CHAPTER XIX.

Ver.10/04/01*END*

This etext was produced by David Widger

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MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, VOLUME 7.

By LOUIS ANTOINE FAUVELET DE BOURRIENNE

His Private Secretary

Edited by R. W. Phipps

Colonel, Late Royal Artillery

1891

CONTENTS:

CHAPTER XIX. to CHAPTER XXVI. 1803-1804

CHAPTER XIX.

1803.

Mr. Pitt--Motive of his going out of office--Error of the English

Government--Pretended regard for the Bourbons--Violation of the

treaty of Amiens--Reciprocal accusations--Malta--Lord Whitworth's

departure--Rome and Carthage--Secret satisfaction of Bonaparte--

Message to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate--

The King of England's renunciation of the title of King of France--

Complaints of the English Government--French agents in British ports

--Views of France upon Turkey--Observation made by Bonaparte to the

Legislative Body--Its false interpretation--Conquest of Hanover--

The Duke of Cambridge caricatured--The King of England and the

Elector of Hanover--First address to the clergy--Use of the word

"Monsieur"--The Republican weeks and months.

One of the circumstances which foretold the brief duration of the peace

of Amiens was, that Mr. Pitt was out of office at the time of its

conclusion. I mentioned this to Bonaparte, and I immediately perceived

by his hasty "What do you say?" that my observation had been heard--but

not liked. It did not, however, require any extraordinary shrewdness to

see the true motive of Mr. Pitt's retirement. That distinguished

statesman conceived that a truce under the name of a peace was

indispensable for England; but, intending to resume the war with France

more fiercely than ever, he for a while retired from office, and left to

others the task of arranging the peace; but his intention was to mark his

return to the ministry by the renewal of the implacable hatred he had

vowed against France. Still, I have always thought that the conclusion

of peace, however necessary to England, was an error of the Cabinet of

London. England alone had never before acknowledged any of the

governments which had risen up in France since the Revolution; and as the

past could not be blotted out, a future war, however successful to

England, could not take from Bonaparte's Government the immense weight it

had acquired by an interval of peace. Besides, by the mere fact of the

conclusion of the treaty England proved to all Europe that the

restoration of the Bourbons was merely a pretext, and she defaced that

page of her history which might have shown that she was actuated by

nobler and more generous sentiments than mere hatred of France. It is

very certain that the condescension of England in treating with the First

Consul had the effect of rallying round him a great many partisans of the

Bourbons, whose hopes entirely depended on the continuance of war between

Great Britain and France. This opened the eyes of the greater number,

namely, those who could not see below the surface, and were not

previously aware that the demonstrations of friendship so liberally made

to the Bourbons by the European Cabinets, and especially by England, were

merely false pretences, assumed for the purpose of disguising, beneath

the semblance of honourable motives, their wish to injure France, and to

oppose her rapidly increasing power.

When the misunderstanding took place, France and England might have

mutually reproached each other, but justice was apparently on the side of

France. It was evident that England, by refusing to evacuate Malta, was

guilty of a palpable infraction of the treaty of Amiens, while England

could only institute against France what in the French law language is

called a suit or process of tendency. But it must be confessed that this

tendency on the part of France to augment her territory was very evident,

for the Consular decrees made conquests more promptly than the sword.

The union of Piedmont with France had changed the state of Europe. This

union, it is true, was effected previously to the treaty of Amiens; but

it was not so with the states of Parma and Piacenza, Bonaparte having by

his sole authority constituted himself the heir of the Grand Duke,

recently deceased. It may therefore be easily imagined how great was

England's uneasiness at the internal prosperity of France and the

insatiable ambition of her ruler; but it is no less certain that, with

respect to Malta, England acted with decidedly bad faith; and this bad

faith appeared in its worst light from the following circumstance:--

It had been stipulated that England should withdraw her troops from Malta

three months after the signing of the treaty, yet more than a year had

elapsed, and the troops were still there. The order of Malta was to be

restored as it formerly was; that is to say, it was to be a sovereign and

independent order, under the protection of the Holy See. The three

Cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg were to guarantee the

execution of the treaty of Amiens. The English Ambassador, to excuse the

evasions of his Government, pretended that the Russian Cabinet concurred

with England in the delayed fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty;

but at the very moment he was making that excuse a courier arrived from

the Cabinet of St. Petersburg bearing despatches completely, at variance

with the assertion of Lord Whitworth. His lordship left Paris on the

night of the 12th May 1803, and the English Government, unsolicited, sent

passports to the French embassy in London. The news of this sudden

rupture made the English console fall four per cent., but did not

immediately produce such a retrograde effect on the French funds, which

were then quoted at fifty-five francs;--a very high point, when it is

recollected that they were at seven or eight francs on the eve of the

18th Brumaire.

In this state of things France proposed to the English Government to

admit of the mediation of Russia; but as England had declared war in

order to repair the error she committed in concluding peace, the

proposition was of course rejected. Thus the public gave the First

Consul credit for great moderation and a sincere wish for peace. Thus

arose between England and France a contest resembling those furious wars

which marked the reigns of King John and Charles VII. Our beaux esprits

drew splendid comparisons between the existing state of things and the

ancient rivalry of Carthage and Rome, and sapiently concluded that, as

Carthage fell, England must do so likewise.

Bonaparte was at St. Cloud when Lord Whitworth left Paris. A fortnight

was spent in useless attempts to renew negotiations. War, therefore, was

the only alternative. Before he made his final preparations the First

Consul addressed a message to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the

Tribunate. In this message he mentioned the recall of the English

Ambassador, the breaking out of hostilities, the unexpected message of

the King of England to his Parliament, and the armaments which

immediately ensued in the British ports. "In vain," he said, "had France

tried every means to induce England to abide by the treaty. She had

repelled every overture, and increased the insolence of her demands.

France," he added, "will not submit to menaces, but will combat for the

faith of treaties, and the honour of the French name, confidently

trusting that the result of the contest will be such as she has a right

to expect from the justice of her cause and the courage of her people."

This message was dignified, and free from that vein of boasting in which

Bonaparte so frequently indulged. The reply of the Senate was

accompanied by a vote of a ship of the line, to be paid for out of the

Senatorial salaries. With his usual address Bonaparte, in acting for

himself, spoke in the name of the people, just as he did in the question

of the Consulate for life. But what he then did for his own interests

turned to the future interests of the Bourbons. The very treaty which

had just been broken off gave rise to a curious observation. Bonaparte,

though not yet a sovereign, peremptorily required the King of England to

renounce the empty title of King of France, which was kept up as if to

imply that old pretensions were not yet renounced. The proposition was

acceded to, and to this circumstance was owing the disappearance of the

title of King of France from among the titles of the King of England,

when the treaty of Paris was concluded on the return of the Bourbons.

The first grievance complained of by England was the prohibition of

English merchandise, which had been more rigid since the peace than

during the war. The avowal of Great Britain on this point might well

have enabled her to dispense with any other subject of complaint; for the

truth is, she was alarmed at the aspect of our internal prosperity, and

at the impulse given to our manufactures. The English Government had

hoped to obtain from the First Consul such a commercial treaty as would

have proved a death-blow to our rising trade; but Bonaparte opposed this,

and from the very circumstance of his refusal he might easily have

foreseen the rupture at which he affected to be surprised. What I state

I felt at the time, when I read with great interest all the documents

relative to this great dispute between the two rival nations, which

eleven years afterwards was decided before the walls of Paris.

It was evidently disappointment in regard to a commercial treaty which

created the animosity of the English Government, as that circumstance was

alluded to, by way of reproach, in the King of England's declaration.

In that document it was complained that France had sent a number of

persona into the ports of Great Britain and Ireland in the character of

commercial agents, which character, and the privileges belonging to it,

they could only have acquired by a commercial treaty. Such was, in my

opinion, the real cause of the complaints of England; but as it would

have seemed too absurd to make it the ground of a declaration of war, she

enumerated other grievances, viz., the union of Piedmont and of the

states of Parma and Piacenza with France, and the continuance of the

French troops in Holland. A great deal was said about the views and

projects of France with respect to Turkey, and this complaint originated

in General Sebastiani's mission to Egypt. On that point I can take upon

me to say that the English Government was not misinformed. Bonaparte too

frequently spoke to are of his ideas respecting the East, and his project

of attacking the English power in India, to leave any doubt of his ever

having renounced them. The result of all the reproaches which the two

Governments addressed to each other was, that neither acted with good

faith.

The First Consul, in a communication to the Legislative Body on the state

of France and on her foreign relations; had said, "England, single-

handed, cannot cope with France." This sufficed to irritate the

susceptibility of English pride, and the British Cabinet affected to

regard it as a threat. However, it was no such thing. When Bonaparte

threatened, his words were infinitely more energetic. The passage above

cited was merely au assurance to France; and if we only look at the past

efforts and sacrifices made by England to stir up enemies to France on

the Continent, we may be justified in supposing that her anger at

Bonaparte's declaration arose from a conviction of its truth. Singly

opposed to France, England could doubtless have done her much harm,

especially by assailing the scattered remnants of her navy; but she could

have done nothing against France on the Continent. The two powers,

unaided by allies, might have continued long at war without any

considerable acts of hostility.

The first effect of the declaration of war by England was the invasion of

Hanover by the French troops under General Mortier. The telegraphic

despatch by which this news was communicated to Paris was as laconic as

correct, and contained, in a few words, the complete history of the

expedition. It ran as follows: "The French are masters of the Electorate

of Hanover, and the enemy's army are made prisoners of war." A day or

two after the shop windows of the print-sellers were filled with

caricatures on the English, and particularly on the Duke of Cambridge.

I recollect seeing one in which the Duke was represented reviewing his

troops mounted on a crab. I mention these trifles because, as I was then

living entirely at leisure, in the Rue Hauteville, I used frequently to

take a stroll on the Boulevards, where I was sometimes much amused with

these prints; and I could not help remarking, that in large cities such

triffles have more influence on the public mind than is usually supposed.

The First Consul thought the taking of the prisoners in Hanover a good

opportunity to exchange them for those taken from us by the English navy.

A proposition to this effect was accordingly made; but the English

Cabinet was of opinion that, though the King of England was also Elector

of Hanover, yet there was no identity between the two Governments, of

both which George III. was the head. In consequence of this subtle

distinction the proposition for the exchange of prisoners fell to the

ground. At this period nothing could exceed the animosity of the two

Governments towards each other, and Bonaparte, on the declaration of war,

marked his indignation by an act which no consideration can justify;

I allude to the order for the arrest of all the English in France--

a truly barbarious measure; for; can anything be more cruel and unjust

than to visit individuals with the vengeance due to the Government whose

subjects they may happen to be? But Bonaparte, when under the influence

of auger, was never troubled by scruples.

I must here notice the fulfilment of a remark Bonaparte often made, use

of to me during the Consulate. "You shall see, Bourrienne," he would

say," what use I will make of the priests."

War being declared, the First Consul, in imitation of the most Christian

kings of olden times, recommended the success of his arms to the prayers

of the faithful through the medium of the clergy. To this end he

addressed a circular letter, written in royal style, to the Cardinals,

Archbishops, and Bishops of France.

It was as follows:

MONSIEUR--The motives of the present war are known throughout

Europe. The bad faith of the King of England, who has violated his

treaties by refusing to restore Malta to the order of St. John of

Jerusalem, and attacked our merchant vessels without a previous

declaration of war, together with the necessity of a just defence,

forced us to have recourse to arms. I therefore wish you to order

prayers to be offered up, in order to obtain the benediction of

Heaven on our enterprises. The proofs I have received of your zeal

for the public service give me an assurance of your readiness to

conform with my wishes.

Given at St. Cloud, 18 Prairial, an XI. (7th June 1803).

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

This letter was remarkable in more than one respect. It astonished most

of his old brothers-in-arms, who turned it into ridicule; observing that

Bonaparte needed no praying to enable him to conquer Italy twice over.

The First Consul, however, let them laugh on, and steadily followed the

line he had traced out. His letter was admirably calculated to please

the Court of Rome, which he wished should consider him in the light of

another elder son of the Church. The letter was, moreover, remarkable

for the use of the word "Monsieur," which the First Consul now employed

for the first time in an act destined for publicity. This circumstance

would seem to indicate that he considered Republican designations

incompatible with the forms due to the clergy: the clergy were especially

interested in the restoration of monarchy. It may, perhaps, be thought

that I dwell too much on trifles; but I lived long enough in Bonaparte's

confidence to know the importance he attached to trifles. The First

Consul restored the old names of the days of the week, while he allowed

the names of the months, as set down in the Republican calendar, to

remain. He commenced by ordering the Moniteur to be dated "Saturday,"

such a day of "Messidor." "See," said he one day, "was there ever such

an inconsistency? We shall be laughed at! But I will do away with the

Messidor. I will efface all the inventions of the Jacobins."

The clergy did not disappoint the expectations of the First Consul. They

owed him much already, and hoped for still more from him. The letter to

the Bishops, etc., was the signal for a number of circulars full of

eulogies on Bonaparte.

These compliments were far from displeasing to the First Consul, who had

no objection to flattery though he despised those who meanly made

themselves the medium of conveying it to him. Duroc once told me that

they had all great difficulty in preserving their gravity when the cure

of a parish in Abbeville addressed Bonaparte one day while he was on his

journey to the coast. "Religion," said the worthy cure, with pompous

solemnity, "owes to you all that it is, we owe to you all that we are;

and I, too, owe to you all that I am."

--[Not so fulsome as some of the terms used a year later when

Napoleon was made Emperor. "I am what I am," was placed over a seat

prepared for the Emperor. One phrase, "God made Napoleon and then

rested," drew from Narbonne the sneer that it would have been better

if the Deity had rested sooner. "Bonaparte," says Joseph de

Maistre, "has had himself described in his papers as the 'Messenger

of God.' Nothing more true. Bonaparte comes straight from heaven,

like a thunderbolt." (Saints-Benve, Caureries, tome iv. p. 203.)]