughout the country; and when he retired to
Mount Vernon, as he did soon after, at the age of
three-and-twenty, he not only carried with him a decisive
reputation for personal bravery, but he was known to have
given advice to Braddock, before the action, which all men
saw, after it, would, if it had been duly heeded, have
prevented his defeat. But he was not allowed to remain long
in retirement. In August, 1755, he was appointed
commander-in-chief of all the provincial forces of Virginia,
and immediately entered upon the duties of reorganizing the
old and raising new troops, in the course of which he visited
all the outposts along the frontier. Soon afterwards, a
dispute about rank having arisen with a person who claimed to
take precedence of provincial officers because he had
formerly held the King's commission, it became necessary for
Colonel Washington to make a visit to Boston, in order to
have the point decided by General Shirley, the
commander-in-chief of his Majesty's armies in America. He
commenced his journey on the 4th of February, 1756, and
passed through Philadelphia, New York, New London, Newport,
and Providence, and visited the Governors of Pennsylvania and
New York. In all the principal cities his character, and his
remarkable escape at Braddock's defeat, made him the object
of a strong public interest. At Boston, he was received with
marked distinction by General Shirley and by the whole
society of the town, and the question of rank was decided
according to his wishes. General Shirley explained to him the
intended operations of the next campaign; and, after an
absence from Virginia of seven weeks, he returned to resume
his command. The next three years were spent in the duties of
this laborious and responsible position, the difficulties and
embarrassments of which bore a strong resemblance to those
which he afterwards had to encounter in the war of the
Revolution. In 1758, he commanded the Virginia troops in the
expedition against Fort Duquesne, under General Forbes. Great
deference was paid by that officer to his opinions and
judgment, in arranging the line of march and order of battle,
on this important expedition; for the fate of Braddock was
before him. The command of the advanced division, consisting
of one thousand men, was assigned to him, with the temporary
rank of brigadier. When the army had approached within fifty
miles of Fort Duquesne, the French deserted it; its
surrender to the English closed the campaign; and in December
Washington resigned his commission, and retired to Mount
Vernon. What he had been, and what he then was, to the Colony
of Virginia, is shown by the Address presented to him by the
officers of the provincial troops, on his retirement. "In our
earliest infancy," said they, "you took us under your
tuition, trained us up in the practice of that discipline
which alone can constitute good troops, from the punctual
observance of which you never suffered the least deviation.
Your steady adherence to impartial justice, your quick
discernment, and invariable regard to merit, wisely intended
to inculcate those genuine sentiments of true honor and
passion for glory, from which the greatest military
achievements have been derived, first heightened our natural
emulation and our desire to excel. How much we improved by
those regulations and your own example, with what alacrity we
have hitherto discharged our duty, with what cheerfulness we
have encountered the severest toils, especially while under
your particular directions, we submit to yourself, and
flatter ourselves that we have in a great measure answered
your expectations.... It gives us additional sorrow, when we
reflect, to find our unhappy country will receive a loss no
less irreparable than our own. Where will it meet a man so
experienced in military affairs, one so renowned for
patriotism, conduct, and courage? Who has so great a
knowledge of the enemy we have to deal with? Who so well
acquainted with their situation and strength? Who so much
respected by the soldiery? Who, in short, so able to support
the military character of Virginia? Your approved love to
your King and country, and your uncommon perseverance in
promoting the honor and true interest of the service,
convince us that the most cogent reasons only could induce
you to quit it; yet we, with the greatest deference, presume
to entreat you to suspend those thoughts for another year,
and to lead us on to assist in the glorious work of
extirpating our enemies, towards which so considerable
advances have already been made. In you we place the most
implicit confidence. Your presence only will cause a steady
firmness and vigor to actuate every breast, despising the
greatest dangers, and thinking light of toils and hardships,
while led on by the man we know and love. But if we must be
so unhappy as to part, if the exigencies of your affairs
force you to abandon us, we beg it as our last request, that
you will recommend some person most capable to command, whose
military knowledge, whose honor, whose conduct, and whose
disinterested principles we may depend on. Frankness,
sincerity, and a certain openness of soul, are the true
characteristics of an officer, and we flatter ourselves that
you do not think us capable of saying any thing contrary to
the purest dictates of our minds. Fully persuaded of this, we
beg leave to assure you, that, as you have hitherto been the
actuating soul of our whole corps, we shall at all times pay
the most invariable regard to your will and pleasure, and
shall be always happy to demonstrate by our actions with how
much respect and esteem we are," &c.
Washington's marriage took place soon after his resignation
(January 6th, 1759), and his civil life now commenced. He had
been elected a member of the House of Burgesses, before the
close of the campaign, and in the course of the winter he
took his seat. Upon this occasion, his inability, from
confusion and modesty, to reply to a highly eulogistic
address made to him by the Speaker, Mr. Robinson, drew from
that gentleman the celebrated compliment, "Sit down, Mr.
Washington, your modesty equals your valor, and that
surpasses the power of any language that I possess." He
continued a member of the House of Burgesses until the
commencement of the Revolution, a period of fifteen years. He
was not a frequent speaker; but his sound judgment, quick
perception, and firmness and sincerity of character, gave him
an influence which the habit of much speaking does not give,
and which is often denied to eloquence. As the time drew
near, when the controversies between the colonies and England
began to assume a threatening aspect, he was naturally found
with Henry, Randolph, Lee, Wythe, and Mason, and the other
patriotic leaders of the colonies. His views concerning the
policy of the non-importation agreements were early formed
and made known. In 1769, he took charge of the Articles of
Association, drawn by Mr. Mason, which were intended to bring
about a concert of action between all the colonies, for the
purpose of presenting them to the Assembly, of which Mr.
Mason was not a member. In 1774, he was chosen a member of
the first Virginia Convention, and was by that body elected a
delegate to the first Continental Congress, where he was
undoubtedly the most conspicuous person present. The second
Virginia Convention met in March, 1775, and reflected the
former delegates to the second Continental Congress, from
which Washington was removed by his appointment as
Commander-in-chief.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that Washington was chosen
Commander-in-chief for his unquestionable merits, and not as
a compromise between sectional interests and local
jealousies.
(The authorities for the statements in this note concerning
Washington's history are the biographies by Marshall and
Sparks, and the Writings of Washington, edited by the
latter.)
FOOTNOTES:
[24] Peyton Randolph, President of the first and reëlected President of
the second Congress, died very suddenly at Philadelphia on the 22d of
October, 1775, and was succeeded in that office by John Hancock. Mr.
Randolph was one of the most eminent of the Virginia patriots, and an
intimate friend of Washington. Richard Henry Lee wrote to Washington, on
the day after his death, that "in him American liberty lost a powerful
advocate, and human nature a sincere friend." He was formerly
Attorney-General of Virginia, and in 1753 went to England as agent of
the House of Burgesses, to procure the abolition of a fee, known as the
pistole fee, which it had been the custom of the Governors of Virginia
to charge for signing land patents, as a perquisite of their office. He
succeeded in getting the fee abolished in cases where the quantity of
land exceeded one hundred acres. He was commander of a company of
mounted volunteers called the Gentlemen Associators, who served in the
French war. He was President of the Virginia Convention, as well as a
Delegate in Congress, at the time of his death. Sparks's Washington, II.
58, 161; III. 139, 140; XII. 420.
[25] In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, they were made in
December; in Connecticut, in November; in New Jersey, in January; in
South Carolina, in February; in the Lower Counties on Delaware and in
Virginia, in March; in North Carolina, on the 5th of April; and in New
York, on the 22d of April.
[26] Virginia renewed her delegation for one year from the 11th of
August, 1775, and Maryland hers with powers to act until the 25th of
March, 1776. These new delegations, as well as that of Georgia, appeared
on the 13th of September, 1775. On the 16th of September, a renewed
delegation appeared from New Hampshire, without limitation of time;
Connecticut sent a new delegation on the 16th of January, 1776, and
Massachusetts did the same on the 31st of January, for the year 1776.
The persons of the delegates were not often changed.
[27] Journals, I. 81, 82.
[28] May 15, 1775. Journals, I. 162.
[29] Journals, I. 112.
[30] Form of enlistment, Journals, I. 118.
[31] Ibid.
[32] See note at end of the chapter.
[33] Secret Journals of Congress, I. 18; Pitkin's History of the United
States, I. 334, 335.
[34] Journals, I. 122.
[35] June 16-July 4, 1775. Journals, I. 112-133.
[36] Journals, I. 125, June 23, 1775. Ibid., I. 185, July 29, 1775.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Journals, I. 186, July 29, 1775. Michael Hillegas and George
Clymer, Esquires, were elected Treasurers.
[39] Journals, I. 177, 178, July 26, 1775. Dr. Franklin was elected
Postmaster-General for one year, and until another should be appointed
by a future Congress.
[40] Journals, I. 106.
[41] Journals, I. 170.
[42] Journals, I. 285.
[43] Journals, I. 161, 162.
[44] Journals, II. 112, 141, 163, 201, 255, 302, 304.
[45] Journals, I. 213; II. 5.
[46] June 9, 1775.
[47] November 3, 1775.
[48] December 4, 1775.
[49] Journals, I. 115.
[50] Journals, I. 231, 235, 279.
[51] Annual Register.
[52] May 10, 1776. Journals, II. 166, 174.
CHAPTER III.
1776-1777.
CONTINUANCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.--DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE.--PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT.--FORMATION OF THE
CONTINENTAL ARMY.
On the 7th of June, 1776, after the Congress had in fact assumed and
exercised sovereign powers with the assent of the people of America, a
resolution was moved by Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, and seconded by
John Adams of Massachusetts, "That these United Colonies are, and of
right ought to be, free and independent states; and that all political
connection between them and the state of Great Britain is and ought to
be totally suppressed."[53] This resolution was referred to a committee
of the whole, and was debated until the 10th, when it was adopted in
committee. On the same day, a committee, consisting of five members,[54]
was instructed to prepare a declaration "that these United Colonies are,
and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are
absolved from all allegiance to the British crown; and that all
political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and
ought to be, dissolved." The resolution introduced by Mr. Lee on the
7th was postponed until the 1st of July, to give time for greater
unanimity among the members, and to enable the people of the colonies to
instruct and influence their delegates.
The postponement was immediately followed by proceedings in the
colonies, in most of which the delegates in Congress were either
instructed or authorized to vote for the resolution of Independence; and
on the 2d of July that resolution received the assent in Congress of all
the colonies, excepting Pennsylvania and Delaware. The Declaration of
Independence was reported by the committee, who had been instructed to
prepare it, on the 28th of June, and on the 4th of July it received the
vote of every colony, and was published to the world.[55]
This celebrated instrument, regarded as a legislative proceeding, was
the solemn enactment, by the representatives of all the colonies, of a
complete dissolution of their allegiance to the British crown. It
severed the political connection between the people of this country and
the people of England, and at once erected the different colonies into
free and independent states. The body by which this step was taken
constituted the actual government of the nation, at the time, and its
members had been directly invested with competent legislative power to
take it, and had also been specially instructed to do so. The
consequences flowing from its adoption were, that the local allegiance
of the inhabitants of each colony became transferred and due to the
colony itself, or, as it was expressed by the Congress, became due to
the laws of the colony, from which they derived protection;[56] that the
people of the country became thenceforth the rightful sovereign of the
country; that they became united in a national corporate capacity, as
one people; that they could thereafter enter into treaties and contract
alliances with foreign nations, could levy war and conclude peace, and
do all other acts pertaining to the exercise of a national sovereignty;
and finally, that, in their national corporate capacity, they became
known and designated as the United States of America. This Declaration
was the first national state paper in which these words were used as the
style and title of the nation. In the enacting part of the instrument,
the Congress styled themselves "the representatives of the United States
of America in general Congress assembled"; and from that period, the
previously "United Colonies" have been known as a political community,
both within their own borders and by the other nations of the world, by
the title which they then assumed.[57]
On the same day on which the committee for preparing the Declaration of
Independence was appointed, another committee, consisting of one member
from each colony, was directed "to prepare and digest the form of a
confederation to be entered into between these colonies." This committee
reported a draft of Articles of Confederation, on the 12th of July,
which were debated in Congress on several occasions between that day and
the 20th of August of the same year, at which time a new draft was
reported, and ordered to be printed. The subject was not again resumed,
until the 8th of April, 1777; but, between that date and the 15th of the
following November, sundry amendments were discussed and adopted, and
the whole of the articles, as amended, were printed for the use of the
Congress and the State Legislatures. On the 17th of November, a circular
letter was reported and adopted, to be addressed to the Legislatures of
the thirteen States, recommending to them "to invest the delegates of
the State with competent powers, ultimately, in the name and behalf of
the State, to subscribe Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union of
the United States, and to attend Congress for that purpose on or before
the 10th day of March next."[58]
A year and five months had thus elapsed, between the agitation of the
subject of a new form of national government, and the adoption and
recommendation of a form, by the Congress, for the consideration of the
States.[59] During this interval, the affairs of the country were
administered by the Revolutionary Congress, which had been instituted,
originally, for the purpose of obtaining redress peaceably from the
British ministry, but which afterwards became _de facto_ the government
of the country, for all the purposes of revolution and independence. In
order to appreciate the objects of the Confederation, the obstacles
which it had to encounter, and the mode in which those obstacles were
finally overcome, it is necessary here to take a brief survey of the
national affairs during the period beginning with the commencement of
the war and the Declaration of Independence, and extending to the date
of the submission of the Articles of Confederation to the State
Legislatures. From no point of view can so much instruction be derived,
as from the position in which Washington stood, during this period. By
following the fortunes and appreciating the exertions of him who had
been charged with the great military duty of achieving the liberties of
the country, and especially by observing his relations with the
government that had undertaken the war, we can best understand the
fitness of that government for the great task to which it had been
called.
The continental government, which commissioned and sent General
Washington to take the command of the army which it had adopted,
consisted solely of a body of delegates, chosen to represent the people
of the several colonies or states, for certain purposes of national
defence, safety, redress, and revolution. When the war had actually
commenced, and the United Colonies were engaged in waging it, the
Congress possessed, theoretically and rightfully, large political
powers, of a vague revolutionary nature; but practically, they had
little direct civil power, either legislative or executive. They were
obliged to rely almost wholly on the legislatures, provincial congresses
and committees, or other local bodies of the several colonies or states,
to carry out their plans. When Washington arrived at Cambridge and found
the army then encamped around Boston in a state requiring it to be
entirely remodelled, he came as the general of a government which could
do little more for him than recommend him to the Provincial Congress, to
the Committee of Safety, and to the prominent citizens of Massachusetts
Bay. The people of the United States, at the present day, surrounded by
the apparatus of national power, can form some idea of Washington's
position, and of that of the government which he served, from the fact
that, when he left Philadelphia to take the command of the army, he
requested the Massachusetts delegates to recommend to him bodies of men
and respectable individuals, to whom he might apply, to get done,
through voluntary coöperation, what was absolutely essential to the
existence of that army.[60] In truth, the whole of his residence in
Massachusetts during the summer of 1775, and the winter of 1775-6, until
he saw the British fleet go down the harbor of Boston, was filled with
complicated difficulties, which sprang from the nature of the
revolutionary government and the defects in its civil machinery, far
more than from any and all other causes. These difficulties required the
exertion of great intellectual and physical energy, the application of
consummate prudence and forecast, and the patience and fortitude which
in him were so happily combined with power. They would have broken down
many of the greatest generals whom the world has seen; but it is our
good fortune to be able to look back upon his efforts to encounter them
as among the more prominent and striking manifestations of the strength
of Washington's mind and character, and as among the most valuable
proofs of what we owe to him.
On the one side of him was the body of delegates, sitting at
Philadelphia, by whom he had been commissioned, who constituted the
government of America, and from whom every direction, order, or
requisition, concerning national affairs, necessarily proceeded. On the
other side were the Provincial Congresses, and other public bodies of
the New England colonies, on whom he and the Congress were obliged to
rely for the execution of their plans. He was compelled to become the
director of this complicated machinery. There were committees of the
Congress, charged with the different branches of the public service; but
General Washington was obliged to attend personally to every detail, and
to suggest, to urge, and to entreat action upon all the subjects that
concerned the army and the campaign. His letters, addressed to the
President of Congress, were read in that body, and votes or resolutions
were passed to give effect to his requests or recommendations. But this
was not enough. Having obtained the proper order or requisition, he was
next obliged to see that it was executed by the local bodies or
magistrates, with whom he not infrequently was forced to discuss the
whole subject anew. He met with great readiness of attention, and every
disposition to make things personally convenient and agreeable to him;
but he found, as he has recorded, a vital and inherent principle of
delay, incompatible with military service, in the necessity he was under
to transact business through such numerous and different channels.[61]
His applications to the Governor of Connecticut for hunting-shirts for
the army;[62] to the Governor of Rhode Island for powder;[63] to the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress to apprehend deserters and to furnish
supplies;[64] and to the New York Provincial Congress to prevent their
citizens from trading with the enemy in Boston,[65]--together with the
earnest appeals which he was obliged to make on these and many other
subjects, which should never have been permitted to embarrass
him,--show how feeble were the powers and how defective was the
machinery of the government which he served.
But there are two or three topics which it will be necessary to examine
more particularly, in order fully to understand the character and
working of the revolutionary government. The first of these is the
formation of the army.
In order to carry on a war of any duration, it is the settled result of
all experience, that the soldier should be bound to serve for a period
long enough to insure discipline and skill, and should be under the
influence of motives which look to substantial pecuniary rewards, as
well as those founded on patriotism. According to Washington's
experience, this is as true of officers as it is of common soldiers; and
undoubtedly no army can be formed, and kept long enough in the field to
be relied upon for the accomplishment of great purposes, if these maxims
are neglected in its organization.
Unfortunately, the Revolutionary Congress, at the very commencement of
the war, committed the serious error of enlisting soldiers for short
periods. When Washington arrived at Cambridge, the army which the
Congress had just adopted as the continental establishment consisted of
certain regiments, raised on the spur of the moment by the provinces of
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut; acting
under their respective officers; regulated by their own militia laws;
and, with the exception of those from Massachusetts, under no legal
obligation to obey the general then in command. The terms of service of
most of these men would expire in the autumn; and as they had enlisted
under their local governments for a special object, and had not been in
service long enough to have merged their habits of thinking and feeling,
as New England citizens, in the character of soldiers, they denied the
power of their own governments or of the Congress to transfer them into
another service, or to retain them after their enlistments had
expired.[66] The army was therefore to be entirely remodelled; or, to
speak more correctly, an army was to be formed, by making enlistments
under the Articles of War which had been adopted by the Congress, and by
organizing new regiments and brigades under officers holding continental
commissions. But the greatest difficulties had to be encountered in this
undertaking. The continental Articles of War required a longer term of
service than any of these troops had originally engaged for, and the
rules and regulations were far more stringent than the discipline to
which they had hitherto been subjected. There was, moreover, great
reluctance, on the part of both officers and men, to serve in regiments
consisting of the inhabitants of different colonies. A Connecticut
captain would not serve under a Massachusetts colonel; a Massachusetts
colonel was unwilling to command Rhode Island men; and the men were
equally indisposed to serve under officers from another colony, or under
any officers, in fact, but those of their own choosing.[67]
In this state of things, a committee, consisting of Dr. Franklin, Mr.
Lynch, and Colonel Harrison, was sent by the Congress to confer with
General Washington and with the local governments of the New England
colonies, on the most effectual method of continuing, supporting, and
regulating a continental army.[68] This committee arrived at Cambridge
on the 18th of October, and sat until the 24th.[69] They rendered very
important services to the commander-in-chief, in the organization of the
army; but in forming this first military establishment of the Union, the
strange error was committed by the Congress, of enlisting the men for
the term of one year only, if not sooner discharged;--a capital mistake,
the consequences of which were severely felt throughout the whole war.
There is no reason to suppose that General Washington concurred in the
expediency of such short enlistments, then or at any other time; but he
was obliged to yield to the pressure of the causes to which the mistake
is fairly to be attributed. In fact, we find him, in a short time after
the new system had been put into operation, pointing it out as a fatal
error, in a letter to the President of Congress.[70] The error may have
been owing to the character of the government, to the opinions and
prejudices prevailing in Congress, and to the delusive idea, which still
lingered in the minds of many of the members, that, although the sword
had been drawn, the scabbard was not wholly thrown aside, and that they
should be able to coerce the British ministry into a redress of
grievances, which might be followed by a restoration of the relations
between the colonies and the mother country, upon a constitutional
basis. No such idea was entertained by Washington, from the beginning.
He entertained no thought of accommodation, after the measures adopted
in consequence of the battle of Bunker's Hill.
But at the time of which we are treating, the issue had not been made,
as Washington would have made it; and, when we consider the state of
things before the Declaration of Independence was adopted, and look
attentively at the objects for which the Congress had been assembled,
and at the nature of their powers, we may perceive how they came to make
the mistake of not organizing a military establishment on a more
permanent footing.
The delegates to the first Congress were, as we have seen, sent with
instructions, which were substantially the same in all the colonies.
These instructions, in some instances, looked to "a redress of
grievances," and in others, to "the recovery and establishment of the
just rights and liberties of the colonies"; and the delegates were
directed "to deliberate upon wise and proper measures, to be by them
recommended to all the colonies," for the attainment of these objects.
But with this was coupled the declared object of a "restoration of union
and harmony" upon "constitutional principles." We have seen how far this
body proceeded towards a revolution. The second, or Revolutionary
Congress, was composed of delegates who were originally assembled under
similar instructions; but the conflict of arms that had already taken
place, between the times of their respective appointments and the date
of their meeting, had materially changed the posture of affairs. Powers
of a revolutionary nature had been cast upon them, by the force of
circumstances; and when they finally resolved to take the field, the
character of those powers, as understood and acted upon by themselves,
is illustrated by the commission which they issued to their
General-in-chief, which embraced in its scope the whole vast object of
"the defence of American liberty, and the repelling every hostile
invasion thereof," by force of arms, and "by the rules and discipline of
war, as herewith given."
It is obvious, therefore, that, at the time when the first continental
army was to be formed, the powers of the national government were very
broad, although vague and uncertain. There seems to have been no reason,
upon principle, why they should not have adopted decrees, to be executed
by their own immediate agents, and by their own direct force. But a
practical difficulty embarrassed and almost annulled this theoretical
and rightful power. The government of the Congress rested on no
definite, legislative faculty. When they came to a resolution, or vote,
it constituted only a voluntary compact, to which the people of each
colony pledged themselves, by their delegates, as to a treaty, but which
depended for its observance entirely on the patriotism and good faith of
the colony itself. No means existed of compelling obedience from a
delinquent colony, and the government was not one which could operate
directly upon individuals, unless it assumed the full exercise of powers
derived from the revolutionary objects at which it aimed. These powers
were not assumed and exercised to their full extent, for reasons
peculiar to the situation of the country, and to the character, habits,
and feelings of the people.
The people of the colonies had indeed sent their delegates to a
Congress, to consult and determine upon the measures necessary to be
adopted, in order to assert and maintain their rights. But they had
never been accustomed to any machinery of government, or legislation,
other than that existing in their own separate jurisdictions. They had
imparted to the Congress no proper legislative authority, and no civil
powers, except those of a revolutionary character. This revolutionary
government was therefore entirely without civil executive officers,
fundamental laws, or control over individuals; and the union of the
colonies, so far as a union had taken place, was one from which any
colony could withdraw at any time, without violating any legal
obligation.
In addition to this, the popular feeling on the subject of the
grievances existing, and of the measures that ought to be taken for
redress, was quite different in the different colonies, before the
Declaration of Independence was adopted. The leading patriotic or Whig
colonies made common cause with each other, with great spirit and
energy, and the more lukewarm followed, but with unequal steps.[71]
Virginia had, upon the whole, less to complain of than Massachusetts;
but she adopted the whole quarrel of her Northern sister, with the
firmness of her Washington and the ardor of her Henry. New York, on the
other hand, for a considerable period, and down to the month of January,
1775, stood nearly divided between the Whigs and the Tories, and did not
choose its delegates to the second Congress until the 20th of
April,--twenty days only before that body assembled.[72]
One of the most striking illustrations, both of the character of the
revolutionary government and of the state of the country, is presented
by the proceedings respecting the Loyalists, or, as they were called,
the Tories. This is not the place to consider whether the American
Loyalists were right or wrong in adhering to the crown. Ample justice is
likely to be done, in American history, to the characters and motives of
those among them whose characters and motives were pure. From a sense of
duty, or from cupidity, or from some motive, good or bad, they made
their election to adhere to the public enemy; and they were, therefore,
rightfully classed, according to their personal activity and importance,
among the enemies of the country, by those whose business it was to
conduct its affairs and to fight its battles. General Washington was, at
a very early period, of opinion, that the most decisive steps ought to
be taken with these persons; and he seems at first to have acted as if
it belonged, as in fact it did properly belong, to the commander of the
continental forces to determine when and how they should be arrested. He
first had occasion to act upon the subject in November, 1775, when he
sent Colonel Palfrey, one of his aids, into New Hampshire, with orders
to seize every officer of the royal government, who had given proofs of
an unfriendly disposition to the American cause, and when he had secured
them, to take the opinion of the Provincial Congress, or Committee of
Safety, in what manner to dispose of them in that Province.[73]
Early in the month of January, 1776, General Washington was led to
suppose that the enemy were about to send from Boston a secret
expedition by water, for the purpose of taking possession of the city of
New York; and it was believed that a body of Tories on Long Island,
where they were numerous, were about rising, to join the enemy's forces
on their arrival. While Washington was deliberating whether he should be
warranted in sending an expedition to check this movement and to prevent
the city from falling into the hands of the enemy, without first
applying to Congress for a special authority, he received a letter from
Major-General Charles Lee, offering to go into Connecticut, to raise
volunteers, and to march to the neighborhood of New York, for the
purpose of securing the city and suppressing the anticipated
insurrection of the Tories.[74] He was inclined to adopt Lee's
suggestion, but doubted whether he had power to disarm the people of an
entire district, as a military measure, without the action of the civil
authority of the Province. Upon this point, he consulted Mr. John Adams,
who was then attending the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts. Mr.
Adams gave it, unhesitatingly, as his clear opinion, that the commission
of the Commander-in-chief extended to the objects proposed in General
Lee's letter; and he reminded General Washington, that it vested in him
full power and authority to act as he should think for the good and
welfare of the service.[75] Lee was thereupon authorized to raise
volunteers and to proceed to the city of New York, which he was
instructed to prevent from falling into the hands of the enemy, by
putting it into the best posture of defence and by disarming all persons
upon Long Island and elsewhere, (and, if necessary, by otherwise
securing them,) whose conduct and declarations had rendered them justly
suspected of designs unfriendly to the views of the Congress.[76] At the
same time, General Washington wrote to the Committee of Safety of New
York, informing them of the instructions which he had given to General
Lee, and requesting their assistance; but without placing Lee under
their authority.[77]
* * * * *
It happened, that at this time, while Washington was considering the
expediency of sending this expedition, the Congress had under
consideration the subject of disarming the Tories in Queen's County,
Long Island, where the people had refused to elect members to the
Provincial Convention.[78] Two battalions of minute-men had been ordered
to enter that county, at its opposite sides, on the same day, and to
disarm every inhabitant who had voted against choosing members to the
Convention.[79] A part of these orders were suddenly countermanded, and
in place of the minute-men from Connecticut, three companies were
ordered to be detailed for this service from the command of Lord
Stirling. This change in the original plan was made on the 10th of
January; and when Washington received notice of it from Lee, he seems to
have understood it as an abandonment of the whole scheme of the
expedition,--a course which he deeply regretted.[80] He thought, that
the period had arrived when nothing less than the most decisive measures
ought to be pursued; that the enemies of the country were sufficiently
numerous on the other side of the Atlantic, and that it was highly
important to have as few internal ones as possible. But supposing that
Congress had changed their determination, he directed Lee to disband his
troops so soon as circumstances would in his judgment admit of it.[81]
Lee was at this time at Stamford in Connecticut, with a body of about
twelve hundred men, whom he had raised in that colony, preparing to
march to New York to execute the different purposes for which he had
been detached. On the 22d of January,--the day before the date of
General Washington's letter to him directing him to disband his
forces,--he had written to the President of Congress, urging in the
strongest terms the expediency of seizing and disarming the Tories;[82]
and he immediately communicated to Washington the fact of his having
done so. Washington wrote again on the 30th, informing Lee that General
Clinton had gone from Boston on some expedition with four or five
hundred men; that there was reason to believe that this expedition had
been sent on the application of Tryon, the royal Governor of New York,
who, with a large body of the inhabitants, would probably join it; and
that the Tories ought, therefore, to be disarmed at once, and the
principal persons among them seized. He also expressed the hope that
Congress would empower General Lee to act conformably to both their
wishes; but that, if they should order differently, their directions
must be obeyed.[83]
General Washington was mistaken in supposing that Congress had resolved
to abandon the expedition against the Tories of Queen's County. That
expedition had actually penetrated the county, under Colonel Heard, who
had arrested nineteen of the principal inhabitants and conducted them to
Philadelphia. Congress directed them to be sent to New York, and
delivered to the order of the Convention of that Colony, until an
inquiry could be instituted by the Convention into their conduct, and a
report thereon made to Congress.[84]
This destination of the prisoners had become necessary, in consequence
of the local fears and jealousies excited by the approach of General Lee
to the city of New York, at the head of a force designed to prevent it
from falling into the possession of the enemy. The inhabitants of the
city were not a little alarmed at the idea of its becoming a post to be
contended for; and the Committee of Safety wrote to General Lee
earnestly deprecating his approach.[85] Lee replied to them, and
continued his march, inclosing their letter to Congress. It was received
in that body on the 26th, and a committee of three members was
immediately appointed to repair to New York, to consult and advise with
the Council of Safety of the Colony, and with General Lee, respecting
the defence of the city.[86] The Provincial Congress of New York were in
session at the time of the arrival of this committee,[87] and, in
consequence of the temper existing in that body and in the local
committees, the Continental Congress found themselves obliged to recede
from the course which they had taken of disarming the Tories of Queen's
County by their own action, and to submit the whole subject again to the
colonial authorities everywhere, by a mere recommendation to them to
disarm all persons, within their respective limits, notoriously
disaffected to the American cause.[88]
Thus, after having resolved on the performance of a high act of
sovereignty, which was entirely within the true scope of their own
powers, and eminently necessary, the Congress was obliged to content
itself with a recommendation on the subject to the colonial authorities;
not only because it felt itself, as a government, far from secure of the
popular coöperation in many parts of the country, but because it had not
finally severed the political tie which had bound the country to the
crown of Great Britain, and because it had no civil machinery of its
own, through which its operations could be conducted.
Another topic, which illustrates the character of the early
revolutionary government, is the entire absence, at the period now under
consideration, of a proper national tribunal for the determination of
questions of Prize;--a want which gave General Washington great trouble
and embarrassment, during his residence at Cambridge and for some time
afterwards. As this subject is connected with the origin of the American
Navy, a brief account may here be given of the commencement of naval
operations by the United Colonies.
* * * * *
When General Washington arrived at Cambridge, no steps had been taken by
the Continental Congress towards the employment of any naval force
whatever. In June, 1775, two small schooners had been fitted out by
Rhode Island, to protect the waters of that Colony from the depredations
of the enemy; and in the same month, the Provincial Congress of
Massachusetts resolved to provide six armed vessels; but none of them
were ready in the month of October.[89] In the early part of that month,
the first movement was made by the Continental Congress towards the
employment of any naval force. General Washington was then directed to
fit out two armed vessels, with all possible despatch, to sail for the
mouth of the St. Lawrence, in order to intercept certain ships from
England bound to Quebec with powder and stores. He was to procure these
vessels from the government of Massachusetts.[90] The authorities of
Massachusetts had then made no such provision; but in the latter part
of August, General Washington had, on the broad authority of his
commission, proceeded to fit out six armed schooners, to cruise in the
waters of Massachusetts Bay, so as to intercept the enemy's supplies
coming into the port of Boston. One of them sailed in September, and in
the course of a few weeks they were all cruising between Cape Ann and
Cape Cod.[91]
On the 17th of September, 1775, the town of Falmouth in Massachusetts
(now Portland in Maine) was burnt by the enemy. This act stimulated the
Continental Congress to order the fitting out of two armed vessels on
the 26th of October, and of two others, on the 30th. It also stimulated
the Massachusetts Assembly to issue letters of marque and reprisal, and
to pass an act establishing a court to try and condemn all captures made
from the enemy, by the privateers and armed vessels of that Colony.
In the autumn of this year, therefore, there were two classes of armed
vessels cruising in the waters of Massachusetts: one consisting of those
sailing under the continental authority, and the other consisting of
those sailing under the authority of the Massachusetts Assembly.
Captures were made by each, and some of those sailing under the
continental authority were quite successful. Captain Manly, commanding
the Lee, took, in the latter part of November, a valuable prize, with a
large cargo of arms, ammunition, and military tools; and several other
captures followed before any provision had been made for their
condemnation,--a business which was thus thrown entirely upon the hands
of General Washington.
The court established by the Legislature of Massachusetts, at its
session in the autumn of 1775, for the trial and condemnation of all
captures from the enemy, was enabled to take cognizance only of captures
made by vessels fitted out by the Province, or by citizens of the
Province. As the cruisers fitted out at the continental expense did not
come under this law, General Washington early in November called the
attention of Congress to the necessity of establishing a court for the
trial of prizes made by continental authority.[92] On the 25th of
November, the Congress passed resolves ordering all trials of prizes to
be held in the court of the colony into which they should be brought,
with a right of appeal to Congress.[93] But these resolves do not seem
to have been, for a considerable period of time, communicated to General
Washington; for, during the months of November, December, and January,
he supposed it to be necessary for him to attend personally to the
adjudication of prizes made by continental vessels,[94] and it was not
until the early part of February that the receipt of the resolves of
Congress led to a resort to the jurisdiction of the admiralty court of
Massachusetts. When, however, this was done, an irreconcilable
difference was found to exist between the resolves of Congress and the
law of the Colony respecting the proceedings; the trials were stopped
for a long time, to enable the General Court of Massachusetts to alter
their law, so as to make it conform to the resolves; and in the mean
while, many of the captors, weary of the law's delay, applied, without
waiting for the decisions, for leave to go away, which General
Washington granted.[95] As late as the 25th of April, 1776, there had
been no trials of any of the prizes brought into Massachusetts Bay. At
that date, General Washington wrote to the President of Congress, from
New York, that some of the vessels which he had fitted out were laid up,
the crews being dissatisfied because they could not obtain their
prize-money; that he had appealed to the Congress on the subject; and
that, if a summary way of proceeding were not resolved on, it would be
impossible to have the continental vessels manned. At this time Captain
Manly and his crew had not received their share of the valuable prize
taken by them in the autumn previous.[96]
* * * * *
Another remarkable defect in the revolutionary government was found in
the mode in which it undertook to supply the means of defraying the
public expenses. It was a government entirely without revenues of any
kind; for, in constituting the Congress, the colonies had not clothed
their delegates with power to lay taxes, or to establish imposts. At the
time when hostilities were actually commenced, the commerce of the
country was almost totally annihilated; so that if the Congress had
possessed power to derive a revenue from commerce, little could have
been obtained for a long period after the commencement of the war. But
the power did not exist; money in any considerable quantity could not be
borrowed at home; the expedient of foreign loans had not been suggested;
and consequently the only remaining expedient to which the Congress
could resort was, like other governments similarly situated, to issue
paper money. The mode in which this was undertaken to be done was, in
the first instance, to issue two millions of Spanish milled dollars, in
the form of bills, of various denominations, from one dollar to eight
dollars each, and a few of twenty dollars, designed for circulation as
currency. The whole number of bills which made up the sum of $2,000,000
was 403,800.[97] The next emission amounted to $1,000,000, in bills of
thirty dollars each, and was ordered on the 25th of July.[98] When the
bills of the first emission were prepared, it would seem to have been
the practice to have them signed by a committee of the members; but this
was found so inconvenient, from the length of time during which it
withdrew the members from the other business of Congress, that, when the
second emission was ordered, a committee of twenty-eight citizens of
Philadelphia was appointed for the purpose, and the bills were ordered
to be signed by any two of them.[99] At this time, no continental
Treasurers had been appointed.[100]
Such a clumsy machinery was poorly adapted to the supply of a currency
demanded by the pressing wants of the army and of the other branches of
the public service. The signers of the bills were extremely dilatory in
their work. In September, 1775, the paymaster and commissary, at
Cambridge, had not a single dollar in hand, and they had strained their
credit, for the subsistence of the army, to the utmost; the greater part
of the troops were in a state not far from mutiny, in consequence of the
deduction which had been made from their stated allowance; and there was
imminent danger, if the evil were not soon remedied, and greater
punctuality observed, that the army would absolutely break up. In
November, General Washington deemed it highly desirable to adopt a
system of advanced pay, but the unfortunate state of the military chest
rendered it impossible. There was not cash sufficient to pay the troops
for the months of October and November. Through the months of December
and January, the signing of the bills did not keep pace with the demands
of the army, notwithstanding General Washington's urgent remonstrances;
and in February his wants became so pressing, that he was obliged to
borrow twenty-five thousand pounds of the Province of Massachusetts Bay,
in order that the recruiting service might not totally cease.[101]
These facts show significantly, that, before the Declaration of
Independence, scarcely any progress had been made towards the formation
of a national government with definite powers and appropriate
departments. In matters of judicature, and in measures requiring
executive functions and authority, the Congress were obliged to rely
almost entirely upon the local institutions and the local civil
machinery of the different colonies; while, in all military affairs, the
very form of the revolutionary government was unfavorable to vigor,
despatch, and consistent method. There were also causes existing in the
temper and feelings of many of the members of that government, both
before and after the Declaration of Independence, which, at times,
prevented the majority from acting with the decision and energy demanded
by the state of their affairs. Many excellent and patriotic men in the
Congress of 1775-6, while they concurred fully in the necessity for
resistance to the measures of the British ministry, and had decided, or
were fast deciding, that a separation must take place, still entertained
a great jealousy of standing armies. This jealousy began to exhibit
itself very soon after the appointment of the Commander-in-chief, and
was never wholly without influence in the proceedings of Congress
during the entire period of the war. It led to a degree of reliance upon
militia, which, in the situation of the colonies, was too often
demonstrated to be a weak and fatal policy.[102]
* * * * *
NOTE TO PAGE 51.
ON THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
The Declaration of Independence was drawn by Thomas
Jefferson; and the circumstances under which he was selected
for this honorable and important task have been for more than
a quarter of a century somewhat in doubt, and that doubt has
been increased by the recent publication of a part of the
Works of Mr. John Adams. The evidence on the subject is to be
derived chiefly from statements made by both of these eminent
persons in their memoirs, and in a letter written by each of
them. We have seen, in a former note, that in 1822 Mr. Adams
declared, that had it not been for a conversation which
occurred in 1775, before the meeting of the Congress of that
year, between himself and his Massachusetts colleagues and
certain of the Philadelphia "sons of liberty," in which the
Massachusetts members were advised to concede precedence to
Virginia, from motives of policy, and but for the principles,
facts, and motives suggested in that conversation, many
things would not have happened which did occur, and among
them, that Mr. Jefferson never would have been the author of
the Declaration of Independence. In regard to the same
speculation, concerning the election of Washington as
Commander-in-chief, I have ventured, on Mr. Adams's own
authority, to suggest doubts whether that election ought now
to be considered to have turned upon motives which Mr. Adams
made so prominent in 1822. In regard to the authorship of the
Declaration of Independence, I shall only endeavor to state
fairly and fully the conflicting evidence, in order that the
reader may judge what degree of weight ought to be assigned
to the cause, _without_ which Mr. Adams supposed Mr.
Jefferson would not have been selected to draft it.
Mr. Jefferson, as it appeared when his writings came to be
published in 1829, wrote in 1821, when at the age of
seventy-seven, a memoir of some of the public transactions in
which he had been engaged. At this time, he had in his
possession a few notes of the debates which took place in
Congress on the subject of Independence, and which he made at
the time. These notes he inserted bodily, as they stood, in
his memoir, and they are so printed. (Jefferson's Works, I.
10-14.) They are easily distinguishable from the text of the
memoir, but they do not appear to throw any especial light
upon the fact now in controversy; although, as Mr. Jefferson,
in 1823, when writing on this subject, supported his
recollection by "written notes, taken at the moment and on
the spot," it is proper to allow that those notes may in some
way have aided his memory, although we cannot now see in what
way they did so. He made this latter reference in a letter
which he wrote to Mr. Madison, in reply to the statements in
Mr. Adams's letter to Timothy Pickering, under date of August
6, 1822. (Jefferson's Works, IV. 375, 376.)
At or near the beginning of the present century, Mr. Adams,
then about sixty-six, wrote an autobiography, which has
recently been published [1850], and in which he gave an
account of the authorship of the Declaration. In 1822, when
about eighty-six, Mr. Adams wrote the letter to Mr.
Pickering, which called forth Mr. Jefferson's contradiction
in his letter to Mr. Madison, under date of August 30, 1823.
(Adams's Works, II. 510-515.) Mr. Jefferson, in his memoir
written in 1821, states simply that the committee for drawing
the Declaration desired him to do it; that he accordingly
wrote it, and that, being approved by the committee, he
reported it to the Congress on Friday, the 28th of June, when
it was read and ordered to lie on the table; and that on
Monday, the 1st of July, the Congress, in committee of the
whole, proceeded to consider it. "The pusillanimous idea," he
continues, "that we had friends in England worth keeping
terms with, still haunted the minds of many. For this reason,
those passages which conveyed censures on the people of
England were struck out, lest they should give them offence.
The clause, too, reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of
Africa, was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and
Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation
of slaves, and who, on the contrary, wished to continue it.
Our Northern brethren, also, I believe, felt a little tender
under those censures; for though their people had very few
slaves themselves, yet they had been pretty considerable
carriers of them to others. The debates having taken up the
greater parts of the 2d, 3d, and 4th days of July, were, on
the evening of the last, closed." (Jefferson's Works, I. 14,
15.)
In Mr. Adams's autobiography, the following account is
given:--"The Committee of Independence were Thomas Jefferson,
John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R.
Livingston. Mr. Jefferson had been now about a year a member
of Congress, but had attended his duty in the house a very
small part of the time, and, when there, had never spoken in
public. During the whole time I sat with him in Congress, I
never heard him utter three sentences together. It will
naturally be inquired how it happened that he was appointed
on a committee of such importance. There were more reasons
than one. Mr. Jefferson had the reputation of a masterly pen;
he had been chosen a delegate in Virginia, in consequence of
a very handsome public paper which he had written for the
House of Burgesses, which had given him the character of a
fine writer. Another reason was, that Mr. Richard Henry Lee
was not beloved by the most of his colleagues from Virginia,
and Mr. Jefferson was set up to rival and supplant him. This
could be done only by the pen, for Mr. Jefferson could stand
no competition with him or any one else in elocution and
public debate.... The committee had several meetings, in
which were proposed the articles of which the Declaration was
to consist, and minutes made of them. The committee then
appointed Mr. Jefferson and me to draw them up in form, and
clothe them in a proper dress. The sub-committee met, and
considered the minutes, making such observations on them as
then occurred, when Mr. Jefferson desired me to take them to
my lodgings, and make the draft. This I declined, and gave
several reasons for declining: 1. That he was a Virginian,
and I a Massachusettensian. 2. That he was a Southern man,
and I a Northern one. 3. That I had been so obnoxious for my
early and constant zeal in promoting the measure, that any
draft of mine would undergo a more severe scrutiny and
criticism in Congress than one of his composition. 4. And
lastly, and that would be reason enough if there were no
other, I had a great opinion of the elegance of his pen, and
none at all of my own. I therefore insisted that no
hesitation should be made on his part. He accordingly took
the minutes, and in a day or two produced to me his draft.
Whether I made or suggested any corrections I remember not.
The report was made to the committee of five, by them
examined, but whether altered or corrected in any thing, I
cannot recollect. But, in substance, at least, it was
reported to Congress, where, after a severe criticism, and
striking out several of the most oratorical paragraphs, it
was adopted on the 4th of July, 1776, and published to the
world." (Adams's Works, II. 511-515.)
The account in Mr. Adams's letter to Mr. Pickering is as
follows:--"You inquire why so young a man as Mr. Jefferson
was placed at the head of the committee for preparing a
Declaration of Independence? I answer, it was the Frankfort
advice to place Virginia at the head of every thing. Mr.
Richard Henry Lee might be gone to Virginia, to his sick
family, for aught I know; but that was not the reason of Mr.
Jefferson's appointment. There were three committees
appointed at the same time. One for the Declaration of
Independence, another for preparing Articles of
Confederation, and another for preparing a treaty to be
proposed to France. Mr. Lee was chosen for the Committee of
Confederation, and it was not thought convenient that the
same person should be upon both. Mr. Jefferson came into
Congress in June, 1775, and brought with him a reputation for
literature, science, and a happy talent of composition.
Writings of his were handed about, remarkable for their
peculiar felicity of expression. Though a silent member in
Congress, he was so prompt, frank, explicit, and decisive
upon committees and in conversation,--not even Samuel Adams
was more so,--that he soon seized upon my heart; and upon
this occasion I gave him my vote, and did all in my power to
procure the votes of others. I think he had one more vote
than any other, and that placed him at the head of the
committee. I had the next highest number, and that placed me
second. The committee met, discussed the subject, and then
appointed Mr. Jefferson and me to make the draft, I suppose
because we were the two first on the list. The sub-committee
met. Jefferson proposed to me to make the draft. I said, 'I
will not.' 'You should do it.' 'O, no.' 'Why will you not?
You ought to do it.' 'I will not.' 'Why?' 'Reasons enough.'
'What can be your reasons?' 'Reason first,--You are a
Virginian, and a Virginian ought to appear at the head of
this business. Reason second,--I am obnoxious, suspected, and
unpopular. You are very much otherwise. Reason third,--You
can write ten times better than I can.' 'Well,' said
Jefferson, 'if you are decided, I will do as well as I can.'
'Very well. When you have drawn it up, we will have a
meeting.'
"A meeting we accordingly had, and conned the paper over. I
was delighted with its high tone and the flights of oratory
with which it abounded, especially that concerning negro
slavery, which, though I knew his Southern brethren would
never suffer to pass in Congress, I certainly never would
oppose. There were other expressions which I would not have
inserted, if I had drawn it up, particularly that which
called the King tyrant. I thought this too personal; for I
never believed George to be a tyrant in disposition and in
nature; I always believed him to be deceived by his courtiers
on both sides of the Atlantic, and in his official capacity
only, cruel. I thought the expression too passionate, and too
much like scolding, for so grave and solemn a document; but
as Franklin and Sherman were to inspect it afterwards, I
thought it would not become me to strike it out. I consented
to report it, and do not now remember that I made or
suggested a single alteration.
"We reported it to the committee of five. It was read, and I
do not remember that Franklin or Sherman criticized any
thing. We were all in haste. Congress was impatient, and the
instrument was reported, as I believe, in Jefferson's
handwriting, as he first drew it. Congress cut off about a
quarter of it, as I expected they would; but they obliterated
some of the best of it, and left all that was exceptionable,
if any thing in it was. I have long wondered that the
original draft has not been published. I suppose the reason
is, the vehement philippic against negro slavery.
"As you justly observe, there is not an idea in it but what
had been hackneyed in Congress for two years before. The
substance of it is contained in the declaration of rights and
the violation of those rights, in the Journals of Congress,
in 1774. Indeed, the essence of it is contained in a
pamphlet, voted and printed by the town of Boston, before the
first Congress met, composed by James Otis, as I suppose, in
one of his lucid intervals, and pruned and polished by Samuel
Adams."
Mr. Jefferson, on the contrary, in his letter to Mr. Madison,
says:--"These details are quite incorrect. The committee of
five met; no such thing as a sub-committee was proposed, but
they unanimously pressed on myself alone to undertake the
draft. I consented; I drew it; but, before I reported it to
the committee, I communicated it _separately_ to Doctor
Franklin and Mr. Adams, requesting their correction, because
they were the two members of whose judgments and amendments I
wished most to have the benefit, before presenting it to the
committee; and you have seen the original paper now in my
hands, with the corrections of Doctor Franklin and Mr. Adams
interlined in their own handwritings. Their alterations were
two or three only, and merely verbal. I then wrote a fair
copy, reported it to the committee, and from them,
unaltered, to Congress. This personal communication and
consultation with Mr. Adams he has misremembered into the
actings of a sub-committee. Pickering's observations, and Mr.
Adams's in addition, 'that it contained no new idea, that it
is a commonplace compilation, its sentiments hackneyed in
Congress for two years before, and its essence contained in
Otis's pamphlet,' may all be true. Of that I am not to be the
judge. Richard Henry Lee charged it as copied from Locke's
Treatise on Government. Otis's pamphlet I never saw, and
whether I had gathered my ideas from reading or reflection I
do not know. I know only that I turned to neither book nor
pamphlet while writing it. I did not consider it as any part
of my charge to invent new ideas altogether, and to offer no
sentiment which had ever been expressed before. Had Mr. Adams
been so restrained, Congress would have lost the benefit of
his bold and impressive advocations of the rights of
revolution. For no man's confident and fervid addresses, more
than Mr. Adams's, encouraged and supported us through the
difficulties surrounding us, which, like the ceaseless action
of gravity, weighed on us by night and by day. Yet, on the
same ground, we may ask what of these elevated thoughts was
new, or can be affirmed never before to have entered the
conceptions of man?
"Whether, also, the sentiment of Independence, and the
reasons for declaring it, which make so great a portion of
the instrument, had been hackneyed in Congress for two years
before the 4th of July, 1776, or this dictum of Mr. Adams be
another slip of memory, let history say. This, however, I
will say for Mr. Adams, that he supported the Declaration
with zeal and ability, fighting fearlessly for every word of
it. As to myself, I thought it a duty to be, on that
occasion, a passive auditor of the opinions of others, more
impartial judges than I could be of its merits or demerits.
During the debate I was sitting by Doctor Franklin, and he
observed that I was writhing a little under the acrimonious
criticisms on some of its parts; and it was on that occasion,
that, by way of comfort, he told me the story of John
Thomson, the hatter, and his new sign." (Jefferson's Works,
IV. 376.)
The substantial point of difference in these two accounts of
the same transaction, relates to the action of the committee
in designating the person or persons who were to prepare the
draft of a Declaration. Mr. Adams states that Mr. Jefferson
and himself were appointed a sub-committee to prepare it; Mr.
Jefferson states that he alone was directed by the committee
to write the Declaration. This question is not important,
since Mr. Adams's version does not in the least impair Mr.
Jefferson's claim to the authorship of the instrument. The
latter, it must be allowed, gracefully parries the
criticisms of Mr. Adams, by a noble allusion to the eloquence
which sustained his compatriots in the difficulties and
embarrassments that surrounded them, and which they did not
think of analyzing, for the purpose of tracing the exact
originality of its sentiments.
It is proper to add, that Mr. Jefferson's account is
confirmed by the original manuscript draft of the
Declaration, a fac-simile of which was published in 1829, in
the fourth volume of his Works, exhibiting the corrections
and interlineations made by Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adams in
their respective handwritings. These emendations were not
important.
The reasons assigned by Mr. Adams for the selection of Mr.
Jefferson as the writer of the Declaration are so numerous,
that it is difficult to determine which of them he intended
should be regarded as the principal or decisive one. In the
autobiography, he states that there were more reasons than
one why Mr. Jefferson was appointed on a committee of such
importance. He assigns two reasons: one, Mr. Jefferson's
reputation as a writer, and the other, the desire of his
Virginia colleagues to have Mr. Jefferson supplant Mr.
Richard Henry Lee. In his letter to Mr. Pickering, Mr. Adams
gives as the reason why Mr. Jefferson was placed at the head
of the committee, that it was "the Frankfort advice to place
Virginia at the head of every thing"; but he also adds, that
Mr. Jefferson brought with him to Congress "a reputation for
literature, science, and a happy talent of composition," and
that this reputation had then been sustained by writings
"remarkable for their peculiar felicity of expression." As in
the case of Washington, therefore, it would seem that there
were reasons of eminent fitness and qualification for the
duty assigned; and certainly the Declaration of Independence
itself fully justifies the selection. Few state papers have
ever been written with more skill, or greater adaptation to
the purposes in view. Whether its sentiments were purely
original with its author, or were gathered from the political
philosophy which had become familiar to the American mind,
through the great discussions of the time, it must for ever
remain an imperishable monument of his power of expression,
and his ability to touch the passions, as well as to address
the reason, of mankind. It would be inappropriate to apply to
its style the canons of modern criticism. Its statements of
political truth, taken in the sense in which they were
manifestly intended, can never be successfully assailed. With
regard to the passage concerning slavery, we may well
conceive that both Northern and Southern men might have felt
the injustice of the terrible denunciation with which he
charged upon _the King_ all the horrors, crimes, and
consequences of the African slave-trade, and in which he
accused him of exciting the slaves to insurrection, and "to
purchase the liberty of which _he_ had deprived them by
murdering the people upon whom _he_ had obtruded them." Mr.
Jefferson, in drawing up the list of our national accusations
against the King, obviously intended to refer to him as the
representative of the public policy and acts of the mother
country; and it is true that the imperial government was, and
must always remain, responsible for the existence of slavery
in the colonies. But this was not one of the grievances to be
redressed by the Revolution; it did not constitute one of the
reasons for aiming at independence; and there was no
sufficient ground for the accusation that the government of
Great Britain had knowingly sought to excite general
insurrections among the slaves. The rejection of this passage
from the Declaration shows that the Congress did not consider
this charge to be as tenable as all their other complaints
certainly were.
FOOTNOTES:
[53] Richard Henry Lee, the mover of this resolution, was born on the
20th of June, 1732, at Stratford, Westmoreland County, Virginia. His
earlier education was completed in England, whence he returned in his
nineteenth year. Possessed of a good fortune, he devoted himself to
public affairs. At the age of twenty-five, he entered the House of
Burgesses, where he became a distinguished advocate of republican
doctrines, and a strenuous opponent of the right claimed by Parliament
to tax the colonies, of the Stamp Act, and of the other arbitrary
measures of the home government, coöperating with Patrick Henry in all
his great patriotic efforts. He was the author of the plan adopted by
the House of Burgesses in 1773, for the formation of committees of
correspondence, to be organized by the colonial legislatures, and out of
which grew the plan of the Continental Congress. In 1774, he was elected
one of the delegates from Virginia to the Congress, in which body, from
his known ability as a political writer and his services in the popular
cause, he was placed on the committees to prepare the addresses to the
King, to the People of Great Britain, and to the People of the Colonies,
the last of which he wrote. In the second Congress, he was selected to
move the resolution of Independence; and besides serving on other very
important committees, he furnished, as chairman of the committee
instructed to prepare them, the commission and instructions to General
Washington. As mover of the resolution of Independence, he would,
according to the usual practice, have been made chairman of the
committee to prepare the Declaration; but on the 10th of June, the day
when the subject was postponed, he was obliged to leave Congress, and
return home for a short time, on account of the illness of some member
of his family. He came back to Congress and remained a member until
June, 1777, when he went home on account of ill health. In August, 1778,
he was again elected a member, and continued to serve until 1780; but
from feeble health was compelled to take a less active part than he had
taken in former years. He was out of Congress from 1780 until 1784, when
he was elected its President, but retired at the end of the year. He was
opposed to the Constitution of the United States, but voted in Congress
to submit it to the people. After its adoption, he was elected one of
the first Senators under it from Virginia, and in that capacity moved
and carried several amendments. In 1792, his continued ill health
obliged him to retire from public life. He died June 19, 1794.
[54] Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and
R. R. Livingston.
[55] See note at the end of the chapter.
[56] On the 24th of June, 1776, the Congress declared, by resolution,
that "all persons abiding within any of the United Colonies, and
deriving protection from the laws of the same, owed allegiance to the
said laws, and were members of such colony; and that all persons passing
through or making a temporary stay in any of the colonies, being
entitled to the protection of the laws, during the time of such passage,
visitation, or temporary stay, owed, during the same, allegiance
thereto." Journals, II. 216.
[57] The title of "The United States of America" was formally assumed in
the Articles of Confederation, when they came to be adopted. But it was
in use, without formal enactment, from the date of the adoption of the
Declaration of Independence. On the 9th of September, 1776, it was
ordered that in all continental commissions and other instruments, where
the words "United Colonies" had been used, the style should be altered
to the "United States." Journals, II. 349.
[58] Journals, II. 263, 320; III. 123, 502, 513.
[59] From June 11, 1776, to November 17, 1777.
[60] Sparks's Washington, III. 20, note.
[61] Works, III. 20.
[62] Ibid. 46.
[63] Ibid. 47.
[64] Ibid. 55.
[65] Ibid. 56.
[66] Letters of General Washington to the President of Congress,
September 21, 1775 (Works, III. 98); October 30, 1775 (Ibid. 137);
November 8, 1775 (Ibid. 146).
[67] Letters of General Washington to Joseph Reed, November 8, 1775
(Works, III. 150); November 28, 1775 (Ibid. 177); and to the President
of Congress, December 4, 1775 (Ibid. 184); to Governor Cooke of
Connecticut, December 5, 1775 (Ibid. 188).
[68] Journals of Congress, II. 208, September 29, 1775.
[69] Writings of Washington, III. 123, note.
[70] February 9, 1776 (Works, III. 278).
[71] Mr. Jefferson once said to my kinsman, Mr. George Ticknor, that
when they had any doubtful and difficult measure to carry in this
Congress, they counted the four New England colonies, and Virginia, as
_sure_; and then they looked round to see where they could get two more,
to make the needful majority.
[72] The General Assembly of New York met on the 10th of January, 1775,
and by a small majority refused to approve of the non-importation
association formed by the first Congress, and also declined to appoint
delegates to the second Congress, which was to assemble in May. They
adopted, however, a list of grievances, which was substantially the same
with that which had been put forth by the first Congress. Towards the
close of the session, in the absence of some of the patriotic members,
petitions to the King and to Parliament were adopted, which differed
somewhat from the principles contained in their list of grievances, and
in which they disapproved "of the violent measures that had been pursued
in some of the colonies." But the people of New York generally conformed
to the non-importation agreement; and on the 20th of April they met in
convention and appointed delegates to the second Congress, "to concert
and determine upon such matters as shall be judged most advisable for
the preservation and reëstablishment of American rights and privileges."
Pitkin's History of the United States, I. 324.
[73] "I do not mean," the orders continued, "that they should be kept in
close confinement. If either of these bodies should incline to send them
to any interior towns, upon their parole not to leave them until they
are released, it will meet with my concurrence. For the present, I shall
avoid giving you the like order in respect to the Tories in Portsmouth;
but the day is not far off, when they will meet with this, or a worse
fate, if there is not a considerable reformation in their conduct."
Writings of Washington, III. 158, 159.
[74] Writings of Washington, III. 230, note.
[75] Writings of Washington, III. 230, note. See also Marshall's Life of
Washington, II. 285-287.
[76] Writings of Washington, III. 230.
[77] Ibid., note.
[78] Journals of Congress, II. 7-9. January 3, 1776. Congress had, on
the 2d of January, passed resolves, recommending to the different
assemblies, conventions, and committees or councils of safety, to
restrain the Tories, and had declared that they ought to be disarmed,
and the more dangerous of them kept in custody. For this purpose, the
aid of the continental troops stationed in or near the respective
colonies was tendered to the local authorities. Journals, II. 4, 5.
[79] The resolves of the Congress on this subject amounted to an
outlawry of the persons against whom they were directed. They were
introduced by a preamble, reciting the disaffection of a majority of the
inhabitants of Queen's County, evinced by their refusal to elect
deputies to the convention of the colony, by their public declaration of
a design to remain inactive spectators of the contest, and their general
want of public spirit; and declaring, that "those who refuse to defend
their country should be excluded from its protection, and prevented from
doing it injury." The first resolve then proceeded to declare that all
the inhabitants of Queen's County named in a list of delinquents
published by the Convention of New York be put out of the protection of
the United Colonies, that all trade and intercourse with them cease, and
that no inhabitant of that county be permitted to travel or abide in any
part of the United Colonies, out of that county, without a certificate
from the Convention or Committee of Safety of New York, setting forth
that such inhabitant is a friend to the American cause, and not of the
number of those who voted against sending deputies to the Convention;
and that any inhabitant found out of the county, without such
certificate, be apprehended and imprisoned three months. The second
resolve declared that any attorney or lawyer who should commence,
prosecute, or defend any action at law, for any inhabitant of Queen's
County who voted against sending deputies to the Convention, ought to be
treated as an enemy to the American cause. The fourth resolve directed
that Colonel Nathaniel Heard, of Woodbridge, N. J., should march, with
five or six hundred minute-men, to the western part of Queen's County,
and that Colonel Waterbury, of Stamford, Connecticut, with the same
number of minute-men, march to the eastern side; that they confer
together and endeavor to enter the county on the same day, and that they
proceed to disarm every person in the county who voted against sending
deputies to the Convention, and cause them to deliver up their arms and
ammunition on oath, and confine in safe custody, until further orders,
all those who should refuse compliance. These resolves were passed on
the 3d of January, 1776, and were reported by a committee on the state
of New York. On the 10th of January, on account of "the great distance
from Colonel Heard to Colonel Waterbury, and the difficulty of
coöperating with each other in their expedition into Queen's County,"
Congress directed Lord Stirling to furnish Colonel Heard with three
companies from his command, who were to join Colonel Heard with his
minute-men, and proceed immediately on the expedition; and also directed
Heard to inform Waterbury that his services would not be required.
Journals, II. 21.
[80] He received this impression from General Lee, who wrote on the 16th
of January and informed him that Colonel Waterbury had "received orders
to disband his regiment, and the Tories are to remain unmolested till
they are joined by the King's assassins." Sparks's Life of Gouverneur
Morris, I. 75.
[81] Letter to General Lee, January 23, 1776. Writings of Washington,
III. 255.
[82] Marshall's Life of Washington, II., Appendix, xvii.
[83] Letter to General Lee, January 31, 1776. Writings of Washington,
III. 275.
[84] February 6, 1776. Journals, II. 51.
[85] Sparks's Life of Gouverneur Morris, I. 75, 76. They wished to "save
appearances with the [enemy's] ships of war, till at least the month of
March."
[86] January 26, 1776. Journals, II. 39.
[87] January 30.
[88] March 14, 1776. Journals, II. 91.
[89] Letter of General Washington to the President of Congress.
[90] Resolve passed October 5, 1775. Journals of Congress, II. 197.
[91] These vessels were fitted out from the ports of Salem, Beverly,
Marblehead, and Plymouth. They were officered and manned chiefly by
sea-captains and sailors who happened to be at that time in the army.
They sailed under instructions from General Washington, to take and
seize all vessels in the ministerial service, bound into or out of
Boston, having soldiers, arms and ammunition, or provisions on board,
and to send them into the nearest port, under a careful prize-master, to
wait his further directions. The first person commissioned in this way
by the Commander-in-chief was Captain Nicholas Broughton of Marblehead,
who sailed in the schooner Hannah, fitted out at Beverly; and in his
instructions he was described as "a captain in the army of the United
Colonies of North America," and was directed to take the command of "a
detachment of said army, and proceed on board the schooner Hannah,
lately fitted out, &c. at the continental expense." Another of these
vessels, called the Lee, was commanded by Captain John Manly. The names
of three others of them were the Harrison, the Washington, and the
Lynch. The name of the sixth vessel is not known, but the names of the
four other captains were Selman, Martindale, Coit, and Adams. (Writings
of Washington, III. 516.) When Washington received directions from the
President of Congress to send two vessels to the mouth of the St.
Lawrence, he wrote, on the 12th of October, that one of these vessels
was then out, and that two of them would be despatched as directed,
immediately. (Ibid., III. 124.) In the course of a few weeks, they were
all out.
[92] Letter to the President of Congress, November 11, 1775. Writings of
Washington, III. 154.
[93] Journals, I. 260.
[94] On the 4th of December, he repeated his former recommendation to
the President of Congress. (Writings of Washington, III. 184.) On the
26th of December, he wrote to Richard Henry Lee, in Congress, begging
him to use his influence in having a court of admiralty or some power
appointed to hear and determine all matters relative to captures;
saying, "You cannot conceive how I am plagued on this head, and how
impossible it is for me to hear and determine upon matters of this sort,
when the facts, perhaps, are only to be ascertained at ports forty,
fifty, or more miles distant, without bringing the parties here
[Cambridge] at great trouble and expense. At any rate, my time will not
allow me to be a competent judge of this business." Ibid., III. 217.
[95] Letter to the President of Congress, February 9, 1776. Ibid., III.
282. Letter to Joseph Reed, February 10, 1776. Ibid., III. 284.
[96] Ibid., III. 370.
[97] This was the emission ordered on the 23d of June, 1775. There were
_forty-nine thousand_ bills of each denomination from one dollar to
eight dollars, inclusive, and _eleven thousand eight hundred_ bills of
the denomination of twenty dollars. The form of the bills was as follows
(Journals, I. 126):--
CONTINENTAL CURRENCY.
No. ________________ Dollars.
This Bill entitles the Bearer to receive ________________
Spanish milled Dollars, or the value thereof in Gold or
Silver, according to the Resolutions of the Congress, held at
Philadelphia on the 10th day of May, A. D. 1775.
[98] Journals, I. 177.
[99] Journals, I. 126, 177. The signers of the bills were allowed a
commission of one dollar and one third of a dollar on each thousand of
the bills signed by them. Ibid.
[100] Ante, p. 35.
[101] Writings of Washington, III. 104, 167, 173, 178, 283.
[102] Writings of Washington, III. 278; IV. 115; V. 328. Mr. Sparks has
preserved an anecdote, which shows the perpetuation of this feeling
about standing armies, and evinces also that Washington possessed more
humor than has been generally attributed to him. In the Convention for
forming the Constitution of the United States, some member proposed to
insert a clause in the Constitution, limiting the army of the United
States to _five thousand men_. General Washington, who was in the chair,
observed that he should not object to such a clause, if it were so
amended as to provide that no enemy should ever presume to invade the
United States with more than _three thousand_.
CHAPTER IV.
JULY, 1776--NOVEMBER, 1777.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.--REORGANIZATION OF
THE CONTINENTAL ARMY.--FLIGHT OF THE CONGRESS FROM PHILADELPHIA.--PLAN
OF THE CONFEDERATION PROPOSED.
When the Declaration of Independence at length came, it did not in any
way change the form of the revolutionary government. It created no
institution, and erected no civil machinery. Its political effect has
already been described. Its moral effect, both upon the members of the
Congress and upon the country, was very great, inasmuch as it put an end
alike to the hope and the possibility of a settlement of the controversy
upon the principles of the English Constitution, for it made the
colonies free, sovereign, and independent states. Men who had voted for
such a measure, and who had put their signatures to an instrument which
the British Parliament or the Court of King's Bench could have had no
difficulty in punishing as treasonable, could no longer continue to feed
themselves on "the dainty food of reconciliation."[103] Thenceforward,
there was no retreat. The colonies might be conquered, overrun, and
enslaved; but this, or the full and final establishment of their own
sovereignty, were the sole alternatives. The consequence was, that the
Declaration was followed by a greater alacrity on the part of the whole
body of the Congress to adopt vigorous and decisive measures, than had
before prevailed among them.
But there was one feeling which the Declaration did not dispel, and
another to which it immediately gave rise, both of which were
unfavorable to concentrated, vigorous, and effective action on the part
of the revolutionary government. The Declaration of Independence did not
dissipate the unreasonable and ill-timed jealousy of standing armies,
which gave way, at last, only when the country was in such imminent
peril that Washington felt it to be his duty to ask for extraordinary
powers, to be conferred upon himself. It was followed, too, as an
immediate consequence, by that jealousy with regard to State rights, and
that adhesion to State interests, which have existed in our system from
that day to the present, and are not entirely separable from it. As the
Declaration made the colonies sovereign and independent, and was
followed by the formation of State governments, before the creation of
any well-defined national system, State sovereignty became at once an
ever-present cause of embarrassment to the Congress, in whose
proceedings entire delegations sometimes made the interests of the
country bend to the interests of their own State, to a mischievous
extent.
To explain these observations, we must recur again to the history of the
army, and to the efforts of Washington to have the military
establishment put into a safe and efficient condition.
* * * * *
After the evacuation of Boston by the British forces, General Washington
proceeded, at once, with the continental army to the city of New York,
where he arrived on the 13th of April, 1776. The loss of the battle of
Long Island on the 27th of August, and the extreme improbability of his
being able to hold the city against the superior forces by which it had
been invested through the entire summer, made it necessary for him to
appeal once more to the Congress for the organization of a permanent
army, capable of offering effectual resistance to the enemy. The
establishment formed at Cambridge in the autumn previous was to continue
for one year only; it was about to be dissolved; and in the month of
September General Washington was compelled to abandon the city of New
York to the enemy. Before he withdrew from it, he addressed a letter to
the President of Congress, on the 2d of September, in which he told that
body explicitly that the liberties of the country must of necessity be
greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, should their defence be left to
any but a permanent standing army; and that, with the army then under
his command, it was impossible to defend and retain the city.[104] On
the 20th of the same month, he again wrote, expressing the opinion that
it would be entirely impracticable to raise a proper army, without the
allowance of a large and extraordinary bounty.[105]
At length, when he had retreated to the Heights of Haerlem, and found
himself surrounded by a body of troops impatient of restraint, because
soon to be entitled to their discharge, and turbulent and licentious,
because they had never felt the proper inducements which create good
conduct in the soldier, he made one more appeal to the patriotism and
good sense of the Congress. Few documents ever proceeded from his pen
more wise, or evincing greater knowledge of mankind, or a more profound
apprehension of the great subject before him, than the letter which he
then wrote concerning the reorganization of the army.[106]
Before this letter was written, however, urged by his repeated requests
and admonished by defeat, the Congress had adopted a plan, reported by
the Board of War, for the organization of a new army, to serve during
the war. A long debate preceded its adoption, but the resolves were at
length passed on the 16th of September, 1776.[107] They authorized the
enlistment of a body of troops, to be divided into eighty-eight
battalions, and to be enlisted as soon as possible. These battalions
were to be raised by the States; a certain number being assigned to each
State as its quota. The highest quota, which was 15, was assigned to
the States of Virginia and Massachusetts, respectively. Pennsylvania had
12; North Carolina, 9; Maryland and Connecticut, 8 each; South Carolina,
6; New York and New Jersey, 4 each; New Hampshire, 3; Rhode Island, 2;
and Delaware and Georgia, 1 each. The inducements to enlist were a
bounty of twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land to each
non-commissioned officer or soldier; and to the commissioned officers,
the same bounty in money, with larger portions of land.[108] The States
were to provide arms and clothing for their respective quotas, and the
expense of clothing was to be deducted from the pay.[109] Although the
officers were to be commissioned by the Continental Congress, each State
was to appoint the officers of its own battalions, from the colonel to
those of the lowest grade, inclusive. A circular letter was addressed by
Congress to each State, urging its immediate attention to the raising of
these troops; and a committee of three members of the Congress was sent
to the head-quarters of General Washington, to confer with him on the
subject.[110]
Two serious defects in this plan struck the Commander-in-chief, as soon
as it was laid before him; but the resolves had been passed, and passed
with difficulty, before he had an opportunity specifically to point out
the mistakes. In the first place, by giving the appointment of the
officers to the States, any central system of promoting or placing the
officers then serving on the continental establishment according to
their characters and deserts was rendered impossible. The resolutions of
Congress did not even recommend these officers to the consideration of
their respective States. They were left to solicit their appointments at
a distance, or to go home and make personal application. Those who chose
to do the latter were more likely to get good places than those who
remained at their posts; but they were also less likely to be deserving
of important commissions than those who stayed with the army. To expect
that a proper attention would be paid to the claims of men of real
merit, under such a system,--whether they had or had not been in service
before,--or that the army when brought together would be found to be
officered on a uniform principle, exhibiting an adaptation of character
to station, was, in Washington's view, to expect that local authorities
would not be influenced by local attachments, and that merit would make
its way, in silence and absence, against personal importunity and bold
presumption.
But Washington saw no remedy for these evils, except by opening a direct
communication with the States, through which he might exert some
influence over their appointments. He immediately suggested to the
Congress, that each State should send a commission to the army, with
authority to appoint all the officers of the new regiments. Congress
passed a resolve recommending this step to the States, and advising that
the Commander-in-chief should be consulted in making the appointments;
that those officers should be promoted who had distinguished themselves
for bravery and attention to their duties; that no officer should be
appointed who had left his station without leave; and that all the
officers to be appointed should be men of honor and known abilities,
without particular regard to their having been in service before.[111]
This was but a partial remedy for the defects of the system. Several of
the States sent such a commission to act with the Commander-in-chief;
but many of them were tardy in making their appointments, and finally
the Congress authorized General Washington to fill the vacancies.
Another and a dangerous defect in this plan was, that the continental
pay and bounty on enlistment were fixed so low, that some of the States,
in order to fill up their quotas, deemed it expedient to offer a further
pay and bounty to their own men. This was done immediately by the States
of Connecticut and Massachusetts. The consequence was likely to be,
that, if the quotas of some States were raised before the fact became
known that other States had increased the pay and the bounty, some
regiments would, when the army came together, be on higher pay than
others, and jealousy, impatience, and mutiny must inevitably follow.
Knowing that a different pay could not exist in the same army without
these consequences, General Washington remonstrated with the Governor of
Connecticut, arrested the proceedings of the commissioners of that State
and of Massachusetts, and prevented them from publishing their terms,
until the sense of the Congress could be obtained.[112] That body, on
receiving from him another strong representation on the subject, passed
a resolve augmenting the pay.
* * * * *
Still, the system, notwithstanding these efforts to amend it, worked
ill. The appointment of the officers by the States was incapable of
being well managed; the pay and bounty, even after they were increased,
were insufficient; and the whole scheme of raising a permanent army was
entered upon at too late a period to be effectually accomplished. As
late as the middle of November, so little had been done, that the whole
force on one side of the Hudson, opposed to Howe's whole army, did not
exceed two thousand men of the established regiments; while, on the
other side, there was a force not much larger to secure the passes into
the Highlands.[113] "I am wearied almost to death," said the
Commander-in-chief, in a private letter, "with the retrograde motion of
things, and I solemnly protest that a pecuniary reward of twenty
thousand pounds a year would not induce me to undergo what I do; and
after all, perhaps, to lose my character, as it is impossible, under
such a variety of distressing circumstances, to conduct matters
agreeably to public expectation, or even to the expectations of those
who employ me, as they will not make proper allowances for the
difficulties their own errors have occasioned."[114]
There are few pages in our history so painful as those on which are
recorded the complaints extorted from Washington, at this period, by the
trials of his situation. That he, an accomplished soldier, who had
retired with honor from the late war with France to his serene Mount
Vernon; who had left it again, to stake life, and all that makes life
valuable, on the new issue of his country's independence; who asked no
recompense and sought no object but her welfare, should have been
compelled to pass into the dark valley of the retreat through New
Jersey, with all its perplexities, dangers, and discouragements,--its
cruel exertions and its humiliating reverses,--without a powerful and
energetic government to lean upon, and with scarcely more than Divine
assistance to which to turn, presents, indeed, to our separate
contemplation, a disheartening and discreditable fact. But no trials are
appointed to nations, or to men, without their fruits. The perplexities
and difficulties which surrounded Washington in the early part of the
Revolution contributed, undoubtedly, to give him that profound civil
wisdom, that knowledge of our civil wants, and that influence over the
moral sense of the country, which were afterwards so beneficently felt
in the establishment of the Constitution. The very weakness of the
government which he served became in this manner his and our strength.
Without the trials to which it subjected him, it may well be doubted
whether we should now possess that tower of strength,--that security
against distracted counsels and clashing interests,--which exist for us
in the character and services of that extraordinary man.
It is not necessary to sketch the scene or to follow the route of
General Washington's retreat through New Jersey, except as they
illustrate the subject of this work,--the constitutional history of the
country. Its remarkable military story is well known. On the 23d of
November, four days after the date of the letter to his brother above
quoted, he was at Newark, with a body of troops whose departure was near
at hand, and for supplying whose places no provision had been made. The
enemy were pressing on his rear, and in order to impress upon Congress
the danger of his situation, he sent General Mifflin to lay an exact
account of it before them.[115] On the 28th, he marched out of Newark in
the morning, and Lord Cornwallis entered it on the afternoon of the same
day. On the 30th, he was at Brunswick, endeavoring, but with little
success, to raise the militia;--the terms of service of the Jersey and
Maryland brigades expiring on that day. On the 1st of December, his
army numbered only four thousand men, and the enemy were pushing forward
with the greatest energy.[116] On the 5th, he resolved to march back to
Princeton; but neither militia nor regulars had come in, and it was too
late to prevent an evil, which he had both foreseen and foretold.[117]
On the 8th, he crossed the Delaware.[118] On the 12th, he saw his little
handful of men still further decrease, and now, without succors from the
government, or spirited exertions on the part of the people, the loss of
Philadelphia--"an event," said he, "which will wound the heart of every
virtuous American"--rose as a spectre in his path.[119] On the 16th, as
he moved on, gathering all the great energies of his character to parry
this deep disgrace, concentrating every force that remained to him
towards the defence of the city, and animating and directing public
bodies, in a tone of authority and command, he once more urged the
Congress to discard all reliance upon the militia, to augment the number
of the regular troops, and to strain every nerve to recruit them.[120]
Finally,--being still in doubt whether Howe did not intend an attack on
Philadelphia, before going into winter quarters,--with less than three
thousand men fit for duty, to oppose a well-appointed army of ten or
twelve thousand, and surrounded by a population rapidly submitting to
the enemy,--he felt that the time had come, when to his single hands
must be given all the military authority and power which the Continental
Union of America held in trust for the liberties of the country. On the
20th of December, therefore, he wrote to the President of Congress a
memorable letter, asking for extraordinary powers, but displaying at the
same time all the modesty and high principle of his character.[121]
To this appeal Congress at once responded, in a manner suited to the
exigency. On the 27th of December, 1776, they passed a resolution,
vesting in General Washington ample and complete power to raise and
collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner from all or
any of the United States, sixteen battalions of infantry, in addition
to those already voted; to appoint the officers of these battalions;
to raise, officer, and equip three regiments of artillery and a corps
of engineers, and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the
States for such aid of their militia as he might judge necessary; to
form such magazines of provisions, and in such places, as he should
think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of
brigadier-general; to fill up all vacancies in every other department
of the American army; to take, wherever he might be, whatever he might
want for the use of the army, if the inhabitants would not sell it,
allowing a reasonable price for the same; to arrest and confine
persons who should refuse to receive the continental currency, or were
otherwise disaffected to the American cause; and to return to the
States of which such persons were citizens their names and the nature
of their offences, together with the witnesses to prove them. These
powers were vested in the Commander-in-chief for the space of six
months from the date of the resolve, unless sooner revoked by the
Congress.[122]
* * * * *
The powers thus conferred upon General Washington were in reality those
of a military dictatorship; and in conferring them, the Congress acted
upon the maxim that the public safety is the supreme law. They acted,
too, as if they were the proper judges of the exigency, and as if the
powers they granted were then rightfully in their hands. But it is a
singular proof of the unsettled and anomalous condition of the political
system of the country, and of the want of practical authority in the
continental government, that, in three days after the adoption of the
resolves conferring these powers, the Congress felt it necessary to
address a letter to the Governors of the States, apologizing for this
step. Nor was their letter a mere apology. It implied a doubt whether
the continental government possessed a proper authority to take the
steps which the crisis demanded, and whether the execution of all
measures did not really belong to the States, the Congress having only a
recommendatory power. "Ever attentive," their letter declared, "to the
security of civil liberty, Congress would not have consented to the
vesting of such powers in the military department as those which the
inclosed resolves convey to the continental Commander-in-chief, if the
situation of public affairs did not require, at this crisis, a decision
and vigor which distance and numbers deny to assemblies far removed from
each other and from the seat of war." The letter closed, by requesting
the States to use their utmost exertions to further such levies as the
general might direct, in consequence of the new powers given him, and to
make up and complete their quotas as formerly settled.[123]
Strictly examined, therefore, the position taken by the Congress was,
that a crisis existed demanding the utmost decision and vigor; that the
measures necessary to meet it, such as the raising of troops and the
compulsory levying of supplies, belonged to the States; but that, the
State governments being removed from each other and from the seat of
war, the Congress confers upon the continental general power to do
things which in reality it belongs to the States to do. In this there
was a great inaccuracy, according to all our present ideas of
constitutional power. But still the action of the Congress expresses and
exhibits their real situation. It contains a contradiction between the
true theory of their revolutionary powers and the powers which they
could in fact practically exercise. Upon principle, it was just as
competent to the Congress to take the steps required by the exigency, as
it was to adjudge them to the States; and it was just as competent to
the Congress to do any thing directly, as to confer a power to do it on
their general. But the jealousies of the States, the habits of the
country, and the practical working of the existing institutions, had
never permitted the full exercise of the revolutionary powers which
properly resided in the hands of the Congress. The true theory of their
situation was limited by practical impossibilities; and an escape from
contradictions became impossible. It was perceived that the States would
neither pass laws or resolves for the summary raising of forces and
levying of supplies, nor allow this to be done by committees or
commissioners of Congress; but it was believed that they would acquiesce
in its being done by General Washington, out of respect for his
character, for his abilities and his motives, and from conviction that
he alone could save the country.
The expectations of the Congress were not disappointed. It was felt
throughout the country, that such powers could be lodged in the hands of
Washington without danger. The States in general acquiesced in the
necessity and propriety of this measure, and there was little
disposition to encroach upon or to complain of the authority conferred.
To this acquiescence, however, there were exceptions.[124]
* * * * *
The period which now followed was a part of the interval during which
the Articles of Confederation were pending in Congress. We have seen
that the plan of a confederation was reported to that body in July,
1776, and finally adopted for recommendation to the States in November,
1777. But soon after the extraordinary powers had been conferred upon
General Washington, the attendance of the members began to diminish, and
several of the most eminent and able men, who had hitherto served,
retired from Congress. In January, 1777, there were no delegations
present from the States of Delaware and New York;[125] and in February,
the absence of many distinguished men, whose counsels had been of vast
importance, made a striking deficiency. The formation of the State
governments, and the local affairs of the States, absorbed for a time,
with a few important exceptions, the best civil talent in the
country.[126]
While the personal efficiency and wisdom of the Congress thus sensibly
declined, no change took place in the nature of their powers, or in
their relations to the States, that would impart greater vigor to their
proceedings. The delegations of many of the States were renewed in the
winter of 1776-7; but there was a great diversity, and in some cases a
great vagueness, in their instructions.[127] In such a state of
things,--with no uniform rule prescribing the powers of the Congress,
and with some uncertainty in that body itself with regard to its
authority to confer upon the Commander-in-chief the powers with which he
was now invested,--however general might be the readiness of the country
to acquiesce in their necessity, it is not surprising that State
jealousy was sometimes aroused, or that it should have been unreasonable
in some of its manifestations.
A striking instance of this jealousy occurred upon the occasion of a
proclamation issued by General Washington at Morristown, on the 25th of
January, 1777. Sir William Howe had published a proclamation in New
Jersey, offering protection to such of the inhabitants as would take an
oath of allegiance to the King. Many of the substantial farmers of the
country had availed themselves of this offer, and had received
protections from the British general. The English and Hessian troops,
however, made no distinction between friends and foes, but frequently
committed great outrages both upon person and property. The resentment
of the population would have restored them to the patriot side; but many
who had taken the oath of allegiance felt, or affected, in consequence,
scruples of conscience.
General Washington therefore issued a counter-proclamation, commanding
all persons who had received the enemy's protection to repair to
head-quarters, or to some general officer of the army, and to surrender
their protections and take an oath of allegiance to the United
States;--allowing thirty days for those who preferred to remain under
the protection of Great Britain to withdraw within the enemy's lines.
This was considered in some quarters as an undue exercise of power. The
idea of an oath of allegiance to the United States, before the
Confederation was formed, was regarded by many as an absurdity.
Allegiance, it was said, was due exclusively to the State of which a man
was an inhabitant; the States alone were sovereign; and it was for each
State, not for the United States, which possessed no sovereignty, to
exact this obligation. The Legislature of New Jersey were disposed to
treat General Washington's proclamation as an encroachment on their
prerogatives: and one of the delegates of that State in Congress
denounced it as improper.[128]
This feeling was shared by other members; but it is not to be doubted,
that the proceeding was a legitimate exercise of the authority vested in
the Commander-in-chief. He had been expressly empowered to arrest and
confine persons disaffected to the American cause; and the requiring
them to attend at his head-quarters was clearly within the scope of this
authority. Moreover, although no confederation or political union of the
States had been formed under a written compact, yet the United States
were waging war, as a government regularly constituted by its
representatives in a congress, for the very purpose of carrying on such
war. They had an army in the field, whose officers held continental
commissions, and were paid by a continental currency. They were
exercising certain of the attributes of sovereignty as a belligerent
power; and in that capacity they had a complete right to exact such an
obligation not to aid the enemy, as would separate their friends from
their foes. It was a military measure; and the tenor of the proclamation
shows that General Washington exacted the oath in that relation. To
pause at such a moment, and to consider nicely how much sovereignty
resided in each of the States, and how much or how little belonged to
the United States, was certainly a great refinement. But it marks the
temper of the times, and the extreme jealousy with which all continental
power and authority were watched at that period.[129]
We have seen that the powers conferred upon General Washington
authorized him to raise, in the most speedy and effectual manner,
sixteen battalions of infantry, in addition to those before voted by
Congress, three regiments of artillery, and a corps of engineers; and
also to apply to any of the States for the aid of their militia when
wanted.[130] At the period when he addressed himself to this great
undertaking of forming a new army, for the third time, the existing
force which he had with him in and around New Jersey was about to be
dissolved. The additional regiments of the regular line were to be
raised by the States, and upon them alone could he depend for the supply
of a new army, with which to commence the campaign in the spring of
1777. He had labored, he said, ever since he had been in the service, to
discourage all kinds of local attachments and distinctions of country,
denominating the whole by the greater name of AMERICAN; but he had found
it impossible to overcome prejudices.
Two causes especially embarrassed his efforts in the formation of the
new army; and both of them show how powerful were the centrifugal forces
of our system at that period, and how little hold that great central
name had taken upon the people of the different States. One of these
causes was the persistence of some of the States in giving extra
bounties to encourage enlistments into their quotas of the original
eighty-eight battalions not yet raised. The bounty allowed by Congress
was twenty dollars to every soldier enlisting into the new establishment
for three years or during the war. The additional bounty offered by
Massachusetts was sixty-six dollars and two thirds. There was thus an
inducement of eighty-six dollars and two thirds offered to the men then
in the service of the United States, not to reënlist in their old
regiments, as fast as their time of service expired, but to go to
Massachusetts and enlist in the fresh quotas which were forming in that
State, and which were to be afterwards mustered into the continental
service. The same inconsiderate and unpatriotic policy was pursued in
all the Eastern States, and before the spring opened, the consequences
began to be felt in the state of the new continental battalions which
General Washington was endeavoring to procure from some of the Middle
States, and in which he would not sanction the allowance of an extra
bounty, regarding it as an indirect breach of the union, and of the
agreement entered into by the delegates of the States in Congress to
give a bounty of twenty dollars only for service in the continental
army.[131] The month of April arrived, and he had not received a man of
the new levies, except a few hundreds from Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia, while the few old regiments which remained, after the
dissolution of the army in January, were reduced to a handful of men,
the enemy being in great force, and making every preparation to seize
upon Philadelphia.
Nor did the allowance of these irregular bounties help the States, in
raising the old levies, as had been anticipated. They rather caused the
soldiers to set a high price upon themselves, and to hold back from
enlisting; while the second cause, to which I have alluded, as
embarrassing the Commander-in-chief, was a great hinderance to his
efforts to plan and carry out a campaign, having for its object the
general benefit of the whole Union.
This cause was the inability of many local authorities to comprehend the
necessity of such a campaign. General Washington was, at this period,
harassed by numerous applications to allow the troops, which had been
raised in the States for the service of the continent, to remain for the
defence of particular neighborhoods against incursions of the enemy.
Nothing, he said on one of these occasions, could exceed the pleasure
which he should feel, if he were able to protect every town and every
individual on the continent. But as this was a pleasure which he never
should realize, and as the continental forces were wanted to meet and
counteract the main designs of the enemy on the principal theatre of the
war, he could not consent to divide them and detach them to every point
where the enemy might possibly attempt an impression; "for that," he
added, "would be in the end to destroy ourselves and subjugate our
country."[132]
From the operation of these and other causes connected with the
political system of the country, the army with which Washington was
obliged to take the field, in the spring of 1777, did not exceed five
thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight effective men, exclusive of a
small body of cavalry and artillery.[133] The consequence was, a
necessary reliance upon militia, to a great extent, throughout that
summer. The battle of the Brandywine, fought with an effective force
of only eleven thousand men, including militia, against a thoroughly
disciplined army of fifteen thousand British and Hessian troops, and
fought for the city of Philadelphia as a stake, was lost on the 11th
of September.[134] The Congress broke up on the 18th. Sir William Howe
took possession of the city on the 26th; and on the 27th, the Congress
reassembled at Lancaster. In a few days, they removed to Yorktown,
where their sessions continued to be held for several months.
The position in which they found themselves, amid the dark clouds which
lowered around their cause, seems to have recalled to their recollection
the Articles of Confederation, which had lain slumbering upon their
table since the 8th of April. On that day, they had resolved that the
report should be taken into consideration on the following Monday, and
that two days in each week should be employed on the subject, until it
had been wholly discussed. When the Monday came, it was postponed; and
it was only after they had been driven from Philadelphia by the approach
of the enemy, that they seem to have fully realized the fact, that,
without a more perfect union and a more efficient government, the
country could not be saved. As soon as they had reassembled at Yorktown,
after the urgent business of the moment had been attended to, they
passed a resolve, on the 2d of October, that the Articles of
Confederation be taken into consideration the next day, at eleven
o'clock. The discussion did not actually commence, however, until the
7th of October; but from that day it was continued until the 17th of
November, when the Articles, as they afterwards went into operation,
were adopted for recommendation to the States, and a circular letter was
addressed to the several legislatures, submitting the plan of a
confederacy, and urging its adoption.
* * * * *
We are now approaching the period when the American people began to
perceive that something more was necessary to their safety and happiness
than the formation of State governments;--when they found, or were about
to find, that some digested system of national government was essential
to the great objects for which they were contending; and that, for the
formation of such a government, other arrangements than the varying
instructions of different colonies or states to a body of delegates
were indispensable. The previous illustrations, drawn from the civil and
military history of the country, have been employed to show the
character and operation of the revolutionary government, the end of
which is drawing near. For we have seen that the great purpose of that
government was to secure the independence of each of these separate
communities or states from the crown of Great Britain; that it was
instituted by political societies having no direct connection with each
other except the bond of a common danger and a common object; and that
it was formed by no other instrumentality, and possessed no other
agency, than a single body of delegates assembled in a congress. For
certain great purposes, and in order to accomplish certain objects of
common interest, a union of the people of the different States had
indeed taken place, bringing them together to act through their
representatives; but this union was now failing, from the want of
definite powers; from the unwillingness of the people of the country to
acquiesce in the exercise of the general revolutionary powers with which
it was impliedly clothed; and from the want of suitable civil machinery.
In truth, the revolutionary government was breaking down, through its
inherent defects, and the peculiar infelicity of its situation. Above
all, it was breaking down from the want of a civil executive to take the
lead in assuming and exercising the powers implied from the great
objects for which it was contending. Its legislative authority,
although defined in no written instruments or public charters, was
sufficient, under its implied general powers, to have enabled it to
issue decrees, directing the execution, by its own agents, of all
measures essential to the national safety. But this authority was never
exercised, partly because the States were unwilling to execute it, but
chiefly because no executive agency existed to represent the continental
power, and to enforce its decrees.
* * * * *
It is a singular circumstance, that, while the revolutionary government
was left to conduct the great affairs of the continent through the mere
instrumentality of a congress of delegates, and was thus failing for the
want of departments and powers, the States were engaged in applying
those great principles in the organization and construction of popular
governments, under which they may be formed with rapidity and ease, and
which are capable of the most varied adaptation to the circumstances and
wants of a free people.
The suppression of the royal authority throughout the colonies, by
virtue of the resolve of the Continental Congress passed on the 10th of
May, 1776, rendered necessary the formation of local governments,
capable at once of answering the ends of political society, and of
continuing without interruption the protection of law over property,
life, and public order. Fortunately, as we have seen, the previous
constitutions of all the colonies had accustomed the people, to a great
extent, to the business of government; and, when the recommendation of
the Continental Congress to the several colonies to adopt such
governments as would best conduce to their happiness and safety was made
immediately after the first effusion of blood, it was addressed to civil
societies, in which the people had, in different modes, been long
accustomed to witness and to exercise the functions of legislation, and
in all of which there were established forms of law, of judicature, and
of executive power.
The new political situation in which they now found themselves required,
in many of the colonies, but little departure from these ancient
institutions. The chief innovation necessary was, to bring into
practical working the authority of the people, in place of that of the
crown of England, as the source of all political power. The changes
requisite to effect this were of course to be made at once; the
materials for these changes existed everywhere, in the representative
institutions which had been long a part of the system of every colony
since the first settlement of the country. Thus, as we have seen, in all
the provincial, the proprietary, and the charter governments, the
freemen of the colony had been accustomed to be represented in the
government, in some form; and although those governments, with a few
exceptions, were under the direct or indirect restraint of the crown,
and could all be reached and controlled by the exercise of arbitrary
power, the practice of representation, through popular elections, was
everywhere known and familiar. The old constitutions of some of the
colonies had also been highly democratic, admitting an election of the
executive, as well as of the legislature, directly by the people;[135]
while, in others, where the executive was appointed by the crown, the
second or less numerous branch of the legislature had been elected by
the people, either directly, or indirectly through the popular assembly.
The foundations, therefore, for popular governments existed in all the
colonies, and furnished the means for substituting the new source of
political power, the will of the people, in the place of that of an
external sovereign.
But there were other materials, also, for the formation of regular and
balanced governments, with nearer approaches to perfection and with far
greater completeness than a mere democracy can afford to any people,
however familiar they may be with the exercise and the practice of
government. The people of these colonies had been so trained as to be
able to apply those principles in the construction and operation of
government which enable it to work freely, successfully, and wisely,
while resting on a popular basis. They were able to see, that the whole
of what is meant and understood by government is comprehended in the
existence and due operation of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers.[136] They had lived under political arrangements, in which these
powers had been distributed so as to keep them for the most part
distinct from each other, and so as to mark the proper limitations of
each. If, in some instances, the same individuals had exercised more
than one of these powers, the distinctions between the departments, and
the principles which ought to regulate such distinctions, had become
known. The people of the colonies, in general, therefore, saw that
nothing was so important, in constructing a government with popular
institutions, as to balance each of these departments against the
others, so as to leave to neither of them uncontrolled and irresponsible
power. In general, too, they understood, and had always been accustomed
to the application of that other fundamental principle, essential to a
well-regulated liberty, the division of the legislative power between
two separate chambers, having distinct origins and of distinct
constructions.[137]
But none of these ideas were applied, or were yet thought of being
applied, to the construction of a government for the United States; and
it is therefore at this period that we are to observe the slow progress
making, through disaster and trial, to those great discoveries which led
the way to the Constitution, and that we are to mark the first of those
failures by which the people of America learnt the bitter wisdom of
experience. For the fate of the revolutionary government presents the
first illustration in our history of the complete futility of a
federative union, whose operation as a government should consist merely
in agreeing upon measures in a general council, leaving the execution of
those measures to the separate members of the confederacy. But this
first illustration, we shall soon see, was not sufficient to establish
this truth in the convictions of the American people.
Another and a severer trial awaited them. They were not only to be
taught once more that a mere federative union was a rope of sand, but
they were also to be taught, that a government instituted upon this
principle for the purposes of a war, in which the separate members of
the confederacy had a common interest, would not answer the exigencies
of a country like this, in time of peace. They were to learn, by a
trying experience, that the vast concerns of peace are far more complex
than the concerns of war; that there were important functions of
government to be discharged upon this continent, which only national
power and national authority can accomplish, and that those functions
are essential, not only to the prosperity and happiness of this nation,
but to the continued existence of republican liberty within the States
themselves. They were to learn this through a state of things verging
upon anarchy; amidst the decay of public virtue; the conflict of
sectional interests; and the almost total dissolution of the bands by
which society is held together. In this state of things was to be at
last developed the fundamental idea on which the Constitution of the
United States now rests,--the political union of the _people_ of the
United States, as distinguished from a union of the _States_ of which
they are citizens.
We have, therefore, now reached the first stage in the constitutional
history of the country. What has thus far been stated comes to a single
point, the earliest great illustration of the radical defects in a
purely federative union. The next stage which succeeds presents the
second illustration of this important truth.
FOOTNOTES:
[103] Washington's Writings, III. 403.
[104] Writings of Washington, IV. 72.
[105] Writings of Washington, IV. 100.
[106] Letter to the President of Congress, Washington's Writings, IV.
110. September 24, 1776.
[107] Journals, II. 357.
[108] 500 acres to a colonel; 450 to a lieutenant-colonel; 400 to a
major; 300 to a captain; 200 to a lieutenant; and 150 to an ensign.
[109] Journals, II. 357. Subsequently, by a resolve passed November 12
(1776), the option was given to enlist for the war or for three years,
taking away the land bounty from those who enlisted for the latter
period only. Ibid. 454.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Journals, II. 403. October 8, 1776.
[112] Writings of Washington, IV. 173.
[113] Ibid. 183, 184.
[114] Writings of Washington, IV. 184.
[115] Writings, IV. 190.
[116] Ibid. 197.
[117] Ibid. 202.
[118] Ibid. 206.
[119] Ibid. 211.
[120] Ibid. 225.
[121] Writings, IV. 232.
[122] Journals, II. 475. A committee, at the head of which was Robert
Morris, was appointed to transmit this resolve to General Washington,
and in their letter they said: "We find by these resolves that your
Excellency's hands will be strengthened by very ample powers; and a new
reformation of the army seems to have its origin therein. Happy it is
for this country, that the general of their forces can safely be
intrusted with the most unlimited power, and neither personal security,
liberty, nor property be in the least degree endangered thereby." In his
reply, the General said to the committee: "Yours of the 31st of last
month inclosed to me sundry resolves of Congress, by which I find they
have done me the honor to intrust me with powers, in my military
capacity, of the highest nature, and almost unlimited in extent. Instead
of thinking myself freed from all _civil_ obligations, by this mark of
their confidence, I shall constantly bear in mind, that, as the sword
was the last resort for the preservation of our liberties, so it ought
to be the first thing laid aside when those liberties are firmly
established. I shall instantly set about the most necessary reforms in
the army; but it will not be in my power to make so great a progress as
if I had a little leisure time upon my hands." Writings of Washington,
IV. 257, 552.
[123] Writings of Washington, IV. 551.
[124] Writings of Washington, IV. 551.
[125] Journals, III. 35.
[126] "We have now to lament," said Robert Morris, in a private Letter
to General Washington, under date of February 27th, 1777 "the absence
from the public councils of America of Johnson, Jay, R. R. Livingston,
Duane, Deane, W. Livingston, Franklin, Dickinson, Harrison, Nelson,
Hooper, Rutledge, and others not less conspicuous, without any proper
appointments to fill their places, and this at the very time they are
most wanted, or would be so, if they had not very wisely supplied the
deficiency by delegating to your Excellency certain powers, that they
durst not have intrusted to any other man. But what is to become of
America, and its cause, if a constant fluctuation is to take place among
its counsellors, and at every change we find reason to view it with
regret?" Writings of Washington, IV. 340, note.
[127] Massachusetts, in December, 1776, renewed the credentials of John
Hancock, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Robert Treat Paine, Elbridge Gerry,
Francis Dana, and James Lovell, giving power to any three or more of
them, with the delegates from the other American States, to concert,
direct, and order such further measures as shall to them appear best
calculated for the establishment of right and liberty to the American
States, upon a basis permanent and secure against the power and art of
the British administration; for prosecuting the present war, concluding
peace, contracting alliances, establishing commerce, and guarding
against any future encroachments and machinations of their enemies; with
power to adjourn, &c. (Journals, IV. 14.) New Hampshire in the same
month sent William Whipple, Josiah Bartlett, and Mathew Thornton, making
any one of them a full delegation, without any other instructions than
"to represent" the State in the Continental Congress for one year, and
allowing only two of them to attend at a time. (Ibid. 41.) Virginia in
the same month appointed Mann Page, in the room of George Wythe, with
the same general instructions "to represent" the State. (Ibid. 42.)
North Carolina in the same month appointed William Hooper, Joseph Hewes,
and Thomas Burke, and invested them "with such powers as may make any
act done by them, or any of them, or consent given in the said Congress
in behalf of this State, obligatory upon every inhabitant thereof."
(Ibid. 37.) South Carolina chose Arthur Middleton, Thomas Hayward, Jr.,
and Henry Laurens, with power "to concert, agree to, and _execute_ every
measure which one or all of them should judge necessary for the defence,
security, or interest of this State in particular, and of America in
general." (Ibid. 53.) Connecticut sent Roger Sherman, Samuel Huntington,
Eliphalet Dyer, Oliver Wolcott, Richard Law, and William Williams, "to
consult, advise, and resolve upon measures necessary to be taken and
pursued for the defence, security, and preservation of the rights and
liberties of the said United States, and for their common safety"; but
requiring them "of such their proceedings and resolves to transmit
authentic copies from time to time to the General Assembly of this
state." (Ibid. 5.) Of the other states, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New
York, New Jersey, Maryland, and Georgia, which renewed their delegations
somewhat later in the year, instructed them simply "to represent" the
state in the Continental Congress; and Delaware empowered its delegates,
on behalf of the state, "to concert, agree to, and execute any measure
which they, together with a majority of the Continental Congress, should
judge necessary for the defense, security, interest, and welfare of that
State in particular, and America in general." (Ibid. 64, 315, 171, 169,
395, 54, 403, 86.)
[128] This was Mr. Abraham Clark, one of the signers of the Declaration
of Independence. Mr. Sparks has preserved a curious letter written by
this gentleman on the subject. Writings of Washington, IV. 298.
[129] The whole of this alarm evidently arose from the use of the words
"oath of allegiance" in General Washington's proclamation. Probably this
phrase was used by him as a convenient description of the obligation
which he intended to exact. He did not use it as a jurist, but as a
general and a statesman. In a letter written by him on the 5th of
February (1777) to the President of Congress, desiring that body to urge
the States to adopt an oath of fidelity, he said: "From the first
institution of civil government, it has been the national policy of
every precedent state to endeavor to engage its members to the discharge
of their public duty by the obligation of some oath"; and he then
observes, with his characteristic wisdom, that "an oath is the only
substitute that can be adopted to supply the _defect of principle_." He
advised that every State should fix upon some oath or affirmation of
allegiance, to be tendered to all the inhabitants without exception, and
to outlaw those that refused it. (Writings, IV. 311, 312.) Afterwards,
when the Legislative Council of New Jersey--where some of the people had
refused to take the oath required by his proclamation--applied to him to
explain the nature of the oath, and to be furnished with a copy of it,
that they might know whether it was the oath prescribed by the General
Assembly of that State, he informed them that he had prescribed no form,
and had reverted to none prescribed by them; that his instructions to
the brigadiers who attended to that duty were, to insist on nothing more
than an obligation in _no manner to injure the States_; and that he had
left the form to his subordinates; but that if he had known of any form
adapted to the circumstances of the inhabitants, he would certainly have
ordered it. (Ibid. 319, note.) This explanation makes it quite certain,
that what General Washington called in his proclamation an oath of
allegiance was merely a military exaction of an obligation in favor of a
belligerent power against the enemy; and his advice on the subject of a
general civil oath of allegiance, to be exacted by the States, shows
that he understood the niceties of the subject as well as any casuist in
or out of Congress. This topic may be dismissed by reverting here to the
fact, that in February, 1778, Congress prescribed an oath or
affirmation, to be taken by the officers of the army, and all others
holding office under Congress, which was simply a renunciation of
allegiance to the King of Great Britain, an acknowledgment of the
independence of the United States, and a promise to support, maintain,
and defend them against King George III. and his successors, and to
serve the United States in the office mentioned with fidelity, and the
best skill and understanding of the party taking the oath. Journals, IV.
49.
[130] Ante, p. 100.
[131] Letter to General Knox, February 11, 1777. Writings, IV. 316.
[132] Letter to Governor Trumbull, May 11, 1777. Writings, IV. 413. See
also Letter to Major-General Stephen, May 24, 1777. Ibid. 431.
[133] Marshall's Life of Washington, III. 102.
[134] The exact numbers of the troops on both sides, in this battle, are
not known. Sir William Howe estimated the American force at 15,000,
including militia; and this number is given in the Annual Register. But
the effective force of the American army was always, at this period of
the war, considerably less than the total number; and Chief Justice
Marshall states it to have been, on this occasion, 11,000, including
militia. The Annual Register gives the number of the royal army brought
into action as 15,000. Marshall supposes it to have been 18,000, when
they landed on the shores of the Chesapeake. Marshall's Life of
Washington, III. 140, 141. Annual Register for 1777, XX. 127.
[135] Connecticut and Rhode Island.
[136] See John Adams's letter to R. H. Lee.
[137] Three of the colonies, namely, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and
Virginia, proceeded to form constitutions of government before the
Declaration of Independence was adopted, under a special recommendation
given to each of them by Congress, in the latter part of the year 1775,
addressed to the provincial convention, advising them "to call a full
and free representation of the people, to establish such a form of
government as in their judgment will best promote the happiness of the
people, and most effectually secure good order in the province during
the continuance of the present dispute between Great Britain and the
colonies." (Journals, I. 231, 235, 279.) In New Hampshire, this
suggestion was carried out in January, 1776, by the representatives of
the people, who had first met as a Provincial Congress of deputies from
the towns, and then assumed the name and authority of a "house of
representatives," or "assembly" of the Colony; in which capacity they
proceeded to elect twelve persons from the several counties, to form a
distinct branch of the legislature, as a council. The council were to
elect their own presiding officer. All acts and resolves, to be valid,
were required to pass both branches; all public officers, except clerks
of courts, were to be appointed by the two houses, and all money bills
were to originate in the popular branch. In case the dispute with Great
Britain should continue longer than the year 1776, and the general
Congress should not give other instructions, it was provided that the
council should be chosen by the people of each county, in a mode to be
prescribed by the council and house. This form of government continued
through the Revolution, and until the year 1790, when a new constitution
was formed. (Pitkin's History of the United States, II. 294.) In South
Carolina, the Provincial Congress likewise resolved itself a "general
assembly," and elected a legislative council, from their own body. By
these two bodies, acting jointly, an executive, styled a president, a
commander-in-chief, and a vice-president, was chosen. The legislative
authority was vested in the president and the two houses. The judiciary
were elected by the two houses and commissioned by the president, and
were to hold their offices during good behavior, subject to removal on
the address of both houses. This form of government remained until June,
1790, when a new constitution was formed by a convention. On the 15th of
May, 1776, the Provincial Convention of Virginia proceeded to prepare a
declaration of rights and a constitution. The latter declared that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be distinct
and separate, and divided the legislative department into two branches,
the house of delegates and the senate, to be called "the General
Assembly of Virginia." The members of the house of delegates were chosen
from each county, and one from the city of Williamsburg and one from the
borough of Norfolk. The senate consisted of twenty-four members, chosen
from as many districts. A governor and council of state were chosen
annually by joint ballot of both houses. The legislature appointed the
judges, who were commissioned by the governor, and held their offices
during good behavior. Massachusetts was one of the colonies whose
situation rendered it necessary to defer the formation of a constitution
for several years. The transition in that colony from the government of
the King to a government of the people took place in the latter part of
the year 1774 and the beginning of 1775. The occurrences which led the
House of Representatives to resolve themselves into a Provincial
Congress have been stated in the text of a previous chapter (ante, p.
26). This body, which assumed the control of the affairs of the colony
in October, 1774, first assembled at Cambridge, where they continued in
session until the 10th of December, and then dissolved themselves,
having first appointed a _Committee of Safety_ to manage the public
concerns, until a new Congress should be assembled. On the 1st of
February, 1775, a new Provincial Congress met at Cambridge, adjourned to
Concord, and thence to Watertown, and were dissolved on the 23d of May.
On the 16th of May, they wrote to the Continental Congress, requesting
their advice on "taking up and exercising the powers of civil
government." In their letter they said, "As the sword should in all free
states be subservient to the civil powers, and as it is the duty of the
magistrate to support it for the people's necessary defence, we tremble
at having an army, although consisting of our own countrymen,
established here, without a civil power to provide for and control
them." On the 9th of June, the Continental Congress passed a resolve,
recommending the election of a new General Assembly, under the
directions of the Provincial Congress, and that the Assembly, when
chosen, should exercise the powers of government, until a governor of
the King's appointment would consent to govern the Colony according to
its charter. (Journals, I. 115.) Meanwhile, a third Provincial Congress
met at Watertown, on the 31st of May, and sat until the 19th. The new
General Assembly of the Province, called "the General Court," after its
ancient usage, met in the mode provided by the charter, and elected a
council. These two branches continued to administer the government, as
nearly in the spirit of the charter as might be, without a governor,
until 1780, when a convention was called and a constitution framed,
similar in all its main features to the present constitution of the
State. The constitutions of the other States were formed under the
general recommendation of the resolve of Congress of May 10th, 1776,
addressed to all the colonies, which contemplated the formation of
permanent governments, and dissolved the allegiance of the people to the
crown of Great Britain. The constitutions of New Jersey, Maryland,
Delaware, and North Carolina were formed in 1776, and that of New York
in April, 1777; all having three branches, the legislative, the
executive, and the judiciary, and all having a legislature consisting of
two houses. The constitution of Georgia was formed in 1789, after the
same general model. That of Pennsylvania was formed in 1776, with a
legislature consisting of a single branch, but with the like division of
the legislative, executive, and judicial departments.
CHAPTER V.
NOVEMBER, 1777--MARCH, 1781.
ADOPTION OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.--CESSIONS OF WESTERN
TERRITORY.--FIRST POLITICAL UNION OF THE STATES.
We have now to examine the period which intervened between the
recommendation of the Confederation by Congress, in November, 1777, and
its final adoption by all the States, in March, 1781;--a period of three
years and a half. The causes which protracted the final assent of the
States to the new government, and the mode in which the various
objections were at length obviated, are among the most important topics
in our constitutional history. But, before they are examined, the order
of events by which the Confederation finally became obligatory upon all
the States should here be stated.
The last clause of the Articles of Confederation directed that they
should be submitted to the legislatures of all the States to be
considered; and if approved of by them, they were advised to authorize
their delegates to ratify the instrument in Congress; upon which
ratification, it was to become binding and conclusive. On the 20th of
June, 1778, a call was made in Congress for the report of the
delegations on the action of their several States, and on the 26th of
the same month a form of ratification was adopted for signature. On the
9th of July, the ratification was signed by the delegates of eight
States; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. North Carolina
ratified the Articles on the 21st of July; Georgia on the 24th; New
Jersey on the 26th of November; Delaware on the 5th of May, 1779;
Maryland on the 1st of March, 1781. On the 2d of March, 1781, Congress
met under the Confederation.
* * * * *
Undoubtedly one of the causes which deferred the full adoption of the
Confederation to so late a period after it was proposed, was the absence
from Congress of many of the most important and able men, whose
attention had hitherto been devoted to the affairs of the continent, but
who began to be occupied with local affairs, soon after the
extraordinary powers were conferred upon General Washington. In October,
1777, Hancock left the chair of Congress, for an absence of two months;
and the votes on a resolution of thanks to him, for his services as
presiding officer, show a great paucity of talent in Congress at that
moment.[138] Twenty-two members only were present, and of these the
only names much known to fame, at that time or since, were those of
Samuel Adams, John Adams, and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, the two
Lees of Virginia, Hayward and Laurens of South Carolina, and Samuel
Chase of Maryland. Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Silas Deane were then in
France. Patrick Henry was Governor of Virginia. Mr. Jefferson was in the
legislature of Virginia, having left Congress in September, in order, as
he has himself recorded, to reform the legislation of the State, which,
under the royal government, was, he says, full of vicious defects.[139]
Mr. Madison was also in the legislature of his native State, a young man
of great promise, but unknown at that time as a continental statesman.
He entered Congress in March, 1780.
In the year 1778, when the delegations were called upon for reports on
the action of their several States upon the Confederation, and when the
first objections to the Articles were to be encountered, Hancock had
returned to Congress. Samuel Adams and Elbridge Gerry were among his
colleagues from Massachusetts. Mr. John Adams was in Europe, as
Commissioner of the United States to the Court of France. Dr. Franklin
was still abroad. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Mr. Laurens and Mr.
Hayward of South Carolina, Roger Sherman, Samuel Huntington, and Oliver
Wolcott of Connecticut, and Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, were
present. The rest of the members, with one brilliant exception, were not
men of great distinction, influence, or capacity. That exception was
Gouverneur Morris, who came into Congress in January of this year, with
a somewhat remarkable youthful reputation, acquired in the public
councils of New York.
When this Congress is compared with that of the year 1776, and it is
remembered that the Declaration of Independence bears the names of John
Adams and Robert Treat Paine of Massachusetts, Francis Hopkinson of New
Jersey, Benjamin Rush and Dr. Franklin of Pennsylvania, Cæsar Rodney of
Delaware, Samuel Chase of Maryland, George Wythe, Thomas Jefferson, and
Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, William Hooper of North Carolina, and
Edward Rutledge and Arthur Middleton of South Carolina,--none of whom
were now present,--we perceive at once a striking difference in the two
bodies. This difference was not unobserved by those who were then deeply
interested in watching the course of public affairs. More than once it
filled Washington with dark forebodings;[140] and in the early part of
the year 1778, it had attracted the notice of Hamilton, whose vigilant
comprehension surveyed the whole field of public affairs, and detected
the causes of every danger that threatened the health of the body
politic.[141]
The objections made by the legislatures of several of the States to the
Articles of Confederation were found, when examined, to consist almost
entirely of propositions for mere verbal amendments, chiefly for the
purpose of rendering the instrument more clear. All of these amendments
were rejected. Some of the States objected to the rule for apportioning
the taxes and forces to be raised by the States for the service of the
Union; but Congress rejected every proposition to alter it, as it was
believed to be impossible that any other rule should be agreed upon.
But there was an objection made by the State of New Jersey, which should
be particularly noticed here, because it foreshadowed the great idea
which the Constitution of the United States afterwards embodied. This
objection was, that the Articles of Confederation contained no provision
by which the foreign trade of the country would be placed under the
regulation of Congress. The sixth of the Articles of Confederation
declared, that no State should levy any imposts or duties, which might
interfere with any stipulations entered into by the United States with
any foreign power pursuant to the treaties already proposed to the
courts of France and Spain; while the ninth article declared that no
treaty of commerce should be made by the United States, whereby the
legislative power of the respective States should be restrained from
imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people were
subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any
species of goods or commodities whatsoever. The effect of these
provisions was simply to restrain the States from laying imposts which
would interfere with the then proposed treaties; in all other respects,
the foreign trade of each State was left to be regulated by State
legislation.
The legislature of New Jersey, in a very able memorial, laid before
Congress on the 25th of June, 1778, declared that the sole and exclusive
power of regulating the trade of the United States with foreign nations
ought to be clearly vested in the Congress, and that the revenue arising
from duties and customs ought to be appropriated to the building and
support of a navy for the protection of trade and the defence of the
coasts, and to other public and general purposes, for the common benefit
of the States. They suggested that a great security would be derived to
the Union, from such an establishment of a common and mutual
interest.[142] But this suggestion was both premature and tardy. It was
premature, because the States had not yet learned that their control
over foreign commerce must be surrendered, if they would avoid the evils
of perpetual conflict with each other; and it came too late, because the
Articles of Confederation were practically incapable of amendment, at
the period when the suggestion was made.[143]
* * * * *
The great obstacle, however, to the adoption of the Confederation, which
delayed the assent of several of the smaller States for so long a
period, was the claim of some of the larger States to the vacant lands
lying within what they considered their rightful boundaries. The
boundaries of the great States, as fixed by their charters derived from
the crown of England, extended, in terms, "to the South Sea," and each
of these States, as successor, by the Revolution, to the crown, with
regard to territorial sovereignty, claimed to own both the jurisdiction
and the property of all the crown lands within its limits. This claim
was strenuously resisted by Rhode Island, Delaware, New Jersey, and
Maryland. They insisted that Congress ought to have the right to fix the
boundaries of the States whose charters stretched to such an indefinite
extent into the Western wilderness, and that the unoccupied lands ought
to be the property of the whole Union; since, if the independence of the
country should be finally established, those lands would have been
conquered from the crown of England by the common blood and treasure of
all the States. The effect of a tacit recognition of the claims of the
great States upon the welfare of such a State as Maryland, through the
absence from the Articles of Confederation of any provision on the
subject, was strikingly exhibited, by its legislature, in certain
instructions to their delegates in Congress, which were laid before that
body on the 21st of May, 1779. They pointed out two consequences likely
to result from a confirmation of the claim which Virginia had set up to
an extensive and fertile country; the one would be, they said, directly
injurious to Maryland, while the other would be inconsistent with the
letter and spirit of the proposed Confederation. They supposed, on the
one hand, that a sale by Virginia of only a small proportion of these
lands would draw into her treasury vast sums of money, enabling her to
lessen her taxes, and thereby to drain the less wealthy neighboring
State of its most useful inhabitants, which would cause it to sink, in
wealth and consequence, in the scale of the confederated States. On the
other hand, they suggested that Virginia might, and probably would, be
obliged to divide its territory, and to erect a new State, under the
auspices and direction of the elder, from whom it would receive its form
of government, to whom it would be bound by some alliance, and by whose
counsels it would be influenced. They declared that, if this were to
take place, it would be inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the
Confederation already proposed; that, if it were to result in the
establishment of a sub-confederacy, an _imperium in imperio_, the State
possessed of this extensive dominion must then either submit to all the
inconveniences of an overgrown and unwieldy government, or suffer the
authority of Congress to interpose at a future time, and lop off a part
of its territory to be erected into a new and free state, and admitted
into a confederation on such conditions as should be settled by nine
States. If, they asked, it should be necessary for the happiness and
tranquillity of a State thus overgrown, that Congress should, at some
future time, interfere and divide its territory, why should the claim to
that territory be now made and insisted upon? Policy and justice, they
urged, alike required, that a country,--unsettled at the commencement of
the war, claimed by the British crown and ceded to it by the treaty of
Paris,--if wrested from the common enemy by the blood and treasure of
the thirteen States, should be considered as a common property, subject
to be parcelled out by Congress into free, convenient, and independent
governments, in such manner and at such times as their wisdom might
thereafter direct. Coolly and dispassionately considering the subject,
weighing probable inconveniences and hardships against the sacrifice of
just and essential rights, they then instructed their delegates to
withhold the assent of Maryland to the Confederation, until an article
or articles could be obtained in conformity with these views.[144]
Against this proposition, the State of Virginia, which had already
ratified the Articles of Confederation, so remonstrated, that there
appeared to be no prospect of reconciling the difficulty. At this
juncture the State of New York came forward, and by an act of its
legislature, passed on the 19th of February, 1780, authorized its
delegates in Congress to limit the western boundaries of the State, and
ceded a portion of its public lands for the use and benefit of such of
the United States as should become members of the federal alliance. The
motives upon which this concession was expressly made had reference to
the formation of the Union, by removing, as far as depended upon the
State of New York, the impediment which had so long prevented it.[145]
After they had received official notice of this act, by a report made on
the 6th of September, 1780, Congress pressed upon the other States,
similarly situated, the policy of a liberal surrender of a portion of
their territorial claims, as they could not be preserved entire without
endangering the stability of the general confederacy;--reminding them
how indispensably necessary it was to establish the Federal Union on a
fixed and permanent basis, and on principles acceptable to all its
respective members,--how essential it was to public credit and
confidence, to the support of the army, to the vigor of the national
councils, to tranquillity at home, to reputation abroad, and to the very
existence of the people of America as a free, sovereign, and independent
people. At the same time, they earnestly requested the legislature of
the State of Maryland to accede to the Confederation.[146]
That State was not without examples of patriotic confidence among her
smaller sister States. As early as the 20th of November, 1778, New
Jersey had led the way to a generous trust on the part of the States
which still remained out of the Union. She declared that the Articles of
Confederation were in divers respects unequal and disadvantageous to
her, and that her objections were of essential moment to the welfare and
happiness of her people; yet, convinced of the present necessity of
acceding to the confederacy proposed, feeling that every separate and
detached interest ought to be postponed to the general good of the
Union, and firmly believing that the candor and justice of the several
States would, in due time, remove the inequality of which she
complained, she authorized her delegates to accede to the
Confederation.[147]
Delaware followed with not unequal steps. On the 1st of February, 1779,
she declared that, although she was justly entitled to a right, in
common with the other members of the Union, to that extensive tract of
country lying to the westward of the frontiers of the United States,
gained by the blood and treasure of all, and therefore proper to become
a common estate, to be granted out on terms beneficial to all; yet, for
the same reasons, and from the same motives with those announced by New
Jersey, and with a like faith in the sense of justice of her great
confederates, she ratified the Articles of Confederation.[148]
These examples were not without influence upon the councils of
patriotic Maryland. On the 30th of January, 1781, her legislature passed
an act, the preamble of which commences with these memorable words:
"Whereas it hath been said, that the common enemy is encouraged, by this
State not acceding to the Confederation, to hope that the union of the
sister States may be dissolved; and they therefore prosecute the war in
expectation of an event so disgraceful to America; and our friends and
illustrious ally are impressed with an idea, that the common cause would
be promoted by our formally acceding to the Confederation: This General
Assembly, conscious that this State hath, from the commencement of the
war, strenuously exerted herself in the common cause, and fully
satisfied that, if no formal confederation were to take place, it is the
fixed determination of this State to continue her exertions to the
utmost, agreeable to the faith pledged in the Union;--from an earnest
desire to conciliate the affection of the sister States, to convince all
the world of our unalterable resolution to support the independence of
the United States, and the alliance with his most Christian Majesty, and
to destroy for ever any apprehension of our friends, or hope in our
enemies, of this State being again united to Great Britain;--Be it
enacted," &c. The act then proceeded to adopt and ratify the Articles of
Confederation, relying on the justice of the other States to secure the
interests of the whole in the unoccupied Western territory.[149]
As soon as this act of Maryland was laid before Congress, the joyful
news was announced to the country, that the Union of the States was
consummated under the written instrument, which had been so long
projected. The same month which saw the completion of this Union
witnessed a cession by Virginia to the United States of all her claims
to lands northwest of the river Ohio; but the cession was not finally
completed and accepted until the month of March, 1784. This vast
territory, now the seat of prosperous and powerful States, came into the
possession of the United States, under a provision made by Congress,
that such lands should be disposed of for the common benefit of the
United States, and should be settled and formed into distinct republican
States, to become members of the Federal Union, with the same rights of
sovereignty, freedom, and independence as the other States.
The historian who may, in any generation, record these noble acts of
patriotism and concession, should pause and contemplate the magnitude of
the event with which they were connected. He should pause, to render
honor to the illustrious deeds of that great community, which first
generously withdrew the impediment of its territorial claims; and to the
no less gallant confidence of those smaller States, which trusted to the
future for the final and complete removal of the inequality of which
they complained. He should render honor to the State of New York, for
the surrender of a territory to which she believed her legal title to be
complete; a title which nothing but the paramount equity of the claims
of the whole Confederacy ought to have overcome. That equity she
acknowledged. She threw aside her charters and her title-deeds; she
ceased to use the language of royal grants, and discarded the principle
of succession. She came forth from among her parchments into the forum
of conscience, in presence of the whole American people;
and--recognizing the justice of their claim to territories gained by
their common efforts--to secure the inestimable blessings of union, for
their good and for her own, she submitted to the national will the
determination of her western boundaries, and devoted to the national
benefit her vast claims to unoccupied territories.
Equal honor should be rendered to New Jersey, to Delaware, and to
Maryland. The two former, without waiting for the action of a single
State within whose reputed limits these public domains were situate,
trusted wholly to a future sense of justice, and ratified the Union in
the confidence that justice would be done. The latter waited; but only
until she saw that the common enemy was encouraged, and that friends
were disheartened, by her reserve. Seeing this, she hesitated no longer,
but completed the union of the States before Virginia had made the
cession, which afterwards so nobly justified the confidence that had
been placed in her.[150]
The student of American constitutional history, therefore, cannot fail
to see, that the adoption of the first written constitution was
accomplished through great and magnanimous sacrifices. The very
foundations of the structure of government since raised rest upon
splendid concessions for the common weal, made, it is true, under the
stern pressure of war, but made from the noblest motives of patriotism.
These concessions evince the progress which the people of the United
States were then making towards both a national character and a national
feeling. They show that, while there were causes which tended to keep
the States apart,--the formation of State constitutions, the conflicting
interests growing out of the inequalities of these different
communities, and the previous want of a national legislative
power,--there were still other causes at work, which tended to draw
together the apparently discordant elements, and to create a union in
which should be bound together, as one nation, the populations which had
hitherto known only institutions of a local character. The time was
indeed not come, when these latter tendencies could entirely overcome
the former. It was not until the trials of peace had tested the strength
and efficiency of a system formed under the trials of war,--when another
and a severer conflict between national and local interests was to shake
the republic to its centre,--that a national government could be formed,
adequate to all the exigencies of both. Still, the year 1781 saw the
establishment of the Confederation, caused by the necessities of
military defence against an invading enemy. But it was accomplished
only through the sacrifice of great claims; and the fact that it was
accomplished, and that it led the way to our present Constitution,
proves at once the wisdom and the patriotism of those who labored for
it.
The great office of the Confederation, in our political history, will
be a proper topic for consideration, after the analysis of its
provisions. But we should not omit to observe here, that, when the
union of the States was thus secured, the motives on which it was
formed, and the concessions by which it was accompanied and followed,
created a vast obstacle to any future dissolution. The immediate
object of each State was to obtain its own independence of the crown
of Great Britain, through the united, and therefore more powerful,
action of all the States. But, in order to effect such a union, that
immense territory, over which, in the language of Maryland, "free,
convenient, and independent governments" were afterwards to be formed,
was to be ceded in advance, or to be impliedly promised to be ceded,
to the use and benefit of the whole confederacy. A confederacy of
states, which had become possessed of such a common property, was thus
bound together by an interest, the magnitude and force of which cannot
now be easily estimated. The Union might incur fresh dangers of
dissolution, after the war had ceased; its frame of government and its
legislative power might prove wholly inadequate to the national wants
in time of peace; the public faith might be prostrated, and the
national arm enfeebled;--still, while the Confederacy stood as the
great trustee of property large enough for the accommodation of an
empire, a security existed against its total destruction. No State
could withdraw from the Confederation, without forfeiting its interest
in this grand public domain; and no human wisdom could devise a
satisfactory distribution of property ceded as a common fund for the
common benefit of sovereign States, without any fixed ratio of
interest in the respective beneficiaries, and without any clear power
in the government of the Confederation to deal with the trust
itself.[151]
FOOTNOTES:
[138] Hancock retired on the 31st of October, for a short absence, after
an unremitted service of two years and five months in the chair. A vote
of thanks was moved, as soon as he had concluded his address; but before
the question was put, it was moved "to resolve as the opinion of
Congress, that it is improper to thank any president for the discharge
of the duties of that office"; and it is a curious fact, that on this
motion the States were equally divided. The previous motion was then
put, and five States voted in the affirmative, three in the negative,
and the delegation of one State was divided. Journals, III. 465-467.
[139] Writings of Jefferson, I. 29.
[140] Writings of Washington, V. 326, 327, 350.
[141] "America once had a representation that would do honor to any age
or nation. The present falling off is very alarming and dangerous. What
is the cause? and How is it to be remedied? are questions that the
welfare of these States requires should be well attended to. The great
men who composed our first council,--are they dead, have they deserted
the cause, or what has become of them? Very few are dead, and still
fewer have deserted the cause: they are all, except the few who still
remain in Congress, either in the field, or in the civil offices of
their respective States; far the greater part are engaged in the latter.
The only remedy, then, is to take them out of these employments, and
return them to the place where their presence is infinitely more
important. Each State, in order to promote its own internal government
and prosperity, has selected its best members to fill the offices within
itself, and conduct its own affairs. Men have been fonder of the
emoluments and conveniences of being employed at home; and local
attachment, falsely operating, has made them more provident for the
particular interests of the States to which they belonged, than for the
common interests of the Confederacy. This is a most pernicious mistake,
and must be corrected. However important it is to give form and
efficiency to your interior constitutions and police, it is infinitely
more important to have a wise general council; otherwise, a failure of
the measures of the Union will overturn all your labors for the
advancement of your particular good, and ruin the common cause. You
should not beggar the councils of the United States to enrich the
administration of the several members. Realize to yourself the
consequences of having a Congress despised at home and abroad. How can
the common force be exerted, if the power of collecting it be put in
weak, foolish, and unsteady hands? How can we hope for success in our
European negotiations, if the nations of Europe have no confidence in
the wisdom and vigor of the great continental government? This is the
object on which their eyes are fixed; hence it is, America will derive
its importance or insignificance in their estimation." Letter by
Hamilton to George Clinton, written from the head-quarters of the army,
February 13, 1778. Writings of Washington, V. 508.
[142] Journals, IV. 269, 270. This wise and well-considered document
contained many other very important suggestions; among which was that of
an oath, test, or declaration to be taken by the delegates in Congress,
previous to their admission to their seats. "It is indeed to be
presumed," said the memorial, "that the respective States will be
careful that the delegates they send to assist in managing the general
interests of the Union, take the oaths to the government from which they
derive their authority: but as the United States, collectively
considered, have interests as well as each particular State, we are of
opinion, that some test or obligation, binding upon each delegate while
he continues in the trust, to consult and pursue the former as well as
the latter, and particularly to assent to no vote or proceeding which
may violate the general confederation is necessary. The laws and usages
of all civilized nations evince the propriety of an oath on such
occasions, and the more solemn and important the deposit, the more
strong and explicit ought the obligation to be."
[143] Three States only voted in favor of adopting any of the
suggestions made by New Jersey: six voted against them, and one was
divided. Journals, IV. 272.
[144] Secret Journals, I. 433.
[145] Secret Journals, I. 440.
[146] Ibid. 442.
[147] Secret Journals, I. 421.
[148] Ibid. 424.
[149] Secret Journals, I. 445.
[150] After the Confederation had thus been formed, by subsequent
cessions of their claims by the other States, to use the language of Mr.
Justice Story, "this great source of national dissension was at last
dried up."
[151] One of the great inducements to the adoption of the Constitution
of the United States was to give the general government adequate
constitutional power to dispose of the Western territory and to form new
States out of it. Congress, under the Confederation, had no express
authority to do this, although they proceeded both to dispose of the
lands and to erect new States, by the Ordinance of 1787. See The
Federalist, No. 38, 42, 43. Story's Commentaries on the Constitution,
III. 184-190, 1st edition.
CHAPTER VI.
NATURE AND POWERS OF THE CONFEDERATION.
The nature of the government established by the Articles of
Confederation can be understood only by an analysis of their provisions.
For this purpose, the instrument must here be examined with reference to
three principal topics: first, the union which it established between
the different members of the Confederacy; second, the form of the
government which it created; and third, the powers which it conferred,
or omitted to confer, upon that government.
I. The parties to this instrument were free, sovereign, and independent
political communities,--each possessing within itself all the powers of
legislation and government, over its own citizens, which any political
society can possess. But, by this instrument, these several States
became united together for certain purposes. The instrument was styled,
"Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States," and
the political body thus formed was entitled "The United States of
America." The Articles declared--as would, indeed, be implied, in such
circumstances, without any express declaration--that each State
retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated by the instrument itself
to the United States in Congress assembled. The nature and objects of
this union were described as a firm league of friendship between the
States, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and
their mutual and general welfare; and the parties bound themselves to
assist each other against all force offered to or attacks made upon
them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or
under any pretence whatever.
It was also provided, that the free inhabitants of each State should be
entitled to all the privileges of free citizens in the several
States;[152] that there should be an open intercourse and commerce
between the different States; that fugitives from justice from one State
to another should be delivered up; and that full faith and credit should
be given in each State to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of
every other State.[153]
II. The government established by the Articles of Confederation
consisted of a single representative body, called a General Congress.
In this body were vested all the powers, executive, legislative, and
judicial, granted to the United States. The members of it were to be
chosen by the States, in such manner as the legislature of each State
might determine; no State to be represented by more than seven
delegates, or by less than two. No delegate was eligible for more than
three years in a period of six; and no delegate could hold any office of
emolument under the United States. Each State was to maintain its own
delegates, and in the determination of questions, the voting was to be
by States, each State having one vote.
III. It should be remembered, that the objects and purposes of the
Confederation related chiefly to the defence of the States against
external attacks; and it was, therefore, as it purported to be, a league
for mutual defence and protection, through the combined powers of the
whole, operating in certain forms and under certain restrictions. For
the manner in which this new authority was to be exercised, we are to
look at the powers conferred upon "the United States in Congress
assembled." These powers related to external and to internal affairs.
With regard to the external relations of the country, Congress was
invested with the sole and exclusive right of determining on peace and
war, unless in case of an invasion of a State by enemies, or an imminent
danger of invasion by Indians; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of
entering into treaties and alliances, under the limitation that no
treaty of commerce could be made, which would have the effect to
restrain the legislature of any State from imposing such imposts and
duties on foreigners as their own people were subjected to, or which
would operate to prohibit the exportation or importation of any
commodity whatever. Congress was also invested with power to deal with
all captures and prizes made by the land or naval forces of the United
States; to grant letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace; and
to establish courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and for determining appeals in cases of capture.
With regard to internal affairs, Congress was invested with power to
decide, in the last resort, on appeal, all disputes between two or more
States, concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause; and also
all controversies concerning land-titles, where the parties claimed
under different grants of two or more States before the settlement of
their jurisdiction; but no State was to be deprived of territory for the
benefit of the United States. Congress was also invested with the sole
and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin
struck by their authority, or by that of any of the United States; of
fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the United
States; of regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the
Indians, who were not members of any State, provided that the
legislative authority of any State, within its own limits, should not be
infringed or violated; of establishing and regulating post-offices from
one State to another, and exacting postage to defray the expenses; of
appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the United
States, and of making rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces, and directing their operations.
Congress was also invested with power to appoint a "committee of the
States," to sit in the recess of Congress, to consist of one delegate
from each State, and other committees and civil officers, to manage the
general affairs under their direction; to appoint one of their number to
preside, but authorizing no person to serve in the office of president
more than one year in a term of three years; to ascertain and
appropriate the necessary sums for the public service; to borrow money
and emit bills on the credit of the United States; to build and equip a
navy; and to agree upon the number of land forces and make requisitions
upon each State for its quota, in proportion to the numbers of white
inhabitants in such State. The legislature of each State was to appoint
the regimental officers, enlist the men, and clothe, arm, and equip
them, at the expense of the United States.
Such were the powers conferred upon Congress by the Articles of
Confederation. But the restrictions imposed, in the same instrument,
greatly qualified and weakened, and in fact almost rendered nugatory,
the greater part of them. It was expressly provided, that Congress
should never engage in a war; nor grant letters of marque or reprisal in
time of peace; nor enter into any treaties or alliances; nor coin money
or regulate its value; nor ascertain the sums of money necessary for the
public purposes; nor emit bills; nor borrow money on the credit of the
United States; nor appropriate money; nor agree upon the number of
vessels for the navy, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised;
nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army or navy;--unless nine
States should assent to the same. The Committee of the States authorized
to sit during the recess of Congress could not do any of these things,
for the assent of nine States could not be delegated.
The revenues of the country were left by the Articles of Confederation
wholly in the control of the separate States. It was provided, that all
charges of war, and all other expenses for the common defence or general
welfare, should be defrayed out of a common treasury; but this treasury
was to be supplied, not by taxes, duties, or imposts, levied by or under
the authority of Congress, but by taxes to be laid and levied by the
legislatures of the several States, within such time as might be fixed
by Congress. The amount to be furnished by each State was in proportion
to the value of the land within its limits granted or surveyed, and the
buildings and improvements thereon, to be estimated according to the
mode prescribed by Congress. The sole means, therefore, which the
Confederation gave to Congress of supplying the treasury of the United
States, was to vote what sum was wanted, and to call upon the
legislature of each State to pay in its proportion within a given time.
The commerce of the country was left entirely within the control of the
State legislatures; rendering it the commerce of thirteen different
States, each of which could levy what duties it saw fit upon all exports
and imports, provided they did not interfere with any treaties then
proposed, or touch the property of the United States, or that of any
other State. The United States had no power of taxation, direct or
indirect.
The Articles of Confederation were also entirely without any provision
for enforcing the measures which they authorized Congress to adopt for
the general welfare of the Union. It was declared in the instrument,
that every State should abide by the determinations of Congress on all
the questions over which the instrument gave that body control; that the
Articles should be inviolably observed by every State; that the Union
should be perpetual; and that no alterations should be made in any of
the Articles, unless agreed to by Congress, and confirmed by the
legislature of every State. But these declarations, however strong and
emphatic in their terms, only made the Confederation in fact, as in
name, a league or compact between sovereign States; for it gave the
government of the Union no power to enforce its own measures or laws by
process upon the persons of individuals, and consequently any party to
the instrument could infringe any or all of its provisions, without any
other consequence than a resort to arms by the general Confederacy,
which would have been civil war.
These, with some restrictions upon the power of the States in regard to
the making of treaties, engaging in war, sending ambassadors, and some
other topics, were the main provisions of the Articles of Confederation;
and under the government thus constituted, the United States, on the
second day of March, 1781, entered upon a new era of civil polity, and
commenced a new existence, under somewhat happier auspices than they had
known before.
It will be seen, in the further development of the period which followed
the establishment of this Confederation, down to the calling of the
Convention which framed the Constitution, that what I have called the
great office of the Confederation, in our political system, was indeed a
function of vast importance to the happiness of the American people,
but, at the same time, was one that was necessarily soon fulfilled, to
be followed by a more perfect organization for the accomplishment of the
objects and the satisfaction of the wants which it brought in its train.
This office of the Confederation was, to demonstrate to the people of
the American States the practicability and necessity of a more perfect
union. The Confederation showed to the people of these separate
communities, that there were certain great purposes of civil government,
which they could not discharge by their separate means; that
independence of the crown of Great Britain could not be achieved by any
one of them, unassisted by all the rest; that no one of them, however
respectable in population or resources, could be received and dealt
with, by the governments of the world, as a nation among nations;--but
that, by union among themselves, by some political tie, which should
combine all their resources in the hands of one directing power, and
make them, in some practical sense, one people, it was possible for them
to achieve their independence, and take a place among the nations. The
Confederation made it manifest, that these consequences could be
secured. It did not, indeed, answer all the purposes, or accomplish all
the objects, which had been designed or hoped from it: it was defective
as a means; but it taught the existence of an end, and demonstrated the
possibility of reaching that end, by showing that in some form, and for
some purposes, a union of the States was both possible and necessary. It
thus made the permanent idea of union familiar to the people of the
different States. It did more than this. It created a larger field for
statesmanship, by creating larger interests, to be managed by that
higher order of men, who could rise above local concerns and sectional
objects, and embrace within the scope of their vision the happiness and
welfare of a continent. It introduced to men's minds the great ideas of
national power and national sovereignty, as the agencies that were to
work out the difficult results, which no local power could accomplish;
and, although these ideas were at first vague and indefinite, and made
but a slow and difficult progress against influences and prejudices of a
narrower kind, they were planted in the thoughts of men, to ripen into
maturity and strength in the progress of future years. When the eagle
grasped in his talons the united shafts of power, and unfurled the
scroll which taught that one people could be formed out of many
communities, the destiny of America was ascertained.[154]
FOOTNOTES:
[152] That is to say, that a citizen of any State might go and reside in
any other State, and be there entitled to all the privileges of a
citizen of that State.
[153] The meaning of this is, that, on the production in any State of a
law passed or of a judgment rendered in any other State, properly
authenticated, it should be admitted that such a law had been passed or
such a judgment rendered in the State whose act it purported to be, and
that all the legal consequences should follow.
[154] The armorial bearings of the United States were adopted on the
20th of June, 1782. Journals, VII. 395.
BOOK II.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE ADOPTION OF
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, IN 1781, TO THE PEACE OF 1783.
CHAPTER I.
1781-1783.
REQUISITIONS.--CLAIMS OF THE ARMY.--NEWBURGH ADDRESSES.--PEACE
PROCLAIMED.--THE ARMY DISBANDED.
The interval of time which extends from the adoption of the Articles of
Confederation to the initiatory steps for the formation of the
Constitution, must, for our purpose, be divided into two periods; that
which preceded and that which followed the peace of 1783; in both of
which the defects of the Confederation were rapidly developed, and in
both of which efforts were made to supply those defects, by an
enlargement of the powers of Congress. Our attention, however, will be
confined, in the present Book, to the first of these periods.
* * * * *
Congress assembled, under the Confederation, on the 2d of March, 1781,
and the Treaty of Peace, which put an end to the war and admitted the
independence of the United States, was definitively signed on the 3d of
September, 1783, and was ratified and proclaimed by Congress on the 14th
of January, 1784.
Notwithstanding the solemn engagements into which the States had entered
with each other, under the Articles of Confederation, the prospect of
bringing the war to a close, through a compliance with those
obligations, was exceedingly faint, at the commencement of the campaign
of 1782. The United States had made a treaty of alliance with the king
of France, in 1778;[155] and in pursuance of that treaty, six thousand
French troops arrived at Newport in July, 1780, and in the spring of
1781 joined the American army near New York. The presence in the country
of a foreign force, sent hither by the ancient rival of England, to
assist the people of the United States in their contest for
independence, encouraged an undue reliance upon external aid. Many of
the States became culpably remiss in complying with the requisitions of
Congress; and, although they had so recently authorized Congress to make
requisitions, both for men and money, and had provided the form in which
they were to be made, the adoption of the Articles of Confederation had
very little tendency to render the States prompt to discharge the
obligations which they imposed. In October and November, 1781, Congress
called upon the States to raise their several quotas of eight millions
of dollars, for the use of the United States, and recommended to them to
lay taxes for raising these quotas separate from those laid for their
own particular use, and to pass acts directing the collectors of the
taxes, intended for the use of the United States, to pay the same
directly into the treasury of the Union.[156] In December of the same
year, Congress also called upon the States, with great urgency, to
complete their quotas of troops for the next campaign.[157]
The aid of Washington was invoked, to influence the action of the States
upon these requisitions. On the 22d of January, 1782, he addressed a
circular letter to the governors of the States, to be laid before their
respective legislatures, on the subject of finance; reminding them how
the whole army had been thrown into a ferment twelve months before, for
the want of pay and a regular supply of clothing and provisions; warning
them that the recent successes in Virginia, by the capture of Lord
Cornwallis's army, might have a fatal tendency to cool the ardor of the
country in the prosecution of the war; assuring them that a vigorous
prosecution of that war could alone secure the independence of the
United States; and urging them to adopt such measures as would insure
the prompt payment of the sums which Congress had called for.[158] A few
days afterwards, he addressed a similar letter to the States, on the
subject of completing their quotas of troops, in which he told them that
the continuance or termination of the war now rested on their vigor and
decision; and that, even if the enemy were, in consequence of their late
reverses, disposed to treat, nothing but a decidedly superior force
could enable us boldly to claim our rights and dictate the terms of
pacification. "And soon," he said, "might that day arrive, and we might
hope to enjoy all the blessings of peace, if we could see again the same
animation in the cause of our country inspiring every breast, the same
passion for freedom and military glory impelling our youths to the
field, and the same disinterested patriotism pervading every rank of
men, that was conspicuous at the commencement of this glorious
revolution; and I am persuaded that only some great occasion was
wanting, such as the present moment exhibits, to rekindle the latent
sparks of that patriotic fire into a generous flame, to rouse again the
unconquerable spirit of liberty, which has sometimes seemed to slumber
for a while, into the full vigor of action."[159]
Notwithstanding these urgent appeals, the spring of 1782 arrived, and
the summer passed away, without any substantial compliance by the States
with the requisitions of Congress for either men or money. When
Washington arrived in camp, in May, to commence the campaign that was to
extort from the British government--now in the hands of a new ministry,
supposed to be more favorable to peace--the terms which he hoped might
be procured, there were less than ten thousand men in the Northern army;
and their numbers were not much increased during the summer.[160] Great
and dangerous discontents now existed in the army, both among officers
and soldiers, concerning the arrearages of pay; for, as the prospects
of peace became brighter, it seemed to become more and more probable,
that the army would ultimately be disbanded without adequate provision
for its claims, and that officers and men would be thrown penniless upon
the world, unpaid by the country whose independence they had achieved.
At this period there occurred the famous proceedings of the officers,
called the Newburgh Addresses, on the subject of half-pay; and since the
claims of the officers and soldiers, as public creditors of the United
States, are intimately connected with the constitutional history of the
country, it is needful to give here a brief account of them.
The pay of the officers in the Revolutionary army was originally
established upon so low a scale, that men with families dependent upon
them could feel little inducement to remain long in a service, the close
of which was to be rewarded only with a patent for a few hundred acres
of land in some part of the Western wilderness. In the year 1778, it had
become apparent to Washington, that something must be done to avert the
consequences of the mistaken policy on which Congress had acted with
reference to the army; and while at Valley Forge,--that scene of
dreadful suffering by the army,--he wrote on this subject to the
President of Congress the first of a series of most able and instructive
letters, which extend through the five following years.[161]
On the 17th of April, after this first letter had been laid before
Congress, a resolution was moved, that an establishment of half-pay be
made for officers, who should serve during the war; to begin after its
conclusion.[162] Four days afterwards, the sense of the house was taken
on the question, whether there should be any provision made for the
officers after the conclusion of the war, and the affirmative was
carried, by the votes of eight States against four.[163] On the 26th of
April, a proposition, that half-pay be granted for life, to commence at
the close of the war, passed by a majority of one State; six States
voting in the affirmative, five in the negative, and one being
divided.[164] The next day, the value of this vote was destroyed by a
resolution, which provided that the United States should have the right
to redeem the half-pay for life, by giving to the officer entitled six
years' half-pay;[165] and on the 15th of May, Congress substituted for
the whole scheme a provision of half-pay for seven years, taking away
the option of half-pay for life.[166]
This miserable and vacillating legislation shows the unpopularity of the
scheme of such an establishment, although demanded alike by
considerations of justice and policy.[167] The spirit which, for a
time, actuated a large part of the people of this country towards the
men who were suffering so much in the cause of national independence,
evinces an extreme jealousy for the abstract principles of civil
liberty, unmitigated by the generous virtues of justice and gratitude.
This spirit was duly represented in Congress. The main arguments
employed out of doors were, that pensions were contrary to the maxims
and spirit of our institutions; that to grant half-pay for life to the
officers was establishing a privileged class of men, who were to live
upon the public for the rest of their days; and that the officers
entered the service on the pay and inducements originally offered,
without any promise or prospect of such a reward. This kind of
impracticable adherence to a principle, working in this instance the
greatest injustice and leading ultimately to a breach of public faith,
was the principal cause that prolonged the war, and made it cost so much
suffering, so much blood, and so much treasure. The people of the United
States adhered so tenaciously to the principles and axioms of freedom,
that, even when they had undertaken a war for their own security and
independence against a foreign foe, they would not establish a
government with the power of direct taxation, or organize an army with
suitable rewards for service. The want of such a power in their
government led to the enormous emissions of paper money, which brought
with them a long train of sufferings and disasters, ending at last in
national bankruptcy. The want of justice to the army placed the civil
liberty of the country in imminent danger, and finally led to the cruel
oppression of men, whose valor had first won, and whose patriotism then
saved it from destruction.
In the six months which followed the vote of the 15th of May, 1778, the
provision which it had made was found to be wholly inadequate, and
General Washington, then at Philadelphia, again earnestly pressed the
subject upon the attention of Congress. On the 11th of August, 1779, a
report from a committee on this subject being under consideration, a
motion was made to amend it, by inserting a provision that the half-pay
granted by the resolve of the 15th of May, 1778, be extended so as to
continue for life; and this motion was carried by a vote of eight States
against four.[168] On the 17th, Congress resolved that the consideration
of that part of the report for extending the half-pay be postponed, and
that it be recommended to the several States that had not already
adopted measures for that purpose, to make such further provision for
the officers and soldiers enlisted for the war, who should continue in
service till the establishment of peace, as would be an adequate
compensation for their dangers, losses, and hardships, either by
granting to the officers half-pay for life and proper rewards to the
soldiers, or in such other manner as might appear most expedient to the
legislatures of the several States.[169]
Before the passage of this resolve, the State of Pennsylvania had placed
her officers upon an establishment of half-pay for life, and with the
happiest consequences. But no other State followed her example; and in
the autumn of 1780, it became necessary for Washington to apply to
Congress again.[170] At length, in consequence of his earnest and
repeated appeals, a resolve was passed, on the 21st of October, that the
officers who should continue in service to the end of the war should be
entitled to half-pay during life, to commence from the time of their
reduction.[171]
From this time, therefore, the officers of the army continued in the
service, relying upon the faith of the country, as expressed in the vote
of the 21st of October, 1780, and believing, until they saw proof to the
contrary, that the public faith thus pledged to them would be
observed.[172] But they were destined to a severe disappointment; and
one of the causes of that disappointment was the adoption of the
Articles of Confederation. The very change in the constitutional
position of the country, from which the most happy results were
anticipated, and which undoubtedly cemented the Union, became the means
by which they were cheated of their hopes. The Congress of 1780, which
had pledged to them a half-pay for life, was the Revolutionary Congress;
but the Congress which was to redeem this pledge was the Congress of the
Confederation, which required a vote of nine States for an appropriation
of money, or a call upon the States for their proportions. When the vote
granting the half-pay for life was passed, there were less than nine
States in favor of the measure; and after the Confederation was
established, the delegates of the States which originally opposed the
provision could not be brought to consider it in its true light,--that
of a compact with the officers. It was even contended that the vote,
having passed before the Confederation was signed and acted upon, was
not obligatory upon the Congress under the Confederation, as that
instrument required the votes of nine States for an appropriation of
money. In this manner, men deluded themselves with the notion, that a
change in the form of a government, or in the constitutional method of
raising money to discharge the obligations of a contract, can dissolve
those obligations, or alter the principles of justice on which they
depend. The States in the opposition to the measure refused to be
coerced, as they were pleased to consider it, and in the autumn of 1782,
the officers became convinced that they had nothing to hope for from
Congress, but a reference of their claims to their several States.[173]
In November, 1782, preliminary and eventual articles of peace were
agreed upon between the United States and Great Britain, by their
plenipotentiaries. Nothing had been done by Congress for the claims of
the army, and it seemed highly probable that it would be disbanded
without even a settlement of the accounts of the officers, and if so,
that they would never receive their dues. Alarmed and irritated by the
neglect of Congress; destitute of money and credit and of the means of
living from day to day; oppressed with debts; saddened by the distresses
of their families at home, and by the prospect of misery before
them,--they presented a memorial to Congress in December, in which they
urged the immediate adjustment of their dues, and offered to commute the
half-pay for life, granted by the resolve of October, 1780, for full pay
for a certain number of years, or for such a sum in gross, as should be
agreed on by their committee sent to Philadelphia to attend the progress
of the memorial through the house. It is manifest from statements in
this document, as well as from other evidence, that the officers were
nearly driven to desperation, and that their offer of commutation was
wrung from them by a state of public opinion little creditable to the
country. They recited their hardships, their poverty, and their
exertions in the cause; and all that they said was fully borne out by
their great commander, in his personal remonstrances with many of the
members of Congress. The officers asserted, that many of their brethren,
who had retired on the half-pay promised by the resolve of 1780, were
not only destitute of any effectual provision, but had become objects of
obloquy; and they referred with chagrin to the odious view in which the
citizens of too many of the States endeavored to place those who were
entitled to that provision.
But, from the prevailing feeling in Congress and in the country, nothing
better was to be expected than a compromise in place of the discharge of
a solemn obligation; and this feeling no American historian should fail
to record and to condemn. If these men had borne only the character of
public creditors, a state of public feeling which drove them into a
compromise of their claims ought always to be severely reprehended. But,
beyond the capacity of public creditors, they were the men who had
fought the battles which liberated the country from a foreign yoke; who
had endured every extremity of hardship, every form of suffering, which
the life of a soldier knows; who had stood between the common soldiery
and the civil power; and often, at the hazard of their lives, preserved
that discipline and subordination which the civil power had done too
much to hazard. They were, in a word, the men of whom their commander
said, that they had exhibited more virtue, fortitude, self-denial, and
perseverance, than had perhaps been then paralleled in the history of
human enthusiasm.
Painful, therefore, as it is, this lesson, of the wrong that may be done
by a breach of public faith, must be read. It lies open on the page of
history, and is the case of those to whose right arms the people of
this country owe the splendid inheritance of liberty. All real
palliations should be sought for and admitted. The country was poor: no
proper system of finance had been, or could be, developed by a
government which had no power of taxation; and the ideas and feelings of
the people of many of the States were provincial, and without the
liberality and enlargement of thought which comes of intercourse with
the world. But, after every apology has exhausted its force, the
conscientious student of history must mark the dereliction from public
duty; must admit what the public faith required; and must observe the
dangerous consequences which attend, and must ever attend, the breach of
a public obligation.
The immediate consequences which followed, in this instance, were
predicted by General Washington, who gave the clearest warning, in
advance of the officers' memorial, of the hazards that would attend the
further neglect of their claims. But his warning seems to have been
unheeded, or to have made but little impression against the prevailing
aversion to touch the unpopular subject of half-pay. The committee of
the officers were in attendance upon Congress during the whole winter,
and early in March, 1783, they wrote to their constituents that nothing
had been done.
At this moment, the predicament in which Washington stood, in the double
relation of citizen and soldier, was critical and delicate in the
extreme. In the course of a few days, all his firmness and patriotism,
all his sympathies as an officer, on the one side, and his fidelity to
the government on the other, were severely tried. On the 10th of March,
an anonymous address was circulated among the officers at Newburgh,
calling a meeting of the general and field officers, and of one officer
from each company, and one from the medical staff, to consider the late
letter from their representatives at Philadelphia, and to determine what
measures should be adopted to obtain that redress of grievances which
they seemed to have solicited in vain. It was written with great ability
and skill.[174] It spoke the language of injured feeling; it pointed
directly to the sword, as the remedy for injustice; and it spoke to men
who were suffering keenly under public ingratitude and neglect. Its
eloquence and its passion fell, therefore, upon hearts not insensible,
and a dangerous explosion seemed to be at hand. Washington met the
crisis with firmness, but also with conciliation. He issued orders
forbidding an assemblage at the call of an anonymous paper, and
directing the officers to assemble on Saturday, the 15th, to hear the
report of their committee, and to deliberate what further measures ought
to be adopted as most rational and best calculated to obtain the just
and important object in view. The senior officer in rank present was
directed to preside, and to report the result to the Commander-in-chief.
On the next day after these orders were issued, a second anonymous
address appeared from the same writer. In this paper, he affected to
consider the orders of General Washington, assuming the direction of the
meeting, as a sanction of the whole proceeding which he had proposed.
Washington saw, at once, that he must be present at the meeting himself,
or that his name would be used to justify measures which he intended to
discountenance and prevent. He therefore attended the meeting, and under
his influence, seconded by that of Putnam, Knox, Brooks, and Howard, the
result was the adoption of certain resolutions, in which the officers,
after reasserting their grievances, and rebuking all attempts to seduce
them from their civil allegiance, referred the whole subject of their
claims again to the consideration of Congress.
Even at this distant day, the peril of that crisis can scarcely be
contemplated without a shudder. Had the Commander-in-chief been other
than Washington, had the leading officers by whom he was surrounded been
less than the noblest of patriots, the land would have been deluged with
the blood of a civil war. But men who had suffered what the great
officers of the Revolution had suffered, had learned the lessons of
self-control which suffering teaches. The hard school of adversity in
which they had passed so many years made them sensible to an appeal
which only such a chief as Washington could make; and, when he
transmitted their resolves to Congress, he truly described them as "the
last glorious proof of patriotism which could have been given by men who
aspired to the distinction of a patriot army; not only confirming their
claim to the justice, but increasing their title to the gratitude, of
their country."[175]
The effect of these proceedings was the passage by Congress of certain
resolves, on the 22d of March, 1783, commuting the half-pay for life to
five years' full pay after the close of the war, to be received, at the
option of Congress, in money, or in such securities as were given to
other creditors of the United States.[176] On the 4th of July, the
accounts of the army were ordered to be made up and adjusted, and
certificates of the sums due were required to be given in the form
directed by the Superintendent of the Finances. On the 18th of October,
a proclamation was issued, disbanding the army.
* * * * *
From this time, the officers passed into the whole mass of the creditors
of the United States; and although they continued to constitute a
distinct class among those creditors, the history of their claims is to
be pursued in connection with that of the other public debts of the
country. The value of the votes which fixed their compensation, and paid
them in public securities, depended, of course, upon the ability of the
government to redeem the obligations which it issued. The general
financial powers of the Union, therefore, under the Confederation, must
now be considered.
FOOTNOTES:
[155] The treaty was concluded at Paris, February 6, 1778, and was
ratified by Congress on the 5th of May. Journals, IV. 256, 257.
[156] Resolves of October 30 and November 2, 1781. Journals, VII. 167,
169.
[157] Resolves of December 10, 1781. Journals, VII. 190.
[158] Writings, VIII. 226.
[159] Writings, VIII. 232, 235.
[160] Sparks's Life of Washington, p. 380.
[161] Letter of April 10, 1778. Writings of Washington, V. 312.
[162] Journals, IV. 221.
[163] Ibid. 228, 229. The States which voted in the negative were Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and South Carolina.
[164] Ibid. 243. The States voting in the negative were Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and South Carolina. The State
whose vote was divided was Pennsylvania.
[165] Ibid. 244. Under this resolve, each officer was entitled to
receive half-pay annually, for the term of seven years after the
conclusion of war, if living.
[166] Ibid. 288.
[167] On the 21st of April, in the resolution reported by a committee,
the words "an establishment of half-pay for life" were, on motion,
changed to a "provision of half-pay";--an amendment which reveals very
plainly the character of the popular objections. Journals, IV. 228.
[168] Journals, V. 312.
[169] Ibid. 316, 317.
[170] Writings of Washington, VII. 165, 246.
[171] Journals, VI. 336.
[172] See General Washington's letter to General Sullivan (in Congress),
November 20, 1780. Writings, VII. 297.
[173] See the letter of General Lincoln, Secretary at War, to
Washington, cited by Mr. Sparks, VIII. 356.
[174] The "Newburgh Addresses" were written by John Armstrong,
(afterwards General Armstrong,) then a young man, and aide-de-camp to
General Gates, with the rank of Major. (Sparks's Life of Gouverneur
Morris, I. 253. United States Magazine for January 1, 1823, New York.)
The style of these papers, considering the period when they appeared, is
remarkably good. They are written with great point and vigor of
expression and great purity of English. For the purpose for which they
were designed,--a direct appeal to feeling,--they show the hand of a
master.
[175] March 18, 1783. Writings, VIII. 396.
[176] The resolves gave the option to lines of the respective States,
and not to the officers individually in those lines, to accept or refuse
the commutation. Journals, VIII. 162.
CHAPTER II.
1781-1783.
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONFEDERATION.--REVOLUTIONARY
DEBT.--REVENUE SYSTEM OF 1783.
It is not easy to ascertain the amount of the public debt of the United
States, at the time when the Confederation went into operation. But on
the 1st of January, 1783, it amounted to about forty-two millions of
dollars. About eight millions were due on loans obtained in France and
Holland, and the residue was due to citizens of the United States. The
annual interest of the debt was a little more than two million four
hundred thousand dollars.[177]
The Confederation had no sooner gone into operation, than it was
perceived by many of the principal statesmen of the country, that its
financial powers were so entirely defective, that Congress would never
be able, under them, to pay even the interest on the public debt.
Indeed, before the Confederation was finally ratified, so as to become
obligatory upon all the States, on the 3d of February, 1781, Congress
passed a resolve, recommending to the several States, as indispensably
necessary, to vest a power in Congress to levy for the use of the United
States a duty of five per cent. _ad valorem_, at the time and place of
importation, upon all foreign goods and merchandise imported into any of
the States; and that the money arising from such duties should be
appropriated to the discharge of the principal and interest of the debts
already then contracted, or which might be contracted, on the faith of
the United States, for the support of the war; the duties to be
continued until the debts should be fully and finally discharged.
It was at this time that the office of Superintendent of the Finances
was established, and Robert Morris was unanimously elected by Congress
to fill it. He was an eminent merchant of Philadelphia, of known
financial skill, devoted to the cause of the country, and possessed of
very considerable private resources, which he more than once sacrificed
to the public service. Under his administration, it is more than
probable that, if the States had complied with the requisitions of
Congress, the war would have been brought to a close at an earlier
period. But there was scarcely any compliance with those requisitions,
and, contemporaneously with this neglect, the proposal to vest in
Congress the power to levy duties met with serious opposition. On the
30th of October, 1781, Congress made a requisition upon the States for
eight millions of dollars, to meet the service of the ensuing year. In
January, 1783, one year and three months from the date of this
requisition, less than half a million of this sum had been received into
the treasury of the United States. After a delay of nearly two years,
one State entirely refused its concurrence with the plan of vesting in
Congress a power to levy duties, another withdrew the assent it had once
given, and a third had returned no answer.
The State which refused to grant this power to Congress was Rhode
Island. On the 6th of December, 1782, Congress determined to send a
deputation to that State, to endeavor to procure its assent to this
constitutional change. The increasing discontents of the army, the loud
clamors of the public creditors, the extreme disproportion between the
current means and the demands of the public service, and the
impossibility of obtaining further loans in Europe unless some security
could be held out to lenders, made it necessary for Congress to be
especially urgent with the legislature of Rhode Island. But, at the
moment when the deputation was about to depart on this mission, the
intelligence was received that Virginia had repealed the act by which
she had previously granted to Congress the power of laying duties, and
the proposal was therefore abandoned for a time.[178] But the leading
persons then in Congress--who saw the ruin impending over the country;
who were aware that the whole amount of money which Congress had
received, to carry on the public business for the year then just
expiring, was less than two millions of dollars,[179] while the three
branches of feeding, clothing, and paying the army exceeded five
millions of dollars per annum, exclusive of all other departments of the
public service; and who were equally aware that no means whatever
existed of paying the interest on the public debts--resolved still to
persevere in their endeavors to procure the establishment of revenues
equal to the purpose of funding all the debts of the United States.
Among these persons, Hamilton and Madison were the most active; and the
part which they took, at this period, in the measures for sustaining the
sinking credit of the country, and the efforts which they made, are
among the less conspicuous, but not less important services, which those
great men performed for their country. Another plan was devised, after
the failure of that of 1781, for investing Congress with a power to
derive a revenue from duties, and, in April, 1783, its promoters
procured for it the almost unanimous consent of Congress. This plan
recommended the States to vest in Congress the power of levying certain
duties upon goods imported into the country, partly specific and partly
_ad valorem_; the proceeds of such duties to be applied to the discharge
of the interest or principal of the debts incurred by the United States
for supporting the war. The duties were to be collected by collectors
appointed by the States, but accountable to Congress. It also
recommended to the States to establish, for a term of twenty-five years,
substantial and effectual revenues, exclusive of the duties to be levied
by Congress for supplying their proportions of fifteen millions of
dollars annually, for the same purpose; and that, when this plan had
been acceded to by all the States, it should be considered as forming a
mutual compact, irrevocable by one or more of them without the consent
of the whole. It was also proposed that the rule of proportion fixed by
the Confederation should be changed from the basis of real estate to
the basis of population.
This plan was sent out to the States, accompanied by an address,
prepared by Mr. Madison, in which the necessity of the measure was urged
with much ability and force. Annexed to this paper were various
documents, exhibiting the nature and origin of the public debts, and the
meritorious characters of the various public creditors; the whole of the
Newburgh Addresses, and the proceedings of the officers; the contracts
made with the king of France; and a very able answer by Hamilton to the
objections of Rhode Island. No stronger and more direct appeal was ever
made to the sense of right of any people. Never was the cause of
national honor, public faith, and public safety more powerfully and
eloquently set forth.[180]
And when we consider the various classes of the public creditors, at the
close of the war, and remember that the debts of the country had been
contracted for the great purpose of establishing its independence, and
that there was scarcely a creditor who had not some claim to the
gratitude of the country, we cannot but be astonished that such an
appeal as was then made should have fallen, as it did, unheeded upon the
legislatures and people of many of the States. In the first place, the
debts were due to an ally, the generous king of France, who had loaned
to the American people his armies and his treasures; who had added to
his loans liberal donations; and whose very contracts for repayment
contained proof of his magnanimity. In the next place, they were due to
that noble band of officers and soldiers, who had fought the battles of
their country, and who now asked only such a portion of their dues as
would enable them to retire, with the means of daily bread, from the
field of victory and glory into the bosom of peace and privacy, and
such effectual security for the residue of their claims, as their
country was unquestionably able to provide. In the last place, they were
due partly to those citizens of the country who had lent their funds to
the public, or manifested their confidence in the government by
receiving transfers of public securities from those who had so lent, and
partly to those whose property had been taken for the public
service.[181]
The United States had achieved their independence. They were about to
take rank among the nations of the world. As they should meet this
crisis, their character would be determined. The rights for which they
had contended were the rights of human nature. These rights had
triumphed, and now formed the basis of the civil polity of thirteen
independent States. The forms of republican government were therefore
called upon to justify themselves by their fruits. The higher qualities
of national character--justice, good faith, honor, gratitude--were
called upon to display an example, that would save the cause of
republican liberty from reproach and disgrace.[182]
But, unhappily, the establishment of peace tended to weaken the slender
bond which held the Union together, by turning the attention of men to
the internal affairs of their own States. The advantage and the
necessity of giving the regulation of foreign commerce to the general
government, if perceived at all, was perceived only by a few leading
statesmen. The commercial States fancied that they profited by a
condition of things which enabled them as importers to levy contribution
on their neighbors. The people did not as yet perceive, that, without
some central authority to regulate the whole trade alike, the clashing
regulations of rival States would sooner or later destroy the
Confederacy. Nor were they willing to be taxed for the payment of the
public debts. The people of the United States had not yet begun to feel,
that such a burden is to be borne as one of the first of public and
social duties. That part of the financial plan of 1783, which required
from the States a pledge of internal revenues for twenty-five years, met
with so much opposition, that Congress was obliged to abandon it, and to
confine its efforts to that part of the scheme which related to the
duties on imports. In 1786, all the States, except New York, had
complied with the latter part of the plan; but the refusal of that State
rendered the whole of it inoperative, and no resource remained to
Congress, after the close of the war, but the old method of making
requisitions on the States, under the rule of the Confederation.[183]
At the return of peace, therefore, the Confederation had had a trial of
two years and six months, as a government for purposes of war. It was
for these purposes, mainly, that it was established; being in fact, as
it was in name, a league of friendship between sovereign States, for
their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual
and general welfare; the parties to which had bound themselves by it to
assist each other against all external attacks. Doubtless the framers of
the Confederation contemplated its duration beyond the period of the
war; for, besides the perpetual character of the Union, which it sought
and professed to establish, it had certain functions which were
manifestly to be exercised in peace as well as in war. These functions,
however, were few. The government was framed during a revolutionary war,
for the purposes of that war, and it went into operation while the war
was still waged; taking the place and superseding the powers of the
Revolutionary Congress, under which the war had been commenced and
prosecuted.
A written constitution, with a precise and well-defined mode of
operation, had thus succeeded to the vague and indefinite, but ample,
powers of the earlier government. But in the very modes of its
operation, there was a monstrous defect, which distorted the whole
system from the true proportions and character of a government. It gave
to the Confederation the power of contracting debts, and at the same
time withheld from it the power of paying them. It created a corporate
body, formed by the Union and known as the United States, and gave to
it the faculty of borrowing money and incurring other obligations. It
provided the mode in which its treasury should be supplied for the
reimbursement of the public creditor. But over the sources of that
supply, it gave the government contracting the debts no power whatever.
Thirteen independent legislatures granted or withheld the means which
were to enable the general government to pay the debts which the general
constitution had enabled it to contract, according to their own
convenience or their own views and feelings as to the purposes for which
those debts had been incurred. Yet the debts were wholly national in
their character, and by the nation they were to be discharged. But, by
the operation of the system under which the nation had undertaken to
discharge its obligations, the duty of performance was parcelled out
among the various subordinate corporations of States, and the country
was thus placed in the position of an empire whose power was at the
mercy of its provinces, and was sure to be controlled by provincial
objects and ideas.
A government thus situated, engaged in the prosecution of a war,
perpetually borrowing, but never paying, and scarce likely ever to pay,
was in a position to prosecute that war with far less than the real
energies and resources of the nation: and it stands the recorded opinion
of him who conducted his country through the whole struggle, and without
whom it could not, under this defective system, have achieved its
independence, that the war would have terminated sooner, and would have
cost vastly less both of blood and treasure, if the government of the
Union had possessed the power of direct or indirect taxation.[184] But
the government of the Confederation was one that trusted too much to the
patriotism and sense of honor of the different populations of the
different States. The moral feelings of a people will prompt to high and
heroic deeds; will impel them with irresistible force and energy to the
accomplishment of the great objects of liberty and happiness; and will
develop in individuals the highest capacity for endurance that human
nature can display. They did so in the American Revolution. The annals
of no people, struggling for liberty, exhibit more of the virtues of
fortitude, self-denial, and an ardent love of freedom, than ours
exhibit, especially in the earlier stages of the contest. But any
_feelings_ are an unsafe and uncertain reliance for the regular and
punctual operations of civil government. The fiscal concerns of a
nation, left to depend principally upon the prevailing sentiments of
justice, honor, and gratitude,--upon the connection between these
sentiments and that passion for liberty which animated the earlier
struggles for national independence,--are exposed to great hazards. If
an appeal to the feelings of a people constitutes the principal ground
of security for the public creditor, other feelings may intervene, which
will lead to a denial of the justice of the claim; for it is the very
nature of such an appeal to submit the whole question of obligation and
duty to popular determination. That government alone is likely to
discharge the just obligations of any people, which possesses both the
power to declare what those obligations are, and the power to levy the
means of payment, without a reference of either point to popular
sentiment.
The history of the Confederation contains abundant proofs of the
soundness of this position. At the close of the war, a debt of more than
forty millions of dollars was due from the United States to various
classes of creditors, and the whole of it had been contracted either by
the government of the Confederation, or by its predecessors, for whose
contracts the Confederation was expressly bound, by the Articles, to
provide. This debt could not be discharged without a grant of internal
revenues from the States, and without a grant of the power to collect
other revenues from the external trade of the country. The appeal that
was made by the government in order to obtain these grants was addressed
almost wholly to the moral sentiments of the people of the different
States; the time had scarcely arrived, although rapidly approaching, for
an appeal to those interests which were involved in the surrender to the
general government of the power of regulating foreign commerce;[185] and
consequently the arguments addressed to the sense of justice and the
feeling of gratitude were answered by discussions of the propriety,
justice, and reasonableness of some of the claims, for which the States
were thus called upon to provide, as existing debts of the country, not
without the hope, entertained in some quarters, of involving the whole
in confusion and final rejection.[186]
The design of the framers of the revenue system of 1783 was twofold;
first, to do justice to the creditors of the country, by procuring
adequate power to fund the public debts; and second, to strengthen and
consolidate the national government, by means of those debts and of the
various interests which would be combined in the great object of their
liquidation. They foresaw, on the approach of peace, that to leave these
debts to be provided for by the States individually would lead to a
separation of interests fatal to the continuance of the Union; but that
to make the United States responsible for the whole of them would be to
create a bond of union, that would be effectual and operative, after
the external pressure of war, which had hitherto held the States
together, should have been removed. For this purpose, they undoubtedly
availed themselves of the discontents of the army, a class of the public
creditors the justice of whose claims there was immediate danger in
denying. There is no reason to suppose that these discontents were
promoted by any one concerned in giving direction to the action of
Congress. But before the crisis had been reached in the "Newburgh
Addresses," it was perceived to be extremely important to prevent the
army from turning away from the general government, as their debtor, to
look to their respective States; and, after the imminent hazard of that
moment had passed, the claims of the army were used, and used most
rightfully, to impress upon the States the necessity of yielding to
Congress the powers necessary to do justice.[187]
In the proposal of this scheme of finance, involving, as it did, a
material change in the operation of the existing constitution of the
country, there was great wisdom; and it was eminently fortunate that it
went forth before the advent of peace, to be considered and acted upon
by the States. The system of the Confederation had utterly failed to
supply the means of sustaining the public credit of the Union, and the
consciousness of that failure tended to produce a resolution of the
Union into its component elements, the States. Men had begun to abandon
the hope of paying the debts of the country; or, if they were to be
paid at all, they had begun to look to the States, in their individual
capacities, as the ultimate debtors, to whom at least a part of the
claims was to be referred. Had the country been permitted to pass from a
state of war to a state of peace, without the suggestion and proposal of
a definite system for funding these debts on continental securities, the
Union would at once have been exhausted of all vitality. The
Confederation, left to discharge the functions which belonged to it in
peace, without the power of relieving the burdens which it had entailed
upon the country during the war, would have been everywhere regarded as
a useless machine, the purposes of which--poorly answered in the period
of its greatest activity--had entirely ceased to exist. Congress would
have been attended by delegates from few of the States, if attended at
all;[188] and the rapid decay of the Union would have been marked by the
feeble, spasmodic, and unsuccessful efforts of some of them to
discharge so much of the general burdens as could have been assigned to
them in severalty; the open repudiation of others; and the final
confusion and loss of the whole mass of the debts, in universal
bankruptcy, poverty, and disgrace.
But the comprehensive scheme of 1783, although never adopted, saved the
imperfect Union that then existed from the destruction to which it was
hastening. It saved it for a prolonged, though feeble existence, through
a period of desperate exhaustion. It saved it, by ascertaining the debts
of the country, fixing their national character, and proposing a
national system for their discharge. It directed the attention of the
States to the advantage and the necessity of giving up to the Union some
part of the imposts that might be levied on foreign commodities, and
thus led the way to that grand idea of uniformity of regulation, which
was afterwards developed as the true interest of communities, which,
from their geographical and moral relations, constitute in fact but one
country.
It is not intended, however, in assigning this influence to the revenue
system proposed in 1783, to suggest that it contained the germ of the
present Constitution. It was an essentially different system. It
proposed the enlargement of the powers of Congress, as they existed
under the Confederation, only by the grant to the United States of the
right to collect certain duties on foreign importations, for the limited
period of twenty-five years, to be applied to the discharge of the
debts contracted for the purposes of the war, but to be collected by
officers appointed by the States, although amenable to Congress; and the
levy and collection by the States of certain internal taxes, during the
same limited term, for the purpose of raising certain proportionate
sums, to be paid over to the United States, for the same object. So far,
therefore, as this system suggested any new powers, there is a wide
difference between its features and principles and those of an entire
and irrevocable surrender to the Union of the whole subject of taxing
and regulating foreign commerce. But the influence of this proposal upon
the country, during the four years which followed, is to be measured by
the evident necessities which it revealed, and by the means to which it
pointed for their relief;--means which, though never applied, and, if
applied, would have proved inadequate, still showed, through the period
of increasing weakness in the Union, the high obligations which rested
upon the country, and which could be discharged only by the preservation
of the Union.
* * * * *
NOTE TO PAGE 185.
ON THE HALF-PAY FOR THE OFFICERS OF THE REVOLUTION.
In Connecticut, the opposition to the plan of enabling
Congress to fund the public debts arose from the jealousy
with which the provision of half-pay for the officers of the
army had always been regarded in that State. In October,
1783, Governor Trumbull, in an address to the Assembly
declining a reëlection, had spoken of the necessity of
enlarging the powers of Congress, and of strengthening the
arm of the government. A committee reported an answer to this
address, which contained a paragraph approving of the
principles which the Governor had inculcated, but it was
stricken out in the lower house. Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., who
had been one of Washington's aids, thus wrote to him
concerning the rejection of this paragraph: "It was rejected,
lest, by adopting it, they should seem to convey to the
people an idea of their concurring with the political
sentiments contained in the address; so exceedingly jealous
is the spirit of this State at present respecting the powers
and the engagements of Congress, arising principally from
their aversion to the half-pay and commutation granted to the
army; principally, I say, arising from this cause. It is but
too true, that some few are wicked enough to hope, that, by
means of this clamor, they may be able to rid themselves of
the whole public debt, by introducing so much confusion into
public measures as shall eventually produce a general
abolition of the whole." (Writings of Washington, IX. 5,
note.) It appears from the Journals of Congress, that in
November, 1783, the House of Representatives of Connecticut
sent some remonstrance to Congress respecting the resolution
which had granted half-pay for life to the officers, which
was referred to a committee, to be answered. In the report of
this committee it was said, that "the resolution of Congress
referred to appears by the yeas and nays to have been passed
according to the then established rules of that body in
transacting the business of the United States; the resolution
itself had public notoriety, and does not appear to have been
formally objected against by the legislature of any State
till after the Confederation was completely adopted, _nor
till after the close of the war_." These words were stricken
out from the report by a vote of six States against one, two
States declining to vote. The journal gives no further
account of the matter. (Journals, IX. 79. March 12, 1784.)
In Massachusetts, the half-pay had always been equally
unpopular. The legislature of that State, on the 11th of
July, 1783, addressed a letter to Congress, to assign, as a
reason for not agreeing to the impost duty, the grant of
half-pay to the officers. The tone of this letter does little
credit to the State.
"_Commonwealth of Massachusetts._
"Boston, July 11. 1783.
"Sir:--
"The Address of the United States in Congress assembled has
been received by the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts; and, while they consider themselves as bound
in duty to give Congress the highest assurance that no
measures consistent with their circumstances, and the
constitution of this government and the Federal Union, shall
remain unattempted by them to furnish those supplies which
justice demands, and which are necessary to support the
credit and honor of the United States, they find themselves
under a necessity of addressing Congress in regard to the
subject of the half-pay of the officers of the army, and the
proposed commutation thereof; with some other matters of a
similar nature, which produce among the people of this
Commonwealth the greatest concern and uneasiness, and involve
the legislature thereof in no small embarrassments. The
legislature have not been unacquainted with the sufferings,
nor are they forgetful of the virtue and bravery, of their
fellow-citizens in the army; and while they are sensible that
justice requires they should be fully compensated for their
services and sufferings, at the same time it is most
sincerely wished that they may return to the bosom of their
country, under such circumstances as may place them in the
most agreeable light with their fellow-citizens. Congress, in
the year 1780, resolved, that the officers of the army, who
should continue therein during the war, should be entitled to
half-pay for life; and at the same time resolved, that all
such as should retire therefrom, in consequence of the new
arrangement which was then ordered to take place, should be
entitled to the same benefit; a commutation of which half-pay
has since been proposed. The General Court are sensible that
the United States in Congress assembled are, by the
Confederation, vested with a discretionary power to make
provision for the support and payment of the army, and such
civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general
affairs of the United States; but in making such provision,
due regard ever ought to be had to the welfare and happiness
of the people, the rules of equity, and the spirit and
general design of the Confederation. We cannot, on this
occasion, avoid saying, that, with due respect, we are of
opinion those principles were not duly attended to, in the
grant of half-pay to the officers of the army; that being, in
our opinion, a grant of more than an adequate reward for
their services, and inconsistent with that equality which
ought to subsist among citizens of free and republican
States. Such a measure appears to be calculated to raise and
exalt some citizens in wealth and grandeur, to the injury and
oppression of others, even if the inequality which will
happen among the officers of the army, who have performed
from one to eight years' service, should not be taken into
consideration. The observations which have been made with
regard to the officers of the army will in general apply to
the civil officers appointed by Congress, who, in our
opinion, have been allowed much larger salaries than are
consistent with the state of our finances, the rules of
equity, and a proper regard to the public good. And, indeed,
if the United States were in the most wealthy and prosperous
circumstances, it is conceived that economy and moderation,
with respect to grants and allowances, in opposition to the
measures which have been adopted by monarchical and luxurious
courts, would most highly conduce to our reputation, even in
the eyes of foreigners, and would cause a people, who have
been contending with so much ardor and expense for republican
constitutions and freedom, which cannot be supported without
frugality and virtue, to appear with dignity and consistency;
and at the same time would, in the best manner, conduce to
the public happiness. It is thought to be essentially
necessary, especially at the present time, that Congress
should be expressly informed, that such measures as are
complained of are extremely opposite and irritating to the
principles and feelings which the people of some Eastern
States, and of this in particular, inherit from their
ancestry. The legislature cannot without horror entertain the
most distant idea of the dissolution of the Union which
subsists between the United States, and the ruin which would
inevitably ensue thereon; but with great pain they must
observe, that the extraordinary grants and allowances which
Congress have thought proper to make to their civil and
military officers have produced such effects in this
Commonwealth as are of a threatening aspect. From these
sources, and particularly from the grant of half-pay to the
officers of the army, and the proposed commutation thereof,
it has arisen, that the General Court has not been able
hitherto to agree in granting to the United States an impost
duty, agreeable to the recommendation of Congress; while the
General Assembly at the same time have been deeply impressed
with a sense of the necessity of speedily adopting some
effectual measures for supplying the continental treasury,
for the restoration of the public credit, and the salvation
of the country;--and propose, as the present session is near
terminating, again to take the subject of the impost duty
into consideration early in the next. From these
observations, you may easily learn the difficult and critical
situation the legislature is in, and they rely on the wisdom
of Congress to adopt and propose some measure for relief in
this extremity.
"In the name and by order of the General Court,
"We are your Excellency's most obedient humble servants,
"SAMUEL ADAMS,
_President of the Senate_.
"TRISTRAM DALTON,
_Speaker of the House of Representatives_.
"HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS."
This letter was thought worthy an answer, and accordingly a
report upon it was brought in by Mr. Madison, and adopted in
Congress, containing among other things the following:--
"Your committee consider the measure of Congress as the
result of a deliberate judgment, framed on a general view of
the interests of the Union at large. They consider it to be a
truth, that no State in this Confederacy can claim (more
equitably than an individual in a society) to derive
advantages from a Union, without conforming to the judgment
of a constitutional majority of those who compose it; still,
however, they conceive it will be found no less true, that,
if a State every way so important as Massachusetts should
withhold her solid support to constitutional measures of the
Confederacy, the result must be a dissolution of the
Union;--and then she must hold herself as alone responsible
for the anarchy and domestic confusion that may succeed, and
for exposing all these confederated States (who at the
commencement of the late war leagued to defend her violated
rights) an easy prey to the machinations of their enemies,
and the sport of European politics; and therefore they are of
opinion, that Congress should still confide that a free,
enlightened, and generous people will never hazard
consequences so perilous and alarming, and in all
circumstances rely on the wisdom, temper, and virtue of their
constituents, which (guided by an all-wise Providence) have
ever interposed to avert impending evils and misfortunes.
Your committee beg leave further to observe, that, from an
earnest desire to give satisfaction to such of the States as
expressed a dislike to the half-pay establishment, a sum in
gross was proposed by Congress, and accepted by the officers,
as an equivalent for their half-pay. That your committee are
informed, that such equivalent was ascertained on established
principles which are acknowledged to be just, and adopted in
similar cases; but that if the objections against the
commutation were ever so valid, yet, as it is not now under
the arbitration of Congress, but an act finally adopted, and
the national faith pledged to carry it into effect, they
could not be taken into consideration. With regard to the
salaries of civil officers, it may be observed, that the
necessaries of life have been very high during the war: hence
it has happened that even the salaries complained of have not
been found sufficient to induce persons properly qualified to
accept of many important offices, and the public business is
left undone." (Journals of Congress, VIII. 379--385.
September 25, 1783.)
* * * * *
NOTE TO PAGE 186.
ON THE NEWBURGH ADDRESSES.
There was a period in this business, when the officers would
have accepted from Congress a recommendation to their several
States for the payment of their dues. Their committee,
consisting of General McDougall, Colonel Brooks of
Massachusetts, and Colonel Ogden of New Jersey, arrived in
Philadelphia about the 1st of January. In their memorial to
Congress, they abstained from designating the funds from
which they desired satisfaction of their demands, because
their great object was to get a settlement of their accounts
and an equivalent for the half-pay established. But they
were, in fact, at one time, impressed with the belief that
their best, and indeed their only security, was to be sought
for in funds to be provided by the States, under the
recommendation of Congress. This plan would have involved a
division of the army into thirteen different parts, leaving
the claims of each part to be satisfied by its own State: a
course that would unquestionably have led to the rejection of
their demands in some States, and probably in many. To
prevent this, there is little doubt that the influence of
those members of Congress who wished to promote their
interests, and to identify them with the interests of the
other public creditors, was used; and by the middle of
February the committee of the officers became satisfied, that
the army must unitedly pursue a common object, insisting on
the grant of revenues to the general government, adequate to
the liquidation of all the public debts. (Letter of
Gouverneur Morris to General Greene, February 15, 1783. Life,
by Sparks, I. 250.) The point, however, which they continued
to urge, was the commutation; and upon this they encountered
great obstacles. The committee of Congress to whom their
memorial was referred went into a critical examination of the
principles of annuities, in order to determine on an
equivalent for the half-pay for life, promised by the resolve
of 1780. The result was a report, declaring that six years'
full pay was the proper equivalent. This report was followed
by a declaratory resolve, which was passed, "that the troops
of the United States, in common with all the creditors of the
same, have an undoubted right to expect security; and that
Congress will make every effort to obtain, from the
respective States, substantial funds, adequate to the object
of funding the whole debt of the United States, and will
enter upon an immediate and full consideration of the nature
of such funds, and the most likely mode of obtaining them."
The remainder of the report, however, was referred to a new
committee of five, the number of years being considered too
many. The second committee reported five years' whole pay as
an equivalent, after another calculation of annuities; but
the approval of nine States could not be obtained. A desire
was then expressed by some of the members, who were opposed
both to the commutation and the half-pay, to have more time
for consideration, and this was granted.
This was the position of the matter on the 8th of February,
when the committee of the officers wrote to General Knox on
the part of the army. They stated that "Massachusetts, New
York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North and South Carolina were
for the equivalent; New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
and Jersey against it. There is some prospect of getting one
more of these States to vote for the commutation. If this is
accomplished, with Maryland and Delaware, the question will
be carried; whenever it is, as the report now stands, it will
be at the election of the line, as such, to accept of the
commutation or retain their claim to the half-pay, Congress
being determined, that no alteration shall take place in the
emolument held out to the army but by their consent. This
rendered it unnecessary for us to consult the army on the
equivalent for half-pay. The zeal of a great number of
members of Congress to get continental funds, while a few
wished to have us referred to the States, induced us to
conceal what funds we wished or expected, lest our
declaration for one or the other might retard a settlement of
our accounts, or a determination on the equivalent for
half-pay. Indeed, some of our best friends in Congress
declared, however desirous they were to have our accounts
settled, and the commutation fixed, as well as to get funds,
yet they would oppose referring us to the States for a
settlement and security, till all prospect of obtaining
continental funds was at an end. Whether this is near or not,
as commutation for the half-pay was one of the principal
objects of the address, the obtaining of that is necessary,
previous to our particularizing what fund will be most
agreeable to us: this must be determined by circumstances. If
Congress get funds, we shall be secured. If not, the
equivalent settled, a principle will be established, which
will be more acceptable to the Eastern States than half-pay,
if application must be made to them. As it is not likely that
Congress will be able to determine soon on the commutation,
(for the reasons above mentioned,) it is judged necessary
that Colonel Brooks return to the army, to give them a more
particular detail of our prospects than can be done in the
compass of a letter." (Writings of Washington, VIII. 553,
554.)
Two classes of persons existed at this time in Congress, of
very different views; the one attached to State, the other to
continental politics; the one strenuous advocates for funding
the public debts upon solid securities, the other opposed to
this plan, and finally yielding to it only in consequence of
the clamors of the army and the other public creditors. The
advocates for continental funds, convinced that nothing could
be done for the public credit by any other measures,
determined to blend the interests of the army and those of
the other creditors in their scheme, in order to combine all
the motives that could operate upon different descriptions of
men in the different States. Washington, who naturally
regarded the interests of the army as the first object in
point of importance, and who had not given his attention so
much to the general financial affairs of the country, seems
to have thought it unadvisable to bring the claims of the
army before the States, in connection with the other public
debts. On the 4th of March, he wrote to Hamilton (then in
Congress), that "the just claims of the army ought, and it is
to be hoped will, have their weight with every sensible
legislature in the United States, if Congress point to their
demands, and show, if the case is so, the reasonableness of
them, and the impracticability of complying with them without
their aid. In any other point of view, it would in my opinion
be impolitic to introduce the army on the tapis, lest it
should excite jealousy and bring on its concomitants. The
States surely cannot be so devoid of common sense, common
honesty, and common policy, as to refuse their aid on a full,
clear, and candid representation of facts from Congress; more
especially if these should be enforced by members of their
own body, who might demonstrate what the inevitable
consequences of failure will lead to." (Writings, VIII. 390.)
But while the advocates of the continental system were
maturing their plans, new difficulties arose, in consequence
of the proceedings of the officers at Newburgh, and of the
jealousies which the army began to entertain. Among the
resolutions adopted by the officers was one, which expressed
their unshaken confidence in the justice of Congress and the
country, and their conviction that Congress would not
disband them, until their accounts had been liquidated, and
adequate funds established for their payment. But Congress
had no constitutional power, under the Confederation, to
demand funds of the States; and to determine that the army
should be continued in service until the States granted the
funds, which it was intended to recommend, would be to
determine that it should remain a standing army in time of
peace, until the States should comply with the
recommendation. On the other hand, Congress had no present
means of paying the army, if they were to disband them. This
dilemma rendered it necessary to evade for a short time any
explicit declaration of the purposes of Congress as to
disbanding the army; and hence arose a jealousy, on the part
of the army, that they were to be used as mere puppets to
operate upon the country, in favor of a general revenue
system. Washington himself communicated the existence of
these suspicions to Hamilton, on the 4th of April, advising
that the army should be disbanded as soon as possible,
consulting its wishes as to the mode. He also intimated that
the Superintendent of the Finances, Robert Morris, was
suspected to be at the bottom of the scheme of keeping the
army together, for the purpose of aiding the adoption of the
revenue system.
Hamilton's reply explains the position of the whole matter,
and the motives and purposes of those with whom he acted.
"But the question was not merely how to do justice to the
creditors, but how to restore public credit. Taxation in this
country, it was found, could not supply a sixth part of the
public necessities. The loans in Europe were far short of the
balance, and the prospect every day diminishing; the court of
France telling us, in plain terms, she could not even do as
much as she had done; individuals in Holland, and everywhere
else, refusing to part with their money on the precarious
tenure of the mere faith of this country, without any pledge
for the payment either of principal or interest. In this
situation, what was to be done? It was essential to our cause
that vigorous efforts should be made to restore public
credit; it was necessary to combine all the motives to this
end, that could operate upon different descriptions of
persons in the different States. The necessity and
discontents of the army presented themselves as a powerful
engine. But, sir, these gentlemen would be puzzled to support
their insinuations by a single fact. It was indeed proposed
to appropriate the intended impost on trade to the army debt,
and, what was extraordinary, by gentlemen who had expressed
their dislike to the principle of the fund. I acknowledge I
was one that opposed this, for the reasons already assigned,
and for these additional ones: _that_ was the fund on which
we most counted to obtain further loans in Europe; it was
necessary we should have a fund sufficient to pay the
interest of what had been borrowed and what was to be
borrowed. The truth was, these people in this instance wanted
to play off the army against the funding system. As to Mr.
Morris, I will give your Excellency a true explanation of his
conduct. He had been for some time pressing Congress to
endeavor to obtain funds, and had found a great backwardness
in the business. He found the taxes unproductive in the
different States; he found the loans in Europe making a very
slow progress; he found himself pressed on all hands for
supplies; he found himself, in short, reduced to this
alternative,--either of making engagements which he could not
fulfil, or declaring his resignation in case funds were not
established by a given time. Had he followed the first
course, the bubble must soon have burst; he must have
sacrificed his credit and his character, and _public_ credit,
already in a ruined condition, would have lost its last
support. He wisely judged it better to resign; this might
increase the embarrassments of the moment, but the necessity
of the case, it was to be hoped, would produce the proper
measures, and he might then resume the direction of the
machine with advantage and success. He also had some hope
that his resignation would prove a stimulus to Congress. He
was, however, ill-advised in the publication of his letters
of resignation. This was an imprudent step, and has given a
handle to his personal enemies, who, by playing upon the
passions of others, have drawn some well-meaning men into the
cry against him. But Mr. Morris certainly deserves a great
deal from his country. I believe no man in this country but
himself could have kept the money machine going during the
period he has been in office. From every thing that appears,
his administration has been upright as well as able. The
truth is, the old leaven of Deane and Lee is at this day
working against Mr. Morris. He happened in that dispute to
have been on the side of Deane, and certain men can never
forgive him.... The matter, with respect to the army, which
has occasioned most altercation in Congress, and most
dissatisfaction in the army, has been the half-pay. The
opinions on this head have been two: one party was for
referring the several lines to their States, to make such
commutation as they should think proper; the other, for
making the commutation by Congress, and funding it on
continental security. I was of this last opinion, and so were
all those who will be represented as having made use of the
army as our puppets. Our principal reasons were:--First, by
referring the lines to their respective States, those which
were opposed to the half-pay would have taken advantage of
the officers' necessities to make the commutation short of an
equivalent. Secondly, the inequality which would have arisen
in the different States when the officers came to compare,
(as has happened in other cases,) would have been a new
source of discontent. Thirdly, such a reference was a
continuance of the old, wretched State system, by which the
ties between Congress and the army have been nearly
dissolved,--by which the resources of the States have been
diverted from the common treasury and wasted: a system which
your Excellency has often justly reprobated. I have gone into
these details to give you a just idea of the parties in
Congress. I assure you, upon my honor, sir, I have given you
a candid statement of facts, to the best of my judgment. The
men against whom the suspicions you mention must be directed,
are in general the most sensible, the most liberal, the most
independent, and the most respectable characters in our body,
as well as the most unequivocal friends to the army; in a
word, they are the men who think continentally." (Life of
Hamilton, II. 162-164.)
FOOTNOTES:
[177] The debt due to the crown of France was ascertained in 1782 to be
eighteen millions of livres; and by the contract entered into by the
Unites States with the king of France, on the 16th of July, 1782, the
principal of this debt was to be paid in twelve annual instalments of
one million five hundred thousand livres each, in twelve years, to
commence from the third year after a peace, at the royal treasury in
Paris. The interest was payable annually, at the time and place
stipulated for the payment of the instalments of the principal, at five
per cent. The king generously remitted the arrears of interest due at
the date of the contract. There was also due to the King of France ten
millions of livres, borrowed by him of the States-General of the
Netherlands for the use of the United States, and the payment of which
he had guaranteed. This sum was to be paid in Paris in ten annual
instalments of one million of livres each, commencing on the 5th of
November, 1787. The interest on this loan was payable in Paris
immediately, and the first payment of interest became due on the 5th of
November, 1782. There was also due to the Farmers-General of France one
million of livres, and to the king six millions of livres, on a loan for
the year 1783; making in the whole thirty-eight millions of livres, or
$7,037,037, due in France. There was also due to money-lenders in
Holland $671,000; for money borrowed by Mr. Jay in Spain, $150,000; and
a year's interest on the Dutch loan of ten millions of livres, amounting
to $26,848;--making the whole foreign debt $7,885,085. The domestic debt
amounted to $34,115,290. Five millions of this were due to the army,
_under the commutation_ resolves of March, 1783. The residue was held by
other citizens, or consisted of arrears of interest. The whole debt of
the United States was estimated at $42,000,375, and the annual interest
of this sum was $2,415,956.
[178] Mr. Madison (under the date of December 24, 1782) says, that, on
the receipt of this intelligence, "the most intelligent members were
deeply affected, and prognosticated a failure of the impost scheme, and
the most pernicious effects to the character, the duration, and the
interests of the Confederacy. It was at length, notwithstanding,
determined to persist in the attempt for permanent revenue, and a
committee was appointed to report the steps proper to be taken." Debates
in the Congress of the Confederation, Elliot, I. 17.
[179] $1,545,818 and 30/90 was the whole amount.
[180] On the final question, as to the revenue system, Hamilton voted
against it. His reasons were given in a letter to the Governor of New
York, under date of April 14, 1783. They were, "First, that it does not
designate the funds (except the impost) on which the whole interest is
to arise; and by which (selecting the capital articles of visible
property) the collection would have been easy, the funds productive, and
necessarily increasing with the increase of the country. Secondly, that
the duration of the funds is not coextensive with the debt, but limited
to twenty-five years, though there is a moral certainty that in that
period the principal will not, by the present provision, be fairly
extinguished. Thirdly, that the nomination and appointment of the
collectors of the revenue are to reside in each State, instead of, at
least, the nomination being in the United States; the consequence of
which will be, that those States which have little interest in the
funds, by having a small share of the public debt due to their own
citizens, will take care to appoint such persons as are the least likely
to collect the revenue." Still, he urged the adoption of the plan by his
own State, "because it is her interest, at all events, to promote the
payment of the public debt in continental funds, independent of the
general considerations of union and propriety. I am much mistaken, if
the debts due from the United States to the citizens of the State of New
York do not considerably exceed its proportion of the necessary funds;
of course, it has an immediate interest that there should be a
continental provision for them. But there are superior motives that
ought to operate in every State,--the obligations of national faith,
honor, and reputation. Individuals have been too long already sacrificed
to the public convenience. It will be shocking, and, indeed, an eternal
reproach to this country, if we begin the peaceable enjoyment of our
independence by a violation of all the principles of honesty and true
policy. It is worthy of remark, that at least four fifths of the
domestic debt are due to the citizens of the States from Pennsylvania,
inclusively, northward." Life of Hamilton, II. 185, 186.
[181] Address.
[182] Ibid.
[183] With what success this was attended may be seen from the fact,
that, from the year 1782 to the year 1786, Congress made requisitions on
the States for the purpose of paying the interest on the public debts,
of more than six millions of dollars, and on the 31st of March, 1787,
about one million only of this sum had been received. The interest of
the debt due to domestic creditors remained wholly unpaid; money was
borrowed in Europe to pay the interest on the foreign loans; and the
domestic debt sunk to so low a value, that it was often sold for one
tenth of its nominal amount.
[184] General Washington's letter to Hamilton, March 31, 1783. Writings,
VIII. 409, 410. Circular Letter to the Governors of the States, on
disbanding the army. Ibid. 439, 451.
[185] None of the documents, connected with the Address to the People of
the United States, issued by Congress in 1783, discussed the question as
one of direct interest and advantage, except Hamilton's answer to the
objections of Rhode Island. The Address itself appealed entirely to
considerations of honor, justice, and good faith. Hamilton's paper,
however, showed with great perspicacity, that the proposed impost would
not be unfavorable to commerce, but the contrary; that it would not
diminish the profits of the merchant, being too moderate in amount to
discourage the consumption of imported goods, and therefore that it
would not diminish the extent of importations; but that, even if it had
this tendency, it was a tendency in the right direction, because it
would lessen the proportion of imports to exports, and incline the
balance in favor of the country. But the great question of yielding the
control of foreign commerce to the Union, _for the sake of uniformity of
regulation_, was not touched in any of these papers. The time for it had
not arrived.
[186] See note at the end of this chapter.
[187] See note on page 194.
[188] As it was, the approach of peace had reduced the attendance upon
Congress below the constitutional number of States necessary to ratify
the treaty, when it was received. On the 23d of December, 1783, a
resolve was passed, "That letters be immediately despatched to the
executives of New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, South
Carolina, and Georgia, informing them that the safety, honor, and good
faith of the United States require the immediate attendance of their
delegates in Congress; that there have not been during the sitting of
Congress at this place [Annapolis] more than seven States represented,
namely, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, and North Carolina, and most of those by only two delegates;
and that the ratification of the definitive treaty, and several other
matters, of great national concern, are now pending before Congress,
which require the utmost despatch, and to which the assent of at least
nine States is necessary." (Journals, IX. 12.)
CHAPTER III.
1781-1783.
OPINIONS AND EFFORTS OF WASHINGTON AND OF HAMILTON.--DECLINE OF THE
CONFEDERATION.
The proposal of the revenue system went forth to the country, although
not in immediate connection, yet nearly at the same time, with those
comprehensive and weighty counsels which Washington addressed to the
States, when the great object for which he had entered the service of
his country had been accomplished, and he was about to return to a
private station. His relations to the people of this country had been
peculiar. He had been, not only the leader of their armies, but, in a
great degree, their civil counsellor; for although he had rarely, if
ever, gone out of the province of his command to give shape or direction
to constitutional changes, yet the whole circumstances of that command
had constantly placed him in contact with the governments of the States,
as well as with the Congress; and he had often been obliged to interpose
the influence of his own character and opinions with all of them, in
order that the civil machine might not wholly cease to move. At the
moment when he was about to lay aside the sword, he saw very clearly
that there were certain principles of conduct which must be called into
action in the States, and among the people of the States, for the
preservation of the Union. He, and he alone, could address to them with
effect the requisite words of admonition, and point out the course of
safety and success. This great service, the last act of his
revolutionary official life, was performed with all the truth and wisdom
of his character, before he proceeded to resign into the hands of
Congress the power which he had held so long, and which he now
surrendered with a virtue, a dignity, and a sincerity, with which no
such power has ever been laid down by any of the leaders of revolutions
whom the world has seen.
His object in this Address was not so much to urge the adoption of
particular measures, as to inculcate principles which he believed to be
essential to the welfare of the country. So clearly, however, did it
appear to him, that the honor and independence of the country were
involved in the adoption of the revenue system which Congress had
recommended, that he did not refrain from urging it as the sole means by
which a national bankruptcy could be averted, before any different plan
could be proposed and adopted.
But how far, at this time, any other or further plans, for the formation
of a better constitution, had been formed, or how far any one perceived
both the vicious principle of the Confederation and the means of
substituting for it another and more efficient power, we can judge only
by the published writings of the Revolutionary statesmen. It is quite
certain that at this period Washington saw the defects of the
Confederation, as he had seen them clearly, and suffered under them,
from the beginning. He saw that in the powers of the States, which far
exceeded those of the Continental Congress, lay the source of all the
perplexities which he had experienced in the course of the war, and of
almost the whole of the difficulties and distresses of the army; and
that to form a new constitution, which would give consistency,
stability, and dignity to the Union, was the great problem of the time.
He saw, also, that the honor and true interest of this country were
involved in the development of continental power; that local and State
politics were destined to interfere with the establishment of any more
liberal and extensive plan of government, which the circumstances of the
country required, as they had perpetually weakened the bond by which the
Union had thus far been held together; and that such local influences
would make these States the sport of European policy. He predicted,
moreover, that the country would reach, if it reached at all, some
system of sufficient capabilities, only through mistakes and disasters,
and through an experience purchased at the price of further difficulties
and distress. Such were his general views, at the close of the war.[189]
But there was one man in the country who had looked more deeply still
into its wants, and who had formed in his enlarged and comprehensive
mind the clearest views of the means necessary to meet them, even before
the Confederation had been practically tried. A reorganization of the
government had engaged the attention of Hamilton, as early as 1780; and,
with his characteristic penetration and power, he saw and suggested what
should be the remedy.
He entertained the opinion, at this time, as he had always entertained
it, that the discretionary powers originally vested in Congress for the
safety of the States, and implied in the circumstances and objects of
their assembling, were fully competent to the public exigencies. But
their practice, from the time of the Declaration of Independence through
all the period that preceded the establishment of the Confederation, had
accustomed the country to doubts of their original authority, and had at
last amounted to a surrender of the ground from which they might have
exercised it. No remedy, therefore, remained, applicable to the
circumstances, and capable of rescuing the affairs of the country from
their deplorable situation, but to vest in Congress, expressly and by a
direct grant, the powers necessary to constitute an efficient government
and a solid, coercive union. The project then before the country, in the
Articles of Confederation, had been designed to accomplish what the
revolutionary government had failed to do. But it was manifestly
destined to fail in its turn; for it left an uncontrollable sovereignty
in the States, capable of defeating the beneficial exercise of the very
powers which it undertook to confer upon Congress. It made the army,
not a unit, formed and organized by a central and supreme authority, and
looking up to that authority alone, but a collection of several armies,
raised by the several States. It gave to the State legislatures the
effective power of the purse, by withholding all certain revenues from
Congress. It proposed to introduce no method and energy of
administration; and without an executive, it left every detail of
government to be managed by a deliberative body, whose constitution
rendered it fit for none but legislative functions.
Under these circumstances, it was Hamilton's advice, before the
Confederation took effect, that Congress should plainly, frankly, and
unanimously confess to the States their inability to carry on the
contest with Great Britain, without more ample powers than those which
they had for some time exercised, or those which they could exercise
under the Confederation; and that a convention of all the States be
immediately assembled, with full authority to agree upon a different
system. He suggested that a complete sovereignty should be vested in
Congress, except as to that part of internal police which relates to the
rights of property and life among individuals, and to raising money by
internal taxes, which he admitted should be regulated by the State
legislatures. But in all that relates to war, peace, trade, and finance,
he maintained that the sovereignty of Congress should be complete; that
it should have the entire management of foreign affairs, and of raising
and officering armies and navies; that it should have the entire
regulation of trade, determining with what countries it should be
carried on, laying prohibitions and duties, and granting bounties and
premiums; that it should have certain perpetual revenues of an internal
character, in specific taxes; that it should be authorized to institute
admiralty courts, coin money, establish banks, appropriate funds, and
make alliances offensive and defensive, and treaties of commerce. He
recommended also that Congress should immediately organize executive
departments of foreign affairs, war, marine, finance, and trade, with
great officers of state at the head of each of them.[190]
Hamilton's entry into Congress in 1782 marks the commencement of his
public efforts to develop the idea of a general government, whose organs
should act directly, and without the intervention of any State
machinery. He first publicly propounded this idea in the paper which he
prepared, as chairman of a committee, to be addressed to the legislature
of Rhode Island, in answer to the objections of that State to the
revenue system proposed in 1781. One of these objections was, that the
plan proposed to introduce into the State officers unknown and
unaccountable to the State itself, and therefore that it was against its
constitution. From the prevalence of this notion, we may see how
difficult it was to create the idea of a national sovereignty, that
would consist with the sovereignty of the States, and would work in its
appropriate sphere harmoniously with the State institutions, because
directed to a different class of objects. The nature of a federal
constitution was little understood. It was apparent that the exercise of
its powers must affect the internal police of its component members, to
some extent; but it was not well understood that political sovereignty
is capable of partition, according to the character of its subjects, so
that powers of one class may be imparted to a federal, and powers of
another class remain in a State constitution, without destroying the
sovereignty of the latter. Hamilton presented this view, and at the same
time pointed out, that, unless the constitution of a State expressly
prohibited its legislature from granting to the federal government new
power to appoint officers for a special purpose, to act within the State
itself, it was competent to the legislative authority of the State to
communicate such power, just as it was competent to it originally to
enter into the Confederation.[191]
In the same paper, also, he urged the necessity of vesting the
appointment of the collectors of the proposed revenue in the general
government, because it was designed as a security to creditors, and must
therefore be general in its principle and dependent on a single will,
and not on thirteen different authorities. This was the earliest
suggestion of the principle, that, in exercising its powers, the federal
government ought to act directly, through agents of its own appointment,
and thus be independent of State negligence or control. When the debate
came on in January, 1783, upon the new project of a revenue system, he
again urged the necessity of strengthening the federal government,
through the influence of officers deriving their appointments directly
from Congress;--a suggestion that was received at the moment with
pleasure by the opponents of the scheme, because it seemed to disclose a
motive calculated to touch the jealousy rather than to propitiate the
favor of the States. But the temporary expedients of the moment always
pass away. The great ideas of a statesman like Hamilton, earnestly bent
on the discovery and inculcation of truth, do not pass away. Wiser than
those by whom he was surrounded, with a deeper knowledge of the science
of government and the wants of the country than all of them, and
constantly enunciating principles which extended far beyond the
temporizing policy of the hour, the smiles of his opponents only prove
to posterity how far he was in advance of them.[192]
The efforts of Hamilton to effect a change in the rule of the
Confederation, as to the ratio of contribution by the States to the
treasury of the Union, also evince both the defects of the existing
government and the foresight with which he would have obviated them, if
he could have been sustained. The rule of the Confederation required
that the general treasury should be supplied by the several States in
proportion to the value of all lands within each State, granted or
surveyed, with the buildings and improvements thereon, to be estimated
according to such mode as Congress should from time to time direct and
appoint; the taxes for paying such proportion to be laid and levied by
the State legislatures, within the time fixed by Congress. But Congress
had never appointed any mode of ascertaining the valuation of lands
within the States. The first requisition called for after the
Confederation took effect was apportioned among the several States
without any valuation,--provision being made by which each State was to
receive interest on its payments, as far as they exceeded what might
afterwards be ascertained to be its just proportion, when the valuation
should have been made.[193] At the outset, therefore, a practical
inequality was established, which gave rise to complaints and jealousies
between the States, and increased the disposition to withhold compliance
with the requisitions. The dangerous crisis in the internal affairs of
the country which attended the approach of peace, had arrived in the
winter and spring of 1783, and nothing had ever been done to carry out
the rule of the Confederation, by fixing upon a mode of valuation. When
the discussion of the new measures for sustaining the public credit came
on, three courses presented themselves, with regard to this part of the
subject;--either, first, to change the principle of the Confederation
entirely; or, secondly, to carry it out by fixing a mode of valuation,
at once; or, thirdly, to postpone the attempt to carry it out, until a
better mode could be devised than the existing state of the country then
permitted.
Hamilton's preference was for the first of these courses, as the one
that admitted of the application of those principles of government which
he was endeavoring to introduce into the federal system; for he saw that
in the theory of the Confederation there was an inherent inequality,
which would constantly increase in practice, and which must either be
removed, or destroy the Union. He maintained, that, where there are
considerable differences in the relative wealth of different
communities, the proportion of those differences can never be
ascertained by any common measure; that the actual wealth of a country,
or its ability to pay taxes, depends on an endless variety of
circumstances, physical and moral, and cannot be measured by any one
general representative, as _land_, or _numbers_; and therefore that the
assumption of such a general representative, by whatever mode its local
value might be ascertained, would work inevitable inequality. In his
view, the only possible way of making the States contribute to the
general treasury in an equal proportion to their means, was by general
taxes imposed under continental authority; and it is a striking proof of
the comprehensive sagacity with which he looked forward, that, while he
admitted that this mode would, for a time, produce material
inequalities, he foresaw that balancing of interests which would arise
in a continental legislation, and would relieve the hardships of one tax
in a particular State by the lighter pressure of another bearing with
proportional weight in some other part of the Confederacy.[194]
Accordingly, after an attempt to postpone the consideration of a mode of
carrying out the Confederation, he made an effort to have its principle
changed, by substituting specific taxes on land and houses, to be
collected and appropriated, as well as the duties, under the authority
of the United States, by officers to be nominated by Congress, and
approved by the State in which they were to exercise their functions,
but accountable to and removable by Congress.[195] These ideas, however,
as he himself saw, were not agreeable to the spirit of the times, and
his plan was rejected. After many fruitless projects had been suggested
and discussed, for making the valuation required by the
Confederation,--some of them proposing that it should be done by
commissioners appointed by the United States, and some by commissioners
appointed by the States,--it was determined to propose no other change
in the principle of making requisitions on the States, than to
substitute population in the place of land, as the rule of
proportion.[196]
Equally extensive and important were his views on the subject of a
peace establishment, for which he saw the necessity of providing, as the
time approached when the Confederation would necessarily be tested as a
government for the purposes of peace. To adapt a constitution, whose
principal powers were originally designed to be exercised in a state of
war, to a state of peace, for which it possessed but few powers, and
those not clearly defined, was a problem in the science of government of
a novel character. It might prove to be an impossible task; for on
applying the constitutional provisions to the real wants and necessities
of the country, it might turn out that the Confederation was in some
respects destitute of the capacity to provide for them; and in
undertaking to carry out its actual and sufficient powers, which had
never hitherto been exercised, opposition might spring up, from State
jealousy and local policy, which, in the real weakness of the federal
government, would be as effectual a barrier as the want of
constitutional authority. Still the effort was to be made; and Hamilton
approached the subject with all the sagacity and statesmanship for which
he was so distinguished.
He saw that the Confederation contained provisions which looked to the
continuance of the Union after the war had terminated, and that these
provisions required practical application, through a machinery which
had never been even framed. The Articles of Confederation vested in
Congress the exclusive management of foreign relations; but the
department of foreign affairs had never been properly organized. They
also gave to Congress the exclusive regulation of trade and intercourse
with the Indian nations; but no department of Indian affairs had been
established with properly defined powers and duties. Nothing had been
done to carry out the provision for fixing the standard of weights and
measures throughout the United States, or to regulate the alloy and
value of coin. Above all, the great question of means, military and
naval, for the external and internal defence of the country during
peace, for the preservation of tranquillity, the protection of commerce,
the fulfilment of treaty stipulations, and the maintenance of the
authority of the United States, had not been so much as touched. To
regulate these important subjects was the design of a committee, at the
head of which Hamilton was placed; and his earliest attention was
directed to the most serious and difficult of them,--the provision for a
peace establishment of military and naval forces.[197]
The question whether the United States could constitutionally maintain
an army and navy, in time of peace, was, under the Articles of
Confederation, not free from difficulty; but it became of imminent
practical importance, under the treaty of peace. That treaty provided
for an immediate withdrawal of the British forces from all posts and
fortifications within the United States; and it became at once an
important question, whether these posts and fortifications--especially
those within certain districts, the jurisdiction and property of which
had not been constitutionally ascertained--should be garrisoned by
troops of the United States, or of the States within which they were
situated. There was also territory appertaining to the United States,
not within the original claim of the United States. The whole of the
Western frontier required defence. The navigation of the Mississippi and
the lakes, and the rights of the fisheries and of foreign commerce, all
belonging to the United States, and depending on the laws of nations and
treaty stipulations, demanded the joint protection of the Union, and
could not with propriety be left to the separate establishments of the
States.
But the Articles of Confederation contained no express provision for the
establishment and maintenance of any military and naval forces during
peace. They empowered the United States, generally, (and without mention
of peace or war,) to build and equip a navy, and to agree upon the
number of land forces to be raised, and to call upon the States to
furnish their quotas. But they also declared that no vessels of war
should be kept up by any State in time of peace, except such number only
as should be deemed necessary by Congress for the defence of such State
or its trade; and that no body of forces should be kept up by any State
in time of peace, except such number only as Congress should deem
requisite to garrison the posts necessary for the defence of such State.
This provision might be construed to imply, that, in time of peace, the
general defence was to be provided for by the forces of each State, and,
in time of war, by those of the Union. But it was the opinion of
Hamilton, that the restrictions on the powers of the States, with regard
to maintaining forces during peace, could not with propriety be said to
contain any directions to the United States, or to contravene the
positive power vested in the latter to raise both sea and land forces,
without mention of peace or war. He strengthened this view by the
capital inconvenience of the contrary construction, and by the manifest
necessities of the country, which could only be provided for by the
power of the Union. If the United States could have neither army nor
navy, until war had been declared, they would be obliged to begin to
create both at the very moment when both were needed in actual
hostilities; and, if the States were to be intrusted with the defence of
the country in time of peace, that defence would be left to thirteen
different armies and navies, under the direction of as many different
governments.[198]
He contemplated, therefore, the formation of a peace establishment, to
consist of certain corps of infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, and
dragoons;[199] a general survey, preparatory to the adoption of a
general system of land fortifications; the establishment of arsenals and
magazines, and the erection of founderies and manufactories of arms. He
advised the establishment of ports and maritime fortifications, and the
formation and construction of a navy; and his report embraced also a
plan for classing and disciplining the militia.[200]
In all this design, Hamilton pursued the purpose, which he had long
entertained, of strengthening and consolidating the Union, and guarding
against its dissolution, by providing the means necessary for its
defence. Federal, rather than State provision for the defence of every
part of the Confederacy, in peace as well as in war, seemed to him
essential. He thought, that the general government should have
exclusively the power of the sword, and that each State should have no
forces but its militia.[201] But his great plans were arrested, partly
in consequence of the doubts entertained on the point of constitutional
power, and partly by reason of the great falling off of the attendance
of members in Congress. At the very time when this important subject was
under consideration, Congress were driven from Philadelphia, by the
mutiny of a handful of men, whom they could not curb at the moment
without the aid of the local authorities, and that aid was not promptly
and efficiently given.[202]
Convinced, at length, that no temporary expedients would meet the wants
of the country, and that a radical reform of its constitution could
alone preserve the Union from dissolution, Hamilton surveyed the
Confederation in all its parts, and determined to lay before the country
its deep defects, with a view to the establishment of a government with
proper departments and adequate powers. In this examination, he applied
to the Confederation the approved maxims of free government, which had
been made familiar in the formation of the State constitutions, and
which point to the distinct separation of the legislative, executive,
and judicial functions. The Confederation vested all these powers in a
single body, and thus violated the principles on which the government of
nearly every State in the Union was founded. It had no federal
judicature, to take cognizance of matters of general concern, and
especially of those in which foreign nations and their subjects were
concerned; and thus national treaties, the national faith, and the
public tranquillity were exposed to the conflict of local regulations
against the powers vested in the Union. It gave to Congress the power of
ascertaining and appropriating the sums necessary for the public
expenses, but withheld all control over either the imposition or
collection of the taxes by which they were to be raised, and thus made
the inclinations, not the abilities, of the respective States, the
criterion of their contributions to the common expenses of the Union. It
authorized Congress to borrow money, or emit bills, on the credit of the
United States, without the power of providing funds to secure the
repayment of the money, or the redemption of the bills emitted.
It made no proper or competent provision for interior or exterior
defence; for interior defence, because it allowed the individual States
to appoint all regimental officers of the land forces, and to raise the
men in their own way, while at the same time an ambiguity rendered it
uncertain whether the defence of the country in time of peace was not
left to the particular States, both by sea and land;--for exterior
defence, because it authorized Congress to build and equip a navy,
without providing any compulsory means of manning it.
It failed to vest in the United States a general superintendence of
trade, equally necessary both with a view to revenue and regulation.
It required the assent of nine States in Congress to matters of
principal importance, and of seven to all others except adjournments
from day to day, and thus subjected the sense of a majority of the
people of the United States to that of a minority, by putting it in the
power of a small combination to defeat the most necessary measures.
Finally, it vested in the federal government the sole direction of the
interests of the United States in their intercourse with foreign
nations, without empowering it to pass _all general laws_ in aid and
support of the laws of nations; thus exposing the faith, reputation, and
peace of the country to the irregular action of the particular
States.[203]
Having thus fully analyzed for himself the nature of the existing
constitution, Hamilton proposed to himself the undertaking of inducing
Congress freely and frankly to inform the country of its imperfections,
which made it impossible to conduct the public affairs with honor to
themselves and advantage to the Union; and to recommend to the several
States to appoint a convention, with full powers to revise the
Confederation, and to adopt and propose such alterations as might appear
to be necessary, which should be finally approved or rejected by the
States.[204]
But he was surrounded by men, who were not equal to the great enterprise
of guiding and enlightening public sentiment. He was in advance of the
time, and far in advance of the men of the time. He experienced the fate
of all statesmen, in the like position, whose ideas have had to wait the
slow development of events, to bring them to the popular comprehension
and assent. He saw that his plans could not be adopted; and he passed
out of Congress to the pursuits of private life, recording upon them his
conviction, that their public proposal would have failed for want of
support.[205]
There was in fact a manifest indisposition in Congress to propose any
considerable change in the principle of the government. Hence, nothing
but the revenue system, with a change in the rule by which a partition
of the common burdens was to be made, was publicly proposed. Although
this system was a great improvement upon that of the Confederation, it
related simply to revenue, in regard to which it proposed a reform, not
of the principle of the government, but of the mode of operation of the
old system; for it embraced only a specific pledge by the States of
certain duties for a limited term, and not a grant of the unlimited
power of levying duties at pleasure. There was confessedly a departure
from the strict maxims of national credit, by not making the revenue
coextensive with its object, and by not placing its collection in every
respect under the authority charged with the management and payment of
the debt which it was designed to meet.[206]
These relaxations were a sacrifice to the jealousies of the States; and
they show that the time had not come for a change from a mere federative
union to a constitutional government, founded on the popular will, and
therefore acting by an energy and volition of its own.
The temper of the time was wholly unfavorable to such a change. The
early enthusiasm with which the nation had rushed into the conflict with
England, guided by a common impulse and animated by a national spirit,
had given place to calculations of local interest and advantage; and the
principle of the Confederation was tenaciously adhered to, while the
events which accompanied and followed the peace were rapidly displaying
its radical incapacity. The formation of the State governments, and the
consequent growth and importance of State interests, which came into
existence with the Confederation, and the fact that the Confederation
was itself an actual diminution of the previous powers of the Union, may
be considered the chief causes of the decline of a national spirit. That
spirit was destined to a still further decay, until the conflict of
State against State, and of section against section, by shaking the
government to its foundation, should reveal both the necessity for a
national sovereignty and the means by which it could be called into
life.
As a consequence and proof of the decline of national power, it is
worthy of observation, that, at the close of the year 1783, Congress had
practically dwindled to a feeble junto of about twenty persons,
exercising the various powers of the government, but without the dignity
and safety of a local habitation. Migrating from city to city and from
State to State, unable to agree upon a seat of government, from jealousy
and sectional policy; now assembling in the capitol of a State, and now
in the halls of a college; at all times dependent upon the protection
and even the countenance of local authorities, and without the presence
of any of the great and powerful minds who led the earlier counsels of
the country, this body presented a not inadequate type of the decaying
powers of the Union.[207] At no time in the history of the
Confederation, had all the States been represented at once; and the
return of peace seemed likely to reduce the entire machinery of the
government to a state of complete inaction.[208]
The Confederation, at the close of the war, is found to have
accomplished much, and also to have failed to accomplish much more. It
had effected the cession of the public lands to the United States; for
although that cession was not completed until after the peace, still the
arch on which the Union was ultimately to rest for whatever of safety
and perpetuity remained for it through the four following years, was
deposited in its place, when the Confederation was established. It had
also placed the United States, as a nation, in a position to contract
some alliances with foreign powers. It had finished the war; it had
achieved the independence of the nation; and had given peace to the
country. It had thus demonstrated the value of the Union, although its
defective construction aided the development of tendencies which
weakened and undermined its strength.
But its imperfect performance of the great tasks to which it had been
called, displayed its inherent defects. It had often been unequal to the
purpose of effectually drawing forth the resources of its members for
the common welfare and defence. It had often wanted an army adequate to
the protection and proportioned to the abilities of the country. It had,
therefore, seen important posts reduced, others imminently endangered,
and whole States and large parts of others overrun by small bodies of
the enemy;--had been destitute of sufficient means of feeding, clothing,
paying, and appointing its troops, and had thus exposed them to
sufferings for which history scarcely affords a parallel. It had been
compelled to make the administration of its affairs a succession of
temporary expedients, inconsistent with order, economy, energy, or a
scrupulous adherence to public engagements. It found itself, at the
close of the war, without any certain means of doing justice to those
who had been the principal supporters of the Union;--to an army which
had bravely fought, and patiently suffered,--to citizens and to
foreigners, who had cheerfully lent their money,--and to others who had
contributed property and personal service to the common cause. It was
obliged to rely, for the last hope of doing that justice, on the
precarious concurrence of thirteen distinct legislatures, the dissent of
either of which might defeat the plan, and leave the States, at an early
period of their existence, involved in all the disgrace and mischiefs
of violated faith and national bankruptcy.[209]
While, therefore, the United States emerged from the war, which for
seven long years had wasted the energies and drained the resources of
the people, with national independence, dark and portentous clouds
gathered about the dawn of peace, as the future opened before them. The
past had been crowned with victory;--dearly bought, but not at too dear
a price, for it brought with it the vast boon of civil liberty. But the
dangers and embarrassments through which that victory had been achieved
made it apparent that the government of the country was unequal to its
protection and prosperity. That government was now called to assume the
great duties of peace, without the acknowledged power of maintaining
either an army or a navy, and without the means of combining and
directing the forces and wills of the several parts to a general end;
without the least control over commerce; without the power to fulfil a
treaty; without laws acting upon individuals; and with no mode of
enforcing its own will, but by coercing a delinquent State to its
federal obligations by force of arms. How it met the great demands upon
its energy and durability which its new duties involved, we are now to
inquire.
FOOTNOTES:
[189] Letter to Hamilton, March 31, 1783. Writings, VIII. 409. Letter to
Lafayette, April 5, 1783. Ibid. 411. Address to the States, June 8,
1783. Ibid. 439.
[190] These suggestions were made by Hamilton, in a letter of great
ability, written in 1780, while he was still in the army, to James
Duane, a member of Congress from New York. It was not published until it
appeared in his Life, I. 284. At its close, he says: "I am persuaded a
solid confederation, a permanent army, a reasonable prospect of
subsisting it, would give us treble consideration in Europe, and produce
a peace this winter. _If a convention is called, the minds of all the
States and the people ought to be prepared to receive its determinations
by sensible and popular writings_, which should conform to the views of
Congress. There are epochs in human affairs when _novelty_ is useful. If
a general opinion prevails that the old way is bad, whether true or
false, and this obstructs or relaxes the operations of the public
service, a change is necessary, if it be but for the sake of change.
This is exactly the case now. 'T is an universal sentiment, that our
present system is a bad one, and that things do not go right on this
account. The measure of a convention would revive the hopes of the
people, and give a new direction to their passions, which may be
improved in carrying points of substantial utility. The Eastern States
have already pointed out this mode to Congress: they ought to take the
hint, and anticipate the others." What is here said of the action of the
Eastern States probably refers, not to any suggestion of a convention to
revise the powers of the general government, but to a convention of
committees of the Eastern States, which first assembled at Hartford, and
afterwards at Boston, in November, 1779, and in August, 1780, _for
regulating the prices of commodities_. Journals of Congress, V. 406; VI.
271, 331, 392. But the writer may have had in his mind the convention
which had just assembled in Massachusetts to form the constitution of
that State. I am aware of no public proposal, as early as 1780, of a
general convention to remodel the Confederacy.
[191] "It is not to be presumed," he said, "that the constitution of any
State means to define and fix the precise numbers and descriptions of
all officers to be permitted in the State, excluding the creation of any
new ones, whatever might be the necessity derived from that variety of
circumstances incident to all political institutions. The legislature
must always have a discretionary power of appointing officers, not
expressly known to the constitution, and this power will include that of
authorizing the federal government to make the appointments in cases
where the general welfare may require it. The denial of this would prove
too much; to wit, that the power given by the Confederation to Congress,
to appoint all officers in the post-office, was illegal and
unconstitutional. The doctrine advanced by Rhode Island would perhaps
prove also that the federal government ought to have the appointment of
no internal officers whatever; a position that would defeat all the
provisions of the Confederation, and all the purposes of the union. The
truth is, that no federal constitution can exist without powers that in
their exercise effect the internal police of the component members. It
is equally true, that no government can exist without a right to appoint
officers for those purposes which proceed from, and concentre in,
itself; and therefore the Confederation has expressly declared, that
Congress shall have authority to appoint all such 'civil officers as may
be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under
their direction.' All that can be required is, that the federal
government confine its appointments to such as it is empowered to make
by the original act of union, or by the subsequent consent of the
parties; unless there should be express words of exclusion in the
constitution of a State, there can be no reason to doubt that it is
within the compass of legislative discretion to communicate that
authority. The propriety of doing it upon the present occasion, is
founded on substantial reasons. The measure proposed is a measure of
necessity. Repeated experiments have shown, that the revenue to be
raised within these States is altogether inadequate to the public wants.
The deficiency can only be supplied by loans. Our applications to the
foreign powers on whose friendship we depend, have had a success far
short of our necessities. The next resource is to borrow from
individuals. These will neither be actuated by generosity nor reasons of
state. 'Tis to their interest alone we must appeal. To conciliate this,
we must not only stipulate a proper compensation for what they lend, but
we must give security for the performance. We must pledge an ascertained
fund, simple and productive in its nature, general in its principle, and
at the disposal of a single will. There can be little confidence in a
security under the constant revisal of thirteen different deliberatives.
It must, once for all, be defined and established on the faith of the
States, solemnly pledged to each other, and not revocable by any without
a breach of the general compact. 'Tis by such expedients that nations
whose resources are understood, whose reputations and governments are
erected on the foundation of ages, are enabled to obtain a solid and
extensive credit. Would it be reasonable in us to hope for more easy
terms, who have so recently assumed our rank among the nations? Is it
not to be expected, that individuals will be cautious in lending their
money to a people in our circumstances, and that they will at least
require the best security we can give? We have an enemy vigilant,
intriguing, well acquainted with our defects and embarrassments. We may
expect that he will make every effort to instil diffidences into
individuals, and in the present posture of our internal affairs he will
have too plausible ground on which to tread. Our necessities have
obliged us to embrace measures, with respect to our public credit,
calculated to inspire distrust. The prepossessions on this article must
naturally be against us, and it is therefore indispensable we should
endeavor to remove them, by such means as will be the most obvious and
striking. It was with these views Congress determined on a general fund;
and the one they have recommended must, upon a thorough examination,
appear to have fewer inconveniences than any other. It has been remarked
as an essential part of the plan, that the fund should depend on a
single will. This will not be the case, unless the collection, as well
as the appropriation, is under the control of the United States; for it
is evident, that, after the duty is agreed upon, it may, in a great
measure, be defeated by an ineffectual mode of levying it. The United
States have a common interest in a uniform and equally energetic
collection; and not only policy, but justice to all the parts of the
Union, designates the utility of lodging the power of making it where
the interest is common. Without this, it might in reality operate as a
very unequal tax." Journals of Congress, VIII. 153.
[192] He said, as an additional reason for the revenue being collected
by officers under the appointment of Congress, that, "as the energy of
the federal government was evidently short of the degree necessary for
pervading and uniting the States, it was expedient to introduce the
influence of officers deriving their emoluments from, and consequently
interested in supporting the power of Congress." Upon this Mr. Madison
observes: "This remark was imprudent, and injurious to the cause it was
intended to serve. This influence was the very source of jealousy which
rendered the States averse to a revenue under collection, as well as
appropriation, of Congress. All the members of Congress who concurred in
any degree, with the States in this jealousy, smiled at the disclosure.
Mr. Bland, and still more Mr. Lee, who were of this number, took notice,
in private conversation, that Mr. Hamilton had let out the secret."
Elliot's Debates, I. 35.
[193] March 18 and 23, 1781. Journals, VII. 56, 67.
[194] Life of Hamilton, II. 50-57.
[195] March 20, 1783. Journals, VIII. 157-159.
[196] The census was to be of "the whole number of white and other free
citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, including
those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all
other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except
Indians, not paying taxes, in each State; which number shall be
triennially taken and transmitted to the United States in Congress
assembled, in such mode as they shall direct and appoint." When the
Articles of Confederation were framed and adopted in Congress, a
valuation of land as the rule of proportion was adopted instead of
numbers of inhabitants, in consequence of the impossibility of
compromising the different ideas of the Eastern and Southern States as
to the rate at which slaves should be counted; the Eastern States of
course wishing to have them counted in a near ratio to the whites, and
the Southern States wishing to diminish that ratio. Numbers would have
been preferred by the Southern States to land, if half their slaves only
could have been taken; but the Eastern States were opposed to this
estimate. (Elliot's Debates, I. 79.) In 1783, when it was proposed to
change the rule of proportion from land to numbers, the first compromise
suggested (by Mr. Wolcott of Connecticut) was to include only such
slaves as were between the ages of sixteen and sixty; this was found to
be impracticable; and it was agreed on all sides, that, instead of
fixing the proportion by ages, it would be best to fix it in absolute
numbers, and the rate of three fifths was agreed upon. (Ibid. 81, 82.)
[197] Life of Hamilton, II. 204-212.
[198] Ibid.
[199] He proposed that the States should transfer to Congress the right
to appoint the regimental officers, and that the men should be enlisted
under continental direction.
[200] That the subject of a peace establishment originated with Hamilton
is certain, from the fact that early in April, soon after the
appointment of the committee, he wrote to General Washington, wishing to
know his sentiments at large on such institutions of every kind for the
interior defence of the States as might be best adapted to their
circumstances. (Writings of Washington, VIII. 417.) Washington wrote to
all the principal officers of the army then in camp, for their views,
and from the memoirs which they presented to him an important document
was compiled, which was forwarded by him to the committee of Congress.
In one of these memoirs Colonel Pickering suggested the establishment of
a military academy at West Point. "If any thing," he said, "like a
military academy in America be practicable at this time, it must be
grounded on the permanent military establishment of our frontier posts
and arsenals, and the wants of the States, separately, of officers to
command the defences of their sea-coasts. On this principle, it might be
expedient to establish a military school, or academy, at West Point. And
that a competent number of young gentlemen might be induced to become
students, it might be made a rule, that vacancies in the standing
regiments should be supplied from thence; those few instances excepted
where it would be just to promote a very meritorious sergeant. For this
end, the number which shall be judged requisite to supply vacancies in
the standing regiment might be fixed, and that of the students, who are
admitted with an exception of filling them, limited accordingly. They
might be allowed subsistence at the public expense. If any other youth
desired to pursue the same studies at the military academy, they might
be admitted, only subsisting themselves. Those students should be
instructed in what is usually called military discipline, tactics, and
the theory and practice of fortification and gunnery. The commandant and
one or two other officers of the standing regiment, and the engineers,
making West Point their general residence, would be the masters of the
academy; and the inspector-general superintend the whole." (Ibid.) The
subject of a peace establishment was made one of the four principal
topics on which Washington afterwards enlarged in his circular letter to
the States, in June; but his suggestions related chiefly to a uniform
organization of the militia throughout the States. He subsequently had
several conferences with the committee of Congress, on the whole
subject, but nothing was done. (Vide note, infra.)
[201] Life of Hamilton, II. 214-219. The State of New York precipitated
the constitutional question, by demanding that the Western posts within
her limits should be garrisoned by troops of her own, and by instructing
her delegates in Congress to obtain a declaration, conformably to the
sixth article of the Confederation, of the number of troops necessary
for that purpose. Hamilton forbore to press this application while the
general subject of a peace establishment was under consideration. But
the doubts that arose as to the constitutional power of Congress to
raise an army for the purposes of peace, and the urgency of the case,
made it necessary to adopt a temporary measure with regard to the
frontier posts, and to direct the commander-in-chief to garrison them
with a part of the troops of the United States which had enlisted for
three years. This was ordered on the 12th of May. Soon after, the mutiny
of a portion of the new levies of the Pennsylvania line occurred, which
drove Congress from Philadelphia to Princeton, on the 21st of June. At
Princeton, they remained during the residue of the year, but with
diminished numbers and often without a constitutional quorum of States.
In September, General Washington wrote to Governor Clinton: "Congress
have come to no determination yet respecting a peace establishment, nor
am I able to say when they will. I have lately had a conference with a
committee on this subject, and have reiterated my former opinions: but
it appears to me, that there is not a sufficient representation to
discuss great national points; nor do I believe there will be, while
that honorable body continue their sessions at this place. The want of
accommodation, added to a disinclination in the Southern delegates to be
farther removed than they formerly were from the centre of the empire,
and an aversion in the others to give up what they conceive to be a
point gained by the late retreat to this place, keep matters in an
awkward situation, to the very great interruption of national concerns.
Seven States, it seems, by the Articles of Confederation, must agree,
before any place can be fixed upon for the seat of the federal
government; and seven States, it is said, never will agree;
consequently, as Congress came here, here they are to remain, to the
dissatisfaction of the majority and a great let to business, having none
of the public offices about them, nor any place to accommodate them, if
they were brought up; and the members, from this or some other cause,
are eternally absent."
[202] Mr. Madison has given the following account of this
occurrence:--"On the 19th of June, Congress received information from
the Executive Council of Pennsylvania, that eighty soldiers, who would
probably be followed by others, were on the way from Lancaster to
Philadelphia, in spite of the expostulations of their officers,
declaring that they would proceed to the seat of Congress and demand
justice, and intimating designs against the Bank. A committee, of which
Colonel Hamilton was chairman, was appointed to confer with the
executive of Pennsylvania, and to take such measures as they should find
necessary. After a conference, the committee reported that it was the
opinion of the executive that the militia of Philadelphia would probably
not be willing to take arms before they should be provoked by some
actual outrage; that it would hazard the authority of government to make
the attempt; and that it would be necessary to let the soldiers come
into the city, if the officers who had gone out to meet them could not
stop them. The next day the soldiers arrived in the city, led by their
sergeants, and professing to have no other object than to obtain a
settlement of accounts, which they supposed they had a better chance for
at Philadelphia than at Lancaster. On the 21st, they were drawn up in
the street before the State-House, where Congress were assembled. The
Executive Council of the State, sitting under the same roof, was called
on for the proper interposition. The President of the State (Dickinson)
came in and explained the difficulty of bringing out the militia of the
place for the suppression of the mutiny. He thought that, without some
outrages on persons or property, the militia could not be relied on.
General St. Clair, then in Philadelphia, was sent for, and desired to
use his interposition, in order to prevail on the troops to return to
the barracks. But his report gave no encouragement. In this posture of
things, it was proposed by Mr. Izard that Congress should adjourn.
Colonel Hamilton proposed that General St. Clair, in concert with the
Executive Council of the State, should take order for terminating the
mutiny. Mr. Reed moved that the General should endeavor to withdraw the
mutineers, by assuring them of the disposition of Congress to do them
justice. Nothing, however, was done. The soldiers remained in their
position, occasionally uttering offensive words and pointing their
muskets at the windows of the hall of Congress. At the usual hour of
adjournment the members went out, without obstruction; and the soldiers
retired to their barracks. In the evening Congress reassembled, and
appointed a committee to confer anew with the executive of the State.
This conference produced nothing but a repetition of the doubts
concerning the disposition of the militia to act, unless some actual
outrage were offered to persons or property, the insult to Congress not
being deemed a sufficient provocation. On the 24th, the efforts of the
State authority being despaired of, Congress were summoned by the
President to meet at Trenton." (Elliot's Debates, I. 92-94.) The mutiny
was afterwards suppressed by marching troops into Pennsylvania under
Major-General Howe. (Journals, VIII. 281.)
[203] Life of Hamilton, II. 230-237.
[204] Life of Hamilton, II. 230-237.
[205] Ibid.
[206] See the Address to the States, accompanying the proposed revenue
system, April 26, 1783, from the pen of Mr. Madison. Journals, VIII.
194-201.
[207] The first Continental Congress was called to meet at Philadelphia,
that being the nearest to the centre of the Union of any of the
principal cities in the United States. Succeeding Congresses had been
held there, with the exception of the period when the city was in the
possession of the enemy, in the year 1777, until, on the 21st of June,
1783, in consequence of the mutiny of the soldiers, the President was
authorized to summon the members to meet at Trenton, or Princeton, in
New Jersey, "in order that further and more effectual measures may be
taken for suppressing the present revolt, and maintaining the dignity
and authority of the United States." On the 30th, Congress assembled at
Princeton, in the halls of the college, which were tendered by its
officers for their use. In August, a proposition was made to return to
Philadelphia, and that, on the second Monday in October, Congress should
meet at Annapolis, unless in the mean time it had been ordered
otherwise. But this was not agreed to. A committee was then appointed
(in September), "to consider what jurisdiction may be proper for
Congress in the place of their permanent residence." This seems to have
been followed by propositions from several of the States, from New York
to Virginia inclusive, respecting a place for the permanent residence of
Congress, although the Journal does not state what they were. A question
was then taken (October 6), in which State buildings should be provided
and erected for the residence of Congress, beginning with New Hampshire
and proceeding with all the States in their order. Each State was
negatived in its turn. The highest number of votes given (by States)
were for New Jersey and Maryland, which had four votes each. A
resolution was then carried, "that buildings for the use of Congress be
erected on or near the banks of the Delaware, provided a suitable
district can be procured on or near the banks of said river, for a
federal town; and that the right of soil, and an exclusive or such
jurisdiction as Congress may direct, shall be vested in the United
States"; and a committee was appointed, to repair to the falls of the
Delaware, to view the country, and report a proper district for this
purpose. A variety of motions then followed, for the selection of a
place of temporary residence, but none was adopted. On the 17th of
October, a proposition was made by a delegate of Massachusetts (Mr.
Gerry), to have buildings provided for the alternate residence of
Congress in two places, with the idea of "securing the mutual confidence
and affection of the States, and preserving the federal balance of
power"; but the question was lost. Afterwards, the following resolution
was agreed to: "Whereas, there is reason to expect that the providing
buildings for the alternate residence of Congress in two places will be
productive of the most salutary effects, by securing the mutual
confidence and affections of the States, _Resolved_, That buildings be
likewise erected, for the use of Congress, at or near the lower falls of
the Potomac, or Georgetown, provided a suitable district on the banks of
the river can be procured for a federal town, and the right of soil, and
an exclusive jurisdiction, or such as Congress may direct, shall be
vested in the United States; and that until the buildings to be erected
on the banks of the Delaware and Potomac shall be prepared for the
reception of Congress, their residence shall be alternately, at equal
periods of not more than one year and not less than six months, in
Trenton and Annapolis; and the President is hereby authorized and
directed to adjourn Congress on the twelfth day of November next, to
meet at Annapolis on the twenty-sixth day of the same month, for the
despatch of public business." (Journals of Congress from June to
November, 1783.)
[208] Report of a committee appointed to devise means for procuring a
full representation in Congress, made November 1, 1783. Journals, VIII.
480-482.
[209] Hamilton's proposed Resolutions; Life, II. 230-237.
BOOK III.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE PEACE OF
1783 TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787.
CHAPTER I.
JANUARY, 1784-MAY, 1787.
DUTIES AND NECESSITIES OF CONGRESS.--REQUISITIONS ON THE
STATES.--REVENUE SYSTEM OF 1783.
The period which now claims our attention is that extending from the
Peace of 1783 to the calling of the Convention which framed the
Constitution, in 1787. It was a period full of dangers and difficulties.
The destinies of the Union seemed to be left to all the hazards arising
from a defective government and the illiberal and contracted policy of
its members. Patriotism was generally thought to consist in adhesion to
State interests, and a reluctance to intrust power to the organs of the
nation. The national obligations were therefore disregarded; treaty
stipulations remained unfulfilled; the great duty of justice failed to
be discharged; rebellion raised a dangerous and nearly successful front;
and the commerce of the country was exposed to the injurious policy of
other nations, with no means of counteracting or escaping from its
effects. At length, the people of the United States began to see danger
after they had felt it, and the growth of sounder views and higher
principles of public conduct gave to the friends of order, public
faith, and national security a controlling influence in the country, and
enabled the men, who had won for it the blessings of liberty, to
establish for it a durable and sufficient government.
Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the downfall of
a government which had been framed with the hope and promise of
perpetual duration;--an interval of time no longer than that during
which the people of the United States are now accustomed to witness a
change of their rulers, without injury to any principle or any form of
their institutions. But this brief interval was full of suffering and
peril. There are scarcely any evils or dangers, of a political nature,
and springing from political and social causes, to which a free people
can be exposed, which the people of the United States did not experience
during this period. That these evils and dangers did not precipitate the
country into civil war, and that the great undertaking of forming a new
and constitutional government, by delegates of the people, could be
entered upon and prosecuted, with the calmness, conciliation, and
concession essential to its success, is owing partly to the fact that
the country had scarcely recovered from the exhausting effects of the
Revolutionary struggle; but mainly to the existence of a body of
statesmen, formed during that struggle, and fitted by hard experience to
build up the government. But before their efforts and their influences
are explained, the period which developed the necessity for their
interposition must be described. He who would know what the
Constitution of the United States was designed to accomplish, must
understand the circumstances out of which it arose.
On the 3d of November, 1783, a new Congress, according to annual custom,
was assembled at Annapolis, and attended by only fifteen members, from
seven States. Two great acts awaited the attention of this
assembly;--both of an interesting and important character, both of
national concern. The one was the resignation of Washington; a solemnity
which appealed to every feeling of national gratitude and pride, and
which would seem to have demanded whatever of pomp and dignity and power
the United States could display. The other was a legislative act, which
was to give peace to the country, by the ratification of the Treaty.
Several weeks passed on, and yet the attendance was not much increased.
Washington's resignation was received, at a public audience of seven
States, represented by about twenty delegates;[210] and on the same day
letters were despatched to the other States, urging them, for the
safety, honor, and good faith of the United States, to require the
immediate attendance of their members.[211] It was not, however, until
the 14th of January that the Treaty could be ratified by the
constitutional number of nine States; and, when this took place, there
were present but three-and-twenty members.[212]
It should undoubtedly be considered, that, from the nature and form of
the government, the delegates in Congress had in some sense an
ambassadorial character, and were assembled as the representatives of
sovereign States. But with whatever dignity, real or fictitious, they
may be considered as having been clothed, the government itself was one
that created a constant tendency to the neglect of its functions, and
therefore produced great practical evils. The Articles of Confederation
provided that delegates should be annually appointed by the States, to
meet in Congress on the first Monday in November in every year; and
although they also gave to Congress the power of adjournment for a
recess, during which the government was to be devolved on a Committee of
the States, they fixed no period for the termination of a session. While
the war lasted, it had been both customary and necessary for the old
Congress, and for its successors under the Confederation, to be
perpetually in session; and this practice was continued after the peace,
with very short intervals of Committees of the States, partly from
habit, and partly in consequence of the reduction of the delegations to
the lowest constitutional number. This rendered despatch impossible, by
putting it in the power of a few members to withhold from important
matters the constitutional concurrence of nine States. Without any
reference to population by the Articles of Confederation, not less than
two nor more than seven delegates were allowed to each State; and by
casting the burden of maintaining its own delegates upon each State,
they created a strong motive for preferring the smaller number, and
often for not being represented at all. This motive became more active
after the peace, when the immediate stimulus of hostilities was
withdrawn; and it was at the same time accompanied, in most of the
States, by a great jealousy of the powers of Congress, a disinclination
to enlarge them, and a prevalent feeling that each State was sufficient
unto itself for all the purposes of government.[213] The consequence
was, that the Congress of the Confederation, from the ratification of
the Treaty of Peace to the adoption of the Constitution, although
entitled to ninety-one members, was seldom attended by one third of that
number; and the state of the representation was sometimes so low, that
one eighth of the whole number present could, under the constitutional
rule, negative the most important measures.[214]
Such was the government which was now called to provide for the payment
of at least the interest on the public debts, and to procure the means
for its own support; to carry out the Treaty of Peace, and secure to
the country its advantages; to complete the cessions of the Western
lands, and provide for their settlement and government; to guard the
commerce of the country against the hostile policy of other nations; to
secure to each State the forms and principles of a republican
government; to extend and secure the relations of the country with
foreign powers; and to preserve and perpetuate the Union. By tracing the
history of its efforts and its failures with regard to these great
objects, we may understand the principal causes which brought about the
conviction on the part of the people of the United States, that another
and a stronger government must take the place of the Confederation.
It was ascertained in April, 1784, that a sum exceeding three millions
of dollars would be wanted to pay the arrears of interest, and to meet
the interest and current expenses of the public service for the
year.[215] Two sources only could be looked to for this supply. It must
either be obtained by requisitions on the States, according to the old
rule of the Confederation, or from the new duties and taxes proposed by
the revenue system of 1783. But that proposal was still under the
consideration of the State legislatures; some of them having as yet
acceded to the impost only, and others having decided neither on the
impost nor on the supplementary taxes. Some time must therefore elapse
before the final confirmation of this system, even if its final
confirmation were probable; and, after it should have been confirmed,
further time would be requisite to bring it into operation. It was quite
clear, therefore, that other measures must be resorted to. Requisitions
presented the sole resource. But in what mode were they to be made? The
preceding Congress had offered two recommendations to the States on the
subject of the rule of the Confederation, which directed that the quotas
of the several States should be apportioned according to the value of
their lands. The Congress of 1783, in order to give this rule a fair
trial, had recommended to the States to make returns of their lands,
buildings, and inhabitants;[216] but, apprehending that the
insufficiency of the rule would immediately show itself, they had
followed this recommendation with another, to change the basis of
contribution from land to numbers of inhabitants.[217] Both of these
propositions were still under the consideration of the State
legislatures, and four States only had acceded to them.[218] A new
requisition, therefore, if made at all, must be made under the old rule
of the Confederation, and with entirely imperfect means of making it
with justice and equality. It was found, however, that large arrears
were still due from the States, of the old requisitions made during the
war.[219] A new call upon them to pay one half of these arrears,
deducting therefrom the amount of their payments to the close of the
year, would, if complied with, produce a sum nearly sufficient for the
wants of the government. This resource was accordingly tried.[220]
In the year 1785, three millions, it was ascertained, would be required
for the service of the year. A renewed call was made for the remaining
unpaid moiety of the old requisition of eight millions, and for the
whole of the old requisition of two millions; but, considering that the
public faith required Congress to continue their annual demand for
money, they issued a new requisition for three millions, and adjusted it
according to the best information they could obtain.[221]
In the year 1786, a sum of more than three millions was wanted for the
current demands on the treasury, and a new requisition was made for it,
under the old rule of the Confederation.[222] Two of the States, Rhode
Island and New Jersey, thereupon passed acts, making their own paper
currency receivable on all arrears of taxes due to the United States,
and proposing to pay their quotas in such currency.[223]
But the entire inadequacy of this source of supply to maintain the
federal government, and to discharge the annual public engagements, had
now become but too apparent. From the 1st of November, 1781, to the 1st
of January, 1786, less than two and a half millions of dollars had been
received from requisitions made during that period, amounting to more
than ten millions.[224] For the last fourteen months of that interval,
the average receipts from requisitions amounted to less than four
hundred thousand dollars per annum, while the interest alone due on the
foreign debt was more than half a million; and, in the course of each of
the nine following years, the average sum of one million, annually,
would become due by instalments on the principal of that debt.[225] In
addition to this, the interest on the domestic debt; the security of the
navigation and commerce of the country against the Barbary powers; the
immediate protection of the people dwelling on the frontier from the
savages; the establishment of military magazines in different parts of
the Union, quite indispensable to the public safety; the maintenance of
the federal government at home, and the support of the public servants
abroad,--each and all depended upon the contribution of the States under
the annual requisitions, and were each and all likely to be involved in
a common failure and ruin.[226]
There can be no doubt that the continuance of the practice of making
requisitions, after the proposal of the revenue system of 1783, had some
tendency to prevent the adoption of that system by the States. But there
was no other alternative within the constitutional reach of Congress;
and in the mean time, the revenue system, submitted as it necessarily
was to the legislatures of thirteen different States, was, as far as it
was assented to, embarrassed with the most discordant and irreconcilable
provisions. It was ascertained in February, 1786, that seven of the
States had granted the impost part of the system, in such a manner,
that, if the other six States had made similar grants, the plan of the
general impost might have been immediately put into operation.[227] Two
of the other States had also granted the impost, but had embarrassed
their grants with provisos, which suspended their operation until all
the other States should have passed laws in full conformity with the
whole system.[228] Two other States had fully acceded to the system in
all its parts;[229] but four others had not decided in favor of any part
of it.[230]
No member of the Confederacy had, at this time, suggested to Congress
any reasonable objection to the principles of the system; and the
contradictory provisions by which their assent to it had been clogged,
present a striking proof of the inherent difficulties of obtaining any
important constitutional change from the legislatures of the States. The
government was founded upon a principle, by which all its powers were
derived from the States in their corporate capacities; in other words,
it was a government created by, and deriving its authority from, the
governments of the States. They alone could change the fundamental law
of its organization; and they were actuated by such motives and
jealousies, as rendered a unanimous assent to any change a great
improbability. Still, the Congress of 1786 hoped that, by a clear and
explicit declaration of the true position of the country, the requisite
compliance of the States might be obtained. They accordingly made known,
in the most solemn manner, the public embarrassments, and declared that
the crisis had arrived, when the people of the United States must decide
whether they were to continue to rank as a nation, by maintaining the
public faith at home and abroad; or whether, for want of timely exertion
in establishing a general revenue, they would hazard the existence of
the Union, and the great national privileges which they had fought to
obtain.[231]
Under the influence of this urgent representation, all the States,
except New York, passed acts granting the impost, and vesting the power
to collect it in Congress, pursuant to the recommendations of 1783, but
upon the condition that it should not be in force until all the States
had granted it in the same manner. The State of New York passed an
act[232], reserving to itself the sole power of levying and collecting
the impost; making the collectors amenable to and removable by the
State, and not by Congress; and making the duties receivable in specie
or bills of credit, at the option of the importer. Such a departure from
the plan suggested by Congress, and adopted by the other States, of
course made the whole system inoperative in the other States, and there
remained no possibility of procuring its adoption, but by inducing the
State of New York to reconsider its determination. All hope of meeting
the public engagements, and of carrying on the government, now turned
upon the action of a single State.
The principal argument made use of, by those who supported the conduct
of New York, was, that Congress, being a single body, might misapply the
money arising from the duties. An answer to this pretence, from the pen
of Hamilton, declared that the interests and liberties of the people
were not less safe in the hands of those whom they had delegated to
represent them for one year in Congress, than they were in the hands of
those whom they had delegated to represent them for one or four years in
the legislature of the State; that all government implies trust, and
that every government must be trusted so far as it is necessary to
enable it to attain the ends for which it is instituted, without which
insult and oppression from abroad, and confusion and convulsion at home,
must ensue[233]. The real motive, however, with those who ruled the
counsels of New York at this period, was a hope of the commercial
aggrandizement of the State; and the jealousies and fears of national
power, which were widely prevalent, were diligently employed to defeat
the system proposed by Congress.
After the passage of the act of New York, and the adjournment of the
legislature, Congress earnestly recommended to the executive of that
State to convene the legislature again, to take into its consideration
the recommendation of the revenue system, for the purpose of granting
the impost to the United States, in conformity with the grants of
other States, so as to enable the United States to carry it into
immediate effect[234]. The Governor declined to accede to this
recommendation.[235] Congress repeated it, declaring that the critical
and embarrassed state of the finances required that the impost should
be carried into immediate operation, and expressing their opinion,
that the occasion was sufficiently important and extraordinary for
them to request that the legislature should be specially
convened.[236] The executive of New York again refused the request of
Congress, and the fate of the impost system remained suspended until
the meeting of the legislature, at its regular session in January,
1787. It was never adopted by that State, and consequently never took
effect.
FOOTNOTES:
[210] The Journals give the following account of General Washington's
resignation:--
"According to order, his Excellency the Commander-in-chief was admitted
to a public audience, and being seated, the President, after a pause,
informed him that the United States in Congress assembled were prepared
to receive his communications; whereupon he arose and addressed as
follows: 'MR. PRESIDENT,--The great events on which my resignation
depended having at length taken place, I have now the honor of offering
my sincere congratulations to Congress, and of presenting myself before
them to surrender into their hands the trust committed to me, and to
claim the indulgence of retiring from the service of my country. Happy
in the confirmation of our independence and sovereignty, and pleased
with the opportunity afforded the United States of becoming a
respectable nation, I resign with satisfaction the appointment I
accepted with diffidence; a diffidence in my abilities to accomplish so
arduous a task; which, however, was superseded by a confidence in the
rectitude of our cause, the support of the supreme power of the Union,
and the patronage of Heaven. The successful termination of the war has
verified the most sanguine expectations; and my gratitude for the
interposition of Providence, and the assistance I have received from my
countrymen, increases with every review of the momentous contest. While
I repeat my obligations to the army in general, I should do injustice to
my own feelings not to acknowledge, in this place, the peculiar services
and distinguished merits of the gentlemen who have been attached to my
person during the war. It was impossible the choice of confidential
officers to compose my family should have been more fortunate. Permit
me, sir, to recommend in particular those who have continued in the
service to the present moment, as worthy of the favorable notice and
patronage of Congress. I consider it an indispensable duty to close this
last act of my official life by commending the interests of our dearest
country to the protection of Almighty God, and those who have the
superintendence of them to his holy keeping. Having now finished the
work assigned me, I retire from the great theatre of action, and,
bidding an affectionate farewell to this august body, under whose orders
I have so long acted, I here offer my commission, and take my leave of
all the employments of public life.' He then advanced and delivered to
the President his commission, with a copy of his address, and having
resumed his place, the President (Thomas Mifflin) returned him the
following answer: 'SIR,--The United States in Congress assembled receive
with emotions too affecting for utterance the solemn resignation of the
authorities under which you have led their troops with success through a
perilous and doubtful war. Called upon by your country to defend its
invaded rights, you accepted the sacred charge, before it had formed
alliances, and whilst it was without funds or a government to support
you. You have conducted the great military contest with wisdom and
fortitude, invariably regarding the rights of the civil power through
all disasters and changes. You have, by the love and confidence of your
fellow-citizens, enabled them to display their martial genius, and
transmit their fame to posterity. You have persevered, till these United
States, aided by a magnanimous king and nation, have been enabled, under
a just Providence, to close the war in freedom, safety, and
independence; on which happy event we sincerely join you in
congratulations. Having defended the standard of liberty in this New
World, having taught a lesson useful to those who inflict and to those
who feel oppression, you retire from the great theatre of action with
the blessings of your fellow-citizens; but the glory of your virtues
will not terminate with your military command; it will continue to
animate remotest ages. We feel with you our obligations to the army in
general, and will particularly charge ourselves with the interests of
those confidential officers who have attended your person to this
affecting moment. We join you in commending the interests of our dearest
country to the protection of Almighty God, beseeching him to dispose the
hearts and minds of its citizens to improve the opportunity afforded
them of becoming a happy and respectable nation. And for you we address
to him our earnest prayers that a life so beloved may be fostered with
all his care; that your days may be happy as they have been illustrious;
and that he will finally give you that reward which this world cannot
give." Journals, IX. 12, 13. December 22, 1783.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Journals, IX. 30. January 14, 1784.
[213] See Washington's letter to Governor Harrison, of the date of
January 18, 1784. Writings, IX. 11.
[214] Twenty-three members voted on the ratification of the Treaty,
January 14, 1784. On the 19th of April of the same year, the same number
being present, eleven States only being represented, and nine of these
having only two members each, the following resolution was passed:
"_Resolved_, That the legislatures of the several States be informed,
that, whilst they are respectively represented in Congress by two
delegates only, such a unanimity for conducting the most important
public concerns is necessary as can be rarely expected; that if each of
the thirteen States should be represented by two members, five out of
twenty-six, being only a fifth of the whole, may negative any measures
requiring the voice of nine States; that of eleven States now on the
floor of Congress, nine being represented by only two members from each,
it is in the power of three out of twenty-five, making only one eighth
of the whole, to negative such a measure, notwithstanding that by the
Articles of Confederation the dissent of five out of thirteen, being
more than one third of the number, is necessary for such a negative;
that in a representation of three members from each State, not less than
ten of thirty-nine could so negative a matter requiring the voice of
nine States; that, from facts under the observation of Congress, they
are clearly convinced that a representation of two members from the
several States is extremely injurious, by producing delays, and for this
reason is likewise much more expensive than a general representation of
three members from each State; that therefore Congress conceive it to be
indispensably necessary, and earnestly recommend, that each State, at
all times when Congress are sitting, be hereafter represented by three
members at least; as the most injurious consequences may be expected
from the want of such representation." At the time when the report of
the Convention, transmitting the Constitution, was received (September
28, 1787), there were thirty-three members in attendance, from twelve
States. Rhode Island was not represented.
[215] The sum reported by a committee, and finally agreed to be
necessary, was $3,812,539.33. Journals, IX. 171. April 27, 1784.
[216] Journals, VIII. 129. February 17, 1783.
[217] Ibid. 198. April 26, 1783.
[218] Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.
[219] Of the old requisition of $8,000,000, made October 30, 1781, only
$1,486,511.71 had been paid by all the States before December 31, 1783.
[220] Journals, IX. 171-179. April 27, 1784.
[221] Journals, X. 325-334. September 27, 1785.
[222] Journals, XI. 167. August 2, 1786.
[223] Ibid. 224. September 18, 1786. Upon this attempt of Rhode Island
and New Jersey to pay their proportions in their own paper currency, the
report of a committee declared, "That, to admit the receipt of bills of
credit, issued under the authority of an individual State, in discharge
of their specie proportions of a requisition, would defeat its object,
as the said bills do not circulate out of the limits of the State in
which they are emitted, and because a paper medium of any State, however
well funded, cannot, either in the extensiveness of its circulation, or
in the course of its exchange, be equally valuable with gold and silver.
That if the bills of credit of the States of Rhode Island and New Jersey
were to be received from those States in discharge of federal taxes,
upon the principles of equal justice, bills emitted by any other States
must be received from them also in payment of their proportions, and
thereby, instead of the requisitions yielding a sum in actual money,
nothing but paper would be brought into the federal treasury, which
would be wholly inapplicable to the payment of any part of the interest
or principal of the foreign debt, or the maintenance of the government
of the United States."
[224] Journals, XI. 34-40. February 15, 1786.
[225] Ibid.
[226] Journals, XI. 34-40. February 15, 1786.
[227] New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina.
[228] Pennsylvania and Delaware.
[229] Delaware and North Carolina.
[230] Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, and Georgia.
[231] The report on this occasion (February 15, 1786), drawn by Rufus
King, declared, "that the requisitions of Congress for eight years past
have been so irregular in their operation, so uncertain in their
collection, and so evidently unproductive, that a reliance on them in
future as a source from whence moneys are to be drawn to discharge the
engagements of the Confederacy, definite as they are in time and amount,
would be not less dishonorable to the understandings of those who
entertain such confidence, than it would be dangerous to the welfare and
peace of the Union. The committee are therefore seriously impressed with
the indispensable obligation that Congress are under, of representing in
the immediate and impartial consideration of the several States the
utter impossibility of maintaining and preserving the faith of the
federal government by temporary requisitions on the States, and the
consequent necessity of an early and complete accession of all the
States to the revenue system of the 18th of April, 1783."
[232] May 4, 1786.
[233] Life of Hamilton, II. 385.
[234] August 11, 1786.
[235] The ground of his refusal was, "that he had not the power to
convene the legislature before the time fixed by law for their stated
meeting, except upon '_extraordinary occasions_,' and as the present
business had already been particularly laid before them, and so recently
as at their last session received their determination, it cannot come
within that description." Life of Hamilton, II. 389.
[236] August 23, 1786.