THE BRITISH POLICIES
_--The British reluctant to surrender the control of the
Northwest--their tampering with the Indian tribes._
The seventh article of the definitive treaty of peace between the United
States and Great Britain in 1783, provided that "His Britannic Majesty,"
should, with all convenient speed, "withdraw all his armies, garrisons,
and fleets from the said United States, and from every port, place and
harbour within the same," but when demand was made upon General
Frederick Haldimand, the British governor of Canada, for the important
posts of Niagara, Oswego, Michillimacinac and Detroit, he refused to
surrender them up, alleging that he had no explicit orders so to do, and
that until he had received such commands, he conceived it to be his duty
as a soldier to take no step in that direction. This action of Haldimand
was cool and deliberate and received the full and entire approbation of
the British cabinet. Tories, and apologists for Great Britain, have
written much about a justification for this action, but there is no real
justification. Lord Carmarthen, the British secretary of state,
afterwards said to John Adams that English creditors had met with
unlawful impediments in the collection of their debts, but the real
reason why England violated her treaty he did not state. She retained
the posts to control the tribes. She looked with covetous eye on the
lucrative fur-trade of the northwest territory upon which the commerce
of Canada was in great measure dependent, and sooner than resist the
entreaties of her merchants and traders, she was willing to embroil a
people of her own race and blood, in a series of long and merciless wars
with murderous savages. For the fact remains, that if England had
promptly surrendered up the posts; had not interfered with our
negotiations for peace with the Indian tribes; had refused to encourage
any confederacy, and had instructed her commanders to keep their spies
and agents out of American territory, the murders on the Ohio, the
slaughter of innocents, and the long, costly and bloody campaigns in the
Indian country might have been avoided.
Nothing can ever extenuate the conduct of England in keeping in her
employ and service such men as Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliott and
Simon Girty. The chief rendezvous of the tribes after the revolution was
at Detroit. Here were located a British garrison and a British Indian
agency. This agency, while guarding the trade in peltries, also kept its
eye on the fleets that descended the Ohio, on the growing settlements of
Kentucky, and warned the Indians against American encroachment. In 1778,
and while the revolution was in progress, the missionary John
Heckewelder, noted the arrival at Goschochking on the Muskingum, of
three renegades and fugitives from Pittsburg. They were McKee, Elliott
and Girty. McKee and Elliott had both been traders among the Indians
and understood their language. All three had deserted the American cause
and were flying into the arms of the British. They told the Delawares
and Wyandots, "That it was the determination of the American people to
kill and destroy the whole Indian race, be they friends or foes, and
possess themselves of their country; and that, at this time, while they
were embodying themselves for the purpose, they were preparing fine
sounding speeches to deceive them, that they might with more safety fall
upon and murder them. That now was the time, and the only time, for all
nations to rise, and turn out to a man against these intruders, and not
even suffer them to cross the Ohio, but fall upon them where they should
find them; which if not done without delay, their country would be lost
to them forever." The same men were now inculcating the same doctrines
at Detroit. They pointed out to the Indians that the Americans were bent
on extinguishing all their council fires with the best blood of the
nations; that despite all their fair promises and pretensions, the
Americans cared nothing for the tribes, but only for their lands. That
England by her treaty had not ceded a foot of the Indian territory to
the United States. That all the treaties thus far concluded with the
tribes by the Americans, were one-sided and unfair, made at the American
forts, and at the cannon's mouth.
A powerful figure now arose among the savages of the north. Joseph Brant
was a principal chief of the Mohawk tribe of the Six Nations of New
York. His sister Molly was the acknowledged wife of the famous British
Indian superintendent, Sir William Johnson. In his youth he had been
sent by Johnson to Doctor Wheelock's charity school at Lebanon,
Connecticut, where he learned to speak and write English and acquired
some knowledge of history and literature. In the war of the revolution
the Mohawks sided with England, and Brant was given a colonel's
commission. He remained after the war a pensioner of the British
government, and General Arthur St. Clair is authority for the statement
that he received an annual stipend of four hundred pounds sterling.
The Mohawks had been terribly shattered and broken by the revolution,
but they still retained that ascendency among the tribes that resulted
from their former bravery and prowess. In the mind of Brant there now
dawned the grand scheme of forming a confederacy of all the northwestern
tribes to oppose the advance of the American settlements. The first
arbitrary assumptions of the continental congress gave him a great
leverage. They had assumed to exercise an unlimited power of disposal
over the Indian lands. The surveyors of the government were advancing
west of the Pennsylvania line and staking off the first ranges. Now was
the opportune time to fan the flame of savage jealousy, and stand with
united front against the foe.
It is probable that Brant took part in the grand council held at
Coshocton in 1785, and reported to Captain John Doughty by Alexander
McCormick. The account of McCormick relates that there "were present the
chiefs of many nations," and that "the object of this council was to
unite themselves against the white people." There was an excited
activity on the part of McKee, Elliott, Caldwell and Girty and they were
endeavoring to keep the tribes away from the American treaties. The
newspapers of London in speaking of Brant's arrival in England in the
latter part of the same year, gave accounts of his lately having
presided over a "grand congress of confederate chiefs of the Indian
nations in America," and said that Brant had been appointed to the chief
command in the war which the Indians meditated against the United
States.
In the month of December, 1785, the distinguished warrior arrived at the
British capital. In an age of less duplicity his coming might have
excited some feeling of compassion. He had journeyed three thousand
miles across the seas, to see what the great English king could do to
restore the broken fortunes of his people. The beautiful valley of the
Mohawk was theirs no longer. Their ancient castles and villages had been
destroyed, or were in the hands of strangers. All had been lost in the
service of the great "father" across the waters. What would that
"father" now do for his ruined and sorrowing children? He reminded Lord
Sidney of the colonial department, that in every war of England with her
enemies the Iroquois had fought on her side; that they were struck with
astonishment at hearing that they had been entirely forgotten in the
treaty of peace, and that they could not believe it possible that they
could be so neglected by a nation whom they had served with so much zeal
and fidelity. The Americans were surveying the lands north of the Ohio,
and Brant now desired to know whether the tribes were still to be
regarded as "His Majesty's faithful allies" and whether they were to
have that support and countenance such as old and true friends might
expect. In other words, the blunt savage wanted to know whether England
would now support the Indian tribes in beginning hostilities against the
United States.
The conduct of the British was characteristic. The lands in controversy
had just been ceded by solemn treaty to the new republic. To openly
espouse the cause of Brant was to declare war. A little finesse must be
resorted to in order to evade the leading question, and at the same time
hold the tribes. They therefore wined and dined the American chief, and
presented him to the king and queen, but promised him nothing. Lord
Sidney rained platitudes. He said the king was always ready to attend to
the future welfare of the tribes, and upon every occasion wherein their
happiness might be concerned he was ready to give further testimony of
his royal favor. He hoped that they might remain united and that their
measures might be conducted with temper and moderation. In the meantime,
the arts of diplomacy must be employed. The barbarian chief must be
bribed with a pension, and covertly used as a tool and instrument of
British design.
The great chief then and afterwards entertained misgivings, but he
proceeded to play the dupe. In November and December, 1786, he was back
in America, and a great council of the northwestern tribes was convened
at the Huron village, near the mouth of the Detroit river. Present were
the Five Nations, the Hurons or Wyandots, the Delawares, Shawnees,
Ottawas, Potawatomi, Miamis, and some scattering bands of the Cherokees.
A letter was here formulated and addressed to the congress of the United
States, which at once marks Joseph Brant and the British agents back of
him as the originators of the idea that all the Indian lands were held
in common by all the tribes, and that no single tribe had the right to
alienate. In answer to the treaties of Fort Stanwix and Fort McIntosh,
they alleged that congress had hitherto managed everything in their own
way, and had kindled council fires where they thought proper; that they
had insisted on holding separate treaties with distinct tribes, and had
entirely neglected the Indian plan of a general conference. They held it
to be "indispensably necessary" that any cession of Indian lands should
be made in the most public manner, "and by the united voice of the
confederacy;" all partial treaties were void and of no effect. They
urged a full meeting and treaty with all the tribes; warned the United
States to keep their surveyors and other people from crossing the Ohio,
and closed with these words: "Brothers: It shall not be our fault if the
plans which we have suggested to you should not be carried into
execution. In that case the event will be very precarious, and if
farther ruptures ensue, we hope to be able to exculpate ourselves and
shall most assuredly, with our united force, be obliged to defend those
rights and privileges which have been transmitted to us by our
ancestors; and if we should be thereby reduced to misfortune, the world
will pity us when they think of the amicable proposals which we now make
to prevent the unnecessary effusion of blood. These are our thoughts
and firm resolves, and we earnestly desire that you transmit to us, as
soon as possible, your answer, be it what it may."
Brant's whole scheme of a confederacy among savage tribes was, of
course, wild and chimerical. The same savage hate and jealousy which was
now directed toward the Americans, would, at the first favorable moment,
break out in fiery strifes and dissensions in the Indian camp, and
consume any alliance that might be formed. To imagine that the Miami and
the Cherokee, the Shawnee and the Delaware, the Iroquois and Wyandot,
after centuries of war and bloodshed, could be suddenly brought together
in any efficient league or combination, that would withstand the test of
time, was vain and foolish. The history of the Indian tribes in America
from the days of the Jesuit fathers down to the day of Brant, had shown
first one tribe and then another in the ascendency. Never at any time
had there been peace and concord. Even within the councils of the same
tribe, contentions frequently arose between sachems and chiefs. It is
well known that in his later days the Little Turtle was almost
universally despised by the other Miami chieftains. A deadly hatred
existed between the Cornplanter and Joseph Brant. Tecumseh and Winamac
were enemies. Governor Arthur St. Clair, writing to the President of the
United States, on May 2, 1789, reported that a jealousy subsisted
between the tribes that attended the treaty at Fort Harmar; that they
did not consider themselves as one people and that it would not be
difficult, if circumstances required it, "to set them at deadly
variance."
Equally pretentious was Brant's claim of a common ownership of the
Indian lands. The Iroquois themselves had never recognized any such
doctrine. In October, 1768, at the English treaty of Fort Stanwix, they
had sold to the British government by bargain and sale, a great strip of
country south of the Ohio river, and had fixed the line of that stream
as the boundary between themselves and the English. At that time they
claimed to be the absolute owners of the lands ceded, to the exclusion
of all other tribes. At the treaty of Fort Wayne, in 1809, between the
United States and the northwestern tribes, the Miamis claimed the
absolute fee in all the lands along the Wabash, and refused to cede any
territory until a concession to that effect was made by William Henry
Harrison. In the instructions of Congress, of date October 26th, 1787,
to General Arthur St. Clair, relative to the negotiation of a treaty in
the northern department, which were the same instructions governing the
negotiations at Fort Harmar in January 1789, specific directions were
given to defeat all confederations and combinations among the tribes,
for congress clearly saw the British hand behind Brant's proposed
league, and knew how futile it was to recognize any such savage
alliance.
The British officials were well aware of the shortcomings of Brant's
league, but they hailed its advent with delight. If the tribes could be
collected together under the shadow of the British forts, and freely
plied by the British agents, they could be kept hostile to the American
vanguard. If the government of the United States could not acquire a
foothold north of the Ohio, the British forts were safe, and the trade
in peltries secure. The result of this policy was of course foreseen. It
meant war between the United States and the Indian tribes. But in the
meantime England would hold the fur-trade. Thus in cold blood and with
deliberation did the British rulers pave the way to the coming
hostilities.
In November, 1786, Sir Guy Carleton, now Lord Dorchester, arrived at
Quebec. Like most of the royal officers of that day he looked with
disdain upon the new republic of the United States. It was evident that
the old confederation could not be held together much longer. There was
constant strife and jealousy between the states. In Massachusetts Shays'
rebellion was in progress, which seemed at times to threaten the
existence of the commonwealth itself. The courts were occluded, and the
administration of justice held in contempt. In the west, the people of
Kentucky were embittered toward the states of the Atlantic seaboard.
Their prosperity in great measure depended upon the open navigation of
the Mississippi, and a free market at New Orleans. Spain had denied them
both, and in the eyes of the Kentuckians congress seemed disposed to let
Spain have her own way.
Under all these circumstances, which appeared to be so inauspicious for
the American government, Dorchester determined to keep a most diligent
eye on the situation. Spain had the nominal control, at least, of the
lands west of the Mississippi. She had designs on the western territory
of the United States, and was about to open up an intrigue with James
Wilkinson and other treasonable conspirators in Kentucky, who had in
mind a separation from the eastern states. To hold the posts within the
American territory, was to be on the ground and ready to act, either in
the event of a dissolution of the old confederation, or in case of an
attempt on the part of Spain to seize any portion of the western
country. Added to all this was the imperative necessity, as Dorchester
looked at it, of maintaining a "game preserve" for the western tribes.
If the Americans advanced, the Indian hunting grounds were endangered,
and this would result in lessening the profits of the English merchants.
Brant was impatient, but Dorchester, like Lord Sidney, proceeded
cautiously. On March 22, 1787, Sir John Johnson, the British Indian
superintendent wrote to Brant, expressing his happiness that things had
turned out prosperously in the Indian country, and saying that he hoped
that the chief's measures might have the effect of preventing the
Americans from encroaching on the Indian lands. "I hope," he writes, "in
all your decisions you will conduct yourselves with prudence and
moderation, having always an eye to the friendship that has so long
subsisted between you and the King's subjects, upon whom you alone can
and ought to depend. You have no reason to fear any breach of promise on
the part of the King. Is he not every year giving you fresh proofs of
his friendship? What greater could you expect than is now about to be
performed, by giving an ample compensation for your losses, which is yet
withheld from us, his subjects? Do not suffer bad men or evil advisors
to lead you astray; everything that is reasonable and consistent with
the friendship that ought to be preserved between us, will be done for
you all. Do not suffer an idea to hold a place in your mind, that it
will be for your interests to sit still and see the Americans attempt
the posts. It is for your sakes chiefly, if not entirely that we hold
them. If you become indifferent about them, they may perhaps be given
up; what security would you then have? You would be left at the mercy of
a people whose blood calls aloud for revenge." On May 29th of the same
year, Major Matthews of the English army, who had been assigned to the
command of the king's forces at Detroit, communicated with Brant from
Fort Niagara, expressing the views of Dorchester as follows: "In the
future his Lordship wishes them (the Indians) to act as is best for
their interests; he cannot begin a war with the Americans, because some
of their people encroach and make depredations upon parts of the Indian
country; but they must see it is his Lordship's intention to defend the
posts; and while these are preserved, the Indians must find great
security therefrom, and consequently the Americans greater difficulty in
taking possession of their lands; but should they once become masters of
the posts, they will surround the Indians, and accomplish their purposes
with little trouble. From a consideration of all which, it therefore
remains with the Indians to decide what is most for their own interests,
and to let his Lordship know their determination, that he may take
measures accordingly; but, whatever their resolution is, it should be
taken as by one and the same people, by which means they will be
respected and become strong; but if they divide, and act one part
against the other, they will become weak, and help to destroy each
other. This, my dear Joseph, is the substance of what his Lordship
desired me to tell you, and I request that you will give his sentiments
that mature consideration which their justice, generosity, and desire to
promote the welfare and happiness of the Indians, must appear to all the
world to merit." Thus did this noble lord, while refraining from making
an open and a manly declaration of war, secretly and clandestinely set
on these savages; appealing on the one hand to their fear of American
encroachment, and urging on the other the security the tribes must feel
from the British retention of the frontier posts. In the meantime, he
bided that moment, when the weakness of the states or their mutual
dissensions would enable him to come out in the open and seize that
territory which the king had lately lost. One is reminded of the remarks
that Tecumseh made to Governor William Henry Harrison in 1810. "He said
he knew the latter (i. e., the English) were always urging the Indians
to war for their advantage, and not to benefit his countrymen; and here
he clapped his hands, and imitated a person who halloos at a dog, to set
him to fight with another."
Pursuant to the instructions of the continental congress heretofore
referred to, Governor Arthur St. Clair, in the year 1788, opened up a
correspondence with the tribes of the northwest in order to bring them
to a treaty. The government, though suffering from a paucity of funds,
had determined to enter into engagements looking to the fair and
equitable purchase of the Indian lands. It was plainly to be seen that
unless an accommodation could be arrived at with the tribes that the
government either had to abandon the territory north of the Ohio, or
levy war. This they were reluctant to do. The treasury was practically
empty and the people poor. The country had practically no standing army,
nor was there the means to raise one. In fact, the new constitution had
not as yet been ratified by an adequate number of states, and the first
president of the United States had not been elected. Again, something
must be done, if possible, to relieve the sufferings of the western
people. They were loudly complaining of the inattention and neglect of
the government, and if they were left entirely without support in
fighting their way to the Spanish markets at New Orleans, and in
repelling the constant attacks of the Indian raiders urged on by British
agents, grave doubts might justly be entertained of their continued
loyalty. In fact, during the month of November, in this same year of
1788, the infamous Dr. John Connolly, arrived at Louisville. He came as
a direct agent of Lord Dorchester, seeking to undermine the allegiance
of the Kentuckians to their government, and offering them arms and
ammunition with which to attack the Spaniards. This inglorious mission
ended in Connolly's disgraceful and cowardly flight.
In their efforts to negotiate a fair compact, the United States had some
reason to anticipate a friendly disposition on the part of the Delawares
and Wyandots. Large numbers of the latter tribe had been won over to the
principles of Christianity and were inclined towards peace, but the
Miamis of the Wabash, the Shawnees and the Kickapoos were hostile. At
Miamitown were the Little Turtle and Le Gris; close by, were the
Shawnees under Blue Jacket; all were under the influence of the Girtys,
George and Simon, and all had been engaged in the Indian raids. The
Miami confederates at Eel River, Ouiatenon and Tippecanoe all looked to
the head men at Miamitown for inspiration. Miamitown was in turn
connected with the British agency at Detroit. The confederates of the
Three Fires, the Ottawas or Tawas, the Chippewas and Potawatomi,
otherwise known as the "Lake Tribes," were also under the influence of
the British. On July 5th, 1788, General Arthur St. Clair, writing to the
Secretary of War from Pittsburg, said that the western tribes, meaning
those under the influence of the Miami chiefs, had been so successful in
their depredations on the Ohio river, their settlements were so distant
and "their country so difficult," that they imagined themselves to be
perfectly safe, and that as they were able by these incursions "to
gratify at once their passions of avarice and revenge, and their desire
for spirituous liquors, every boat carrying more or less of that
commodity, few of them may be expected to attend; nor are they much to
be depended on should they attend generally." He further remarked: "Our
settlements are extending themselves so fast on every quarter where they
can be extended; our pretensions to the country they inhabit have been
made known to them in so unequivocal a manner, and the consequences are
so certain and so dreadful to them, that there is little probability of
there ever being any cordiality between us. The idea of being ultimately
obliged to abandon their country rankles in their minds, and our
British neighbors, at the same time that they deny the cession of the
country made by them, suffer them not to forget for a moment the claim
that is founded upon it."
The first attempt of the government in 1788, to form a treaty ended in
disaster. In order to mollify the tribes, it was proposed to hold the
negotiations at the falls of the Muskingum river, in what the Indians
were pleased to term "their own country" and "beyond the guns of any
fort." General Josiah Harrnar was instructed to erect a council house
there, and appropriate buildings in which to house the goods to be
distributed among the Indians. On the night of July 12th, some Ottawas
and Chippewas attacked the sentries and attempted to steal the goods
they were guarding. Two soldiers were killed and two wounded. Friendly
Delawares who arrived identified an Indian who was slain in the fight,
as an Ottawa. It was learned that both the Chippewas and Ottawas were
opposed to a treaty, "and in favor of war, unless the whites would agree
to the Ohio as a boundary line." Who set on these wild tribes from the
north may well be imagined. General St. Clair now determined to hold the
treaty at Fort Harmar at the mouth of the Muskingum, and sent a message
to the tribes now collecting on the Detroit river, to that effect.
The machinations of the British agents at Detroit in the summer and
autumn of 1788, while involved in some degree of mystery, seem to have
been about as follows: Lord Dorchester was apprehensive that the
Americans contemplated the taking of the posts and thereby uprooting
the British influence. In order to avoid such action, it might be the
safer policy to make certain concessions and advise the Indians to give
up a small portion of the territory north of the Ohio, rather than to
bring on an armed conflict. But all the tribes must be kept together, if
possible, and under the direction of the authorities at Detroit. No
single tribe must be allowed to negotiate a separate treaty, for that
might result in the cultivation of friendly relations with the United
States, and if one tribe could be brought under the American influence,
this might ultimately lead to the disintegration of the British power
over all. Therefore it was resolved that before any negotiations were
entered into with General St. Clair, that another grand council of the
northwestern tribes should be held in the valley of the Miami of the
Lake, or Maumee, and that to that council should be summoned the
principal sachems and warriors of all the tribes. Alexander McKee, the
British Indian agent, was to be there, and Joseph Brant, and all action
taken was to be under their supervision and control.
On July 14th, General Richard Butler wrote to General St. Clair that
about eighty chiefs were present at the Detroit river, awaiting the
arrival of Brant. On August the 10th that chieftain reached Detroit, but
instead of meeting with unanimity of counsel, he found that the Wyandots
were for "a private and separate meeting with the Americans to settle
matters for themselves," while the warlike Miamis were against any peace
at all and in favor of open hostilities. After five weeks of waiting and
cajolery, Brant got them all together in the Miami valley, and the
council started to deliberate. The Hurons, Chippewas, Ottawas,
Potawatomi and Delawares stood with Brant, and in favor of surrendering
up a small portion of their country, rather than of entering headlong
into a destructive war. The Potawatomi, Ottawas and Chippewas were far
to the north and were probably indifferent; the Wyandots and Delawares
were sincerely for peace. But insuperable objections were now offered by
the Miamis, Kickapoos and the Shawnees. Horse stealing was their "best
harvest," and the plundering of the boats they would not forego. In vain
did the Wyandots urge a treaty. They presented the Miamis with a large
string of wampum, but this was refused. They then laid it on the
shoulder of a principal Miami chieftain, but he turned to one side and
let it fall on the ground without making any answer. In the end the
Wyandots withdrew and the council broke up in confusion. It was plain
that if any agreement was entered into with the American government that
it would not be through any concerted action on the part of the tribes.
Tribal jealousy and savage hate rendered that impossible.
It has been related that when Brant perceived that his confederacy was a
failure, and that he could not secure united action, that he said "that
if five of the Six Nations had sold themselves to the devil, otherwise
the Yankees, that he did not intend that the fierce Miamis, Shawnees and
Kickapoos should do so." However this may be, it is evident that from
the time of the breaking up of the Indian council on the Miami, that
Brant and the British agents did all that lay within their power to
frustrate the American negotiations with the Wyandots and Delawares at
Fort Harmar. According to reports reaching the ears of General St.
Clair, stories were placed in circulation among the tribes that in case
they attended the treaty, that the Americans would kill them all, either
by putting poison in the spirits, or by inoculating the blankets that
would be presented to them, with the dreaded smallpox. Brant, after
coming within sixty miles of the fort, turned back to Detroit, taking
all the Mohawks with him, and urging back the oncoming tribes of the
Shawnees and Miamis. "It is notorious," says President Washington, in a
letter to governor Clinton, of New York on December 1st, 1790, "that he
(Brant) used all the art and influence of which he was possessed to
prevent any treaty being held; and that, except in a small degree,
General St. Clair aimed at no more land by the treaty of Muskingum than
had been ceded by the preceding treaties."
Thus did the British government, through its duly authorized agents, its
governor and army officers, retain the posts belonging to the new
republic, encourage the tribes in their depredations, and defeat the
pacific intentions of the American people, and all from the sordid
motives of gain. On April 30th, 1789, when George Washington was
inaugurated as the first President, every savage chieftain along the
Wabash, or dwelling at the forks of the Maumee, was engaged in active
warfare against the people of the United States, largely through the
instrumentality of the British officials.