CHAPTER X.

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF THE NILE.

MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1798. AGE, 39.

Between the time that Nelson was wounded at Teneriffe, July 24, 1797,

and his return to active service in April, 1798, important and ominous

changes had been occurring in the political conditions of Europe.

These must be taken briefly into account, because the greatness of the

issues thence arising, as understood by the British Government,

measures the importance in its eyes of the enterprise which it was

about to intrust, by deliberate selection, to one of the youngest

flag-officers upon the list. The fact of the choice shows the

estimation to which Nelson had already attained in the eyes of the

Admiralty.

In July, 1797, Great Britain alone was at war with France, and so

continued for over a year longer. Portugal, though nominally an ally,

contributed to the common cause nothing but the use of the Tagus by

the British Navy. Austria, it is true, had not yet finally made peace

with France, but preliminaries had been signed in April, and the

definitive treaty of Campo Formio was concluded in October. By it

Belgium became incorporated in the territory of France, to which was

conceded also the frontier of the Rhine. The base of her power was

thus advanced to the river, over which the possession of the fortified

city of Mayence gave her an easy passage, constituting a permanent

threat of invasion to Germany. Venice, as a separate power,

disappeared. Part of her former domains upon the mainland, with the

city itself, went to Austria, but part was taken to constitute the

Cisalpine Republic,--a new state in Northern Italy, nominally

independent, but really under the control of France, to whom it owed

its existence. Corfu, and the neighboring islands at the mouth of the

Adriatic, till then belonging to Venice, were transferred to France.

The choice of these distant and isolated maritime positions, coupled

with the retention of a large army in the valley of the Po, showed, if

any evidence were needed, a determination to assure control over the

Italian peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea.

The formal acquisitions by treaty, even, did not measure the full

menace of the conditions. The Revolutionary ferment, which had

partially subsided, received fresh impetus from the victories of

Bonaparte and the cessation of Continental war; and the diplomacy of

France continued as active and as aggressive as the movement of her

armies had previously been. By constant interference, overt and

secret, not always stopping short of violence, French influence and

French ideas were propagated among the weaker adjoining states.

Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian Republics became outposts of

France, occupied by French troops, and upon them were forced

governments conformed to the existing French pattern. In short, the

aggrandizement of France, not merely in moral influence but in

physical control, was being pushed forward as decisively in peace as

in war, and by means which threatened the political equilibrium of

Europe. But, while all states were threatened, Great Britain remained

the one chief enemy against which ultimately the efforts of France

must be, and were, concentrated. "Either our government must destroy

the English monarchy," wrote Bonaparte at this time, "or must expect

itself to be destroyed by the corruption and intrigue of those active

islanders." The British ministry on its part also realized that the

sea-power of their country was the one force from which, because so

manifold in its activities, and so readily exerted in many quarters

by reason of its mobility, France had most reason to fear the arrest

of its revolutionary advance and the renewal of the Continental war.

It was, therefore, the one opponent against which the efforts of the

French must necessarily be directed. For the same reason it was the

one centre around whose action, wisely guided, the elements of

discontent, already stirring, might gather, upon the occurrence of a

favorable moment, and constitute a body of resistance capable of

stopping aggressions which threatened the general well-being.

When the British Government found that the overtures for peace which

it had made in the summer of 1797 could have no result, except on

terms too humiliating to be considered, it at once turned its

attention to the question of waging a distinctively offensive war, for

effect in which co-operation was needed. The North of Europe was

hopeless. Prussia persisted in the policy of isolation, adopted in

1795 by herself and a number of the northern German states. Russia was

quietly hostile to France, but the interference contemplated by the

Empress Catherine had been averted by her death in 1796, and her

successor, Paul, had shown no intention of undertaking it. There

remained, therefore, the Mediterranean. In Italy, France stood face to

face with Austria and Naples, and both these were dissatisfied with

the action taken by her in the Peninsula itself and in Switzerland,

besides sharing the apprehension of most other governments from the

disquiet attending her political course. An advance into the

Mediterranean was therefore resolved by the British Cabinet.

This purpose disconcerted St. Vincent, who, besides his aversion from

the war in general, was distinguished rather by tenacity and

resolution in meeting difficulties and dangers, when forced upon him,

than by the sanguine and enterprising initiative in offensive measures

which characterized Nelson. Writing to the latter on the 8th of

January, 1798, he says: "I am much at a loss to reconcile the plans

in contemplation to augment this fleet and extend its operations, with

the peace which Portugal seems determined to make with France, upon

any terms the latter may please to impose; because Gibraltar is an

unsafe depot for either stores or provisions, which the Spaniards have

always in their power to destroy, and the French keep such an army in

Italy, that Tuscany and Naples would fall a sacrifice to any the

smallest assistance rendered to our fleet." In other words, the old

question of supplies still dominated the situation, in the

apprehension of this experienced officer. Yet, in view of the serious

condition of things, and the probable defection of Portugal under the

threats of France and Spain, to which he alludes, it seems probable

that the ministry were better advised, in their determination to

abandon a passive defence against an enemy unrelentingly bent upon

their destruction. As Nelson said of a contingency not more serious:

"Desperate affairs require desperate remedies."

However determined the British Government might be to act in the

Mediterranean, some temporary perplexity must at first have been felt

as to where to strike, until a movement of the enemy solved the doubt.

In the early months of 1798 the Directory decided upon the Egyptian

expedition under General Bonaparte, and, although its destination was

guarded with admirable secrecy until long after the armament sailed,

the fact necessarily transpired that preparations were being made on a

most extensive scale for a maritime enterprise. The news soon reached

England, as it did also Jervis at his station off Cadiz. Troops and

transports were assembling in large numbers at the southern ports of

France, in Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Corsica, while a fleet of at

least a dozen ships-of-the-line was fitting out at Toulon. Various

surmises were afloat as to the object, but all at this time were wide

of the mark.

On the 29th of April, less than three weeks after Nelson left

England, but before he joined the fleet, the Cabinet issued orders to

St. Vincent to take such measures as he deemed necessary to thwart the

projects of the Toulon squadron. It was left to his judgment whether

to go in person with his whole fleet, or to send a detachment of not

less than nine or ten ships-of-the-line under a competent

flag-officer. If possible, the government wished him to maintain the

blockade of Cadiz as it had been established since the Battle of St.

Vincent; but everything was to yield to the necessity of checking the

sailing of the Toulon expedition, or of defeating it, if it had

already started. A speedy reinforcement was promised, to supply the

places of the ships that might be detached.

Accompanying the public letter was a private one from the First Lord

of the Admiralty, reflecting the views and anxieties of the

Government. "The circumstances in which we now find ourselves oblige

us to take a measure of a more decided and hazardous complexion than

we should otherwise have thought ourselves justified in taking; but

when you are apprized that the appearance of a British squadron in the

Mediterranean is a condition on which the fate of Europe may at this

moment be stated to depend, you will not be surprised that we are

disposed to strain every nerve, and incur considerable hazard in

effecting it." This impressive, almost solemn, statement, of the

weighty and anxious character of the intended step, emphasizes the

significance of the choice, which the First Lord indicates as that of

the Government, of the officer upon whom such a charge is to devolve.

"If you determine to send a detachment into the Mediterranean [instead

of going in person with the fleet], I think it almost unnecessary to

suggest to you the propriety of putting it under the command of Sir H.

Nelson, whose acquaintance with that part of the world, as well as his

activity and disposition, seem to qualify him in a peculiar manner for

that service."

In concluding his letter, Earl Spencer summed up the reasons of the

Government, and his own sense of the great risk attending the

undertaking, for the conduct of which he designated Nelson. "I am as

strongly impressed, as I have no doubt your Lordship will be, with the

hazardous nature of the measure which we now have in contemplation;

but I cannot at the same time help feeling how much depends upon its

success, and how absolutely necessary it is at this time to run some

risk, in order, if possible, to bring about a new system of affairs in

Europe, which shall save us all from being overrun by the exorbitant

power of France. In this view of the subject, it is impossible not to

perceive how much depends on the exertions of the great Continental

powers; and, without entering further into what relates more

particularly to them, I can venture to assure you that no good will be

obtained from them if some such measure as that now in contemplation

is not immediately adopted. On the other hand, if, by our appearance

in the Mediterranean, we can encourage Austria to come forward again,

it is in the highest degree probable that the other powers will seize

the opportunity of acting at the same time, and such a general concert

be established as shall soon bring this great contest to a

termination, on grounds less unfavorable by many degrees to the

parties concerned than appeared likely a short time since." It may be

added here, by way of comment, that the ups and downs of Nelson's

pursuit, the brilliant victory at the Nile, and the important

consequences flowing from it, not only fully justified this forecast,

but illustrated aptly that in war, when a line of action has been

rightly chosen, the following it up despite great risks, and with

resolute perseverance through many disappointments, will more often

than not give great success,--a result which may probably be

attributed to the moral force which necessarily underlies determined

daring and sustained energy.

As has appeared, the Government's recommendation had been ratified

beforehand by St. Vincent, in sending Nelson with three ships to watch

Toulon. Upon receiving the despatches, on the 10th of May, the

admiral's first step was to order Nelson to return at once to the

fleet, to take charge of the detachment from the beginning. "You, and

you only, can command the important service in contemplation;

therefore, make the best of your way down to me." More urgent letters

arriving from England, with news that a heavy reinforcement had left

there, he, on the 19th, hurried off a brig, "La Mutine," commanded by

Hardy, Nelson's former lieutenant, to notify the rear-admiral that a

squadron of ten ships would be sent to him shortly from before Cadiz;

and on the 21st this detachment sailed, under the command of Captain

Troubridge.

The "Mutine" joined Nelson on the 5th of June. His little division had

so far had more bad fortune than good. Leaving Gibraltar on the 8th of

May, late in the evening, so that the easterly course taken should not

be visible to either friend or enemy, he had gone to the Gulf of

Lyons. There a small French corvette, just out of Toulon, was captured

on the 17th, but, except in unimportant details, yielded no

information additional to that already possessed. On the 19th

Bonaparte sailed with all the vessels gathered in Toulon, directing

his course to the eastward, to pass near Genoa, and afterwards between

Corsica and the mainland of Italy. On the night of the 20th, in a

violent gale of wind, the "Vanguard" rolled overboard her main and

mizzen topmasts, and later on the foremast went, close to the deck.

The succession of these mishaps points rather to spars badly secured

and cared for than to unavoidable accident. Fortunately, the "Orion"

and "Alexander" escaped injury, and the latter, on the following

morning, took the "Vanguard" in tow, to go to Oristan Bay, in

Sardinia. The situation became extremely dangerous on the evening of

the 22d, for, the wind falling light, the sail-power of the

"Alexander" was scarcely sufficient to drag both ships against a

heavy westerly swell which was setting them bodily upon the Sardinian

coast, then not far distant. Thinking the case hopeless, Nelson

ordered the "Alexander" to let go the hawser; but Captain Ball begged

permission to hold on, and finally succeeded in saving the flagship,

which, on the 23d, anchored with her consorts under the Islands of San

Pietro, at the southern extremity of Sardinia. The governor of the

place sent word that they must not remain, Sardinia being allied to

France, but added that, as he had no power to force them out, they

would doubtless do as they pleased; and he supplied them with fresh

provisions,--a line of conduct which illustrates at once the

restrictions imposed upon British operations in the Mediterranean by

French insistence, and at the same time the readiness of the weaker

states to connive at the evasion of them, other instances of which

occurred during this period. By the united efforts of the division,

four days sufficed to refit the "Vanguard" with jury-masts, and the

three ships again sailed, on the 27th, for an appointed rendezvous, to

seek the frigates, which had separated during and after the gale.

This severe check, occurring at so critical a moment,--more critical

even than Nelson knew, for he remained ignorant of the French sailing

for some days longer,--was in itself disheartening, and fell upon one

whose native eagerness chafed painfully against enforced inaction and

delay. His manner of bearing it illustrated both the religious

characteristics, which the experience of grave emergencies tends to

develop and strengthen in men of action, and the firmness of a really

great man, never more signally displayed than under the pressure of

calamity and suspense, such as he continually had to undergo. The

exceptional brilliancy and decisiveness of his greater battles--the

Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar--obscure the fact that each of them

was preceded by a weary period of strenuous uphill work, a steady

hewing of his way through a tanglewood of obstacles, a patient

endurance of disappointments, a display of sustained, undaunted

resolution under discouragements, nobler far than even the moments of

triumphant action, into which at last he joyfully emerges and freely

exerts his extraordinary powers. "I trust," he wrote to St. Vincent,

"my friends will think I bore my chastisement like a man. I hope it

has made me a better officer, as I believe it has made me a better

man. On the Sunday evening I thought myself in every respect one of

the most fortunate men, to command such a squadron in such a place,

and my pride was too great for man." To his wife he wrote in the same

strain: "I ought not to call what has happened to the Vanguard by the

cold name of accident; I believe firmly that it was the Almighty's

goodness, to check my consummate vanity."

Vanity was rather a hard name to call the natural elation of a young

admiral, intrusted with an unusually important service, and proud of

his command; but the providential interposition worked directly to his

advantage. The delays caused by the repairs to the "Vanguard," and by

the subsequent necessity of seeking the separated frigates at the

rendezvous appointed for such a case, made possible the junction of

Troubridge, of whose approach Nelson was totally ignorant. On the 2d

of June Sir James Saumarez mentions speaking a ship, which a few days

before had seen eleven sail-of-the-line, supposed to be English. "We

are at a loss what conjectures to put on this intelligence." Five days

before this, May 28, a vessel out of Marseilles had informed them of

Bonaparte's sailing with all his transports. Nelson would doubtless

have pursued them at once, in conformity with his instructions to

ascertain the enemy's objects; but for such operations, essentially

those of a scouting expedition, the frigates were too necessary to be

left behind. On the 4th of June he reached the rendezvous, and, not

finding the frigates, waited. The next morning, by the arrival of the

"Mutine," he learned that he was to expect the reinforcement, which

converted his division into a fleet, and enlarged his mission from one

of mere reconnoissance to the duty of overtaking and destroying a

great maritime expedition.

Besides this good news, the "Mutine" brought word of another

misfortune, more irretrievable than the loss of spars. She had fallen

in with the frigates three days before, and the senior captain had

told Hardy that he was going with them to Gibraltar, persuaded that

the condition of the flagship, which he had seen, would necessitate

her return to an arsenal for repairs. "I thought Hope would have known

me better," commented Nelson, when he became aware of a step which

materially affected, in fact probably entirely changed, the course of

events, and most seriously embarrassed all his subsequent movements.

This untimely and precipitate action, and his remark, illustrate

conspicuously the differences between men, and exemplify the peculiar

energy and unrelaxing forward impulse which eminently fitted Nelson

for his present high charge.

The inconvenience and danger arising from the frigates' departure was

instantly felt. "Nothing," wrote Saumarez, "can equal our anxiety to

fall in with the reinforcement. Our squadron has been, these two days,

detached in all directions, without falling in with them; and there is

strong reason to fear they think us returned to Gibraltar"--from

Hope's reports. Such were the risks springing from misplaced caution,

more ruinous than the most daring venture, and which from beginning to

end well-nigh wrecked the great attempt upon which the Admiralty, St.

Vincent, and Nelson had staked so much. In further consequence, the

line-of-battle ships became separated by stretching too far apart in

their anxious care to find Troubridge, and when he joined the

"Vanguard," on the 7th, the "Orion" and "Alexander" were not in sight.

The French having so long a start, and there being now with him

eleven seventy-fours, Nelson with characteristic promptness would not

delay an instant. The fifty-gun ship "Leander," which had come with

Troubridge, was directed to wait forty-eight hours for the two

absentees, with a memorandum of the course about to be followed.

Confident that single ships would be able to overtake a squadron whose

route they knew, the admiral at once pushed on for Cape Corso, the

north point of Corsica, intending to pass between the island and

Italy, seeking information as he went. The "Mutine" was all he had to

replace the missing frigates.

June 7th thus marks the beginning of a chase, which ended only upon

the 1st of August in the Battle of the Nile. During this miserable

period of suspense and embarrassment, occasioned and prolonged beyond

all reason or necessity by the want of lookout ships, the connecting

and illuminating thread is the purpose of Nelson, at once clear and

firm, to find the French fleet and to fight it the instant found. No

other consideration draws his mind aside, except so far as it may

facilitate the attainment and fulfilment of this one object. In this

one light he sees all things. At the start he writes to St. Vincent:

"You may be assured I will fight them the moment I can reach, be they

at anchor or under sail." Three days later, he tells Sir William

Hamilton: "If their fleet is not moored in as strong a port as Toulon,

nothing shall hinder me from attacking them." "Be they bound to the

Antipodes," he says to Earl Spencer, "your Lordship may rely that I

will not lose a moment in bringing them to action, and endeavour to

destroy their transports." Such expressions are repeated with a

frequency which proves the absolute hold the resolution had upon his

mind. When obstacles occur to him, or are mentioned, they do not make

room for the thought of not fighting to be entertained; only Toulon

suggests the idea of impossibility. He raises difficulties diligently

enough, but it is only that they may be the better overcome, not that

they may deter. All possible conditions are considered and discussed,

but simply in order that the best fighting solution may be reached.

The constant mental attitude is such that the man is unprepared to

recede before any opposition; he fortifies his mind beforehand with

the best means of meeting and vanquishing it, but the attempt at least

shall be made. "Thank God," he wrote at this moment, "I do not feel

difficulties;" yet the avowal itself accompanies so plain a statement

of his embarrassments as to show that his meaning is that they do not

discourage. This characteristic appeared most strongly at Copenhagen,

partly because the difficulties there were greatest, partly from the

close contrast with a man of very different temper.

Being entirely without intelligence as to the real object of the

French, there was nothing to do but to follow upon their track, with

eyes open for indications. They were known to have gone southerly,

towards Naples and Sicily; and these two points, parts of the Kingdom

of the Two Sicilies, had been mentioned by Jervis as probable

destinations. The "Orion" and "Alexander" rejoined in two or three

days, and on the 14th of June information, second-hand but probable,

was obtained that on the 4th the French armament had been seen off the

west end of Sicily, steering to the eastward. "If they pass Sicily,"

said Nelson in his letter to Spencer written the next day, "I shall

believe they are going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria, and

getting troops to India--a plan concerted with Tippoo Saib, by no

means so difficult as might at first view be imagined." Troubridge was

now sent ahead in the "Mutine" to communicate with Sir William

Hamilton, the British minister at Naples, and with Acton, the prime

minister of that Kingdom. He took with him letters from the admiral,

who wished to know what co-operation he might hope from the Court of

Naples, in the matters of supplies, of frigates to act as lookouts,

and of pilots for Sicilian waters.

On the 17th the squadron hove-to ten miles off Naples, and Troubridge

rejoined. The Neapolitan Government sent assurances of good wishes,

and of hatred to the French; supplies would be given under the rose,

and Acton sent a written order to that effect, addressed to the

governors of ports in the name of the King. Naples being at peace with

France, assistance with ships could not be given, nor, to use the

words of Nelson, "the smallest information of what was, or was likely

to be, the future destination of the French armament. With this

comfortable account I pushed for the Faro of Messina." Troubridge

brought word, however, that the French fleet was off Malta, about to

attack it, which served to give direction for the squadron's next

move.

After leaving Naples Nelson wrote strong and clear letters to Sir

William Hamilton upon the existing conditions. Why should Naples stand

in shivering hesitation about taking a decided step in support of

Great Britain? She had looked and prayed for the arrival of the fleet,

as the one force competent to check the designs of the French. Sicily

could be approached only by water, and the distance of Naples from

Northern Italy rendered the control of the sea most advantageous, if

not absolutely essential, to a French army attempting to hold the boot

of the peninsula. Now the British fleet had come, in force adequate to

neutralize the French Navy, and, in Nelson's belief, to defeat and

destroy it, if properly supported. Did Naples expect to escape by a

timid adherence to half measures, when by her notorious preference for

the British she had already gained the ill-will of the French? "The

French know as well as you and I do, that their Sicilian Majesties

called for our help to save them--even this is crime enough with the

French." Safety--true safety--could be had only by strenuous and

decisive action in support of Nelson's squadron. Did not the attack on

Malta indicate a design upon Sicily? "Were I commanding a fleet

attending an army which is to invade Sicily, I should say to the

general, 'If you can take Malta, it secures the safety of your fleet,

transports, stores, &c., and insures your safe retreat [from Sicily]

should that be necessary; for if even a superior fleet of the enemy

should arrive, before one week passes, they will be blown to leeward,

and you may pass with safety.' This would be my opinion.... I repeat

it, _Malta is the direct road to Sicily_." If the French are

overtaken, he continues, and found in some anchorage, it can scarcely

be so strong but that I can get at them, but there will be needed

things which I have not, fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and gunboats, when

one hour would either destroy or drive them out. Without such aid, the

British may be crippled in their attempt, and forced to leave the

Mediterranean. In case of blockade--or necessity to remain for any

reason--the fleet must have supplies; which only Naples can furnish.

Failing these it must retire, and then Sicily and Naples are lost.

Since, then, so much assistance must be given in time, why postpone

now, when one strong blow would give instant safety? Why should not

his own motto, "I will not lose a moment in attacking them," apply as

well to the policy of an endangered kingdom as of a British admiral?

If this reasoning and advice took more account of the exigencies of

the British arms than of the difficulties of a weak state of the

second order, dependent for action upon the support of other nations,

they were at least perfectly consonant to the principles and practice

of the writer, wherever he himself had to act. But Nelson could not

expect his own spirit in the King of the Two Sicilies. Even if the

course suggested were the best for Naples under the conditions, it is

the property of ordinary men, in times of danger, to see difficulties

more clearly than advantages, and to shrink from steps which involve

risk, however promising of success. The Neapolitan Government, though

cheered by the appearance of the British fleet, had to consider danger

also on the land side, where it relied upon the protection of Austria,

instead of trusting manfully to its own arms and the advantages of its

position, remote from the centre of French power. Austria had pledged

herself to support Naples, if invaded without just cause; but it was

not certain that she would interfere if the cause of attack was the

premature admission of British ships into the ports of the kingdom,

beyond the number specified in the still recent treaties with France.

The Emperor was meditating war, in which he expected to assist Naples

and to be assisted by her; but he did not choose to be hurried, and

might refuse aid if an outbreak were precipitated.

Actually, what Naples did mattered little. Under some contingencies,

such as Nelson was contemplating when he wrote his letter, it might

have mattered much whether he received the abundant support of small

armed vessels which he indicated; but in the end supplies only were

required, and those he had orders from Jervis to exact at the mouth of

his cannon from all powers,--friends or neutrals,--Sardinia only

excepted. The fleet passed the Straits of Messina on the 20th of June,

and continued south, keeping close to the Sicilian shore in hope of

information, until the 22d, when it was off Cape Passaro, the

southeastern extremity of the island. There a Genoese brig was spoken,

which had left Malta the previous day. From her Nelson learned that

Malta had surrendered to the French on the 15th, a week before, which

was correct; but the information further stated, that, after landing a

garrison, the expedition had sailed again on the 16th--it was thought

for Sicily. This last news was untrue, whether by intention or not,

for Bonaparte remained in Malta till the 19th; but upon it Nelson had

to act. Had he seen the captain of the stranger himself, he might have

found out more, for he was a shrewd questioner, and his intellect was

sharpened by anxiety, and by constant dwelling upon the elements of

the intricate problem before him; but the vessel had been boarded by

the "Mutine," three hours before, and was now beyond recall.

At this season the winds in the Mediterranean prevail from the

westward; therefore, with the six days' start the enemy was believed

now to have, no time could be lost. Six days sufficed to carry the

British squadron from its present position to Alexandria, which Nelson

was already inclined to think the destination of the French. Yet,

being dependent upon a wind then practically constant in direction, it

would not do to yield a mile of ground, except upon a mature, if

rapid, deliberation. Nelson's own mind was, by constant preoccupation,

familiar beforehand with the bearings of the different conditions of

any situation likely to occur, and with the probable inferences to be

drawn; his opinions were, so to say, in a constant state of formation

and development, ready for instantaneous application to any emergency

as it arose. But he had, besides, exercised the same habit in the

captains of the ships, by the practice of summoning them on board the

flagship, singly or in groups; the slow movement of sailing vessels,

particularly in the light summer weather of the Mediterranean,

permitting such intercourse without materially affecting the progress

of the fleet. Invitations or commands so to visit the flagship were

common. "I have passed the day on board the Vanguard," notes Saumarez

on one occasion, "having breakfasted and stayed to dinner with the

admiral." "It was his practice during the whole of his cruize," wrote

Berry, the flag-captain, "whenever the weather and circumstances would

permit, to have his captains on board the Vanguard, where he would

fully develop to them his own ideas of the different and best modes

of attack, in all possible positions." That such conversations were

not confined to tactical questions, but extended to what would now be

called the strategy of the situation, is evident from allusions by

Saumarez to the various surmises concerning the probable movements of

the enemy. Nelson never yielded a particle of his responsibility, nor

of his credit, but it is clear that such discussion would not only

broaden his own outlook, but prepare his subordinates to give readier

and sounder views upon any new conjuncture that might arise.

He now summoned on board four captains "in whom I place great

confidence," Saumarez, Troubridge,--the two seniors,--Ball, and Darby,

stated the case, and received their opinions. These seem to have been

given in writing,[60] and from his letter to St. Vincent the results

of the conference, as shown by his decision, may be summarized as

follows. With the existing winds, it would be impossible for such a

fleet as the enemy's to get to the westward. Had they aimed at Sicily,

an object concerning which explicit disclaimers had been given by the

French to the Neapolitan Government, some indication of their approach

must have been known at Syracuse, the day before, when the British

were off that city. Consequently, the expedition must have gone to the

eastward. The size and nature of the armament must also be

considered,--forty thousand troops, a dozen ships-of-the-line, besides

a staff of scientific men,--all pointed to a great, distant, and

permanent occupation. The object might be Corfu, or to overthrow the

existing government of Turkey, or to settle a colony in Egypt. As

between these, all equally possible, the last was the most direct and

greatest menace to present British interests, and should determine his

course. "If they have concerted a plan with Tippoo Saib, to have

vessels at Suez, three weeks, at this season, is a common passage to

the Malabar coast, where our India possessions would be in great

danger."

Such was the conclusion--how momentous at the moment can only be

realized by those who will be at the pains to consider a man still

young, with reputation brilliant indeed, but not established;

intrusted with a great chance, it is true, but also with a great

responsibility, upon which rested all his future. On slight, though

decisive, preponderance of evidence, he was about to risk throwing

away an advantage a seaman must appreciate, that of being to windward

of his enemy,--able to get at him,--the strategist's position of

command. The tongues of envy and censure might well be--we now know

that they were--busy in inquiring why so young an admiral had so high

charge, and in sneering at his failure to find the enemy. "Knowing my

attachment to you," wrote his old friend, Admiral Goodall, alongside

whom he had fought under Hotham, "how often have I been questioned:

'What is your favourite hero about? The French fleet has passed under

his nose,' &c., &c." Nelson was saved from fatal hesitation,

primarily, by his singleness of purpose, which looked first to his

country's service, to the thorough doing of the work given him to do,

and only afterwards to the consequences of failure to his own fame and

fortunes. At that moment the choice before him was either to follow

out an indication, slight, but as far as it went clear, which, though

confessedly precarious, promised to lead to a great and decisive

result, such as he had lately urged upon the King of Naples; or to

remain where he was, in an inglorious security, perfectly content, to

use words of his own, that "each day passed without loss to our side."

To the latter conclusion might very well have contributed the

knowledge, that the interests which the Cabinet thought threatened

were certainly for the present safe. Broadly as his instructions were

drawn, no word of Egypt or the East was specifically in them. Naples,

Sicily, Portugal, or Ireland, such were the dangers intimated by

Spencer and St. Vincent in their letters, and he was distinctly

cautioned against letting the enemy get to the westward of him. He

might have consoled himself for indecisive action, which

procrastinated disaster and covered failure with the veil of nullity,

as did a former commander of his in a gazetted letter, by the

reflection that, so far as the anticipations of the ministry went, the

designs of the enemy were for the time frustrated, by the presence of

his squadron between them and the points indicated to him.

But the single eye of principle gained keener insight in this case by

the practised habit of reflection, which came prepared, to the full

extent of an acute intellect, to detect every glimmer of light, and to

follow them to the point where they converged upon the true solution;

and both principle and reflection were powerfully supported in their

final action by a native temperament, impatient of hesitations, of

half measures, certain that the annihilation of the French fleet, and

nothing short of its annihilation, fulfilled that security of his

country's interests in which consisted the spirit of his instructions.

His own words in self-defence, when for a moment it seemed as if,

after all, he had blundered in the great risk he took, though rough in

form, rise to the eloquence that speaks out of the abundance of the

heart. "The only objection I can fancy to be started is,'you should

not have gone such a long voyage without more certain information of

the enemy's destination:' my answer is ready--who was I to get it

from? The governments of Naples and Sicily either knew not, or chose

to keep me in ignorance. Was I to wait patiently till I heard certain

accounts? If Egypt was their object, before I could hear of them they

would have been in India. To do nothing, I felt, was disgraceful;

therefore I made use of my understanding, and by it I ought to stand

or fall."

The destination of the enemy had been rightly divined, following out a

course of reasoning outlined by Nelson a week before in his letter to

Spencer; but successful pursuit was baffled for the moment by the

wiliness of Bonaparte, who directed his vast armament to be steered

for the south shore of Candia, instead of straight for Alexandria.

Even this would scarcely have saved him, had Nelson's frigates been

with the fleet. Immediately after the council, the admiral with his

customary promptitude kept away for Egypt under all sail. "I am just

returned from on board the Admiral," writes Saumarez, "and we are

crowding sail for Alexandria; but the contrast to what we experienced

yesterday is great indeed, having made sure of attacking them this

morning. At present it is very doubtful whether we shall fall in with

them at all, as we are proceeding upon the merest conjecture only, and

not on any positive information. Some days must now elapse before we

can be relieved from our cruel suspense; and if, at the end of our

journey, we find we are upon a wrong scent, our embarrassment will be

great indeed. Fortunately, I only act here _en second_; but did the

chief responsibility rest with me, I fear it would be more than my too

irritable nerves would bear." Such was the contemporary estimate of an

eye-witness, an officer of tried and singular gallantry and ability,

who shared the admiral's perplexities and ambitions, though not his

responsibility. His words portray justly the immensity of the burden

Nelson bore. That, indeed, is the inevitable penalty of command; but

it must be conceded that, when adequately borne, it should convey also

an equal measure of renown.

In the morning, before the consultation with the captains, three

French frigates had been seen; but Nelson, warned by the parting of

the "Orion" and "Alexander" a fortnight before, would not run the risk

of scattering the squadron by chasing them. No time could now be lost,

waiting for a separated ship to catch up. The circumstance of the

fleet being seen by these frigates was quoted in a letter from Louis

Bonaparte, who was with the expedition, to his brother Joseph, and was

made the ground for comment upon the stupidity of the British admiral,

who with this opportunity failed to find the armament. The criticism

is unjust; had the frigates taken to flight, as of course they would,

the British fleet, if not divided, would certainly not be led towards

the main body of the enemy. Concentration of purpose, singleness of

aim, was more than ever necessary, now that time pressed and a

decision had been reached; but the sneer of the French officer

reproduces the idle chatter of the day in London streets and

drawing-rooms. These, in turn, but echoed and swelled the murmurs of

insubordination and envy in the navy itself, at the departure from the

routine methods of officialism, by passing over the claims of

undistinguished seniors, in favor of one who as yet had nothing but

brilliant achievement, and yet more brilliant promise, to justify

committing to him the most momentous charge that in this war had

devolved on a British admiral. A letter from one of the puisne lords

of the Admiralty was read publicly on board the "Prince George,"

flagship of Sir William Parker,--the same who had the controversy with

Nelson about the Battle of St. Vincent,--denouncing Lord St. Vincent

in no very gentle terms for having sent so young a flag-officer.[61]

"Sir William Parker and Sir John Orde have written strong

remonstrances against your commanding the detached squadron instead of

them," wrote St. Vincent to Nelson. "I did all I could to prevent it,

consistently with my situation, but there is a faction, fraught with

all manner of ill-will to you, that, unfortunately for the two

Baronets, domined over any argument or influence I could use: they

will both be ordered home the moment their letters arrive." It will be

seen how much was at stake for Nelson personally in the issue of these

weeks. Happy the man who, like him, has in such a case the clear light

of duty to keep his steps from wavering!

The night after Nelson made sail for Alexandria the two hostile bodies

crossed the same tract of sea, on divergent courses; but a haze

covered the face of the deep, and hid them from each other. When the

day dawned, they were no longer within range of sight; but had the

horizon of the British fleet been enlarged by flanking frigates,

chasing on either side, the immunity of the French from detection

could scarcely have continued. For some days not a hundred miles

intervened between these two foes, proceeding for the same port. On

the 26th, being two hundred and fifty miles from Alexandria, Nelson

sent the "Mutine" ahead to communicate with the place and get

information; a single vessel being able to outstrip the progress of a

body of ships, which is bound to the speed of its slowest member. On

the 28th the squadron itself was off the town, when the admiral to his

dismay found that not only the French had not appeared, but that no

certain news of their destination was to be had.

Preoccupied as his mind had been with the fear that the enemy had so

far the start that their army would be out of the transports before he

overtook them, the idea that he might outstrip them does not seem to

have entered his head. Only three vessels had been spoken since Sicily

was left behind,--two from Alexandria and one from the Archipelago;

but these knew nothing of the French, being doubtless, when met, ahead

of the latter's advance. That Nelson again consulted with his captains

seems probable--indeed almost certain, from casual mention; but if

so, their opinion as to the future course does not appear. The

unremitting eagerness of his temperament, the singleness of his

purpose, which saw the whole situation concentrated in the French

fleet, had worked together up to the present to bring him to the true

strategic point just ahead of time; although, by no fault of his own,

he had started near three weeks late.[62] These two high qualities now

conspired to mislead him by their own excess. "His active and anxious

mind," wrote Captain Berry, "would not permit him to rest a moment in

the same place; he therefore shaped his course to the northward, for

the coast of Caramania [in Asia Minor], to reach as quickly as

possible some quarter where information could probably be obtained."

To say that this was a mistake is perhaps to be wise only after the

event. Had Nelson known that the French, when leaving Malta, had but

three days' start of him, instead of six, as the Genoese had reported,

he might have suspected the truth; it is not wonderful that he failed

to believe that he could have gained six days. The actual gain _was_

but three; for, departing practically at the same time from points

equidistant from Alexandria, Bonaparte's armament appeared before that

place on the third day after Nelson arrived. The troops were landed

immediately, and the transports entered the port, thus making secure

their escape from the British pursuit. The ships of war remained

outside.

Meanwhile Nelson, "distressed for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies,"

was beating back to the westward against the wind which had carried

him rapidly to the coast of Egypt. Rightly or wrongly, he had not

chosen to wait at the point which mature reflection had indicated to

him as the enemy's goal, and the best course that now occurred to him

was to do with his fleet the exploring duty that frigates should have

done. "_No frigates_," he wrote to Sir William Hamilton; "to which has

been, and may again, be attributed the loss of the French fleet." On

his return he kept along the northern shore of the Mediterranean,

passing near Candia; but, though several vessels were spoken, he only

gathered from them that the French were not west of Sicily, nor at

Corfu. On the 19th of July, he anchored the fleet at Syracuse, having,

to use his own words, "gone a round of six hundred leagues with an

expedition incredible," and yet "as ignorant of the situation of the

enemy as I was twenty-seven days ago."

At Syracuse fresh disappointments awaited him, which only the

indomitable single-mindedness and perseverance of the man prevented

from becoming discouragements. The minister at Naples had sent

despatches to await him at Cape Passaro; when he sent for these,

thirsty for news about the French, they had been returned to Naples.

The governor of the port, despite Acton's assurances to Troubridge,

made difficulties about the admission of so many ships, and about

supplying water, which they absolutely required. This Nelson resented,

with angry contempt for the halting policy of the weak kingdom. "I

have had so much said about the King of Naples' orders only to admit

three or four of the ships of our fleet into his ports, that I am

astonished. I understood that private orders, at least, would have

been given for our free admission. If we are to be refused supplies,

pray send me by many vessels an account, that I may in good time take

the King's fleet to Gibraltar. Our treatment is scandalous for a great

nation to put up with, and the King's flag is insulted at every

friendly port we look at." "I wish to know your and Sir William's

plans for going down the Mediterranean," he wrote to Lady Hamilton,

"for, if we are to be kicked in every port of the Sicilian dominions,

the sooner we are gone the better. Good God! how sensibly I feel our

treatment. I have only to pray I may find the French and throw all my

vengeance on them."

These words show the nervous exasperation superinduced by the

tremendous strain of official anxiety and mortified ambition; for the

governor's objections were purely formal and perfunctory, as was the

Court's submission to the French. "Our present wants," he admitted at

the same writing, "have been most amply supplied, and every attention

has been paid us." Years afterwards Nelson spoke feelingly of the

bitter mental anguish of that protracted and oft-thwarted pursuit. "Do

not fret at anything," he told his friend Troubridge; "I wish I never

had, but my return to Syracuse in 1798, broke my heart, which on any

extraordinary anxiety now shows itself, be that feeling pain or

pleasure." "On the 18th I had near died, with the swelling of some of

the vessels of the heart. More people, perhaps, die of broken hearts

than we are aware of." But the firmness of his purpose, the clearness

of his convictions, remained unslackened and unclouded. "What a

situation am I placed in!" he writes, when he finds Hamilton's

despatches returned. "As yet I can learn nothing of the enemy. You

will, I am sure, and so will our country, easily conceive what has

passed in my anxious mind; but I have this comfort, that I have no

fault to accuse myself of. This bears me up, and this only." "Every

moment I have to regret the frigates having left me," he tells St.

Vincent. "Your lordship deprived yourself of frigates to make mine

certainly the first squadron in the world, and I feel that I have zeal

and activity to do credit to your appointment, and yet to be

unsuccessful hurts me most sensibly. But if they are above water, I

will find them out, and if possible bring them to battle. You have

done your part in giving me so fine a fleet, and I hope to do mine in

making use of them."

In five days the squadron had filled with water and again sailed.

Satisfied that the enemy were somewhere in the Levant, Nelson now

intended a deliberate search for them--or rather for their fleet, the

destruction of which was the crucial object of all his movements. "It

has been said," he wrote to Hamilton, "that to leeward of the two

frigates I saw off Cape Passaro was a line-of-battle ship, with the

riches of Malta on board, but it was the destruction of the enemy, not

riches for myself, that I was seeking. These would have fallen to me

if I had had frigates, but except the ship-of-the-line, I regard not

all the riches in this world." A plaintive remonstrance against his

second departure was penned by the Neapolitan prime minister, which

depicts so plainly the commonplace view of a military situation,--the

apprehensions of one to whom immediate security is the great object in

war,--that it justifies quotation, and comparison with the clear

intuitions, and firmly grasped principle, which placed Nelson always,

in desire, alongside the enemy's fleet, and twice carried him, at

every risk, to the end of the Mediterranean to seek it. "We are now in

danger of a war, directly on Admiral Nelson's account; you see fairly

our position; will Admiral Nelson run to the Levant again _without

knowing for certain_ the position of the French, and leave the Two

Sicilies exposed in these moments? Buonaparte has absconded himself,

but in any port he has taken securitys not to be forced. God knows

where he is, and whether we shall not see him again in a few days, if

we do not hear of what a course he has taken. I present all this to

your consideration." To this letter, which oddly enough was written on

the very day the Battle of the Nile was fought, Nelson might well have

replied then, as he did in terms a year afterwards, "The best defence

for His Sicilian Majesty's dominions is to place myself alongside the

French fleet."

The fleet left Syracuse on the 25th of July, just one week before the

discovery of the enemy in Aboukir Bay put an end to Nelson's long

suspense. The course was first shaped for the southern capes of the

Morea, and on the 28th Troubridge was sent into the Gulf of Koron for

information. He returned within three hours, with the news that the

French had been seen four weeks before from the coast of Candia, and

were then steering southeast. This intelligence was corroborated by a

vessel spoken the same day. Southeast, being nearly dead before the

prevailing wind, was an almost certain clew to the destination of an

unwieldy body which could never regain ground lost to leeward; so,

although Nelson now learned that some of his missing frigates had also

been seen recently off Candia, he would waste no time looking for

them. It may be mentioned that these frigates had appeared off the

anchorage of the French fleet, and had been recognized by it as

enemies; but, so far from taking warning from the incident, the French

admiral was only confirmed by it in a blind belief that the British

feared to attack. Immediately after Troubridge's return, the fleet

bore up under all sail, and at 2.45 in the afternoon of the 1st of

August, 1798, the masthead lookout of the "Zealous" discovered the

long-sought-for enemy, lying in Aboukir Bay, on the coast of Egypt,

fifteen miles east of Alexandria.

Suspense was ended, but Nelson's weightiest responsibility had yet to

be met. The enemy was still so far distant that he could not be

reached till near nightfall, and it was possible that not only would

the battle be fought in the dark, but that some at least of the ships

would not have daylight to take their positions. The consequent

difficulty and risk was in any event great; but in this case the more

so, because the ground was unknown to every officer in the fleet. The

only chart of it in possession of the British was a rude sketch lately

taken out of a prize. There was no time now for calling captains

together, nor for forming plans of action. Then appeared conspicuously

the value of that preparedness of mind, as well as of purpose, which

at bottom was the greatest of Nelson's claims to credit. Much had been

received by him from Nature,--gifts which, if she bestows them not,

man struggles in vain to acquire by his own efforts; but the care

which he took in fitting himself to use those gifts to their utmost

capacity is his own glory. The author of the first full narrative of

these eventful weeks, Captain Berry, than whom no man had larger

occasion to observe Nelson's moods, used his capitals well when he

wrote, "The admiral viewed the obstacles with the eye of a seaman

DETERMINED ON ATTACK." It was not for him, face to face with

opportunity, to hesitate and debate whether he would be justified in

using it at once. But this preparation of purpose might have led only

to a great disaster, had it not received guidance from a richly stored

intellect, which had pondered probable conditions so exhaustively that

proper direction could be at once imparted and at once understood. The

French admiral, indeed, by his mistaken dispositions had delivered

himself into the hands of his enemy; but that might not have availed

had that enemy hesitated and given time, or had he not instantly

comprehended the possibilities of the situation with a trained glance

which had contemplated them long before. "By attacking the enemy's van

and centre, the wind blowing directly along their line, I was enabled

to throw what force I pleased on a few ships. This plan my friends

readily conceived by the signals."[63]

It was, therefore, no fortuitous coincidence that the battle was

fought on a plan preconcerted in general outline, though necessarily

subject to particular variations in detail. Not only had many

situations been discussed, as Berry tells us, but new signals had been

inserted in the signal-book to enable the admiral's intentions to be

quickly understood. To provide for the case of the enemy being met at

sea, the force had been organized into three squadrons,--a subdivision

of command which, while surrendering nothing of the admiral's

initiative, much facilitated the application of his plans, by

committing the execution of major details to the two senior captains,

Saumarez and Troubridge, each wielding a group of four ships. Among

the provisions for specific contingencies was one that evidently

sprang from the report that the enemy's fleet numbered sixteen or

seventeen of the line,--an impression which arose from there being in

it four Venetian ships so rated, which were not, however, fit for a

place in the line. In that case Nelson proposed to attack, ship for

ship, the rear thirteen of the enemy. That he preferred, when

possible, to throw two ships on one is evident enough--the approaching

battle proves it; but when confronted with a force stronger,

numerically, than his own, and under way, he provides what was

certainly the better alternative. He engages at once the attention of

as many ships as possible, confident that he brings against each a

force superior to it, owing to the general greater efficiency of

British ships over French of that date, and especially of those in his

own squadron, called by St. Vincent the _élite_ of the Navy.

The position of the French fleet, and the arrangements made by its

commander, Admiral Brueys, must now be given, for they constitute the

particular situation against which Nelson's general plan of attack was

to be directed. Considering it impracticable for the ships-of-the-line

to enter the port of Alexandria, Brueys had taken the fleet on the 8th

of July to their present anchorage. Aboukir Bay begins at a promontory

of the same name, and, after curving boldly south, extends eastward

eighteen miles, terminating at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. From the

shore the depth increases very gradually, so that water enough for

ships-of-the-line was not found till three miles from the coast. Two

miles northeast of the promontory of Aboukir is Aboukir Island, since

called Nelson's, linked with the point by a chain of rocks. Outside

the island, similar rocks, with shoals, prolong this foul ground under

water to seaward, constituting a reef dangerous to a stranger

approaching the bay. This barrier, however, broke the waves from the

northwest, and so made the western part of the bay a fairly convenient

summer roadstead. The French fleet was anchored there, under the

shelter of the island and rocks, in an order such that "the wind blew

nearly along the line." Its situation offered no local protection

against an enemy's approach, except that due to ignorance of the

ground.

It was therefore Brueys's business to meet this defect of protection

by adequate dispositions; and this he failed to do. Numerically his

force was the same as Nelson's; but, while the latter had only

seventy-fours, there were in the French fleet one ship of one hundred

and twenty guns, and three eighties. In a military sense, every line

divides naturally into three parts,--the centre, and the two ends, or

flanks; and it is essential that these should so far support one

another that an enemy cannot attack any two in superior force, while

the third is unable to assist. Shallow water, such as was found in

Aboukir Bay, if properly utilized, will prevent a flank being turned,

so that an enemy can get on both sides of the ships there, or

otherwise concentrate upon them, as by enfilading; and if, in

addition, the ships are anchored close to each other, it becomes

impossible for two of the attacking force to direct their fire upon

one of the defence, without being exposed to reprisals from those next

astern and ahead. These evident precautions received no illustration

in the arrangements of Admiral Brueys. The general direction of his

line was that of the wind, from northwest to southeast, with a very

slight bend, as shown in the diagram. The leading--northwestern--ship

was brought close to the shoal in thirty feet of water, but not so

close as to prevent the British passing round her, turning that flank;

and there were between the successive ships intervals of five hundred

feet, through any one of which an enemy could readily pass. Brueys had

very properly accumulated his most powerful vessels at the centre. The

flagship "Orient," of one hundred and twenty guns, was seventh in the

order; next ahead and astern of her were, respectively, the "Franklin"

and the "Tonnant," each of eighty. By a singular misconception,

however, he had thought that any attack would fall upon the rear--the

lee flank; and to this utter misapprehension of the exposed points it

was owing that he there placed his next heaviest ships. Nelson's

fore-determined onslaught upon the van accordingly fell on the weakest

of the French vessels.

Such was the French order of battle. The proceedings of the British

fleet, under its leader, show an instructive combination of rapidity

and caution, of quick comprehension of the situation, with an absence

of all precipitation; no haste incompatible with perfect carefulness,

no time lost, either by hesitation or by preparations postponed. When

the enemy were first discovered, two ships, the "Alexander" and

"Swiftsure," were a dozen miles to leeward, having been sent ahead on

frigates' duty to reconnoitre Alexandria. This circumstance prevented

their joining till after the battle began and night had fallen. At the

same moment the "Culloden" was seven miles to windward. She was

signalled to drop the prize she was towing, and to join the fleet. To

this separation was due that she went aground. The remaining ten

ships, which had been steering about east, hauled sharp on the wind to

enable them to weather with ample allowance the shoal off Aboukir

Island. It was blowing a whole-sail breeze, too fresh for the lighter

canvas; the royals were furled as soon as close-hauled. As the French

situation and dispositions developed to the view, signals were made to

prepare for battle, to get ready to anchor by the stern, and that it

was the admiral's intention to attack the van and centre of the

enemy. The captains had long been forewarned of each of these

possibilities, and nothing more was needed to convey to them his

general plan, which was intrusted to them individually to carry out as

they successively came into action.

At about half-past five signal was given to form line of battle. This,

for the ships of the day, was a single column, in which they were

ranged ahead and astern of each other, leaving the broadside clear. As

they came abreast the shoal, Nelson hailed Captain Hood, of the

"Zealous," and asked if he thought they were yet far enough to the

eastward to clear it, if they then headed for the enemy. Hood replied

that he did not know the ground, but was in eleven fathoms, and would,

if the admiral allowed, bear up and sound with the lead, and would not

bring the fleet into danger. This was done, Hood leading all the fleet

except the "Goliath," Captain Foley, which kept ahead, but outside, of

the "Zealous." No close shaving was done, however, at this critical

turn; and it is that steady deliberation, combined with such parsimony

of time in other moments, which is most impressive in Nelson. So few

realize that five minutes are at once the most important and the least

important of considerations. Thus the British passed so much beyond

the island and the shoal, before keeping away, that, as the long

column swept round to head for the French van, the ships turned their

port broadsides to the enemy, and were steering southwesterly when

they finally ran down. "The English admiral," wrote the French second

in command, "without doubt had experienced pilots on board; he hauled

well round all dangers."

The "Goliath" still leading the fleet, followed closely by the

"Zealous," the flagship was dropped to sixth in the order,--Nelson

thus placing himself so that he could see what the first five ships

accomplished, while retaining in his own hands the power to impart a

new direction to the remaining five of those then with him, should he

think it necessary. Captain Foley had formed the idea that the French

would be less ready to fight on the inshore side, and had expressed

his intention to get inside them, if practicable. Sounding as he went,

he passed round the bows of the leading vessel, the "Guerrier," on the

inner bow of which he intended to place himself; but the anchor hung,

and the "Goliath" brought up on the inner quarter of the "Conquérant,"

the second ship. The "Zealous," following, anchored where Foley had

purposed, on the bow of the "Guerrier;" and the next three ships, the

"Orion," "Theseus," and "Audacious," also placed themselves on the

inner side of the French line.

The two leading French vessels were at once crushed. All the masts of

the "Guerrier," although no sail was on them, went overboard within

ten minutes after she was first attacked, while the "Conquérant" was

receiving the united broadsides of the "Goliath" and the

"Audacious,"--the latter raking. Nelson therefore placed the

"Vanguard" on the outer side, and within pistol-shot, of the third

French ship, the "Spartiate," which was already engaged on the other

side by the "Theseus," but at much longer range. His example was of

course followed by those succeeding him--the seventh and eighth of the

British engaging the fourth and fifth of the French, which were

already receiving part of the fire of the "Orion" and "Theseus" on the

inner side--the latter having ceased to play upon the "Spartiate" for

fear of hitting the "Vanguard." Thus five French ships were within

half an hour in desperate conflict with eight British, while their

consorts to leeward looked helplessly on.

The ninth and tenth of Nelson's fleet were less fortunate, owing to

the envelope of smoke and the growing darkness, which now obscured the

scene. The "Bellerophon," missing the sixth French vessel, the

"Franklin," brought up abreast the "Orient," whose force was double

her own, and which had no other antagonist. The "Majestic," groping

her way, ran into the ninth French, the "Heureux," where for some

moments she hung in a position of disadvantage and had her captain

killed. Then swinging clear, she anchored on the bow of the next

astern, the "Mercure," and there continued a deadly and solitary

action. Owing to the circumstances mentioned, the loss of each of

these ships was greater, by fifty per cent, than that of any other of

the British fleet. The movements so far described, and the resultant

fighting, may be styled the first stage of the battle. Concerning it

may be remarked the unswerving steadiness, rapidity, and yet sound

judgment, with which all the movements were executed; and further,

that not only was the first direction of the attack that prescribed by

Nelson's signal, but that the second, initiated by his own ship, was

also imparted by him. The incident of passing round the "Guerrier,"

and inside of the line, is a detail only, although one which cannot be

too highly praised. "The van ship of the enemy being in five fathom,"

wrote Captain Hood, "I expected the Goliath and Zealous to stick fast

on the shoal every moment, and did not imagine we should attempt to

pass within her." It is difficult to exaggerate the coolness,

intrepidity, and seamanlike care of Captain Foley, to whom is to be

attributed, perhaps, the whole conception, and certainly the entire

merit of the execution; but they no more detract from Nelson's honors

than does the distinguished conduct of the other captains.

The battle had begun a little after half-past six, the "Guerrier's"

masts falling at sundown, which was quarter before seven. It continued

under the conditions already given until past eight o'clock--none of

the ships engaged shifting her position for some time after that hour.

It was, apparently, just before the second act of the drama opened

with the arrival of the remaining ships--the "Alexander," "Swiftsure,"

and "Leander"--that Nelson was severely wounded; but the precise

moment has not been recorded. He was struck upon the upper part of the

forehead by a flying piece of iron, the skin, which was cut at right

angles, hanging down over his face, covering the one good eye, and,

with the profuse flow of blood, blinding him completely. He exclaimed,

"I am killed! Remember me to my wife!" and was falling, but Captain

Berry, who stood near, caught him in his arms. When carried below to

the cockpit, the surgeon went immediately to him, but he refused to be

attended before his turn arrived, in due succession to the injured

lying around him.

The pain was intense, and Nelson felt convinced that his hurt was

mortal; nor could he for some time accept the surgeon's assurances to

the contrary. Thus looking for his end, he renewed his farewell

messages to Lady Nelson, and directed also that Captain Louis of the

"Minotaur," which lay immediately ahead of the "Vanguard," should be

hailed to come on board, that before dying he might express to him his

sense of the admirable support given by her to the flagship. "Your

support," said he, "has prevented me from being obliged to haul out of

the line."[64] From the remark it may be inferred that the French

"Aquilon," their fourth ship, which became the "Minotaur's"

antagonist, had for a measurable time been able to combine her

batteries with those of the "Spartiate" upon the "Vanguard," and to

this was probably due that the loss of the latter was next in severity

to that of the "Majestic" and of the "Bellerophon." The inference is

further supported by the fact that the worst slaughter in the

"Vanguard" was at the forward guns, those nearest the "Aquilon."

After his wound was bound up, Nelson was requested by the surgeon to

lie quiet; but his preoccupation with the events of the evening was

too great, and his responsibility too immediate, to find relief in

inactivity,--the physician's panacea. He remained below for a while,

probably too much jarred for physical exertion; but his restlessness

sought vent by beginning a despatch to the Admiralty. The secretary

being too agitated to write, Nelson tried to do so himself, and it was

characteristic that the few lines he was then able to trace, blinded,

suffering, and confused, expressed that dependence upon the Almighty,

habitual with him, which illustrated a temperament of so much native

energy and self-reliance, and is more common, probably, among great

warriors than in any other class of men of action. This first outburst

of emotion, excited in him by the tremendous event wrought by his

hands, was identical in spirit, and not improbably was clothed in the

same words, as those with which began the despatch actually sent:

"Almighty God has blessed His Majesty's arms."

While Nelson lay thus momentarily disabled, important events were

transpiring, over which, however, he could have exerted no control. It

has been mentioned that the "Culloden" was seven miles to the

northward and westward of the fleet, when the French were first

discovered. Doing her best, it was impossible to reach the main body

before it stood down into action, and the day had closed when the ship

neared the shoal. Keeping the lead going, and proceeding with caution,

though not with the extreme care which led Hood and Nelson to make so

wide a sweep, Troubridge had the mishap to strike on the tail of the

shoal, and there the ship stuck fast, pounding heavily until the next

morning. The fifty-gun ship "Leander" went to her assistance, as did

the brig "Mutine," but all efforts to float her proved vain. Meanwhile

the "Alexander" and "Swiftsure" were coming up from the southwest, the

wind being so scant that they could barely pass to windward of the

reef, along whose northwestern edge they were standing. The

"Alexander," in fact, was warned by the lead that she was running into

danger, and had to tack. As they approached, Troubridge, by lantern

and signal, warned them off the spot of his disaster, thus

contributing to save these ships, and, by removing doubt, accelerating

their entrance into action. As they rounded the stranded "Culloden,"

the "Leander" was also dismissed from a hopeless task, and followed

them to the scene of battle.

The delay of the two seventy-fours, though purely fortuitous, worked

in furtherance of Nelson's plan, and resulted, practically, in

constituting them a reserve, which was brought into play at a most

auspicious moment. The "Bellerophon," crushed by the preponderating

weight of the "Orient's" battery, had just cut her cable and worn out

of action, with the loss of forty-nine killed and one hundred and

forty-eight wounded, out of a total of five hundred and ninety men.

Her foremast alone was then standing, and it fell immediately after.

The firing, which had been animated from the French left towards the

centre, now slackened around the latter, at the point where the

"Orient" and her next ahead, the "Franklin," were lying. For this

spot, therefore, the captains of the two fresh British ships steered.

The "Swiftsure," Captain Hallowell, anchored outside the enemy's line,

abreast the interval separating the "Orient" and the "Franklin,"

between which he divided his fire. The "Alexander," Captain Ball,

passed through the line, astern of the "Orient," and anchored close on

her inner quarter. Just at this time a shot cut the cable of the

"Peuple Souverain," next ahead of the "Franklin," and she drifted out

of her place to abreast the latter ship, ahead of which a wide gap of

a thousand feet was thus left. Into this the "Leander" glided, fixing

herself with great skill to rake at once the "Franklin" and the

"Orient."

These two French ships had already been much battered, and the

"Franklin" was still receiving part of the fire of the "Orion," Sir

James Saumarez, on her inner bow, as well as that of the "Defence,"

hitherto engaged by the "Peuple Souverain." This accumulation upon

them of three fresh ships would doubtless have proved irresistible,

even if a yet more dire calamity had not supervened. The new-comers

took their positions soon after eight, and a little before nine a fire

was observed on the poop of the "Orient." The British captains, seeing

the flames fighting on their behalf, redoubled their efforts,

directing their aim especially upon the scene of the conflagration,

and thereby thwarting all attempt to extinguish it. The blaze spread

rapidly, upward through the tarred rigging and the masts, downward to

the lower decks, where her heroic crew, still ignorant of the

approaching doom, labored incessantly at their guns. As the sublime

sight forced itself upon the eyes of all about, friends and enemies

alike busied themselves with precautions for their own safety in the

coming catastrophe. The ships to windward held on; those to leeward

for the most part veered or slipped their cables, the "Alexander"

fiercely refusing to do so till assured that the "Orient's"

destruction was inevitable. Captain Berry went below to report to the

admiral this appalling climax to the night's work, and to his own

long-sustained efforts in chase and battle. Nelson demanded to be led

on deck, where he gave orders that the only boat still in condition

for use should be sent with the "Vanguard's" first lieutenant, to help

save the unhappy crew. He then remained watching the progress of the

fire. At quarter before ten the "Orient" blew up. At this time the

moon rose, and from her tranquil path looked down, through the clear

Egyptian air, upon the scene of devastation.

Nelson was now persuaded to go to bed, but he neither got nor sought

repose of mind. Throughout the night, and in the early morning,

messages went from him to various ships to take this or that step, to

garner in the fruits of the victory yet unculled. The fleet responded

somewhat spasmodically, if not inadequately, to these calls. Men in

truth were worn out with labor and excitement. "My people were so

extremely jaded," wrote Captain Miller of the "Theseus," who obeyed a

summons to move, "that as soon as they had hove our sheet anchor up

they dropped under the capstan bars, and were asleep in a moment in

every sort of posture, having been then working at their fullest

exertion, or fighting, for near twelve hours." Nelson, in common with

other great leaders, could not be satisfied with any but the utmost

results. To quote again his words of years gone by: "Had ten ships

been taken and the eleventh escaped, we being able to get at her, I

should never consider it well done." His idea, Captain Berry tells us,

was first to secure the victory, and then to make the most of it, as

circumstances might permit. The expression is so luminous that it can

scarcely be doubted that the words are substantially those of the

admiral himself.[65] First, the great combination, which necessarily

for the moment neglects a part of the enemy in order to disconcert and

overwhelm the rest; afterwards, the unremitting pursuit, which

completes the triumph.

It was therefore perfectly characteristic of Nelson's habit of

thought, and not merely an egotistic expression of baseless discontent

with others, that he avowed his dissatisfaction with the results of

the night's work, stupendous and wholly unparalleled as they were. But

his own condition, prostrated and with disabled head, was doubly

typical of the state of his fleet after the "Orient" blew up. Not only

were men overcome with fatigue,--from weariness as great men have been

aroused by the inspiring call of a trusted chief,--but the guiding

head of the body was dazed and incapacitated; that was gone which

alone could sustain energy and give unity to movement. Although Nelson

indulged in no metaphorical allusions, he had this figure of the head

clearly enough in his mind, when he wrote four weeks later to Lord

Minto: "I regret that one escaped, and I think, if it had pleased God

that I had not been wounded, not a boat would have escaped to have

told the tale; but do not believe that any individual in the fleet is

to blame. In my conscience, I believe greater exertions could not have

been, and I only mean to say, that if my experience could in person

have _directed_[66] those exertions of individuals, there was every

appearance that Almighty God would have continued to bless my

endeavours." This opinion he reiterated to Lord Howe, even more

positively, after four months' longer reflection, in a letter dated

January 8, 1799; and, whether the result would or would not have

equalled his belief, the traces are clear that what was wanted, during

the remainder of that eventful night, was just that concord of action

which the head imparts to the members. Messages went from ship to

ship, captains consulted together and proposed to move together, and

did move separately; there was no lack of good-will, nor, as Nelson

says, of exertion; but men were not quite sure of what the other man

would do, and felt no authority to command him; and there was

hesitation over risks, and cautious delays about soundings and shaky

spars, which, the author is persuaded, would not have deterred Nelson

in such conditions, where victory was decisive, though not yet

complete. Illustrations would perhaps be invidious, as seeming to

imply a blame upon individuals which Nelson expressly disavowed; blame

that officers of exceptional professional capacity, concerning whom

the measured professional opinion of Lord Howe affirmed that the

Battle of the Nile "was unparalleled in this respect, that _every

captain_ distinguished himself," fell short of the peculiar excellence

attained by Nelson only among the men of his day. Moreover, this work

does not aim at a discussion of battles, except so far as they touch

Nelson personally. It may, however, be permissible to remark, that the

incident here under discussion suggests a doubt about the opinion, too

easily current, that an admiral's powers of control cease when the

battle joins. Under the circumstances, it is probable that Nelson,

being so far incapacitated as he thought himself, should have

transferred the direction of affairs, formally, to the next senior

officer, with general orders to secure the best results attainable.

The following morning it was found that the leading six ships of the

French had already struck their colors. The "Orient" having blown up,

there were six survivors. Of these, one, the "Tonnant," next astern of

the "Orient," though dismasted, was still afloat, a mile behind her

former position, having dropped there to avoid the explosion. The

"Heureux" and "Mercure," which had slipped their cables for the same

reason, were ashore and helpless. The spars of the three rear ships,

the "Guillaume Tell," "Généreux," and "Timoléon," were still standing,

and they had received little injury. At about noon these vessels,

commanded by Rear Admiral Villeneuve, got under way to go to sea; but

the "Timoléon" cast with her head inshore, and, after an ineffectual

attempt to wear, ran aground, bows on, her foremast going over the

side as she struck. The crew escaped to the beach, and she was then

set on fire by her captain, her colors flying as she burned. The two

other ships escaped, with two frigates which accompanied them. Only

one British ship, the "Zealous," was in condition to follow, and she

did so; but Nelson, seeing that she could not be supported, recalled

her from the unequal contest.

It is upon the chance that these sole survivors of the great

catastrophe might have been secured, by action during the night, that

the validity of Nelson's regrets turns. Concerning this, it is

impossible to affirm positively one way or the other; therefore his

regrets were well grounded. It is not certainties, but chances, that

determine the propriety of military action. Had Villeneuve, conscious

that he had done nothing as yet, and not fully aware how the fight had

gone, hesitated about running away, and had several British ships

dropped to leeward together, which was all they had to do, and what

the dismasted French had done, it was quite within the bound of

possibilities that the "Généreux" and the "Guillaume Tell" would have

been crippled at their anchors. "If" and "but," it may be objected.

Quite so; it is on if and but, not on yea and nay, that military

criticism justly dwells. A flash of lightning and a crash of thunder

may be seen and heard; it is the still small voice that leads the hero

to success. As regards Villeneuve, indecision was his distinguishing

trait; and Bonaparte wrote that if any error could be imputed to him,

it was that he had not got under way as soon as the "Orient" blew up,

for by that time the battle was lost beyond redemption.

The extent of the victory was decided by this retreat, and Nelson,

before devoting himself to the new duties entailed by his successes,

paused an instant that he might first acknowledge his debt of

gratitude to God and man. A memorandum was issued at once to the

captains of the Squadron:

Vanguard off the mouth of the Nile, 2d August, 1798.

Almighty God having blessed His Majesty's arms with victory, the

Admiral intends returning Public Thanksgiving for the same at

two o'clock this day; and he recommends every ship doing the

same as soon as convenient.

HORATIO NELSON.

To those under his command he at the same time issued a general

order, congratulating, by explicit mention of each class, the

captains, officers, seamen, and marines, upon the event of the

conflict. "The Admiral desires they will accept his most sincere and

cordial thanks for their very gallant behaviour in this glorious

battle." It was this habit of associating to himself, in full

recognition and grateful remembrance, those who followed and fought

with him, that enthroned Nelson in the affections of his men; nor will

it escape observation that the warmth, though so genuine, breathes

through words whose quietness might be thought studied, were they not

so transparently spontaneous. There is in them no appeal to egotism,

to the gratified passion for glory, although to that he was far from

insensible; it is the simple speech of man to man, between those who

have stood by one another in the hour of danger, and done their

duty--the acknowledgment after the event, which is the complement of

the famous signal before Trafalgar.

The order closed with further words of commendation, which will not

have the immortal response of the human heart to the other phrases;

but which, uttered at such a moment, conveyed a salutary warning,

justified as much by recent unhappy events in the British navy, as by

the well-known disorganization and anarchy that had disgraced that of

France. "It must strike forcibly every British seaman, how superior

their conduct is, _when in discipline and good order_, to the riotous

behaviour of lawless Frenchmen."[67] Captain Berry states that the

assembling of the "Vanguard's" ship's company for the thanksgiving

service strongly impressed the prisoners on board,--not from the

religious point of view, which was alien from the then prevalent

French temper,--but as evidence of an order and discipline which could

render such a proceeding acceptable, after a victory so great, and at

a moment of such seeming confusion. No small amount of

self-possession, indeed, was needed thus to direct the attention of

six hundred men, in the confined space of a ship, whose shattered

sides and blood-stained decks bore witness to the hundred dead and

wounded snatched from their number within the few hours before; yet,

on the other hand, nothing could have been better calculated to

compose the thoughts, or to facilitate the transition from the

excitement of battle to the resumption of daily life.

If, by the escape of two ships-of-the-line, the British triumph lacked

something in technical completeness, the disaster to the French was no

less absolute. Victory, said Nelson truly, is not the name for such a

scene as I have witnessed. There remained now to gather up the spoils

of the field, and to realize the consequences of the battle, great and

small, near and remote. The first was speedily done; battered as they

were, "only two masts standing out of nine sail-of-the-line," within a

fortnight six of the nine prizes were ready to start for Gibraltar.

Little by little, yet with the rapidity of his now highly trained

intuitions, Nelson saw the greatness of what he had effected, and with

his full native energy struggled on, amid mental confusion and bodily

suffering, and in the heat of an Egyptian August, to secure all the

fruits of success. With splitting head and constantly sick, a

significant indication of the rattling shock his brain had received,

he was wonderfully helped, so far as the direction of his efforts was

concerned, by the previous familiarity of his mind with the various

elements of the problem. First of all, the home government must be

informed of an event that would so profoundly affect the future.

Berry's orders, as bearer of despatches to St. Vincent off Cadiz, were

issued on the 2d of August; but there were no frigates, and the

"Leander," appointed to carry him, could not sail till the 6th. For

the same reason it was not until the 14th that the "Mutine" could be

sent off with duplicates, to go direct to the Admiralty by way of

Naples,--a wise precaution in all events, but doubly justified in this

case; for the brig reached port, whereas the fifty-gun ship was

captured by the "Généreux." The "Mutine's" account, though hastened

forward without delay, reached London only on the 2d of October, two

months after the action.

The news was received at the first with an applause and a popular

commotion commensurate to its greatness, and promised for the moment

to overflow even the barriers of routine in one of the most

conservative of nations. "Mr. Pitt told me the day after Captain Capel

arrived," wrote his old admiral, Hood, to Nelson, "that you would

certainly be a Viscount, which I made known to Lady Nelson. But it was

objected to in a certain quarter, because your Lordship was not a

commander-in-chief. In my humble opinion a more flimsy reason never

was given." Official circles regained, or rather perhaps again lost,

their senses, and the victory, unquestionably the most nearly complete

and the most decisive ever gained by a British fleet, was rewarded, in

the person of the commanding officer, with honors less than those

bestowed for St. Vincent and Camperdown. Nelson was advanced to the

lowest rank of the peerage, as Baron Nelson of the Nile. "In

congratulating your Lordship on this high distinction," wrote the

First Lord, "I have particular pleasure in remarking, that it is the

highest honour that has ever been conferred on an officer of your

standing,[68] in the Service, and who was not a commander-in-chief;

and the addition [of the Nile] to the Title is meant more especially

to mark the occasion on which it was granted, which, however, without

any such precaution, is certainly of a nature never to be forgotten."

His Lordship's sense of humor must a little have failed him, when he

penned the platitude of the last few words.

To the sharp criticism passed in the House of Commons on the

smallness of the recognition, the Prime Minister replied that Nelson's

glory did not depend upon the rank to which he might be raised in the

peerage; a truism too palpable and inapplicable for serious utterance,

the question before the House being, not the measure of Nelson's

glory, but that of the national acknowledgment. As Hood justly said,

"All remunerations should be proportionate to the service done to the

public;" and if that cannot always be attained absolutely, without

exhausting the powers of the State,[69] there should at least be some

proportion between the rewards themselves, extended to individuals,

and the particular services. But even were the defence of the

Ministers technically perfect, it would have been pleasanter to see

them a little blinded by such an achievement. Once in a way, under

some provocations, it is refreshing to see men able even to make fools

of themselves.

Nelson made to the First Lord's letter a reply that was dignified and

yet measured, to a degree unusual to him, contrasting singularly with

his vehement reclamations for others after Copenhagen. Without

semblance of complaint, he allowed plainly to appear between the lines

his own sense that the reward was not proportionate to the service

done. "I have received your Lordship's letter communicating to me the

Title his Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer upon me--an

Honour, your Lordship is pleased to say, the highest that has ever

been conferred on an officer of my standing who was not a

Commander-in-Chief. I receive as I ought what the goodness of our

Sovereign, and not my deserts, is pleased to bestow; but great and

unexampled as this honour may be to one of my standing, yet I own I

feel a higher one in the unbounded confidence of the King, your

Lordship, and the whole World, in my exertions. Even at the bitter

moment of my return to Syracuse, your Lordship is not insensible of

the great difficulties I had to encounter in not being a

Commander-in-Chief. The only happy moment I felt was in the view of

the French; then I knew that all my sufferings would soon be at an

end." To Berry he wrote: "As to both our Honours, it is a proof how

much a battle fought near England is prized to one fought at a great

distance."

Whatever was defective in the formal recognition of his own government

was abundantly supplied by the tributes which flowed from other

quarters, so various, that his own phrase, "the whole world," is

scarcely an exaggeration to apply to them. The Czar, the Sultan, the

Kings of Sardinia and of the Two Sicilies, sent messages of

congratulation and rich presents; the Czar accompanying his with an

autograph letter. The Houses of Parliament voted their thanks and a

pension of £2,000 a year. The East India Company acknowledged the

security gained for their Indian possessions by a gift of £10,000,

£2,000 of which he, with his wonted generosity, divided at once among

his father and family, most of whom were not in prosperous

circumstances. Other corporations took appropriate notice of the great

event; instances so far apart as the cities of London and Palermo, and

the Island of Zante, showing how wide-spread was the sense of relief.

Not least gratifying to him, with his sensitive appreciation of

friendship and susceptibility to flattery, must have been the numerous

letters of congratulation he received from friends in and out of the

service. The three great admirals,--Lords Howe, Hood, and St.

Vincent,--the leaders of the Navy in rank and distinguished service,

wrote to him in the strongest terms of admiration. The two last styled

the battle the greatest achievement that History could produce; while

Howe's language, if more measured, was so only because, like himself,

it was more precise in characterizing the special merits of the

action, and was therefore acknowledged by Nelson with particular

expressions of pleasure.

Besides the honors bestowed upon the commander of the squadron, and

the comprehensive vote of thanks usual on such occasions, a gold medal

commemorative of the battle was given to the admiral and to each of

the captains present. The First Lord also wrote that the

first-lieutenants of the ships engaged would be promoted at once. The

word "engaged" caught Nelson's attention, as apparently intended to

exclude the lieutenant of the "Culloden," Troubridge's unlucky ship.

"For Heaven's sake, for my sake," he wrote to St. Vincent, "if this is

so, get it altered. Our dear friend Troubridge has suffered enough.

His sufferings were in every respect more than any of us. He deserves

every reward which a grateful Country can bestow on the most

meritorious sea-officer of his standing in the service. I have felt

his worth every hour of my command." "I well know, he is my superior,"

he said on another occasion; "and I so often want his advice and

assistance. I have experienced the ability and activity of his mind

and body: it was Troubridge that equipped the squadron so soon at

Syracuse--it was he that exerted himself for me after the action--it

was Troubridge who saved the "Culloden," when none that I know in the

service would have attempted it--it was Troubridge whom I left as

myself at Naples to watch movements--he is, as a friend and an

officer, a _nonpareil_!" His entreaties prevailed so far that the

officer in question received his promotion, not with the others, but

immediately after them; a distinction which Troubridge bewailed

bitterly, as a reflection upon himself and his ship.

On the 9th of August, Nelson sent a lieutenant to Alexandretta, on the

northern coast of Syria, to make his way overland, by way of Aleppo,

to India, with despatches to the Governor of Bombay. Resuming briefly

the events of the past months, and the numbers and character of the

French army in Egypt, he expresses the hope that special care will be

exercised against the departure of ships from India, to convey this

huge force thither by the Red Sea. On the side of the Mediterranean,

their fate is settled by the recent victory. They can receive nothing

from France; they cannot advance freely into Syria, as water transport

is essential for much of their equipment; even in Egypt itself they

are hampered by the difficulties of communication--on land by the

guerilla hostility of the natives, and now on the water through his

own presence and control. The Nile, through its Rosetta mouth, had

been heretofore the easiest communication between Cairo and

Alexandria. The garrison of the latter depended largely for daily

bread upon this route, now closed by the fleet in Aboukir Bay. By

land, nothing short of a regiment could pass over ground where, even

before the battle, the French watering-parties from the ships had to

be protected by heavy armed bodies. He intended, therefore, to remain

where he was as long as possible. "If my letter is not so correct as

might be expected," he concludes, "I trust for your excuse, when I

tell you that my brain is so shook with the wounds in my head, that I

am sensible I am not always so clear as could be wished; but whilst a

ray of reason remains, my heart and my head shall ever be exerted for

the benefit of our King and Country."

It may be added here, that the scar left by this wound seems to have

been the cause of Nelson's hair being trained down upon his forehead,

during the later years of his life. Prior to that it was brushed well

off and up, as may be seen in the portrait by Abbott, painted during

his stay in England, while recovering from the loss of his arm. After

his death, a young officer of the "Victory," who had cut off some

locks for those who wished such a remembrance of their friend, speaks

of "the hair that used to hang over his forehead, near the wound that

he received at the Battle of the Nile."

The perception of his control over the communications from Rosetta to

Alexandria dawned rather late upon Nelson, for on the 5th of August he

had announced his purpose of starting down the Mediterranean on the

19th. This he postponed afterwards to the first part of September, and

again for as long as possible. While in this intention, most secret

and urgent orders came on the 15th from St. Vincent, to return to the

westward with his command, and to co-operate with an expedition

planned against Minorca. Six prizes, with seven of the British

ships-of-the-line, had started on the 14th for Gibraltar, under the

command of Sir James Saumarez. The three remaining prizes were burned,

and hasty temporary repairs, adequate only for a summer voyage, were

put upon the "Vanguard," "Culloden," and "Alexander," the three most

defective ships of his fleet. On the 19th he sailed with these three

for Naples, which he had from the first intended to visit, in order to

give them the complete overhauling they imperatively needed. On and

after the 13th of August several frigates had joined him. Three of

these, with three ships-of-the-line, were left with Captain Hood, to

conduct the blockade of Alexandria, and to suppress the enemy's

communications by water along the coasts of Egypt and Syria.

FOOTNOTES:

[60] The author is indebted to the present Lord De Saumarez for a copy of

the opinion of Sir James Saumarez, written on board the "Vanguard" at this

meeting:--

"The French fleet having left Malta six days ago, had their destination

been the Island of Sicily there is reason to presume we should have

obtained information of it yesterday off Syracuse, or the day before in

coming through the Pharo of Messina--under all circumstances I think it

most conducive to the good of His Majesty's service to make the best of our

way for Alexandria, as the only means of saving our possessions in India,

should the French armament be destined for that country.

"Vanguard, at sea, 22d June 1798. JAMES SAUMAREZ."

[61] Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson, vol. ii. p. 100.

[62] That is, counting from May 19, when Bonaparte left Toulon, to June 7,

when Troubridge's squadron joined, and pursuit began.

[63] Nelson to Lord Howe.

[64] G. Lathom Browne's Life of Nelson, p. 198.

[65] An interesting example of the illuminating effect of a sound maxim

upon different phases of a man's life and actions, and one illustrative of

the many-sidedness of this motto of Nelson's, occurs later in his career,

and not long before his death. When the frigates "Phoebe" and "Amazon" were

ordered to cruise before Toulon in October, 1804, "Lord Nelson gave

Captains Capel and Parker several injunctions, in case they should get an

opportunity of attacking two of the French frigates, which now got under

way more frequently. The principal one was, that they should not each

single out and attack an opponent, but 'that both should endeavour together

to take one frigate; if successful, chase the other; but if you do not take

the second, still you have won a victory, and your country will gain a

frigate.'" (Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains, p. 122.) When

summarized, this again is--Victory first; afterwards the results, as

circumstances may permit.

[66] Author's italics.

[67] Author's italics.

[68] "Rank" doubtless is meant by this singularly ill-chosen word.

[69] As General Sherman justly asked, "What reward adequate to the service,

could the United States have given Grant for the Vicksburg campaign?"