CHAPTER II

SURVIVALS OF MILITARISM IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT

We are accustomed to say that the machinery of government incorporated

in the charters of the early American cities, as in the Federal and

State constitutions, was worked out by men who were strongly under the

influence of the historians and doctrinaires of the eighteenth century.

The most significant representative of these men is Thomas Jefferson,

and their most telling phrase, the familiar opening that “all men are

created free and equal.”

We are only now beginning to suspect that the present admitted failure

in municipal administration, the so-called “shame of American cities,”

may be largely due to the inadequacy of those eighteenth-century

ideals, with the breakdown of the machinery which they provided. We

recognize the weakness inherent in the historic and doctrinaire method

when it attempts to deal with growing and human institutions. While

these men were strongly under the influence of peace ideals which were

earnestly advocated, both in France and in America, even in the midst

of their revolutionary periods, and while they read the burning poets

and philosophers of their remarkable century, their idealism, after

all, was largely founded upon theories concerning “the natural man,” a

creature of their sympathetic imaginations.

Because their idealism was of the type that is afraid of experience,

these founders refused to look at the difficulties and blunders which

a self-governing people were sure to encounter, and insisted that,

if only the people had freedom, they would walk continuously in the

paths of justice and righteousness. It was inevitable, therefore, that

they should have remained quite untouched by that worldly wisdom which

counsels us to know life as it is, and by that very modern belief that

if the world is ever to go right at all, it must go right in its own

way.

A man of this generation easily discerns the crudeness of “that

eighteenth-century conception of essentially unprogressive human

nature in all the empty dignity of its ‘inborn rights.’”[4] Because

he has grown familiar with a more passionate human creed, with the

modern evolutionary conception of the slowly advancing race whose

rights are not “inalienable,” but hard-won in the tragic processes of

experience, he realizes that these painfully acquired rights must be

carefully cherished or they may at any moment slip out of our hands.

We know better in America than anywhere else that civilization is

not a broad road, with mile-stones indicating how far each nation

has proceeded upon it, but a complex struggle forward, each race and

nation contributing its quota; that the variety and continuity of this

commingled life afford its charm and value. We would not, if we could,

conform them to one standard. But this modern attitude, which may

even now easily subside into negative tolerance, did not exist among

the founders of the Republic, who, with all their fine talk of the

“natural man” and what he would accomplish when he obtained freedom and

equality, did not really trust the people after all.

They timidly took the English law as their prototype, “whose very root

is in the relation between sovereign and subject, between lawmaker

and those whom the law restrains,” which has traditionally concerned

itself more with the guarding of prerogative and with the rights of

property than with the spontaneous life of the people. They serenely

incorporated laws and survivals which registered the successful

struggle of the barons against the aggressions of the sovereign,

although the new country lacked both nobles and kings. Misled by the

name of government, they founded their new government by an involuntary

reference to a lower social state than that which they actually saw

about them. They depended upon penalties, coercion, compulsion,

remnants of military codes, to hold the community together; and it

may be possible to trace much of the maladministration of our cities

to these survivals, to the fact that our early democracy was a moral

romanticism, rather than a well-grounded belief in social capacity and

in the efficiency of the popular will.

It has further happened that as the machinery, groaning under the

pressure of new social demands put upon it, has broken down that from

time to time, we have mended it by giving more power to administrative

officers, because we still distrusted the will of the people. We are

willing to cut off the dislocated part or to tighten the gearing, but

are afraid to substitute a machine of newer invention and greater

capacity. In the hour of danger we revert to the military and legal

type although they become less and less appropriate to city life in

proportion as the city grows more complex, more varied in resource and

more highly organized, and is, therefore, in greater need of a more

diffused local autonomy.

A little examination will easily show that in spite of the fine phrases

of the founders, the Government became an entity by itself away from

the daily life of the people. There was no intention to ignore them

nor to oppress them. But simply because its machinery was so largely

copied from the traditional European Governments which did distrust

the people, the founders failed to provide the vehicle for a vital

and genuinely organized expression of the popular will. The founders

carefully defined what was germane to government and what was quite

outside its realm, whereas the very crux of local self-government, as

has been well said, is involved in the “right to locally determine the

scope of the local government,” in response to the needs as they arise.

They were anxious to keep the reins of government in the hands of the

good and professedly public-spirited, because, having staked so much

upon the people whom they really knew so little, they became eager

that they should appear well, and should not be given enough power to

enable them really to betray their weaknesses. This was done in the

same spirit in which a kind lady permits herself to give a tramp five

cents, believing that, although he may spend it for drink, he cannot

get very drunk upon so small a sum. In spite of a vague desire to

trust the people, the founders meant to fall back in every crisis upon

the old restraints which government has traditionally enlisted in its

behalf, and were, perhaps, inevitably influenced by the experiences of

the Revolutionary War. Having looked to the sword for independence from

oppressive governmental control, they came to regard the sword as an

essential part of the government they had succeeded in establishing.

Regarded from the traditional standpoint, government has always needed

this force of arms. The king, attempting to control the growing

power of the barons as they wrested one privilege after another from

him, was obliged to use it constantly; the barons later successfully

established themselves in power only to be encroached upon by the

growing strength and capital of the merchant class. These are now, in

turn, calling upon the troops and militia for aid, as they are shorn of

a pittance here and there by the rising power of the proletariat. The

imperial, the feudal, the capitalistic forms of society each created

by revolt against oppression from above, preserved their own forms of

government only by carefully guarding their hardly won charters and

constitutions. But in the very countries where these successive social

forms have developed, full of survivals of the past, some beneficent

and some detrimental, governments are becoming modified more rapidly

than in this democracy where we ostensibly threw off traditional

governmental oppression only to encase ourselves in a theory of

virtuous revolt against oppressive government, which in many instances

has proved more binding than the actual oppression itself.

Did the founders cling too hard to that which they had won through

persecution, hardship, and finally through a war of revolution? Did

these doctrines seem so precious to them that they were determined to

tie men up to them as long as possible, and allow them no chance to go

on to new devices of government, lest they slight these that had been

so hardly won? Did they estimate, not too highly, but by too exclusive

a valuation, that which they had secured through the shedding of blood?

Man has ever overestimated the spoils of war, and tended to lose his

sense of proportion in regard to their value. He has ever surrounded

them with a glamour beyond their deserts. This is quite harmless

when the booty is an enemy’s sword hung over a household fire, or a

battered flag decorating a city hall, but when the spoil of war is

an idea which is bound on the forehead of the victor until it cramps

his growth, a theory which he cherishes in his bosom until it grows so

large and near that it afflicts its possessor with a sort of disease of

responsibility for its preservation, it may easily overshadow the very

people for whose cause the warrior issued forth.

Was this overestimation of the founders the cause of our subsequent

failures? or rather did not the fault lie with their successors, and

does it not now rest with us, that we have wrapped our inheritance

in a napkin and refused to add thereto? The founders fearlessly took

the noblest word of their century and incorporated it into a public

document. They ventured their fortunes and the future of their children

upon its truth. We, with the belief of a progressive, developing human

life, apparently accomplish less than they with their insistence upon

rights and liberties which they so vigorously opposed to mediaeval

restrictions and obligations. We are in that first period of conversion

when we hold a creed which forecasts newer and larger possibilities

for governmental development, without in the least understanding its

spiritual implications. Although we have scrupulously extended the

franchise to the varied immigrants among us, we have not yet admitted

them into real political fellowship.

It is easy to demonstrate that we consider our social and political

problems almost wholly in the light of one wise group whom we call

native Americans, legislating for the members of humbler groups whom

we call immigrants. The first embodies the attitude of contempt or, at

best, the patronage of the successful towards those who have as yet

failed to succeed. We may consider the so-called immigration situation

as an illustration of our failure to treat our growing Republic in the

spirit of a progressive and developing democracy.

The statement is made many times that we, as a nation, are rapidly

reaching the limit of our powers of assimilation, that we receive

further masses of immigrants at the risk of blurring those traits

and characteristics which we are pleased to call American, with

its corollary that the national standard of living is in danger

of permanent debasement. Were we not in the midst of a certain

intellectual dearth and apathy, of a skepticism in regard to the ideals

of self-government which have ceased to charm men, we would see that

we are testing our national life by a tradition too provincial and

limited to meet its present motley and cosmopolitan character; that we

lack mental energy, adequate knowledge, and a sense of the youth of

the earth. The constant cry that American institutions are in danger

betrays a spiritual waste, not due to our infidelity to national

ideals, but arising from the fact that we fail to enlarge those ideals

in accord with our faithful experience of life. Our political machinery

devised for quite other conditions, has not been readjusted and adapted

to the successive changes resulting from our development. The clamor

for the town meeting, for the colonial and early century ideals of

government is in itself significant, for we are apt to cling to the

past through a very paucity of ideas.

In a sense the enormous and unprecedented moving about over the face

of the earth on the part of all nations is in itself the result of

philosophic dogma of the eighteenth century--of the creed of individual

liberty. The modern system of industry and commerce presupposes freedom

of occupation, of travel, and residence; even more, it unhappily rests

in a large measure upon the assumption of a body of the unemployed and

the unskilled, ready to be absorbed or dropped according to the demands

of production: but back of that, or certainly preceding its later

developments, lies “the natural rights” doctrine of the eighteenth

century. Even so late as 1892 an official treaty of the United States

referred to the “inalienable rights of man to change his residence

and religion.” This dogma of the schoolmen, dramatized in France and

penetrating under a thousand forms into the most backward European

States, is still operating as an obscure force in sending emigrants

to America and in our receiving them here. But in the second century

of its existence it has become too barren and chilly to induce any

really zealous or beneficent activity on behalf of the immigrants after

they arrive. On the other hand those things which we do believe--the

convictions which might be formulated to the immeasurable benefit of

the immigrants, and to the everlasting good of our national life,

have not yet been satisfactorily stated, nor apparently apprehended

by us, in relation to this field. We have no method by which to

discover men, to spiritualize, to understand, to hold intercourse with

aliens and to receive of what they bring. A century-old abstraction

breaks down before this vigorous test of concrete cases and their

demand for sympathetic interpretation. When we are confronted by the

Italian lazzaroni, the peasants from the Carpathian foothills, and the

proscribed traders from Galatia, we have no national ideality founded

upon realism and tested by our growing experience with which to meet

them, but only the platitudes of our crudest youth. The philosophers

and statesmen of the eighteenth century believed that the universal

franchise would cure all ills; that liberty and equality rested only

upon constitutional rights and privileges; that to obtain these two

and to throw off all governmental oppression constituted the full

duty of the progressive patriot. We still keep to this formalization

because the philosophers of this generation give us nothing newer. We

ignore the fact that world-wide problems can no longer be solved by

a political constitution assuring us against opposition, but that we

must frankly face the proposition that the whole situation is more

industrial than political. Did we apprehend this, we might then realize

that the officers of the Government who are dealing with naturalization

papers and testing the knowledge of the immigrants concerning the

Constitution of the United States, are only playing with counters

representing the beliefs of a century ago, while the real issues are

being settled by the great industrial and commercial interests which

are at once the products and the masters of our contemporary life.

As children who are allowed to amuse themselves with poker chips

pay no attention to the real game which their elders play with the

genuine cards in their hands, so we shut our eyes to the exploitation

and industrial debasement of the immigrant, and say, with placid

contentment, that he has been given the rights of an American citizen,

and that, therefore, all our obligations have been fulfilled. It is as

if we should undertake to cure the contemporary political corruption

founded upon a disregard of the Inter-State Commerce Acts, by requiring

the recreant citizens to repeat the Constitution of the United States.

As yet no vigorous effort is made to discover how far our present

system of naturalization, largely resting upon laws enacted in 1802, is

inadequate, although it may have met the requirements of “the fathers.”

These processes were devised to test new citizens who had immigrated to

the United States from political rather than from economic pressure,

although these two have always been in a certain sense coextensive.

Yet the early Irish came to America to seek an opportunity for

self-government, denied them at home; the Germans and Italians started

to come in largest numbers after the absorption of their smaller

States into the larger nations; and the immigrants from Russia are the

conquered Poles, Lithuanians, Finns, and Jews. On some such obscure

notion the processes of naturalization were worked out, and, with a

certain degree of logic, the first immigrants were presented with the

Constitution of the United States as a type and epitome of that which

they had come to seek. So far as they now come in search of political

liberty, as many of them do every day, the test is still valid, but,

in the meantime, we cannot ignore those significant figures which show

emigration to rise with periods of depression in given countries, and

immigration to be checked by periods of depression in America, and we

refuse to see how largely the question has become an economic one.

At the present moment, as we know, the actual importing of immigrants

is left largely to the energy of steamship companies and to those

agents for contract labor who are keen enough to avoid the restrictive

laws. The business man is here again in the saddle, as he so largely

is in American affairs. From the time that the immigrants first make

the acquaintance of the steamship agent in their own villages, at

least until a grandchild is born on the new soil, they are subjected

to various processes of exploitation from purely commercial and

self-seeking interests. It begins with the representatives of the

transatlantic lines and their allies, who convert the peasant holdings

into money, and provide the prospective emigrants with needless

supplies, such as cartridge belts and bowie knives. The brokers, in

manufactured passports, send their clients by successive stages for

a thousand miles to a port suiting their purposes. On the way the

emigrants’ eyes are treated that they may pass the physical test; they

are taught to read sufficiently well to meet the literacy test; they

are lent enough money to escape the pauper test, and by the time they

have reached America, they are so hopelessly in debt that it requires

months of work to repay all they have received. During this time they

are completely under the control of the last broker in the line, who

has his dingy office in an American city. The exploitation continues

under the employment agency whose operations verge into those of the

politician, through the naturalization henchman, the petty lawyers who

foment their quarrels and grievances by the statement that in a free

country everybody “goes to law,” by the liquor dealers who stimulate a

lively trade among them, and, finally, by the lodging-house keepers and

the landlords who are not obliged to give them the housing which the

American tenant demands. It is a long dreary road, and the immigrant

is successfully exploited at each turn. At moments one looking on is

driven to quote the Titanic plaint of Walt Whitman:

“As I stand aloof and look, there is to me something profoundly

affecting in large masses of men following the lead of those who do

not believe in men.”

The sinister aspect of this exploitation lies in the fact that it is

carried on by agents whose stock in trade are the counters and terms

of citizenship. It is said that at the present moment there are more

of these agents in Palermo than perhaps in any other European port,

and that those politicians who have found it impossible to stay even

in that corrupt city are engaged in the brokerage of naturalization

papers in the United States. Certainly one effect of the stringent

contract labor laws has been to make the padrones more powerful

because “smuggled alien labor” has become more valuable to American

corporations, and also to make simpler the delivery of immigrant

votes according to the dictates of commercial interests. It becomes a

veritable system of poisoning the notions of decent government; but

because the entire process is carried on in political terms, because

the poker chips are colored red, white, and blue, we are childishly

indifferent to it. An elaborate avoidance of restrictions quickly

adapts itself to changes either in legislation here or at the points

of departure, because none of the legislation is founded upon a real

analysis of the situation. For instance, a new type of broker in Russia

during the Russian-Japanese War made use of the situation in the

interests of young Russian Jews. If one of these men leaves the country

ordinarily, his family is obliged to pay three hundred rubles to the

Government, but if he first joins the army, his family is free from

this obligation for he has passed into the keeping of his sergeant. Out

of four hundred Russian Jews who, during three months, were drafted

into the army at a given recruiting station, only ten reported,

the rest having escaped through immigration. Of course the entire

undertaking is much more hazardous, because the man is a deserter from

the army in addition to his other disabilities; but the brokers merely

put up the price of their services and continue their undertakings.

All these evasions of immigration laws and regulations are simply

possible because the governmental tests do not belong to the current

situation, and because our political ideas are inherited from

governmental conditions not our own. In our refusal to face the

situation, we have persistently ignored the political ideals of the

Celtic, Germanic, Latin, and Slavic immigrants who have successively

come to us; and in our overwhelming ambition to remain Anglo-Saxon, we

have fallen into the Anglo-Saxon temptation of governing all peoples

by one standard. We have failed to work out a democratic government

which should include the experiences and hopes of all the varied

peoples among us. We justify the situation by some such process as that

employed by each English elector who casts a vote for seventy-five

subjects besides himself. He indirectly determines--although he may be

a narrow-minded tradesman or a country squire interested only in his

hounds and horses--the colonial policy, which shall in turn control

the destinies of the Egyptian child toiling in the cotton factory in

Alexandria, and of the half-starved Parsee working the opium fields of

North India. Yet he cannot, in the nature of the case, be informed of

the needs of these far-away people and he would venture to attempt it

only in regard to people whom he considered “inferior.”

Pending a recent election, a Chicago reformer begged his hearers to

throw away all selfish thoughts of themselves when they went to the

polls and to vote in behalf of the poor and ignorant foreigners of the

city. It would be difficult to suggest anything which would result

in a more serious confusion than to have each man, without personal

knowledge and experiences, consider the interests of the newly arrived

immigrant. The voter would have to give himself over to a veritable

debauch of altruism in order to persuade himself that his vote would be

of the least value to those men of whom he knew so little, and whom

he considered so remote and alien to himself. In truth the attitude of

the advising reformer was in reality so contemptuous that he had never

considered the immigrants really partakers and molders of the political

life of his country.

This attitude of contempt, of provincialism, this survival of

the spirit of the conqueror toward an inferior people, has many

manifestations, but none so harmful as when it becomes absorbed and

imitated and is finally evinced by the children of the foreigners

toward their own parents.

We are constantly told of the increase of criminals in the second

generation of immigrants, and, day after day, one sees lads of twelve

and fourteen throwing off the restraint of family life and striking

out for themselves. The break has come thus early, partly from the

forced development of the child under city conditions, partly because

the parents have had no chance of following, even remotely, this

development, but largely because the Americanized child has copied the

contemptuous attitude towards the foreigner which he sees all about

him. The revolt has in it something of the city impatience of country

standards, but much more of America against Poland or Italy. It is all

wretchedly sordid with bitterness on the part of the parents, and

hardhearted indifference and recklessness on the part of the boy. Only

occasionally can the latter be appealed to by filial affection after

the first break has once been thoroughly made; and yet, sometimes,

even these lads see the pathos of the situation. A probation officer

from Hull-House one day surprised three truants who were sitting by

a bonfire which they had built near the river. Sheltered by an empty

freight car, the officer was able to listen to their conversation. The

Pole, the Italian, and the Bohemian boys who had broken the law by

staying away from school, by building a fire in dangerous proximity to

freight cars, and by “swiping” the potatoes which they were roasting,

seemed to have settled down into an almost halcyon moment of gentleness

and reminiscence. The Italian boy commiserated his parents because they

hated the cold and the snow and “couldn’t seem to get used to it;” the

Pole said that his father missed seeing folks that he knew and was

“sore on this country;” the Bohemian lad really grew quite tender about

his old grandmother and the “stacks of relations” who came to see her

every Sunday in the old country, where, in contrast to her loneliness

here, she evidently had been a person of consequence. All of them felt

the pathos of the situation, but the predominant note was the cheap

contempt of the new American for foreigners, even though they are of

his own blood. The weakening of the tie which connects one generation

with another may be called the domestic results of the contemptuous

attitude. But the social results of the contemptuous attitude are even

more serious and nowhere so grave as in the modern city.

Men are there brought together by multitudes in response to the

concentration of industry and commerce without bringing with them

the natural social and family ties or the guild relationships which

distinguished the mediaeval cities and held even so late as the

eighteenth century, when the country people came to town in response

to the normal and slowly formed ties of domestic service, family

affection, and apprenticeship. Men who come to a modern city by

immigration break all these older ties and the national bond in

addition. There is all the more necessity to develop that cosmopolitan

bond which forms their substitute. The immigrants will be ready to

adapt themselves to a new and vigorous civic life founded upon the

recognition of their needs if the Government which is at present

administered in our cities, will only admit that these needs are

germane to its functions. The framers of the carefully prepared

charters, upon which the cities are founded, did not foresee that

after the universal franchise had once been granted, social needs

and ideals were bound to enter in as legitimate objects of political

action. Neither did these framers realize, on the other hand, that the

only people in a democracy who can legitimately become the objects

of repressive government, are those people who are too undeveloped

to use their liberty or those who have forfeited their right to full

citizenship. We have, therefore, a municipal administration in America

which concerns itself only grudgingly with the social needs of the

people, and is largely reduced to the administration of restrictive

measures. The people who come most directly in contact with the

executive officials, who are the legitimate objects of their control,

are the vicious, who need to be repressed; and the semi-dependent

poor, who appeal to them in their dire need; or, for quite the reverse

reason, those who are trying to avoid an undue taxation, resenting the

fact that they should be made to support a government which, from the

nature of the case, is too barren to excite their real enthusiasm.

The instinctive protest against this mechanical method of civic

control, with the lack of adjustment between the natural democratic

impulse and the fixed external condition, inevitably produces the

indifferent citizen, and the so-called “professional politician.” The

first, because he is not vicious, feels that the real processes of

government do not concern him and wishes only to be let alone. The

latter easily adapts himself to an illegal avoidance of the external

fixed conditions by assuming that these conditions have been settled

by doctrinaires who did not in the least understand the people,

while he, the politician, makes his appeal beyond the conditions to

the real desires of the people themselves. He is thus not only “the

people’s friend,” but their interpreter. It is interesting to note

how often simple people refer to “them,” meaning the good and great

who govern but do not understand, and to “him,” meaning the alderman,

who represents them in these incomprehensible halls of State, as an

ambassador to a foreign country to whose borders they themselves could

not possibly penetrate, and whose language they do not speak.

In addition to this difficulty inherent in the difference between the

traditional and actual situation, there is another, which constantly

arises on the purely administrative side. The traditional governments

which the founders had copied, in proceeding by fixed standards to

separate the vicious from the good, and then to legislate against the

vicious, had enforced these restrictive measures by trained officials,

usually with a military background. In a democracy, however,

the officers entrusted with the enforcement of this restrictive

legislation, if not actually elected by the people themselves, are

still the appointments of those thus elected and are, therefore,

good-natured men who have made friends by their kindness and social

qualities. This is only decreasingly true even in those cities where

appointments are made by civil service examinations. The carrying out

of repressive legislation, the remnant of a military state of society,

in a democracy is at last put into the hands of men who have attained

office because of political pull. The repressive measures must be

enforced by those sympathizing with the people and belonging to those

against whom the measures operate. This anomalous situation produces

almost inevitably one result: that the police authorities themselves

are turned into allies of vice and crime. This may be illustrated

from almost any of the large American cities in the relation existing

between the police force and the gambling and other illicit life. The

officers are often flatly told that the enforcement of an ordinance

which the better element of the city has insisted upon passing, is

impossible; that they are expected to control only the robbery and

crime that so often associate themselves with vice. As Mr. Wilcox[5]

has recently pointed out, public sentiment itself assumes a certain

hypocrisy, and in the end we have “the abnormal conditions which are

created when vice is protected by the authorities,” and in the very

worst cases there develops a sort of municipal blackmail in which

the administration itself profits by the violation of law. The very

governmental agencies which were designed to protect the citizen

from vice, foster and protect him in its pursuance because everybody

involved is thoroughly confused by the human element in the situation.

Further than this, the officer’s very kindness and human understanding

is that which leads to his downfall, for he is forced to uphold the

remnant of a military discipline in a self-governing community. It is

not remarkable, perhaps, that the police department, the most vigorous

survival of militarism to be found in American cities, has always

been responsible for the most exaggerated types of civic corruption.

It is sad, however, that this corruption has largely been due to the

kindliness of the officers and to their lack of military training.

There is no doubt that the reasonableness of keeping the saloons in

lower New York open on Sunday was apparent to the policemen of the East

Side force long before it dawned upon the reform administration; and

yet, that the policemen allowed themselves to connive at law-breaking,

was the beginning of their disgraceful downfall. Because kindness to an

enemy may mean death or the annihilation of the army which he guards,

all kindness is illicit on the part of the military sentinel on duty;

but to bring that code over bodily into a peaceful social state is to

break down the morals of both sides, of the enforcer of the ill-adapted

law, as well as of those against whom it is so maladroitly directed.

In order to meet this situation, there is almost inevitably developed

a politician of the corrupt type so familiar in American cities, the

politician who has become successful because he has made friends

with the vicious. The semi-criminal, who are constantly brought in

contact with administrative government are naturally much interested

in its operations. Having much at stake, as a matter of course, they

attend the primaries and all the other election processes which so

quickly tire the good citizens whose interest in the government is a

self-imposed duty. To illustrate: it is a matter of much moment to a

gambler whether there is to be a “wide-open town” or not; it means the

success or failure of his business; it involves, not only the pleasure,

but the livelihood, of all his friends. He naturally attends to the

election of the alderman, to the appointment and retention of the

policeman. He is found at the caucus “every time,” and would be much

amused if he were praised for the performance of his civic duty; but,

because he and the others who are concerned in semi-illicit business do

attend the primaries, the corrupt politician is nominated over and over

again.

As this type of politician is successful from his alliance with crime,

there also inevitably arises from time to time a so-called reformer

who is shocked to discover the state of affairs, the easy partnership

between vice and administrative government. He dramatically uncovers

the situation and arouses great indignation against it on the part of

good citizens. If this indignation is enough, he creates a political

fervor which is translated into a claim upon public gratitude. In

portraying the evil he is fighting, he does not recognize, or at least

does not make clear, all the human kindness upon which it has grown.

In his speeches he inevitably offends a popular audience, who know

that the evil of corruption exists in all degrees and forms of human

weakness, but who also know that these evils are by no means always

hideous, and sometimes even are lovable. They resent his over-drawn

pictures of vice and of the life of the vicious; their sense of

fair play, their deep-rooted desire for charity and justice, are all

outraged.

To illustrate from a personal experience: Some years ago a famous New

York reformer came to Chicago to tell us of his phenomenal success,

his trenchant methods of dealing with the city “gambling-hells,” as

he chose to call them. He proceeded to describe the criminals of

lower New York in terms and phrases which struck at least one of his

auditors as sheer blasphemy against our common human nature. I thought

of the criminals whom I knew, of the gambler for whom each Saturday

I regularly collected his weekly wage of $24.00, keeping $18.00 for

his wife and children and giving him $6.00 on Monday morning. His

despairing statement, “the thing is growing on me, and I can never give

it up,” was certainly not the cry of a man living in hell, but of him

who, through much tribulation had at least kept the loyal intention.

I remembered the three girls who had come to me with a paltry sum of

money collected from the pawn and sale of their tawdry finery in order

that one of their number might be spared a death in the almshouse and

that she might have the wretched comfort during the closing weeks of

her life of knowing that, although she was an outcast, she was not a

pauper. I recalled the first murderer whom I had ever known, a young

man who was singing his baby to sleep and stopped to lay it in its

cradle before he rushed downstairs into his father’s saloon to scatter

the gang of boys who were teasing the old man by giving him English

orders. The old man could not understand English and the boys were

refusing to pay for the drinks they had consumed, but technically had

not ordered.

For one short moment I saw the situation from the point of view of

humbler people, who sin often through weakness and passion, but seldom

through hardness of heart, and I felt that in a democratic community

such sweeping condemnations and conclusions as the speaker was pouring

forth could never be accounted for righteousness.

As the policeman who makes terms with vice, and almost inevitably

slides into making gain from vice, merely represents the type of

politician who is living off the weakness of his fellows, so the

over-zealous reformer who exaggerates vice until the public is scared

and awestruck, represents the type of politician who is living off the

timidity of his fellows. With the lack of civic machinery for simple

democratic expression, for a direct dealing with human nature as it is,

we seem doomed to one type or the other--corruptionists or anti-crime

committees.

And one sort or the other we will continue to have so long as we

distrust the very energy of existence, the craving for enjoyment,

the pushing of vital forces, the very right of every citizen to be

what he is without pretense or assumption of virtue. Too often he

does not really admire these virtues, but he imagines them somewhere

as a standard adopted by the virtuous whom he does not know. That

old Frankenstein, the ideal man of the eighteenth century, is still

haunting us, although he never existed save in the brain of the

doctrinaire.

This dramatic and feverish triumph of the self-seeker, see-sawing

with that of the interested reformer, does more than anything else,

perhaps, to keep the American citizen away from the ideals of genuine

evolutionary democracy. Whereas repressive government, from the

nature of the case, has to do with the wicked who are happily always

in a minority in the community, a normal democratic government would

naturally have to do with the great majority of the population in their

normal relations to each other.

After all, the so-called “slum politician” ventures his success upon an

appeal to human sentiment and generosity. This venture often results in

an alliance between the popular politician and the humblest citizens,

quite as naturally as the reformer who stands for honest business

administration usually becomes allied with the type of business man

whose chief concern it is to guard his treasure and to prevent a rise

in taxation. The community is again insensibly divided into two camps,

the repressed, who is dimly conscious that he has no adequate outlet

for his normal life and the repressive, represented by the cautious,

careful citizen holding fast to his own,--once more the conqueror and

his humble people.

FOOTNOTES:

[4] “The Spirit of Modern Philosophy,” Josiah Royce, page 275.

[5] The American City, Dr. Delos F. Wilcox, page 200.

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