WAYNE AND FALLEN TIMBERS
--_Final triumph of the Government over Indians and British._
The great soul of Washington was sorely tried, but he did not falter.
The first thing to do was to raise an efficient army, and that was done.
Early in the year 1792, the forces of the United States were put on a
new footing. The military establishment was now to consist of "five
thousand one hundred and sixty-eight non-commissioned officers, privates
and musicians." Enlistments were to be made for a period of three years,
and the pay of the soldiers increased. General Anthony Wayne was
appointed commander and instructed by Washington to spare neither powder
nor ball, 'so that his men be made marksmen.'
Wayne was a fighter of fearless courage and daring brilliancy. He was
now forty-seven years of age and had entered the revolution as a Colonel
in the Continental Army. He had fought with Washington at Brandywine and
Germantown, and had driven the Hessians at the point of the bayonet. "At
Monmouth he turned the fortunes of the day by his stubborn and
successful resistance to the repeated bayonet charges of the Guards and
Grenadiers." The storming of Stony Point is ranked by Lossing as one of
the most brilliant achievements of the Revolutionary war. He fought at
Yorktown and later drove the English out of Georgia. His favorite weapon
of offense was the bayonet. General William Henry Harrison, who was aide
to Wayne at the battle of Fallen Timbers, said to him: "General Wayne, I
am afraid you will get into the fight yourself, and forget to give me
the necessary field orders." "Perhaps I may," replied Wayne, "and if I
do, recollect the standing order of the day is, 'Charge the damned
rascals with the bayonets!'"
In the month of June, 1792, Wayne arrived at Pittsburgh to take charge
of his new command. Most of the new army were ignorant of military
tactics, and without discipline, but the General at once entered
vigorously upon his great task. On the twenty-eighth of November, the
army left Pittsburgh and encamped at Legionville, twenty-two miles to
the south. Here the great work of training the raw recruits proceeded.
"By the salutary measures adopted to introduce order and discipline, the
army soon began to assume its proper character. The troops were daily
exercised in all the evolutions necessary to render them efficient
soldiers, and more especially in those maneuvers proper in a campaign
against savages. Firing at a mark was constantly practiced, and rewards
given to the best marksmen. To inspire emulation, the riflemen and the
infantry strove to excel, and the men soon attained to an accuracy that
gave them confidence in their own prowess. On the artillery the General
impressed the importance of that arm of the service. The dragoons he
taught to rely on the broadsword, as all important to victory. The
riflemen were made to see how much success must depend on their
coolness, quickness and accuracy; while the infantry were led to place
entire confidence in the bayonet, as the certain and irresistible weapon
before which the savages could not stand. The men were instructed to
charge in open order; each to rely on himself, and to prepare for a
personal contest with the enemy." The orders and admonitions of Wayne
fell not on deaf ears. The Legion of the United States became a thing of
life. In the battle at the Miami Rapids a soldier of the Legion met a
single warrior in the woods and they attacked each other, "the soldier
with his bayonet, the Indian with his tomahawk. Two days after, they
were found dead; the soldier with his bayonet in the body of the
Indian--the Indian with his tomahawk in the head of the soldier."
About the first of May, 1793, the army moved down the Ohio in boats and
encamped near Fort Washington, Cincinnati, at a place which was named
"Hobson's Choice." At this place the main body of the troops was halted
until about the seventh of October, to await the outcome of the repeated
attempts of the government to make peace with the Indian tribes.
The difficulties that beset the pathway of President Washington at the
opening of the year 1792, seemed insurmountable. On the one hand, the
people of the east regarded the westerners as the real aggressors in the
border conflicts, and were extremely loath to grant aid to the
government. The debates in Congress reflected their attitude. On the
other hand, the people of Kentucky regarded the efforts of the
government to secure to them the navigation of the Mississippi, as
procrastinating and futile. They even suspected the good faith of
Washington himself, but in this they erred, for negotiations were on
foot that finally secured to them the desired end. Moreover the failure
of Harmar and the disaster of St. Clair had filled the backwoodsmen with
misgivings and they had no faith in the regular army or its generals.
The extreme poverty of the government, the utter lack of support from
all sections, would have brought dismay to the heart of any man but
Washington. He, however, remained firm. Forced by what Roosevelt has
termed as the "supine indifference of the people at large," he
determined to make one more effort to secure peace, but failing in that,
the army of Anthony Wayne should be made ready for the final appeal to
arms.
On the seventh of April, 1792, Freeman and Gerrard, two messengers of
peace, were sent forward to the Maumee, but both were killed. About the
twentieth of May, Major Alexander Trueman, of the First United States
Regiment, and Colonel John Hardin, of Kentucky, left Fort Washington
with copies of a speech from President Washington to the Indians. The
President expressed his desire to impart to the tribes all the blessings
of civilized life; to teach them to cultivate the earth and to raise
corn and domestic animals; to build comfortable houses and to educate
their children. He expressly disaffirmed any intention to seize any
additional lands, and promised that compensation should be made to all
tribes who had not received full satisfaction. The threat of Simon
Girty against Proctor, was now made good as against both Hardin and
Trueman. Hardin was to go among the Wyandots at Sandusky, while Trueman
proceeded to the Rapids of the Maumee. Months after they had departed,
one William May, who had been captured by the Indians, testified that he
saw the scalp of Trueman dangling on a stick, and that Trueman's papers
fell into the hands of Alexander McKee, who forwarded them to Detroit.
Later he saw another scalp said to be the brave Colonel Hardin's, and
Hardin's papers fell into the hands of Matthew Elliott. This was the
answer of the savage allies to the flag of truce.
In May, 1792, General Rufus Putnam, of Ohio, and the Reverend John
Heckewelder, of the Moravian missions, were sent to the Wabash tribes to
make a treaty. The instructions to Putman were of the most pacific
nature. He was told to renounce on the part of the United States, "all
claim to any Indian land which shall not have been ceded by fair
treaties, made with the Indian nations." "You will make it clearly
understood, that we want not a foot of their land, and that it is
theirs, and theirs only; that they have the right to sell, and the right
to refuse to sell, and the United States will guarantee to them the said
just right." Putnam carried forward with him about one hundred women and
children captured by Scott and Wilkinson, and a number of presents for
the Wea and other chiefs. A treaty was finally made with a small number
of Weas, Kickapoos, and other Wabash and Illinois tribes at Vincennes on
the twenty-seventh of September, but all attempts to induce the Miamis
to join in the negotiations were unavailing. Pricked on by Elliott, the
Girtys and McKee, the chiefs at Kekionga were threatening the Potawatomi
and the tribes of the lower Wabash with the destruction of their
villages, if they failed to oppose the advances of the Americans. The
treaty at Vincennes had little, if any, effect, upon the posture of
affairs.
Still other efforts were made by the government. Joseph Brant, the
Mohawk chieftain, was induced to come to Philadelphia in June, 1792, and
he received the most "marked attention," at the hands of the government
officials. He remained at the capital some ten or twelve days, and it
was sincerely hoped that he could be persuaded to undertake the office
of a messenger of peace, but he was a pensioner of the British and
thoroughly under their control. The next summer we find him urging the
northwestern tribes to arms, and offering the aid of his tomahawk to
Alexander McKee. The government next turned to Cornplanter and the
chiefs of the more friendly Iroquois. In March, 1792, about fifty
headmen of these tribes visited the city of Philadelphia and communed on
terms of amity with the American officers. The Cornplanter, with
forty-eight chiefs of the Six Nations, were now deputed to a grand
council of the Miami confederates held at Au Glaize on the Maumee in the
fall of 1792. "There were so many nations," says the Cornplanter, "that
we cannot tell the names of them. There were three men from the Gora
Nations; it took them a whole season to come, and twenty-seven nations
from beyond Canada." Joseph Brant, who detested the Cornplanter, was not
present, but Blue Jacket and the Shawnees were there filled with hate.
They accused the Iroquois with speaking 'from the outside of their
lips,' and told their chiefs that they came with the 'voice of the
United States folded under their arm.' Every word was haughty, proud and
defiant, but in the end the Iroquois wrung a promise from them to
suspend hostilities until the ensuing spring, when a council of peace
should be held with the Americans. This promise was not kept. War
parties of Shawnees constantly prowled along the Ohio stealing horses
and cattle, burning cabins, and leading away captives to the Indian
towns. On the morning of the sixth of November, an army of three hundred
Indians composed of Miamis, Delawares, Shawnees and Potawatomi,
commanded by the Little Turtle, attacked a party of about one hundred
Kentucky militia under the walls of Fort St. Clair, situated on the line
of march from Fort Washington to the Miami villages. They were under the
command of Major John Adair, afterwards governor of the State of
Kentucky. Little Turtle's object was to wipe out a white settlement at
the mouth of the Little Miami, but capturing two men near Fort Hamilton,
he learned that the Kentuckians were escorting a brigade of packhorses
on their way to Fort Jefferson, and he determined to waylay them. The
attack occurred just before daybreak and was opened by a hideous chorus
of Indian yells, but the Kentuckians bravely stood their ground and
repelled the assault. Six men were killed, including Lieutenant Job
Hale, and five men wounded. The camp equipment and about one hundred
and forty horses were lost. The Indians had two killed.
The spring of 1793 came, the time for the proposed council. The British
had promised to give their aid and co-operation in the forming of a
friendly compact. Full credence seems to have been given to their
statements. The President appointed Benjamin Lincoln, of Massachusetts,
Beverly Randolph, of Virginia, and Timothy Pickering, of Pennsylvania,
as commissioners. The basis of their negotiations was to be the treaty
of Fort Harmar, of 1789, which the government considered "as having been
formed on solid grounds--the principle being that of a fair purchase and
sale." They were to ascertain definitely the Indian proprietors
northward of the Ohio and south of the Lakes; to secure a confirmation
of the boundary established at Fort Harmar, and to guarantee to the
tribes the right of the soil in all their remaining lands. Liberal
payment was to be made for all concessions, and annuities granted. The
commissioners were to be accompanied by the Reverend John Heckewelder,
who had gone with Putnam to Vincennes, and who was thoroughly conversant
with the Delaware language. Some Quakers were also in the party.
The commissioners left Philadelphia in April, and arrived at Fort
Niagara on the southern shore of Lake Ontario in the month of May.
Niagara was then in command of Colonel Simcoe, of the British army, who
invited them to take up quarters at Navy Hall. This invitation was
accepted, and the commissioners now awaited the termination of the
preliminaries of a grand council of the northwestern tribes which was
being held at the Rapids on the Maumee. On the seventh of June, the
commissioners addressed a note to Simcoe, suggesting the importance of
the coming conference, their wish to counteract the deep-rooted
prejudices of the tribes, and their desire for a full co-operation on
the part of the English officers. Among other things, they called the
Colonel's attention to a report circulated by a Mohawk Indian to the
effect that "Governor Simcoe advised the Indians to make peace, but not
to give up any lands." The Colonel promptly replied, tendering his
services in the coming negotiations, appointing certain officers to
attend the treaty, and particularly denying the declaration of the
Mohawk. But in his reply he used these words: "But, as it has been, ever
since the conquest of Canada, the principle of the British government,
to unite the American Indians, that, all petty jealousies being
extinguished, the real wishes of the tribes may be fully expressed, and
in consequence all the treaties made with them, may have the most
complete ratification and universal concurrence, so, he feels it proper
to state to the commissioners, that a jealousy of a contrary conduct in
the agents of the United States, appears to him to have been deeply
impressed upon the minds of the confederacy." In view of the subsequent
results, the story of the Mohawk may not have been wholly without
foundation.
On the fifth day of July, Colonel John Butler, of the British Indian
department, Joseph Brant, and about fifty Indians from the council of
the tribes on the Maumee, arrived at Niagara. On the seventh, the
commissioners, and a number of the civil and military officers of the
crown being present, Brant addressed the American envoys and said in
substance that he was representing the Indian nations who owned all the
lands north of the Ohio "as their common property;" that the treaty had
been delayed on account of the presence of the American army north of
the Ohio; that the tribes wanted an explanation of these warlike
appearances, and desired to know whether the commissioners were
authorized "to run and establish a new boundary line between the lands
of the United States, and of the Indian nations." On the next day, the
commissioners gave full answer. They informed the Indian deputation that
the purposes of the United States were wholly peaceful; that the Great
Chief, General Washington, had strictly forbidden all hostilities, and
that the governors of the states adjoining the Ohio had issued orders to
the same effect. However, to satisfy the tribes, they would immediately
dispatch a messenger on horseback to the seat of the government, with a
request that the "head warrior," General Wayne, be instructed to remain
quietly at the posts until the event of the treaty could be known. This
was faithfully done. With reference to the running of a new boundary
line, the commissioners expressly stated that they were vested with full
authority to that end, but that mutual concessions were necessary to a
reconcilement, and that this should be plainly understood by both sides.
On the ninth of July, Brant gave assurance that the answer of the
commissioners had been satisfactory, "Brothers: We think, from your
speech, that there is a prospect of our coming together. We, who are the
nations at the westward are of one mind; and, if we agree with you, as
there is a prospect that we shall, it will be binding and lasting.
Brothers; Our prospects are the fairer, because all our minds are one.
You have not spoken before to us unitedly. Formerly, because you did not
speak to us unitedly, what was done was not binding. Now you have an
opportunity of speaking to us together; and we now take you by the hand,
to lead you to the place appointed for the meeting." In explanation of
this peaceful language and his subsequent conduct, Brant afterwards
wrote that, "for several years (after the peace of 1783), we were
engaged in getting a confederacy formed, and the unanimity occasioned by
these endeavors among our western brethren, enabled them to defeat two
American armies. The war continued without our brothers, the English,
giving any assistance, excepting a little ammunition; and they seeming
to desire that a peace might be concluded, we tried to bring it about at
a time when the United States desired it very much, so that they sent
commissioners from among their first people, to endeavor to make peace
with the hostile Indians. We assembled also, for that purpose, at the
Miami River, in the summer of 1793, intending to act as mediators in
bringing about an honorable peace; and if that could not be obtained, we
resolved to join with our western brethren in trying the fortunes of
war. But to our surprise, when on the point of entering on a treaty with
the Commissioners, we found that it was opposed by those acting under
the British government, and hopes of further assistance were given to
our western brethren, to encourage them to insist on the Ohio as a
boundary between them and the United States." Whatever the truth may be
as to Brant's peaceful intentions on the ninth of July, his attitude was
certain on the fourth of the succeeding August. On that date, according
to Roosevelt, the treacherous pensioner wrote to Alexander McKee that
"we came here not only to assist with our advice, but other ways, * * *
we came here with arms in our hands." Following the advice of his
British counsellors, he advised the northwestern Indians not to yield an
inch, and to stand on the Ohio as their southern boundary.
The Commissioners of the United States were doomed to meet with a sudden
and unexpected interruption of their proceedings. On the twenty-first of
July they arrived at the mouth of the Detroit river. They immediately
addressed a note to McKee informing him of their arrival, and expressing
a desire to meet with the confederated tribes. On the twenty-ninth of
July a deputation of over twenty Indians, among whom was the Delaware
chief, Buck-ong-a-he-las, arrived with Captain Matthew Elliott. On the
next day, and in the presence of the British officers, the Wyandot
chief, Sa-wagh-da-wunk, after a brief salutation, presented to the
Commissioners a paper writing. It contained this ultimatum, dictated
beyond doubt by the British agents: "Brothers: You are sent here by the
United States, in order to make peace with us, the confederate Indians.
Brothers: You very well know that the boundary line, which was run
between the white people and us, at the treaty of Fort Stanwix, was the
river Ohio. Brothers: If you seriously design to make a firm and
lasting peace, you will immediately remove all your people from our side
of that river. Brothers: We therefore ask you, are you fully authorized
by the United States to continue, and firmly fix on the Ohio river, as
the boundary between your people and ours?" This document was signed by
the confederated nations of the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis,
Mingoes, Potawatomi, Ottawas, Connoys, Chippewas and Munsees, at the
Maumee Rapids on the twenty-seventh of July, 1793.
The remaining passages between the Commissioners and the Indian allies
are briefly told. In vain did the Commissioners urge that settlements
and valuable improvements had been made on the faith of past treaties;
that it was not only impracticable but wholly impossible to consider the
Ohio as the boundary; that the treaty of Fort Harmar had been made in
good faith and with the very tribes who professed to own the lands
ceded. In vain did they admit the former mistakes of the government in
setting up a claim to the whole country south of the Great Lakes. The
jealous and apprehensive chieftains, spurred on and encouraged by
British promise of support, refused to listen to all appeals,
contemptuously rejected all offers of money or compensation, and
insisted to the last on the Ohio as the boundary.
That the full responsibility for this action on the part of the tribes
must be laid at the door of the British, goes without successful
challenge. If at the beginning they had only furnished a little
ammunition, as Brant says, they were now fast becoming openly hostile.
The French Revolution had opened, and England and France were battling
for supremacy. In order to cut off supplies of food from the French
people, England had seized all cargoes of corn, flour and meal bound for
French ports, and had purchased them for the benefit of his majesty's
service. This action had greatly irritated the American merchants and
had led to serious remonstrance on the part of the government. England
had also asserted the right to board neutral vessels and impress British
seamen whenever found. Many an American ship had been hailed on the high
seas, and forced to submit to a humiliating search. It was claimed that
many American sailors had been seized and forced to enter the British
service. Added to all this, the Citizen Genet had, in the early part of
the year 1793, arrived in America. As the representative of the French
Republic he was armed with numerous blank commissions for privateers, to
be delivered "to such French and American owners as should apply for the
same." An attack was to be launched on British commerce. Before he
arrived at Philadelphia the British minister had laid before the
President a list of complaints "founded principally on the proceedings
of Mr. Genet, who, at Charleston, undertook to authorize the fitting and
arming of vessels, enlisting men, and giving commissions to cruise and
commit hostilities on nations with whom the United States were at
peace." Washington did everything in his power to preserve neutrality.
On the twenty-second of April, 1793, and twenty-three days before Genet
arrived at Philadelphia, the President issued a proclamation, declaring
that "the duty and interest of the United States required that they
should, with sincerity and good faith, adopt and pursue a conduct
friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers." But the vast
majority of the people of the United States, including many high in
public life, were in open sympathy with the French and utterly detested
England. These sentiments were particularly marked in the western
countries, for there the people had suffered from all the cruelty and
savagery of the Indian warfare, and they fiercely denounced the British
agents.
Under all these circumstances the relations between Great Britain and
the United States had become tense and strained. The provincial officers
at Quebec and the Indian partisans at Detroit quickly echoed the mood of
the home government. In the event of a new war, England could again
command the savage allies and ravage the frontiers as she had done
during the revolution. The Indians would not only prove to be a useful
barrier in the event of an American invasion of Canada, but they might
help England to regain in part the territory she had lost. "Hence,
instead of promoting a pacification, the efforts of the Canadian
government were obviously exerted to prevent it." This, no doubt,
accounts for what Brant has noted concerning the exchanges with the
American commissioners at the mouth of the Detroit river. The western
tribes were suddenly given assurance by the British that England would
come to their aid, and were told to insist on the Ohio as the limit of
concession. This put an effectual stop to all further measures for
peace.
Wayne was now free to go forward with his campaign again, but so much
time had been consumed by the commissioners, and the militia were so
slow in arriving from Kentucky that the army did not take up its march
from Hobson's Choice until the seventh of October. The general now had
about twenty-six hundred effective men, including officers, thirty-six
guides and spies, and about three hundred and sixty mounted volunteers.
With these he determined to push forward to a position about six miles
in advance of Fort Jefferson, and about eighty miles north of
Cincinnati. He would thus excite a fear on the part of the savages for
the safety of their women and children, and at the same time protect the
frontiers. He expected resistance, for the Indians were "desperate and
determined," but he was prepared to meet it. The savages constantly hung
on his flanks, making attacks on his convoys of provisions, and picking
off the packhorses. On the morning of the seventeenth of October, a
force of ninety non-commissioned officers and men under Lowry and Boyd,
who were escorting twenty wagons loaded with grain, were suddenly
assaulted about seven miles north of Fort St. Clair. Fifteen officers
and men were killed, seventy horses killed or carried away, and the
wagons left standing in the road. Nothing daunted, Wayne pushed on. On
the twenty-third of October, he wrote to the Secretary of War that, "the
safety of the western frontiers, the reputation of the Legion, the
dignity and interests of the nation, all forbid a retrograde maneuver,
or giving up one inch of ground we now possess, until the enemy are
compelled to sue for peace."
In the meantime General Charles Scott had arrived from Kentucky with
about one thousand mounted infantry and had camped in the vicinity of
Fort Jefferson, but the season was so far advanced, that Wayne now
determined to send the Kentuckians home, enter into winter quarters, and
prepare for an effectual drive in the spring. Unlike his predecessors,
Wayne entertained no distrust of the frontiersmen, but determined to
utilize them with telling force. The hardy riflemen were quick to
respond to a real leader of men. They looked on the wonderful bayonet
practice, the expert marksmanship of the Legion, and the astonishing
maneuvers of the cavalrymen with great admiration. When they went to
their homes for the winter they were filled with a new confidence in the
government, and in its ability to protect their firesides. The
vigilance, the daring, and the unflinching discipline of the continental
general, gave them assurance. Fort Greenville was now erected on a
branch of the Big Miami, and here Wayne established his headquarters. In
December, eight companies of infantry and a detachment of artillery
erected Fort Recovery, on the spot made memorable by St. Clair's defeat.
At the opening of the year 1794, "the relations between Great Britain
and the United States had become so strained," says Roosevelt, "that
open war was threatened." On the tenth of February, Lord Dorchester
addressed a deputation of prominent chiefs of the northwestern tribes as
follows: "Children: I was in the expectation of hearing from the people
of the United States what was required by them: I hoped that I should be
able to bring you all together, and make you friends. Children: I have
waited long, and listened with great attention, but I have not heard
one word from them. Children: I flattered myself with the hope that the
line proposed in the year eighty-three, to separate us from the United
States, which was immediately broken by themselves as soon as the peace
was signed, would have been mended, or a new one drawn, in an amicable
manner. Here, also, I have been disappointed. Children: Since my return,
I find that no appearance of a line remains; and from the manner in
which the people of the United States rush on, and act and talk, on this
side; and from what I learn of their conduct toward the sea, I shall not
be surprised, if we are at war with them in the course of the present
year; and if so, a line must then be drawn by the warriors." Copies of
this speech were circulated everywhere among the tribes. Alexander
McKee, Lieutenant-Colonel John Butler, of the British army, and Joseph
Brant were active. Large presents were sent up from Quebec, ammunition
and arms were distributed, and the Ottawas and Chippewas summoned from
the far north. In April, 1794, Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe, of Canada,
openly advanced into the American territory, built a fort at the Miami
Rapids, and garrisoned it with British redcoats. Massive parapets were
constructed on which were mounted heavy artillery. The outer walls were
surrounded by a deep fosse and "frasing" which rendered it secure from
escalade. The Indians, thus buttressed, as they supposed, by British
support, were openly defiant and refused to make peace.
The indignation of the American people may well be imagined. To a long
train of secret machinations the British now added open insult.
Washington, justly aroused by England's long course of treachery and
double-dealing, wrote to Jay concerning Simcoe's action as follows: "Can
that government, or will it attempt, after this official act of one of
their governors, to hold out ideas of friendly intentions toward the
United States, and suffer such conduct to pass with impunity? This may
be considered the most open and daring act of the British agents in
America, though it is not the most hostile or cruel; for there does not
remain a doubt in the mind of any well-informed person in this country,
not shut against conviction, that all the difficulties we encounter with
the Indians--their hostilities, the murder of helpless women and
innocent children along our frontiers--result from the conduct of the
agents of Great Britain in this country. In vain is it, then, for its
administration in Britain to disavow having given orders which will
warrant such conduct, whilst their agents go unpunished; whilst we have
a thousand corroborating circumstances, and indeed almost as many
evidences, some of which cannot be brought forward, to know that they
are seducing from our alliance, and endeavoring to move over the line,
tribes that have hitherto been kept in peace and friendship with us at
heavy expense, and who have no causes of complaint, except pretended
ones of their creating; whilst they keep in a state of irritation the
tribes who are hostile to us, and are instigating those who know little
of us or we of them, to unite in the war against us; and whilst it is an
undeniable fact that they are furnishing the whole with arms,
ammunition, clothing, and even provisions to carry on the war; I might
go farther, and if they are not much belied, add men also in disguise."
The President also called on the British minister, Mr. Hammond, for an
explanation. Hammond, while admitting the authenticity of Dorchester's
speech and the construction of the British fort on the Maumee, pointed
to pretended acts of hostility on the part of the United States. This
was the insolent tone assumed toward a government considered to be too
weak to defend its lawful rights.
The British were now busy in assembling a savage army to oppose Wayne's
advance. Two Potawatomi captured on the fifth of June, said that a
message had been sent to their tribe to join in the war against the
United States; that the British were at Roche de Bout on the Maumee with
about four hundred troops and two pieces of artillery, exclusive of the
Detroit militia, and that they "had made a fortification around Colonel
McKee's house and store at that place, in which they had deposited all
their stores and ammunition, arms, clothing and provisions with which
they promised to supply all the hostile Indians in abundance, provided
they would join and go with them to war; that about two thousand
warriors had been assembled, and that Governor Simcoe had promised that
fifteen hundred British troops and militia would join them in the attack
on the Americans." They further related that this same Governor Simcoe
had sent them four different invitations to join in the war, promising
them arms, ammunition, provisions and clothing, and everything that they
wanted. "All the speeches," said these Potawatomi, "that we received
from him, were as red as blood; all the wampum and feathers were
painted red; the war pipes and hatchets were red; and even the tobacco
was red." The evidence furnished by two Shawnees, captured on the
twenty-second of June, corroborated the Potawatomi. They testified that
the British were always setting the Indians on, like dogs after game,
pressing them to go to war, and kill the Americans, "but did not help
them; that unless the British would turn out and help them, they were
determined to make peace; that they would not be any longer amused by
promises only." Asked about the number of warriors collected along the
Maumee, they put the number of the Shawnees at three hundred eighty, the
Delawares at four hundred and eighty, the Miamis at one hundred, and the
Wyandots at about one hundred and fifty. The Chippewas, however, would
furnish the greatest number of fighting men, and they were on the way to
the council. That the question of whether there would be a fight or not
depended upon the British; "that the British were at the foot of the
rapids, and had fortified at Roche de Bout; that there was a great
number of British soldiers at that place; that they told the Indians
they were now come to help them to fight; and if the Indians would
generally turn out and join them, they would advance and fight the
American army; that Blue Jacket had been sent by the British to the
Chippewas and northern Indians, a considerable time since, to invite
them, and bring them to Roche de Bout, there to join the British and
other hostile Indians in order to go to war."
On the last day of June, 1794, the premeditated blow fell on Fort
Recovery, the scene of St. Clair's disaster in 1791. The garrison was
under the command of Captain Alexander Gibson, of the Fourth Sub-Legion.
Under the walls of the fort were a detachment of ninety riflemen and
fifty dragoons under the command of Major McMahon, who had escorted a
train of packhorses from Fort Greenville on the day before, and who were
now about to return. The Indians were, according to some authorities,
under the command of the Bear chief, an Ottawa; others assign their
leadership to the Little Turtle. That they had planned a coup de main
and a sudden re-capture of the position is certain. Their army consisted
of about fifteen hundred men; they had advanced in seventeen columns,
with a wide and extended front, and their encampments were perfectly
square and regular. They were attended by "a captain of the British
army, a sergeant, and six matrosses, provided with fixed ammunition,
suited to the calibre of two field pieces, which had been taken from
General St. Clair, and deposited in a creek near the scene of his defeat
in 1791." They expected to find this artillery, which had been hidden by
the Indians, and turn it on the fort, but the guns had been recovered by
their legitimate owners and were now used for defense. A considerable
number of white men accompanied the savages, disguised as Indians and
with blackened faces, and three British officers, dressed in scarlet,
were posted in the rear and encouraged the Indians in their repeated
assaults.
The first attack on Major McMahon was successful. Nineteen officers and
privates and two packhorsemen were killed and about thirty men wounded.
Packhorses to the number of two hundred were quickly taken. But the
Indians now made a fatal mistake. In a spirit of rashness, they rushed
on the fort. The determined legionaries, aided by McMahon's men, poured
in a murderous fire, and they fell back. Again they attacked, and again
were they repulsed. All day long they kept up a constant and vigorous
fire but it availed nothing. During the succeeding night, which was dark
and foggy, they carried off their dead.
On the next morning the attack was renewed, but great numbers of the
savages were now becoming disheartened. The loss inflicted by the
American garrison had been severe, and was mourned for months by the
Indian tribes. Forty or fifty red men had bit the dust and over a
hundred had been wounded. Disgraced and crestfallen the savage horde
retired to the Maumee. The first encounter with Wayne's army had proved
disastrous.
On the twenty-sixth of July, Wayne was joined by sixteen hundred mounted
volunteers from Kentucky under the command of Major-General Charles
Scott. Scott was a man of intrepid spirit and his men knew it. Moreover,
the Kentuckians now looked forward to certain victory, for they trusted
Wayne. On the twenty-eighth of July, the whole army moved forward to the
Indian towns on the Maumee. No finer body of men ever went forth into
the wilderness to meet a savage foe. Iron drill and constant practice at
marksmanship had done their work. Officers and men, regulars and
volunteers, were ready for the work at hand. Unlike Harmar and St.
Clair, Wayne had in his service some of the most renowned scouts and
Indian fighters of the day. Ephraim Kibby, William Wells, Robert
McClellan, Henry and Christopher Miller, and a party of Chickasaw and
Choctaw warriors, constantly kept him posted concerning the number and
whereabouts of the enemy, and the nature of the ground which he was to
traverse. "The Indians who watched his march brought word to the British
that his army went twice as far in a day as St. Clair's, that he kept
his scouts well out and his troops always in open order and ready for
battle; that he exercised the greatest precaution to avoid an ambush or
surprise, and that every night the camps of the different regiments were
surrounded by breastworks of fallen trees so as to render a sudden
assault hopeless." "We have beaten the enemy twice," said Little Turtle,
"under separate commanders. We cannot expect the same good fortune
always to attend us. The Americans are now led by a chief who never
sleeps. The night and the day are alike to him; and, during all the time
that he has been marching upon our villages, notwithstanding the
watchfulness of our young men, we have never been able to surprise him.
Think well of it. There is something whispers me, it would be prudent to
listen to his offers of peace."
On the eighth of August Wayne reached the junction of the Au Glaize and
the Maumee, and began the erection of Fort Defiance. The whole country
was filled with the Indian gardens and corn fields which extended up the
Maumee to the British fort. On the thirteenth of August, the General
dispatched the scout, Christopher Miller, with the last and final
overture of peace. In the event of a refusal, there must be a final
appeal to arms. "America," said Wayne, "shall no longer be insulted with
impunity. To the all-powerful and just God I therefore commit myself and
gallant army." Impatient of a reply, Wayne moved forward again on the
fifteenth, and met Miller returning. The Indians requested a delay of
ten days to debate peace or war. Wayne gave orders to march on. At eight
o'clock on the morning of the twentieth of August, 1794, the army
advanced in columns and in open order to meet the enemy. The Indian
forces consisted of Shawnees, Delawares, Wyandots, Ottawas, Miamis,
Potawatomi, Chippewas and Mohawks, numbering from fifteen hundred to two
thousand warriors. Added to these were two companies of Canadian militia
from Amherstburg and Detroit, commanded by Captain Caldwell. Alexander
McKee was present, and Matthew Elliott and Simon Girty, but they kept
well in the rear and near the river. The whole mixed force of Indians
and Canadians were encamped on the north bank of the Maumee, "at and
around a hill called 'Presque Isle,' about two miles south of the site
of Maumee City, and four south of the British Fort Miami."
The order of march was as follows: The Legion was on the right, its
flank covered by the Maumee. On the left hovered a brigade of mounted
Kentucky volunteers under Brigadier-General Todd. In the rear was
another brigade of the same kind of troops under Brigadier-General
Barbee. In advance of the Legion rode a select battalion of mounted
Kentuckians under Major Price. These were to be on the lookout and to
give timely notice to the regulars in case of attack. The army had
advanced about five miles and were entering an area covered with fallen
timber and high grass, when the advance corps under Price received such
a sudden and terrible fire from the hidden enemy that they were
compelled to retreat. "The savages were formed in three lines, within
supporting distance of each other, and extending for two miles, at right
angles with the river." The fallen trunks of the trees, blown down by a
tornado, made a fine covert for the red men and prevented any favorable
action by the cavalry. Wayne was instantly alert. He formed the Legion
into two lines, one a short distance behind the other, and began the
fight. He soon perceived from the weight of the savage fire and the
extent of their lines that they were trying to turn his left flank and
drive him into the river. He now ordered the second line to advance and
support the first; directed Major-General Scott to take all the mounted
volunteers and turn the right flank of the enemy, while he issued orders
to Mis Campbell who commanded the legionary cavalry, to gallop in at the
right and next to the river and turn the Indian left. The front line was
ordered to charge with trailed arms and rouse the Indians from their
coverts at the point of the bayonet, "and when up, to deliver a close
and well directed fire on their backs, followed by a brisk charge, so as
not to give them time to load again." The mounted volunteers under
Scott, Todd and Barbee, and the second line of the Legion, had only
gained their positions in part, when the battle was over. The first line
of the federal infantry, charging with that impetuosity imparted to
them by their gallant commander, drove savages and Canadians in headlong
rout for a distance of two miles and strewed the ground with many
corpses. The legionary cavalry, blowing their trumpets and dashing in
upon the terrified Indians, slew a part of them with broadswords, and
put the remainder to instant retreat. "This horde of savages," says
Wayne, "with their allies, abandoned themselves to flight and dispersed
with terror and dismay, leaving our victorious army in full and quiet
possession of the field of battle." The British, with their usual
treachery, closed the gates of the fort in the face of the fleeing red
men and refused them refuge. Lured and encouraged into a hopeless
contest, they found themselves abandoned by that very power that had
urged them to reject all offers of peace. The Americans lost
thirty-three in killed, and had one hundred wounded. The savage loss was
much heavier.
Immediately after the battle of Fallen Timbers the American army moved
down the river and encamped within view of the British garrison. Fort
Miami occupied a well fortified position on the north bank of the Maumee
near the present Maumee City. There were four nine-pounders, two large
howitzers, and six six-pounders, mounted in the fort, and two swivels.
The entire fortification was surrounded by a wide, deep ditch about
twenty feet deep from the top of the parapet. The forces within
consisted of about two hundred and fifty regulars and two hundred
militia. All were under command of Major William Campbell, of the
Twenty-fourth Regiment. The rout of the Indian allies had been
humiliating enough, but at sight of the victorious ranks of the
American army Campbell became furious. On the next day after the battle
he could contain himself no longer. He addressed a note to Wayne
complaining that the army of the United States had taken post on the
banks of the Maumee and within range of his majesty's fort, for upwards
of twenty-four hours, and he desired to inform himself as speedily as
possible, in what light he was to view so near an approach to the
garrison. Wayne made immediate reply. He said that without questioning
the authority or the propriety of the major's question, he thought that
he might without breach of decorum observe, that if the major was
entitled to an answer, that a most full and satisfactory one had been
announced to him from the muzzles of his (Wayne's) small arms on the
previous day, in an action against a horde of savages in the vicinity of
the British post, which had terminated gloriously to the American arms.
He further declared that if said action had continued until the Indians
were driven under the influence of the British guns, that these guns
would not have much impeded the progress of the victorious army under
his command, "as no such post was established at the commencement of the
present war between the Indians and the United States." On the next day
the incensed major wrote another note, threatening Wayne with war if he
continued to approach within pistol shot of the fort with arms in his
hands. To this Wayne replied by inviting the major to return with his
men, artillery and stores to the nearest post "occupied by his Britannic
Majesty's troops at the peace of 1783." Campbell wrote another reply
refusing to vacate the fort and warning Wayne not to approach within
reach of his cannon. "The only notice taken of this letter," says Wayne,
"was by immediately setting fire to and destroying everything within
view of the fort, and even under the muzzles of the guns." For three
days and nights the American troops continued to destroy the houses and
corn fields of the enemy both above and below the British post, while
the garrison looked on and dared not sally forth. One of the severest
sufferers from this devastation was the notorious renegade, Alexander
McKee, who had done so much to inflame the war between the tribes and
the United States. His houses, stores and property were utterly
consumed.
The army now retired by easy marches to Fort Defiance, laying waste the
villages and corn fields for about fifty miles on each side of the
Maumee. On the fourteenth of September the march was taken up for the
Miami villages at the junction of the St. Joseph and the St. Marys, and
the troops arrived there on the seventeenth. On the eighteenth, Wayne
selected a site for a fort. On the twenty-second of October the new
fortification was completed, and a force of infantry and artillery
stationed there under command of Colonel John F. Hamtramck. The new post
was named Fort Wayne. On the twenty-eighth of October, the main body of
the troops started back on the trace to Fort Greenville, and here, on
the second day of November, 1794, General Wayne re-established his
headquarters.
The victory of Wayne was complete and final. It brought peace to the
frontiers, and paved the way for the advance of civilization. In 1802,
Ohio became a state of the Union. His triumph did more. It made the
name and the power of the United States respected as they never were
before, and gave authority and dignity to the federal arms. The Indian
tribes were sorely dispirited. Not only had the British abandoned them
in their final hour of defeat, but their fields and cabins had been laid
waste and their supplies of food destroyed. There was much suffering
among them, during the ensuing winter. The establishment of the post at
Fort Wayne put a new obstacle in the path of the British in the valleys
of the Wabash and the Maumee, and led the way to the final abandonment
of the northwest by their troops and garrisons.
The administration of Washington was also vindicated. In the face of two
disheartening defeats, a lack of confidence in the west, and almost open
opposition in the east, a fighting general had at last been found, an
army trained, and led forth to splendid victory. The great northwest
owes a debt of eternal gratitude to the first president of the republic,
George Washington.
The administration was further successful. While General Wayne was
preparing for his campaign, the Chief Justice of the United States, John
Jay, had been sent to England to effect a treaty of peace. Feeling was
high in both countries and the danger of war was imminent, but the
prudence and moderation of Washington led him to see that what the
nation needed most was peace and repose and a chance for development. On
the nineteenth of November, 1794, Mr. Jay and Lord Grenville "concluded
a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation between the United States
and Great Britain," by the terms of which the latter country, among
other things, agreed to surrender the western posts. On the eleventh day
of July, 1796, at the hour of noon, the Stars and Stripes floated over
the ramparts of the British fort at Detroit.